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TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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PREFACE

Two seemingly dissimilar but actually interrelated crises competed for American attention during 1965. That year the United States went to war in Vietnam. American planes bombed North Vietnam, and American troops entered direct combat against Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam. American Armed Forces personnel in Vietnam increased eightfold, from 23,300 on January 1 to 184,300 by December 31. American deaths soared from 147 in 1964 to 1,369 in 1965, and those wounded from 1,039 to 6,114. Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe, President Johnson dispatched 20,000 American troops to the Dominican Republic to evacuate American citizens and to prevent a Communist takeover of that nation.

So paramount was the escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam that the Dominican intervention seemed a minor diversion. Yet during that summer, as the Foreign Relations Committee held alternating hearings on Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, its members—and especially its chairman, J. William Fulbright—could not help but draw comparisons between the two. Senator Fulbright's conclusions would have fateful consequences for himself, the Johnson administration, and the fundamental relations between Congress and the Presidency over the conduct of foreign policy.

Clearly, the committee's support for the war in Vietnam depended upon its confidence in the accuracy of the information that it received from the administration, and its faith in the official spokesmen who testified before it. Only a year earlier, Senator Fulbright had advocated Senate approval of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, despite his deep reservations about the widening war in South Vietnam. "We do not want to embarrass the administration," he told Secretary Rusk in 1965, as he pressed the administration to inform the committee as to how far it contemplated going into this war. Secretary Rusk simply deflected the question by observing that it was "very hard to look into the future."

The Dominican intervention opened the first crack in the "credibility gap." The more that committee members heard about the chronology of events during the Dominican intervention, the more suspicious they became of both the public and private statements from the administration. Senators found it hard to believe President Johnson's declaration of mass executions and beheadings, and concluded that the President had acted upon less than accurate assessments of the situation. After encountering such skepticism at an executive session in May, Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann suggested that the committee would have no doubts about the correctness of American policy if they could see the administra-

tion's documentation. The committee took him at his word and offered to send its Latin American specialist, Pat Holt, to the Department of State to examine the cables transmitted between Washington and the American Embassy in Santo Domingo.

Working for several weeks out of Secretary Mann's office, Holt read through the documentation and concluded, as he later recalled, "that, sure enough, the way the situation had been presented by the Johnson administration did not really jive with the reports that the administration was getting from State and CIA." Holt's lengthy memo formed the basis for both the committee's hearings on the Dominican intervention, and for the chairman's speech, on September 15, 1965, criticizing the handling of the crisis and condemning unilateral interventionism. Despite Senator Fulbright's careful efforts to level blame primarily on the President's advisors, President Johnson took the criticism all too personally. The once friendly relations between the President and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee abruptly terminated.

Although the Dominican intervention stimulated lengthy hearings and heated exchanges between Senators and administration officials, Senator Fulbright recognized that the incident offered "nothing like the danger inherent in Vietnam." If the committee intended to confront the administration in open hearings, then it should choose something "important enough to warrant it." Fulbright counseled, and that would be Vietnam. Taking that cue, Senator Frank Church strongly advocated public hearings on Vietnam policy, and in due course the committee launched its now famous "educational" hearings on Vietnam in January 1966.

These debates between committee members, and the often difficult and frustrating exchanges that took place with Johnson administration witnesses remain vividly in my memory, for it was in 1965 that I first became a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Naturally, one reads one's own words recorded over two decades ago with some pause, but I find myself still in agreement with the positions that I took at that time. As early as that February, even before the "Americanization" of the Vietnam war, I questioned why we geared our heaviest retaliations to attacks on Americans. "Haven't there been many incidents of this sort where equally large numbers or larger numbers of South Vietnamese have been killed or wounded? Doesn't this indicate a sort of two-kind response? We respond heavily for American lives, and not for Vietnamese lives?" I asked Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. "I think that is a very searching question, Senator, and it is one that has concerned us," he replied. "I think we are going to have to get at this point that you have raised, because I think it is a very acute one." Nevertheless, the administration increasingly interpreted the conflict as an American rather than a Vietnamese war, and took on the mantle of chief combatant.

"Do you think we might be wrong?" I asked Secretary Bundy, questioning why so few Asian nations seemed to be supporting our efforts in Vietnam in any appreciable way. And at another point during the hearings I complained: "I still don't fully understand what our policy is in Vietnam. It seems a little like an Alice in Wonderland talking about a program unless we know what our objectives are. I don't mean to be a discordant fellow but it leaves me

unhappy. How can you have a program unless you know what your objective is?" Finally, I note my prediction that a stalemate was the best we could expect in Vietnam, despite the consistently optimistic assessments we received from the administration representatives.

There are other notable exchanges contained in these transcripts. One reads with a sense of irony Senator Fulbright's suggestion—in 1965—of a Presidential trip to Peking to achieve a breakthrough for world peace, and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's assertion that such a trip would only be interpreted as a sign of American weakness. Not in our wildest imaginations could any of us have predicted that just 7 years later such a Presidential trip to China would take place, and by none other than Cabot Lodge's one-time Presidential running mate, Richard Nixon.

One reads here the first assessments of the Soviet Union after the downfall of Nikita Khrushchev, of our troubled relations with Nasser's Egypt, of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and of the troubled finances of the United Nations. This volume also contains Adlai Stevenson's last testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as commentary by Edward Lansdale, Llewellyn Thompson, Maxwell Taylor, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and other key players in the events of that pivotal year.

The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents the editor's choice of material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than "off the record" references for which no transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes of those sessions, in chronological sequence. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the committee for 1965 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to scholars under the access rules of that agency. Some transcripts will require further declassification procedures.

In accordance with the general policy of this series, portions of the volume were submitted to the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for review and comment.

The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to the Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in approving the release of those sessions in which its members participated.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

CLAIBORNE PELL.

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UNITED NATIONS PROBLEMS

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The 19th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which opened on Jan. 18, 1965, was locked into a no-voting situation due to a U.S.-U.S.S.R. dispute over financial assessments. The Soviet Union, France, and 10 other nations had refused to pay special assessments to fund peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and the Congo, causing U.N. financial reserves to fall dangerously low. The United States insisted that under article 19 of the U.N. Charter, any nation more than 2 years in arrears in its assessments should be barred from voting in the General Assembly. This impasse continued until Aug. 16, when the United States conceded that a majority of nations in the General Assembly were unwilling to apply article 19. The Soviet Union resumed payments, except for what it termed "illegal" operations, and the General Assembly returned to its regular voting arrangements.]

TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Long, Gore, Church, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State. For the record, I wish to state that the committee has arranged for the Secretary to appear twice for briefing sessions, today and again late next week. Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann will be here Thursday at 10 a.m. to talk on Latin American problems, and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson we tentatively set for next Tuesday, for a briefing session. We arranged this, the staff did, at my request, as sort of a background briefing so we will all know where we are as best we can at the start of the session.

Mr. Carl Rowan is available. No arrangements have been made, but I anticipate we will want to bring him in directly sometime next week and then the Secretary of Defense and the Director of CIA for briefings.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to see you. Since we last saw you many things have developed. As I understand it, you have not a prepared speech but you are prepared to brief us in executive session, and I emphasize that. The Secretary said he would much rather appear before the committee with the assurance that it will not be leaked, because it is very embarrassing to them on any current negotiations for these positions to be leaked. I hope the com-

mittee can respect that. I think we get a much better response from the Secretary and a much more thorough briefing if we respect the executive nature of this testimony.

You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. I do appreciate the chance to talk with very great frankness about developments which have occurred since your adjournment on October 3. I thought perhaps it would be in our mutual interest if I could concentrate on those things which are not readily available from public information or the press, and touch upon a good many things rather briefly in my opening informal remarks and then come back for further discussion, as the committee may wish, on particular points.

I think the committee will recognize, as I go along, that discretion with respect to what is said about some of these things publicly at this point could be a matter of some importance.

SOVIET DELINQUENCY IN THE U.N.

First, we might start with the session of the General Assembly. Senator Long and Senator Carlson might themselves wish to add their own observations because they were two very valuable members of our delegation at a time when we had some very special problems up there. The key issue before the Assembly is, of course, article 19.

The committee will recall that during the period when the Soviet Union was simply not paying their bills up to the 2-year limit that we had not ourselves picked this up to raise a great controversy about it. We did not look upon it, the United States, as the bill collector for the United Nations. This was a matter between the Secretary General and the members.

We have used our diplomatic influence in a number of capitals from time to time to urge them to pay their bills so that they stay ahead of the sheriff under article 19. But when the Soviet delinquency went past the 2-year period, then this not only created a serious constitutional question for the U.N., but for us here created a very important issue as to the nature of our own financial contributions to that organization.

We are very much interested in knowing whether assessments are to be voluntary or compulsory. We are particularly interested in knowing whether the General Assembly thinks they are compulsory for some and voluntary for others.

CONFRONTATION IN SIGHT

So, we went to the General Assembly believing, insisting, that the Assembly could not set aside article 19; that that is no way to amend the charter, simply by ignoring article 19; that it was necessary for the Secretary General to be in a position to say that there were no delinquencies which raised the question of article 19.

The Soviets came to the meeting taking the view that the Congo and Middle Eastern assessments were illegal, despite the decision

of the International Court, despite the fact that the decision was approved by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. Therefore, a first-class confrontation was in sight.

We did not ourselves want the confrontation because we could see considerable injury to the United Nations whichever way it came out. We believe that in the clutch there would be the necessary votes to sustain article 19. But if that should lead the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Assembly or from the United Nations, I think there would be a general feeling that would be damaging to the United Nations and that would be unfortunate. On the other hand, if the Assembly went the other way, we felt that ran the risk of seriously impairing U.S. support of the United Nations, and that certainly could not help the United Nations.

Let me say when the pledging conference came on the special fund, we postponed our pledge; we did so because in a real sense a pledge which would run in the order of $40 million seemed to us to be a pledge of the Congress. We had just had from the Congress a nearly unanimous resolution on article 19. We felt it would be reckless for use to make a pledge without being able to report to the Congress what the position was on article 19. So, we withheld a pledge on that and have continued to do so.

CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES

Now, in the course of the discussions, the Soviets and the United States made a concession on each side. On our side, we said that we are not interested in the theory, we are not interested in the form. All we are interested in is some money, the necessary amount of money to get the Soviet delinquency back within the constitutional limits of the 2-year period. From a financial point of view, the minimum that they would be required to pay to stay ahead of the sheriff would be something like $17 million on the peacekeeping operations, with about $10 million on regular contributions which presents no great obstacle. With the payment of about $27 million they could at least delay or postpone any problem deriving from article 19.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many million?

Secretary RUSK. About $27 million altogether, $17 million of that on the peacekeeping and about $10 million on regular contributions, about which there is not too much controversy.

SOVIETS WILLING TO MAKE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION

The Soviets, on their side, indicated that they were prepared to make a voluntary contribution to the finances of the United Nations. Now, the present problem is this: That they say that they will make a substantial financial contribution, voluntary contribution, provided the General Assembly takes action ahead of time through a resolution not to apply article 19. We say that we can't buy that pig in a poke—and when I say "we," I am talking now about 30 or 40 members who are especially interested in this, in addition to quite a few of the Afro-Asians—that we can't buy a pig in the poke by agreeing to set aside article 19 unless we know what amount of money is to be paid in on a voluntary fund. So, we left it to the Secretary General to try to probe with the Soviet Union

what amount of money they would be prepared to pay when, and to see whether or not this matter could be resolved.

Now, the situation at the moment rests just about there. The Soviet representatives have indicated privately that if the resolution were passed ahead of time, there would be no problem because they would make a voluntary contribution which is sufficient to remove the question, but that, as a matter of their view of the legalities of the situation and prestige factors, they are unwilling to make a voluntary contribution until the General Assembly has, in effect, taken away from them the pressure of article 19.

The Assembly meets again on January 18. We hope the Secretary General will be able to probe this somewhat further. We ourselves are not looking for a parliamentary victory or diplomatic victory. We are looking for some money. We have told the Soviet Union if they left some money under the Secretary General's door in an old shoebox that would be satisfactory. All we wanted to do was to pass the article 19 problem. The Soviets themselves do not want a direct confrontation on this.

VIEW OF THE SMALLER NATIONS

I think their position in the last week of the Assembly suffered considerably when they rejected a compromise resolution or compromise statement that had been presented by [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, the President of the General Assembly, which would call on members to make voluntary contributions in order to restore the financial position of the United Nations, and would anticipate that article 19 would not have to be raised. The Soviets turned that down, although the Afro-Asians had pretty well lined up behind the Quaison-Sackey approach.

The smaller members, the large majority of the members, are getting to be quite impatient about this delay. They have a lot of things they want to take up in the Assembly, and they tend to blame both the United States and the Soviet Union for this impasse. I think there will be some——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is their reason for blaming the United States for this impasse?

Secretary RUSK. Some of them think, not all of them, but some of them think, that article 19 could be brushed under the rug if we just turned aside and forgot it. In other words, it is not on a basis that appeals to us very much.

Senator LONG. If I might just put a word in there—my impression is, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG [continuing]. Some of these people, some of the smaller nations, feel we shouldn't present them those bills for what we had on the payment. Just make the payment, and we advance the money. They say, "The outfit is not bankrupt unless you come in and demand payment. Why should you demand payment?"—that kind of thing.

Secretary RUSK. That is right; and, of course, as some of you know, the smaller members tend to take the view that on peacekeeping operations the permanent members of the Security Council should pay most of the bill anyhow. They have a special position

under the charter and in the Security Council and this is primarily their financial responsibility, even though many of them pay only .04 percent of the U.N. budget. They tend to throw that responsibility over to the permanent members.

SOVIETS WILLING TO SEPARATE ISSUES

We were surprised in one respect in talking about this article 19 problem with the Soviets. We had supposed that if they were going to do anything that would relieve the article 19 problem, they would insist upon ironclad assurances about future arrangements. They take the view that the Security Council has the sole responsibility for the maintenance of international peace; the charter says primary responsibility. We would be glad to see the Security Council role underlined and, if anything, strengthened if there are procedures by which it can be done, but we do not believe the General Assembly should abandon, if you like, its residual or ultimate right to get into the matter of maintaining international peace if the Security Council is unable to act.

Oddly enough, Mr. Gromyko,[1] who we thought would link these two things, separated them. He said the future arrangements are too complicated, they will take too long to work out. The immediate problem is the article 19 problem. He said, "Let's try to deal with that one and save the future arrangements discussion for later." That was, I say that was, a surprise. We thought they would insist upon a linkage, and I think to some extent that opens up the possibility that we can move along.

THE PRESTIGE FACTOR

We know that Mr. Gromyko has told the Eastern European countries that the Soviet Union will pay something, but we haven't had a figure from them. There have been one or two comments indicating that the figure that the Soviets have in mind will be enough, but the thing that would be most embarrassing for us would be, if we take that $27 million figure, Senator, for them to come in with a contribution, say, of $15 or $20 million, that is, a contribution which is in fact fairly substantial but which is not enough to remove the article 19 problem. That would erode our voting position in the General Assembly, I am afraid, rather badly. So that is the dirtiest trick they could play on us at this point.

We had a talk with the Soviet Ambassador last evening on this subject, and I got the impression that the Soviets will make some effort between now and January 18 to find a solution to this problem. But they are desperately afraid of the prestige factor. They are afraid that we will promote this into a great victory. I think if we can find some way to remain relatively quiet about it while they pay, that somehow the situation might be eased off, but I will have to say to the committee that we do not yet see a solution and when you get back to the Assembly on January 18, the odds are now that we shall have this confrontation once again.

Senator MORSE. Could I ask one question? I think we will probably save time by asking it here.

---

[1] Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

SOVIET MINIMUM PAYMENT

Senator MORSE. I am not sure I understand about the suggested compromise that Russia will make some payment between now and January 18 of x dollars. Will that put her in a position to say that those x dollars buy a circumventing of the World Court decision with respect to article 19, that article 19 is no longer binding in that the United Nations does not have the authority now to compulsorily assess any nation for peacekeeping activities; would that be the effect of it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, one thing that I think we could expect them to try for is to parley the minimum payment that is required to get them back behind the 2-year rule into a cancellation of the rest of the indebtedness. You see, they owe about $52 million and in some of the discussions they have had with the Secretary General, they have said that if they make a voluntary contribution it would be on the basis that this question would not be raised again. That is not easy for us. They could carry 2 years on the cuff indefinitely. With a $27 million payment and just perhaps a little more, not very much more, according to our slide rule they could remain about 2 years delinquent without paying the remainder of the $52 million for some time to come.

A SPECIAL FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. Would that have the effect of excusing them from a binding obligation with regard to future assessments for peacekeeping purposes?

Secretary RUSK. That would be involved in the question of what the future arrangements would be, and it is not—we have not put forward any proposed solution on that. Now, quite frankly, as you would recognize, Senator, there is a pretty serious question about the extent to which the majority, the two-thirds majority, of the General Assembly ought to exercise the power to make assessments against great powers against their will. This is not an easy question.

Five percent of the contributions to the U.N. can cast two-thirds of the vote. Ten percent of the population of the world can cast two-thirds of the vote in the General Assembly. So, in our proposals that we have taken up there for discussion at the U.N., we have suggested that those who do in fact make the largest contribution, say, the 20 countries that make the largest contributions, ought to themselves constitute something like a special financial committee who would consider appropriations by the U.N., especially for peacekeeping operations. They would advise the General Assembly so that when the General Assembly votes on an assessment they will have before them the solid judgment of those who in fact pay the bills. I don't think we can get a charter amendment to deal with this question, but I think we can increase the influence of those who do in fact pay the bills by some sort of arrangements having those who pay the largest contributions give some special advice in the deliberations of the Assembly.

POWER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator MORSE. Is it possible, Mr. Secretary, to outmaneuver the Russians in this way of providing a resolution for future interpretation of article 19 that would have the effect of protecting us against 10 percent of the population of the world in the United Nations assessing us and Russia and other great powers in the future?

Secretary RUSK. We have ourselves not been faced with the threat of serious damage resulting from that kind of voting. It is certainly theoretically possible for the future. I must say that the charter gives the General Assembly an extraordinary amount of power in this respect. For example, this came up in the Palestine issue and one or two other questions. The General Assembly under the charter could in fact accept a trusteeship for Indonesia with a $2 billion a year budget. Under the charter they could assess us any fraction of that which two-thirds of the Assembly wished to assess, you see, strictly as a charter matter. This was a very far-reaching legal authority given to the General Assembly under the charter, but thus far, this kind of issue has not arisen because the political aspects of the problem have kept this matter under control.

I don't think we could get the Assembly to agree to surrender the right of assessment by two-thirds vote. I doubt that we could get a charter amendment that would restrict that right, whatever the wisdom of it would be.

We do think that if the, say, 20 or 25 members who do in fact come up with 90 percent of the contributions were to say to the Assembly, "This you must not do," it would be most unlikely that the Assembly would proceed against the advice of those who pay the bills. But that is a view, and I think that there are some, perhaps around this table, who believe that the Assembly must be very careful in making assessments against great powers to pay for things to which they are opposed. That is one of the things which have complicated this problem somewhat.

FRENCH DELINQUENCY

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, before you leave the United Nations matter——

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CARLSON [continuing]. Isn't it true that as of January 1 France did become delinquent, and what position are we in with that country?

Secretary RUSK. France has a slightly different position than the Soviets, but the result is the same. They don't want to pay. I think that France is capable indeed of being at least as stubborn as the Soviet Union on this issue. We do have the impression, however, if this is worked out with the Soviet Union that France will not remain isolated. They will find some way to make a voluntary contribution, but the amount that they would have to pay would be substantially less. I think it is somewhere less than $10 million in the case of France, but we don't really consider that France is the key problem here.

Couve de Murville [2]—by the way, some of these personal remarks I am making today should be carefully guarded—Couve de Murville did say not too long ago that France would not object if it is deprived of its vote in the General Assembly. It does not consider it that important, you see.

SOVIET THREAT TO WITHDRAW

Senator CARLSON. Isn't that about the way Russia has been feeling, also? We heard some discussion, as one who has sat around there for about a month, they felt they could participate, be a member, and other resolutions, but didn't necessarily need to vote.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, and they have also used behind the scenes a threat to withdraw. We don't believe that they will withdraw from the Security Council. They could withdraw from the General Assembly. Unfortunately, we are not quite in a position to counter that kind of a threat with an equal and reciprocal threat, because if we make such a threat people don't really quite believe it.

We have said to them, though, that, to the members, and we have cited a congressional resolution that we cannot give any assurances whatever about American financial support for the United Nations if the General Assembly elects to ignore article 19 and not find a solution to this question.

Senator MORSE. I think we ought to be careful, Mr. Secretary, that the compromise solution you may reach isn't subject to the interpretation that for *x* millions of dollars the Russians were able to set aside the legal effects of the World Court advisory opinion. I think that is worth more to us——

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. Than any amount of money that they may put under the Secretary General's door. I think we have a clear issue here of standing for the enforcement of that judicial section of the charter. I think that is worth any amount of money.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

SOVIET VIEW OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it your opinion that Russia, apart from the money issue, has in mind the very thing that Senator Morse has implied in his questions?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I remember once a talk between Secretary [Dean] Acheson and the Russian Ambassador on a particular point of law. It involved the immunities of a Russian who had been caught in some mischief in this country. Three times Mr. Acheson made the argument to him that this man under our law did not have immunity. Three times the Russian repeated his argument. Finally, the Russian Ambassador said, "Mr. Secretary, the law is like the tongue of the wagon, it goes in the direction in which it is pointed." This is their basic view toward such things as international obligations. They claim that the advisory opinion of the World Court was only an advisory opinion, that it had no compel-

[2] French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

ling legal effect. They claim that the resolution of the General Assembly approving that decision was a recommendatory opinion, resolution.

We take the view that on the subject of financial assessment, which is the issue on which the General Assembly has mandatory authority, that a decision of the General Assembly on that point is mandatory and is not merely recommendatory in character, you see. But, Senator, we will concentrate on the issue that they must keep ahead of article 19. This is the issue which has arisen.

Senator MORSE. So long as they do that they are within the framework of the opinion. They are within the framework of the opinion and within the framework of the charter.

Secretary RUSK. If they insist upon carrying some indebtedness on the cuff, others have done so. I mean there probably are 15 or 20 who are carrying a part of their obligations within this 2-year framework on the cuff. They are to that extent delinquent, but stepping over the 2 years is the key point, because that raises the issue for us as well as under the charter——

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state that as a member who sat in with Senator Long and Ambassador [Adlai] Stevenson and our delegation, the United States has been firm in the position that the Secretary has just mentioned. I sincerely trust we will stay firm in his position because I believe that it is in the interests of not only the United Nations, but our own Congress and the country.

ASSESSMENTS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, in your example about Indonesia, do you mean exactly what you said, that the General Assembly could say it costs $2 billion and it can say specifically the United States of America should pay $1.5 billion?

Secretary RUSK. This came up operationally during the Palestine affair, 1947 and 1948. There was a serious discussion at that time of constituting a U.N. trusteeship for a period for Palestine. Now, the cost of that would probably run, would have run, in the order of $400 million a year, if I remember the figures after all these years. There is no charter limitation on the General Assembly in determining what proportion of these assessments are paid by whom, and by a two-thirds vote they can decide.

We have, as you know—we started out, I think, originally with about 40 percent; we have now worked that down to 32 percent, just over 32 percent. From a purely charter point of view, from the point of view of the letter of the law, the General Assembly would have such authority, but it is not an authority which the General Assembly feels that it can prudently exercise. In other words, there has been very little agitation to move in that direction, because it is just not in the framework of world politics for them to do that. But the charter that you gentlemen ratified almost unanimously carries with it article 17 and article 19.

Senator MUNDT. We were subject to too much persuasion from the State Department. [Laughter.]

SETTING ASIDE ARTICLE 19

I don't believe you told us, though, what specific changes Russia wanted in No. 19 prior to making this cash payment. You said they had changes first.

Secretary RUSK. What the Russians wanted was a resolution of the Assembly saying article 19 will be set aside.

Senator MUNDT. Would that run into the roadblack Wayne pointed out?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Then they would make a voluntary contribution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the legal argument to say that the General Assembly can set aside a fundamental article in the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. This is the kind of argument we have made. We have said you can't amend the charter that way, and unless you know what these payments are going to be—I mean if the Russians told us tomorrow that between now and January 18 they would pay $27 million in a voluntary contribution, we wouldn't object to it saying in a resolution that the Assembly would proceed with its normal business. But we don't believe that the Assembly by resolution should set aside an article of the charter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Assembly by resolution can set aside that, the other side of the coin is the Assembly by resolution could amend the charter.

Secretary RUSK. That is exactly the point.

REAPPORTIONMENT OF VOTING

Senator WILLIAMS. Have there been any questions as to the necessity of setting some future date for this reapportionment of voting?

Senator CHURCH. Maybe the World Court can give us some opinion.

Secretary RUSK. We have looked into that question with great care. We had an exhaustive study—I believe a copy of the study is here in the committee, Senator Williams—on weighted voting. We tried 15 different formulas of weighted voting based on such things as gross national product and population and military strength and things of that sort and various contributions of these, contributions to the U.N. We applied those 15 formulas against 275 key issues that were voted upon by the United Nations in the last 7 years. Curiously enough, we could not find a weighted voting formula that would strengthen the relative position of the United States on those voted. This is basically because on most of those issues in the main we find ourselves working with the general majority of the U.N. Now, for the future we have got to keep an eye on this, because we can't be sure this is going to continue that way.

Senator CHURCH. That is the point. I was wondering if at some time we are not going to have to face that issue.

INCREASE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Secretary RUSK. We would be glad, for example, to find a way to increase the relative position of the Security Council on these peacekeeping operations to see that these matters come first to the

Security Council in every instance; if the Security Council is unable to act, to have it go to the General Assembly for a recommendation to the Security Council; that it come back to the Security Council only after the second try, then to let it go to the General Assembly for some possible final decision of the matter; in some way to emphasize that it is not the swirling majority of the General Assembly that ought to have the first shot at all these things, but that somehow the Security Council should play an increased role. We have to do that without giving the Soviets a complete veto on both the Security Council and the General Assembly, you see, because they say the Security Council has sole responsibility for peacekeeping operations and determining the finances of peacekeeping operations and the Assembly has not agreed to that.

I might just say to the committee that we had to get through the first of the year with certain essential organic actions in the General Assembly. It was possible to do this on a basis of no objection. The Security Council elections were handled that way. The authority to the Secretary General to continue spending at the rate of this year's budget was handled on a no-objection basis, and one or two other, I think less important, actions were taken on that basis.

INDONESIAN THREAT TO WITHDRAW

This raises the interesting point of the Indonesian threat to withdraw. Malaysia last year ran for the Security Council and there was a split vote and it was agreed that the seat would be split as sometimes is done, 1 year for Czechoslovakia and 1 year for Malaysia, so it was necessary to elect Malaysia for the Czechoslovakian seat. The Indonesian delegation had an opportunity to spoil this by objecting, that is, it could have simply raised its hand and said, "I object" and then it was dead because we could only proceed on a no-objection basis. We couldn't have votes.

The next day, Sukarno [3] made a speech saying that if Malaysia takes its seat in the Security Council, Indonesia will withdraw. They have not taken formal action to withdraw. We have taken the view, and have so instructed our Ambassador, that it is not for us, the United States, to press Sukarno not to withdraw.

In the first place——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I saw something on the ticker just before I came in here, a series of stories on Sukarno's attitude, some statements he made this morning.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I hadn't heard anything further than that when I left the office at 9 o'clock. They had not filed any formal letter of withdrawal, which they could do, by the way, under the agreements of San Francisco. A formal notice to withdraw is acceptable under the charter. There is no provision within the charter for withdrawal. It was decided that it would be unwise to encourage people to think this was a normal thing to do, but on the other hand, it was clearly understood that you would not take sanctions to prevent a withdrawal. So that they could, as the legislative record makes clear, withdraw.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary.

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[3] President of Indonesia.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE FINANCING

Senator CHURCH. One question: In connection with our proposals for future financing of the whole bundle of proposals you have been discussing——

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CHURCH [continuing]. What reaction, if any, have we had from the Russians as to whether or not they might be favorably disposed to move in this direction? Have we had any?

Secretary RUSK. We made proposals first last March that would give more emphasis to the role of the Security Council——

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Short of an ultimate veto on both the Council and the General Assembly. We also made the proposal that I mentioned about constituting a special financial committee of the principal contributors.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The Soviets did not pick those up. From March until December they were really unwilling to talk about those proposals because they have taken the view that the Security Council ought to have the sole responsibility and that, therefore, the Soviet veto could take care of this matter of great power financial interest in peacekeeping operations. They seem somewhat more disposed to talk about it, but we were rather puzzled as to why they waited 9 months before talking about something in which to a degree they and we have a common interest, you see.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. But we didn't get much interest from them. In July in effect they told us they couldn't accept our proposals, but there has been very little serious discussion of them.

SOVIET CONCERN OVER CHINESE POWER

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a group here, just quickly; these thoughts rise in my mind and I would like to run them through. Have the Soviets any apprehension about the rise in Chinese power and, if not, why not; and, if so, why do they foster these juridical arguments which endanger the future of the U.N.?

Is it to save money or is it to needle us, perhaps along with the French, or is it because they are getting ready to leave the U.N. or is it because they want to be party to sinking the U.N.? Those are the thoughts that come to my mind as I listen to you talk this morning.

Secretary RUSK. If they have apprehension about the growth of Chinese power—we think they do have some, but they have been unwilling to talk to us about it. On several occasions I have tried to draw Gromyko into a discussion of China. He never has been willing to. I think among other things he is afraid to have it leaked that the great Socialist country is talking to a capitalist country about a member of the Socialist world. But we have much more success with talking to the Eastern European countries about China than we do with the Soviet Union.

I think their view on the other questions you have raised is that, whatever their differences with Peiping, Peiping ought to fill the Chinese seat in the U.N., although we had some reports from African delegations that the Soviets have rather passed the word they are not particularly interested in the this question at the present time. It was rather interesting that several African delegations reflected that view from various members of the Soviet delegations.

BRING CHINA INTO THE U.N.

Senator MUNDT. You mean on the question of bringing Red China in?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Was this reliable information?

Secretary RUSK. We don't know. There have been times in the past, Senator Gore, when we felt if the Soviets really wanted to get Red China into the U.N., they could not have acted in a more inept parliamentary way. In other words, on some occasions they seem to have gone right around the table and alienated almost everybody there on this subject. There have been times when we have tried to think of the moves that were available to them on this issue to raise the question and cause trouble with it. They have only used—on one occasion I remember they only had used about a third of the moves available to them as a parliamentary matter.

So, we are not 1,000 percent sure that they want to make an all-out battle and make an all-out commitment to insuring that Peiping takes the China seat. To some extent this is a free ride for them and this is one thing they can give to Peiping without too much cost, but their enthusiasm on this issue seems to vary from year to year. I don't know what—I think we can expect them to press fairly hard this year.

On the China seat, the vote on the merits this year will be very close, that is if you just look at it in terms of everybody lining up and saying, "Do you want China in or not?"

UNITED STATES WILL VOTE AGAINST ADMITTING CHINA

Senator SYMINGTON. Will we vote against it?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why?

Secretary RUSK. There are several reasons, but the special reason in 1964, Senator, is that we do not believe that this is the time to let Peiping think that their policy and their attitude toward their neighbors in Asia pays dividends. I mean we are very much concerned about trying to bring the Politburo in Peiping and in Hanoi to a decision that they have got to make some modifications in their policy.

This is not just a case of continuing something that we started 15 years ago. There is something special about it at the present time. Anything that causes the Politburo to look around the world and say, "We are doing fine these days, let's stay on the path we are on," seems to us to be moving toward a larger conflict.

The recognition business—when France recognized Peiping, we weren't so much concerned about the French aspect of it as we were as to how Peiping would interpret this. Questions of substan-

tial increases in trade with the free world, anything that leads Peiping at this point to say, "We are on the right track, we are making headway, we are doing fine, let's just stay with it," seems to us to encourage them to a course of policy that doesn't make sense.

NOT A DOGMATIC POLICY

Now, we were prepared on more than one occasion—President Eisenhower on one occasion—I don't think this is a secret—in the middle fifties was prepared to take a fresh look at this sort of a question. President Kennedy was prepared to take a fresh look at it, but in each instance Peiping came along to pursue policies that just blocked the door of any fresh look at the problems. It is not just a dogmatic look at something that has been going on here since 1949.

We are running out of gas, quite frankly, on votes on the earlier pattern. I think we ought to bear in mind this has been an eroding position over time. There are those who think that the United Nations can reform someone who comes in and it would be good to have Peiping there. There is a kind of argument that can be made for that. But we haven't seen yet any flexibility on the part of these primitive Long March veterans who are setting forth a policy that has caused deep divisions even within the Communist world, quite apart from the interests of the free world.

A VERY CLOSE VOTE

On a straight vote on the issue, we will be fortunate to have a majority of, say, three or four this year. In other words, it is going to be a very close thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that on the question of making it an important question or on the question of final vote?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. The assurance in the background is there are a number of those, such as Britain, for example, who would on the direct issue on the merits feel compelled to vote for seating Peiping, who nevertheless agree that it is an important question requiring a two-thirds vote. The President of the Assembly in a statement made recently, in a statement in the earlier General Assembly resolution deciding this was a two-thirds vote—this remains the decision of the Assembly. So, we have that assurance so far as seating any time soon is concerned. We think it will be a very long time before they could get a two-thirds vote on this matter.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just one more question.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

TRADE WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Last year I asked Secretary Hodges [4] if there was any industrial country in the world except the United States that wasn't doing its best to promote its trade with all countries behind the Iron Curtain, including China——

Senator GORE. You asked who?

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[4] Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges.

Senator SYMINGTON. Hodges. I also asked the same question of Secretary Dillon,[5] and I think they both said there was no country. I think perhaps Canada would be an exception to that, but in any case France has done it, Britain has done it. If we are going to put this situation in the world on an economic basis where the question is more trade, less aid, and so forth, and if there is a chance of our losing it, politically anyway, which certainly gives us less face than we agreed to before we lost it, how can we expect to develop our markets and our setup economically if at the same time the allies, the friends we have, supported so heavily with multibillions of dollars—we have given $25, $30 billion to France and England alone, and they are promoting their eyeballs on it. They have been promoting it, as was said in Senator Fulbright's office, they are doing their best for it—I see Australia is doing the most on it now—how in the name of Heaven can this country as an economic unit continue as we live in this world—the President last night talked about the world, sort of trying to get the world together—if our banks, our industry, and businessmen are barred from this industry and trade with 700 million people because of a political situation that is falling apart? It is a long question and I don't understand it myself.

Secretary RUSK. I think it would be of interest to the committee if I could send down the actual statistical position of Free China with the free world. It has been growing in the last 2 or 3 years, and the trade between Mainland China and the free world is shrinking.

EUROPEAN COMPETITION FOR CHINA TRADE

Senator SYMINGTON. But any businessman knows you get your roots in when the people begin to develop so you are miles ahead of your competition. That is what I think the British and the French have got in their minds because certainly that is what the Department of Commerce felt.

Secretary RUSK. I think the British trade, particularly the Hong Kong trade, with Mainland China is fairly substantial. French trade remains low, the Italian and German trade is low.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary told us—there was a man in the chairman's office, Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Sparkman were there—they are supposed to do the most behind the Iron Curtain, and they said they are going to get as much trade with China as they can. So, it makes England, France, and Germany.

Secretary RUSK. We have tried on occasion to, over the last 8 years to, point out to Mainland China that their relations to the rest of the world could improve if their own policy and their own attitude would show some genuine relaxation. These conversations—and Senator Symington, let me point out that we have talked with Peiping on serious matters more than any member of the free world who has diplomatic relations with Peiping. This is not a question of not having contact. We have had contacts with them for 8 years.

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[5] Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.

But those discussions in Warsaw, and before that in Geneva, always start with their demand that we turn over these 11 million people on Formosa. When we say that is not possible, then we get back into the exchange of views as represented by public propaganda.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we remain on the subject of the United Nations, because if we get into this issue of trade we have departed from the item that we were discussing. The trade question ought to come up but I don't think it ought to be——

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you had exhausted the Assembly thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I was just about to move to the European scene and was ready to go from there to Africa and——

The CHAIRMAN. On the U.N. Assembly are there any further questions?

NORTH VIETNAMESE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to ask one question on the U.N. Does the State Department have any direct information, or indirect, that units of North Vietnam, organized in North Vietnam, equipped there with military paraphernalia, were delivered to South Vietnam and participated in the trouble that we have?

Secretary RUSK. We don't have information that organized military units, as such, came from North Vietnam to South Vietnam to join the Vietcong. We do have increasing information, Senator, that military personnel trained in North Vietnam in the North Vietnamese regular forces have come in as individuals and as groups to join as cadre in the Vietcong units.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have had a statement made to me yesterday by a newspaperman of Ohio who was in South Vietnam to the effect that he was told that a fully equipped unit was delivered from North Vietnam into South Vietnam and participated in what is going on. That would be a direct aggression. Have you any knowledge on that subject at all? Is there any rumor?

Secretary RUSK. No, I will doublecheck that because we have been watching that point very closely. We do not at the moment have information but I will doublecheck to be sure, because we do know in interrogation of prisoners that we are getting in these infiltrators more North Vietnamese, as distinct from the southerners who are living north and were trained in the north, and more of those who were actually trained in the military formations of the Vietnamese army.

Senator MORSE. I think the Senator from Ohio has raised a very vital subject.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too, but let's finish.

NEW PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

Senator MUNDT. This is directly on the U.N. I would like to get from the Secretary his candid off-the-record bare knuckle analysis of this new president of the U.N. Is he a good guy, are we happy with him, is he everything he might be, what can we expect?

Secretary RUSK. He has proved to be thus far a much more helpful president than his Ghanian nationality would have suggested, let me put it that way.

Senator MUNDT. That is damning with faint praise.

Secretary RUSK. I want to be candid with you, gentlemen, because we are just at the beginning of the Assembly. He has been very helpful thus far but we can't—we do know that he is relatively independent of his government on his representation at the U.N. and as president he feels, I think, that he especially is not under the direct instructions of his government in terms of being president. But I don't want to issue any guarantees in the future about him with the rest of the Assembly. He has been thus far——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is his educational background?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to look that up.

Senator GORE. I talked with him a good deal when I was there, a good deal the year before last. He was educated in England, quite well-educated—I am not sure of the details. I had the feeling that he was basically friendly to us.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think that is generally right, generally right. He got the Afro-Asian group to support his proposed compromise, which was a great improvement from our point of view over the resolution that they had adopted themselves under the plan which would have started by canceling the application of article 19 and leaving open the question of how much of a voluntary contribution might be made.

Mr. Chairman, if I might move on.

EVIDENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. May I take 1 minute and finish up what Senator Lausche started for the record? I am not going to argue it.

I think the point that Senator Lausche raised is very, very important. We ought to know what the latest developments are. And, Mr. Secretary, I think the records of this committee will show time and time again that I have asked at briefings, both of the State and Defense Departments, if they have any evidence there have been any North Vietnam troops, official troops, or Chinese troops or Pathet Lao troops from Laos in South Vietnam. The record will have to speak for itself, but I think it will show that each time the witnesses have said we have no evidence there have been any formal troops from these other parts of Southeast Asia moved into South Vietnam. We do have evidence that a good many South Vietnamese have gone into North Vietnam and have been trained in North Vietnam in guerrilla warfare and have come back to South Vietnam.

Now, the first change that I have detected in this count was when the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister or high official was here and issued some statement to the effect that there are some 20 or 30 thousand North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. As you know, I then asked for proof of his statement, and none was forthcoming either from the Pentagon or the State Department. It is a factual matter I think we ought to get settled for the record because we are headed for a historic debate on South Vietnam in the Senate, because at long last some of my colleagues in the

Senate have announced publicly that they are ready to debate the subject. I have been trying to get them to do it for over a year, and this is going to be one of the points in the debate.

It would appear from the stories that are now emanating from the Pentagon Building and the State Department that in recent weeks or months apparently there is some evidence that they have what you say here this morning, detected individual North Vietnamese soldiers or groups of soldiers not operating under the North Vietnam Government as United States troops operating under the United States Government, but are joining the Vietcong, and arms and prisoners captured indicate that they at one time served in the North Vietnam Army and of recent date. All I am asking, Mr. Secretary—because I try to stay within the facts, I stay within the facts as to my knowledge at the time I make a statement—but I have said over and over again in my speeches that the administration has not offered to the committee to date any evidence that they have ever found formal organized North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. If that has changed, I think it is very important, may I say, to be told to the American people.

AN ACT OF AGGRESSION

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I put the question because I think it is germane with regard to article 39 of the United Nations Charter, which says that when there is an act of aggression it is the responsibility of the Security Council to decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 to restore the international peace and security. So, my question is throughly germane.

Secretary RUSK. I think that we ought to provide the committee with the details of the information we have on this subject. But let me say for now that we do know that there are North Vietnamese battalions actually present in Laos, contrary to the agreement of 1962. We carry 13 North Vietnamese battalions actually present in Laos.

Second, Senator, with respect to—we also know that the Vietcong are under the day-by-day operational command of Hanoi. We have a clear template of the command channels and the command traffic.

[Discussion off the record.] [6]

GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Secretary RUSK. Let me turn briefly to the European scene because some things have happened there. Some discussions have occurred during the past 3 months that will be of interest to the committee.

We have had a NATO meeting in Paris in mid-December. We first had a four-power dinner to talk about Germany with the Federal Republic, France, Great Britain, and ourselves, and we have a problem at the present time with the Germans during their electoral season in that the government there is in a somewhat precarious position. The coalition has weakened in the sense that there

[6] No transcript was made "off the record" remarks.

are now divisions in that coalition between the Adenauer-Strauss orientation and the Erhard-Schroeder orientation.[7] At the same time, the polls in Germany are beginning to show that the SPD, that is the Socialist Party, has a lead in prospect for the election. In other words, there is a certain political sensitivity in Germany at the present time, and I think we will expect them to be very nervous here during the next 9 months.

Against this background, the German Government has wanted to take an initiative on the subject of Germany's reunification. This is going to be a very lively matter. There are growing pressures from the 12 million refugees in the Federal Republic, as well as others, on the subject of reunification. They have somehow felt that with all the other things being talked about in the world, the subject of reunification has sort of dropped onto the back burner.

We are not opposed to an initiative on reunification.

Senator MUNDT. We are or are not?

Secretary RUSK. We are not opposed. Our attitude on reunification is that a permanent settlement of the German question based on self-determination is not only right as a solution but would lay the basis for the genuine settlement of the problem of central Europe. It would open the way for real stabilization of security on that continent, could open the way for some disarmament. I don't know how many hundreds of our own defense burden can be directly related to the unresolved German question, for example. And it could open the way for the kind of contacts between East and West Europe that could bring about very important changes in Eastern Europe.

AN INITIATIVE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The difficulty is that we believe that an initiative—and when I say "initiative", I mean the Germans want us, the four, to make a proposal to the Soviet Union. We believe that an initiative with the Soviet Union is a serious matter, that you just can't make it and drop it, that you have got to be prepared for the day after tomorrow if you go down that track. And I have said to my colleagues in France, Great Britain, and Germany, that we are prepared to take an initiative provided the four of us are genuinely together.

I spent a year and a half talking the Russians out of the Berlin crisis practically alone, with the French saying, "We want none of it," and with the Germans being very suspicious during the whole process. I say when we start down this trail, I don't want to look around and ask, "Where is everybody?" If you really decide to go, let's go together, but let's not kid ourselves about what you are doing because you can't make a proposal to the Soviet Union unless they accept the talks, in which case you have got half a dozen questions that are going to be in front of you on the table in the first 15 minutes, frontiers, security arrangements, disarmaments.

The Germans say we don't want to talk about those questions. We don't want to talk about them. During this electoral period

[7] Former West Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, former Defense Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

they want to talk about reunification, but they don't want to talk about frontiers. They have got 12 million refugees who still think they are going to get something east of the Oder-Neisse line. They have got people who don't want to talk about disarmament, people who don't want to talk about security arrangements in central Europe.

ALLIES MUST MOVE TOGETHER

In the first place, we say, "We have got to move together and be tough." If you pull the fig leaf at this point, you have got to be prepared about it and you have got to be prepared to make the second speech and not the opening speech on the first day.

Germans are nervous about this; they know this is our view, and the German press is now stirring this up. But I just don't believe you can responsibly put a proposal before the Soviet Union, either have them accept the matter for discussion or have them come back and say, "No, but let's go back to the present city of West Berlin, you fellows get your troops out of Berlin." We want to know with our allies on that subject.

The last time that crisis occurred, it cost the United States more than $10 million in our defense budget. It took us a year and a half to talk the fever out of that problem, and we are just not at all sure that our allies are prepared—at least in our talks with them, we know they are not prepared to look down that trail. This is the principal issue there on this question of an initiative on reunification.

We will join with them, and have already on two or three occasions. We will join with them making all the declarations they want to on this subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which allies are they who do not want to go down the trail?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, the French don't want anything to do with it. And I will come to that in my comment on the talks with French President [Charles] de Gaulle.

Senator MORSE. The German press fellows are trying to put you in an unfair light on the question that we are going to take the initiative, and I am certain there is no basis for that thing at all.

[Discussion off the record.]

SOVIETS AND REUNIFICATION

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, I am correct that we still adhere to the position we took in 1945 and 1946 that we want determination by people of one ethnic character but that at this time the subject of reunification isn't ripe for pressing?

Secretary RUSK. It isn't ripe as far as the Russians are concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is what I mean.

Secretary RUSK. It is quite clear the Russians are not prepared to talk quite clearly about reunification. They continue to say this is a matter for the Germans. Well, they have said that for years and so I——

[Discussion off the record.]

NOT FILIBUSTERING AGAINST VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. I would like, Mr. Chairman—and I am not filibustering against Vietnam—but I would like to cover some of these key conversations I have had since you adjourned.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to allow time for Vietnam. I want to talk about that. I want you to give a little survey about a lot of these things, but I want——

Secretary RUSK. What time do you have?

The CHAIRMAN. We will go until about 12:30.

Secretary RUSK. Let me spend about 10 minutes on President de Gaulle and Gromyko, and then go on to the Congo.

THE FRENCH AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This time during my NATO meeting I made my usual call on President de Gaulle and I was pleased to find he was prepared to open up and talk somewhat more than he has in past years. Indeed, by inadvertence we stumbled onto something that created a mild sensation in France because we didn't get through in the first talk, which was an hour and a half, and just as a routine matter I asked the President if I could call on him again before I left in order to finish.

The fact that I had had the second visit with him was picked up in France as something of a major development. People on the streets would give me high signs they haven't given me in France in some years. The No. 2 man in the foreign office said this was the greatest thing that had ever happened. All I was doing was finishing a converation.

But President de Gaulle does not believe that there is much chance to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons unless those who have nuclear weapons are prepared to use them to suppress nuclear weapons elsewhere. He is not in favor of that and sees no prospects of that. He says it will be the course of history that these weapons will be in the hands of many more people and nothing can be done about it unless you are prepared to actually suppress them. We are not quite so pessimistic about that, although I must say this question of dissemination is now a much more difficult question following the Chinese detonation.

FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT GERMANY

It also developed that President de Gaulle has some very serious concerns about Germany.

We had the impression at the time of the Franco-German treaty that there was in that agreement a little of the feeling that if you can't trust the girl, marry her, because Chancellor Adenauer had on occasion said to me he was afraid President de Gaulle might at some stage go off to Moscow and make a deal with Moscow behind Germany's back. And President de Gaulle during those years had also said to me that West Germany might move off and do something on its own in central Europe.

He is not at all interested in reunification. He says a divided Germany is full of problems but so is a unified Germany, and he made it quite clear that a safe Germany is a Germany in a secondary position as far as France is concerned. That, I think, is the

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principal problem about the MLF, and I will come to that in just a moment——

Senator GORE. He wouldn't confine that secondary position to Germany, would he?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I had a feeling that I was in a sense talking to Poincaré.[8] There was a little of that attitude of the mid-between ties, that you somehow have to keep Germany in a secondary position or they will break out and go on their own way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So, you kept them in a secondary position and they broke out?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. Unless you brought them into the body of the Atlantic Community, you are going to stimulate the very thing you worried about.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I remember in the middle 1920's the political science teacher I had pointed to the Treaty of Versailles and the ethnic groups. He said, "This is only temporary; the Germans will break out. It is the law of human nature; you can't stop it." He proved to be right.

Secretary RUSK. We feel there is a real chance that the Germans can be absorbed into and become a part of the, what might be called the inertia of Europe as a whole. The principal way you can keep them from going off some future day under some leadership on adventures of their own is integration into Western Europe in a high degree of unity, so something called "Germany" is much less important than it would be on a purely national basis.

DE GAULLE AND NATO

President de Gaulle was not willing to talk about any particular proposals for changes in the NATO structure. He was prepared to say that our two Defense Ministers should talk about the coordination of our two nuclear forces in terms of targeting and things of that sort. There was a little advance on that. They have resisted thus far the talk of coordination; they said, "Let's wait until we get something to coordinate before we get into that problem."

I have the impression that about 1967, as we come up to 1969, which is the date in which a country can elect or withdraw from NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance, that about 1967, if President de Gaulle is still there, we will have some proposals from the French for a reorganization of the alliance with the action that they would take in 1969 as sort of a lever or sanction on those proposals, but he was not willing to get into that now. He insists that the alliance is absolutely essential. He likes the alliance, he supports the alliance, but he doesn't like the NATO organization that has been put together within the alliance. Part of that is his own experience with his own armed forces and his feeling that they should be French in character and that they not be diluted by being members of something called NATO forces.

DE GAULLE'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What did he say about Vietnam?

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[8] Raymond Poincaré, the French Prime Minister who pressed for German reparations after World War I, regardless of Germany's ability to pay.

Secretary RUSK. He himself did not go into that. I talked to Couve de Murville at some length about that. Couve de Murville seemed to think that there was a political possibility—I beg your pardon, President de Gaulle did say something abut Vietnam. He said, "As far as France is concerned, we are in favor"——

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. Couve de Murville seemed to think——

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask, is France a member of SEATO?

Secretary RUSK. They are, but in 1960 de Gaulle told us there would never be another French soldier in Southeast Asia, so that, in effect, in 1961 resigned from SEATO in terms of actually committing French forces in case forces were needed under SEATO.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, may I ask one question there? Bad as it would be for us if we got out of South Vietnam, wouldn't it be worse for the French?

Secretary RUSK. The French are out for all practical purposes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know. But from the standpoint of balance of power in the world. Don't they sort of dump it all on us and yet isn't it part of a bluff?

Secretary RUSK. Their interests in Southeast Asia are now primarily economic, and they are gambling that they could somehow make do with those regardless of the regime, plus about 500 teachers, technical assistants, administrators, people of that sort.

DE GAULLE'S ISOLATIONIST MOOD

But I have a feeling that President de Gaulle is in something of an isolationist mood. He feels somewhat cut off from his own neighbors in Western Europe. He is not really wrestling hard with problems that are being created for him by the Chinese and others in the French-speaking countries of Africa in which he has a tremendous stake. They tend to sort of give up on Congo Brazzaville, where we have relied rather heavily on the French to keep it somewhat under control. There is no effective participation in Asian matters. In other words, I think there has been a shrinking, despite the fact he is talking about France as a great world force. In fact, his horizons seem to be shrinking, and he seems to be draining them in upon himself, and this, I think, is a disturbing aspect of French policy at the present time.

HANOI'S NERVOUSNESS ABOUT CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. You started to say what Couve de Murville said.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. He dropped the word to me casually. He thought that Hanoi was concerned with the possibility that the Chinese might come into Vietnam, that Hanoi was nervous and afraid. He thought there was some possibility there that somehow Hanoi would make a deal.

I immediately picked that up and pursued it because I wanted to talk to you gentlemen about some other things in the same direction which have been tried, but he had no information whatever to go on. He had had no talks with Hanoi. He had had no—this was just surmise based upon what information was available to him in Paris.

TRIUMVIRATE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

On South Vietnam let me just make two points to start off. The one is that Ambassador [Maxwell] Taylor went back out there after his last visit to Washington with strong instructions from the President to try to move Heaven and Earth to get these South Vietnamese leaders pulling together in a common effort to deal with the problem of the Vietcong and to set aside their personal or leader problems until that particular mission had been accomplished.

The events that led up to the present situation start with the takeover by Khanh from General Big Minh; the establishment of a three general triumvirate, General [Nguyen] Khanh, General Big Minh, General [Le Van] Kim, who is now their Ambassador in Washington; the decision by Khanh that he wanted to get out of the business of running the government on a daily basis—he would like to have a civilian government to take care of the affairs of government so that he could concentrate more on military matters—the constitution there by the triumvirate of a high national council made up of distinguished citizens, perhaps unfortunately not directly representative of, say, the Buddhists, the Catholics and others, but distinguished citizens, who themselves devised a charter providing for a civilian government with a military running the war under the general direction of the government.

MILITARY DISSOLVED THE HIGH NATIONAL COUNCIL

Now, this was a South Vietnamese device, it was not something we wrote out as a prescription for them. It seemed to us that if Prime Minister Tran Van Huong could be given a fair shake and fair chance and the military were to concentrate on the job militarily of getting the job done against the Vietcong that this would have a chance of working. But General Khanh's position among his own generals became uncertain. He went along with the young Turk generals to remove or arrest and remove certain members of the High National Council and a military order dissolving the High National Council.

Our problem with that was not that this particular arrangement was an American invention but that this was an arrangement which they had worked out by which civilian leaders and military leaders can work together. Our concern all along here has been unity, unity, unity under whatever formula and under whatever arrangement. Therefore, we were upset that these young Turk generals moved this way, without any consultation with the Uinted States, and brought once again the whole structure of the South Vietnamese governmental situation into jeopardy.

Ambassador Taylor, under his instructions, had some very frank talk indeed with these leaders. Some of them, particularly those in uniform, felt that he had been too frank with them, claimed that their honor has been injured.

GENERAL KHANH'S OFFER TO LEAVE

General Khanh himself offered to leave the country if that would solve the problem. General Taylor didn't tell him he had to leave.

General Khanh himself offered to leave and asked for expense money to do some foreign traveling.

Senator AIKEN. How much?

Secretary RUSK. We didn't get to that because before he got our answer he called back and said, "No, he is going to stay; he doesn't want to travel after all." He had used, apparently these frank discussions to try to rally around him these young Turk generals on the basis that General Taylor was trying to take over the armed forces and to try to intrude into their internal affairs in a way that was not acceptable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Maybe he can get more expense money out of sitting there than traveling, he found out. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUSK. After that key confrontation, second thoughts began to take hold and they moderated, the generals have moderated their attitude about General Taylor personally, partly because General Taylor got them all in and said what he had said to Khanh, contrary to the report of what General Taylor had said to Khanh.

AN HOUR-TO-HOUR BASIS

At the present time, the government, Huong, and the generals are in consultation with each other. I mean, I could be wrong by the time we leave this room this morning, because we are on an hour-to-hour and day-to-day basis there, but our insistence has been that whatever the arrangements, however, they work it out, an indispensable condition for a success in that effort out there must be unity among the Vietnamese leaders themselves. This is a problem among about 500 people in the country, because this affects all sorts of things.

It has not yet affected the actual military operations in the countryside, say, at the regimental or battalion level, but it does mean that about 25 generals have been spending most of the last 2 or 3 weeks in Saigon involved in all these political problems instead of out in the field running their troops. It does affect the administration of the provinces because the provincial administrators are looking over their shoulders when they get orders or don't get orders from Saigon about who is going to be their next government and who is going to be with whom. It doesn't yet seriously affect the situation down the line.

PARTICIPATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

It does affect the situation on something we have been pressing very hard with other governments in the past weeks, that is, more nations, more personnel, more participation on the part of other governments. There are over 1,000 nationals of other countries in South Vietnam at the present time, most of them in the countryside. We would like to multiply that several times.

The Filipinos are at the point of sending over a very considerable number, more than 1,000 additional personnel. The South Koreans and the Australians and others are beefing up their effort there.

But all of these noises out of Saigon are very depressing when we talk to other governments about getting their own people to South Vietnam to show international solidarity, because it raises the

question of what there is to support. It is very hard for us, in talking with other governments, to be completely convincing when these noises are coming out of Saigon.

PRESSURES FROM NORTH VIETNAM

There is another important factor. I have had talks now with, considerable talks with, Gromyko, with the Rumanian Foreign Minister who has contacts with Peiping, with the Polish Foreign Minister who has contacts with Hanoi, trying to make it clear to them that our presence there is a reaction to these aggressions from the north. If those pressures from the north would stop, if North Vietnam would leave Laos and South Vietnam alone, our military could come home. I mean, among ourselves, we could take that chance because we could get back faster than they could if arrangements broke down. But if they continue to press into Southeast Asia, there is bound to be serious trouble ahead.

Now, the trouble is that when you are talking, to explore the possibilities of inducing these fellows to turn around, when you get noises like this out of Saigon, the other side won't listen, because they see ahead of them the possibility of success through the lack of anything solid in South Vietnam to support another effort. So, I feel it is quite right that Ambassdor Taylor is putting maximum emphasis on this question of unity, because it affects everything. Even though relatively a handful of people are basically involved in the problem, it affects the running of the country, the running of the war, the getting international support, and clarifying our view to the other side.

AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the impression I get is that it is all going very badly indeed. I thought our commitment, such as it was, was merely to give them a reasonable opportunity, if they could form a government, to form such a government which we would help. They have failed to do so, and it looks much worse now than it did a year ago—the chaos, from the reports, with the Buddhists, and no one seems to be unified. How long do you think we should continue to give this opportunity? It seems to me we have about discharged our original commitment to give them a reasonable opportunity.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the consequences of a collapse in South Vietnam or our withdrawal from South Vietnam would be very serious.

The CHAIRMAN. What would they be?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we saw what they were when Vietnam was divided, and North Vietnam was organized as a Communist country. Laos immediately came under pressure, and an attempt was made to grab Laos. South Vietnam immediately came under pressure, and I would suppose that it is all laid out there in what Peiping has said publicly about the nature of their world revolution, the necessity for militancy. It is all there. It is there just as clearly as "Mein Kampf."

COMPARISON OF HO CHI MINH AND TITO

The CHAIRMAN. But you indicated Couve de Murville thought that Hanoi was very concerned about Chinese pressure. What is wrong with the theory, at least, that perhaps he is concerned, that if he could be made another Tito [9] that this wouldn't be another solution, than for us to be involved in an escalation of the war?

Senator GORE. You mean Ho Chi Minh?

Secretary RUSK. Another Tito?

The CHAIRMAN. You said de Murville suggested that Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, is concerned about Chinese pressure and he might be concerned about making a deal. You said that.

Senator GORE. You followed it up with a question. What was your question then?

The CHAIRMAN. Why can't we expect a better solution if Ho Chi Minh did take that position and turned out to be another Tito? What are we going to get out of this if they fail after, now, how many years of effort to give them a chance to create a government?

It looks worse now, a good deal worse, than it did a year and a half ago when McNamara first came back and told us maybe by April we would be able to take our troops out. It has gotten much worse. Now we have 23,000, according to the press, as against 8 or 10.

Secretary RUSK. As against 750 in 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. And it keeps getting worse and worse. Our forces get bigger. What is worse, either that or escalation?

You have heard many of our colleagues talk about that. I don't know where we are coming out, and I wonder if a deal—if de Murville has any reason to say that, whether it wouldn't be better for us.

Secretary RUSK. He has no reason whatever to think that Hanoi can be persuaded to become a Tito and cut itself off from China.

The CHAIRMAN. He doesn't want to be a satellite.

Secretary RUSK. Or to leave South Vietnam alone. Gromyko has made it very clear, and so has Hanoi, that Hanoi is a Communist country; it is going to remain a Communist country, remain a member of the Communist bloc, and there is no point in talking about any changes so far as Hanoi is concerned.

So far it has been a completely closed book. So, the issue really is South Vietnam.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that——

Senator SYMINGTON. Yugoslavia is a Communist country?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

HANOI'S WAR

Senator CHURCH. Why is the situation, if I may just pursue this point, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, go ahead.

Senator CHURCH. I really find it hard to follow the thinking or the presentations of the State Department on this particular question, Mr. Secretary. We have had some experts here, at least spokesmen for the Department, in the past year, and we have

[9] Marshal Tito (Josef Broz), President of Yugoslavia.

pressed them with questions on China, that is to say, what possiblities there are there in dealing with China in such a way as might induce China to cooperate in calling off the war in Vietnam. Invariably, the response to this kind of question has been "When it comes right down to it, we don't think that it is within the power of China to call off the war in Vietnam because this essentially is Hanoi's war and Hanoi can sustain it. Indeed, it is even possible that the Vietcong alone could go a long way toward sustaining it within Vietnam itself."

We have heard this numbers of times from the State Department. "We don't think Peiping has within its power to dictate to Saigon."

The CHAIRMAN. With Hanoi.

Senator CHURCH. With Hanoi.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said, "We don't think."

Senator CHURCH. I am talking about what the witnesses have said. I am not talking about our opinion.

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, I don't accept that either to that extent.

CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS

Senator CHURCH. We have had this statement made a number of times. We have had some stories out of Hong Kong, where our own State Department experts have commented on Red China, and we have had these published statements to this effect.

Then we turn around, if this is sound, then we turn around and say if Hanoi were to fail in some kind of final settlement down there, that this means that Chinese dominion is extended toward Southeast Asia. It seems to me we can hold one position or the other, but I don't know how we can hold both contradictory positions simultaneously.

Secretary RUSK. I do believe myself, if China, if Peiping, said to Hanoi, "Stop what you are doing," that Hanoi would. Now, this may be——

Senator CHURCH. This has been in conflict with other testimony.

Secretary RUSK. This may be in conflict with what some of my colleagues have said. Hanoi is heavily dependent upon support from Peiping for arms and aircraft that are in North Vietnam, for eventual military support, presumably, if they want to take a stance in that direction. I do not believe that Hanoi would be in a position to sustain this effort if both Peiping and the Soviet Union said, "You have got to stop and we won't support you if you continue going on this track."

CHINESE ARMS IN VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. What does the evidence show with respect to this modern equipment that the North Vietnamese have in South Vietnam, of bringing down our airplanes?

Secretary RUSK. We have captured such items as antiaircraft machineguns and 75 millimeter recoilless rifles made in China, so we do know that Chinese arms are coming in.

Senator Lausche. Is there any question about that?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; no, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is the equipment that has been bringing down our helicopters and our planes?

Secretary RUSK. The machineguns are the principal ones that do that; yes, sir.

DEALING WITH THE VIETCONG

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't the situation, as you see it, this: That talking about some kind of settlement there, Hanoi being another Yugoslavia, if Hanoi agreed that they would leave South Vietnam alone, is there any feeling that the South Vietnamese could organize a government that would stand on its own? In other words, you still have got the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. On that point, I myself believe that if the South Vietnamese were to resolve this problem of unity in Saigon, and the infiltration were stopped, that the South Vietnamese Government would be able to deal with the Vietcong with relative dispatch, not necessarily within a year but with relative dispatch.

Senator SPARKMAN. But that is the point I made. You see no signs that the South Vietnamese Government will get there.

Secretary Rusk. But this is the point the chairman made. We are not yet prepared to abandon this effort so far as the South Vietnamese are concerned because the stakes are pretty high there.

ORGANIZING A GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. I realize that. But if you pull out and leave them by themselves, is there any hope of them resolving it?

Secretary RUSK. This is something which has brought about some of these second thoughts in the past 10 days.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me put the question in another way.

If North Vietnam pulls out and Red China pulls out, and the subversion and infiltration and pushbutton riots are eliminated, isn't there a great probability that they will be able to organize a government?

Secretary RUSK. I think—well, yes, if that should come first, it would greatly ease the problem of organizing a government.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course.

Secretary RUSK. But on the other hand, to press them to the point where they come to that decision because the alternatives are not acceptable to them requires an organized and unified government in Saigon.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. You see, so long as Hanoi hears all of this disunity, confusion among the South Vietnamese leaders from Saigon, they clearly think if they just stay with it they have got it made. I mean this is the problem of the noises that come out of Saigon about all of these personal differences there. But let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just add——

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask this then: Do you take the position that what the North Vietnamese are doing contributes not at all to the disorder and the inability——

Secretary RUSK. Not at all. It does indeed.

Senator LAUSCHE. I certainly would think it is not so.

Secretary RUSK. But, you see, when Yugoslavia became Yugoslavia in the ideological sense, that was the thing that put a stop to the Greek guerrillas.

Senator GORE. Put a what?

Secretary RUSK. Put a stop to the Greek guerrillas.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. If Hanoi were to move in a Tito direction, almost by definition this intervention in the south would come to an end.

A PUPPET OF PEIPING?

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, do I understand you correctly, do you think it is not possible that there are things we might do, or in concert with other countries interested in a settlement of that region of the world, that could not induce Hanoi to move in a Titoist direction or are we taking the position that Hanoi is irretrievably the puppet of Peiping and subject to Peiping orders and must be dealt with on that basis?

Secretary RUSK. Gentlemen, I wonder if we could go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. May I make a suggestion? I would like to make the suggestion that the chairman and the Secretary, together with the staff of the committee and the Department, organize a presentation, a logical sequence and treatment. You are now discussing our contacts with Hanoi, but that is a part of it, but unless this be in some organized, logical presentation then we are going to be hopskipping and jumping hither and yonder.

Secretary RUSK. I appreciate the force of that. I was trying to go to—and I haven't had a chance to finish—I was trying to come to those things which happened since October 3, but in a total review of situation we would have to do it more systematically than that.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. This was kind of a preliminary briefing on a number of things. I think your suggestion is quite right.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I put this question to the Secretary, from a psychological standpoint and tactical operation, would it be wise or unwise to give publicity now that the Foreign Relations Committee contemplates reviewing our position in South Vietnam? Will such a public statement give further encouragement to Hanoi and discouragement to the South Vietnamese?

I am merely asking the question from the standpoint of thinking whether we ought to just quietly carry on this program suggested or whether we ought to label it——

Secretary RUSK. My own strong preference would be—there is no reason why it could not be done; we are continuing our discussion in executive session of South Vietnam, but we don't look at it, shall we say, as an organism of fresh decision because I don't know where we could come out, and because we could create serious problems internationally.

Senator GORE. Call it a review, continuation review.

Senator SPARKMAN. Continuation of review of world problems.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we are here for.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, is it true that we lost a naval vessel in one of the recent engagements?

Secretary RUSK. You mean in the Gulf of Tonkin affair?

Senator WILLIAMS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Oh, no, sir. They weren't even hit.

Senator WILLIAMS. I saw a news article to the effect we had lost one.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, none at all.

Mr. Chairman, perhaps——

[Discussion off the record.]

PLANE SHOT DOWN IN EGYPT

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry we didn't have a chance to talk about Mr. Nasser [10] today. As an interim point I would just, as a matter of friendly advice to my colleagues on the committee, say that I would take it easy on this plane that was shot down in Egypt as an issue. We have got other issues with Nasser that are more rewarding, but the facts of the matter are that this plane is a very mysterious affair from our own point of view.

In the first place, it had nothing to do with CIA. The pilot is a man with a pretty colorful criminal background; he is a pretty colorful person. I can go into details—he has had some prison experience and he has had some rather interesting charges brought against him from time to time. He was escorted to Cairo, Cairo airfield, by Egyptian fighters. They thought he was going to land. When they turned aside he took out for Alexandria without landing. He strayed outside of the civil air corridor and headed for an area that happened to be a reserve area because some Egyptian air exercises were going on in that area. He was transmitting the entire time but we are not sure he was receiving. The conduct of the plane appeared to throw a very great doubt on just what he was up to and what he was doing.

Until we get full information on it, I would not emphasize the plane because it could turn out to be of some embarrassment to us in terms of what he was up to and what he was doing. I can assure you he was doing nothing for the U.S. Government, but we still are not at all satisfied about his bona fides and what might have been involved.

Senator WILLIAMS. Was this a private plane?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it was a private plane. It was a pilot, this man I am talking about, and a copilot, a European. I just want to pass that along. If you want to make speeches about Nasser, I think there are better things to make them on than this particular plane incident.

A MORE ORDERLY MEETING

The CHAIRMAN. About the future, we had scheduled, I believe it is Mann as firm on Thursday. How about Tuesday for a continu-

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[10] Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

ation of South Vietnam? Is that good enough, a week from today? Does that suit you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. For Thursday I have already announced Mann and possibly, if we have time, Thompson.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps in the spirit of Senator Gore's remark it might save us some time for me to send down to members of the committee before I come a digest of the background as a reminder, because I think the whole background is important. Maybe then we can pick up at whatever point the committee thinks wise to go into it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be helpful.

Secretary RUSK. We could have it in front of us, and some of the basic documents.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very helpful.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I make one suggestion, that we do it in an orderly way among ourselves, so that I will not be popping in and Senator Lausche and others?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Senator GORE. And stay for a particular period on a definite part of the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a more orderly meeting on the subject. This morning it was more wide-ranging.

NOT A POLLYANNA ON VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. I am sure the committee knows I am not in front of you talking about South Vietnam as a Pollyanna.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Secretary RUSK. I share everybody's frustrations on this matter, and I wish we didn't have the thing in front of us. I am not going to try to mislead the committee about optimism where optimism is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. We all are just trying to understand it.

Secretary RUSK. It is a rough problem and we have it on our hands. I think the President would appreciate it if we could have, I am not quoting him, he didn't say this to me specifically, but I am sure he would appreciate a full discussion and the solid judgment of this committee as to how it looks and how we proceed in this matter.

HEADED FOR WAR

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you and the Secretary for arranging this kind of series of executive meetings, because I don't think we have anything more important in foreign policy than to follow Mr. Hickenlooper's proposal. In my judgment, if we followed the proposals of the State Department today, we might just as well face up to it that we are headed for war, and a major war. If we are going to assume we haven't anything to gain by calling upon the free nations of the world to join with us in a political settlement of this, we are in for war, and that is where the State Department, in my judgment, is heading us. I think we ought to announce to the world we are ready to go to a 14-nation confer-

ence, to go to the United Nations and put some other nations on the spot and help take us off.

The CHAIRMAN. That is just the purpose of these meetings, to see if we can arrive at any kind of consensus on this subject.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, may I ask, would we be a member of the 14-nation conference?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, we would.

Senator SPARKMAN. Were we a member of it before?

Secretary RUSK. We were of the 14-member conference in Laos. We were a member in 1954 although we didn't sign the agreement, although [Walter] Bedell Smith said we would comply with it and consider a violation of it a threat to peace.

I will have that document in front of you.

SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Senator MUNDT. Are you going to discuss the Congo at all?

Secretary RUSK. I am prepared to at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have an opportunity for that, and we had that down today but we got onto the other things. There wasn't time for it.

Secretary RUSK. I might just say to the committee very briefly on the Congo, we have now rescued more than 3,000 hostages being held in the rebel areas. The government columns are able to move anywhere they want to move in the northeastern Congo. The rebels are very ineffective. We have been capturing very considerable quantities of arms that have been slipped in by Egypt and Algeria but very ineffectively used. A number of them were captured in the hands of alleged troops but still had cosmolene on them; they were trying to fire them with cosmolene on them.

The prospect is that within this week, the government columns will have seized those points up at the Sudan-Ugandan borders, which will make a big difference in stopping any further flow of arms. There are still a good many problems there, but the situation has been improved since the paratroop drop.

I might also say that since some of you may have had some questions about why we dropped the paratroopers twice and then didn't drop them any more, the point is that this Belgian paratroop battalion, which was part of a little, or palace, guard in Belgium—they were elite troops—had no backup shorter than 72 hours away. They had to go in where there was an airstrip, get the hostages, let planes land, and bring them and the hostages out.

There were three points where there were airstrips. We dropped on two of them. The third one we didn't drop on because we had information that the hostages had been taken away from this area. We couldn't drop these paratroopers into the middle of the bush and have them march 250 miles through rebel-held territory because there was simply no way of supporting them. The land columns took on the job after the paratroop drop and themselves recovered about 1,500 hostages. Unfortunately, in the process, in that whole area something less than 200 hostages lost their lives.

PROBLEMS WITH AMERICAN MISSIONARIES

I can also say to the committee we are having terrible problems with our missionaries. We have told them repeatedly they should not be in this area, but even now they are going back into the very areas that we rescued them from in the last 3 weeks. This is a very serious problem about how you get dedicated Americans who are committed to something to have a little sense ahead of time. They say, "This is none of your business. You are not responsible for us," but as always happens, when they get in trouble they want us to come after them, you see.

NO AID TO AGGRESSIVE NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marcy just raised a technical question. Under the aid program, section 620(i) reads, "No assistance shall be provided to any country which the President determines is engaged in aggressive military efforts against any country receiving assistance under this Act." Algeria and the U.A.R. would not be eligible for continued aid?

Secretary RUSK. We are sweating that one out right now, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you announce that $15 million additional aid?

Secretary RUSK. In deference to some of my junior colleagues, may I make this answer off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will see you next week.

The committee is adjourned.

Thursday we are having, as I already announced, either Mann or Thompson, one or the other. We will have a meeting Thursday morning.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Following the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, the United States found itself drawn steadily into military action in Vietnam. The junta that had overthrown Diem was itself toppled in January 1964, by Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who resigned in August as a result of civilian protest and unrest. The civilian High National Council was removed in a military coup in December, restored at U.S. insistence, and ousted again by the military in January 1965. These "changing-chair governments" proved increasingly ineffective against both civilian unrest and military confrontations by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident and the resulting resolution Congress passed in August 1964 committed the United States not only to defending South Vietnam but to retaliating against North Vietnam. The Johnson administration began authorizing air attacks on North Vietnam and deliberated over the possibility of expanding the numbers of American ground troops in South Vietnam.]

THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:10 p.m., in room 1215, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), Senator Sparkman, and Vice President-elect Humphrey.

Also present: Edward G. Lansdale, Major General, USAF (retired), Consultant, Food for Peace, White House; Bert Fraleigh, USAID, Saigon, Vietnam; George H. Melvin, USAID, Cantho, Vietnam; Rufus C. Phillips, President, Intercontinental Consultants, Inc., (former Assistant Director/Rural Affairs), USAID/Vietnam; and Mr. Marcy and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

Mr. LANSDALE. Senator, my name is Lansdale. I served in Vietnam in the very early period there, actually from 1954 through 1956, in the early days of [Ngo Dinh] Diem's regime, and then came back and served in the Pentagon as an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a General in the active service then?

Mr. LANSDALE. I am retired now.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you then?

Mr. LANSDALE. I was a Major General in the Regular Air Force, retired.

The CHAIRMAN. But I mean when you first served?

Mr. LANSDALE. When I was out there I was in the regular service.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant.

Mr. LANSDALE. I was a Colonel out in Vietnam.

Two of these gentlemen served with me in the early days in Vietnam, Mr. Phillips and Mr. Melvin. I had heard of the third gentleman, Mr. Fraleigh, when he was working up in China and later in Formosa, for his work.

GETTING CLOSE TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

I have kept up with many Vietnamese and I have known many of the folks who were leaders out there, and so forth, when they were youngsters and getting started in the early days. About 1962, I guess it was, AID came up with a concept of putting Americans in the field for our U.S. economic mission in Vietnam, not sticking around Saigon in the headquarters but actually getting close to the Vietnamese people in the field. They came over and talked to me in the Pentagon about it, and we discussed how best to man it and getting Americans who were very dedicated out to do this type of duty.

From our conversations, I introduced some to Mr. Phillips. He was chosen by AID to go out and head this particular work which was called rural affairs at that time.

I also recommended these other two gentlemen for this work. Mr. Fraleigh was up in Formosa at that time. George Melvin was just returning from the U.S. Army as a Colonel and was looking for some other way to serve his country.

So, the three of them got together in Vietnam and were carrying out the work in the countryside in Vietnam and very close to the people. This is quite different than many Americans get a chance to do in Vietnam.

Mr. Phillips left there about a year ago on the death of his father. He has taken over his father's business.

Melvin was the regional director for AID in the 15 provinces down in the Mekong Delta, and it is something he wouldn't tell you, but he has driven his own car all around the highways there through VC barricades. He has gotten in very close to the people, and the Communist guerrillas haven't attacked him because he was so close to the people. This was an American who was helping folks, and they would have been in deep trouble if they had shot him, and so on.

Bert Fraleigh left there at the end of December, was the Saigon end of keeping this operation going, but he is the type of a person who is very unhappy behind a desk, wants to see things going, and has been all over the country pitching in and helping out, even if it meant getting some callouses on his hands to help out. So, he knows Saigon and the countryside.

George Melvin knows the delta region, which is a really critical area in the south, extremely well, by all of the Vietnamese down there and the Americans who are working there.

Rufus Phillips, our hearts are sort of with the people down there and have kept very close contact with individual Americans and Vietnamese who serve there.

This is roughly it. I don't know if they would like to add anything to what I have had to say.

THERE MUST BE A WIN

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody can add anything and then you can start, however you wish to begin.

Who wishes to begin to tell us about Vietnam? You understand, I don't know much about Vietnam. I don't think Senator Sparkman does. We have had briefings but I have never been there and I know very little about it other than what we have read.

Mr. LANDSALE. If you don't mind, we are all committed to the fact that there must be a win on our side out there. This is our very firm belief among us. It might be useful sometime to touch us on that.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be delighted if you could tell us how.

PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you start, let me ask you, what did you say that program was called?

Mr. FRALEIGH. It was called originally rural affairs. Now it is called provincial operations.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that just in Saigon?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. This is the people's program?

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is the people's program throughout the country.

Senator SPARKMAN. Throughout the different countries?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No, this is only in Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know, but we do have a people's program in AID.

Mr. LANSDALE. Not quite like this.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not quite the same.

Mr. LANSDALE. Not quite the same; no.

Mr. FRALEIGH. I would like to add that we are also quite confident that the situation there can still be won if we, the United States, take the right steps. We do feel that the key to the question still lies here in America, in the United States, and in our people. But I would like to also add, before we get into the details of the situation, a little bit more on how we are organized and operated in Vietnam.

BATTLE FOR THE MIND OF THE PEOPLE

When we first got there, we found that our AID mission generally was delivering commodities and supplies to the Ministry of the Central Government.

The CHAIRMAN. About when was this chronologically?

Mr. FRALEIGH. This was in May 1962. These supplies were only slowly trickling down to the people, and so the people were not really seeing much real benefit from the aid program.

We realized that the struggle with the Vietcong out there, with the Communists, is a battle for the mind of the people. So, we realized it was absolutely imperative to bring the government of Vietnam in touch with its people and to try to develop a relationship with the people and mass support from the people.

In order to do that, we had to get our AID mission, which was then operating primarily in Saigon, out to the people. So, we select-

ed a number of very young and vigorous Americans. At first we had trouble recruiting civilians; we borrowed from the Army in the field, the American Army, and we positioned these men in each of the provinces of Vietnam.

Altogether there at that time were, I think, 41 provinces. Today there are 45. We put one American in each province. We called him the USOM. USOM means United States operations mission to Vietnam, USOM provincial representative. We worked with the governor of the province, the Vietnamese governor who was known as the province chief, who generally was a young military officer. Then the third man on the team was the U.S. military aid advisor to the province.

They formed what we called a provincial team, which was expanded to include the advisors from the Vietnamese government technical services such as agriculture and what not, and province level, to form a provincial development commission.

AN AID DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

More than that, we broke the system which formerly had merely put supplies on the wharf of Saigon at the mercy of the Vietnamese government whether they were or were not distributed. We organized a distribution system which assured these supplies arriving in the ports of Vietnam actually went from the ports down to this provincial team in each province. Then also funds were positioned there, both from AID and from the Vietnamese government budget, at provincial level. These funds and these supplies could be committed upon the signature of the Vietnamese province chief and one of the Americans present for use in programs which were developed at provincial level to reach the people in that province.

That was really a revolutionary system in this country, and it did work. It has worked until this day most effectively. It has also given us for the first time in Vietnam a real handle on our AID supplies to ensure that these supplies do actually get down to the people.

Previous to this time, something like less than 2 percent of the total aid going to Vietnam actually got to the people in the countryside, who made up approximately 80 percent of the population.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened to it, black market in Saigon?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No. The AID program works like this in Vietnam. It did then and it still does. A lot of it was going into the Saigon level and was going to develop industry and the areas in the city itself.

Second, a very large portion of our aid goes into Vietnam as what we call consumables, commercial import program, which is sold throughout the markets of the country, canned milk, every conceivable kind of commodity or supply, and generates Vietnamese local currency which is in turn used to pay the cost of the military effort of the Vietnamese Army. More than 75 percent—well, at that time far more than 75 percent; now, approximately 75 percent of the total aid, economic aid to Vietnam, is used in this way. The balance we redirected so that after about a year of this type of program we had approximately 20 percent of the aid going to where 80 percent or more of the population was or is.

AMERICAN MISSION IN VIETNAM

Mr. PHILLIPS. I might amplify a little bit on what we say as the mission of this organization in USOM. We believe our mission to be to help the Vietnamese win the support of the population for their government. We took this as our central mission and shaped our aid program in such a way that we would help them accomplish that mission by giving the population a tangible demonstration that the government was for them and was willing to help them.

This was not a giveaway program. The people were expected to contribute and did contribute, and a major part of it was agricultural loans and what we call self-help, where the government gave materials and the people contribute their labor and they build schools, roads, dispensaries, bridges, dams, and what have you.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Now, this economic aid program also had the objective of improving the social, economic, and political conditions of the people. It went together with, of course, our military effort. The absolute essential for the country, of course, is security, but it was always envisioned that the military effort would bring the security. The breakdown has been that whereas the economic program has gone forward quite smoothly toward reaching the countryside, we have failed in achieving any kind of military security as of the moment.

We have actually succeeded, through the aid program, in winning a number of people to support the government and to literally stand up and fight the Communists when they attack, almost with their bare hands. However, they don't fight more than once or twice with their bare hands before they realize that this is pretty futile, and then they come under the Communist thumb.

So, it is absolutely true that you must have a program which has both a military and economic and social and political base going foward simultaneously.

FAILED TO DEVELOP LOCAL LEADERSHIP

Now, where I think we have really failed, and this brings us up almost to the present day—I left there myself on December 28, a little more than a week ago—is on this whole question of the political effort in South Vietnam. We have failed to realize that this is—I guess we realize it; we have failed to exploit the application of the situation and to help the Vietnamese people to develop a popular government and a popular leadership.

We have been operating a program more or less which has been in response to Communist activity and Communist incident and quick response to this, rather than coming through with a long-range overall plan which is working with the Vietnamese themselves and developing this local leadership. For instance, you read in the papers here about the students in the streets causing all this trouble. The fact is, I have made it personally a point to deal with these students and to know them personally, meeting with them at night, and to find out what was in their minds.

I might say I did also work in China in 1946 to 1950. The student movement in China was completely Communist infiltrated and was the dominant factor in helping to lose that country.

However, in South Vietnam there are at least nine major student groups. I know all nine leaders. I know seven of them very, very well. As of this moment, these students are not Communists. These students are still people who are sitting there, watching their country go down the drain. They are frustrated. They are worried. They are very energetic, and they want to do something about it, but they haven't been given a mission. They haven't been given anything to which they can work, so the only thing they can do is demonstrate their frustration by going in the street and yelling for an improved government or a government which will give them the leadership to move.

The fact is that we as Americans are not working closely with this student group. I was working strictly on a personal or ad hoc basis. There are other important groups in the country.

STUDENTS AID DURING VIETNAM FLOOD

Mr. LANSDALE. Before you leave the students, tell them what happened in the floods there last month.

Mr. FRALEIGH. You may recall on about November 9 or 10 we had these tremendous floods in central Vietnam. It happened to be on Armistice Day, November 11. I went to the office and I got all the cable information coming in that we were having these floods. The very same time, simultaneously in Saigon, there were rumors that particular day the students were going into the streets to demonstrate against the government.

When I saw this, I thought in my mind, well, this is the place to send the students. The students are looking for a job. So, I talked with our military people, because we had an airlift capacity, and we immediately went to the student leaders, said, "Now, you have this terrible disaster. Let's forget about demonstrating. Let's go up and start working."

That very day we airlifted their leaders to central Vietnam to look at the situation. Within a week we had about 1,000 of them up there working. Their work ended up very, very successfully. They worked very, very hard under difficult conditions in distributing relief supplies and aiding the victims.

This was a positive contribution to showing what the students can do if they have a chance to do something. But we must work, as I say, with them to develop this sort of thing.

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATIONS

Some of these other groups, of course, the groups which can really resist Communists, are those which have a motivation which is something similar to what the Communists themselves have. It happens that those that have such motivation are those religions. Some of the religious sects seem to provide this. This is true of the Catholic group, which is a minority of approximately 11 or 12 percent of the population, I believe. They are very firm in their resistance to the Communists.

Then there are some of the various sects. They call them Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. These are various names. The Communists try to attack them because of this religious spirit they have which is a

zeal which tends to match the Communist zeal. They are able to stand and fight.

You will find that we have very few, if anybody, working with these groups trying to marshal this spirit and channel it into bringing both leadership and also strong resistance to the Communist infiltration. In other words, politically we are not seizing the opportunities in that country. What we really need over there is people who know how to win an election in this country, men who can go out to the precincts and give the spirit to the people.

If we have motivation of the people in Vietnam, very quickly we could turn this situation around. We would not have to run the risk of much escalation, nor would it be necessary to, of course, get out of the country, with all that would mean to the rest of Asia.

If we get out of that country we are in real trouble Asiawide and perhaps worldwide, because already these other countries are gravitating toward Communist China and seeing them as the real power out there.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. LANSDALE. I think on this political thing, this might be of interest to you, Senator, to get into it, sitting and influencing as you do so much this. We don't have any Americans stationed in Vietnam with the ability that you gentlemen would have in running for elected office here in the United States, of knowing the nuts and bolts and the real work of political work out in the countryside, in your own States, and how you get elected and how you get a party with roots down in among the people, and getting precinct by precinct out at any point where the Vietnamese can talk to them, and get ideas of how they might do the same thing themselves.

There are about 60 political parties in Vietnam right now. It is just a tremendous proliferation of parties, very few of them with any potential even of roots in among the people in the countryside. This is mostly in the big cities and principally in Saigon.

Many of the leaders have come to ask help of Foreign Service officers and so forth, for advice and ideas on how to do this, and this isn't a Foreign Service function at all. Our Foreign Service officers can't really sit there and tell people how to get a political party going out in the countryside, to get some help on this thing.

SENDING POLITICIANS TO VIETNAM

I personally think that the wisest move that the United States could make, when we have got people that are so anxious to get some of this political thinking from us, would be to take professional politicians, if you will permit the term, people who have been through the mill, that had to work the hard way to get elected here, who perhaps aren't up here on the Hill right now, but get them out as advisors and available to the folk like the Vietnamese in our Embassy some place, if not a regular staff member, but as a part of our mission there, and confer with them on this, and come up with ideas for them, and get a real dialog going.

We haven't had that in Vietnam really since I left there, as I was doing this. I have never been elected to anything, but I was

trying to help them with their first elections out there, in getting political parties started and a political system, which is a heck of a thing for a military guy to have to do. The Vietnamese are hungry for this, and we haven't supplied this. So, when we say the Vietnamese have to win the war, we are really denying them some real strengths and knowledge and know-how that they are seeking from America.

LACK OF COMMUNICATION

Mr. MELVIN. I would like to endorse this. One thing that is apparent when you work out in the field is that the Vietnamese officer class who have the government in its military government, and the civil servant class, particularly at high level, are not in touch with the people. There is no communication between them for the most part.

The CHAIRMAN. Between the Vietnamese?

Mr. MELVIN. Between the Vietnamese higher level, army and civil servants, and the people. There are exceptions to this, of course. I think there are quite a number of Vietnamese people who have one foot [illegible] the people and the other one with the government, but for the most part these people are not in office.

Do you agree, Bert?

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is completely true; yes. This stems from the fact that most of the high-level officers, as well as the old functionaries in the government, the civil servants, are an educated class, largely from families who had money before, the landed gentry or something of that nature. They came from the cities, went to the French schools with the French tradition, which is not one that gets down to the people, so there is this big gulf.

The CHAIRMAN. What language do most of the people speak?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Their own native Vietnamese. A number of the officials speak French. There has been a tremendous swing toward English.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you speak to them, French?

Mr. FRALEIGH. I can speak a little French; yes. I can also speak Chinese which is useful in some places in the country.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. And Vietnamese?

Mr. FRALEIGH. I am sorry, I do not speak much Vietnamese.

LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered how a politician communicates with the people if he can't speak the language.

Mr. FRALEIGH. We, as part of the program, have developed a group of Vietnamese assistants who work with us, something like ourselves, young people who are highly motivated in Vietnam. A number of the young people who have gone out working in the countryside now speak good Vietnamese after just 2 years' time.

Mr. LANSDALE. To get back to the point of your question, Senator, if you got an American who under application from having lived it himself and having realized the reality of the thing and not the thinking out of a political science textbook someplace, but what really, actually happens in this, this would be very evident quickly to the Vietnamese, if he just spoke English, but as he started talk-

ing to him would be sympathetic or understanding or come back with some comments. He could work through an interpreter quite readily out there and be accepted. It is the manner in which we sit and talk.

For example, no American topside in Saigon right now would sit and talk to a group of Vietnamese the way you called us in to talk to them.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Mr. LANSDALE. It is all done over a conference table and it is very formal. But a person with a political background here, this is a good way to work. He learns some things. He wants to work this way, and the Vietnamese would start responding quite readily.

They have got, as many other Asian people, they have got sort of a personal radar. They read the expression on your face and so forth, and they warm up to people who look sincere to them, very quickly.

ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS

The CHAIRMAN. Haven't you all told our top people there this?

Mr. LANSDALE. I haven't been out there. I don't know whether these folks have. I have told our top people this in Washington, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean in the field. You just came back.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, we have told them this, but people who come from a background which is not a background necessarily with the people themselves, with a political feeling, have a very hard time unbending. With no criticism of Ambassador [Maxwell] Taylor, it is very difficult for a four-star General to get down and really mix with a number of people, Vietnamese of all different classes.

In the whole tradition and upbringing there is this feeling of, what would you say, awe?

Mr. MARCY. Was Mr. [Henry Cabot] Lodge better at it since he was a politician?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Mr. Lodge was somewhat better at it but Mr. Lodge, I think, was also not a warm politician.

Mr. MARCY. He is a Massachusetts politician.

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is right.

Mr. PHILLIPS. He is not only a Massachusetts politician. Of course, I served under him and I had some sort of chance to see him in action. He was also, if you will, a U.N. world figure and at this point in his career, I think application in Massachusetts had been left pretty far behind, so that when you were talking to him, or when the Vietnamese were talking to him, they were no longer talking to somebody on their same level, you see, and exchanging ideas. It was a one-way communication.

It is unfortunate, but the Vietnamese, and I think this is true of other Asians, will not let down their hair to high-level dignitaries or personalities if they feel that they are talking to a dignitary. If the dignitary can somehow shed this cloak and give them the feeling that he is another human being, this is a different story. But, generally, of course, this is very difficult for a lot of our people.

NEED FOR PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

Mr. FRALEIGH. If we had had this close dialog out there, I can say from my best judgment in the last 6 or 8 months, we would have avoided at least two of these—you can call them coups or government upheavals. We would have known that they were coming.

In Asia it is absolutely imperative that you deal on the basis of personal diplomacy. The matter of face is involved. When you make a friend in Asia, he is a friend for life, and if you make an enemy, he is an enemy for life, too.

This is a very interesting thing. But if you have that friend and then he sort of takes you into this family, once you are in with that family and in his circle, he will not lose your face and he does not expect you to lose his face.

In order to prevent you from losing this face, he will give you anything he has got. If you ask him for something, he will give it to you. In fact, he will even give you part of his country if it is necessary. That is the kind of an arrangement.

So, you do not deal on the basis of an exchange of memorandums or sending a first secretary over to the Foreign Office and delivering something and expecting a reply on expecting to hold off a coup. You do it by hearing and knowing and having your ear to the ground, knowing it is coming. Then you go to the guy and say, "My God, if you do this I will be called back to Washington," or something of this nature, and he will say, "Gentleman, maybe we had better not do this. We will do it a different way." It is that kind of political negotiating that you have to do.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how you get at this. How do we deal with them? Under our system the President thought he was sending a very strong team out there with Alexis Johnson, a top diplomat, and a top General. Apparently this is the wrong thing to do.

Mr. MELVIN. They are not counterinsurgents. They are all fine administrators and top people, but I don't think that any one of them has really made a study of insurgency, the study of Communist insurgency.

The Communists have developed a technique of using our forces against us. You can see it in just about everything that happens.

Let's see if I can pick an example. Well, I will use yours. We are fighting two wars here. One of them is pure counterinsurgency out in the countryside where they are trying to win the people, and we are trying to win the people and deny them.

So, what do they do? They create Binh Gia,[1] if I can take a current example. They sustain forces there, and we get worried and reorganize ourselves for a massive division size onslaught.

This would be a Communist technique. I don't say it is, but it forces us into a conventional-type warfare in an unconventional or counterinsurgency situation.

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[1] Vietcong forces occupied the village of Binh Gia, 40 miles from Saigon, from December 28, 1964 until January 4, 1965.

INABILITY TO THINK UNCONVENTIONALLY

Mr. FRALEIGH. Our failure, I think, militarily in Vietnam has been that we have been unable to think unconventionally. We have tried to meet the small Communist platoon—it always starts out with very small groups—we have tried to meet them with a division. To crank up a division takes hours, to get them together, whether it be a company or a battalion.

By the time we have got it going with all its trucks and all its equipment, the Communists know it is coming and they are gone or they know it is coming and they ambush it on their way. It is a lion or an elephant trying to fight a fly, using elephantine methods.

We have also used our artillery and our aircraft, with bombing and napalm and strafing and all that, to do the basic ground fighting that has to be done. You have got to get down and chase them on the ground. You have got to chase them until they either run out of food or run out of energy and you catch them.

But you can't chase them by shooting artillery at them in the dark from 5 miles away and that sort of thing. So, we have used this stuff, or we have allowed the Vietnamese to use this, to substitute for this basic fighting. We have not thought in terms of unconventional warfare and actually done it the way that is required.

Mr. MELVIN. Let's go on with one other and better example perhaps, the technique the Communists use of sending two or three guerrillas in a so-called safe area, a secure oil spot, and having them fire at our airplanes. We respond with bombs, if you will, and strafing, and we are only bombing and strafing the civilian people. They are causing us to use our force against our objectives. They are not losing anything. This takes a study of counterinsurgency, and it takes leadership with knowledge of counterinsurgency.

CIA COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. As I say, I hesitate and I only ask the question, but we were told that the CIA had special services out there, special people for counterinsurgency. When they come to justify the effort made out there, we have been told this is exactly what we are doing. Apparently we didn't do it.

Mr. MELVIN. We are going through the mechanics, if I may say so, but we are not personalizing it. The Communists are.

Each thing they do is carefully thought out on a personal, people objective basis. We get a system going and we follow the system.

CONTACT WITH THE VIETCONG

The CHAIRMAN. Are most of these Vietcong, or do you know? Have you known any of them or come in contact with them?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they like? Are they natives who simply don't like the government, or what are they?

Mr. MELVIN. This is one thing I think Senator Humphrey wanted us to discuss. I am a regional coordinator. It is my job to service the province representatives that Mr. Fraleigh is talking about, and I move from province to province to do this.

As a civilian, unarmed——

The CHAIRMAN. Come in, Hubert.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Please sit down. Excuse me for being late.

Mr. MELVIN. I was right in the middle of answering a question the Senator had on direct contact with Vietcong.

As a civilian, and also as someone who had been there previously and had these old friends that General Lansdale was talking about—and they do last for long periods—gradually the word got through to Vietcong agents that they could come and talk to me. They always had reasons for doing so, and one of the major reasons was that they wanted to rally to the government's side.

LETTERS FROM THE VIETCONG

Just before I left Vietnam, I received three letters. One was from the financial commissioner of Roc Gia. Roc Gia to them is a province, and an important one, on the Gulf of Siam.

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is a Vietcong shadow government. You see, they have a shadow government for every province.

Mr. MELVIN. Yes, and the financial commissioner of Kien Hoa—I think you have all heard of Kien Hoa, that is the lower tip of Vietnam.

The third letter was from the secretary of the New Democratic Party, I think it was. It is actually rather old, and, incidentally, they identified themselves with the Democratic Party here.

That was a very important thing to them. That is why I mention it. They were told I was a Democrat, so they wanted to talk to me for that reason, giving credence to what you have said and the need for American politicians out there.

They claimed to represent about 60 percent of the Vietcong in the Delta. I knew of a meeting they had had on November 22. If my memory is correct, it was of 143 leaders. These were top leaders in this 60 percent of the Vietcong.

Now, these Vietcong were different than the others in that they were not real Communists. They have been fighting with the Communists because of dissidency to the French and/or the Diem governments previously.

Now they have found themselves in an untenable position, particularly with the entry of the Chinese Communists into some of their units, and they wanted to rally. But they wanted to rally as patriots, not as those who would surrender or return because they were wrong or anything like that. They felt they had left the government out of patriotism, and they would return to the government out of patriotism.

The reason they contacted me is because I had inquired of a number of their friends and agents what really were the minimum demands.

CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

I knew there were a large number of Vietcong who no longer had a reason to stay on that side and would like to come in. I knew our Chieu Hoi program was just about as bad as any program could be.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Chieu Hoi is a program to encourage the Vietcong to surrender.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You say it was about as bad as any program could be?

Mr. MELVIN. The Chieu Hoi is dismal, our Chieu Hoi program for returnees. It couldn't be worse.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to interrupt your story. Come back to that, if you will.

Mr. MELVIN. All right. Advising these very important USGVM, Government of Vietnam provincial committees, as General Lansdale brought up, which was one of my main jobs, I wanted to devise a program that could be implemented at province level that would be acceptable to the Vietcong who wished to rally to the government, and I made this program up in my mind. I never wrote it down. It had four points to it. Very briefly, I will try to hit the four points.

The first one is nothing new, adequate security for the returnee, if you will, and for his family, both during the period of retention when he is being indoctrinated and after that, and adequate security for him when he is out of the Chieu Hoi centers, as we call them.

The same with his economic well-being, adequate provision for himself and his family during his period of retention and adequate economic opportunity for him afterward.

Now, these are pretty much incorporated into existing programs, not very successfully administered, but they are in the programs.

REASONS FOR VIETCONG SUPPORT

The third point, which I consider most important, was recognition, whether true or not, Senator, recognition that he went to the Vietcong out of a spirit of patriotism. He went in opposition to what he felt was an intolerable situation in this government, the French, the Diem regime, and this is very true in the delta. Many of the Hoa Hao sect went for exactly this reason, in opposition to the Diem government.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they Buddhists?

Mr. MELVIN. They are reformed Buddhists; yes, sir.

Mr. LANSDALE. They have got some Moslem bits of mixture, I believe.

Mr. MELVIN. Like the Cao Dai that was mentioned. They are both uniquely Vietnamese religions.

And also that his return would be one with dignity and one with national recognition that it was a patriotic move by a dedicated patriot, if you will. No flags, nothing else—and I made this very clear—no ceremonies, but simply a heartfelt feeling. If a province could do this, they were interested.

VIETNAMESE LOYALTIES

The fourth point, something that we don't seem to recognize in Vietnam, is that loyalties are not to the national government. Loyalties are to the Vietnamese and to leaders that they can identify themselves with. This is only natural because they haven't had their own government, or an acceptable government.

Usually these loyalties are at village level. Frequently they are loyalties to religious leaders, including the militant religious leaders.

So, if a leader a few years ago went with the Vietcong, the leaders would have to return before his following would return. This was the fourth point, that is, that we must be ready to accept them back in groups, if you will, from squad size or group size to anything up to a division.

RESISTANCE TO FORMER VIETCONG

The CHAIRMAN. Who resists this? Does anybody object to it?

Mr. MELVIN. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does?

Mr. MELVIN. I think everyone. I have passed this to everyone who will talk to me.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they say? You mean our people?

Mr. MELVIN. Our people and the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they say?

Mr. MELVIN. The Vietnamese I would say are resisting it even more strongly than our people in this instance.

The CHAIRMAN. On what ground, do they say?

Mr. MELVIN. These are their former enemies.

The CHAIRMAN. Traitors?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes, sir, and they are not about to consider them patriots. Now, they have been fighting them for a long time, and they also fought them before they were Vietcong, back in the time that General Lansdale was there, the way Hoa Hao remained dissident until one of their key leaders, Baku, was killed.

There is very strong opposition, but I don't think it is insurmountable. We have got to have a firm American position. If we have that, I think they will fall in line.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the American position?

Mr. MELVIN. We are leaning—I gave these four points to our Chieu Hoi chief, John Perry, before I left, and he is incorporating it into the USOM Chieu Hoi program.

We really don't have top recognition of these last two needs to meet the minimum demands of the VC.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You mean the needs of recognizing that this is a partiotic act?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. That they will be accepted back with dignity?

Mr. MELVIN. And the willingness—I didn't quite finish—the willingness to accept them back en masse, say, in battalion and regimental size, if you will, and reorient them, reindoctrinate them, reequip them, and let them, if they choose, go back and fight the Vietcong, and many will choose this.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Switch sides?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

HERITAGE OF STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FRENCH

Mr. FRALEIGH. Could I give out one or two words of clarification on this?

This is a very difficult problem in South Vietnam. You have to realize that they fought with all sincerity against the French, and the Viet Minh, which were Ho Chi Minh's group in the north, were very energetic in their battle against the French. So, many people joined the Viet Minh because this was the group which was fighting the French.

When the war was over and the French were defeated, a lot of these people, some of them at that time left and came back from the so-called resistance to the South Vietnamese government, but a number of them stayed with the Viet Minh because those who came back and joined the South Vietnamese government found some amount of persecution because the people in the South Vietnamese government were primarily those who had collaborated with the French fighting the Viet Minh.

Do you follow me? This is quite a complicated situation.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This is the problem. So, the major part of the government, certainly in Diem's time, were really the collaborators with the French.

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. They weren't what you would call partisans. They were collaborators.

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is particularly true today and of the army, the military generals, and the high officers.

The CHAIRMAN. The Vichy group.

Mr. FRALEIGH. In South Vietnam. So that many people who are still in the bush and many people still in Saigon who had fought with the Viet Minh but were anti-Communist still feel they haven't gotten a square shake. People still discriminate and look down upon them, and these people still in the bush are somewhat reluctant to come out because of this.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. These are the people who feel they are not defeated.

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is another reason and this is a very complicated question, but it also gives great power to the Communist cause. They still use the line, therefore, that the Americans have substituted for the French, and these people who used to collaborate with the French now collaborate with the Americans.

VIETNAMESE CONCERN ABOUT UNITED STATES ROLE

Mr. MELVIN. Senator, one thing that impresses me, has impressed me all along, say, in the last 7 or 8 months, has been the express desire of the people to unify their government. They are not satisfied with the government they have but they are patient. They are willing to see one evolve, and they think they do see a possibility.

They are very concerned about whether the United States will stay with them or not, and I might say that when the U.S. presses put out something that would indicate we are going in a different direction, it doesn't take more than hours for it to get down to the most remote villages. The exact expression is lost, but the feeling is this gets down by word of mouth and by radio.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. In other words, if somebody says here, a prominent public official that we are going to withdraw or that we ought to get out——

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This information gets to the average man out there in the bush and the "boondocks," so to speak.

Mr. MELVIN. Much faster than it gets to the Vietnamese Army or any of the so-called——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. And what is the effect? What is the psychological effect of that?

Mr. MELVIN. I get it, of course, from people coming back. Most of these are friends of Vietcong or relatives of Vietcong, sometimes Vietcong themselves. But most of the people I deal with there—and they go cold on whatever they were planning to do in the way of rallying or anything——

The CHAIRMAN. If they identify us as having taken the position of the French and as working with the collaborators, why don't they want us to get out? Why do they want us to stay?

Mr. MELVIN. They don't want communism. They know communism. They are the most politically astute peasants I think we have got in the world. Every one of them has had to make that decision: "Am I going to go with the Communists or am I not going with them?" It is a tough decision.

DEFINITION OF "VIETCONG"

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you something. What does the term "Vietcong" mean?

Mr. MELVIN. Vietnamese Communist.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Then these people are not Vietcong that you are talking about?

Mr. MELVIN. That is right, sir.

Mr. FRALEIGH. They are with the Vietcong.

Mr. MELVIN. Technically—they are the enemy but they are not true Communists.

Mr. LANSDALE. They aren't party members, in other words.

Mr. PHILLIPS. May I explain something about the political setup on the Communist side, if you will?

There is a national liberation front. This is the political instrument the Communists are using in South Vietnam. They do not use the North Vietnamese Communist Party. The Communist Party is a part of the liberation front and, of course, controls the liberation front.

But the liberation front itself is what is the political base, if you will, of the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. The people George is talking about are people who are a part of the national liberation front. A number of them hold very responsible positions.

COMPARISON TO YUGOSLAVIA

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. But it is something like in the World War II period, take, in Yugoslavia, the partisans led by Tito, and there was another leader at the time. Most of the people——

The CHAIRMAN. Mikhailovitch.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Most of the people were non-Communist, but the Communists controlled the apparatus, and what happened was that the Communists were able to sustain themselves and throw out the government and win the war, so to speak, for themselves.

You are saying that in the Vietcong, the partisans, like in Yugoslavia, are contolled through this national liberation front, but many people that are a part of the national liberation front are not Communists but they are anticolonial, anti-French, antiforeign interference, so to speak. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, and the Communist front put up some ideals that a lot of these folks buy that don't say Communist.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. That is not unusual.

Mr. LANSDALE. And this is where they feel they are patriots, you see, because this is what they believe. The fact that the Communists are controlling the organization that they then join and use—they aren't the party members. They are the hard-core cadre.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ABOUT DIEM

Mr. MELVIN. And right at the moment, there is a lie to what they have said in the past, of course. They called it the Diem puppet to the United States, as far as the government was concerned, and——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. When you say they called it, you mean the Communist propaganda apparatus calls this.

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. The people don't always believe this, do they?

Mr. MELVIN. No, but they didn't have reason not to believe it, enough reason not to believe it, up to the time of Diem's death. Afterward, they were still fighting government. Diem was done. The objective had been reached and they were still fighting government. This they couldn't understnad.

More recently there seems to have been quite a number of Chinese Communists who have entered the foray, and this, these agents tell me, has worried the so-called 60 percent, the 143 leaders I mentioned earlier.

Mr. LANSDALE. This is a counterpart to our USAID advisory effort there. Now the Chinese have got an opposite one going on the other side in South Vietnam.

USIA TREATMENT OF CHINESE IN VIETNAM

Mr. FRALEIGH. I have confirmed, too, that we have almost no propaganda being put in by the United States nor the South Vietnamese targeting the Chinese as an enemy.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This is something that I wanted you to hear, Mr. Chairman. These men told me that our propaganda or our USIA or whatever we operate with over there hardly ever identify Chinese Communist interference in Vietnam.

Mr. FRALEIGH. And yet the Chinese are the most hated of people in South Vietnam, and the most logical enemy and the biggest enemy.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Who have they got in charge of USIA? They must have a Chinaman.

Mr. MELVIN. It doesn't take cold intelligence to tell us the Chinese are in there. This is a reason. We know they are in, but I haven't seen much firm intelligence that would say that the Chinese are with units down to battalion size or company size. Have you, Bert?

Mr. FRALEIGH. I have heard of some; yes.

Mr. MELVIN. I have heard of it, but the information has come from the Communists themselves, the Vietcong themselves, not from our source.

U.S. PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Let me pinpoint something here to you for the record. Do you listen to American broadcasts? Do you listen to these propaganda broadcasts?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No, sir; I don't think we have much in the way of propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam. We have some generated within the country, and I have heard some in English, but not in Vietnamese. I haven't heard the translation. But we are involved in the leaflet question, drops and that sort of thing.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Leaflets that picture the fact of Chinese Communist intervention and control?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Of the Vietcong apparatus.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Of the Vietcong?

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is right.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You don't see that exposed?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No, I do not. Yesterday I went back after talking to you and asked some of our men who are also over here now if in Vietnam any of them have seen this, and they have not seen this.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This is just incredible.

Mr. MELVIN. But, you see, the Chinese are protected even after death. They are pulled back with a little wire attached to the arm and heads are chopped off and they are no longer identifiable as Chinese. Uniforms are taken away. And we deal now only with cold intelligence, which, incidentally, is a little wrong.

Mr. PHILLIPS. It is a lot wrong.

COUNTED DEAD

Mr. MELVIN. How many people did we really kill in this Binh Gia operation? Get some really good intelligence and I think you will find it was several times the number that we claimed. Well, the Communists immediately use that. They report this as a Communist victory. It isn't.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Let's get that again because I read in the paper that the Vietnamese—and, of course, we, as allied with them or helping them—had taken quite a licking in the most recent engagement. Where did that take place?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Binh Gia.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Are you saying that the figures that were reported here in the American press are low in terms of the casualties of the Vietcong?

Mr. MELVIN. I dare say from past experience that these are counted dead.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Counted dead?

Mr. MELVIN. Counted dead, and the Vietcong don't leave very many bodies behind to be counted.

Mr. FRALEIGH. There is a very interesting reason for this. There was one major reason, just as easy, to confuse you when you actually go out and count who won the battle and who lost, because almost invariably they will go to great ends to carry away their dead and their wounded.

The second reason they do this is that they always respect the family system. According to the family system, which is the Chinese pattern in both China and Vietnam, the burial of the dead and return of the ashes to the family and all that is absolutely imperative.

So, in respect of this system they always will go to unbelievable ends to carry away the dead, and it is to show and demonstrate to the Vietcong soldier, see how the party, see how the government takes care of you when you are killed. Do you see what I mean?

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You mean the fact that the Vietcong takes care of the body?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Of the wounded and the dead; yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This leaves a favorable impression.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Exactly.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY [continuing]. Upon the local people.

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is the main purpose of this.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This is sort of a religious rite.

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is right.

Mr. MELVIN. And on the rest of the troops.

Mr. FRALEIGH. And on the rest of the troops; it is a morale thing.

VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP

Mr. LANSDALE. I think getting back to a point that Senator Fulbright raised as we started into this might be useful at this moment. I would like to comment on it just briefly if I might.

It is extremely difficult to organize and operate the type of a thing that Melvin was just talking about, with these Vietcong coming in and wanting to come in and so forth. The top Vietnamese leadership has to feel that he can gamble on such a thing and not be criticized by political opponents for making some sort of a deal with the enemy. I don't think we have anybody at topside in Vietnam now, nor have we had since President Diem earlier, who have quite the position of strength to do one of these.

Second, it takes Americans backing that top person and maybe encouraging them to go ahead and take a chance, who would understand the gamble, the nature of it, and the nature of people who could be fighting one minute and still say, "I want to be a patriot and come in." There is sort of an illogic to this that a rational American finds very hard to understand unless he gets down and sees this happen a number of times and has a real feeling for the people. And given that sort of thing, then we could get the top Vi-

etnamese to afford to gamble on this and then carry it through thoroughly enough so that the first one would succeed; that, in turn, would be heard all around the country and there would be a lot more folks coming in.

DIEM'S GAMBLE

This was done in Vietnam in the early days of President Diem when he got there, and he consciously took a big gamble. He got the No. 1 Communist military leader in South Vietnam to surrender with all of his forces and come in and help the government side against the Communists, and they eaned their way by going on out and fighting again.

He got under tremendous attack in our own Embassy and among his supporters and in his cabinet, by people saying that he was a damn fool in dealing with the enemy and letting them retain their arms and so forth. He explained they were out proving their loyalty by fighting the enemy, the common enemy, and he had enough strength at the time to just stay put and do this.

I don't think that we have either in Mr. Tran Van Huong out there or General Khanh, anybody who could quite afford to take that political risk at this time, unless General Taylor came on out and said "do it and we will back you all the way on this," along with General William Westmoreland, and so forth.

COMPARISON TO THE PHILIPPINES

So, this is a hard problem with these folks. This, incidentally, is the way we defeated the Huks in the Philippines, by having, again, a leader go out and take a real big gamble in doing this very same thing with the Communist guerrillas there. Again, later it worked in Vietnam. But this takes a considerable skill, including real political skill, with their own people.

I was with Magsaysay when he was called into the cabinet and jumped very hard by his President for starting some of the things he was doing and trusting the enemy. But meanwhile the word had gotten out all over the enemy, and they started coming in and surrendering. They saw a way of doing it. They all wanted to be labeled a patriot, and so forth, and we put them right to work again, and for very low cost.

The thing that impressed me by what Melvin had said, these folks aren't coming back for the economic advantages. They aren't looking for money. They are looking for personal honor regained somehow. This means more to them than any of the economic gain.

VIETCONG AS ULTRA PATRIOTS

Mr. MELVIN. Mr. Chairman, I might add to that. My pitch, if I might say so, in dealing with these people—if you are going to talk money, you are talking to the wrong person. Only talk patriotism. And this brought them back. This brought them back every time.

These people are not potentially patriotic. Actually, the 60 percent—I am using that out of the air—60 percent of the Vietcong are ultrapatriots. That is what is wrong with them. That is why they are such good fighters.

Senator SPARKMAN. Have these matters been discussed with our Embassy people?

Mr. MELVIN. With anyone who would discuss them; yes, sir.

[Discussion off the record.]

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. While I was visiting with some of our friends that were in the service of the American Government, and some that were no longer in the service of the Government but had been and had occupied very important positions in the American Government's activities in Vietnam, I found out that the main problem we have is one of communication. It still is. I asked these gentlemen yesterday or the day before yesterday, "Who do you tell these things to?"

I listen to these things, and they are either liars, which I know they are not, or they are incapable or unable to get their message to somebody. I can't believe that if this message got through to where it belongs, where the policy is made, that some changes wouldn't be made, or at least that you wouldn't hear more about that. Now, who do you report to, Mr. Melvin?

Mr. MELVIN. I report to Mr. Fraleigh, and I did report to Mr. Tanham or Mr. Wilson.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Who are they?

Mr. MELVIN. They are all in the rural affairs office for provincial operations.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Central level in Saigon.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Who is the office of rural affairs and what is it?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Within the U.S. operation mission, the economic aid mission to Vietnam in Saigon. We, in turn, would report this to our director, most recently Mr. James Killen, or to people in the U.S. Embassy.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. What have you reported, Mr. Fraleigh, and to whom do you report? Have you reported any of this material?

Mr. MELVIN. This I reported to Mr. Wilson, what I have given you here.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. To Mr. Wilson? I never heard of him but I am sure he is a fine man. What does he have to say about the policy of our Government?

TROUBLE WITH NEW DIRECTOR

Mr. FRALEIGH. At the moment in Saigon, all of us within the AID mission, Mr. Wilson, myself, and Mr. Tanham, formerly the vice president of Rand, who resigned and went out to Saigon to work in its AID mission in charge of this entire office, rural affairs, provincial operations office, and has most recently resigned because he had difficulties with the new director of mission, Mr. Killen, and is now back in this country. All of us are very worried because we are having very great trouble with our new director because he himself is not politically oriented and is not paying too much attention to this sort of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this Killen you are having this trouble with?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Tanham? I can't get these straight. I don't know these names. Make it a little clearer. Killen is the top man?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Mr. Killen is the top man.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Tanham?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Tanham was the third man in the mission. He took the job that Mr. Phillips had formerly, which was called the associate director for provincial operations.

The CHAIRMAN. For provincial.

Mr. FRALEIGH. And I was the deputy. There were two deputies to Mr. Tanham. One was myself and the other was Mr. Wilson.

The CHAIRMAN. You could tell this to Mr. Tanham, couldn't you?

Mr. FRALEIGH. This was told to Mr. Tanham.

The CHAIRMAN. He knows what you have been telling us, Tanham?

Mr. MELVIN. Only through Wilson.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Wilson?

Mr. MELVIN. Deputy, the same as Mr. Fraleigh is.

Mr. FRALEIGH. In this particular case, sir, this was told to Mr. Wilson. This was written down, I am sure.

Mr. MELVIN. No, I gave it to him verbally.

TANHAM'S RESIGNATION

The CHAIRMAN. Tanham, you say, just resigned. Does that mean he resigned in disgust and frustration that they wouldn't do anything he wanted them to do?

Mr. FRALEIGH. He went out with a letter from Dave Bell stating he had authority to operate in this counterinsurgency program.

The CHAIRMAN. Tanham did?

Mr. FRALEIGH. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. When?

Mr. FRALEIGH. This was in approximately August 1964.

The CHAIRMAN. And he has already resigned?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes. Before this he was a vice president of Rand and supposedly wrote several books on the Vietcong. He was an expert in counterinsurgency.

The CHAIRMAN. He was?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. He was specially recruited?

Mr. FRALEIGH. He worked in Vietnam a little more than 3 months and he had very difficult working relationships with the new director of the mission, a Mr. James Killen.

The CHAIRMAN. Killen?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Then he came back to Wasington to clarify his status and he was told, as I understand it, that the decision, that all the responsibilities out there on this probably lay with Ambassador Taylor, and Ambassador Taylor was responsible for the personnel and that the letter he had stating what his authority was of no use. So, he said he would go back to Saigon and see if he could work. He went back to Saigon and remained about 3 or 4 weeks and found he could not work, so he resigned. He is now back in Washington. He has now gone back to Rand.

The CHAIRMAN. It looks like we're the ones who are disorganized.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I couldn't agree with you more.
[Discussion off the record.]

REPORTING SYSTEM IN VIETNAM

Mr. PHILLIPS. I won't go into the application deeply, but he felt that it was necessary, in order to really back up General Khanh, it was necessary to stage a demonstration of force, a kind of coup, if you will. And so he wanted to know really whether he should march his troops on Saigon. He didn't call up General Khanh, mind you. He called up——

[Discussion off the record.]

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. This is the kind of thing I have been hearing, not only from these men as individuals. I have been getting information. It just seems to me if the South Vietnamese are disorganized, then believe me, we have got chaos, because there is no real communication between what is going on in the field and what is going on at Saigon. I want to go back to your reporting system again, Mr. Fraleigh.

Now, let's assume that the—it got Mr. Tanham——

Mr. FRALEIGH. Mr. Wilson.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. To Mr. Wilson.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Then where did it go?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Mr. Wilson should have turned it over—it came in, as we have just found out, in written form to Mr. Wilson; pardon me, in verbal form. Mr. Wilson should have probably put that down in memorandum form and given it to Mr. Killen, and I presumably would also give a copy to the political section of the U.S. Embassy. I would presume that.

Mr. MELVIN. These letters in question were turned over by me——

[Discussion off the record.]

THOUSANDS WILLING TO RALLY

Mr. MELVIN. I want to devalue these, if I may, because I have been through this exercise before, and a lot of these things grow cold right away or are inflated. I don't want to give the impression that these are a firm 20,000 people who want to rally. I hope there are.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. There are at least a thousand; wouldn't you say?

Mr. MELVIN. This would be my estimate, that there are at least a thousand.

Mr. FRALEIGH. There is one precedent for this. Immediately after the Diem coup there were a number who did rally.

Mr. MELVIN. Yes, we have Hoa Hao.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Several thousand men with arms came in together.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. When you say rally you mean turned over?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes.

Mr. MELVIN. In separate groups it added up to several thousand.

Mr. PHILLIPS. George, were you not talking to an ex-Hoa Hao general whom the Communists killed in order to prevent surrendering?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes, last May or June. He had a thousand people he wanted to rally, but here there must have been a breach of intelligence someplace along the line because he was picked up by the VC, the hard-core VC, and released again, picked up again, and killed.

HARD-CORE VIETCONG

The CHAIRMAN. These hard-core VC, as you call them—how do you estimate the numbers? Are they merely the leaders of these other people? Are there a lot of them?

Mr. MELVIN. They control. I wouldn't say they are the leaders, because all groups possess their own leaders. Frankly, sir, I don't dare estimate a number.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they South Vietnamese mostly?

Mr. MELVIN. The group I am talking about claims to have the hard core within it. That is, within its own group are the well-equipped, not the hard-core Communists but the well-equipped soldiers, well-equipped and trained, the regular type. And each of the others have the regular and have the recruit or the guerrilla.

The CHAIRMAN. Are most of them South Vietnamese or North Vietnamese? In other words, are there many North Vietnamese down there?

Mr. MELVIN. Oh, yes, sir, there are a lot of North Vietnamese.

Mr. FRALEIGH. A great number of them are South Vietnamese who have been taken to the north and then been reintroduced.

I would like to say one other thing on this. The infiltration across the 17th parallel or around the end of the 17th parallel through Laos, as far as materiel, up until very recently has not been very important, but that has been extremely important because it is through here that they can introduce the hard-core, motivated leadership for the movement in Vietnam.

A MERGER OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. And their purpose is to join North Vietnam? Is that what the real purpose is, to merge the south with the north?

Mr. FRALEIGH. A Communist takeover of the south, and then presumably merge. I have heard speculation that even if they took the south they might, because of North Vietnamese application, they might maintain it as the south for a while until they got themselves straightened out on that, because there is feeling between south and north, regional loyalty.

Mr. MELVIN. Their loyalty is directed toward Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. FRALEIGH. They do talk about Ho Chi Minh.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETCONG TERRITORY

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I want to get down to the $64 question.

You told me most of our U.S. civilian personnel can travel without too much molestation in the Vietcong areas; is that right?

Mr. FRALEIGH. They can travel in areas which are not in the known Vietcong bases, but they can travel in areas which show on the maps as being contested areas or with Vietcong infiltration.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. If an AID official, U.S. AID official, walks those roads, and a Vietnamese Army man walks those roads, who gets killed?

Mr. FRALEIGH. The Vietnamese Army man will be shot.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. And will the other man not be?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Very likely he may not be, if there is a choice he will not be. Also, the U.S. military man will be shot before the AID man will be shot.

VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You said to me there was a good deal of spirit for the nation in Vietnam and for their local leaders amongst even people that are presently with the Vietcong; is that right? There is a good deal of loyalty to the nation of Vietnam?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, of course. Nationalism I think——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Nationalism.

Mr. FRALEIGH [continuing]. Is the cause, is the only hope.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Right. Do you feel that our AID programs have been doing quite well with these people; is that a fact?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Our economic and social programs have been doing quite well, but they have lacked a strong political input, in psychological exploitation of nationalism, for instance.

TRANSFERS OF AID PERSONNEL

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You told me the other night that a number of people presently in the AID programs in the boondocks out in the provinces are now being transferred.

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is correct.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Why?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Because since we have had new leadership in our mission, we are having a reorientation of policy. The policy is now to pay more attention to the urban areas and to not put supplies into areas which are under potential or possible Vietcong control, which is wise.

The CHAIRMAN. Have your three people been sent home? Are you relieved of your duties?

Mr. FRALEIGH. My status is very indefinite. I have just been sent home on 30 days TDY. My wife is in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. What is TDY?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Temporary duty, consultation.

Mr. MELVIN. I am home also on a roundtrip on 60 days TDY, and everyone tells me, all of our personnel people, that I am not to go back. And you told me yesterday, I think, that my replacement has been——

Mr. FRALEIGH. They are trying to recruit somebody. It is not easy.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Is this the policy of Mr. Killen? Is he seeking a new staff?

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is correct; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that what it is?

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is right, but this is bigger than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this because Mr. Killen doesn't approve or agree with your analysis of the situation?

A POLITICAL WAR

Mr. PHILLIPS. I think it is a question of issues, if I may just enter. I have been away for a year, Senator, but I have followed this closely. George Tanham replaced me. I have talked to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Tanham replaced you and now he is replaced?

Mr. PHILLIPS. That is true. Well——

Mr. LANDSDALE. He was asked to leave, I might comment.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked to leave?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, this is another story.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it over some similar policy difference?

Mr. PHILLIPS. I will be very frank with you. It was really with Ambassador Lodge. He told Dave Bell that he would accept me back there if I kept strictly out of anything that had to do with anything political. I told Mr. Bell that this was a political war, and I didn't see how I could do that and accomplish my mission of helping the Vietnamese win the support of the population.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Tanham had the same experience?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Yes, but his has been, I think, much rougher in the sense that Mr. Killen has chosen to take exception or objection to the emphasis in our AID program, the way it was organized, the purposes of it.

He believes, for instance, because we decentralized to the rural areas, we actually helped destroy or we hurt the central government because we didn't give the ministries anything to do, whereas the fact was that we had been running our AID program through the ministries before and achieving no results. So, in order to get something done, we took the AID program out into the provinces.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Killen then reversing this?

Mr. FRALEIGH. He has attempted to reverse but now he has found out this is very difficult because there is such instability in Saigon there are very few people to deal with. So, he is continuing the same general pattern of operation.

REMOVAL OF MR. NESS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you gentlemen know a man named Ness out there, any of you?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, I knew him.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did he leave, the same reason?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No, I don't think he was involved in anything of this nature.

The CHAIRMAN. They sent him home. He came back about, when, 6 months ago?

Mr. FRALEIGH. I think he was probably sort of a lame duck when General Taylor moved out and Mr. Sullivan went out, Ambassador Sullivan.

The CHAIRMAN. He was merely replaced by the new name?

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is right, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he sympathetic to these views; do you know?

Mr. FRALEIGH. I don't think that he even encountered these views. He moved out about the same time they arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a career diplomat; isn't he?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He wasn't in the AID program?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, sir.

WHAT IS WRONG AT SAIGON?

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Now, what is wrong at Saigon, gentlemen? We get around to this all the time. I told you the other night I am the devil's advocate with a degree of frustration here, because you tell me that the AID program works fairly well when it is decentralized in the provinces; you tell us that your American civilian aides or American civilian personnel have reasonably good security, considering what is going on in the area.

You have contacts with the Vietcong. You tell the information that you get to either CIA or to your superiors. Have you ever noticed that any of this information that you have given have been acted upon?

Mr. MELVIN. Not on the U.S. side. On the Vietnamese side; yes, sir.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. When you say "not on the U.S. side," what do you mean by that?

Mr. MELVIN. I have turned in all sorts of information on Americans where they happen to be located, American POW's, and the information goes into the machine and that is the last I see of it.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Like what?

Mr. FRALEIGH. American prisoners of war, where they are located.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Oh, you mean where the American prisoners of war are located?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. How do you get that information?

Mr. MELVIN. From agents.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. From the Vietcong agents?

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. And you turn that in to our Government people?

Mr. MELVIN. Right.

VIETNAMESE DOUBLE AGENTS

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. And do you ever find out whether these prisoners of war are contacted or released?

Mr. MELVIN. I get reports that they are not released. This is a very tenuous thing, and you have a lot of double agents, Vietnamese double agents working on this sort of thing. They know that we will jump to any information on American prisoners, so I would say four-fifths of that is not valid. But one case in particular I passed to General Duc and he did act. He acted wrongly. As a

result the Vietcong got word, I am sure, of what he was going to do. But he at least did act.

On our side I don't think that we really have a capability. We are advisors, and we keep strictly within that role.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. All right.

Now, you are here talking to us because you think something is wrong out there.

Mr. MELVIN. Yes.

WE ARE NOT WINNING IN VIETNAM

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Is that why? You didn't come here just for a visit. You had something else to do, I gather.

Well, what do you think is wrong? And if there is something wrong, who is responsible for it? I mean, we have got to get down to cases. All these little details mean nothing unless you get down to whether the policy is wrong, and if it is, what should be substituted, and if this information is not getting through, if you feel that some of the things that are going on are wrong, whose responsibility is it?

Mr. FRALEIGH. At the moment, of course, we all know that we are not winning in Vietnam and we know that it appears that the alternatives are very painful. One alternative appears to be, of course, escalation. Another alternative seems to be withdrawal. The question is, is there a third alternative, and is it possible to win, or to reverse the tide? We feel that it is still possible, but the time is growing very short.

A THIRD ALTERNATIVE

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. It is still possible for what?

Mr. FRALEIGH. It is still possible to try perhaps a third alternative to either escalation or withdrawal, and that is that we really move in there with a team which is politically oriented and can work with the Vietnamese groups, as I mentioned before you came here this afternoon, and can synthesize from them a program and some leadership. Our main problem in South Vietnam is that we are not thinking. What we are doing is emerging a tremendous amount of paperwork and bureaucracy and reacting to the Vietcong action.

We are in a passive situation, not in a situation of action. Our programs are passive and are not action programs. And we are not working with the Vietnamese themselves to develop action programs or platforms which the Vietnamese people themselves can rally to and follow and which, in turn, can stimulate motivation and leadership.

We believe if we get in there now with a team of people who can work with these Vietnamese groups, who do show real concern about what is happening to their country, it is still not too late in these last hours to develop a sense of motivation, much as was done in the Philippines, in which once that motivation emerged the Huks were defeated, to everybody's great surprise, in less than a year. We feel that this is a war of minds and that we still have something to sell and that our way is better than the Communist way.

NEED FOR A POLITICALLY ORIENTED LEADER

The CHAIRMAN. He said before you came in that what they need out there is the politically oriented leader in place, I would say, of a General, who is a fine General but not a politician, and the only man I could think of when he said that was our Vice President. He is the only one who is politically capable of doing this, both a successful politician and motivated. It seems to me a wonderful opportunity.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. One of the advantages of taking that assignment is that you couldn't do much worse than what is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. He made the point, that our leaders, the so-called top team there, do not understand politics. They do not understand dealing with people. He made that very clear.

Mr. FRALEIGH. May I say I do not know whether this covers Ambassador Johnson? I am speaking very, very frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand,

Mr. FRALEIGH. My observation has been that Ambassador Johnson has been pretty much overshadowed as of the moment. He is standing, obviously, in the wings, expecting some day to walk on stage and he is not getting very mixed up in the public eye with American policy. He is not as yet, and I think that has probably been wise, because if he is going to move in, if he had already been associated with a failing policy, it would not be——

BUREAUCRATIC ORDERS AND REGULATIONS

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Let me ask you a question. You told me the other day that central headquarters has just racks of bureaucratic orders and regulations.

Mr. FRALEIGH. This is true, and this is correct of the whole AID program. We are operating a program over there, which should be unconventional, according to conventional regulations and orders and that looks like a lawyer's office. You have to run to the books to find out what you should do next and what color toilet paper you should have, literally, or something like that. These laws are supposed to apply to nearly 70 different countries and they don't necessarily apply to fighting the Communists in Vietnam.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You also pointed out to me, as I recall, that you thought that we were spending more money than we needed to spend and that we had more people around there than we needed to have.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Very definitely, sir. This is not a war of more dollars, more guns, or more people, and again——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean military people or civilian?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Both. I think this is a mistake, a simplification of the problem which Secretary McNamara has been somewhat guilty of. He felt you could just send over more of this and somehow or other you could win.

Mr. MELVIN. Not quantity, we need quality.

COMPARISON TO THE PHILIPPINES

Mr. FRALEIGH. In the Philippines we were able to do this thing with a few people.

The CHAIRMAN. Magsaysay. That is why I say you need Humphrey over there.

Mr. FRALEIGH. But he was nurtured by American help.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You know that General Lansdale was in charge of that program; don't you?

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't know it until a moment ago this was mentioned.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. He was in charge, with Magsaysay, of pacification in the country. He also was over there in the early days of South Vietnam.

COMPARISON OF KHANH AND MAGSAYSAY

The CHAIRMAN. With Diem's death, regardless of what he may have been like, there is no one else you know of that might serve the purpose, the same role that Magsaysay [2] did?

Mr. LANSDALE. There are dedicated Vietnamese full of energy who could be brought up.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know such people? Do you know one such person?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir, I know a number of them over there.

The CHAIRMAN. All you need is one if they could rally around him.

Mr. LANSDALE. There are such people in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Is General Khanh not one of them?

Mr. LANSDALE. I don't think so, but he could be.

The CHAIRMAN. We examined McNamara and all of them about this Khanh. Everybody they knew said this was the best fellow they had. I don't know whether you were there or not, but we asked him particularly, Is there anybody in that country that you can tie to and you can back? The best one was Khanh. That is exactly what they told us in the committee.

Mr. LANSDALE. Sir, anybody that wants to be this sort of a leader, if he will trust somebody as a friend in close to tell him what is right and wrong to do, can be developed into this.

STUDENT LEADERS

Mr. MELVIN. Incidentally, the students in Saigon, as Bert probably knows, are considering this very problem: Who is the man? Last September they definitely ruled out Khanh. He could not be the man.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Have you told the chairman about the students?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, he did in the beginning.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. About the student leaders?

These men know the student leaders, and Bill, I have sat in these conferences and asked who are these student leaders. Nobody seems to know. That is why to me it was a revelation.

The CHAIRMAN. They all left the impression with the committee that the student leaders were just troublemakers.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. And sort of Commies?

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[2] Former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, radicals if not Commies, troublemakers. They always say students are always that way.

But on this very point I specifically recall questioning them. Who can you tie it to? Who in the country appears to be a leader, some personality that they can rally around and identify with their cause? I remember we went over it and Khanh was the best one. We had a description of what he was like. You remember that.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I sure do.

The CHAIRMAN. This was one of the key points. Can you tie to this man?

EVALUATION ON NGO DINH DIEM

Mr. LANSDALE. Sir, let me comment on it this way. Let's take President Diem. When he first got there, I am positive—and let's look back to the early days there. You will find that Bao Dai, the Emperor there, was sitting in France at the time and handpicked him because Diem had been in this country, knew some in the State Department, and I am positive that he appointed him as his Premier in Vietnam because he could get United States aid as the French were going into Geneva to quit. So, he picked somebody he figured he can get U.S. help and aid, and he picked this man.

The CHAIRMAN. Picked Diem?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes. I was in Saigon at that time on the Ambassador's staff, and brought in to try and help save the country there. We heard in a radio message that this man had been picked. I asked the Ambassador who he was because I didn't know Vietnam too well. I had just come in from the Philippines. He said that he had been an official of some sort, but we we went to the files and looked him up in the biographic register in the Embassy, and this is where we found out about this man.

He was coming in the next day at the airport outside of Saigon. He was flying in on a commercial airline from France.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this Bao Dai or Diem?

Mr. LANSDALE. This is Diem.

So, early in the morning, I drove out to the airport to meet him, and I noticed that along the road from the city itself out to the airport there were hundreds of thousands of people of all walks of life lining up along this roadway that this fellow would come in. I thought instead of going out to the ceremonies at the airport, I will get out of my car and just walk among the people and watch their attitudes toward this new leader coming in. We waited and waited and waited. The sun got hot. People had been there for hours, and the kids were getting restless and so forth, and they were still saying, "We will stay here and greet this man."

After a time we heard some sirens. Pretty soon, along came a motorcycle escort going about 60 miles an hour. A little black sedan was following it. You couldn't see who was in it, but it just shot right through people. People were all looking at each other. "What was it? Did you see him? Was this the man?" And so forth.

They didn't know. Just getting the disappointment in the crowd.

Dien Bien Phu had been fought. France was abandoning it. They were told this was a great leader coming.

The CHAIRMAN. They didn't know him? They just wanted to have one?

Mr. LANSDALE. That is right.

I went back and saw the Ambassador when he came back from the airport and I said, "This is wrong. This man should have come in in an open car or walked the streets or something and said, 'I am your champion.' "

The CHAIRMAN. Shook hands with everybody like Humphrey does.

You never miss that opportunity.

A POLITICALLY STUPID MOVE

Mr. LANSDALE. This was a politically stupid move that was made. So, I said, "Look, I don't know this man, but would you mind, as the No. 1 American here, if I sat down and wrote a little plan for him to follow which included driving along slowly and getting among the people and so on?"

He said, "No, go to it."

So, I sat down that night and the rest of the day and I wrote a plan for the next 30 days for the guy, for the next year, and then just for the ducks of it I threw in a hundred years, looking way out in the future, as the George Washington of his country, if he could be that. I checked it through with the Ambassador, and he said, "You can show it."

I went up to the palace. I don't speak Vietnamese. I don't speak French. I grabbed an American who could speak French, and took him with me. He was the head of USIA out there at the time. We went up to the palace, went by the guards, and I said, "I am looking for the new Premier." They said, "He is in an office there," so we went wandering in. There was a lot of confusion. He had just moved in.

I went up and introduced myself to him, told him I had watched him come in, I was concerned, and here were just some ideas for him, and I handed him this paper. He reached into his pocket, and of course my paper was in English and it was about 10 pages long. He picked out a little English-French dictionary: "Where is the railroad station? I am returning Friday? How much is the cloth?"

I said, "No, there are political ideas in here; this is a little more sophisticated than that. I have brought this man along who is bilingual in French and he can explain it to you."

The USIA man got the paper to translate it for him and explain it, and he held it out like this and brought it back, and he said, "Gosh, I forgot my glasses. I can't read this typing."

So, President Diem took his own glasses off and shoved them on this American, and he read this to him. Diem said, "This is very interesting. My brothers have told me differently. This is why I came in fast."

START OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS

He called in his brothers and I met his family and we sat there and started talking. I said, "I am doing this because I have been among your people. We Americans want to help people that want to be free, and your people have expressed this, and I am just

trying to be a spokesman for them, and I am a foreigner and you don't have to take this from me."

This started a relationship where I could go in and talk to him all the time I was there.

The CHAIRMAN. He always was friendly to you?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. How long were you there?

Mr. LANSDALE. Until the end of 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. But he didn't act on your advice, did he?

Mr. LANSDALE. He acted on my advice in holding a popular election. He was elected President finally, when there was a break with the Emperor. I insisted that the election be such that he would set up a political system and call an assembly to form a constitution that the folks would like, whatever document the Vietnamese wanted and whatever form of government, so that he had a platform that he was voted in on.

Mr. MELVIN. You are too modest here.

He practically wrote the constitution.

ROLE OF NGO DINH NHU

The CHAIRMAN. Was Nhu the one who also opposed his being friendly with the people?

Mr. LANSDALE. To a large extent, and making him suspicious of people. Nhu was running an intelligence system and he would always come in and say, "You know, so and so has a father," and this, that, and the other thing, just to give him extra influence with his brother.

The CHAIRMAN. He was the real trouble, I take it.

DIEM'S RELATIONS WITH COMMON PEOPLE

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir, but I have pictures of Mr. Diem in the early days when I was there, going out among the people, the people grabbing him and putting him up on their shoulders. He was a little, short, dumpy guy and he used to get sort of scared when they would do that.

But after a little bit of this—and this wasn't rigged at all, these were just the common people coming up, and I don't have to tell you gentlemen, something happens to you and you start responding to this. It happened to Diem. And he was really tremendous out among the people.

Mr. MELVIN. He continued, incidentally, even into 1963 out in the provinces, but not in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me why they ever got rid of him.

Mr. LANSDALE. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you suspect, if you don't know?

Mr. LANSDALE. I suspect that the reason we did was that many of our Vietnamese intellectual friends in Saigon who were seeking power for themselves had denigrated him a great deal. The Communist press had very carefully carried on a character assassination from the very early days, a great deal of which I read later in the U.S. press but which I heard initially years before on Radio Hanoi, and so forth.

DIEM'S IMAGE AS COLD AND REMOTE

I think the image of a cold, remote, corrupt mandarin dictator type, the image was solidified in part by all of this press attack on him and the intellectual talk and so forth, and somewhat from his own increasing fear toward the end, his brother making him suspicious of people, of not trusting them, so that he started withdrawing a bit from them, to the point where we felt that he was no longer capable of really handling the situation and ruling it.

And some of his ministers and people had done things that were quite wrong, like with the Hoa Hao that Mr. Melvin was telling about and so forth, so that he was credited with not keeping his word with folks and so forth, and using force and strength at times that I feel he didn't even know about, many times. He wasn't informed about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it was a mistake for them to remove him?

Mr. LANSDALE. I think we could have done something else with him.

ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE DIEM

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I was just going to ask, wasn't he susceptible to some pressure from the U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy, if we really cracked down?

Mr. LANSDALE. Sir, I think we could have gone in as a friend to say to him—and forced him to move his brother out and so forth. I last saw him in 1961, and he brought his brother in to talk. "Should I ask for U.S. aid? Should I ask for U.S. troops out here?"

And I said, "As an American I refuse to answer that."

And he said, "Do you think you need them? Are you that weak? Are you willing to admit to your own people you don't have anything here?"

He said, "No, don't."

I said, "Then why did you ask the question?"

I said, "With your brother here I am very worried. Do you realize that he isn't up to a position in the public where the public can see whether he is any good or not? Why don't you make him a minister in your cabinet, and he either does well on the job or not?"

At this time, he mentioned President Kennedy and his brother in the Government. And I said, "Yes, but the Attorney General is up where everybody can take a look at how he does his job. Why don't you do that with your brother?" His brother was quite angry with me for doing that, and Diem said, "Wait. He is incapable. He is not a good administrator."

I said, "Well, then, don't have him here advising you on administrative matters."

And he said, "Well, you don't understand. I am taking care of him."

I said, "Well, I think he is taking care of you now. And this is wrong."

But I never got a chance to get back on in again when things got very difficult. I did talk to the very top people in our Government at that time, in the White House, topside and State, and I was beg-

ging to be sent back and out to break up the family relationship in a very hard way for the United States. I said, "Before we go ahead with anything more, you come out and encourage a coup. This is a final last step that is going to cause trouble in the future. Let's try something else first on this. Go in and talk real rough."

ADMIT WE HAVE FAILED

The CHAIRMAN. That is very interesting. I still come back to this: You say you think——

Mr. LANSDALE. I sure hope this is kept in executive.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. This won't be published. It won't be allowed to be revealed to the press or to anybody but members of the committee.

That is very interesting and I am very glad to hear it. You said you thought you knew somebody now that is capable of being another Diem. Do you really have any feeling or do you just suspect that such a person may be found? Do you know anybody that you think could be or do any of you know anyone? Is there any person out there that might be built?

The reason I ask this, if we can't do this in the very near future, I am afraid I am about to give up on it. I just don't see how you are going to drag this out, and I would rather admit we have failed. I don't want to escalate this war. I am not going to do that, at least with my vote, under any circumstances. And if we can't do what you are saying we ought to do, then I think the other alternative is inevitable unless we can in some way get this moving in the right direction, which it apparently is not now.

A PERSONALITY PEOPLE CAN RALLY AROUND

Mr. LANSDALE. I don't know whether we can find another Diem but I think we can find another Magsaysay.

The CHAIRMAN. That is better.

Mr. LANSDALE. He was a cabinet member. He was Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. He was a personality around whom they could all rally and they had confidence in him?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir, but he had a President and cabinet sitting on top of him. I think we can get this relationship going and pick a young doer in Vietnam who could either be in Defense or Interior or someplace at a cabinet level. This then would take really Americans holding hands up at the top in the Vietnamese government to make them trust the man long enough and let him do his job, and to protect him in doing this by getting a feeling of loyalty between a chief of state and an executive underlying at some place to really generate this and get this going.

AMERICAN CONSULTANTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think with these generals in their present mood that this can be accomplished?

Mr. LANSDALE. We were talking about a team, sir. To me we have had enough very wonderful Americans passing through on tours of duty out there. If we say the Vietnamese have to win the war, and this is essentially what we are saying, can we find a Viet-

namese Magsaysay or another Diem and so forth, is there Vietnamese leadership and following that will win the war for us? I think we have to get Americans out who can help the Vietnamese do just this.

Now, if we say that they have to win, then why can't we go to the key people, generals and political figures in power, and say to them: "Which Americans whom you have known out here, if we could do it, would you name that we could bring out to be a consultant or an advisor or somebody to work right along with you?" Each one of these young Turk generals, each one of the top political leaders I am positive will come up with names of Americans who, if any of our top executive folks here wanted to screen through personnel, are the types of Americans we would want to send out, but the Vietnamese would pick them by names. I think if we really worked hard to get those Americans back out there, the Vietnamese would get a tremendous shot in the arm. This is their American, in other words, coming in. They are obligated by this face that Mr. Fraleigh was talking about, to heed their advice, to look on them as a real friend. The American, in turn, if he has a leader out there who keeps giving him a real program and a real direction, will go out and advise these people step by step to get things going.

Now, one piece of advice with the Premier and with, say, a Defense Secretary like a Magsaysay, would be to say, "We will keep very close tabs on the two Americans advising, and up close, whom these folks trust as friends and they have asked for them out there," to say, "You must trust each other, you two Vietnamese. This is the only way a government can run. This is the only way your country can be saved, trust."

And when he gets reports that the Secretary is talking behind his back about something, be very careful that the American who knows him well and is close enough to him finds out it is false. He would just come out and say, "That is false. Let's get you folks together to talk to each other here and you just ask him."

GET A VIETNAMESE TEAM TOGETHER

In this way we would get a Vietnamese team together that would really work. And, at the same time, if there are generals out around who want to revolt and everything, in turn will say, "No, but why do you want to?" Find out, and again go through the same process of making them willingly give their trust to some people and get behind and support. This is the only way you get teamwork.

The same thing with the Buddhists. The same thing with these students.

Why are they doing all this? You get down to root causes and start working them together into things and then finding a place where they can make their talents and capabilities and energies and so forth work toward a common goal and as part of a team. This is political work, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is. It takes a political genius to do that.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. It takes a lot of personal contact, personal trust, personal doing.

THE RIGHT TYPE OF AMERICANS

Mr. LANSDALE. The other thing on this, the Americans like that—the Vietnamese will pick Americans whom they felt were dedicated and willing to go out and risk their lives. For what? Because the United States said so? No, because they believed in what the United States did and they only are helping out in Vietnam toward our own great national goals that we have abroad on this, and that this is a very worthwhile doing. The Vietnamese will believe such Americans as that.

In turn, the Americans will be available to them night or day, so they don't have to worry if the guy is going to be in his office at 9 o'clock in the morning or 8 o'clock or something, and they can only meet in the office. We have Americans—and these gentleman here are such Americans—whom the Vietnamese don't mind calling up at 2 o'clock in the morning, and they are in pajamas or something and are about to go to bed or have gotten out of bed, and have a problem and don't feel embarrassed by sitting there in bare feet and talking to them, as a friend.

Now, it is getting these type of Americans up with top leadership in Vietnam so that they can work along with them.

FOREIGN MINISTER OF VIETNAM

I had the Foreign Minister of Vietnam, when he visited here, and I forgot whether he came in——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I had a long talk with him, a wonderful visit.

Mr. LANSDALE. He arrived in Washington. He was going up to see the President the next day, and he came in to say hello to me. We were old friends from years ago, in 1953 up in Hanoi. The fellow had just gotten off the plane, and that is a long trip to go across the dateline and the times are all different, and he was barely able to keep his eyes open. His staff members with him were so tired, and they were trying to wait on him, be nice. They were over at my house, and I said, "Go and lie down on the couch and get some sleep" to them. I propped him up with some pillows and put his feet up on there and I said, "How are things going," and so forth. He started to talk to me, and a lot of things he said, he said, "I don't know about that" or "It is going badly," and so on. And he jumped up from the chair and went over and woke up his staff who were sleeping there, and said "Listen, I am telling an American that I don't know something. This is a rare thing. I haven't done that since I last saw him, because we can't afford to do this with any American top officials in Saigon because they will cut off the aid or go and look for a replacement for us or something like that." He said, "They don't know that we are human and we don't have 100 percent good answers all the time."

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. He practically told me that when I talked with him. He was a very interesting fellow.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his name?

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Quat.

Mr. LANSDALE. He is an M.D., Dr. [Phan Huy] Quat.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. He told me a lot of things privately that he said he could not tell the Secretary of State, because he says, "When I see the Secretary of State, I will have my Ambassador with me."

Mr. LANSDALE. Who will report on him.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. "That Ambassador will report on me. The reason I want to talk to you, Senator, is that I have been told that you will be helpful in terms of conveying this information where it needs to be, to the Secretary of State or to the President."

And so he sat in my office and we talked and talked. He told me all kinds of things.

He said, "If I am asked about this, I am going to deny it." But he said, "I am telling you what you need to know." And he said, "I want you to be sure now that this information gets to where you think it ought to be."

So, I got hold of Dean Rusk and talked to him and told him about it. Later on this man Quat asked me whether or not I—I saw him once again just briefly—if I had been able to convey that message. This was in terms of what you are talking about right now; namely, that we need more than just a buddy system.

"You have got to have Americans there that are standing right with us and Americans that we trust and Americans that understand us and not Americans that deal with us like we are"—I won't say slaves or subservient—"but Americans that put us on an equal basis, except when you know more that you say you know more, and if we don't know that we can say we don't know, and if we are wrong you must tell us that we are wrong."

He said, "Your advisors now are so worried about sovereignty frequently that they will let us go along and make mistakes when they know better because they have been told, 'You must not in any way injure the sovereignty of Vietnam'."

He said, "You have got to be careful when you do this." We went over this the other day.

"If you chastise us in the presence of others, it becomes impossible, but if you tell us privately and insist upon it, why, we will do it." He just went on and on and on. He just kept telling me all about their weaknesses and what the problems were and how they needed people down at the local levels of government.

He said, "We have lost so many of our administrators. They have been killed and they have been intimidated."

He said, "You have just got to have people that understand Vietnam, that know our people, that our people understand and trust. You must help us run that government, and when we are wrong you must tell us we are wrong, and when we think you are wrong we must be able to tell you that you are wrong. You can't have this arm's-length business of normal diplomacy." He was just going on and on.

Didn't you bring him in to me?

Mr. PHILLIPS. No, sir, I didn't.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Somebody from the Governmental Affairs Insititute brought him in.

TURNOVER OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL

The CHAIRMAN. My God, Hubert, if I understand it, it looks like we have a tremendous turnover, just a succession of people that go, stay a few months, and then leave.

Mr. FRALEIGH. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This is impossible

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. It is just incredible.

The CHAIRMAN. What do we do about it?

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Now, Bill, they are taking out many of our people there that have learned how to speak the native tongue, that have a working acquaintanceship. They are sending them to language school to teach them Thai so they can put some of them over in Thailand. If they are totally incompetent, they shouldn't be there in the first place.

This fellow Killen that is out there, I have heard something about him besides. There have been complaints about him, but he apparently has decided that he is going to have his team in now. You know, everybody has got to bring their gang on in. It is ridiculous. I think that when that AID program comes up, you had better take a good look at that dollar sign on it, on that Vietnam business.

The CHAIRMAN. That is going to be a long time off. It seems to me if there is anything to be done, it ought to be done now. I don't know whether we can persuade the President.

[Discussion off the record.]

ALL COUPS TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY

The CHAIRMAN. The results clearly prove that things aren't going well, but how does one move in a situation like this? We have got this prestigious general now as the head of it, and he is a fine general and a fine man, but I can't imagine him doing what you are talking about. You can't do that here. He is always beautifully dressed and turned out and you just don't approach a fellow like that in an informal manner. He is a fine man. I don't wish to reflect upon him in any way, other than whether this was the right role.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Did you tell him about the Ambassador and the colonels?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Tell them about this recent coup, the colonels moving in and what the Ambassador did.

Mr. FRALEIGH. The young Turks, as I understand it, on December 20, it was a late Saturday night or early Sunday morning——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Don't these coups all take place on Sunday?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Is our Embassy active on Saturday?

Mr. FRALEIGH. I think they are getting that way.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. They hadn't been. Believe it or not, all this stuff had been going on—every coup was on Sunday.

COUP OF YOUNG OFFICERS AGAINST OLD ELITE

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, late Saturday night or early Sunday morning. Pearl Harbor was, too. The Embassies heard about this, it is my understanding—and I got this from the Vietnamese side, from the Vice Minister of National Economy. The young generals, the four young generals that decided to pull off this coup or this purge in order to isolate General Khanh—and they were afraid if they didn't that General Khanh himself would make a stab for the government; he was already plotting to do so. And so they conferred with Mr. Huong and Mr. [Phan Khac] Suu, the Premier and the chief of state, and before they did this. They had their tacit approval, because they felt that the Buddhists would not react, the Buddhists having had a hunger strike which didn't get any kind of violent street reaction, so they felt it would be safe to go ahead and have this government change. So, they went ahead and had the change, and they arrested a number of members of the High National Council.

The reason that they did this was because they wanted the High National Council to declare a law which put in effect that all the old generals who had served 25 years or more would be retired from the army. This would get rid of the old group.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. The old elite?

Mr. FRALEIGH. The old elite, and this would complete the revolution.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. The guys that had been in cahoots with the French.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, these are the collaborators.

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S REACTION OF THE COUP

Mr. FRALEIGH. Some of these young guys were with the French, too, but the idea was they couldn't do anything when they had these old corrupt generals and officers still in the army. They went ahead and did this. The Embassy heard about this and some of the young generals—I don't know whether all four went or not, but I heard it was all four—went to the Embassy to explain to Ambassador Taylor what had happened and Ambassador Taylor when they got there was furious with them. According to the Vietnamese, he got all four of them and lined them up and he told them in no uncertain terms that he was opposed to this coup and they should go immediately and reverse the coup, release anybody that had been arrested as prisoners, and restore the High National Council.

And so one of the young generals, a General [Nguyen Chanh] Thi, tried to explain to him what had happened, and he tried to explain to him why they had done this and why they were motivated and they had some motivation other than to just grab for power. The Ambassador wouldn't look to this. The Ambassador then asked them where General Khanh was and they said they didn't know.

Actually, they had General Khanh under house arrest. This is what they claimed.

And so the Ambassador said he must see General Khanh and talk to General Khanh, too. He asked them to find General Khanh, to. He asked them to find General Khanh and produce him.

Then they went out of the Embassy. They came and called up Sam Wilson in our office—General Thi called Sam Wilson and he was cursing Ambassador Taylor. He said Ambassador Taylor had just insulted him and insulted the other generals and, as far as he was concerned, he was going to get on the airplane and go back to his command in the north and that was all there was to it. He was furious.

INTERFERING IN THE VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS

And so then when this happened, they talked among themselves and apparently had a talk with Khanh, so Khanh went to the Embassy the next day.

When Khanh got to the Embassy, Ambassador Taylor told Khanh: "I no longer have any confidence in you. You will no longer have my support."

And Khanh said, "Does that mean that I should leave the country?"

Ambassador Taylor replied, "That might not be a bad idea."

And so Khanh was mad about this, and so he went out and he felt that this was interfering with the Vietnamese affairs.

So, when Khanh got back, the four got together with Khanh. Actually, they had been fighting each other up until this minute, and they decided that Ambassador Taylor was meddling in Vietnamese affairs and it was a question of national sovereignty, and he had made them, the four young guys, lose face. So, they rallied together, instead of splitting up, and they decided to go against General Taylor.

PAYING FOR THEIR TICKETS

Before they did this, General Khanh—this is something I didn't mention but it is so typically Vietnamese and so typically Asian—General Khanh called Ambassador Taylor on the telephone and he said, "If I leave the country, will the United States pay for my ticket?" Ambassador Taylor said, "I will think about it." Then General Khanh hung up.

About 30 minutes later he called again and he said, "If I leave the country and some of the other generals leave, will the United States pay for all of our tickets?" Ambassador Taylor replied, "I will consider it." After that it was all broken.

Then they decided among themselves to have Taylor declared persona non grata after this question of national honor and face. In order to do this, they had to get this civilian chief of state to do this. They went over and asked him if he would do it, and he said he would not. So, that is about the end of it.

GENERAL KHANH'S LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT

We at that time felt that this impasse between the United States and the Vietnamese generals, especially General Khanh, would last perhaps a week and then they would fall out among themselves, but actually it has gone on until this moment. My personal feeling, however, at this moment is, even if this is patched up or papered over today, that maybe the young generals and General

Khanh will still fall out, because General Khanh definitely does not have any more popular support.

The CHAIRMAN. He does not?

Mr. FRALEIGH. He does not. He has run out of popular support.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel, too, that there is somebody that might be made into a popular leader there?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes, sir, I definitely feel there are a number of people.

The CHAIRMAN. I would rather have one instead of a number, if you can think of one.

Mr. FRALEIGH. Yes. I myself know of several people whom I would consider highly qualified.

The CHAIRMAN. Civilians?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Both civilians and military.

The CHAIRMAN. And who have some following, some base to begin with?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Well, I know a civilian—yes, a civilian who has some following, but I also know military people who have following.

CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS UNREALISTIC

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Which brings this question up: Do you think that it is absolutely essential to have a totally civilian government there at this time?

Mr. FRALEIGH. No, sir, I certainly do not. I think it is not only nonessential but I think it is unrealistic.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. That High Council and Huong, our Government's position is that it must be civilian. They are modifying that some, but up until recently it had to be civilian.

Mr. FRALEIGH. That was a matter of face.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to experiment a little, is there such a man, a young officer we will say, that you think could be built up if we really backed him and tried to build him up?

Mr. PHILLIPS. May I throw something in here, sir? The easiest way to get one of these leaders killed off politically is to come out and give him the official U.S. blessing the way Secretary McNamara raised Khanh's hand.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. That fixed him.

Mr. PHILLIPS. The immediate Vietnamese reaction was that the Americans are trying to impose a leader on us and we won't stand for it.

GROW INTO A LEADERSHIP POSITION

The CHAIRMAN. Then how would you go about it?

Mr. MELVIN. Let someone grow to the top position. I know such a man. I can give you his name. He is 78 years old. He is highly acceptable. He has got one foot with the people, one with the government. He was the first Prime Minister that they had in Vietnam in 1945. I mentioned him to you, sir, Dr. Hoach. He is an eye surgeon. He is currently the interministerial chairman for all four of their religions. After November 27 they reaffirmed their faith in his chairmanship. He is acceptable to the students. He is a fine man.

But why pick a man like this? He is too old for the job, no question about it. But as General Lansdale said, to get a Magsaysay, someone who can grow and prove that we made the right choice, before he emerges to the top will give us great stability of choice.

AMERICANS WHO UNDERSTAND ASIA

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. How do you do that? That is what the chairman is after.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get this done?

Mr. LANSDALE. We come to a very basic question on this thing. Vietnam is only one of the countries where the Communists will be fighting this hard, and we haven't come to it yet in other countries, but we passed it in Laos. But if you get Americans who understand this—and I don't know that our present organizational setup is organized correctly to fight such a war—but by this time we have had Americans who have been down this road in a number of countries, who understand it. When they move into a country the people there understand that they understand it and will start working with them.

It doesn't matter whether the guy is wearing a civilian suit or a uniform or what. They start catching on, and it is a mixture of political, military, economic, and so forth. So, the way you start solving this is to find a way of getting those Americans into duty, and in a place where they can work under firm U.S. policy guidance and this thing, but not in a normal narrow slot job of some sort. Be available to them, and get in and encourage this.

For example, in Vietnam today there are a number of younger people now in their early 30's out there. Some have been in the government. Some are in business. Some are in the military. Some are part of the civil service now who are desperate to rally to a very unselfish devotion to their country up above getting their week's pay and so forth, and committing themselves thoroughly to win behind somebody and something, if they can really be made effective in their jobs. I think if we could find one of these younger folks and make him, with the blessing of the top leadership, the Vietnamese leadership, the Premier and chief of state, and move him into leadership or some important post that will have great meaning throughout, and let him start rallying some of these folks and hiring them, and then protect him against this tremendous bureaucracy in Vietnam, on their side, and get the American bureaucracy to help permit breaking some of the rules and bring in these folks, we can start getting not only that ministry working but right across the board putting in similar folks devoted throughout the country. They, in turn, will start generating a lot of them.

APPROACHING THE KEY PEOPLE

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Would you start to work with Huong right now?

Mr. LANSDALE. He is the leader now. You would have to start with him.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. What you were saying earlier is you would go apparently to the key people in the government at

the present time and these key generals, this mixture that is coming out now, part civilian and part military.

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You would go to the key religious leaders, the youth leaders, and you would say, "All right, look here, we are going to give you a team over here. We are prepared to help. You give us the names of people that you think would make good American partners over here in Vietnam in this common struggle for your freedom."

Mr. LANSDALE. If I had the rest of this ready to go yesterday I would do it, but I would't do it if just offhand as the only answer to the thing. And I am not too certain that our Americans in Saigon presently could do this in the right way and be believed.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I understand that. It might take a change.

Mr. LANSDALE. But this would be part of the change.

DEALING WITH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Let's say you have got a practical situation today. We have a government in Saigon.

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I mean there is a Vietnamese government there. It isn't much but it is there. If you were now made the Ambassador, General, what would you recommend that we do with that government? Let's get right down to particulars. Let's say we have got General Lansdale now as Ambassador.

Mr. LANSDALE. I would immediately sit down and talk to the present government leaders there, and this is the Premier and the chief of state, the old Suu who is almost a figurehead, but sit down and talk very much the way we are talking here.

"We want to help but we can't help because of the change," and so forth. "Who among the young Vietnamese or younger, more energetic people could be brought in to help?" Let them start naming people. And if they didn't name some folks that we know about, and we know so many of these people, just raise the name. And if they react, say, "Why don't you trust him, why don't you pick him?" Start resolving some of these differences, perhaps by bringing these folks together.

I brought many folks that were enemies with each other and acting as good officers, saying," I want you to meet each other because you both sound alike. You say you differ on things but you both talk to me the same way. Talk to each other the same way and see if you can't get together." And I brought them together.

Given that as a start, and doing it obviously to help them succeed in their positions there, and doing it so that they take it in earnestness, good faith, and integrity on our part, and doing it as a good friend to help, not just to make us look good but to make them look good and to save their country, you have got them willing to listen, do, and act. Then you start to bring in the Americans to help.

Now, you said if I were out there. I would grab people like you see right here to come up and work out of the Embassies and very close to the top. If one of them was closer to a top Vietnamese

figure, I would say "Well, he is the man you will be working with," and so forth, and he could just move right in close to him. This takes a degree of humility, mind you.

It might be that someone far below me in rank or age or something else might be closer to the top man than I would be, and it takes a humility to let that guy go ahead and be close to him and take credit and so forth. You have to be quite selfless in these things. This, in turn, is reflected very quickly by agents who, in turn, start trusting on this thing.

WILLIAM TRUEHEART

Given that, then you need to same sort of Americans working in closely to coordinate the U.S. effort. Now, we had a good man, a Foreign Service career man, coordinating all of the U.S. effort and a really good term in Saigon and quite informally in a work session much like this, without a lot of red documents, but getting things going. He is back here in the State Department now in Washington. A person like that ought to be moved back in to get the U.S. effort——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. What was his name?

Mr. LANSDALE. Trueheart, whom I haven't met, but I have just heard from Americans and Vietnamese and everything that here was a fine person.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his position?

Mr. FRALEIGH. Bill Trueheart. He was Deputy Chief of Mission before Mr. Ness in the Embassy. He ran a committee on provincial rehabilitation which met at least once a week, and usually for 3 or 4 hours, at which the operating level people from all the various U.S. agencies were present, the General, the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did they move him out?

Mr. FRALEIGH. When they moved him out that was the last time we had any meeting of that nature. That was more than 15 months ago, I think, now. The very thing that Melvin brought up over here about the guys wanting to resign, had we had such a committee, that would have been on the table at the very next meeting and all discussed. But since that stopped, there has been no dialog between the American agencies at a working level in Saigon, none whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. This completely puzzles me.

Mr. FRALEIGH. There have been orders come down from State ordering this to be reestablished, but it has never been done by the Embassies.

Mr. LANSDALE. You can substitute another name for me on this, but I am thinking very specifically because of this.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. We have to get down to specifics.

COORDINATE ALL AMERICAN OPERATIVES IN VIETNAM

Mr. LANSDALE. I don't want this to look self-serving at all.

The second thing to do would be to have the team—here you have got an American—to get the American operators all talking to each other, understanding and working on problems, and coming up with solutions and to do the type of correction right from the

Embassies. You have to got a group of Americans such as these gentlemen whom the Vietnamese trust and respect and feel are friends that you can put in very quickly to work with the present government topside there, and the military. I would certainly grab this man that is here in Washington now that was very close to General Khanh. He should go right back, and fast, to find out quickly what Khanh is feeling and all the rest of this.

You start bringing these Vietnamese together through these Americans, until you start getting a working entity within the present government where the Vietnamese officials themselves are talking to each other and starting to trust each other and working together. Then you start bringing in other elements, the students, the Buddhists, and other groups that are in opposition, and you find Americans that are close to them, and again bring in the group.

Now, this group of Americans is not a very large one. I doubt that it would even come up to 10 people who would have an ability to talk to General Khanh and to a student leader and so forth, maybe a dozen key people. It might be just one American. But, in turn, they have got to be talked to by a person that speaks for the United States in terms that they feel here is a friend who is really trying to help them win, is up talking to them here, and you can have a tremendous dialog and give-and-take going on these things.

PRACTICAL POLITICAL PEOPLE

I would certainly, as early as possible, bring in real practical political people from the United States and I think the service up here on the Hill, or perhaps a governor, but somebody that wasn't born with a gold spoon in his mouth but had to come up the hard way in the rough and tumble of politics and knew reality. I would certainly want at least two such people out there to be available as consultants with political leaders who wanted to start building an organization out through the countryside, and start advising them on that, and to be available to talk to them as the Vietnamese are worried about the stability of their government, of sitting down and working out methods of ensuring that, and broadening it so that if the young Turks wanted to overthrow something, of getting them in to sit with the leaders, and they all sit and discuss what this would really mean if they did it, but what did the young Turks want to bring about in their way of just sitting around and talking, that this could be agreed to without use of force and illegal means on this.

Then that point is when you would start getting the names of Americans, the key people who are going to be in command and at decision points throughout the country. You go and say, "Give me the name of the American that you really respect and would most want to be out here to help you in these diffcult moments." Then work very hard to get them out and, in turn, have them working very closely with this same top team.

THE COMMUNISTS HAVE THE INITIATIVE

Getting this done is not enough. The Communists still have the initiative. They still have the strategy. They still have the tactics

on this thing. We are just reacting to them. These same people, with maybe one or two others, ought to be devising a strategy, a program, if you will, toward a victory on our side, without retaliation on the north, without bombing villages, and so forth, of winning over the people and getting a victory that the U.S. public and you gentlemen could stand foursquare behind, of the people defeating the Communists out there, the Vietnamese people, working out that strategy, and then working out tactics from that to let us do something that makes the Communists make a mistake, and force them to make the mistake, which would then require the Communists—for any such tactical mistake on their part it takes them 3 months to figure out what they did wrong, and those 3 months are time that you have bought to work out further things to make them do wrong things.

This will very quickly let you seize the initiative on this, if you have got good Vietnamese keeping on doing it, and you are strengthening them. Then this thing starts snowballing. The Communists will never catch up again.

MAKING THE MILITARY INITIATIVE

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Let's assume that what you have outlined makes sense, and let's assume that we would like to implement it. How do you get this thing underway if the Communist forces, the Vietcong, are able to terrorize, infiltrate, attack, and devastate? What do you do on the military front now? This is the application and I know they are interrelated. I am not unaware of that.

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. But what do you do to start getting some military initiative? Can we do better militarily?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You are a military officer. You have been out in the battlefield. What do you think can be done militarily?

Mr. LANSDALE. There are, again, a number of things that can be done. What I have done in both the Philippines and Vietnam before is get a group, call them Rangers, call them Special Forces, whatever, of highly trained, motivated combat types. In the past I have split them up and put them in with different units, usually a team of five men with a regular battalion, and let those five men do all of the things that we have been saying, patrolling at night and all types of closeup combat against the enemy, and let those men come back after a success against the enemy and do a very human thing, boast about what they have done the night before as they are cleaning their weapons. You would notice the morale and the spirit of the troops, in wanting to emulate these folks, very naturally generate and start moving up on this thing.

I have suggested this, incidentally, to every last one of our military leaders who have gone out into a key position in Vietnam. I have suggested this to all of our Ambassadors who have been there. I have told them that this is a proven working method. I haven't seen it done yet, sir.

Next, I would take a unit that has a success, and if need be I would very carefully pick a small target and send a battalion in to almost a setup for them to win. I would let the men go in and go through the risk and be very successful in doing this the right way that would have been taught, and let them come on out feeling very gung-ho, that they had really done something, at which time I would decorate the men publicly, praise them, or reward them in some way. I would split them up and let them go out and preach this gospel as little training teams around with the rest of the army, and be as boastful as they want and so forth, but get the rest of the armed forces angry enough that those fellows, whether they said were boasting or not, would want to go out and do something better.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Do you use this?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. In the Philippine situation?

Mr. LANSDALE. Yes, sir, and in Vietnam, too. These things have worked.

VULNERABILITY OF THE ENEMY

Then this enemy is vulnerable and he is not too bright always. They are Vietnamese just like the folks on our side, and they don't trust each other. There are all sorts of things that can be done once you get to really learn the enemy leaders and the organizations and start to divide them.

There is a tremendous amount of infiltration work that can be done, dressing up troops on our side as the enemy and moving them in and getting them to mistrust each other, of taking some of the folks that were coming in and talking to Melvin and saying, "Look, I am ready to give you a commission in the Vietnamese Army if you do this. You have got these three hard-core advisors just down from Hanoi. Get rid of them. And then come in and talk to me again." And you will notice that the three Vietcong would be murdered, and then others being sent down from Hanoi would have two thoughts before they got in and joined such a unit. There are all sorts of things that can be done up close on the other side.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. But this is being done, isn't it, a lot of this?

Mr. MELVIN. We don't have a very good OB, by that I mean order of battle or list of names and units and who are the Vietcong. We don't know for the most part.

Mr. LANSDALE. We have taught all of this, sir, but it really isn't being done this way.

Mr. MELVIN. Since this is the record, may I introduce that paper you gave me?

Mr. LANSDALE. I think the Vice President might see that one.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Is that the one I asked you to get ready?

Mr. LANSDALE. No, sir. This one I wrote New Year's Day.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. We ought to get this in.

[The paper referred to follows:]

THOUGHTS ON VIETNAM

I.

The United States needs a win in Vietnam. This need is clearly a critical matter, if one considers not only the consequences of our commitment there, but also how much the events in Vietnam are reflected in U.S. relations in country after country around the world. Anything less than a plainly recognized win will pose foreign problems for the United States, ranging from the difficult to the dangerous. The moment seems to be one of those potential turning points in world history which usually look like just another event until they are seen truly afterward. It is now just before us.

A win is possible in Vietnam. It will require the United States to mend its ways in dealing with Vietnamese problems and to use intelligently the lessons taught by the war in Vietnam, not merely pay them lipservice. The changes required are practical ones. If they are undertaken correctly, the United States can start the Vietnamese on the first steps toward victory. If they are following up thoroughly, there will be a definite win during the new U.S. administration, a win credited to the leadership of President Johnson.

The principles involved in gaining a win in Vietnam are fundamental ones. They can be stated this way.

(a) The Vietnamese themselves are the only ones who can truly free their own country from Communist subversive insurgents who are striving to capture the country by capturing the loyalty of its people.

(b) The United States, which is committed to help the Vietnamese be free, must give its help in a way that strengthens the Vietnamese will and capability to achieve freedom; conversely, it must not give help in a way to encourage some selected Vietnamese to wage conventional war on their own people; the "freedom" of the grave is not the desired end.

(c) Thus, the United States must place Americans into Vietnam, in positions where their influence can be decisive, whom the Vietnamese trust to share the Vietnamese desire to be free in a way understood by Vietnamese, and whom the Vietnamese realists believe can give practical advice worthy of their heeding on how to defeat Communist subversive insurgency as it is waged in Asia; this is another way of saying: Pick the right man for the job, position him to do the job, and then give him the help he needs to get the job done.

(d) With the right Americans in the right places doing the right things in Vietnam, the climate will be established for the right Vietnamese to emerge into the right places to do the right things to free their country; the "right things" include both a strategy which outthinks and outdoes the Communist leadership and a strategy which constructs a stable government reflecting and responsive to the will of the great majority of the people in a way they recognize and willingly support.

II.

These fundamental principles, in turn, need to be put into practice in a realistic way. Noted below are some of the initial steps in doing so:

(1) The top United States leadership in Vietnam, starting with the Ambassador, should be Americans who are associated in Vietnamese minds as champions of individual liberty and who have proven this championship out on the battlegrounds of today's struggle. In Vietnamese eyes, none of the present top United States leadership in Vietnam meets this criteria. The need, then, is to replace them with Americans who do meet it. Although such Americans are rare, they do exist and should be positioned in Vietnam.

(2) As part of the direct staff of the U.S. Ambassador, there should be a small, handpicked group of Americans who can devise strategy, advise the Ambassador, and also be intimate counselors to Vietnamese who are in key positions of decision. They must be Americans whom the Vietnamese trust enough to share with them their innermost problems and expect understanding friendship, even if such problems arise in the middle of the night and are discussed under most informal conditions. Among Americans who would be able to play this role are Rufus Phillips, Lou Conein, and John Vann. There are others.

(3) Added to this small group working directly for the Ambassador should be at least two practical American politicians, a Democrat and a Republican, who can work with the realities of Vietnam in counseling Vietnamese leaders in the construction of political parties based and organized among the people, in devising a form of representative government which they then help evolve into being, step by step as feasible, and in assisting the Vietnamese in keeping the existing government

as stable as humanly feasible in the interim. Such a bipartisan U.S. team could be used to gain some positive dividends in the United States, such as explaining the Vietnamese situation plainly enough to U.S. political figures here at home to gain harmonious support for the administration's policy in Vietman, as well as earning wide acceptance among U.S. political thinkers for the long-needed "cold war" operation of practical U.S. political work abroad. The U.S. politicans selected need to have wide repute for astuteness and integrity. Two names that come to mind for such skilled political work are Bill Benton, as a Democrat, and Walter Judd, as a Republican. Again, there are others.

(4) Another addition to this small group working directly for the Ambassador should be a coordinator of the U.S. effort, a person with demonstrated ability to get the U.S. operational echelons working imaginatively and energetically in willing teamwork on tactical, day-to-day, week-to-week operations, as the real executive assistant to the Ambassador. Further, he must be fully aware of the realities of Vietnam and be freed to participate as much as needful in personal contacts with key Vietnamese, as well as help devise the long range strategy. A person who played this role successfully in the past in Vietnam was William C. Trueheart of the Foreign Service. He should prove invaluable in an even larger role under the top leadership envisioned above.

(5) Given United States leadership which would have the trust of the Vietnamese leadership, resulting in teamwork at the top in Saigon, the concept of a realistic teamup of Vietnamese with Americans whom they really trust and respect should be extended to at least the next echelon, if not further. An effective way to do this, which would bolster Vietnamese morale tremendously while greatly increasing United States prestige, would be to ask key Vietnamese leaders to name the American known to them whom they would most want assigned as an advisor—and then the United States should go to work to get that advisor sent to Vietnam for such advisory work, as a matter of priority, for the best interest of the United States. Past experience has shown that this would result, in the overwhelming majority of cases, of returning to Vietnam a number of Americans of unusual dedication and selfless service who infuse this same spirit among Vietnamese with whom they work. Admittedly, this would require a sharp change in United States personnel management practices, but its dynamic effect in Vietnam, coupled with a United States leadership there who would free such United States advisors to play the full role for which they are capable, could be possibly the single most important United States action in changing the course of the war in our favor.

(6) At the same time, Americans who have served in Vietnam and have a strong desire to return there for further service, should be given a way of volunteering without prejudice to their careers in United States services. Names of such volunteers, with notes of their specialty, their previous duties in Vietnam, and their personal reasons for volunteering to return should be passed expeditiously to the Embassy in Saigon for screening by the Ambassador and his immediate, special staff. In turn, the Ambassador will submit names approved via this screening to the head of the appropriate United States service in Vietnam, for reclama to the Ambassador with cause or compliance in requesting individuals by name within a brief period, perhaps 3 days if this is reasonable under Saigon conditions at the time. Such requests from Saigon should then have priority over other considerations in being filled by U.S. personnel staffs in Washington. This personnel action, along with the others noted above, is made an executive action by top leadership mainly because, in a people's war such as in Vietnam, the United States people on the scene should be the most valuable United States assets. As such, they deserve top consideration by top people to get the committed American doers, who know how to do the right thing, out to Vietnam and doing so.

(7) Still another change in United States personnel procedures can be accomplished in Vietnam by simple fiat under existing rules. The top staffs of U.S. organizations in Saigon need some realistic leavening of their thinking by adding the field viewpoint as plans develop, to ensure that U.S. plans and directives made practical sense to the Americans and Vietnamese who have to carry them out in the Vietnamese countryside. A ready way to do this is to select individual Americans who have proven themselves over the months in the field, away from Saigon, and give them the opportunity of volunteering for a 1-year tour in Saigon as full members of top staffs. This would infuse a heavy dose of field reality into U.S. thinking in Saigon, without the need to depend upon the presently overloaded reporting and paperwork systems. It is probable that a number of exceptional Americans, now on 1-year hardship tours in the Vietnamese countryside, would volunteer for an extra year of putting reality into the thinking of Saigon staffs. It would be for them a "dream" assignment, not to be missed.

III.

It is by no idle design that the first steps toward getting a win in Vietnam are listed above as actions to place the right Americans into the right service there. The stark fact, which needs to be faced up to, is that the Communists are winning control of more and more Vietnamese people, along with the geography upon which they live, despite the great superiority of the Vietnamese forces backed by the United States—in the size of the forces on our side, in the bountiful fiscal support they have had, and in the abundancy of modern weapons and equipment with which they have been supplied. Our side outnumbers, outguns, and is wealthier than the enemy who is creepingly defeating us. Surely it is rational to put the finger on the management of these superior resources and say: Change this management to one that can use these resources correctly to get a win. This is the crux of our problem in Vietnam.

For some obscure reason, which perhaps future historians might uncover while trying to explain the incredible, the United States has made small use of Americans who have shown that they know how to defeat Asian Communist subversive insurgency. The beleaguered Vietnamese know who these Americans are and have pleaded with the United States for such help, in vain. We have given Vietnam everything but our winners in this unconventional type of warfare. It is as though a football team in the last quarter of the game asks for a fieldgoal kicker and instead sees the star catcher of the baseball team sent in who has never kicked before, a passer asked for and a pole-vault champion sent in, a defensive linesman needed and the captain of the debating team supplied. If such a team were then defeated, despite the money lavished on its uniforms and equipment, or the thick steaks at its training tables, where would the sportswriters and the spectators place the blame? The analogy is uncomfortably close to the reality of United States actions in Vietnam, with the consequences in terms of historians as the sportwriters and foreign governments as the spectators.

Placing the "right" Americans into decisive position in Vietnam, and backing them up, would lead to proven strategy and tactics being employed by the Vietnamese into making the war a "pro-people" struggle on our side, giving the Vietnamese a cause to fight for instead of against, building up a representative Vietnamese political system the people willingly support as something of their own, and breaking the will of the enemy by using a superior political base for psychological, economic and military actions. This is a proven way of getting a win and is in sharp contrast to the present United States theory being applied in Vietnam, of selecting an elite to form a rootless central administration and of a United States-supported military arm which conventionally attempts to destroy enemy units by military force. Using a further sport analogy, we are using a pro football team and are playing a bangup game of football—only, it is being played on a rink and the game, with its scoring, is hockey. We have scored a little, but our opponents' skill and knowledge of the rules of the game are giving us a bad licking. By switching to playing the right game, we at least can give ourselves an intelligent break.

As a postscript, it is not too early to start considering the consequences if we start winning in Vietnam. Certainly, the great majority of United States advisors would be phased out of Vietnam. Faith in American know-how would be revived in the free world, along with fresh respect for the United States in much of the rest of the world. But, do we then attempt to rest on defensive ramparts along the perimeter of South Vietnam, or do we try for a better resolution of the situation in Laos and Cambodia? Will the Chinese Communists remain in a static role or attempt seizing the initiative to continue their dynamic role? Or, can we induce the Chinese Communists to choose the static role by political arrangement or by threat? Or, once the United States learns to apply political actions correctly in the cold war, as a true instrument of its power, should the United States then use it further to enforce the Wilsonian concept of "self-determination" of nations by undertaking revolutionary actions to create proper conditions for such determination in North Vietnam, in China itself?

The further goal is worth solid consideration as we go for a win in Vietnam.

ED LANSDALE.

12/31/64

DIFFERENT TESTIMONY FROM JOINT CHIEFS

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I have asked these men to put down their private thoughts and get some specifics in the record because this is some different testimony that we have been getting.

The CHAIRMAN. It surely is. It is quite different.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. It is just impossible not to give it some credence when it comes from men who are proven and tested in the work that they are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. When I think of the character of our two Ambassadors there, I don't think they can do this sort of thing. It is out of their line. They wouldn't be expected to do this sort of thing.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Cabot couldn't go that either.

The CHAIRMAN. Cabot isn't that kind of a man. You can't expect a four-star general who has been Chief of the Joint Chiefs to talk to these minor officials in an informal manner. It is just against nature to do that.

Mr. LANSDALE. This really isn't personalities. I am just wondering if a lot of things here aren't something——

The CHAIRMAN. I know when talking to General LeMay, he is so formidable behind his big cigar and he is not even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. These people are not that kind of people. You know them as well as I do. They have a place, but it isn't this kind of a place.

Mr. FRALEIGH. I think the thing we want to get across is we still believe that the majority of the Vietnamese people are very strongly anti-Communist. They don't know which way to turn. They haven't developed their own leadership to show this. The situation is still salvageable.

NEED FOR A LEADER

The CHAIRMAN. I come back to my other one. I don't know anything about this, but I have noticed the countries that have done pretty well have had a leader, and it does not necessarily mean he has got to be Jesus Christ, but he is a man around whom they rally. Magsaysay was one. The first gleam of hope I can remember in the Philippines was Magsaysay. Before that they were all so corrupt nobody had the slightest respect for any of the officials until he appeared, and then he turned it around and ever since it has been going well. The best example in this hemisphere is Muñoz, one man who has absolutely made over that country because all of the people rallied around him. Look at the Dominican Republic.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Look at the way he conducted himself.

The CHAIRMAN. In this country we have had a long tradition of institutions which sort of make it unnecessary to have an individual. It is good to have one but we can get along without one.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Don't be too sure on that one.

The CHAIRMAN. We did get along for 8 years during the 1950's without one and it proved our institutions were strong enough that you don't need a leader, but it is all right to have one.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You can tolerate him.

The CHAIRMAN. But this kind of a country, I think, has got to have one. Really all this other talk is how do the Americans manage to make it possible for one to develop, if one can develop.

Mr. MARCY. Quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Ever since we have been there, ever since Diem was killed, this recurs. Who is going to be the man that can pull

this country together? They told us Khanh. They built up Khanh pretty strong.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I mean in our committee.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. They built him up in our committee.

The CHAIRMAN. When we asked them who is going to do this, "Khanh is the best man out there. He has got spirit. He seems intelligent," and so on. "He is the best possible," and it just doesn't turn out.

Senator SPARKMAN. A mixer with people.

Mr. FRALEIGH. They never stayed close to him.

Mr. PHILLIPS. And they never really helped him.

The CHAIRMAN. They didn't?

WHY KHANH IS BITTER

Mr. PHILLIPS. No, sir. In fact, I can cite you one incident which is really, I think, why Khanh is so bitter. Khanh had somebody on his staff write up this constitution for him that sort of elected him the supreme leader. He gave that constitution to the American Embassy, and this is a fact, and it was reviewed by General Taylor and by Mr. Sullivan. They made a few minor changes in the language of this thing, and it was given back to Khanh.

Now, I am sure they gave it back to Khanh with the understanding that really they were just trying to help him out but they weren't really involved, but this wasn't Khanh's understanding. His understanding was, when he gave them this constitution and they gave it back to him and said in effect that it was OK, that he had the full 100-percent backing of the Americans to put this constitution into effect. He went down and assembled all the leaders in the army and he said, "I have the 100-percent backing of the Americans. This is their constitution. You are going to vote me in."

And everybody said, "If this is so sure we are going to vote you in." And so in came this thing, and of course it hadn't been checked out with any of the political leaders, the Buddhists, students, or anybody else and there was this tremendous reaction, "We don't want a dictator, Khanh or anybody else, imposed on us." Out they went in the streets. They forced Khanh to back down. The Americans didn't lift a finger to help Khanh at this point.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Left him high and dry.

Mr. PHILLIPS. And he got very bitter.

The CHAIRMAN. This was last——

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Last November.

Mr. FRALEIGH. The charter of September 13.

Mr. PHILLIPS. This is the kind of thing that never should have happened, but unless there is communication and constant contact between friends that understand each other, this is the kind of thing that does happen.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I heard about the discussions of this. Our Embassy was working on the proposition that Khanh had checked this all out with everybody, you know, that this was great, and that we were just trying to get the language straightened out a little bit and give it a little style.

The CHAIRMAN. We were the legal advisors.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Really, no fooling. Of course, our Embassy figures all the time Khanh is going out and check this with the Buddhists and the Catholics and the students and everybody else, and Khanh was coming to us to make sure that either we were going to clear it with all the boys or that we were going to say to him, "Look, this is it and we have got the power and we will see to it that you are in power."

AUTHOR OF THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION

Mr. PHILLIPS. Incidentally, there was a young American who went out there and talked to the major on Khanh's staff that was writing this constitution. He said, "Have you checked this with any political leader?"

"No," he said, "are you a lawyer?"

"No," he said, "have you ever had any experience in writing constitutions?"

"No."

He said, "What is your experience?"

He said, "I have been an army officer. You pick up a lot of things in the army."

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Who was this, not our American?

Mr. PHILLIPS. This was the Vietnamese Army major writing the constitution who told it to an American, and I am sure it was reported back to the Embassy but I don't know that it ever got up.

BLESSINGS IN THE BACK ROOM

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what we can do about it unless we have a new setup of our own.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Bill, I think the best example of what goes wrong, and I heard about this within 48 hours after it happened, was when that picture appeared in the American press, do you remember, where McNamara was addressing all the troops and he put his arm around Khanh and said, "This is our man." Well, man oh man, a friend of mine that was traveling in Saigon, it was about a week later, he came on back and said, "That fellow is all through." He said, "He has had it." I said, "What do you mean, he has had it?" He said, "Your Secretary of Defense went over there and just killed him."

I know we were led to believe back home here in America—you read that and said, "Isn't that great? There is McNamara and he is out there and he is giving him the real old blessing."

It is one thing to give him the blessing in the back room. You know, all of us fellows in politics have a few boys that we give some blessing to and we get blessed once in a while, but there are a certain number of people that have blessed me that I wouldn't want to have bless out here in the street.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. This had never occurred to him, of course. He felt this was the thing to do.

THE MISSING ELEMENT

Mr. LANSDALE. Incidentally, what we have just touched on—there is a tremendous antipathy for any Americans in the Foreign Service or AID or even CIA to do exactly what we have just described the correct way. I mean the politically astute and constructive and realistic way of building a person. This is not part of the job of many of these folks. This is the missing element maybe, that we are thinking.

[Discussion off the record.]

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. You are the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and John Sparkman is the ranking member. You are two of the most influential Members in the Government. Somebody has to understand this, if it is only for the purpose of asking questions. When the questions come up, if you bring this material up I can tell you how the answers are going to be. They are going to say, "That is all fine and good but there is terrorism in the countryside. We never get a chance to do what these men are talking about."

Everybody says we have to improve the political situation. But in the meantime they say you can't improve the political situation until you win the military situation. You know it is just hopeless if you keep talking like that.

A WAR FOR THE PEOPLE

Mr. MELVIN. Since Rufus Phillips went out on this problem, the answer is really simple. Insulate the rural areas from Saigon. This is what we have done. This is what rural affairs outfits have done for 2 years. We have provincial committees, combined United States-Government of Vietnam committees made up of our military sector advisor, our USOM representative, and the provincial chief. When authority doesn't exist in Saigon because of a change of government, we usurp authority or take authority down in the province and continue programs.

Mr. PHILLIPS. This is a war for the people, Senator, if I may say so, that you don't hear about. What the American public sees are these open, pitched battles with regular Communist forces that occur periodically as the Communists attack a particular post and attempt to hold it for a period of time. But the daily war, the war for the support or the control over the people, goes on all the time, and this is being fought out in the provinces by the provincial government and by the provincial forces. In this war, despite all the problems, despite all the deterioration in Saigon, we are still not doing——

Mr. MELVIN. We are not losing out there. In some places we are, actually in three-quarters of the country we are deteriorating pretty heavily, but in the other quarter we aren't, and I can give you reasons why we are deteriorating there. But by insulating and by putting Americans down in the province, counterinsurgents, if you will, we can continue this war as we have done for the past year for quite a few years while you straighten out Saigon.

NEED TO FIGHT EVERYWHERE

Mr. FRALEIGH. We are going to have to learn how to fight this one, because if we don't win it there we are going to have to fight it everywhere, Central America, Africa, the whole works.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. We are practicing the same thing in Africa only it will work better there because they are half savage.

Mr. MELVIN. This is not money or anything like that. I know it would be unpolitic to reduce the budget for Vietnam, but we only need a fraction of the money that you are spending in Vietnam and only a fraction of the people you have out there. This doesn't take people or money. As a matter of fact, I can build a school that will stand longer with less money, letting the Vietnamese contribute, than with more money where we do the whole thing. The reason, the Communists say that is an American school, knock it down, the people don't care.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we are going the other way. I saw, in the people, there were 23,000 men out there.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is growing.

BUILDING A BELTWAY

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. The new AID program around program is to put a big beltway around the city. I am going to stop that around here.

The CHAIRMAN. A road?

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. A road.

Senator SPARKMAN. Like this one around Washington?

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. A freeway around this city. You had better look into that one or I will tell Wayne Morse. He doesn't even know that yet.

Mr. FRALEIGH. The idea was to urbanize the program and concentrate in urban areas. The best thing to do was to urbanize Saigon and the thing to do was to build a beltway because this would employ a lot of people.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Can you imagine such stupidity?

Mr. MELVIN. We need policemen. USOM is responsible for advising the police. We need policemen out in the provinces, and where are they putting them? Right around Saigon. We need them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go. I have listened to this with a great deal of interest and I must confess that I am greatly disturbed.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. Me, too.

Senator SPARKMAN. We have got a record of it. Now what use are we going to make of it?

GETTING WORD TO THE PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. There is only one man that can do anything about it and that would actually be the President.

Senator SPARKMAN. How are you going to get that word to the President?

The CHAIRMAN. We have got the Vice President here. I will go with him.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with what was said a while ago that there can be some questioning of Rusk based on this without giving it away where it came from, but I don't know how effective that is going to be.

The CHAIRMAN. I think if we can do anything about it, the only thing I can think of is that you and me and the Vice President talk to the President about it.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I talked to the President yesterday preliminarily, Bill. May I say if this record is to be printed up at all, I would like to have Carl have the privilege of editing it a bit to make it more readable.

I have talked to the President a little bit about this without going into too much detail but really kind of an agonized concern over the fact that I didn't think the whole story was being given in the cables as we have studied some things yesterday. I told him we were going to meet today and he was pleased about that. He said to me in so many words, "If you feel that some of these things should be done, get hold of Rusk and talk to these people and bring these boys in."

The President hasn't a closed mind on this. I think what we ought to do is to have this record more orderly, to take this record, the material from this record, to brief it down and then you, Bill, as the chairman of the committee, and John, as the ranking member, and myself ask the President if we can sit down and go over it with him. But he isn't going to have time to read all this. We are going to have to make it more concise.

Mr. MARCY. Summarize the points.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. And summarize it, because I feel like these men do. It is just a tragedy to think we are losing when we don't need to. I know some of the decisions that are being made as we sit here and talk right now. I feel maybe we are going to make some decisions that will be disastrous.

The CHAIRMAN. Rusk is coming before the committee in the morning, that is the full committee. We can ask him some questions about it.

Vice President-elect HUMPHREY. I prefer that you don't on this. I will tell you why.

[Discussion off the record.]

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Church, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Senator Kuchel; and Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, before we begin may I suggest that we adhere to the rule that in the asking of questions hereafter we proceed according to seniority?

The CHAIRMAN. I am thoroughly in accord with that. Let me add that further thought. I don't like to interfere with anybody's right to ask questions. If we will all be reasonable we don't have to resort to the 5- or 10-minute rule if people will be reasonable. I much prefer to leave it up to everyone, because there are times when men ought to go a little longer and there are times when we ought not to belabor a point.

I think we ought to move along satisfactorily and call on each one at the moment until this committee gets to be, whatever it is, is the 19 we are going to be now. It is going to be difficult.

Senator LAUSCHE. I can understand where on a special point of information on something that is immediate a brief question can be asked, but to intervene and a long series——

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, I hope we can all be reasonable and restrained. If not, we have to go to the old rigid limitation.

A STAFF OUTLINE

Senator GORE. Before we start, Mr. Chairman, have the chairman, the Secretary, or the staff prepared sort of an outline of some, well, logical developments on the background of various points or are we still going at it hither and yon?

The CHAIRMAN. We haven't any formal preparation of it but I thought that having gone through as much as we did, we will get right down on the particulars now of the Vietnam thing. The Secretary will open up with some general description of the things that are involved and in a sense I think the main question we

raised the other day, what is the real interest of the United States in being here and exerting ourselves? Then it will flow from that. I didn't anticipate that the members would want any outline more than that. We can always prepare that if anyone wishes it for future hearings.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do I understand this hearing is devoted just to Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. This is in front of everyone—if you have looked in your folder. There are suggested lines. Is that what you had in mind?

Senator GORE. I had not seen this, I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we have background relating to this in committee print form. This background information is a summary of the situation.

All right, then we will come to order. Mr. Secretary, do you wish to make a preliminary opening statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.

Last time I tried to touch upon a good many things that had happened since the adjournment of Congress in October, but as you suggested, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that today we could give some serious thought to what might be called the station in Southeast Asia. This necessarily involves speculation, judgments, but I would be happy to have a chance to comment on that issue myself, looking backward as well as forward, because so much flows from a judgment on what the real stakes are to us and to the free world in this entire Southeast Asia situation, of which South Vietnam is a critical and very important part.

Perhaps I might begin by going back to the spring of 1961, not because it was the time when administrations changed, but because it was a period when I assumed my present responsibility and perforce had to make my first effort to assess the stakes in Southeast Asia, along with President Kennedy and others.

STABILIZING LAOS

We saw in Laos at that particular moment a situation of civil war which had flowed from the coup of December 1960 by Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi [Nosovan] against the then Government of Laos, a division of the country in which the so-called neutral elements under Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao were pitted against the government elements under Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi.

The neutralists and the Pathet Lao began to receive considerable help from North Vietnam, both in arms and in military formations and personnel. They began to move westward through the Plaines des Jarres southward into the panhandle with a first-class civil war in fact and in prospect.

We struggled through much of 1961 to try to stabilize that situation but we became impressed with the fact that, so far as the Laotians were concerned, on both sides the Laotians were not particu-

larly caught up in the issues that were at stake, that the Laotians themselves, if left alone, did not seem to be much interested in fighting each other. The Pathet Lao were poor soldiers. Certainly the government forces did not prove that they had very much combat capability.

LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY

As you look at the total situation in Southeast Asia, President Kennedy concluded that from the point of view of our own interests and the future security of Southeast Asia, the people outside of Laos should not insist upon pitting these Laos against each other, that if we could get all of the foreigners out of the country and deal with Laos as a neutralized but independent country, it at least could serve as a buffer between the north and the rest of Southeast Asia.

He put that to Mr. Khrushchev at the Vienna meeting. Mr. Khrushchev agreed that we and the Soviet Union should not be pitted against each other in this small landlocked country.

Those discussions opened the way for the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. I think it is important to remember the Laotian experience because there was an international agreement to treat it as a neutral and independent country. There was an international agreement that foreign military elements would stay out of there and leave the Laotians to resolve their own affairs.

It is important also as an example of an effort to bring about a neutral and independent country. It is important also to bear in mind that, despite those most solemn agreements, there was never a moment after those agreements were signed in which the other side was in compliance with the agreements.

In other words, at no time, according to our best estimates, at no time did the North Vietnamese military personnel in Laos ever drop below 6,000, and at no time did the North Vietnamese cease using the Laotian corridor for continued infiltration into South Vietnam. Now, both of those elements were very specifically prohibited in the Laotian agreement.

MOSCOW-PEIPING DISPUTE

I think we perhaps had in the case of Laos one example of the disadvantage to us of the dispute between Moscow and Peiping, because whatever Moscow's intention was in that respect, I am willing to give them a reasonable amount of credit for an intention to carry out the 1962 accords. I say reasonable amount of credit because there was a relatively small country, and this was an issue which became a part of and fitted into the total bilateral issues that we have up with the Soviet Union.

But one always has to bear in mind the possibility that regimes such as Moscow and Peiping always themselves reserve at least a margin of bad faith if it appears in their interest to act contrary to their agreements. But the Moscow-Peiping dispute involved influence in Hanoi, and it seemed quite clear that in 1961, 1962, and 1963, the Russian influence in Hanoi decreased very sharply and they lost effective influence in Hanoi and with the Pathet Lao in Laos, so that the bilateral commitments that were made by

Moscow were weakened by the relative inability of Moscow to guarantee what would happen on the ground in Laos because of the Moscow-Peiping dispute.

HANOI'S SUPPORT OF THE VIETCONG

At the same time we made a similar examination of the situation in South Vietnam. We were aware of the fact, we became aware of the fact, when we came into the administration that in 1959 Hanoi had made a decision to activate and step up the liberation front and its operations against South Vietnam in 1960, had made that public. That had led to some increase in American aid to South Vietnam. But on a full examination of the situation as it developed during 1961, we came to the conclusion that the kind of aid that was being given, that is, military hardware and economic aid, would not be sufficient to meet what the Vietcong were laying on with outside help. At that time we had about 750 American military personnel there in our aid mission.

The CHAIRMAN. What year was that?

Secretary RUSK. 1961.

But the structure of the military mission was the typical military assistance mission type of personnel; that is, they were ordnance and they were signal and they were quartermasters and people who were there to assist in bringing in and setting up and training local people in the use of the hardware.

INCREASING AMERICAN AID TO VIETNAM

We felt that the South Vietnamese would need substantially more help if they were to have a chance of meeting what seemed to be coming down the track from the Vietcong. They needed a highly intensified training program, an increase in their own armed forces, a sharp increase in their mobility, both by ground and by air. They needed better intelligence communications facilities.

That led to a rather rapid increase in the size of the American aid effort, and also some important changes in the components of our own personnel out there. That is, we had to get people who were trained in combat, Ranger types, to train the South Vietnamese. We needed men who could serve as advisers at military headquarters down to the battalion level. We needed men to assist in mobility through such things as helicopters. It called for a much more combat-oriented type of military personnel there to assist the South Vietnamese. During that buildup, or in connection with that buildup, we gave a lot of thought to the nature of the stake in Southeast Asia.

THE DOMINO THEORY

As I indicated at our last meeting, we did not look upon this as something that could be explained in as artificial terms as something called a domino theory because we had in front of us not only the militant doctrine of Peiping which had become a subject of great debate inside the Communist world, but we also had in front of us the very specific program that we knew had been adopted by Hanoi, which was to support the liberation front for the seizure of South Vietnam, to direct the military operations of the Vietcong

from Hanoi, to supply that with arms and equipment not only through the Ho Chi Minh Trail but in whatever way they could smuggle them in by sea or otherwise into South Vietnam, and to infiltrate to them trained cadres around which could be built these guerilla groups.

So, we knew what the appetites were on the other side. Therefore, the question in our own minds was, what is the stake of the free world in Southeast Asia?

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

Now, there has been some history to that question. When the Communists took over in Peiping, we and the British and the French had very serious discussions in 1949, 1950, during that period. The three of us at that time agreed that the security of Southeast Asia was of vital importance to the free world and that the security of Southeast Asia turned crucially upon security of the Red River Valley in North Vietnam.

In 1954, for reasons with which the committee is familiar, I think, it did not seem possible for the Western countries to join together on a common position or at least join together on a course of action which would have secured the Red River Valley of North Vietnam. The country was split in the 1954 accord. North Vietnam was organized as a Communist country and it started its infiltration and pressures against its neighbors in Laos and South Vietnam.

But nevertheless the major issues that were recognized all through this period by both administrations still were present; that is, that here were a number of independent countries, at least one of them on the mainland of Southeast Asia itself, allied directly with us, that is Thailand—a number of independent countries that were under pressure from the north. We felt that we could not say that just one more bite would be satisfying to them and that that would be the end of the matter.

We felt that this program had been made clear, that they were out to press in whatever way they could until stopped, press their brand of the world revolution, and therefore that we would have to anticipate that failures in Laos and South Vietnam would expose other neighbors, not because of historical inevitablity but because of the deliberately adopted program of those who were pressing into the south.

CHAIN REACTION OF AGGRESSION

Now, these are very difficult matters to judge. One cannot prove what the next steps would be. One cannot say with certainty that this chain reaction of aggression would continue indefinitely into the future. But yet it had seemed to us that we had at least a good many chances to find out what happens when a government embarks upon a course of aggression and finds initial success in pursuing that course.

It was only 10 years from the seizure of Manchuria until Pearl Harbor. It was less than that from the seizure of Ethiopia and the occupation of the Rhineland to the outbreak of war in Western Europe. We thought we had a pretty good illustration in Southeast

Asia itself as to how it would work when, after the most formal kind of agreement in 1954, negotiated with great difficulty, the Chinese north in Vietnam immediately set about trying to bring down, trying to infiltrate and take over by subversion or otherwise its own two immediate neighbors in Laos and in South Vietnam.

Therefore, I think we have to consider very seriously that the issues that are at stake in Laos and South Vietnam do directly affect the possibility of maintaining any position for independent free world countries in Southeast Asia as a whole, and that if Southeast Asia as a whole drops under the control or the domination of those who are deeply committed against free world interest, that this could move very quickly into Indonesia, and that the free world would be split right down the middle in the Asian area, and leave countries like Burma, India, politically exposed and—politically and militarily exposed, and countries like Korea, Japan, Formosa, Philippines deeply discouraged about the long-range prospects of maintaining their own position in the free world structure.

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA

I mention Indonesia because we have seen very important developments here in the last few days. There had been growing up for a period of a few months an anti-PKI movement in Indonesia under the leadership of such ministers as Malik and Saleh,[1] and perhaps [Gen. Abdul Haris] Nasution, the Minister of Defense, a movement that called itself the Sukarnoist movement as a counterpoise to opposition to the Communist PKI.

Sukarno himself dissolved that movement about what, 10 days ago, a week ago, about 2 weeks, 2½ weeks ago, dissolved that movement. We expect cabinet changes here in the next—almost at any moment, to reflect the increasing pressure of the PKI.

One of the issues at stake here is whether the army once again will be able to maintain its position over against the PKI by maintaining its own representatives in the government in the Ministry of Defense, in the top military command, as a counterweight to a Communist-dominated government.

This issue inside Indonesia between the PKI and the army, who are the only two effective forces in terms of being able to seize and hold power, this counterpoise there has been responsible for our attempting to maintain some sort of contact, effective contact, in Jakarta despite some of the wild and disagreeable words and actions of President Sukarno.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

We have, for example, maintained the threads of some military assistance to the armed forces in Indonesia.

Senator GORE. Maintained what did you say?

Secretary RUSK. The thread of military assistance.

Senator GORE. Thread.

Senator AIKEN. What is a thread?

Secretary RUSK. It is a training activity.

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[1] Indonesian Trade Minister Adam Malik, and Basic Industries and Mining Minister Chaerul Saleh.

Senator AIKEN. Just contact.

Secretary RUSK. Contact. But also some training activity of some Indonesians here as a means of being in regular contact with Indonesian armed forces.

Senator AIKEN. You told us last year.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, from a broad political point of view this looks like a rather curious thing to be doing, to be giving military assistance to a man who is acting in the way that Sukarno has been acting. But from the point of view of what happens next in Indonesia and from the point of view of the interest of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have felt it important at least to keep that thread going, to keep that contact, because if international events in Indonesia bring about the confrontation that I was mentioning, it will be very important for us to have quick and effective contacts with those who would be leading the armed forces. I think I reported to the committee that at the last change in government the plan was to remove Nasution as the Minister of Defense but that the army commanders in the field jointly told Sukarno that he would not be permitted to do so and insisted that he retain Nasution as Minister of Defense. Whether that will occur now that cabinet changes are being discussed, we frankly cannot be sure.

DISSIDENCE AND COOPERATION IN INDONESIA

Senator AIKEN. Are all the states and provinces in Indonesia cooperating with the Sukarno government?

Secretary RUSK. There are varying degrees of dissidence. Many of the outlying islands have never been enthusiastic about Jakarta.

Senator AIKEN. What about Jogjakarta?

Secretary RUSK. It is under control of the central government. The Sultan of Jogjakarta is playing a role of hands off at the present time. There are those who have spoken of him as the possible successor to Sukarno, but I think the present prediction is that he would be standing aside.

Senator AIKEN. He would be a distinct improvement, however.

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about it. It would be a great improvement if the army were to succeed and someone like the Sultan of Jogjakarta could come in.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. So, we have felt, Mr. Chairman, that the position of the free world inside Southeast Asia and South Asia and the Southwest Pacific could be seriously injured from a security point of view if a chain of events should start which would lead to a Communist takeover in the Peninsula of Southeast Asia, linked up with what would then be a greatly encouraged PKI operation in Indonesia, with them whetting the appetite of Peiping for still further adventures.

MOSCOW MOVING TOWARD PEIPING'S POSITION

I think there is another problem in the background here that we thought about and are concerned with. That is that if Peiping can demonstrate that their course of policy is paying substantial dividends, as successes in Southeast Asia and Indonesia would indicate, then there is a much greater possibility that Moscow would at-

tempt to close the gap between Moscow and Peiping by moving toward Peiping's more militant attitude toward the world revolution.

In other words, we have felt thus far that because of the situation in Eastern Europe, and because of the internal problems of the Soviet Union, and some of the caution that has come out of the nuclear confrontation, that it would be unlikely under present circumstances that Moscow and Peiping would close the gap on the basis of Moscow's moving over toward the Peiping position. As some of the Communist ambassadors have expressed it to me, the dynamics of the Communist world would not make that possible.

However, if Peiping demonstrates that they can make substantial headway in the free world, that their brand of militant world revolution is paying off in Asia, possibly even in Africa, then there is a greater chance that Moscow would try to find some way to resolve their bilateral differences and adopt a view that a more militant attitude toward the world revolution would speed up the world revolution to which Moscow itself is committed.

So, these stakes are not, it seems to me, just geographical in Southeast Asia. They do have a great deal to do with the total worldwide issue between the free world and the Communist world.

A DOUBLE STANDARD

I think it is also fair to say that the United States is under a very severe double standard with regard to commitments such as we have in Southeast Asia. We have 42 allies. Not all of them are interested in Southeast Asia, not all of them are happy about the fact that we ourselves are deeply involved there. Yet, if we were to abandon those commitments to Southeast Asia, I think there is no question whatever that this would affect the quality of our commitments and the quality of confidence that others would have in our commitments in other parts of the world. I think I illustrated this to the committee last time in pointing to the Cuban missile crisis.

For a year our NATO allies proved to be wholly indifferent to the Cuban problem as we had discussed it with them before the missile crisis. When the missile crisis came up, however, it was quite clear that had we permitted the Soviets to establish 72 MRBM and IRBM missiles in Cuba, the confidence of our allies in the value of our commitments under NATO would have been greatly shaken. Many of them have said that to me directly.

I think it is fair to say that an abandonment of a commitment in Southeast Asia would lead to very serious questions right across the board in the free world about just how determined we might be in the case of serious danger. To illustrate the double standard, I have no—President de Gaulle—could we leave this off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

COMMITMENTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Secretary RUSK. In the case of the British, I hope the committee understands that the British have undertaken a major commitment in Southeast Asia with respect to Malaysia and are doing something about it. We have not pressed the British hard yet for major assistance in South Vietnam because they are making a

major effort there in Malaysia. They have more than 50,000 men there. They have a formidable order of battle. More than 20 percent of their defense budget is committed in Southeast Asia at the present time, and we know that if there is an increase in Indonesian military pressure against Malaysia, the British and the Australians will act promptly.

The British have supported our own attitude in South Vietnam, internationally, politically, in SEATO, in NATO. Our principal problem there by no means have been the British. They have been very helpful. The French have been a serious problem, and some of the others have been not as helpful as we would want them to be and expect them to be in terms of giving direct assistance.

I think I said to the committee the last time that we have been making a very considerable effort in capitals to increase the number of flags, increase the number of personnel from other countries in South Vietnam. We are making considerable headway in the Philippines, in Korea, increases from Formosa are in sight. Australian increases are in sight. But these recent political echoes out of Saigon, the political disorder in Saigon has quite frankly cut across the bows of that effort, and governments are going to watch that situation a little bit more before they make new and firm commitments about Southeast Asia.

There are certain governments, I suppose Japan is one of them, that would prefer to give their help through the machinery of an international organization of one sort or another, such as UNICEF or WHO, FAO or some of those. We are working to see what can be done on that because otherwise they might have very difficult political problems internally.

Yes?

IF SOUTH VIETNAM ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO LEAVE

Senator AIKEN. Assuming Saigon should say, "We are going to reach an agreement with the Vietcong, we are going to unite the country," what would be our position then? Because then, of course, according to your arguments, Southeast Asia would likely be exposed. What would our position be if we reach an agreement?

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, we were unable to understand the question.

Senator AIKEN. Assuming the Vietnamese government, whichever it happened to be this week, said, "We are going to make a settlement with the Vietcong and unite the country," what would be our position there? I think we may have to fact that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we may have to. I must say that if a government in Saigon, with the support of its own armed forces, were to ask us to get out, it would be extremely difficult for us to maintain any position there.

Senator AIKEN. To stay.

Secretary RUSK. You see, we don't have, except for certain aviation units, we don't have combat forces there. Our people are interlaced with the Vietnamese Armed Forces. They are—their personal safety is a function of their close working relationship with the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, you see. We do not have the divi-

sions that would be necessary to take over the country, for example.

Senator AIKEN. How long can we go——

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. But I don't anticipate that being the direction of the problem. I mean I really would have to emphasize that thus far we have not seen any significant element among the South Vietnamese, other than the Vietcong, that seem to be looking to Hanoi for an answer here in this situation.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

WAITING FOR A RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

How long can we wait for a responsible government to be established?

Secretary RUSK. The sooner the better.

Senator AIKEN. We all agree on that.

Secretary RUSK. This requires looking into the future and to speculate about alternatives and contingencies.

Senator AIKEN. How long before we lose our patience?

Secretary RUSK. I would say that the events of the last 10 days have diverted some of the top generals from their jobs in the field to politics in Saigon. I think this is the first time we have had a direct indication that what was happening in the field was being affected adversely by the political turmoil in Saigon. But this involves about 20, 25 generals and it involves the key corps commanders and division commanders. This has not turned up at the regimental or battalion level.

For example, in this last battle in the south, where there were several battalions engaged on the government side and perhaps, what, 2,500 on the Vietcong side, 1,800 to 2,000 on the Vietcong side, the government battalions were committed piecemeal, one at a time. There was not the overall direction present to put them in there all at once, to take advantage of the military advantage of mass, and so these battalions got hit one after the other as they were committed piecemeal. This was a problem of failure at the higher command, you see, in that situation. That has really been, I think, about the first time that I can recall that there seemed to be some clear connection between political diversion in Saigon and activities in the field.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we ought to start around now and give everybody a chance. Is that about it?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

DETERIORATING SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand it, you have made a very strong case that this is vital, although you made this decision in 1949 with the British and French, at least the French now no longer think it is vital, and you and the British do. In 1949 it was the first time.

If it is vital, and accepting that as an assumption, it looks as if since the assassination of Diem that it has been deteriorating. Of course, what bothers me very much are the rather optimistic reports we had subsequent to that which proved to be quite erroneous and the situation deteriorated very gravely; is that not correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, there has been deterioration.

The CHAIRMAN. It is much worse, and the political situation especially.

Secretary RUSK. I think it ought to be emphasized that whereas the government forces have been greatly strengthened and improved, the Vietcong effort, including the effort from the north, has been greatly increased. In other words, the infiltration has increased. I think perhaps during 1964 we will see that the figures will turn out to be somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 infiltrators during the calendar year.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I wanted to talk about, the most disturbing part is the instability of the Vietnamese governments which have the constant changes and the constant quarrelling and the demonstrations and the fairly clear picture of chaos in the government itself. You yourself have said by the time you get back to the office it may be a different one. This is disturbing. So, on the assumption, first, that it is vital—I am not yet positive I agree with that, but maybe it is, we always consider every place as vital, I suppose, that we are interested in—then we haven't been doing it right.

CHANGING THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO VIETNAM

Is there anything we can do to change our approach to this thing? It strikes me that maybe we have thought of this entirely as a military operation, or practically so, and that we have not been able, or willing or able, I should say, to help them generate a stable political organization which could then be the basis with which we work. We don't have anybody with which to work. There has been a constant change in personnel. People are going and coming. We get a new aide out there in recent months. You return the people who have been working there, whether they were good or bad, I don't know.

You have a new team, military team, that is, the General. I wondered if you think this can succeed because it looks very bad. The only reason I and others have entertained the possibility, even entertained the thought, that maybe we might have to negotiate is simply that it looks hopeless. It isn't because we want to, but when we are faced with the fact it just isn't working—unless we reverse that, I think this is what is behind the situation.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might comment briefly because I think it does affect the rest of our discussion, I might briefly on some of the specific efforts that have been made to probe the possibility of a political settlement which leaves South Vietnam free and independent and leaves Laos living in accordance with the 1962 accords.

We have had many, many communications with the Soviet Union on this subject, in which it has been pointed out that the issue here is not an American military presence in Southeast Asia as a threatening presence toward the north. The issue here is whether these people in Hanoi will keep their own military people out of Laos and out of South Vietnam, that if Hanoi will do that the American military can come home. We have pressed the Soviets very hard on their bilateral commitment to us to see that that happens in Laos.

We don't have a commitment from them on South Vietnam. South Vietnam to them still remains one of those wars of liberation, and there is no perceptible difference between the attitude of Moscow and Peiping with regard to South Vietnam.

NO POLITICAL GIMMICK

The CHAIRMAN. That is not responsive. At least, I didn't make myself clear. I am assuming now this is important and so on. How do we go about making it effective. Have you any idea of how to improve the situation?

Secretary RUSK. I was coming to the second part of it. I will come to the first part of it now.

But there have been other probes in the United Nations, the ICC through the Geneva machinery, to find out whether or not there is an indication from the other side that they will permit the political processes to go forward that would register the fact that they leave their neighbors alone.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think they are possibly going to do that as long as it is so weak and deteriorating; why would they do it?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean unless you can make some headway here, they are never going to do it. They are never going to say, "We are nice fellows and friends." The local Vietcong can say, "Maybe we will take power." They can do this without any aid from North Vietnam, as long as our operation is too defective within it.

Secretary RUSK. All right, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you, but I think that is a very——

The CHAIRMAN. They are not going to do that?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. But that is a very important conclusion that was just reached. I fully agree with it and, therefore, I think that those who feel there is some political gimmick which can be used to talk the other side out of Laos and South Vietnam under present circumstances have a considerable burden in finding that gimmick. We have been looking for it. We can't find one, for exactly the thing you have said.

ALTERNATIVES IN LAOS

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask something in aid of this question?

Was the war in Laos being won or being lost at the time we entered into the accords there? Was the Pathet Lao being defeated or was the Pathet Lao in process of conquering?

Secretary RUSK. The process was in 1962 that the Pathet Lao neutralist combination would continue to advance in Laos unless we put troops in.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. In other words, they were taking over?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. Now——

Senator CHURCH. The second question——

Secretary RUSK. But I think it is important to point out there, however, that from our point of view it was either the Geneva Accords of 1962 or SEATO, including United States troops in Laos.

Senator CHURCH. I understand.

Secretary RUSK. And we are not turning aside from that possibility.

Senator CHURCH. I understand. But we chose to go to the conference table at a time when the neutralists and Pathet Lao were taking over.

Secretary RUSK. Were advancing, yes.

Senator CHURCH. Were advancing.

FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS

The second question is, In the light of subsequent developments, do you think it was a mistake to go to the conference table or do you think the situation is worse today than it would have been if we had not?

Secretary RUSK. I don't myself think it was a mistake to go even though we were disappointed with the compliance with the results, because two or three things have happened. One is there is a very important international commitment now on the record with respect to Laos. The Soviets have a very important direct commitment to us which we support in terms of our total bilateral situation with them. The neutralists and the government, former government forces are now working together.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The territory that was occupied by the neutralists has been added to the government forces, and on the ground the situation, I think, is somewhat improved over what it was at the time we went into the conference in 1962.

The CHAIRMAN. Even what it was 6 months ago or a year ago?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, but the buildup there is such that we can't be sure that 3 months from now we can say the same thing. In other words, the situation there is precarious. So, I think the situation has been improved in Laos since 1962. But it remains very fragile, and the key thing of interest to us, the use of the Laos corridor into South Vietnam, has not improved at all.

Senator CHURCH. Precisely.

Secretary RUSK. Has not improved at all.

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me in referring to Laos as you did earlier as an example of the futility of negotiations in this area, the facts are the contrary.

Secretary RUSK. Futility in terms of achieving the result that was expected when the areement was signed, you see.

Senator CHURCH. In the overall balance negotiation paid off, if I understood your answers to the previous questions.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is true. I think that is true. There may be an element of contradiction there, but I think that both elements have some validity.

HISTORICAL SIMILARITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have some questions?

Senator MORSE. I apologize to the Secretary for not being here earlier.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I start out, at least, with a premise as a basis for these questions on Laos and some other places that prob-

ably starts from your statement a moment ago, Mr. Secretary, that the Japanese seized Manchuria and a few years later we had Pearl Harbor; that the Italians seized Ethiopia and a few years later we got into World War II. As I mentioned a moment ago, Chamberlain declared the peace in our time at Munich and we went almost kaleidescopically into World War II, or shortly after that.

It seems to me that there are a great many similarities in our most unfortunate situation we are in now, if I can just mention three or four of them. We got actively into Laos and then this so-called negotiation business went on.

The Communist group has not really kept its promises in this thing, but I submit that it is entirely possible that the situation in Laos would not have been even as, well, let's say, on dead center today as much as it is if we hadn't been bombing the Communist supply groups up there. Now, it was our airplanes and our bombers that have been going in there and blowing up their nests of attack. It hasn't been necessarily any willingness to comply on their part, as I understand it, with these agreements. They have kept certain agreements and have withdrawn because they have been preoccupied, North Vietnam has been preoccupied now more than South Vietnam and our people—either stimulated by us or with materiel and so on furnished by us—have been bombing their strong point.

Senator GORE. Where?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In Laos, which has made the Plaines des Jarres somewhat untenable, so it looks to me as if an argument could be made that it is the military force that we continually supported in Laos there to knock out these strong points that has made it a little more untenable or unprofitable for North Vietnam to come in there and pursue their continued conquest of Laos. It just isn't worth it to them at the moment. They keep the Ho Chi Minh Trail open and furnishing stuff to South Vietnam. That is one.

No. 2, we gave the French, as I understand it, about $1 million to help support the French in their unfortunate activity in Laos.

KICKED IN THE TEETH

Today we see Sukarno making great strides. maybe he doesn't impress us too much, but he certainly impresses, or will impress, the neutral world if he can kick the United States, the United Nations in the teeth and get away with it. It is bound to have a psychological effect.

We see Nasser burn our libraries; we see him tell us to go jump in the lake or drink from the Mediterranean. Yet, on the very next day almost, we say, "Oh, well, boys will be boys. He was just playing and really he didn't mean to burn our Embassies," and stand for it. "He didn't mean to insult us. He was only using a political gimmick there and we propose to continue." And I know, I am not referring to one incident that happened shortly after that on a certain amount of help but we continued to put in from 25 to, well, however you want to figure it, it would be up somewhere near 40 percent of the food he is eating there. He can't live without us because the Russians, I am sure, are not going to feed him. Yet, he gets away with insulting the United States, calling us all kinds of

names, burning our buildings, insulting our people, and that is going to have, in my judgment, quite an effect on the uncommitted nations that Nasser can kick us in the teeth, and especially in the Middle East.

I think the Middle East probably can be a great tinderbox. I think they are watching this thing. Can Nasser get away with knocking the U.S. ears down?

Going way back prior to World War II, the *Panay* incident, when the Japanese went in and bombed and shot up the *Panay,* we didn't do anything about it. We just objected and so on, so the Japanese got more strength from that. Maybe we couldn't get the British to help, maybe Stimson wanted to do something, but we didn't do it and we let them get away with it.

These things are building up. Having apparently assumed responsibility in a commitment in various parts of the world—and to which I am not opposed; I think sometimes we have got to stand for the vigorous defense of freedom or we have got to supinely sit back and see how we can dodge being kicked in the teeth.

ACHIEVE VICTORY OR GET OUT

I have felt for a long time that in Southeast Asia we should know, first, what our determinedness policy is. If it is not victory in Southeast Asia, that is, victory in Vietnam, we had better get out of there, because this monkey business—the only strong man we have had down there that has been able to hold that country together was Diem, and he got murdered and got thrown out down there. Now, he had some excesses and so on, I realize there is some criticism, but he is the fellow who pulled them up by the bootstraps locally down there after the French situation was finally resolved. We have had a hodgepodge government in there. Whether we could have gone in, I don't know. I don't know enough about it, but whether we could have gone in with a little bit more strong arm and put a government together and say we are going to hold this and stop this monkey business—and maybe we couldn't do that, I don't know—but nevertheless we have had this. I think in the eyes of a great many people that we are losing every day in this attitude either these neutralists or leftists are taking.

Of course, as you know, Mr. Secretary, I have been quite disturbed about the Yemen situation and the activities of Nasser down there. He has got 50,000 or maybe 48,000 men down there more than he has had some years ago. The Yemen Government, the so-called republican government, has completely disappeared in Yemen. Most of them have fled across the border into Aden and other places, and the Egyptians have just moved in there. They are making strides every day against the influence of the United States, and so on.

I greatly salute the activities that we took in the Congo. I think that is one of the first rays of hope I have seen for a long time. They went in there and saved a bunch of people. It is a very difficult situation, but I think we are at the point where something is going to give pretty soon. I wish I were smart enough to know what the detailed answers are. I simply don't.

NEED FOR MILITARY SUPPORT

But I still get back to the old story about Buddy Baer when he started to be world champion heavyweight prizefighter like his brother was for a short time. The first major fight he had was with his ham and eggs fighter. He took a beating and between rounds, his manager said, "Keep right in there pitching, he ain't laid a glove on you." Buddy Baer looked at him with one eye closed and said, "Well then, for God's sake, somebody had better watch the referee because somebody is beating hell out of me."

We have got some place to arrive at and I am not sure we have established understandable policies. It has greatly concerned me.

Sukarno starting adventures now—I heard over the radio this morning, more of them against Malaysia. We have got—I realize that we keep—it is very desirable under a great many conditions to keep in touch with some elements, but I submit this: We talk about the military in these countries; there isn't any country that I know of in these developing countries, or whatever you want to call them, undeveloped, where either a civilian government can survive or a military government can survive without the military. You have got to have the military either way. You get a civilian government set up in South Vietnam, it can't survive without the military support. If you get a military government set up, it can't survive without a military.

So, the military is pretty much the key in these countries. The government can't survive in the Congo without military support, although it claims to be a civilian government. All the rest of these countries can't survive without the military.

I am not a militarist and I don't advocate military government, but we have these problems which are very unclear. We have been—certainly the rest of our so-called allies have sat back many times on their haunches and said, "Let the United States carry this burden. Sure, we think it is a good thing, we want to preserve liberty, but the United States has undertaken this. Let them carry it now."

VIGOROUS LEADERSHIP

If we have assumed the responsibility, then I think we have got to discharge it vigorously and to a successful conclusion. Otherwise, if we don't, I think we will see these countries fade away and fail away and there may come a time, and very easily could, when history will repeat itself, when we get into some kind of a holocaust.

Had they stopped Italy from taking Ethiopia when they did and really used some vigor, it might have gone a long way toward stopping World War II. When Hitler marched into the Rhineland the countries were supine, they yelled about it. When he had union with Austria, it is very doubtful that his military forces were then sufficient to ensure him victory and he might have backed out. We kept letting these malignancies grow and grow in various parts of the world until pretty soon we get into a very difficult situation. I think we are in a certain phase of that situation now, which has either got to be resolved successfully or we can maybe look forward to a lot more trouble in the future, because we may have lost the

confidence of whether or not the United States is a paper tiger or whether it is going to exercise that vigorous leadership.

I think people follow vigorous leadership. I think they have a tendency to stand on the sidelines if they are not sure that the leadership is too vigorous.

I saw in the paper this morning that Nasser has now said he will give 1,000 books to the library, and he is going to move to a villa on the Nile for a while. I don't think there has been a word in the Egyptian papers of sorrow or regret for burning the libraries or compound. My own impulsive feeling at the moment is—I will admit at the moment, impulsive—I would cut off his water. Sure, I know he can go out and sink some ships in the Suez Canal, but I don't know. If we slap Nasser down, in my judgment we would have, we would gain more respect in the whole Middle East, and there are other places in the world, but if we let him get away from it, I think we will further erode our influence.

I think we ought to be vigorous down there. I have talked and not asked questions. I suppose I can ask you what you are going to do about a lot of these things. I think there are a lot of alternatives about this, that, and the other. This is just a philosophical outburst.

FOCUS ON VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I might just comment on one or two points?

The CHAIRMAN. On Vietnam, or are you going to cover the whole field? I would like some of the members to be able to ask questions on Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me say I only went into some of these other areas because the agenda said we are going to talk about Vietnam and others. So, under the "and others," I did talk about it.

Senator GORE. In fairness, shouldn't it be said they all have a bearing?

The CHAIRMAN. They do have a bearing. This is not the only meeting we are going to have this year. We will have other opportunities to go into any and all of these things.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I am very anxious at some point for the committee to know some of the background and some of the conversations we have had with Egypt's neighbors about this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but we can't take them all at once. We have to take them one at a time. We will get to Nasser, no doubt. Senator Morse.

ANTI-AGGRESSOR AMENDMENT

Senator MORSE. I have just a few, Mr. Secretary, I would like to have some help on. I am sorry I was not here at the beginning, but I have been briefed by whispered conversations since I arrived. It is my understanding that you made a very effective defense this morning of the so-called domino theory which, as you know, I do

not support—never have, didn't at the time of the Dulles proposal and spoke against it then. I would be at a loss to understand the domino theory in view of your statement before the committee the other day that you didn't accept the domino theory as correct.

But let's——

Secretary RUSK. I repeated that this morning, sir. I did not embrace the domino theory. I was pointing to the program of action announced by Peiping and Hanoi. That is the theory——

Senator MORSE. I don't think there is any question about the fact that we are continuing to have difficulty with Peiping in Southeast Asia and, I think, now with Sukarno, too. We will get around to, at some other meeting, the points that Senator Hickenlooper raised. I have some points to raise about the anti-aggressor amendment we passed last year. The question is why it shouldn't apply to Sukarno and Nasser, but I will devote myself to Vietnam now.

AMERICAN UNILATERAL ACTION IN VIETNAM

Let's assume you take the domino theory for a moment in discussion. The difficulty that I can't get around is why, when you seek to carry out the domino theory by American unilateral action. If the domino theory is sound, and I submit it is not—it never has been sound, and events in issue show it hasn't been sound, because we are about the only ones that argue about it; we are the only great power that argues about the domino theory in Asia. You don't find Australia and New Zealand and Great Britain and France pressing the domino theory, because they couldn't very well and stay out of the region. If the domino theory is sound, then why don't we call formally and officially within our rights under existing treaties for other great powers to come in and support it?

Secretary RUSK. On the, specifically on the, SEATO treaty, formally action under SEATO would be vetoed by France. That is the parliamentary situation inside SEATO.

Senator MORSE. Have we adopted a procedural rule outside the treaty itself? We adopted the procedural rule for the implementation of the treaty that calls for unanimity.

Secretary RUSK. I spoke to the committee earlier, Senator, about Britain's very large commitments.

MALAYSIAN SITUATION

Senator MORSE. Please don't repeat anything, because I haven't the time for repetition in Malaysia.

Secretary RUSK. But so far as the Southeast Asia treaty is concerned, Britain has more than 20 percent of its defense in Southeast Asia, Malaysia. It has a powerful order of battle there, and they are now girding for action against Indonesia. They are very firm in that position.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think had the Malaysia situation not developed as it has, we would have had far more participation by Great Britain and Australia in South Vietnam, but they have a more important matter. We have felt it important that Britain and Australia stay way out in front in the Malaysian-Indonesian affair as far as armed action is concerned, military action is concerned. So far as

Southeast Asia itself is concerned, they have taken on that sector and have been doing a great deal about it while we have been concentrating on South Vietnam.

A GOOD WAY TO CREATE A WAR

Senator MORSE. I ask further, Mr. Secretary, whether it is Great Britain or the United States. Let's assume hypothetically that Great Britain is going to follow a unilateral course of action in Southeast Asia vis-a-vis Malaysia. Why don't we take the position that even that threat to the peace of that part of the world, and eventually the world, ought not be handled through existing treaty obligations on the part of Great Britain and, as well, the United States? To put it more succinctly, I just am unable to follow the U.S. State Department position that there is any situation in Southeast Asia that justifies our going it alone, our deciding for ourselves, our saying to the world, "We are going to do what we want to do."

In essence that is what Adlai Stevenson said in that unfortunate speech he read to the Security Council some weeks ago, "We are going to do in South Vietnam what we think is necessary." That is a good way to create a war, if some of the other countries challenge our going it alone.

PUTTING THE ISSUE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

I am certain as I sit here this morning, that we are going to be challenged, and I am trying to avoid that challenge. You and I had a very quick—and I am sorry that we haven't had a longer conversation—we had a very short conversation after the last meeting and you put to me the question: "Well, Senator, what would you do through the United Nations? How would you put it before the United Nations?"

And my answer was that I would just ask them to take jurisdiction, which under that character they have the right to take jurisdiction if they will. I haven't any doubt that in the Security Council, Russia will probably veto it. I am not sure, but I am sure she probably would. All right, put her on the spot, prove who it is who is trying to stir up a storm of war. Then I would move into the General Assembly.

Now, maybe we will have to show that the United States has become ineffective. I don't think so. I hate to admit it; I would want to prove it.

But I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that I just do not think in terms of history this country can justify following your policies in South Vietnam which are unilateral policies, which is the expression of American military might under every kind of rationalization we tried to trump up.

That is the great difference, I think, that is developing in this country, and ultimately the people are going to have to decide which position shall prevail. But if there is anything that you can say here or elsewhere to me that will clarify my thinking on this point, give me some facts which you have never given me to date that will satisfy me that I am wrong.

I am going to continue to press that I say across this country for the United States to get back inside the framework of international law, because I think we are clearly outside of it. I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

AMERICAN SUBMARINE OFF CHINA COAST

Senator AIKEN. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. What was the purpose, Mr. Secretary, of the recent announcement that the United States has a submarine off the coast of China in position to launch nuclear missiles?

Secretary RUSK. The fact is that long before the Chinese detonation, it was planned to deploy some Polaris submarines to the Pacific. If they were deployed there, in the first place it is not something that can be kept secret. Their presence there will become known, and we thought it would also be a stabilizing element in countries like Japan and India to know that there are Polaris submarines in the Pacific.

Senator AIKEN. So, we announced we had one there?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. It was not intended as an indication that if we expanded the war and things got going rough that we would, if pressed hard enough, use nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. We have substantial nuclear forces in the western Pacific quite apart from the submarine, so that issue is always with us in the situation if we get into a larger war situation.

Senator AIKEN. I just wondered why the announcement was made at this time.

Secretary RUSK. I think it was made, first, because submarines are being deployed there and their presence cannot be secret, and second, because the detonation of a device by the Chinese created some nervous news and we thought that would be a stabilizing factor.

Senator AIKEN. Was the announcement made by the State Department or the Defense Department?

Mr. BUNDY. I think it was announced by the Defense Department, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. That is all. I just wondered if there was any particular——

Secreatary RUSK. You will notice the Indian Government expressed approval, whereas 6 months ago they had expressed reservations about it.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, the Indian Government is quite concerned about having something to eat, too. I have noticed that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, as I understand your earlier statement, the unfavorable consequences which might flow from a disengagement of the United States in Vietnam would be more political than military—its effect upon Japan, upon India, Thailand, perhaps others. Do I correctly assume that the untoward consequences which you see as possibilities, if not probabilities or certainties, would be more political, diplomatic in nature rather than military?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I think I would not separate the political and the security side of things to that extent, because——

Senator GORE. Political is a part of security?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, but I am thinking about actual additional moves in the military as well as political field to bring independent countries under the control of the Communist world, particularly in this instance of Peiping.

For example, we do know that Indonesia is attempting to initiate certain mischief in the Philippines. This is very trivial thus far in terms of what they have been trying to do, but if Indonesia, Southeast Asia are solidly linked up with Peiping, I am sure they can be expected to start out after the next target, at least we have no reason to think they will stop. Their pattern thus far has been that they would continue the next effort, and I would think we could see exactly the pressures on Thailand that we have been getting in Laos and South Vietnam. I think they have announced themselves as pursuing that course of policy; it is there objectively stated to the rest of the world.

They are now trying to get some sort of toehold in Africa to carry out the same sort of operation there. It is a much smaller scale, and I think it is much less likely to be serious and effective in Africa than it has been in Southeast Asia.

THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

Senator GORE. Since this is, I take it, not only an executive session but a very guarded one, I would like to compliment you and the late President Kennedy upon declining the advice of the military to go to war in Laos. The late President told me that he had four different recommendations, varying in manner, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military intervention in Laos. Perhaps it would be, at least it has been thought-provoking to me to recall one other thing that he said to me with respect to South Vietnam, and that is that when Red China achieved nuclear weapons South Vietnam was within the sphere of influence of Red China. However that may be, we do have the situation there of South Vietnam with one harbor, continuous communication northward, and the crudest sort of nuclear weapon could isolate vast forces should we have vast forces in Vietnam.

Therefore, one could make the case that from a military, purely logistics standpoint, we are under now the threat of even crude nuclear weapons insofar as a major military operation in South Vietnam is concerned. Without attempting to become technical in this matter, it seems to me that with the present mobility, with the changed nature of military operations, that as a military base this, South Vietnam, has little importance to us, comparatively little. That is why I was trying to draw a distinction as to what are these great and untoward consequences that might flow, and it seemed to me from your statement that they were preponderantly political, diplomatic, involving the prestige of the United States. I would not underrate them.

It seems to me that the effect of a tuck-tail-and-run policy in South Vietnam on Japan and India and Red China is far more important than its effect upon what Indonesia does in the Philippines.

I think if we could place things in their relative degree of importance it might be helpful. I hope I made my position clear.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, yes, sir. I don't myself, and I don't think you did, draw a sharp distinction between the political and the military or the security aspects.

For example, Munich was a political agreement.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. But it was a major step toward World War II. Our position in Berlin could be surrendered politically, but the security impact of a surrender of our position in Berlin could be enormous, enormous in terms of the capacity of NATO to deal with any threats from the east if those threats should develop, because I think those two aspects are very closely linked.

HAZARD OF WAR WITH CHINA

Senator GORE. I agree. It is very hard to avoid diversion into tangents. The point I had sought to make right in the beginning was that it seems to me the greatest hazard we run by involvement in the Vietnamese situation is the possible, a possible, war with Red China, then freeing the Soviet Union to move in Eastern Europe, more particularly into the Mediterranean and the African theaters. It is this great hazard that has caused great worry on my part for the past 4 years. I do not mean by this to imply any criticism for any Senator who has made speeches. I just have not been making speeches on the subject, but for 4 years within this committee, I have been urging the administration to find a pretext or to create one to disengage from this great hazard which I think we run.

Would you be willing to comment upon this, the possibility that we are running a great hazard of becoming involved in a war with Red China, leaving the most powerful Communist nation comparatively free to move into other theaters which we would of necessity neglect in the event of a war with Red China?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this question—and I would hope to answer part of it off the record if I may—this question of the possibility of a war with Red China is very much in our minds. This is not a war that anybody would ask for, would seek out. But on the other hand, if we say we can under no circumstances envisage the possibility of a war with Red China, then that is not a bad way to have one, because it would encourage Red China to quit thinking about the possibility that they might have a war with us on their plate.

Now, just in the most recent years, we have had to face this. In the summer of 1961, when——

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. When the President asked the Congress, and Congress added several billions of dollars, the entire tone of the Soviets changed and the threats dropped out of the picture, but it had to be faced.

POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION OVER CUBA

In the Cuban missile crisis, when the President made his speech on that first Monday, we did not think that the Soviets would launch a nuclear strike, but no one could know it. The President's speech was made in full recognition that a nuclear strike could occur, because that was the really only effective way that the Soviets had to meet militarily what was enchained so far as Cuba was concerned. They didn't have the conventional capabilities to do anything about Cuba from that distance, you see. So that during this entire postwar period, we have been forced to be in the position that we are prepared to look at the possibility of a war in order to force the other side to look at that same possibility.

I think in this connection it should be pointed out, in order to keep the way open for political moves that might be possible if we get some sort of signs that such are possible, I think it is worth pointing out that Hanoi and Peiping could be doing a great deal more against Southeast Asia than they are. In other words, they have not made an allout, flat, complete commitment with the forces that are available to them to overrun Southeast Asia. I mean they are also thinking about the possibility of war with the United States, so this is in the background, this is in the back of people's minds, and this is why we would like, if possible, to find a way to ensure the security of Southeast Asia without that development if we possibly can. But they, too, must think about it, not just we on our side, and I think they are thinking about it.

HAZARD IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE

Senator GORE. When you recognize the hazard and accept it as a fact of life and as a necessary consequence, the hazard as a necessary consequence?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE [continuing]. Of our continued operation in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That factor is also there in places like Korea, Formosa. In other words, it is not just in South Vietnam. But that factor is a total part of the equation.

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION

Senator GORE. Now, if you view this problem in the context of a decade hence, what is your assessment of its bearing upon the possibility that the Soviet Union may or may not continue on the course of rapprochement with the Western powers which has been underway now since the confrontation in 1961, thus possibly reentering the European society or, conversely, being more closely aligned with Red China, not only in a push into the Pacific but aligned more closely in a more aggressive Communist world assault?

Secretary RUSK. It is hazardous to have a single answer to that question, because one just can't really know——

Senator GORE. Isn't this one of the paramount questions? I know you can't know, but isn't it one of the paramount considerations?

Secretary RUSK. It is indeed, and this has been very much in our own thinking about the matter. When I say you can't know, it is

not just a question of intelligence. I am not at all sure that Moscow and Peiping know the answer to that question in terms of their relations.

I do believe, myself, that the Soviet Union does not want to be engaged with us in a major struggle over Southeast Asia. I personally am convinced of that.

Second, I do believe that Moscow is very fearful that they will be faced with an extremely difficult situation if these two socialist countries of North Vietnam and China come into a clash with the leader of the capitalist world and then they have to decide whether to stand aside or to support brother socialist countries. We have had some indication that they are worried about that particular prospect down the long trail here in this situation. I think this may have had something to do with their relatively moderate attitude on Laos.

I do believe, myself, that if Hanoi and Peiping can be turned back in Southeast Asia, can be brought to a point where they recognize that they have go to adjust their policy and start leaving these people alone, that then the idea of peaceful coexistence in the Communist world will be greatly strengthened. But if Peiping shows profit from its militancy, if they demonstrate that this is the way of the future, if they demonstrate they are making headway, they are picking up countries, then I think this gives an enormous impetus to the more mulitant doctrine of communism as declared by Peiping and that Moscow would be sorely tempted to move in that direction rather than to try to stay on a basis of peaceful coexistence.

AN HONORABLE WAY TO CUT OUR LOSSES

Senator GORE. The third point I had in mind, which I will only state, lest I take too much time, was that because of the anticolonial feelings of the Indochina peninsula, the intensity of racial feeling, and the intensity of religious strife, plus the inability to follow democratic procedures, perhaps lack of sympathy for democratic procedures, that therefore, political stability may be impossible and success there impossible. If success is impossible, then it would appear to me that we should find some honorable way to cut our losses. But I have stated my three principles, my three major sources of concern here, and I have used my time, so I will wait until further time to question this more in detail, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

INCREASED AID TO VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary. I spent the month of December in New York at the United Nations. I can assure you, not the Secretary but I can assure the committee, that there is great concern about our position in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, and we have many sympathetic supporters. I don't say we are getting any material help, but we get sympathy and a lot of discussion. They are concerned about our maintaining our position. From our standpoint of visiting with these people, I gather the impression that the prestige, not only at

the present but the future welfare of our Nation, is well at stake in this area. It is a difficult situation we are confronted with.

I was there when the President, I believe, or at least the administration, announced substantial aid, about the first part of December, to be put into this area, and it seemed as though something happened. That aid never was forthcoming, and later I began to hear some discussions.

What was that situation?

Secretary RUSK. Ambassador Taylor went back to Saigon after his last visit here with some increased action in his portfolio. Those have not been talked out further with the Government of South Vietnam because of the recent political difficulties, such things as increasing the size of the armed forces and things of that sort, police forces. I think that is all that is involved. Mr. Bundy, would you like to comment further?

Mr. BUNDY. That is it. There was no specific announcement at that time of any particular amounts. In fact, the programs in some cases still need full staffing. But as the Secretary said, the possibility of negotiating with a number of increased measures, such as economic aid in the cities, where there are some good projects, could be put underway. But that has simply not been possible to work out with the Vietnamese Government because of the happpenings of the last few weeks.

Senator CARLSON. It was announced, however, and there was some discussion of it.

Mr. BUNDY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. A reference was made to increased assistance when Ambassador Taylor left Washington.

A PAPER TIGER

Senator CARLSON. My only thought was, we get into a position where, I don't like to say, we make commitments and we don't follow through. I think, Mr. Secretary, of our position in Cuba. We have got to be firm.

Now, how far that firmness goes is a difficult situation, but we are a great nation and we are looked upon as such a nation. If we continue to just—I think Senator Hickenlooper used the word—to be a paper tiger, we don't increase our standing among the nations of the world. We must keep our commitments; I am greatly concerned about it. I sympathize with everybody about this problem.

That is all I want to say about it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

UNITED STATES SECURITY TIED TO VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. First of all, Mr. Secretary, I want to say to you that in forming my judgment on foreign relations, I have to rely substantially upon you men in high echelons, especially those in the civilian branch as distinguished from the military. With that premise, I want to be substantially assured that in the taking of a position I do not find myself subsequently sawed off by action of the Government that is contrary to the words which it is now uttering.

With this base, is it the definite judgment now that the security of our country is at stake in what happens in Southeast Asia?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. The President in his State of the Union Message said that our security is tied to these events on the other side of the Pacific.

Senator LAUSCHE. Earlier you made the statement that if we broke our word, we would suffer a loss of prestige in the Southeast Asian area, and that it would likely lead to Red Russia reconciling its difference with Peiping.

Secretary RUSK. That is a contingency that we have to think about. I did not make that as a prediction, but it is a contingency which we have to think about.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Which nations in Southeast Asia are likely to suffer a change in attitude in the event we depart from our committed word?

Secretary RUSK. Well——

Senator LAUSCHE. You mentioned Formosa and Korea.

Secretary RUSK. I would think that in the first instance it would be Cambodia which would complete the journey to the other side, and that Thailand would be the next one that would very quickly, I think, change its general attitude under those conditions.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we pull out, and if we breach our agreement, is there any feeling among you men in the high echelon of office that that would bring to an end the troubles which face us?

Secretary RUSK. My own view is that it would not bring to an end those troubles, that it would increase them.

THE NATURE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield for a clarification? He keeps saying commitment.

Could you clarify the nature of the commitment? Is it to go to war, the same kind of commitment we have under NATO?

Secretary RUSK. The commitment with regard to South Vietnam to give them the help necessary to maintain their independence and security.

A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE VIETCONG

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Is there now in process through the instigation of the State Department, an effort to bring about a coalition between the Vietcong in South Vietnam and the believers in the freedom?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. There is a very active defectors program at work to try to lure as many of the Vietcong back from the Vietcong as possible. That brings in perhaps, what, 200 or 300 a week, that kind of thing, something of that sort, not a great many thus far. But we have not pressed the South Vietnamese to negotiate toward or work toward a coalition government with the Vietcong.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not in the process now?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has it or has it not been the technique of the Communists generally in their efforts to achieve success to promote coalition governments?

Secretary RUSK. In a number of circumstances they have started that way. They started that way in Eastern Europe, for example.

We have had other places where Communists for a time took part in a government and then were pushed out. We had that in postwar Italy and we had that in postwar France.

But they would apparently rather have a coalition government than have no participation in government as a next step.

Senator LAUSCHE. But isn't it generally a fact that when they promote a coalition government, their objective is that eventually the Communists will take over?

Secretary RUSK. I think this is a part of their basic Marxist doctrine that was proclaimed with respect to the world revolution.

VIOLATION OF THE 1954 ACCORD

Senator LAUSCHE. Now that principle prevails in the fragmentation of French Indochina. It was anticipated by the French and the participants in the Geneva accords that that would bring peace in Laos and Thailand and Cambodia and South Vietnam and North Vietnam, but the expectation did not materialize.

Secretary RUSK. In the case of Vietnam, when Vietnam was split, the 1954 accord anticipated there would be elections throughout the country.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am glad you brought that up. Was there an election?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. So that the expectation was completely nullified by the subsequent development of facts. This 1954 accord was violated by the North Vietnamese.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. They charged that South Vietnam also violated it by not having elections. The South Vietnamese, as you will recall, did not sign the 1954 accord.

Senator LAUSCHE. Anyhow, the South Vietnamese have not gone into North Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. But the North Vietnamese have gone into South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

COMPARISON TO KOREA AND EASTERN EUROPE

Senator LAUSCHE. Doesn't the same principle prevail also with respect to Korea? It was anticipated that the division into North and South Korea would bring peace, and the South Koreans abided by the word and the North Koreans began to provoke disorders.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it also not a fact that this same principle prevailed in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Laos?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, laying that basis, what would you say is the reasonable conclusion that a reasonable mind ought to draw as to what will happen in the event we enter into a coalition form of government in South Vietnam? I am not saying that you

are doing that now. But just for my own information, what is to be anticipated, that they will keep their word or they will try to communize it?

Secretary RUSK. I have seen nothing that would lead me to believe that that would not be looked upon as the next step toward taking over the country.

RETREAT WILL NOT BRING SECURITY

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you see any relationship as to the activity of Indonesia in Malaysia now with the supposed success that they are having up in South Vietnam, the Communists?

Secretary RUSK. I think that in the case of Indonesia, the PKI have been encouraged by what they consider to be the favorable prospects in South Vietnam, and I think that Prince Sihanouk's attitude and actions in Cambodia have been substantially influenced by the situation in South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. Going beyond Southeast Asia, if we pull out or abandon the main tenets of what we now believe to be our interest in Southeast Asia connected with the security of this country, can we anticipate that that will step up the operations of the Communists in Africa and, second, in South America?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that certainly in Africa, where Peiping would be perhaps more active than they have been in South America. I think it would encourage the Communists elsewhere, including Latin America. I think there might be some time before this would be manifest in any substantial way, but I think we can expect it.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, retreat will not bring peace and ensure security for our country?

Secretary RUSK. That is my view of the matter, Senator. That is the basis on which we have been making this very substantial effort in Southeast Asia.

USE OF SEATO

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, going to a different field, why don't we go to SEATO? [2] There are eight nations in that, and I do know that several years ago we were disturbed about India and Poland being on the International Control Commission. Pakistan was strong at that time. It is doubtful now. I think the other day you said that France will veto anything we try to do in SEATO.

Secretary RUSK. I think the chances are very high that they would veto any formal action that would fly a SEATO flag, as such, in Southeast Asia. As I indicated, President de Gaulle had told us in 1961 he would not put a French military power in Southeast Asia again and to that extent resigned from that part of SEATO, that aspect of SEATO. Pakistan has pulled away because of the interminable dispute over Kashmir and is not willing to take responsibility there.

The British have taken a major responsibility in Malaysia and are doing a lot about it, and the Australian forces are being involved in that at the present time. The Thais are being very active

[2] Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.

and helpful in Laos and in Southeast Asia in ways that I shouldn't perhaps fully put on the record. The Australians are increasing their small contingent in South Vietnam. They are out in the field as combat advisors. They are doing the kind of work that our fellows are doing. The Filipinos are now on the point, we think, of putting a substantial and large constituent into South Vietnam. So that those members of SEATO who are not caught up in special circumstances are taking a considerable part in this entire Southeast Asia situation.

IMPEDIMENTS TO USING THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting to the questions that were put by Senator Morse, what is the impediment to going into the United Nations, either on the basis of the provisions of the charter or from the standpoint of practical advisability of going in?

Secretary RUSK. There is no problem about it as far as the charter is concerned and we have probed the possibility of the United Nations recently in at least two cases. One, at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, where, as you will recall, the North Vietnamese were invited to come to the Security Council and they refused that invitation. We thought it might be possible that if they came there could be some contacts, some discussions by the Secretary General and others to try to clarify just what it is the North Vietnamese had in their mind about this whole situation.

In the case of Cambodia, we hoped very much the Security Council would be able to establish along the Cambodian border a substantial U.N. presence to patrol that border so that on the one side the Vietcong could not use Cambodian territory for depredations against South Vietnam and also to ensure that in the fighting in that area that South Vietnamese forces would not through inadvertence get over into Cambodian territory. Sihanouk turned that down.

It is possible to take this to the United Nations. I don't believe, with all respect, that it is likely, that the United Nations would likely come to a result. It may be, Senator Morse, that——

Senator MORSE. We could find out.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. That to demonstrate that is worth the exercise.

Senator MORSE. Of course. It will make us friends around the world instead of enemies.

Secretary RUSK. But that is the question we have in front of us.

NORTH VIETNAMESE CADRES

Senator LAUSCHE. The other day I said to you that it was stated to me that organized units from Hanoi have appeared in South Vietnam and that would be, if it hasn't happened—you used the word cadres a moment ago—that would be tantamount to aggression, and you could not the other day tell me whether organized units had been brought down by Hanoi. Have you made any inquiries in that?

Secretary RUSK. No, I promised to doublecheck that and I told you that, so far as I had the information—and I would get complete, I think, complete information on this matter—that we have

not located organized units of North Vietnamese military elements in South Vietnam but we are getting increasing numbers of personnel who came from North Vietnamese organized military units.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one or two more questions and I will close. Will our position be better from the standpoint of security if we pull out of South Vietnam? I might have asked that question already.

Secretary RUSK. I think my introductory remarks covered that point, Senator. I do not, myself, believe that our security can be anything but weakened if we were to withdraw from South Vietnam at the risk of a Communist takeover of Southeast Asia.

PULLING OUT OF VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. I will close with this. In my judgment we have to strengthen the will of the people of our country to survive. That responsibility rests upon the State Department and the administration and ourselves. They are willing to say, "let's pull out," and if it is true, if we will be better off by pulling out, it ought to be said early.

Secretary RUSK. When you say, "They would be willing to pull out"——

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, the public might be willing to say we should pull out, but I am going to go forward on the assumption that you men running the Government, separate and apart from the military, are definitely of the opinion that the security of our Nation is related to what happens in the Southeast Asia.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. I don't know who is proposing pulling out. We constantly use this phrase "pulling out." Some of us are talking about staying in, but on an entirely different basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

THINGS ARE GETTING WORSE

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, if you had to answer a direct question with one word and the question was, are we better off now in Vietnam than we were when Congress adjourned, better or worse or the same, how would you answer it?

Secretary RUSK. I would say somewhat worse. Somewhat worse.

Senator MUNDT. It seems that way to me, and I speak as one who does not believe in pulling out. I don't think the people of South Dakota believe in pulling out, but nobody is very happy when things are getting worse, and it would look to me like they are worse.

Secretary RUSK. I might say the primary reason, I would say, for that is the political confusion in Saigon that the chairman spoke of. That is the primary reason. There are some other elements but that is the primary reason.

Senator MUNDT. I think that is right. Is there an element of truth in a rather critical column I read about the policy, I read some while ago by the Alsops [3] to this general tenor, that the

[3] Joseph and Stuart Alsop.

weakness of our effort in Vietnam was that we were concentrating too much on trying to find or evolve or develop a good, sound, stable, democratic form of government instead of reaching out and finding wherever we can a militant government able to control the situation and willing to fight? It seems to me, at least, that there is a lot of element of truth in that. We all want a democratic government there. That would be fine. But I don't see how you have got time to try to develop a democratic government with one hand and fight a war with another, and you have got to put first things first.

COMPARISON TO LATIN AMERICA

You keep talking about unity and stability and a will to fight, that is what we want. I think we are going to have to look at it through our Latin American glasses. We are not squeamish about being positive that every single leader in Latin America has been elected according to the Constitution of the United States, but to use your phrase of the other day, we work with the governments that are there. I would like to have you dilate on that a little bit, because in my opinion this is the basic weakness of our American policy in Vietnam and the reason it goes from bad to worse.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it seems to me that in the case of Latin America, we are in a position to and ought to support just as vigorously as we can the idea of constitutional government that the traffic can bear.

Senator MUNDT. That is right. But even so, in a situation like Brazil, we close our eyes. We have a new guy; we would like to get him out but he is our boy so we will work with him. You have it in the Dominican Republic, you have it in Spain, in Portugal. It is not novel. Why do we have a different formula in Saigon?

WHY DIEM FAILED

Secretary RUSK. We don't. In South Vietnam, Senator, we are not approaching this question of the government out there in a doctrinaire fashion. Remember that for 10 years we supported the Diem government, despite the fact that it was not democratic in fact. But the Diem government——

Senator MUNDT. He was stuck in the back with a blade.

Secretary RUSK. But chiefly because of his brother, his brother Nhu, that government was not able to govern its own generals and major elements of its own population. We hoped desperately to the very end that President Diem would find a way to separate himself off from his brother who was causing great difficulty with the leadership in intrigues and so forth, because President Diem had done a good job for his country under the most difficult circumstances. I think if anyone could look at the problems Diem was to face in 1954, they would have said there is only 1 chance in 100 of making a go of it.

Succeeding Diem was the military government of General Big Minh. That was not a striking success. General Khanh came in. We thought that, because he had been a first-class troop commander and was intelligent and imaginative and seemed to have some dynamic leadership qualities about him, his military government might succeed in doing a better job of it. But he himself——

THE MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT

Senator MUNDT. His government, this is where Carlson's question comes in. When his government was being hit by a lot of council of advisors and so forth, other people, he said, "I am going to take it over and firm up my position to strengthen it," we announced in the papers at least—I read the same thing he read—"All right, if you are going to do that we will withdraw our aid." This is undermining the government.

Secretary RUSK. No, but the government to which you are referring was established because General Khanh himself decided that a military government which had preceded him, his present government, was being too much encumbered with civilian responsibilities and civilian activities that ought to be left to civilians. It was the military who decided to establish this present government with Mr. Suu and Prime Minister Huong and the military running the war.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, then the military—looking at the machinery they had set up, either the system is wrong or the people are wrong; if the system is wrong saying we have to eliminate it.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, but those fellows have got to work together.

DISUNIFYING ASPECTS

Senator MUNDT. This is not what was reported in the press. What I am saying—from the press reports I saw after we had set up this rather democratic basis, civilian government, I think we should commend him rather than condemn him for his initial effort in that regard. Either his machinery is wrong, which sometimes happens, or the machinery is OK and the advisors were wrong, which sometimes happens, but in all events then we announce—the people believe that because he had sort of withdrawn from this democratic posture and had gone back to a more unified system under his own military command, we were withholding the supplies.

Secretary RUSK. No, the problem there, sir, was not form but substance.

Senator MUNDT. Or threatening to——

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; the action taken by the generals was not action taken in the direction of unity but action taken to break up the pieces still further. I mean it was the disunifying aspects of that action that bothered us.

Senator MUNDT. Explain that more specifically.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The High National Council had been drawn together by the triumvirate of which General Khanh, General Big Minh, and General Kim were the members. The High National Council had been drawn together as a group of respected Vietnamese citizens who had not had, shall we say, contentions and controversial involvements with the various groups in the country in a way that might have disqualified them to try to get some sort of a unified group within which political discussion could be forwarded. That High National Council themselves drafted the charter on which the present government was set up. The civilian government was expected to take care of the normal operations of the civilian aspects

of South Vietnamese public life. The military were supposed to concentrate on the war effort, that is, on the war against the Vietcong.

GOVERNMENT AS A REFEREE

Even there, some of the group, such as certainly the Buddhists, felt that there ought to be more direct representation in the government of their own particular groups, whereas General Khanh, the High National Council, Prime Minister Huong felt that the government would have to be more of a referee of these groups and not involve itself by having direct representation from contending groups in the cabinet and just bring these differences in to the cabinet. As sort of government technicians, they might be better serving as a referee among such groups as might raise contentious problems. But at any rate, this was their formula.

Now, when certainly the generals, with General Khanh, moved in to arrest members of the High National Council and issued a military decree dissolving it, then this broke apart once again all of these contending elements, some of them generals, contending among themselves to a degree. The military-civilian relationship was broken, and it invited those who opposed the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Huong, to become more active again in their opposition to the Prime Minister.

We have not been able to, we have not felt that we could ourselves, write them a constitution or write a prescription which they would accept as their own on the basis of which they would unify. This has been the most vexing and frustrating aspect of this entire business. The chairman commented on it earlier, this matter of getting, I would say, on the order of 500 leaders in the country, civilian and military, to set aside lesser questions until the war against the Vietcong has been disposed of. I wish we had a miraculous answer for that, but I think there is nothing which has preoccupied our time and thought and effort more than that particular question over the last several months.

A FIRM BASE FOR FIGHTING COMMUNISM

Senator MUNDT. Also according to this Alsop article, the young generals or young Turks or whoever it was that sort of broke up this council but who stayed, if I am correct, loyal to Khanh, and Khanh stayed loyal to them, they comprise our one solid, firm base as far as militancy fighting communism is concerned.

Now, ever since the days of the Panama Canal, and maybe earlier, the United States has been in the business of helping to establish, recognize, and protect foreign governments friendly to it to achieve purposes which are of concern to us. We have got it in Panama; at least, I remember that one. It has been happening ever since. It has been happening, as you so correctly put it, in Latin America where we haven't got much of an excuse to do it, where we are not fighting. But now here, where we are involved with American boys who are being killed and spending all this money, I think the only way we are ever going to get this thing bettered instead of worsened is to decide on some group down there and back them up and not related with how they are going to be elected

under the constitution, and rid the thing of the penetration and rid the thing of subversion and attacks of the Communists.

Stu and I and Lausche can convince you that the freedom academy is a good thing. We will train civilians and go down there and run a civilian government; we are out of the woods. But there is the weakness, Mr. Secretary. It will be a long time before we will come up and say, "Here is a good man." Then the first thing I know, he acts a little totalitarian so we either boot him out or else discredit him by announcing around the world, "We have a large portfolio and if we ever open it up, boy, there are a lot of goodies for everybody, but you can't have it."

Secretary RUSK. The last part is really not the issue of the problem here.

Senator MUNDT. That is my statement.

Secretary RUSK. I hope people will understand we are just a little cautious after the experience of the last 2 or 3 years in saying that any particular individual is our last white hope. We tried Big Minh, he was supposed to be the fellow who was popular around the country and had the full support of the generals, and then one of his own corps commanders came in one day without notice to anybody and took his command away from him. We had General Khanh, whom we thought was very promising in this respect, but I would caution you about not putting too much trust in the relationship between General Khanh and the young Turks. It is not so easy as Joe Alsop says.

PROBLEM WITH THE TOP 500 PEOPLE

Senator MUNDT. Would you say there it is easier for us to withdraw or for us to be running the war with General Taylor? What about running out of guys?

Secretary RUSK. I wish I could give you a really first class answer to the problem of South Vietnamese governmental and political leadership. I am afraid I can't today. I can say that——

Senator MUNDT. I am going to keep asking questions on that, because I think that is the source of the difficulty. There are plenty of people who do the fighting. I have talked to a lot of our fellows who do the fighting. I have talked to a lot of our fellows down there who have been doing the fighting, and to my surprise they say the South Vietnamese are good soldiers.

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about it. They have fought well, stubbornly, and gallantly. The problem is not among the ranks. The problem, I really feel—perhaps the figure is not exactly right—that much of this problem is within, say, the top 500 people.

Senator MUNDT. You don't want to sit here, Mr. Secretary, and tell us that the great United States, with all its prestige and its power and its billions of dollars and its diplomats, who should have gone through the freedom academy but didn't, can't get 500 human beings around Saigon to whip up some kind of a government we are going to support. What is the use of killing all these American boys right down in the delta—and having some meetings in a marble hall someplace in Saigon with these 500 jokers.

Secretary RUSK. You see, one of the problems we have had recently is we have been trying so hard just to do that, and those we have been trying with have squealed.

DULLED BY AN IDEALISTIC APPROACH

Senator MUNDT. True. But our effort has been dulled by an idealistic approach—we are going to do it democratically.

Secretary RUSK. That is really not the problem. We are not approaching it from a doctrinaire——

Senator MUNDT. Then you should say it in the press. You go back to your press clippings.

Secretary RUSK. Are we talking about a responsible and effective government?

Senator MUNDT. That is right.

Mr. BUNDY. We made no reference to the State Department's aid. What we said was there must be a duly constituted government in full power without any improper influence from any outside group. That is the guts of the matter—a government.

Secretary RUSK. You see, this was their own agreement under which they were to organize themselves. This was not our prescription. They were the ones who put this together and said, "On this basis we are going to work together."

Senator MUNDT. But you have to grant them the same right to make a mistake and change their mind that people do in this country.

Secretary RUSK. But it sets back the war effort, and that is why we have objected.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator will allow the other two members to ask questions.

Senator MUNDT. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

MAKE REALISTIC COMMITMENTS

Senator CHURCH. Leading off from where the last question seemed to lead us, it seems to me that this is not a simple question of getting a stable government. It is the extremely complicated question, and the harder we embrace these people, the more we underwrite and endorse their schemes, and perhaps this will be the kiss of death. In that part of the world, knowing how the general Asian attitude is toward Western nations, it seems to me this is not a simple thing to do. If it can be done at all, it has got to be done by them. It can never be successfully done by us and be acceptable to them.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, just to go briefly through one or two things, it has been repeatedly said around this table that if we pull out, there will be very serious consequences. I just want to make it clear that I, for one, don't believe that we ought to pull out. I believe that we ought to keep our commitments that are not wisely made, but I do think for that reason we should make commitments sparingly and should make them realistically. But I don't know anyone on this committee—I don't understand Senator Morse's position to be that we ought to pull out or break commitments solemnly made.

However, I think it is terribly important to understand the nature of the commitment. To this end, the chairman asked you a few minutes ago what it was, and you answered, but I still think there is some ambiguity. Your answer is that we have made a solemn commitment to Saigon to assist that government in maintaining its independence, assist in its resistance to the Communist insurrection against it. We all undertand that.

INTERVENTION WITH AMERICAN TROOPS

But is there now, or has there been in connection with this comitment, any understanding with Saigon that we intended to assist them to the point of intervening on our own with our own forces and making that region an area of American warfare? Does this commitment go to the point where we have assured them that if the necessity arises we will intervene with our own troops and undertake to sustain them through an American war effort?

Secretary RUSK. We have not—first, let me say that our commitment there takes into account the fact that this is more than an insurrection.

Senator CHURCH. I understand.

Secretary RUSK. There is the outside factor, you see.

Senator CHURCH. I understand, but I wanted to know the nature of the commitment in the light of all the facts.

Secretary RUSK. Second, we have not made any specific commitments to the South Vietnamese about an unknowable future. Hanoi and Peiping are helping to write this scenario. We have not made specific commitments to the South Vietnamese about a number of contingencies which could be foreseen in the future in one direction or another.

Actually, the South Vietnamese have not asked us for combat forces. They are not asking other governments for combat forces. That is not the problem basically, so that issue has not arisen between us and the South Vietnamese.

COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. Can I take it, then, Mr. Secretary, that since the issue has not arisen up to this time, we have made no commitments to move in with our own forces and undertake American war for the purpose of sustaining the Saigon government against the Communist forces?

Secretary RUSK. We have not made a commitment to put large U.S. combat forces in there and take over the war from the South Vietnamese; no, sir, we have not done that.

Senator CHURCH. So then it follows if we choose not to do that, we are not breaking any comitments?

Secretary RUSK. Here again, I mean in terms of what your decisions in the future may have to be in the light of the circumstances and what the north might be doing——

Senator CHURCH. But we will make those decisions in the light of our national interest at that time and not by virtue of any commitment made to Saigon?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the commitments, of course, are made as a part of our consideration of our national interests there, the com-

mitments to help assure the South Vietnamese their security and independence.

Senator CHURCH. The commitment is made to pursue an objective, is it not? Isn't that objective, hasn't it always been, an independent South Vietnam which, I take it, would not be a military ally of the United States? We would be satisfied if it were an independent and neutral South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. We would not object to a non-aligned South Vietnam.

TELLING THE UNITED STATES TO GET OUT

Senator CHURCH. Then our problem is how do we best accomplish the objective which is and should be a neutral and independent South Vietnam. We have the present course and we have, it seems to me, two possible alternatives. You have talked about the consequences that might follow if we fail to keep out commitment. What would the consequences be if we continue the present course and the situation in Vietnam continues to deteriorate to the point where Saigon, as a result of some coup d'etat, new coup d'etat, new coalition of forces tiring of the war efforts and tiring of us, turns to us and says, "Get out?" You have already indicated that since it is their country and not ours, we would have no honorable recourse but to get out.

But what would then be the consequences to American prestige, to the American position in the Orient, to the prospects for new Communist victories in that part of the world if this should happen?

Secretary RUSK. I can't imagine that a group in Saigon would say that without having made their own arrangements with the Vietcong.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, sir.

Secretary RUSK. Any other group saying that would catch the next plane to Paris.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I mean there would be nothing there for them. They couldn't stay.

I would think the general effect would be very close to the effect of pulling out. The consequences would be about the same in the longer run.

Senator CHURCH. And you have said that the pulling out would have very adverse and serious consequences.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I didn't want to leave any impression that I felt if the South Vietnamese told us to get out that that would give us any comfort at all in the total and general situation.

Senator CHURCH. It would be as bad as it is possible that it would be worse in its overall effect?

Secretary RUSK. It is a little speculative, Senator. I think that——

Senator CHURCH. That is a matter of judgment.

Secretary RUSK. And I think that the responsibility would be much more heavily upon them. It would be clearer that we were prepared to do everything that we could so long as they were ready to fight for themselves and do their own job.

Senator CHURCH. But there would be an element, too——

Secretary RUSK. But if they threw in the sponge——

Senator CHURCH. But it would be an element, too, of an outright repudiation of the policy of the United States that would be terribly damaging to us.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

ENLARGING THE WAR

Senator CHURCH. One thing I want to say, I am afraid this is a real possibility not too far down the road and we will have to take into account in the balance in weighing what we should do now.

The other alternative that has been talked about has been the alternative of enlarging the war. Suppose that—I believe if this happens it can't be done just cleanly with bombs but it has got to go to foxholes and it has got to go to American—I think it would end up with a large scale American troop commitment in that part of the world.

If this were to happen, and we did enlarge the war and we did move in with our own forces and held with our own power this region, do you think that as a consequence of that kind of action we could then leave very soon, or do you think we would have to then hold with American forces looking down the line for a rather long period of time?

I think of Korea where now a dozen years after the victory we are still heavily involved with half a billion a year and 55,000 American troops permanently stationed on the 38th Parallel. Do you think it would be any different in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think under those circumstances that the presence there would be there for quite a long time.

Senator CHURCH. I do, too.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR COMPETENCE

Then looking down the road a little ways, assuming this happens to us, quite apart from the cost in lives and treasure which this would involve, China has already detonated the first nuclear weapon—I don't sell China short, I don't think we should. Given 10 years' time and effort and application, it seems to me that China is capable of developing a formidable, respectable nuclear arsenal.

China has again and again asserted that this is her sphere of influence. If then we were in physical occupation of this region beneath China, holding it with American troops quite apart from how durable a victory we could expect in view of the wash of history and the fact that the white man's dominance out there is over and the Asians are all agreed that it is Asia for the Asians—quite apart from that and the force that would give to the Communists in dealing with us in that part of the world, what is China going to do once she develops a nuclear competence? Aren't we then in danger of being in the same situation in Asia that Khrushchev found himself in Cuba when he put his missiles there and we challenged him and said, "That is our sphere of influence, our national security. You are not entitled to be here. Our national security is so extended that we are going to have a showdown with you." In this showdown he realized the game was not worth the candle and he

withdrew under circumstances that to me represented the most serious Communist defeat which has occurred since the end of the Second World War.

Wouldn't we 10 years down the road, if we take that course, be placing ourselves in a position that could be compared strategically to the position that Mr. Khrushchev found himself in if China were to turn upon us and say as we said to Russia, "This is our sphere of influence, you do not belong here, and we are going to have a showdown with you."

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would like to make two or three comments on that point. I really feel very deeply that you cannot take up on a question of formal reciprocity the position of those who are trying to construct a peaceful world order based on the United Nations charter on the one side and those who are trying to subject the world to Communist world revolution on the other. Therefore, formal reciprocity of theory troubles me a bit on something of that sort.

Senator CHURCH. You understand I was only talking about not theory or the reason for our respective positions; I was talking about the strategic reality which led Khrushchev to withdraw when he found, regardless of the formalities, that the game was not worth the candle.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, all right.

NO RIGHT TO DOMINATION

And on those questions we are on our side so that my view is influenced by that factor. I don't believe that we can accept the proposition that geographic propinquity confers a right to domination under the theory of sphere of influence. If that were so, there would never be an end of the movement of these forces we are worried about. Iran, Turkey, Greece, Austria, Norway, all these things could easily be taken up as spheres of influence given the present configuration of the two blocs. We believe that these countries in Southeast Asia have a right to be independent even though they live next to a giant.

Senator CHURCH. Right.

Secretary RUSK. And it is in our interests that they have that right.

UTILIZE U.N. MACHINERY

Senator CHURCH. But remember, Mr. Secretary, again, what I am saying is we have agreed on our objective; our objective is an independent and unaligned South Vietnam. The only point at issue here is which way is most likely to produce this result. We have talked about two things. We have discarded withdrawal, and I have tried to look down the road with you a little bit if we go the other direction, which seems to me to be equally lacking in promise and perhaps could lead us into a catastrophe.

There is a third direction which I don't think has been explored sufficiently. The third direction is in an effort, an initiative on our part to try to utilize the United Nations machinery in a way that might better advance the cause of a neutral, unaligned South Vietnam than either of these other alternatives we have talked about.

I know there are difficulties, but thus far, we have not said in any public way that we would like to see the United Nations assume responsibility, we would like Saigon to invite the United Nations to do so, the same way as it was done in the Congo. On the whole, the U.N. effort, where it has been made, has been pretty good, the record is pretty good, not pretty bad, and I can see lots of possibilities if the U.N. would own up to the responsibility, possibilities for a U.N. force to move in and maintain the neutrality for a given transitory period, possibilities for the U.N. to police a self-determination in this area, possibilities for winning over positively world opinion in the same way that we won it over to our cause in Korea because we operated under the aegis, indeed even the flag, of the United Nations.

Every time this question has been brought up at this table, the immediate response has been, "No, that is out." I just wonder now in the light of the alternatives that face us whether we ought to give greater consideration to exploring the possibilities of moving in this direction. If it doesn't work, at least it can then not be said of us that it failed only because we failed to try and thus far we haven't tried.

Secretary RUSK. We——

Senator CHURCH. That is, as far as the information I know about is concerned.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

HANOI WOULD NOT ACCEPT U.N. JURISDICTION

First, the problem here is with Hanoi and Peiping. There is not the slightest evidence that they would accept U.N. jurisdiction of this problem. That is one of the elements, I think, in this situation.

Second, I don't think there is a chance in the world that we could get U.N. forces to do any fighting in South Vietnam. If there were peace, it might be possible to get U.N. forces to patrol that peace, and that is a real possibility. There is no indication yet that Hanoi and Peiping are prepared to see a solution short of Hanoi's taking over South Vietnam. Now, unless U.N. forces are in there to fight, therefore, I don't think that the U.N. is likely to be able to impose a barrier to that appetite from the north.

Senator CHURCH. Well——

Secretary RUSK. Third, we have tried to get the U.N. on more than one occasion, I think we might on—we will send to the committee the attempts over the years to involve the U.N. one way or the other in Southeast Asia. We tried to get the U.N. to do something that was entirely in accord with the record of the U.N., the type of activity the U.N. has been willing to undertake in resolving at least a part of this problem, and that is the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border problem.

That failed. The U.N. was unable to do even that.

Senator CHURCH. There is a difference, it seems to me, and I am going to—Senator Symington has been sitting here a long time. I just want to to say one or two things more.

IMPACT ON WORLD OPINION

When the U.N. went into the Congo, there was chaos, there was fighting, there was bloodshed, there was rebellion. The U.N. was invited in to restore order because all of this constituted a threat to the peace. It was invited into the Congo.

There is violence, there is fighting, there is bloodshed and certainly there is a threat to the peace in South Vietnam today. On the same basis, it seems to me that the Saigon government might invite the U.N. to help restore order under an arrangement which would guarantee the neutrality of the area and ultimately guarantee the right of self-determination. This new arrangement might have such impact upon the forces that are actually struggling there; in fact, it might even offer such basis of hope for them that there might be a chance to put down the rebellion under the force of the U.N. intervention, and it wouldn't matter whether Peiping participated.

Peiping is not in the U.N. and neither is Hanoi. But the impact of this on world opinion and the possibility of its impact, indeed upon the very forces that are fighting in South Vietnam, it seems to me that it ought to be permitted.

A FACE-SAVING ARGUMENT

Senator MORSE. May I say to the Senator, it seems to me the Senator is unanswerably right on this analysis, and may I say to the Secretary of State, more respectfully, that I think the Secretary of State has presented their face-saving argument that you presented again about Cambodia and Hanoi on a segmentized basis that you offered the United Nations to come in, but the State Department has never faced up to putting the whole South Vietnamese issue under the charter before the United Nations. You can't, in my judgment, get out of your responsibility by saying you want to come in and look at a couple of segments of it. The fact is the charter is perfectly clear.

The Senator from Idaho has pointed out the United Nations can take jurisdiction whether Hanoi or Peiping want to come in or not. That is its responsibility. Why don't we try it and find out? It may not work but, believe me, we have then got ourselves in an unanswerable position. We are not now, and I just don't understand why you gentlemen over there keep citing this face-saving argument of yours. It is not a face-saving argument at all.

We made a gesture here on Cambodia and Hanoi, on the Tonkin Bay matter, and they wouldn't come in. That doesn't relieve us of our clear duty under that charter, in my judgment, to lay the whole issue before the United Nations. Until we do, we are going to continue to lose face around the world. Why don't we put a lot of nations on the spot?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have given an enourmous amount of study to this question about it here and at the U.N. Quite frankly, it will be tempting to put it there in order to meet this argument and let you find out what the U.N. will or will not do.

Senator MORSE. That is what I want to do. Why don't you do it?

Secretary RUSK. But don't expect the U.N. to take over this thing and solve this problem for us. They won't do it.

Senator MORSE. Let's find out how far they will go, and if they are not willing to do it, let's face up to the fact that the United Nations has become a chatterbox.

URGING ACTION

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we could let the Senator from Missouri have a few words.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I have to say will be very brief.

I am very much impressed with the opening questions that the chairman asked you, Mr. Secretary, because we are all mixed up on this thing. And I say with the greatest respect that I am not sure that isn't also true with the executive branch, based on the questioning. What it seems to me we get out of this meeting is that Senator Hickenlooper is urging action. His action is different from the action that Senator Morse and Senator Church are urging, but what they are doing is urging action, some form of action.

There was a time when I was in South Vietnam with Taylor and Rostow, and I urged action. I wrote President Kennedy—it must be in the record—in longhand, urging action. At that time, incidentally, Mr. Rostow agreed with my position without reservation.

What is happening that worries me a great deal is that many of the things you said this morning I think American people should know about. I don't think they are conditioned with the disintegration that has occurred that the chairman referred to in the beginning. I think it is going to come as a great shock to them. What is going to happen out there, in my opinion, in the not too distant future, one way or the other—the problem of democracy—if they are going to have to move forward with you on some basis, I think they ought to know more about what is going on. If they are going to have to—this United Nations thing is to me a step; it is a move. But we are just sitting on the situation, and ultimately, I don't see how we can profit by it. There must be something that we can do. It has either got to be military or political, perhaps it has got to be both.

That is the only thought that I wanted to leave with you. I don't think we are being candid with the people.

For example, you mentioned and we took——

[Discussion off the record.]

ACQUAINT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WITH THE FACTS

Senator SYMINGTON. The only thought I wanted to leave with you—and I say this very respectfully, you know that—is that we must do something, in my opinion, to acquaint the American people more with the facts involved. You have got to move on some basis at some time.

I am impressed with the logic of what Senator Morse and Senator Church have said about the United Nations. We just can't sit there and die in this situation which, in my opinion, we would do it if the South Vietnamese Government—and Khanh was getting pretty close to it, regardless of the power he may or may not have—simply says, "We would like you to get out." I should think the face loss to that would be incredibly high.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have to say at this time.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, one of the purposes of this discussion, as we indicated last time, was to consult with this committee. I will, in fact, as far as I am concerned, review this whole U.N. aspect of the matter and be prepared to discuss that further with the committee, because that suggestion has come up today from two or three members of the committee. We have given a lot of thought to it, but I think this is something we can discuss further, with profit, in the committee to see what the committee's judgment on it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do believe that, as far as the facts are concerned, there may be certain points, such as what President de Gaulle said to me in Paris, that the general public does not know. I think they could surmise it from other things that President de Gaulle has said, but I don't know of any situation where the facts are reported in more detail than from South Vietnam.

NO STRONG INTEREST TO MAKE IT A BIG WAR

Senator SYMINGTON. May I interject, just to be sure we understand each other——

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. I have listened to two briefings, one in this committee and one in the Armed Services Committee, where all the facts belied the statement that things looked better out there. I have seen it happen twice last year.

Secretary RUSK. I just got through saying it looks worse.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know you did this time, but my point is whether it was the military budget or what the reason was, I didn't know. Senator Gore reminded me that it also occurred in this committee that things looked considerably better.

Now, the curiosity in my State on South Vietnam is great, more than on any other subject today in the world. I just don't think the people are informed as to what is going on out there and, therefore, any decision that you make is going to have the problem of criticism incident to ignorance.

Secretary RUSK. I wonder, Senator, if it isn't true that in the main, as far as the American public is concerned, there is no strong interest to get out, there is no strong interest to make it a big war tomorrow and, therefore, the American people feel the same frustrations that we feel in this committee room, that I feel, about how to get on with it, if possible, between those two points. The problem is not so much the broadest line of policy. The problem is that we need some good news out of South Vietnam, and this includes this question of the political confusion at the top. It also would be affected by operational news from the countryside.

COLUMNISTS' VIEWS ON VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. I can't agree with you on that. You have columnists like Alsop on one side saying it would be terrible to get out, and [Walter] Lippmann on the other side, at least implying that we should get out, making a statement which I believe was that we are exploited a little bit everywhere and not enough anywhere, and that people are beginning to say if we have to stay in

Korea, if we have to stay in Berlin, if we have this balance of payments problem, if the British pound is collapsing, de Gaulle is selling his gold, let's get out of someplace, and the best place to get out of right now is South Vietnam. That is my impression of what the people feel today in many quarters. Of course, there is a general dissent about this subject, because I think we have given them a little bit of Nembutal as against the fact.

But, on the other hand, if the facts were known I think there would be a much more sharp opinion on it.

Secretary RUSK. Our own mail doesn't show that there is very much general support for either the Lippman or the Joe Alsop point of view on this question.

ATTACKS ON NORTH DEPEND ON STABLE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before we break up, there are one or two questions I have.

The last time we had a meeting of the committee there were very few here, in fact only four members. This is during the recess when General [Maxwell D.] Taylor was here; we had a very small attendance, only four or five of us that day. It is my very clear understanding that he was asked on several occasions, by all the members practically, what the policy was regarding escalating the war. I believe I am correct in stating it—the record will show it perhaps—he said the policy was that there would be no attacks, overt attacks on North Vietnam unless and until a stable government was established in Saigon. In other words, as long as you had this very——

Senator GORE. Ephemeral.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Unstable, ephemeral government in Saigon, they would not do that. Is that still the firm policy of the Government?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, that is the present policy. I think I should say if the President should come to any other conclusions, he would do so in consultation with the leadership of the Congress.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I clarify that statement and the answer just a minute, because on the record you have left a rather interesting answer. The chairman posed the question that there would be no attacks on North Vietnam unless and until a stable government was established, which could well be interpreted that as soon as we got a stable government in North Vietnam we would attack the north, and I don't believe the chairman meant that.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I didn't mean to leave that impression, but it was in a sense, to me it was, a kind of a guarantee that as long as there was this situation they wouldn't do it.

The reason I put it that way is there was the other argument that has been made—I am not sure that he made it—that the only way to get a stable government and to encourage the South Vietnamese was to launch an attack on the north, and that this would sort of rally the people and so on. This has been the other side of the coin.

I was particularly interested, I mean, I think I have made it very clear, that I don't think anything can justify the escalation of the war, in my opinion. We hadn't talked too much about that this

morning, but I just don't want another Korea there in spite of all the importance of this area that you so brilliantly emphasized this morning. I am perfectly willing to go along with many more efforts to stabilize. I just wanted some reassurance, if it is possible, that you are not now contemplating, because of the desperate situation in Saigon, an escalation of the war.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I think that is something that the President and leadership will talk to each other about.

The CHAIRMAN. Will we be told after the decision is made or before? Will we be invited to a meeting at the White House and told we have made up our mind tomorrow morning or in 30 minutes to launch an attack?

Secretary RUSK. We have never ourselves guaranteed North Vietnam as a safe haven for all these depredations which have been coming out of North Vietnam. There have been incidents down the coast and other things which have happened.

THE POSSIBILITY OF RETALIATION

The CHAIRMAN. I understand covert attacks have been made and we know about it, but I am talking about a rather major attack on North Vietnam by forces which are not just a hit and run.

Secretary RUSK. I take it you are going beyond the possibility of retaliation at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. There was the Gulf of Tonkin.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. That was retaliation.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to know what the idea is. I would hate for this decision to be made before the committee had an opportunity to consider it.

IMPORTANT FOR ADMINISTRATION TO CONSULT WITH CONGRESS

Now, when it was contemplated that we go into Dienbienphu and aid the French, I recall we were asked, a number of us, to the White House and we were told about this. If my memory is correct, it was almost unanimous among the congressional leaders that we didn't want to put 50,000 men in Laos. It was about that time it was contemplated—later we had a similar one on Laos—Dienbienphu, but it was before the fact, and I always believe that the Congress in one of those rare occasions had some influence upon the executive decision.

I can't prove this but I sort of suspected that it had some sort of influence on preventing contemplated action, perhaps in both places. I think you were there, Bourke. I never trust my memory too well about the precise things, but I had the feeling that we did.

In this case it is so important that I hope the administration won't make a decision of that nature before at least feeling the pulse of this committee. Do you think that would be a reasonable thing to expect?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, perhaps the reasonable thing on a matter of such importance is to report your remarks to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I was going to ask somebody if we can't deal with 30, 40,000 guerrillas any better than we have been doing, how we would handle several times that number.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that, too.

QUESTIONS ABOUT GENERAL TAYLOR

There is one other thing and I hate to bring this up; I hope you will understand it. I have the greatest respect for General Taylor. He has been one of my favorite Generals. He is one of the least, what shall I say, military leaders I know of. He is a very high cultivated man. He has many accomplishments. I only raise this question that he is a trained military man and it keeps coming into my mind that what has failed here is the enlistment of the local people, both military and civilians, in their real dedication to this effort.

I have a feeling, I don't like to put it in a way of criticism of General Taylor as a man, as a great military man, but he is not a politician. Now, whatever you say about politicians, every man in the Senate, in this room, has found a way to appeal to people and get them to support him, at least. I have a feeling that maybe he is miscast in this role.

Now, I don't know whether there is another man in existence who can do it. But you said we thought we had a leader and we had a leader. I just question whether General Taylor would recognize a possible leader who might develop here, whether he would recognize a man that, we will say, might be like [Luis] Muñoz Marin in Puerto Rico or Magsaysay in the Philippines.

There was an example. You had an internal Communist rebellion in the Philippines, and by some miracle our people, I think, recognized—they didn't create him—Magsaysay, and in a relatively short time after he appeared they solved it, apparently for good. This is not too unlike that.

But what happened was he rallied the people themselves in that country. I can't help but believe down in South Vietnam there are many very patriotic people who don't want to be Communists, who still don't like the government and won't cooperate with it, and therefore they do nothing or even they go along. It looks that way. It is the most chaotic situation I have ever run into and I don't think it can ever be solved unless there is someone around whom they can rally. They rallied, at least to some extent, around Diem.

Looking back on it, with all of his faults, and his main faults appeared to be Madam Nhu and Mr. Nhu, he has some little element of leadership and they did rally around him. At least for a time he did an excellent job, as you have said.

I don't think you will ever do it until you get a native leader. The idea of our talking it over and establishing a base, I just think it would be terrible to do that. I agree with what Senator Church said about all these things.

Now we come down to what can we do. I don't like to say we will remove General Taylor because I do really have the greatest respect for him, but I wonder if you have ever thought about that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first, let me express my own personal regard for General Taylor which is similar to yours.

The CHAIRMAN. As I say, I hate to say it.

Secretary RUSK. He is one of those men, a great military leader and a great civilian.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. He and Alex Johnson [4] are two of our most accomplished people and have had a lot of military and political experience in situations of this sort. General Taylor had a very special responsibility for the last 4 years in the beginning of 1961 in thinking about it and working on and sweating with the problem in South Vietnam.

COMPARISON TO AMBASSADOR LODGE

We had an experienced politician there as Ambassador in Ambassador Lodge. He worked most intimately with these leaders but while he was there as Ambassador, General Khanh walked in and took the government away.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't like to again be put on the spot about it because I like [illegible]t Lodge, but he wasn't what I would call the warmest kind of politician who conciliated people in the way I am thinking about. I mean I am thinking more like the ward heeler who knows how to deal with people at the grassroots. He is, as you know, a Brahmin of Boston. I like him, we all like him and so on, but he is not the kind of politician I am talking about.

Senator MORSE. Don't include us all. Speak for yourself. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I liked him. He is a friend of mine, but he isn't at all quite what I am thinking about.

GENERALS ARE SET APART

Secretary RUSK. But, Mr. Chairman, these top 500 people that I am talking about——

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get them together? Do you think that a General with a great personality—the fact he is a great General, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, sort of sets him apart? People don't feel easy and intimate with that kind of a person, even this person.

I can hardly bring myself to ask a question of General LeMay. He is so awesome and he is such a great figure, I don't feel like just pulling down my hair and talking to him, and none of us do. When he comes before this committee we all sort of stiffen and feel as if we are going to salute him. It is the nature of the man; God knows he is a great General.

Senator MORSE. Strike the word "all" again.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't make myself clear.

I may not have anything at all on it. I just keep wondering why in the world do these local people seem unhappy about any government that turns up, whether it is civilian or general. The local people aren't supporting him, and I don't think there is any hope of our succeeding unless they get together. This is one of the pre-

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[4] U.S. Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam U. Alexis Johnson.

conditions made, I thought, an understanding with Taylor, until they got together and had something to work with and for, I don't see any hope in this situation.

Secretary RUSK. That is where we put enormous emphasis.

UNITED STATES BACKED THE WRONG MAN IN LAOS

The CHAIRMAN. Look what they did to Phouma. Kong Le got so fed up with the government we were backing up there, he got so fed up—he was the man we trained. I remember Foster Dulles saying, "We put Kong Le in training in the Philippines." But he was fed up. He got so fed up with the corruption and stupidity of the people we had that he rebelled, and that sort of led to the breakdown. We thought Phouma was a Communist, we had nothing to do with him. Now we take Phouma as the only hope, and things have been better.

Secretary RUSK. He has done a very good job.

The CHAIRMAN. He is better, and yet we thought he was a leftist and had nothing to do with him. Our man was Phoumi, and Kong Le broke that thing, and it started here. Now Kong Le, as a neutralist, came back and apparently somebody has contributed something to the situation.

Secretary RUSK. Kong Le made the classic remark that Laotian troops will fight only on the way into town. They will only fight around the city.

The CHAIRMAN. He was about the best. We backed the wrong man. Now, for reasons I don't understand—I thought the place had completely gone over to North Vietnam, but there seems to be some vague kind of stability there, I don't think perhaps for reasons that we understand, but anyway there is. I just wanted to make that comment.

Senator GORE. May I have one minute before we close?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether I know what we are talking about. I don't know much about this country. But it looks like there is a failure of political elements there to give something around which the people can rally.

Yes, I am through.

NEGOTIATIONS PREFERABLE TO FAILURE

Senator GORE. I think this has been a very helpful discussion. The Secretary, in my opinion, has ably and eloquently expressed the problem and the administration's point of view. One constructive thing emerges, that he is going to examine fully before the committee the possibility, explore the possibility of some reference to the U.N. That is fine. I don't have much hope for it, but I want to see it thoroughly explored.

The Secretary has cited the Laotian settlement and I wonder if he wouldn't be willing to discuss, after he finishes the U.N., the possibility of such a solution in South Vietnam, whether we could negotiate, in fact, from the position of weakness we now occupy there; but if so, if this could be a feasible undertaking. Lastly, I think we come back to the first question that the chairman posed at the beginning of the session this morning, and that is the possibility of success or failure of the present undertaking. Nothing fails

quite so dramatically as failure. Even disengagement, while terrible on our part, would be preferable to utter and complete failure. So it seems to me we are making some progress but that maybe we have only started.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I am sure we need some further discussion of this and I hope we can have the next installments fairly soon. I think, because of Prime Minister Sato's visit, that perhaps—and commitments to the other side of the Capitol—that Friday of next week is the first time I can get back, but Mr. Bundy is available for subcommittee or whatever you wish in the meantime, and I would like to resume if I could.

CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE THE HEARING

I would very much appreciate, Mr. Chairman, I think really, if I dare say so, I ought to insist upon it, that out of this meeting not come statements that I am studying the reference to the U.N. Senators are free to say anything they wish to on that subject. So far as I am concerned, we could have some problems in Saigon and elsewhere on that subject.

Senator MORSE. That is a very fair request.

The CHAIRMAN. I am all in favor of this being super secret because I know it is a critical thing. I will try my best.

Secretary RUSK. I have another request to which I would completely defer to the committee. What Senators have said in these two meetings are of very considerable importance. It would be of some help to me if the committee would make an exception, if it could let me have one private personal copy of the transcript to look over and talk to the President about the views expressed here.

Senator MORSE. I move that it be granted.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection so ordered, that he be granted one copy of the top secret transcript.

WILLINGNESS TO USE THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator MORSE. I want to applaud the Secretary on his responses this morning, and I want to associate myself with the great statements made by the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Tennessee and the chairman himself as to the plight in which we find ourselves. Mr. Secretary, you are going to report to us on the United Nations, and I want to say I think there is a growing feeling in many places here and outside of our country that Great Britain and the United States are willing to use the U.N. on occasions when they think they are going to support our position, and we are not going to use it when we think they are not going to support our position. I think you have no better way to squelch that idea than to say, "We'll see what the United Nations will do."

I don't buy that argument we are leading from weakness if we go to the U.N. now. On the contrary, I think we will be applauded around the world and I think it is the strongest position from which to lead. As long as you treat the United Nations the way you have been treating it, you are going to give enemies of ours around the world an opportunity to use it against us. I want to get us out of that position.

The CHAIRMAN. If we do give you this, I will trust you not to let General Taylor and some of the others see it. We have been very free in talking about them. I want to have you pledge yourself——

Secretary RUSK. As far as that is concerned, the end of this could be taken out.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a Department of Defense man here. I don't want this to be misunderstood about General Taylor. This is a difficult point.

Secretary RUSK. Why don't we leave that part of it off the record so it won't be in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it will be wise. I don't like to bandy names around except when it comes down to nut-cutting. I don't like to——

Senator GORE. I don't know why the President shouldn't have the benefit of that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary can tell him about it.

Senator MORSE. I can be protected and left in. The Secretary will protect it.

Senator CHURCH. I think the chairman of the committee has made an original contribution. We have had Brahmin, we have had Generals, we have had career diplomats, what about a ward heeler?

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody to bring these fellows together. [Laughter.]

I am not going to tell the press anything but that we had an interesting discussion of it.

Secretary RUSK. I have already told them I am not going to say anything.

The CHAIRMAN. I agreed to see them in here. I will say we had a very interesting discussion and we will have further discussions.

Before you leave, we rescheduled Tom Mann next Tuesday, and we have a little routine business. We had to cancel it because of a conference.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA

TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:26 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

[On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of Ben H. Brown, Jr., to be Ambassador to Liberia; William A. Crawford, to be Ambassador to Rumania; Ralph A. Dungan, to be Ambassador to Chile; William H. Sullivan, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos; Antonio Certosima et al., being a list dated January 6, 1965, for promotions and appointments in the Foreign Service.

On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee approved for report an original resolution authorizing $135,000 for use of the committee in 1955 and for study and investigative purposes.]

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I apologize. It turns out the Republicans are having a meeting this morning. We are very pleased this morning to have Assistant Secretary of State Mann to review questions about the Latin American world in general, and we will assume you will proceed, Mr. Mann, with a short statement and then be subject to questioning.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS MANN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. MANN. Thank you, sir. If the committee wishes, I might talk about three things, trying to finish within 15 or 20 minutes. First, how the hemisphere is going geographically, working down north to south on a country basis in very general terms; second, something about trade, which is the biggest problem we face in Latin America in 1965; and third, a few things about the AID program.

MEXICO

Mexico continues stable. The new government probably understands the United States better than any government has in Mexico since 1917. Central America continues to progress—except for Costa Rica where they have had this volcano, and it is a major natural disaster for them—largely due to the rise in commodity prices and the increase in trade within the regional market. I

think one of the most exciting things going on in the hemisphere is this Central American Common Market. Growth rates are up in some countries to 11 percent per annum.

COLOMBIA

Colombia continues to go pretty well except that they have developed recently some political divisions which in turn have created a lack of confidence in the economic sector. This was followed by flights of capital, and their double rate of exchange has been under very heavy pressure in recent months. A major problem for us will be to try to find some way to correct this early in 1965.

ECUADOR

Ecuador continues on as before without much change in 1964. The junta has promulgated some plans for holding elections, but they haven't fixed the date. They are making preliminary plans about registration of voters, they say to prevent fraudulent voting, to prevent double and triple and quadruple voting. They have said that they are moving toward elections here.

HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA

On the dictatorship issue, I might say we continue to work with Lopez [1] in Honduras in an effort to get him to move toward constitutional government. We believe there will be development in 1965, but the going has been rather slow for us there.

Guatemala is moving along much better. They have held a constituent assembly. They will hold elections in 1965. The problem there is to get the military and the political parties to agree on the official government candidate.

VENEZUELA

Venezuela continues to progress at a satisfactory level. A coalition was worked out between Jovito Villalba and another small group, and the Christian Democrats were left out of the coalition, which we regret. But up to now there have been no serious problems arising from that.

PERU, CHILE, ARGENTINA

Peru goes very well except for some nationalistic actions in regard to the International Petroleum Company properties there. We have partially negotiated an agreement with the regime in Chile in which we hope to control inflation and make the economy viable within two to three years.

Argentina is not doing too well. On the economic front they are running a budgetary deficit of about $1 billion a year. Of every tax dollar that is spent, only 45 cents out of it is collected in taxes; the other 55 percent represents inflationary printing of money. The rate of inflation there is only about 25 percent, but we would expect that to rise unless they can bring their budgetary deficits into balance.

[1] Col. Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, President of Honduras.

URUGUAY

Uruguay is having much the same kind of trouble, only worse. There the rate of growth is less than zero per year, and the population growth rate is 1.8 percent per annum. Unemployment is continuously rising.

Senator MORSE. Less than zero?

Mr. MANN. Minus zero, the GNP. This takes colossal mismanagement with the population increase not to have some increase in GNP.

Senator CLARK. What is the rate of population growth?

Mr. MANN. It is 1.8 percent.

Senator CLARK. That is the lowest in the hemisphere.

Mr. MANN. That is one of the lowest; yes, sir. The rate of inflation is now somewhere between 40 and 50 percent per year. The basic trouble there is lack of good political leadership. There are nine presidents, a plural presidency, and they don't speak with each other with great facility, so that they have trouble making a decision on any subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Wherever you have trouble that is the reason, isn't it?

Mr. MANN. That is correct Mr. Chairman. It is not often you have nine presidents though.

Senator CLARK. If you get 100 Senators, then you really have trouble.

MEXICAN STABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection you said Mexico was probably the most stable and satisfactory of all, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Should I conclude from that that a one party state is better than a two party or multiple state because it is a one party state?

Mr. MANN. It is the most efficient. I wouldn't want to say it was better but it is certainly more efficient than the one in Uruguay.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. MANN. The big problem is how to make democracy work in some of these countries. Again on the issue of dictatorship—and I would, myself, hope that there would be a constitutional reform in Uruguay. I think if the parties won't agree on that, we will run the risk which would be a big setback for democracy. Yet if we urge constitutional reform too hard, then we are intervening and everybody resents that, so we are working quietly to try to get the responsible political leaders in all parties to face up to the fact that the present system isn't working and to do something about it before it is too late.

DEVELOPING LEADERS LIKE MUÑOZ MARIN

The CHAIRMAN. Before I forget it, and I might, is there any possibility of utilizing a man like Muñoz Marin, who is a retired chief of state so to speak, to instruct a country like Uruguay on the facts of life as to political organization? Is there any possibility in that?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, Latin America divides itself into two areas. The people in the temperate zone down south speak of those

who live around the Caribbean area as "tropical" Americans and look down on them and speak about this so openly and so blatantly that it is very embarrassing.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean just like the Yankees do to the Southererns here?

Mr. MANN. Very much like that.

Senator CLARK. How about vice versa?

Mr. MANN. The result, to answer your question, I would say that there are areas in the Caribbean basin, that general area, where Muñoz Marin could be very useful.

The CHAIRMAN. He couldn't be useful in Uruguay?

Mr. MANN. It would be counterproductive; he would only be insulted if he went too far south.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right? It is utterly absurd because he has done the best job in any Latin American country, considering what he had to do with it. I didn't mean to interrupt you. I was just curious. I was down there at the inauguration. Here is a man of extraordinary capacity, I think, a political leader who knows what to do, especially for underdeveloped countries.

Mr. MANN. Of course, the Latin Americans are also conscious that Puerto Rico has certain very important advantages. For example, they have an unlimited access to the U.S. market, certain tax advantages that even people on the mainland don't have, and tourism and so forth, and if you extended these same economic advantages to other countries, a lot of Latin Americans say that——

The CHAIRMAN. If they would develop leaders like Muñoz and run an honest show we might consider extending them, but the trouble is the hen and the egg. They are so corrupt that no one likes to do business with them. They are inefficient, stupid, or whatever you want to call them.

Mr. MANN. There is a great deal in what you say, Mr. Chairman, a great deal of truth in that.

PARAGUAY, BOLIVIA

Paraguay just very briefly: no great change in 1964. Their growth rate is up. They have stability and a certain rate of progress, but not really much change in 1964.

Bolivia, a revolution took place. We have a military government there. The golpe was due almost entirely to Paz'[2] mistaken attempt to extend his constitutional term. He had the constitution amended so he could run for a third term, and the Bolivian people across the board, although they voted for him, there was no support at all when the students and the teachers and the miners and the peasants came out into the streets. There was no visible support outside the bureaucracy itself to Paz. We did everything we could to support the government, probably too much, even to the point of sending arms down at his request in the last hours, which were never really used. The troops fired on the miners and killed 30 or 40 of them with a machinegun, and then finally turned against the President himself.

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[2] Victor Paz Estenssoro, exiled former President of Bolivia.

Bolivia is probably one of the most difficult problems we have in the area, I would say the second most difficult. Every male—this is a generalization but largely true—is armed with M–1 rifles, some of them with submachineguns themselves, which in various revolutions they have looted and taken from the police and from the military. The miners themselves are Communist led, about 5,000 strong, and have a strength roughly equivalent, perhaps somewhat inferior but roughly equivalent, to the armed forces. So that the thing that we worry about in Bolivia, one of the many things we worry about, is the possibility of a commie takeover around the Lechin and Communist led miner groups.

BRAZIL

Brazil is one the brightest spots. [Humberto] Castello Branco is not a popular president but he is making heroic efforts to make the Brazilian economy viable. If we succeed, as we hope we will, in reducing the rate of inflation there from 142 percent which it was under the last days of [Joao] Goulart down to somewhere around 10 percent within a span of 24 months, we will have for the first time in the last 20 years a viable Brazilian economy capable of assuming good leadership, of leading the whole continent of South America. It is half the land mass and half the population and crucial, I think.

The most important thing in my time in ARA in my opinion that has taken place is the Brazilian revolution. I think very few people realize how closely identified Brizola, especially, was and Goulart, to a large extent, with Castro, with Peron, and with anti-American nationalist groups in Brazil. And if Brazil had gone, I think it would have been difficult. All people who know the area would say it would be almost impossible to hold the continent. It borders on all the countries in the area except two.

We are putting, therefore, a great deal of emphasis on trying to build a strong, stable, viable, prosperous, dynamic, democratic Brazil, and if we succeed in that, I think we have done a great deal.

We are more optimistic now than we were even 6 months ago, largely because of the determination and leadership of Castello Branco, who has proved himself much better than we thought he would likely be, a much better statesman. He is collecting taxes from the rich, and this has alienated the rich. Lacerda and some of the more right wing, or at least we have thought them to be more in the right wing, are attacking him.

They are trying to capitalize. Of course, labor wants 100 percent wage increase which you can't give them and still control inflation, and he is appealing to every vote, every sector of the population that Castello Branco is calling on to give the kind of sacrifices that have to be made if they are going to come out of this tailspin.

HAITI

In the islands, there is no change in Haiti. Haiti, as you know, has never had an honest government or even a decent government. It is more comparable to certain parts of Africa, the most backward

parts of Africa, than it is to Latin America culturally and historically.

We have tried nearly everything to get aid to the people, to help them get educated. If you put in an education program, then the teachers have to kick back to the government. If you try to build a dam, the trucks are taken away from hauling dirt and put to hauling people to political rallies. We have simply given up, Mr. Chairman, in trying to do anything.

We have a small malarial program there, and we are trying to keep our mission on, simply because they are close to Cuba. There is some Communist infiltration, and we are afraid if we are pushed out without any ears or eyes, that before we get back in we may find a Communist in the presidential chair. I think the only way you can deal with that kind of a situation is by collective action, and we have never been able to get collective action. We have tried it since 1945 periodically. By collective action, I mean the use of military force, because the force that he has and exercises in the island is total.

Senator CLARK. When you say collective, you mean OAS?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic economically was left in a shambles by [Juan] Bosch. For example, in the government owned sugar plants, the cost of producing sugar is 7 cents a pound, Mr. Chairman, and the world price is 2.5 cents a pound. The job of firing thousands of featherbedded employees, reducing costs, making that industry efficient and so forth is politically an almost impossible task. The government has shown great courage in trying to put its house in order, and our immediate problem there is that our dividing sugar quota into four quarterly parts has disrupted their economy. We are now getting some of the commercial banks to roll over some of their credits and we are now going to have to put in money to get the economy back on its feet.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the people performing reasonably well?

Mr. MANN. Very well. The government is performing very well within the limits and under great political difficulty. The great difficulty is responsibility and good management as you say, Mr. Chairman, good leadership all over the area. This is our number one problem and perhaps the one that is most difficult to come to grips with.

Where you find people who are willing to do the thing that is necessary, the unpopular thing, then it is very hard for them to stay in office, because all segments of the country then rise up against them and sometimes they are thrown out. There is always that danger in the Dominican Republic, that you may have——

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't it make quite logical what I said more or less just with regard to Mexico, that during an early period in a country's effort to develop self government, a one party system really functions better. The instability of two or more parties in

that kind of a society just makes it impossible to get any kind of continuing policy, doesn't it?

One reason Mexico succeeded is they did get an efficient, strong single party organization to be able to take some of the measures that are necessary for their own development. Isn't that partly the reason they succeeded?

Mr. MANN. I think it is. May I say something off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will be on the record.

Mr. MANN. I wonder if I might pass, because it is related to what we are talking about, to some of the economic and social problems.

TRINIDAD

Senator CLARK. You didn't say anything about Trinidad and Jamaica. Maybe you don't need to.

Mr. MANN. We have problems in all those places.

Senator CLARK. Cuba——

I don't want to interrupt.

Mr. MANN. I can run through them very quickly. The problem in Trinidad and British Guiana, as you know, is a racial problem. The Indians in British Guiana have a slight majority over the Negroes and it is vice versa in Trinidad.

Trinidad is fortunate in that they have good leadership in Williams.[3] I don't know whether the committee has spoken with Williams. He is one of the ablest politicians. He knows economics. He knows more about what makes the world go round than I think anyone else in the Caribbean. He taught here at Howard University. He was educated, I think, in England. I am not sure where, but he is a very intelligent, well prepared man. Consequently, we don't have any immediate problems there.

BRITISH GUIANA

In British Guiana you don't have this kind of leadership. You have Jagan,[4] who represents really the majority of the people. The voting is strictly by racial lines, entirely by racial lines. A fellow named Forbes Burnham, who represents the Negro minority, is now Prime Minister. The question is how you build up leadership on the Negro side there, at least until Jagan is out of the way, so that you can prevent total commie takeover.

The British wanted to pull out some time ago, and we got them to stay on, and now we are trying to launch a modest aid program to help Burnham. London is having difficulty because of squabbles—this is very delicate—inside the government, in giving us permission to do even that, a very modest program. We think we will have this worked out very soon.

JAMAICA

Jamaica is ruled by a man who is 84 years old, a rather temperamental but intelligent man.[5] He obviously won't be around too

[3] Eric E. Williams, former Prime Minister of Trinidad.
[4] Cheddi Jagan, former Prime Minister of British Guiana.
[5] Jamaican Prime Minister Sir Alexander Bustamante.

long, and the opposition is split now for the first time between the Marxist and the non-Marxist, so that I think we will be having some problems in Jamaica within the foreseeable future. I don't know how far down the line this is, depending on how long Bustamante can last.

THREAT OF COMMUNISM IN HAITI AND JAMAICA

Senator CLARK. You might wake up one day and find both Haiti and Jamaica going Communist?

Mr. MANN. Haiti could go Communist very easily, because the poverty there—I really don't know what to do about Haiti. I wish that somebody could give me a suggestion, a lead on that, following the doctrines of non-intervention, assuming the fabric that we live in today, just how you help the Haitian people.

The CHAIRMAN. What has happened to Manley in Jamaica?

Mr. MANN. Manley had an opposition party. At its annual meeting they had to adjourn it because he lost some of the crucial votes. They postponed it 4 or 5 months. He lost it to the Marxists, the rising young Turks. They postponed the annual party meeting and they are supposed to get together within the next 3 or 4 months, hopefully having patched up their differences.

I don't know what to say about Cuba that the committee doesn't already know.

SOVIET MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA

Senator MORSE. I have one question about Cuba, Mr. Secretary. Carl handed me a question based on the fact that a January 8 dispatch from Miami by the Associated Press quotes defecting Castro officials as saying Soviet troops are once again building underground military installations and missile sites in Cuba.

Does our intelligence give us any proof of that?

Mr. MANN. We don't think there is, Senator. We are continuing, as you know, the U–2 flights and we are maintaining a fairly good level of intelligence at the cost of a pretty high attrition rate. We check out each one of these stories. They come out from the exile groups by the dozens. We do our best to check each one of them out. We have probably our ablest officers in the Latin American bureau working in a separate office on Cuba, just largely running down these rumors and trying to tighten up the blockade, and the unanimous opinion of the intelligence community, Defense, our own, and the CIA is that the chances of this being true are remote. I won't say there is no chance, because no intelligence operation is that good, but we think they are quite remote. We are watching this, though, every day.

DISENCHANTMENT WITH CASTRO

If I might say this about Cuba, it seems to me that what is happening in Cuba is of enormous importance to the rest of the continent. The intellectuals, the Marxists, the men who believe that socialism on the Marxian style was the answer to Latin American social and economic problems have been disenchanted in the last 5 years with Castro. I think in the intellectual battle, we have gained a great deal.

I am not sure but what we are losing ground somewhat in the counterinsurgency battle, because Castro is still training people from virtually every country in Latin America in sabotage. They are trained in Peking, in Moscow and Havana, and they are sent back then to Latin American countries and some of them are organized into active guerrilla bands.

GUERRILLAS IN LATIN AMERICA

I might run down for the committee, because I think this is quite important, the guerrilla bands in Latin America today. There is a group—perhaps all of these number around 200 or 300 not counting their sympathizers. We don't know, it is hard to estimate the number of sympathizers; a small minority but nevertheless very dangerous. They are operating in the mountains of Guatemala and around Lake de Izabal. They never fight. They hit and run, killing people and destroying as much property as they can. They raid highways and things of that kind and then fade back into the mountains.

Another group exists in Honduras. There is a large—they have made quite an effort in Panama, a large group, organized, but more on the urban type rather than the rural type of guerrilla in Panama, with a potential which is considerable for doing damage. Colombia—in the Andes there has been a large problem, and we have intelligence that the Communists will step up their activities in Colombia within the next 3 or 4 months.

Senator MORSE. Do you draw a distinction between the guerrillas and bandits in Colombia or do you class them together?

Bandits years ago were not Communists. They were just highwaymen.

Mr. MANN. Yes, I am drawing a distinction between the old traditional conservative and liberal bandit groups that have always existed and these new groups that are Communist led. Now, this doesn't mean that they don't recruit from the bandit groups or don't control them in some cases, but the leadership is quite different, and certainly the political objectives are totally different.

There are Castro trained cadres now operating in the mountains in Colombia, and arms are being smuggled in to them in various ways, through Panama we think largely. There are also groups, the FALN in Venezuela; there were some in Brazil which have been eliminated. There are some aligned with the Peronists in the Argentine, and groups not yet active but existing in both Peru and in Ecuador.

Senator MORSE. Speaking about Venezuela, Mr. Secretary, I have suggested that he see you, and I am making the same suggestion to you. Senator Ernest Gruening has spent some time in Venezuela and briefed me the other night. He is very much concerned about the danger of this type of uprising in Venezuela, and he is afraid that this regime is in trouble from these infiltrators. I wish you would have him tell you what he observed.

Mr. MANN. I shall do that. Thank you, Senator.

COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAMS

We are talking now about guerrilla activities. I think the committee knows what we have been trying to do about them. We are training police. We are training military and are engaged in counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla type of training both in Panama and in the States. The AID program itself spends money in training police types, giving them communications equipment which they don't have, vehicles and communications equipment, and above all in helping them build up their files. What they really need, the best defense against this, is an FBI, an efficient national police force in each country built around a service which has tenure and permanence and where you don't change your police every time you change the government, destroy all the files, which happens so often, and build up a competence to deal with this thing. We have squabbles between the police and the military to contend with, jealousies in each country.

It is not a type of operation which the military can always do very well. It takes about 10 soldiers to watch one guerrilla, and it is a very expensive type of operation. It takes time to move, and by the time they get to the place where the guerrillas have raided, the guerrillas have been gone three hours. It isn't an easy thing, but we are working on it along a number of fronts, and we have had some considerable success. In Venezuela, for example, the police is now much more efficient than it was 12 months ago.

I won't tell you about our successes because I think they are to be forgotten about. We should think about the problems.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH PANAMA

The CHAIRMAN. What about Panama, before you go too far away from that. What is happening with regard to any negotiations that we have had with Panama?

Mr. MANN. Following the line of the President's statement, Mr. Ailes [6] and I, I hope Mr. Anderson,[7] intend to go down this month, probably around the 27th, and start exploratory talks with Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia about a sea level canal. The only way out of this impasse in Panama is to dig a new canal. There are only a million Panamanians, and for 50 years they have been emotionally caught up in this idea that the Americans must get out. Their real objective is for us to get out of the Panama Canal, turn it over to them, to fix the tolls, and to operate the canal. Their thought is that God had given them a favored geographic position and that therefore they don't have to work and scramble for a living like all the rest of us human beings, and they can live off of that canal.

Now, any concession you make is acceptable to them only to the extent that it advances them toward this ultimate goal. I don't think anybody disagrees with that. If you read the statements of the last 10 days by Marco Robles, by the political leaders, by the Foreign Minister, this becomes very clear. They are talking about getting the military bases outside of Panama. A lot of this is Com-

[6] Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes.
[7] Former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson.

munist inspired, Marxist inspired, Castro inspired, because they say this makes them a target, a military target, in the event of a third world war and that they should be neutralist. You don't hear the Government saying this but you hear a lot of the Senators and Congressmen saying this, and a lot of the student leaders are saying it.

BUILDING A NEW CANAL

Our idea is that we ought to select—my own personal idea, I can't speak for the President on this—is that we ought to select the location of the new canal both taking into account our political problems and our technical probelms. Certainly the cost of building a canal in Panama is much less than it would be anywhere else. Tentative estimates are that it would cost only abut $750 million to build it in Panama but if, having spent that much money, all we do is buy a new century lawsuit or a squabble and violence, I think we ought to keep an open mind about building it, let's say in Colombia, where it would cost $1.2 billion.

Senator CLARK. You are speaking, aren't you, Mr. Secretary, of a sea level canal approximately following the same route as the present canal?

Mr. MANN. Yes, Sir.

Senator CLARK. If you built it elsewhere in Panama it would be more expensive, wouldn't it?

Mr. MANN. The costs are $750 million in Panama—these are preliminary estmates which will be subject to change after we do our on-site surveys——

Senator CLARK. There is another site in Panama, though, as I understand it.

Mr. MANN. There are only two sites really in Panama.

Senator CLARK. The other would be more expensive.

Mr. MANN. One would be to use the present zone, which I think is politically impossible for us. I think this would get us into great difficulties.

The cost of digging a canal along the present site in the zone is about $2 billion, because this would have to be done by conventional means. The cost of digging a canal about 200 miles south of the present canal through the Darien Peninsula by nuclear means would be about $750 million. The cost of digging a canal a little south of there in this little neck of Colombia that juts into the isthmus would be about $1.2 billion, the cost of digging, by nuclear means. The cost of digging a canal through Nicaragua-Costa Rica, passing south of Lake Managua, would be around $2 billion, roughly equivalent to the cost of digging one through the present site by conventional means.

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The CHAIRMAN. Have you considered a proposal that has been discussed by paticularly Machado and others about an international private corporation to take over this project?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you arrived at any firm conclusion about it?

Mr. MANN. No, we haven't Senator. I think a lot of us would like to see—let me put it this way: There are obvious advantages to an international administration of the new canal.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. And to an international financing of the new canal.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. MANN. We run into problems of what is feasible economically and politically. The total gross revenues of the present canal are only $68 million. Now, we think with a——

The CHAIRMAN. That is based on your very low rates that are now I think less than they were in 1914, aren't they?

Mr. MANN. No, the same.

TOLL REVENUES

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed in this morning's paper the Suez Canal last year had $179 million income in contrast to when it was something like $74 million. I don't know why they can afford to pay so much more, but they got $179 million last year out of the Suez Canal. Did you see that piece this morning?

Mr. MANN. I didn't see that, but the possibility of raising tolls is one thing. The almost certainty of increased revenues, even at the present toll level, by increased traffic is another thing, if we can look into the future. Certainly the operating costs on a sea level canal would be much lower.

PANAMA'S OBJECTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Come back to the objection. You have seen this preliminary plan that they drew up over there, haven't you, and the way it was to be done?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the objection to that? I am sure there are objections, but I am not aware of them. It looks very logical to me.

Mr. MANN. In the first place, Panama itself would object to this.

The CHAIRMAN. But she objects to anything except us doing whatever she likes. That I take for granted, but is that enough?

Mr. MANN. Not necessarily. We haven't turned this down, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Which plan are you talking about, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very interesting plan.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. On the record.

DIGGING THE CANAL BY NUCLEAR MEANS

Mr. MANN. I am going on the assumption that we will dig a canal by nuclear means.

Senator WILLIAMS. Have you explored this possibility with the other countries that have signed this test ban treaty?

Mr. MANN. No, I was saying that we were going down and explore this problem, the problem that the chairman mentioned, on a very preliminary basis, with all four countries, and get their ideas before we try to come up to you and to the President with a draft.

Senator CLARK. May I make a comment and ask for an observation? I was down there in November.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I haven't talked about this other publicly for the same reason. I don't want to get a big controversy going.

I do want this thoroughly explored and good reasons as to why you can't do it if you can't do it.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. I think there ought to be a very thorough analysis of the proposal, Mr. Chairman, but I think there are many serious objections to it at the present time.

NOT AN AMERICAN CANAL

Take this proposal to build a canal with conventional means at the present site of the Panama Canal. In my judgment, there would be impossible problems with the Government of Panama. They are not going to permit, in my judgment, the United States to build any canal at the present site that Panama doesn't own and control lock, stock, and barrel. Let's face it. We are not going to run a canal through Panama——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not part of this plan.

Senator MORSE. I know. I am coming to that in a minute.

We are not going to run any canal through Panama any more and have it an American canal. They have done such a propaganda job, such a Marxist job on public opinion in Panama that I think you would simply be buying yourself just an impossible situation. In fact, I don't see how you are going to work out with Panama any arrangement that they are going to live by. I certainly haven't heard anything proposed by the State Department yet that I think would be acceptable to Panama.

When you get to this proposal to build this canal by private financing and internationalizing under private business organizational setup, you have got a whole host of questions of sovereignty involved, how you are going to administer it from the standpoint of the governments involved. If you are going to internationalize that canal, I think you are going to have to internationalize it through an existing international organization such as the Organization of American States. I don't think you can do it on a bilateral basis through a private business world organization.

The political problems and the defense problems—I can just hear the Defense Deaprtment on that one because they are, rightly, greatly concerned about the defense factors involved in a new canal. I think the Secretary is performing a great service in the caution that he is using in preparing the alternative proposals for this canal.

I want to say, Mr. Secretary, unless I have been given nothing but misinformation about the situation in Panama, I don't think the United States is going to tell Panama what they are going to do about the new canal. Either they get out of Panama and build it elsewhere, which I think is our only alternative, or you are going to build a canal in Panama with Panama sitting in the saddle.

U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Mr. MANN. May I say this, Mr. Chairman, about this whole range of questions? We have done an enormous amount of work on all these possibilities, with Steve Ailes, the Corps of Engineers, and the people in Defense working very closely, and I think we are very close to agreement in principle on what our objectives are. There are a number of problems.

When the present canal goes out of operation, then under the 1903 treaty our rights automatically terminate in the zone. Now, in the zone we have a $750 million military installation. Will it be possible to negotiate in Panama a base rights agreement so that we can keep this military facility in being in the future? With the guerrilla operations and the prospect of this growing in the next decade, all of us agree that we need a strong military base somewhere in that area, and we would like to keep it there because we have got so much money invested in communications equipment, marine cables, and that sort of thing.

Another immediate problem is that Panama is probably going to insist, according to our information, on replacing the 1903 treaty before they even talk about the sea level canal. This presents us with enormous problems too, because if we had an alternate canal that we knew was going to be opened, then the problems of sovereignty and perpetuity and these other things become manageable.

If we continue to be relying on the present canal, then our ability to agree to turning over any kind of real control to the Panamanians, as heavily infiltrated as they are by Communists, and given its vulnerability to sabotage, is greatly limited. So that one of the reasons we are taking off now, this month, and talking to all the governments at a fairly high level, we hope to see the Presidents of all these countries, to get a feel on what they consider is politically possible for them, including Robles.

Senator MUNDT. Including who?

Mr. MANN. Robles, the President.

FOUR POSSIBLE SITES FOR NEW CANAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just interrupt there? You said, "Of all these governments." Which governments do you mean?

Mr. MANN. I was just saying before you came in, Senator, Steve Ailes and I, I hope Mr. Anderson——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you mean all the governments of the world,

Mr. MANN. No, no, there four possible sites.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. I didn't know how inclusive that was.

Mr. MANN. Now, I don't know that this comes out very clearly in the President's message, but what we had in mind was a package deal with whomever we negotiate with. We don't want to give up rights that we now have before we get rights to replace them.

So that on many of these details—let me say this also: I don't know that I agree with Jack Vaughn in one respect, Senator. I think Robles is doing a very find job and he is a very fine man. I don't have any reason to distrust Robles on the basis of his performance in the last 6 months.

But I think it would be in our interest to have some kind of assurance that not only a president who is going to be there for a limited period of time but the people themselves agree that this is in their interest. If we dig a canal in Panama and 95 percent of the people think that this is against their interests and violates their sovereignty, then sooner or later we are going to have the same kind of trouble we had last January.

IMPACT ON PANAMANIAN ECONOMY

Senator CLARK. I think that is true, but don't you also have to take into account the impact on the economy which the Panamanians must have sense enough to realize? If you pull that canal out and if you dig the new one somewhere else, you are going to have massive unemployment there in a way which is going to be very difficult to retain political stability.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I do, Senator. I agree with that. Let's suppose that we dug the canal in some other country, or let's suppose we dug it by nuclear means down south of the present canal, the loss of revenues would be somewhat cushioned if they allowed the military base to stay on, because nearly half of their direct and indirect economic benefits derived from the present zone come from the military base and not from the canal proper.

Senator CLARK. Still, the major employment is in the canal, or am I wrong about that?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. The indirect effect as to the spending of the military, I quite agree with you on that.

CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET

Mr. MANN. Then there is another thing about Panama. There are only, as you know, or there were only 1 million people in 1964 in the republic. Panama in 1914 had a very small population—I don't remember what it was, but it was very small—and the whole economy was oriented toward the canal zone. It was the only large employer. As the population grows, this is becoming less and less viable, so that no matter what we do in the canal, I think Panama is going to have to basically reorient its whole economy.

I think they should become a part of the Central American Common Market. One possibility would be some kind of a trading arrangement with the U.S. similar to the one that we have given Puerto Rico. There are a number of possibilities on the economic side, but I think it would be a great mistake, personally, Senator, to mix up a whole series of economic problems that a million people have, with the political and security problems that we have in terms of guaranteed access to a sea level canal. I think we can find ways to cope with both of those problems, both the economic and the security and military, no matter which way we go. It will be a different thing.

NEGATIVE EFFECT ON PANAMA

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, that point you are making now is a point I was about to raise. I am glad you raised it. We had a discussion of this some months ago before our Subcommittee on Latin

American Affairs, and I will give you a thumbnail summary of it very quickly. It ran to this effect: From the standpoint of the future, Panama itself, economically, for the welfare of the people, it would probably be a good thing if the canal got out of there, because they do simply rely on income from the canal. It is having a bad effect on their economic structure. It is leaving thousands of people to just do nothing, and they just count upon the canal as sort of a grab bag barrel to which they go.

You say there are only 1 million people. I remember in that discussion it was pointed out that if we could work out some economic arrangement with Panama, where we could be the stimulus for an early economic development, it would provide 200,000 jobs not connected with the canal at all. Assume for the moment the canal is out. If we could provide economic development in Panama for 200,000 jobs, in a matter of 10 years you completely change the nature of the Panamanian economy.

At that meeting there was discussion as to what could be done there to stimulate the development in Panama, industrial, agricultural, and public works type that in turn would create more wealth that would solve this employment problem. The employment problem of the indigenous population is a most serious difficulty.

Mr. MANN. I agree.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. And they have just come to rely on this canal. In the long run, if we could pave the way by working out agreement with them in advance of pulling out of the canal, we would be doing the best thing for Panama.

Mr. MANN. I think we are in agreement, Senator. The economic problem is terrific. The unemployment problem in Panama City is now somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 percent.

IRRATIONAL THINKING IN PANAMA

Senator WILLIAMS. Doesn't Panama have some responsibility about giving concern to their own economic problems?

Mr. MANN. Oh yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. They don't seem to be averse to telling us to get out. I think they should do a little bit of the worrying about it. I am not too concerned as to what effect it is going to have unless they have some concern themselves.

Senator MUNDT. Isn't the competition from some of the other countries going to change the thinking in Panama?

Senator WILLIAMS. I think it would change it if we told them we were going to pull out and leave them, period.

Mr. MANN. I would like to say this to the committee: There is very little that is rational and logical in the thinking of the Panamanian politician. Being a southerner, maybe I can say this. My grandfather was the only one of five boys that came back alive from the Civil War. The feeling in Panama I can only describe as being similar to the feeling which existed in the South after the Civil War. It took us 100 years and two generations to get over this.

They have lost the capacity to rationalize. They have lost the capacity to even sit down and understand where their own interests lie.

A CORRUPT OLIGARCHY

Senator CLARK. Isn't the situation vastly complicated by the fact that Robles is representing a minority government. He has commies on his left and conservatives on his right and he doesn't control the Congress, and this means there is no real stability down there around which you can build.

Mr. MANN. There isn't anything to build on in Panama really—a corrupt oligarchy, which is conservative. It is an oligarchy which, in effect, was created out of the economy of the canal. It has never contributed to the economy of Panama except to take money from the canal, and they are absolutely corrupt and decadent, opportunistic. There is just no solid basis to work on in Panama that we have been able to find.

Senator CLARK. You have those students on the left inspired by the commies. That is one reason that I felt that if we did tie ourselves to Robles, who seems to be a good deal more intelligent than anybody else, that we had the best of a certain number of bad bets.

Mr. MANN. We do have, no doubt about that.

Senator MUNDT. How permanent?

Senator CLARK. I don't know.

Mr. MANN. It is a very unstable situation. At its grass roots, it is very unstable.

I wonder if I might talk for a minute; I would like to say this to the committee, that we are not going to give any text of any treaty to any government until we clear it first with this committee, because we need your advice and want it. The problems are enormous, very complex. I am sure that it isn't going to be easy sailing in these negotiations, and——

[Discussion off the record.]

TRADE PROBLEM

Mr. MANN. I wonder if I might pass to the trade problem, which I think is very important in Latin America.

Senator MORSE. You certainly may.

Mr. MANN. There is a growing movement which was articulated the other day by the Foreign Minister of Chile that the struggle between the East and the West, between the free and the slave part of the world, is not the important thing to Latin America. The struggle is really between the northern and southern half of the globe, and in the southern half of the globe you find Africa, the South Asians, and Latin America.

The committee knows that some months ago at Alta Gracia, either in early 1964 or late 1963, a Latin American trade group was formed, and at Lima the other day a permanent secretariat to this trade group was formed. The trade group, which is closely identified with Raul Prebisch and ECLA in this whole line of economic thought, demands in effect preference for the underdeveloped part of the world in all of the so-called developed nations. Following the Alta Gracia conference and the series of resolutions adopted there, there was a meeting in Geneva which Mr. Ball attended and stated the position of the U.S. Government in opposition to some of the ideas expressed in the Alta Gracia group. Growing out of this, they formed what I call the Club 77. There are ap-

proximately 77 members, African states, Latin American states, and South Asian states who got together at Geneva and formed an underdeveloped club. It is the poor against the rich, and intellectually the Latins had a lot to do with this.

STABILIZE PRICES

The main thrust is the same as the thrust at Alta Gracia, the thrust of the idea, namely, that the developed part of the world had an obligation to open up its markets without limitation—I am sure this is negotiable, but this is the demand—to the industries and basic products of the underdeveloped part of the world and, at the same time, to enter into various types of arrangements to stabilize prices of all the basic commodity prices.

Senator MUNDT. Would these prices that you are talking about be at world levels, American levels, or underdeveloped levels?

Mr. MANN. You enter into a very hazy set of notions now, Senator, as to just how you do this. There are all kinds of schemes about compensatory financing through the International Monetary Fund, all kinds of schemes, just worlds without end, but in general they are impractical.

Senator WILLIAMS. Whatever happened to the idea of forming a market in the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. MANN. I am coming to that. I am just trying to take this chronologically, because this movement has a lot of steam behind it and is very important, I think, to our whole position in the hemisphere.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

The agreements and disagreements reached at Geneva were referred to the United Nations, in what is called UNCTAD. They were kind of given the job of looking into reconciling these differences between the developed countries and the underdeveloped countries.

I went down to Lima, I guess 2 weeks ago or 3 weeks ago at the outside, and there was a 2-week meeting there of the economic arm of the Inter-American System. What I found when I got there—the experts had been meeting for a whole week, and the Latins had formed caucuses. They were caucusing among themselves. The only member of the club who wasn't in on the caucuses was the United States. The lines were strictly drawn on this South-North axis basis. They had the idea that the United States would be afraid to be isolated on some of these crucial trade problems.

The issue came up on a resolution that was presented in the form of a resolution supported unanimously by the Latin Americans to the effect that the United States would give a preference, without any limitation at all, to all basic products and manufactured goods from Latin America and that CIAP would be given the job of working out ways in which to accomplish this. CIAP is the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress which Carlos Sans de Santa Maria leads here in Washington. This is the Spanish initials of the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress.

Senator WILLIAMS. This would include all of the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask you a question——

Mr. MANN [continuing]. It would certainly include all the Western Hemisphere. Presumably it would include, because of the Geneva and Alta Gracia clubs, all of South Asia and the rest of the world, Africa as well.

A WHOLE NEW FARM PROGRAM

Senator MUNDT. May I ask you a question here? You know Latin America a lot better than the rest of us economically, but looking at it from a farm state area, it would seem to me that this would create a whole new farm problem, because aren't most of their exports agricultural?

Mr. MANN. That is so, especially in the temperate zone, agricultural products from Argentina, wheat, wool, beef, that sort of thing. There is a sharp conflict of interest. Now, when you get into Middle America, north of the temperate zone, there it is mainly coffee, bananas, and things of that kind.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is Canada in on this?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. This is the Inter-American System we are talking about.

PRESSURE TACTICS

We were obliged—I might tell the committee, too, that the pressure tactics were very obvious. I think it was obvious that they overestimated the worth of their votes in the U.N. and in the OAS, and underestimated our willingness to be isolated, and they thought that by presenting a united front, the tactic was that we would, in fear of isolation, agree, so we would have unanimity.

Senator LAUSCHE. How would they isolate us?

Mr. MANN. Just by vote and before radio and television. We would take a propaganda licking and this sort of thing.

Senator WILLIAMS. Would they stop taking the money, too?

Mr. MANN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, they wouldn't stop taking our money.

Senator WILLIAMS. Not complete isolation.

Mr. MANN. So we pointed out—and I must say that we didn't have much of a chance to talk in private, because the Latins themselves insisted that all the debates be in plenary, and there was television and radio and this was part of the pressure tactic. So on three occasions, for the first time, I think maybe perhaps ever, but certainly in my time, the last 22 years, we were obliged to publicly take issue with some of the doctrines that the Uruguayans, Argentines, and Chileans were announcing.

The air was rather tense for 2 or 3 days as a result of these exchanges in the plenary sessions. Then we told them that we didn't really have any great problem, that they had the right to vote their convictions, and if they thought that this was the way to do it, to go ahead. We regretted this because it has political implications as well as strictly economic.

It is combined also with the Chilean movement to reorganize the OAS, I suspect diluting U.S. influence in the OAS and making it essentially a Latin American club. There is a lot of opposition to all of these ideas. The lead principally came from Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. Toward the end of the meeting, they became convinced that we didn't mind isolation.

I told them that in American history we had a phase "splendid isolation." We didn't want to go back to it, but if they wanted to isolate us, that we were perfectly willing to accept the consequences. I didn't know how they thought the Alliance would work if there was no banker, but that obviously we couldn't wipe out our cotton textile industry, for example. We couldn't agree or even appear to agree to a set of ideas which would obviously wipe out totally our cotton textile industry in this country, or any other industry for that matter. We were willing to sit down and try to work our sensible solutions to particular problems, but we couldn't accept any of these sweeping generalizations that would have an adverse effect on our economy and which the American people didn't think were fair, and we wouldn't accept.

At the last minute, before the vote, they came in and asked us to rewrite this. We did rewrite the resolution. We did get unanimity in the form in which we rewrote it, and I made an explanatory statement setting out the American position very clearly, that we were not in agreement with this set of ideas, that CIAP would have to be free to consider all ideas, including our principles of liberal non-discriminatory trade and all the rest of it.

Now, I give you this as background because it is rather important. This is a movement that has been afoot for about 5 years. It is going to be stronger rather than weaker in the future.

Senator LAUSCHE. You mentioned who the leaders were?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

GENESIS IN MARXIST DOCTRINE

Senator LAUSCHE. But haven't the Communist countries originated the thought that, on the matter of commodities, to stabilize the economy of those countries that have basic commodities to sell there should be a subsidization to which all of the nations of the world will contribute?

I now have specific reference to a booklet that came to me containing the discussion that was had on the subject by the cabinet members, whatever you call them, in Yugoslavia, and the final theme was that the developed countries should contribute to a fund that will be used in compensating the suppliers of commodities for whatever difficulties they encounter because of the collapse of the prices. My question is, isn't the origin of this thought with the Communist countries rather than with those three down there?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I would say there is a genesis to this set of ideas, perhaps in Marxist doctrine, which preaches exploitation of industrial countries, as you know, exploitation by the industrial countries of the developing countries. This whole set of ideas about exploitation through trade and otherwise has Marxian roots. I wouldn't want to say that this idea about commodities is essential-

ly Communist, because I don't believe it is. I think that it is essentially a Latin American idea, visionary in many of its aspects, and one which we must resist because it would be suicide or silly and stupid for us to buy this set of ideas. There is just no hope, in my opinion, to get together.

ARTIFICIAL RATES

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question, whether any thought has been given by the State Department to reversing this whole concept of tariffs, so that instead of constantly using them to wage war against the American standard of living, we work out something along the lines of what we were doing in Cuba prior to Castro. We were paying, obviously, an artificial rate for sugar.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. We were trying to help an underdeveloped country.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. It seems to me that some thought should be given to paying American price levels for the raw materials and the manufactured materials which we import from underdeveloped countries, and then blocking that difference, which is really a subsidy that we are paying—but we can afford to pay it, and you don't downgrade the economy of this country—block those currencies, to the extent that it is a subsidy, in the name of those countries, that they in turn can spend in the country to which they are accredited whether it is Germany, Great Britain, or the United States. That way we upgrade the income, the earning power and the buying power and the standards of living of the underdeveloped countries without hurting ourselves, and they have more money with which they can buy whatever they need, sewing machines, schoolbooks, or whatever it is. I don't see why, constantly, we always have to use the tariff mechanism to wage war against our standards of living.

I think we can fulfill our obligations to the world better by upgrading their economy rather than downgrading ours. Has any thought been given to that? I know there is a little school of economists in this town whom I have talked with quite often in the last 20 years who believe that and who make quite an interesting pitch for that.

Senator WILLIAMS. We are doing that now.

Mr. MANN. I was coming to something very close to that.

Senator MUNDT. The Russians are doing that, as I understand it, with Cuba now. They have taken our place in that particular bilateral arrangement.

KEEPING THE HEMISPHERE GLUED TOGETHER

Mr. MANN. I was coming, with the committee's permission, to what I think we can do in a constructive way to try to keep the hemisphere glued together in the next two decades. May I start out by saying that we wouldn't have great problems in this whole field if we had a static population in Latin America?

The growth rate has been high enough so that each individual citizen would have been demonstrably better off than he was year

by year. The system isn't working bad, our system, roughly our system. The difficulty we face is that the population is doubling in Latin America every 18 years. This means, in concrete terms, that these countries have to find ways to double the number of jobs in roughly the same period of time, and they have got to find ways to double their food production that their people consume, within that period of time. Perhaps this task, gigantic as it is, would still be manageable if you had discipline, responsibility, and good political leadership that we were talking about earlier, throughout the whole area.

But the fact is, gentlemen, that we don't have that kind of leadership. There are structural weaknesses of a cultural kind throughout the whole area, too much demagogy, too much thought by politicians of a short-term personal advantage and not enough thought about what is good for the country in the long run, too much thought about "after me, the deluge." The only important thing is to get elected to office and to stay in office, and who cares about these long-term problems?

DEPENDENCE ON ONE COMMODITY

In consequence, knowing as well as any man at this table the difficulties of commodity arrangements and all of the arguments against them, the dependence of Latin American economies, certain Latin American economies on one commodity or two commodities is so enormous that we simply cannot, for political reasons, permit fluctuations in prices as wild as they have been. May I cite some illustrations?

Twelve months ago the price of sugar was 11 cents a pound. It cost the Dominican Republic right now 7 cents a pound to produce sugar. The world price today is 2.5 cents a pound.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On what basis does it cost that? What are the elements that go into that cost of 7 cents a pound?

BOSCH WAS A BAD MANAGER

Mr. MANN. The Dominican Republic had a man named Bosch who was running the country for some time. He nationalized all the Trujillo sugar industries, which were fairly efficient. He featherbedded those with two or three times as many employees as they really needed because unemployment was very high.

He was an incredibly bad manager. The costs went up all along the line, and now we have a government which is trying to fire thousands of people in a country where unemployment is still very high, and to make this industry competitive.

Now, this is the kind of concrete problem that we have to face in the State Department every day. And it is a sugar economy. It is not just this one business. It is a sugar economy. The whole economy depends on the price of sugar.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But do we have to bail out stupidity? I mean shouldn't the cost of sugar be comparably based upon reasonably efficient production costs?

Mr. MANN. Yes, it must be.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Rather than to calculate it on a——

Mr. MANN. It must be. I think, Senator, the thing that I am proudest of is the progress we have made in the last 12 months in insisting on adequate self-help measures in our negotiations with Brazil, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.

If the committee has time, I would like for this committee to look at the program which we have outlined for the Dominican Republic. I think you will agree with me that it is as tough a program as any government could be expected to enact within a short period of time. We are doing the same thing in Brazil. We are doing the same thing in Chile, and no one understands better than we do the absolute necessity of these governments doing the things that have to be done to make their economies viable in the face of this population explosion. Otherwise, are headed for disaster.

DROP IN SUGAR PRICES

Senator CLARK. What is the explanation for the drop in the price of sugar from 11 cents to 2 cents, just demand and supply with no regulation?

Mr. MANN. The old phenomenon of supply and demand. Prices go up. This brings out large amounts of production. The production is put on the world market. This in turn depresses prices. All the marginal and high cost producers are eliminated, and then you go through the same cycle again. The same thing is happening in coffee.

Senator CLARK. That is a terrible drop, though, from 11 cents to 2.

Mr. MANN. I simply want to point out to the committee the enormity of the problems of keeping the fabric together in the face of this population explosion.

Now, it is perfectly feasible for us, without buying some of these silly doctrines about compensatory financing and this kind of thing, which would be operation rathole and won't help very much, to do something in at least two commodities of primary importance to Latin America, coffee and sugar. We could have a sugar act which stabilizes the U.S. part of the market.

We are going to have great difficulty in entering into any kind of an international agreement because this may save Castro, and this we are struggling with. We are inclined to think that there is not much we can do or should do to cooperate with the world in stabilizing the world price of sugar, because this may mean the difference between Castro's surviving and going under. But we do think that we have got to, at least on our part of the market, count the old Cuba trade, I think so, as historical, natural Latin American trade with us, instead of dividing it up around the world, and to have another look at this recapture clause, perhaps along the lines, Senator, you were suggesting, or some other comparable line, so that we can stabilize at least this part of their world market and enable them to plan their budgets.

THE COFFEE AGREEMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. How has the coffee agreement worked out? We tried to do it in the coffee commodity, didn't we?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. The Senate passed this, as you know, the so-called implementing legislation to the coffee agreement, but the House at the last minute voted against this, so that we are not an effective member of this, and this has damaged us psychologically very greatly. I don't know that the coffee agreement, Senator, has had much effect on coffee prices—I doubt it myself—the coffee agreement itself depends for its effectiveness on export quotas. This is very delicate but I think it is true. There are so many exporting nations, including all of the African ones and the Latin American ones, that either don't have the capacity to limit their exports or, if they do, cheat on this. I don't know that the coffee agreement will ever work efficiently. I think it will help stabilize, but whether it will ever be efficient I doubt, unless we move to import quotas on the part of the large consuming countries.

SUGAR TRADE

Senator LAUSCHE. In principle, are you trying to approach the sugar problem?

Mr. MANN. This is the sugar act.

Senator LAUSCHE. On the same basis as the coffee agreement?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. We don't have a position in the executive, but I certainly wanted——

Senator MUNDT. We are not doing that round the world.

Mr. MANN. The trade in sugar has always been controlled as far as our market—we are a sheltered market—it has always been controlled by the so-called Sugar Act which Congress enacts from time to time. Remember the Sugar Act expired last year because the House and the Senate were unable to get together, and we don't have a sugar act. We have got a makeshift arrangement right now and Congress, I am sure, will be addressing itself to this problem very soon. I simply wanted to point out the absolute importance of this to the Latin Americans. We will come up with a concrete set of ideas for you. I wanted to flag this as something that is very important against this whole emotional background of the North versus the South and all of this sort of thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you finish your presentation on this North and South proposition? You were down in Lima, Peru when you broke off.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I was saying, Senator, that we got unanimity because they finally became convinced we weren't going to stampede or to be afraid of isolation, and they redrafted this resolution to take care of our points of view in it. The problem isn't by any means solved. It will continue to be with us, but we are not committed to anything.

Senator LAUSCHE. There are 77 nations?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That are joined in this movement now?

Mr. MANN. Yes. Now, I think the first objective——

Senator MUNDT. Not much bigger than this table?

VARIETY OF OBJECTIVES

Mr. MANN. The first objective—at least my bureau thinks this way—is to drive a wedge between Latin America and some of the

more irresponsible countries in the rest of the world, and I think we might in the future. I am not ready really to make any concrete suggestions, but we are going to have, obviously, to decide whether we consider we have a special relationship tradewise to this continent or whether we don't.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask you this, Tom, and as a speculation? Do you think the Latin Americans' objective is to really form a cohesive alliance or association along this line with the African countries, or is it to get their hands in the American jam jar?

Mr. MANN. I think it is a bit of both.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And they are using the threat of joining up with the African nations and some of the Asian nations just to get for themselves a little more free grub?

A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Mr. MANN. I think the more responsible people—let me put it in political terms—the more responsible people in Latin America realize that the American states have historically had a special relationship toward each other, and that when they in effect become anti-American in a bloc with Africans and Asians, they are weakening at least this political tie that has been very useful to them, and secondarily the size of their demands becomes so enormous that reasonable men know that the United States couldn't possibly accept, so that reasonable people are saying, why shouldn't Latin Americans look after Latin American interests and forget about this Africa and South Asia business?

They are split on that. But the Chileans, the Argentines, the Uruguayans are going in the other direction. I think that it is foredoomed, myself, Senator, because it is just impractical. It wouldn't work. I told them, I said, "I wonder whether you think this Club 77 is any less fictional than 77 Sunset Strip we look at on television. It seems to me entirely visionary and without any possibility of achieving, concretely."

OBJECTIVES OF CLUB 77

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What their objective is apparently is not to reach a level of economic stability and prosperity such as represented by the African countries with whom they propose to join. They are trying to reach a level of prosperity in economic and social objectives as represented by the United States.

Mr. MANN. No doubt about that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now they are using some techniques that look to me like they are trying to use the squeeze play.

Mr. MANN. As I stated earlier, I think they are overestimating the value of a vote in these organizations. It is kind of an Alice in Wonderland exercise.

I do think that we are going to have to think about it, and I would like to say this to the committee. I don't know whether you have thought about this. In the 1930's, we started out on nondiscriminatory most favored nation treatment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. The aim of the 77 nations, if put into effect, will be applicable not only to the United States b[illegible] also to the European nations?

Mr. MANN Yes, sir, definitely.

Senator LAUSCHE. Except with these preferential arrangements that the nations of the commonwealth have, and other nations have with their former colonial relationship, it won't be generally applicable all over the world.

Mr. MANN. There are many contradictions in it, Senator, many contradictions.

ROLE OF CANADA

Senator MUNDT. Why isn't Canada included in this?

Mr. MANN. Canada is included in this in the sense that the Club 77 is directed to all developed nations, and Canada is certainly one of those.

Senator MUNDT. I mean in working out a hemispheric market, which makes a lot of sense. Canada is part of the hemisphere. Shouldn't it be brought into the picture?

Mr. MANN. Yes, except for this same contradiction the Senator was referring to, the special ties it has with the British Commonwealth. There is a contradiction there.

Senator MUNDT. Which economically isn't as important as their trade with us.

Mr. MANN. No, I think this is certainly a possibility. We are only talking now about the long-term future in this thing.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MUNDT. I would like to say, Mr. Secretary, what you have just said makes an awful lot of sense to me, and I think it is long overdue. I do think we should at least consider seriously or make the approach to Canada to bring it into this hemispheric trade bloc.

GIVE THEM MORE PURCHASING POWER

Second, I think it should be directed at admitting Latin American prices instead of excluding them at Latin American prices. I don't think we can do it by admitting the products at Latin American levels.

Mr. MANN. I agree with that.

Senator MUNDT. And giving them more purchasing power. They moved in that direction, and I think we have got to pull them up instead of holding them down.

Mr. MANN. I couldn't agree more, Senator. I think this is the most crucial thing. The most crucial decisions we will make in Latin America relate to trade and commodity problems in 1965. Aid problems, yes, they are important.

I would like to finish my list of ideas or questions with a small talk about what we are doing or trying to do with the aid program. We are going to be subjected to heavy criticism for this, but I think it is absolutely essential to follow down this road. We are saying to Latin America, in effect, "You have exhausted your borrowing capacity largely."

Ten years ago, 6 percent of their total foreign exchange earnings were used to service their foreign debt. Today the average, excluding Venezuela, is in excess of 20 percent.

Gene Black [8] used to say that 10 percent was about the margin of safety. Nobody will disagree that 20 percent or 22 percent is excessive. So that on top of all these other problems, we have a problem of their borrowing capacity. This is why the soft loan approach is absolutely essential.

GET THEIR HOUSE IN ORDER

Now, it is essential to understand that we don't have enough money to finance this thing and that they have got to show a discipline that they have never shown before if we are to make the Alliance a success. So what we have said, in effect, to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and all the rest of them is that in defining self-help we are only interested in what you are doing right now.

We are not interested, for example, in whether over the last decade your country has been more responsible than another country. We are interested in what your government today is doing to help itself. And where we believe that either because you have an unrealistic rate of exchange or because you have a huge budgetary deficit or for any other reason that you are not doing the things that have to be done to get your house in order, we are not going to give you any aid.

Senator LAUSCHE. What are the principal things that they ought to do to get their house in order?

Mr. MANN. All right, Senator, that is a very good question. It varies from country to country, from region to region almost. One of the big weaknesses is the operating deficits of government-owned enterprises. The railroads in Argentina, for example, cost the government out of its budget some $300 million a year. If you add to that other government-owned enterprises in Brazil, in Argentina, the deficit, the total deficit in those two countries alone from government-owned business enterprises supposed to earn a profit—I am not talking about schools and things of that nature—exceeds the total amount of our aid program.

Now, obviously, this is something——

SUBSIDIZING SOCIALISM

Senator MUNDT. All we do is subsidize socialism then?

Mr. MANN. No; we are not really doing that any more. Maybe in the past we could have been accused of that, but we are planning zero aid for Argentina in 1965, both because they have not yet come up with the self-help measures that we think are required and also because of the attitude they have taken with the oil companies under the Hickenlooper-Adair Amendment.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it fair to say that where you have conversion into government operation of these businesses, such as communication, transportation and, let's say, steel and copper——

Senator MUNDT. And mining.

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[8] President of the World Bank.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. That usually you find featherbedding and inordinate expenditures without regard to sound business practices?

Mr. MANN. There are some government-owned business operations that are efficient, in Chile, for example, but I would say somewhere between 80 and 90 percent are very inefficiently managed, because of duplication, featherbedding, graft, just sheer inability of governments to manage business. In this sense, I am a free enterpriser from way back.

POLITICAL PRESSURE TO KEEP PRICES DOWN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is one other element. I think maybe in some places the government operates these facilities. The political pressure to keep the prices down to the public is very great, and therefore they don't take in enough revenues to anywhere near carry it.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I heard down in Uruguay here a year or so ago that you could almost talk clear across the country in Uruguary on the state telephone system for 25 cents, but it took you 6, 7, or 8 years to get a telephone. They were in the red all the time. The government was just subsidizing that. They were telling the people what cheap telephone service they had.

Mr. MANN. The common denominator of all these problems is political expediency.

Senator MUNDT. Why should we condemn Latin America for its failure to operate a government enterprise successfully in the economic field when our country, the creator of the best economic system in the world, fails to do the same thing in the Post Office? It is just inherent in the nature of the enterprise. We can't expect them in swaddling clothes to operate a system successfully when we can't do it for the same identical reason, political expendiency. We get pressures to raise the price.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Oh no, no. Don't you know we are embarking on the Great Society now?

Senator MUNDT. No, no, I am just talking about the Post Office. This has been Republican, Democrat, and everything else. It has never shown a profit. I think we should lead them into the field of private enterprise, rather than try to tell them how to operate an economic enterprise profitably when we can't do it ourselves.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean do as we say, not as we do.

Senator MUNDT. Yes. Well, do as we do, except for that one glaring instance. We are pretty much of a private enterprise country.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the second item?

Mr. MANN. The second item, for example, with the same common denominator, is exchange rates to keep the prices of food down to the common people, which gets you votes or is for some other reason connected with politics.

Senator LAUSCHE. The third?

Mr. MANN. This is turn tends either to build up large commercial backlogs, if you have a controlled exchange rate, or it tends to deflate your foreign exchange dollar and gold reserves.

Another one is just subsidizing imports of wheat and gasoline and other things to keep prices down. Another big problem, of course, is graft, corruption. These are some of the structural weaknesses. I would identify these.

Another one is inflation, a very great one, again, pressures to build social projects which they can't really afford by printing money, going to the printing presses. It gets you into the field of fiscal and monetary policy and things of this kind.

SITUATION IN BRAZIL

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, how are things going in Brazil?

Mr. MANN. Very well.

Senator MUNDT. They have a new government.

Mr. MANN. I can only say that we are shooting to bring the inflation rate from 142 percent down to somewhere, we hope, under 10 percent within a 2-year period. We are trying to hold the line on wages to do that and to increase taxes, increase budgetary revenues, and the government is very unpopular. The people who pay taxes don't like to pay taxes. The people who work for wages don't like to hold the line there.

Senator MUNDT. If you can avoid an election there for a few years, though, it looks pretty good.

Mr. MANN. I must say that Castello Branco has exceeded our expectations in his courage and his willingness to sacrifice his personal popularity for the good of the country, which is really what it comes down to.

Senator LAUSCHE. We have been very late in approaching this problem. About 5 years ago on a Saturday noon, we had the Premier of Brazil, or whatever they call him here, and he at that time said that they needed money. In answer to a question which I put to him, I said, "Aren't you suffering a 50 percent a year inflation now?" He was jarred. Then he asked his economic advisor, and his economic advisor said, "It is only 25 percent." Well, then it was all wrong.

I said, "Do you have any indebtedness to your people?" He said, "None whatsoever." I said, "Well how do you finance all of these projects?" And he was frank. Printing press money.

And we did nothing about it. We gave them a loan and the Monetary Fund gave them money and the World Bank gave them money and on they went the same way.

It is worse now than it was 5 years ago.

Go ahead.

Mr. MANN. Certainly we think and hope we have turned the corner in Brazil, and we are putting the pressure on in Chile and in Colombia and in other places. I probably won't be very popular for all this either, Senator.

PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you pardon me? I am going to depart from this subject.

I read somewhere an article about 2 months ago about a subcommittee of the United Nations undertaking to make a study of the relationship of the United States with Puerto Rico. That subcom-

mittee voted that Puerto Rico should become an independent nation, and whatever ties it has with the United States should be severed by the United States, allowing Puerto Rico to be a sovereign country. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. MANN. No, I am not, Senator. I know there has been a debate for a decade between statehood, commonwealth status, which is what they have now, and total independence.

Senator LAUSCHE. Puerto Rico hasn't asked for it. The United Nations main committee says that Puerto Rico——

Mr. MANN. Oh excuse me, sir. Yes, I think there was some vote in the U.N. on this issue, totally irresponsible.

Senator LAUSCHE. Could I have supplied for me and for the record the nations that participated and the nations that voted for the separation of Puerto Rico completely, contrary to Puerto Rico's wishes, from its ties with us?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, we can give you that. That is easy to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all we need on that.

Mr. MANN. That is about all I had in mind talking about. I will be glad to answer any questions.

DISCOURAGE NATIONALIZATION

Senator MUNDT. I would like to make one suggestion about your number one problem in Latin America. Would there be any logic in rearranging our foreign aid program so that instead of tending to encourage, if not subsidize, the nationalization of industries which have never worked anywhere and which doesn't work here, we thought of our aid program in terms of the American experience with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in which we would work out some kind of a reconstruction finance corporation concept, so that our aid would be administered and made available not to politicians down there to nationalize industry, but on a loan basis to entrepreneurs large and small?

Mr. MANN. We are doing a great deal of that, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Are we?

Mr. MANN. Oh yes, a great deal of that.

Senator MUNDT. Have you carried it to the second step, and that is to provide that as these industries become efficient, and we can supply them American guidance to help run them, experts and so forth, that they develop the same stock ownership concept down there so that gradually there is a broad base of profit enterprise?

Mr. MANN. That is an objective that we agree with completely. Of course, if you have inflation, you don't have any savings, because even at 25 percent inflation, it destroys any incentive to save money, so that people don't have any money to buy stock with. They put it all into iceboxes or tangibles or real estate and that sort of thing.

Senator MUNDT. But if you get a little piece of stock, your value goes up.

Mr. MANN. If it is common stock, yes.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, that is what I am talking about, common stock ownership.

LATIN AMERICAN CAPITALISM

Mr. MANN. We are encouraging that. One of the problems we have is that the Latin American capitalist—I think we ought to understand this very clearly—is not as enlightened as the American capitalist, and capitalism U.S. style 1964 is quite different from capitalism English style 1850 or even U.S. style 1850.

We do have an enlightened capitalist system in this country, people with a sense of responsibility and patriotism and so forth. The capitalist in Latin America is a different breed, and I think it would be a mistake for us to say that——

Senator MUNDT. Is part of that because he is sort of a family corporate industry?

Mr. MANN. It is a cultural thing. They grow up in a different culture.

Senator MUNDT. It doesn't have as broad a base of private ownership.

DIFFERENT STANDARDS

Mr. MANN. Different standards of morality, different standards of conduct. It is just a different culture, a different world. I don't think that we would want to go back to the days when the Latin American capitalists were just free, without antitrust laws or anything of that kind, to exploit the people, because this is exactly what they would do.

We need to find a system which is somewhere between socialism and the old style capitalism that existed in England, let's say, when Marx wrote his treatise. We need to find governments which will understand the value of competition, for example. In the Latin American culture they don't really accept that competition is good. They have a tradition of monopoly, whether it is privately owned or state owned. They have a tradition of monopoly, and how you reverse deep grained cultural habits of this kind isn't easy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That comes from the old idea of monopoly granted by the king, is that it?

Mr. MANN. That is right. It is a cultural thing, politics, the economic system.

Senator MUNDT. By encouraging a proliferation of small private ownership projects——

Mr. MANN. We agree with that, and we are working with that.

Senator MUNDT. You give two pretty grim alternatives when you say do we want socialism or 1850 capitalism. We don't want that. We want 1964 U.S. capitalism.

Mr. MANN. And we are doing that.

Senator MUNDT. And you get competition.

Mr. MANN. We are doing that principally through credit, which I think may be the main question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It takes a long time to do it through the little fellow, because he has no concept of what his possibilities and potentials are and his responsibilities. That is the trouble.

Senator MUNDT. That is where the technical assistance comes in to help him to be a bigger fellow.

Mr. MANN. I thank all of you very much.

Senator LAUSCHE. I enjoyed your presentation.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

THE SOVIET UNION AFTER KHRUSHCHEV

THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Symington, Lausche, Gore, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire Mr. Jones, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the committee come to order?

We are very pleased to have Ambassador Thompson with us this morning.

Before we proceed to that, I need some guidance. I thought that this would be a period of time when we would get some people here. I think it is a little embarrassing to the committee to have very busy people up here and then have such a small attendance.

I am perfectly willing to have these meetings, but I think to ask the Secretary of State, for example, to come, and the Ambassador, with only a few here, it obviously means at a later date we will have to go all over it again for the benefit of the other members. I wonder if it is worthwhile until after the Inauguration to have any more meetings.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. We have Ambassador Thompson here this morning, who, as we all know, is one of our finest experts on the Communist world.

I wonder if we could proceed, Mr. Ambassador, with you giving us a little rundown on the situation, and then have questions.

Ambassador THOMPSON. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed, please?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLEWELLYN THOMPSON, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE

Ambassador THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I thought I might start with this ouster of Khrushchev.[1] Both the Secretary and I talked to some of you at the time that happened. There hasn't been very much since to, I think, change our view that we had at that time.

[1] Nikita S. Khrushchev was deposed as Soviet Premier and Communist Party First Secretary Oct. 14–15, 1964.

The principal thing seems to have been their dissatisfaction with his style and method of operation, rather than any specific policy. But it is true that they have had a number of very serious problems. He seems to have failed on most of them. I think they would have put up with his style of leadership if he had been succeeding, but he wasn't.

The thing that we don't know is what particular thing kicked this off at the time it did. There are a number of hypotheses or guesses about it, but we don't know in fact which of these it would have been.

As you recall, these astronauts had completed their successful flight, and there was to be a big celebration in Moscow. He was coming up to make a speech, and one supposition is that they were worried about what he might say in that speech. There are a number of possibilities. One was one of their most serious problems, the allocation of their resources.

In September they had had a secret meeting at which they had not reached agreement on this problem, and on October 2, Khrushchev had caused to have published in the press a summary of his speech that he had made at that secret meeting in which he came down very heavily on the side of increasing the production of consumer goods. It looked as though he was trying to force the hand of his colleagues, and they may have been afraid he would have gone further along that line.

MANY POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR KHRUSHCHEV'S REMOVAL

There were a number of other possibilities, of course. One was that he had been working on a new constitution, which he said he was going to introduce more democracy into the system, and this may have been something they were worried about. And it could have been a lot of other problems, such as the military policy, on which they have also had disagreements.

Then there was the very curious thing that Brezhnev had been in East Germany for a whole week before this happened and got back only the day before. We know they were worried about Khrushchev's impending visit to West Germany. They were very annoyed that he had sent his son-in-law to arrange this without telling them what he was up to, and they could have been worried about that.

There are several other guesses that might account for it. One was the suggestion that they may have known the Chinese nuclear test was coming off, and they may have speeded up their program in order not to have it happen after that.

And then, finally, there was a suggestion that Khrushchev had lately been backing Nikolai Podgorny rather than Leonid Brezhnev, and Brezhnev may have felt his position was slipping and he better move when he could.

But all these are simply guesses. We just don't know.

WEAKER SOVIET LEADERSHIP

I think the important thing, of course, for us is what this is likely to mean. I think in the first place it means that for the time being their leadership is going to be weaker. They will be operating

by committee. And until people know where the power really lies, both we and the people in the Communist world are going to be uncertain about where they are heading.

There is a supposition that there will eventuate another power struggle, and their system does tend in that direction. But I would guess that the two present leaders, Brezhnev and [Aleksei] Kosygin—neither one strikes me, or most of the people, observers in Moscow, as the type that are likely to succeed in getting power. So it could be somebody else on the Presidium.

One of the things that pushes them toward a dictatorship is that the government is so centralized, and decisions have to be made quickly. The committee procedure is pretty slow compared to one man who can decide.

Another thing that pushes them in that direction is the power of appointment. Practically all of the important jobs, at least in the party, and many of the government jobs, are dictated from the center on down. And whoever makes those appointments almost automatically begins to build up a machine.

So that over time, it is quite likely that some one man will emerge, but this might be several years. It took Khrushchev some years before he really asserted his power.

DIVISIONS IN THE LEADERSHIP

The one thing that these people were agreed on was to get rid of Khrushchev. As far as we know, there was no consensus on any other one problem. They divide in different ways, depending on what the problem is.

It is quite likely that there will evolve a little group within the Presidium which will band together in order to exercise power. But we don't know—we have no real indications who that will be. They divide along different lines. Politically, for example, there are traditionally the Ukranians against the Russians, and under Khrushchev the Ukranians were pretty much in the ascendancy. And today, out of 11 full members of the Presidium, 5 of them are Ukranians. The Ukranians are also very prominent in the military.

Of course, on specific questions there will be different combinations. But the dividing of the two front jobs, the head of the party and the head of the Government itself, tends, I think, to bring out a combination in which you have the interest of those, particularly the business people who manage their industry and agriculture, against those who are primarily playing a party role.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MISTAKES

Probably the biggest single mistake that Khrushchev made, as far as his holding power is concerned, was in 1962, when he divided the party along production lines, right down to the grassroots. He set up one committee which was in charge of agriculture, another committee that was in charge of industry and production. What this meant was that every local leader had his empire divided into two. He didn't like that.

The second thing was it was almost unworkable because there are a lot of questions that these committees deal with which don't fall in either category; for example, education, the police, party

propaganda, all of these things. There was always then a dispute between the two committees as to who is responsible for it.

At the same time, he had made clear that the head of these committees was going to be responsible for success or failure. The normal practice there is for the party fellow, whenever a factory fails to meet its plan, for example, they fire the factory manager. Khrushchev had made clear he was going to hold the party man responsible. Well, of course, they didn't like that.

On the other side of it, the factory managers didn't like it because this meant more interference in their affairs by these party types, many of whom were incompetent. So this really, I think, was the most foolish move he made, and it certainly pulled the rug out from under him as far as support in the party on the local level was concerned.

EASTERN EUROPEAN ASSERTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE

I would think that certainly one result of the way they got rid of Khrushchev was to greatly increase the feeling in the Eastern European Communist countries that they would—they want to assert greater independence in Moscow. They were, all of them, I think, disturbed at the way this was done. They probably realized that they could not be told in advance because chances—it is a pretty dangerous thing to remove a leader of a state like that.

But what they particularly objected to was the fact that they immediately began to criticize him; that is, the Soviet new regime. He had visited all of these countries frequently. These leaders had all praised him and so on, and it made them look very silly. Of course, they do this partly for internal reasons, to destroy Khrushchev's machine and warn people they better get on the new bandwagon. But it was very embarrassing for these people in Eastern Europe, and I think they will be much less inclined to follow every twist and turn in Soviet policy than they were before.

They had already started a very strong move away from the rigid Soviet policy. Of course, they are all still Communist countries, but the Rumanians in particular have been getting out in front in asserting their own interests.

In addition, some of the leaders of these Eastern European countries had used Khrushchev's support to maintain themselves in power. This caused some uncertainty on their part.

THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

I think it also added to the tendency of the Communist parties in the free world to assert greater independence. The Italians had been moving very much in this direction. Togliatti [2] left a memorandum or testament asserting the right of these parties to operate independently of Moscow. From our point of view, this has both advantages and disadvantages, because if they are able to operate independently, they can in some ways be more effective.

Take Italy, for example. The Italian party, I think, was weakened by having to follow the Soviet line on cultural matters. There are a lot of Italians that like modern art. If this is supposed to be a

[2] Palmiro Togliatti, former head of the Italian Communist Party.

bad thing, the way the Soviets look at it, this, of course, alientates some support in Italy. This is only a minor example. But there are a lot of things of that sort that weaken these parties because of their close ties to Moscow's policies.

MORE FLEXIBILITY ON BERLIN

I think they now have a little more flexibility on the Berlin question, because Khrushchev had made so clear that this policy of trying to establish a free city of West Berlin was his own idea, and these people now, I think, would find it easier not to pursue that. On the other hand, I think they will find it harder to deal with the German question as a whole, because in a system like the Soviet Union it takes a strong man to deviate from the regular line. And I think until someone has consolidated this power, it will be harder for them to deviate, and they will follow a more orthodox Communist line just by inertia.

I think Khrushchev's ouster also means less standing of the Soviet party within the movement. Certainly now they don't have anybody the stature of Mao in China as the leader of the party and as an ideologist. This is another reason they tend to want to build up one man, so they are able to exercise their influence through the Communist bloc.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY

As far as we know, the military didn't pay any particular role in this, other than they obviously had to give their tacit consent. But from what we know of it, they were not initiating and active. They were dissatisfied with Khrushchev's policies. So I think the people who planned this coup must have known that they could count on them.

But by the same reason I should think for some time, again, until somebody or some group consolidates power, they will have to move pretty carefully on things like disarmament in order not to alienate the military.

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

On relations with us and the West in general, I think they will be much more orthodox, for this reason I have just mentioned. I think, at the same time, they will be less erratic than Khrushchev was. He made some very dangerous moves. I think these people will be more cautious, consider more carefully the moves they make. There will be probably fewer surprises.

Senator LAUSCHE. They will be more orthodox in what?

Ambassador THOMPSON. In their propaganda, for example. This is already evident.

Senator LAUSCHE. Orthodox Communist line?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes.

Actually, I think that relations with the West—we won't know, in my opinion, for some time whether or not there are going to be any particularly new lines. Their first job is going to be consolidate their power. In a system like this, it takes considerable time. They will have to make a lot of changes throughout the system.

The second thing is that they will have to deal with these very critical internal problems that Khrushchev was failing to deal with, and these are not going to be easy. The problems are still there. Getting rid of him did not change the problems.

RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Certainly in the next months, almost their greater preoccupation is going to be their relations with Communist China. Since they are contending with the Communist Chinese for influence over other parties, everything they do will be looked at as to how it will affect that problem. They also have problems with the Communist parties throughout the rest of the world, so I think relations with the West will be very low on their agenda, and it will be some time before we get any very clear indications.

I might——

Senator GORE. Do you really mean it is going to have a low priority?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes. I think as issues come up, they may have to deal with them. For example, if something happens in Vietnam or the Congo, they will, of course, be obliged to deal with it. But I don't think that they will decide on any change in their line toward the West—if they do decide on one—for months.

Senator GORE. That is not exactly what you said. You said that relations with the West would be low on their agenda. You mean they will be slow to change?

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is right. And slow to get to it.

I think they will deal with the Chinese problem first. This will be their first priority. They have a meeting coming up in March. Khrushchev had a meeting set for December 15. This may have been one of the reasons why they got rid of him, because he was clearly heading for a break. I think they thought with better handling they might avoid a break and a split in the Communist world.

Senator GORE. I don't know how they could possibly rationalize their relations with China without giving top priority to a consideration of its effect upon their relations with the West. It seems to me that——

Ambassador THOMPSON. They certainly are connected. How they come out with China will affect how they deal with us and vice versa. But——

Senator GORE. That is why I could not quite rationalize your statement there.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think it is partly the question of timing. They have this meeting coming up, so they have to deal with it, in the first place. This is set now for March 1, which is pretty close.

Senator GORE. But if they cannot deal with one without it having a direct bearing upon the other, I don't know how one is low on the agenda. It seems to me both will have to be high on the agenda.

LITTLE CHANCE OF RESOLVING PROBLEMS WITH CHINA

Ambassador THOMPSON. They could settle with the Chinese without actually making any change in their attitude toward us, if the

Chinese would agree. Of course, one of the things that the Chinese criticize them for is for trying to have good relations with us. So this does get involved, I will agree. You cannot split it.

But I think in general if they plan—and we don't know that they do—any particular new lines toward us, that their attention is going to be preoccupied with this other problem. They will be looking at it in that light, rather than in ours, I think.

But as far as we know, and all the signs so far are that there is very little chance of their being able to resolve their problems with China. They had this meeting at the time of their November 7 celebration, October Revolution, and apparently got nowhere. And the signs are that Chinese will resume polemics and propaganda against them. The Soviets are keeping theirs more mute, obviously with concern about influence on these other parties.

But as far as we can tell, even if the Soviets want to keep from splitting the movement, the Chinese won't let them. They are going to go straight ahead in what is going to result in a break.

THE CHINESE WILL FORCE A BREAK

Senator GORE. This leads to one further question, it seems to me, and that is, do you foresee the possibility that the Chinese will force an alteration of the pattern of relationship between the Soviets and the Western powers, which, I think you will agree, has been on a course of rapprochement since the confrontation over Cuba, or will the Soviets permit the Chinese to force a break over this issue?

These are some of the reasons why I just cannot see how one is high on the agenda and the other is not. It seems to me that they are on a collision course with this meeting in March. And if the Chinese are going to force a break unless they alter their position with the West, will the Soviets alter that position, or let the break occur for a lack of alteration?

Ambassador THOMPSON. In my opinion—as I say, I think the Chinese will force the break. There are other issues than the issue of relations with the West. This is only one of a long list of disputed problems.

In my opinion, the Chinese will leave them no choice, because the Chinese will force the break. They are already working very hard and have succeeded in splitting or getting control of the number of important Communist parties, such as the Japanese, the Indonesian, they have split the Indian party, they have the New Zealand party, and so on. I think these would be very hard to put back together even if they wanted to.

In my opinion, they may paper this over at this meeting for some time, but the break is really there and I think will continue. But this doesn't necessarily in itself mean that their policies toward us will necessarily be different. It will push them toward accommodation with us, but it doesn't necessarily follow—even if they have a complete break, they could go on following a pretty hard line if they wanted to.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador.

ALLOCATION OF SOVIET RESOURCES

Ambassador THOMPSON. I want to adapt this to what you gentlemen want. I might just run down the list of some of the problems facing these people inside.

The biggest one, I think, is this question of how they allocate their resources. Their goals that they have set are bigger than their capabilities, and something has to give. This is a very difficult problem for them to decide, one they have been struggling with for a long time, and it won't be any easier for them than it was for Khrushchev to deal with it.

The principal claimants for their resources are the military, the people interested in space, which calls for very heavy expenditures, their heavy industry people, agriculture, housing, and finally consumers. The first signs—these people have made almost promises to everybody, so it is hard to tell from their statements which way they are really coming down. I would guess on balance they realize they have to do something to increase the production of consumer goods, partly because the pressure is for it on the part of the public, but mainly because of the need of incentives to make their economic system work. Where the cuts are going to come, we don't know, except that they have, of course, already cut their military budget somewhat, or say they have.

Another problem for them is the general problem of the management of industry. They have this problem of should they centralize or decentralize.

Under Khrushchev they set up these economic councils. But each time that they have attempted to get a more rational system by decentralization, the party has worried that they would lose control, and they make an offsetting move to keep this highly centralized planning and control in Moscow.

Related to this is the role of the party in all of these things. These people are all professional party people and very much concerned in keeping the control in the hands of the party. On the other hand, in general, this tends to be inefficient and ineffective.

AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS

By the same token, they have the problem of the management of agriculture, and in both of these fields there has been a lot of talk and experimenting with new methods. I even saw an article the other day saying in agriculture that they were thinking of charging land rent to the collective farms. This is quite a departure from normal Communist procedure.

One of the reasons they are considering this is that they have the problem of raising the level of the poor farms. If you have in the same area one farm with very rich land and another very poor land, the rich farm gets richer and the poor poorer as time goes on.

They have a flat income tax rate of 12½ percent for the farms. And the only other way they can equalize this at all is by their procurement policies. The State buys produce at a fixed, and really below market, rate. But that is not a very effective way of leveling this off, so since they have declared their objective of trying to abolish the income tax, it is quite possible that they will seriously consider charging land rent, depending on the type of land it is.

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Another very difficult problem for them, and one that they have had arguments over, very intense arguments, over the last 3 years, is the whole question of military strategy. Khrushchev, as you know, said in the atomic age it makes no sense to have big conventional armies, and in 1961 he started a cutback of 1.5 million men, which he had to drop because of the tension over Berlin. But he was always pushing in that direction, trying to get in this problem of allocating resources, trying to take it away from the conventional military.

The military themselves, of course, were divided somewhat on this issue. We have had a lot of speeches and articles published back and forth on both sides.

Another important——

EXPERIMENTS WITH THE PROFIT MOTIVE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Ambassador, before we get too far away from some of the economic matters, I wonder if you might say something to us about something that we read in the newspapers a good bit about, and that is the economic reorganization on the profit motive basis.

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes, sir. They have indicated they are going to—in fact, they have already, on an experimental basis, added some industries, not the whole industry but, for example, certain shoe manufacturing establishments and textile industries in certain areas. There are really two things involved here. One is what is the measure of success of an enterprise; in this, they are talking about using profits as a measure. The second thing is the problem of adapting production to the market.

Now, what they have always done before is have a centralized plan. Everything is allocated right down the line. They have no feedback, no way of knowing whether what they are producing is really meeting their needs.

Now, this wasn't much of problem as long as everything was scarce, because they could sell anything they made. But now we estimate that they have at least $1.5 billion worth of goods that are unsalable at the present prices. And the prices are fixed by the central government.

What they are trying to do now is to let these particular industries, on an experimental basis, adapt their production to what their consumers ordered. This doesn't necessarily mean the retail store, but the distributing organization, which sort of corresponds in a way to a wholesale house.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there flexibility on price, too?

Ambassador THOMPSON. So far, no. This is where I think they are on a slippery path. In the end, they are going to find they have to go all the way. You cannot have a market economy if you have certain of these things rigidly fixed. It seems to me it won't work. But they are trying very hard to raise quality of goods, and that is one of the purposes of this.

But if you have profit as the measure, and you have a fixed price, in some ways this may tend to cause people to lower quality so they can make more profit and, therefore, get a bonus. That is

why I think they are going to find in the end you cannot shoot this off halfway. But they are going to move cautiously in this, I think, and try it out and see how it works.

So far the first experiments they have had apparently have been pretty successful. But as it is, a factory can go on producing, say, a textile the women don't like for 2 years, and the stuff just piles up on the shelves before they get around to finding out they have got to change that. This is one of the things that is inherent, I think, in their very centralized and planned economy.

RELATIONS WITH LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

There are other problems. Some we have already mentioned, the relations with Communist China and the parties of the East European countries.

Also, there is the matter of their relations with the less developed countries. There has been considerable criticism there of foreign aid in their country as well as ours. This is another one of the things they have been fighting with the Chinese about. The Chinese say, "You ought to help us instead of helping these bourgeois governments." And there has been a good deal of criticism within the Soviet Union.

Actually, their foreign aid went up in 1964 as compared with 1963. One of the things that they criticized Khrushchev for was he promised the Egyptians a credit of $180 million and gave them a decoration, without bothering to let his colleagues know he was doing it.

Senator LAUSCHE. What country?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Egypt.

One of their top people, a member of the Presidium, has been in Egypt now, and we understand he is undertaking to fulfill this commitment. But as far as we know, he has not given them anything more.

I might just briefly point out the specific actions that they have taken since they took over.

RESTRICTIONS REMOVED ON PRIVATE FARM PLOTS

One of their first moves was to remove the restriction—I talk first about domestic matters—they removed the restrictions they had put on the private plots that each of these collective farmers is allowed to have. They had started the process of squeezing them down, trying to make them give up their cattle—usually they have a cow or some pigs or sheep. Almost within the first few weeks they announced they were removing these restrictions and thus will try to increase production, because those little plots produce about half of their vegetables, things like potatoes, and almost 50 percent of their meat was formerly produced on these little plots. The farmers spend their time on those rather than on the collective.

REEVALUATION OF LYSENKO

Another thing they did was to start to announce that they were removing support from Lysenko,[3] this geneticist who is considered by most Westerners as a fake, but who had the support both of Stalin and later of Khrushchev. Our people think that in science you cannot have a phony system in one discipline and not affect the others, and this is probably true. But it also probably would affect their development of agriculture, because this fellow had so much influence on agricultural methods.

PRODUCTION EXPERIMENTS

They also announced they were combining the separate party units which Khrushchev divided on production lines; now they are being put back into one committee. They have also announced, as we just mentioned, these steps toward experimenting and using profit as a measure of success of an enterprise.

REDUCED MILITARY BUDGET

They also announced that they had reduced their military budget by a little over $\$½$ billion. And they are talking, although they haven't actually taken any step yet, to undo Khrushchev's educational reform, if you call it reform, in which he established a system where every pupil had to go to work in a factory enterprise before he could go on to the university. They haven't yet changed that, but there are indications they are considering doing it.

CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP

And, finally, internally, they have made a couple of changes in the leadership. They have promoted a fellow, Shelepin, who was formerly head of the secret police, before that the head of their youth organization, and who has a very powerful position in the leadership. He is both on the Presidium and the Secretariat, and the Party-State Control Committee, which is a sort of auditing body in a way which rides herd on the party and government.

Senator SPARKMAN. He is from the Ukraine, too, isn't he?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I don't think so.

FOREIGN PROPAGANDA LINE

In the foreign field they have made promises to everybody. Their propaganda line, I think, has become a little bit harder toward the West—their criticism over the Congo, Vietnam.

They started out on the President's State of the Union Message with sort of an ordinary middle of the road line, and then a few days after that suddenly became very critical.

Senator LAUSCHE. What part of it did they take exception to, mainly?

Ambassador THOMPSON. They mentioned a number of things. One was lack of any mention of disarmament. They particularly objected to the talk of bridges to Eastern Europe, taking it in the

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[3] On Feb. 4, 1965 the Soviet Academy of Sciences removed Trofim Denisovich Lysenko as head of its Institute of Generics.

sense that this meant separation from the Soviet Union. They said there was a lot of talk about peace but, at the same time, there was talk about our policy in Vietnam and so on.

They proposed this meeting of the Communist parties from December 15 to March 1. They had their first talks with the Chinese, which apparently broke down almost immediately.

They announced that they were going to continue their policy of peaceful coexistence, as they call it. In the Secretary's talks with Gromyko in New York, there were really no new developments. The tone was very good. The Secretary even needled him a few times but didn't get the usual reaction you used to get from him. It was very mild. Substantively, there is no real change.

Senator GORE. Could I ask one further question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

POINTS OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

Senator GORE. I would like to advert to the question I asked you a few moments ago, and your answer.

You said you thought that the Red Chinese were going to force a break, and that alteration of policy by the Soviets with the West itself would not forestall a break, as I understood you to say. Now, if that be the case, what are the other major charges or issues that the Red Chinese are forcing a break upon?

I had understood, and I suppose from your statement, erroneously, that the principal reason for the Chinese attempting to force a break was this question of coexistence and the relation of the Communist world with the capitalist world. If that is not the case, what are the other three or four major points of controversy between the Red Chinese and the Russians, or is the principal issue that they want to seize control of the international Communist movement?

Ambassador THOMPSON. There are two sets of issues. One is what you might call nationalistic and the other ideological. They have got disagreements on both sides. Considering that these are both Communist regimes, ideology is very important to them. Just to give you one example, they accused the Soviets of what they call revisionism of the dogma.

Now, the Soviets realize that they can only run a modern industrial economy on the basis of incentives. The Chinese don't have the wherewithal to provide incentives. Therefore, they must use a combination of coercion and, if you will, conviction, or belief in the dogma. If you are operating on that basis, it is very important that you not tamper with the dogma, and the Soviets have a lot of ideological positions which the Chinese object to. One of them, for example, is that the Soviets say, "We now have no longer any antagonistic elements in the Soviet Union."

You know, they talk of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviets now say, "We have a dictatorship of the whole people," and that there are some individuals who are antagonistic, but in general there are no classes that are antagonistic in the Soviet Union. The Chinese, wanting to use coercion, say this is wrong, you must say there are classes, therefore you have to have this tight dictatorship which operates on the basis of coercion.

WHO IS GOING TO RUN THE COMMUNIST WORLD?

There are a lot of other issues. The Chinese think the Soviets should help them economically and militarily. I think probably the biggest single thing is really the issue of who is going to run the Communist movement throughout the world and for what purposes.

The Chinese want to be able to have the power of the Communist bloc used to get back Taiwan. The Soviets don't want to run the risk of a world war over an issue like that. They want to push for their own objectives.

There are a lot of other collateral issues, such as the border quarrel. The Chinese have raised that. They have even gone so far as to raise not only their own border with the Soviet Union, but to suggest that the Soviets got too much in Western Europe at the end of the war, which is, of course, infuriating to the Soviets.

They disagree over the policy toward the less developed countries. The Chinese say you should not help bourgeois governments, this is a wrong policy, you should stir up revolution anywhere you can. The Soviets say it is wrong to encourage a revolution where it cannot succeed, you should wait. There are a whole series of issues of this sort on which they disagree.

POPULATION AND LAND

I think there are some fundamental problems, such as the population explosion in China and the fact that Siberia is relatively empty. I think the Soviets and the Chinese both realize that the Chinese cannot do much about this frontier problem now because of their military weakness, but the Soviets are worried that in the long run the Chinese will keep this problem alive, that years ahead may really raise this issue in a serious way.

If I may go back to the way you started your question, what I said was that a break between Communist China and the Soviet Union would not itself necessarily settle Soviet relations with us. A lot of these problems would still remain, and it would depend on what happened. It would certainly push them in our direction and make them disposed, I think, to come to a settlement with us. But this would not automatically follow. They are still a Communist country, and we are not.

SPLIT THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Senator GORE. I also understood you to say that in your view an alteration of policy by the Soviets with respect to the West would not itself prevent a break, that the Chinese were for other reasons determined to force a break.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think—I would stand on that statement. I think that is true. It would be a long way. That would be an important factor in it, but I think some of these other issues would remain and, largely, one as to who is going to run the movement and for what purpose.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I interrupt right there?

I am glad you brought out that point, because I was a little puzzled with your original statement. I understood you to say that you thought that regardless of what Russia did with regard to relations

to the West, that China would force that break. I thought that you meant that China would force a break between Russia and the United States, but you mean force a break between China and Russia.

Ambassador THOMPSON. And in the Communist movement, to split the movement.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in the Communist movement generally?

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is right.

INITIATIVES TOWARD THE WEST

Senator GORE. Then, if that be the case, would it not be logical to assume that the Russians would rationalize, if they started running, so to speak, if they moved to alter their position with the West to no avail, then they would put themselves on the defensive, and if they started giving in on one, they would be vulnerable to giving in on others?

Could it not follow, then—it seems to me it would come back to your original thesis that so long as this situation is in the state of flux, we should not expect any immediate change in the policy of the Soviets toward the West.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that is right. When I made my original statement, what I was thinking was we are trying to read where this new government is going—I don't think they will be taking any initiatives toward the West, particularly on their own initiative, any new moves, until they have seen how this other thing develops. I think it will be at least 6 months before we can have any clear reading as to what, if any, change there is going to be in their policy toward the West.

One thing I think we have to remember is these same people were administering the Soviet Government all along. Khrushchev spent half his time out of Moscow. He made major policy decisions—arbitrarily. But these are the same people that were running the Soviet Government, so I would not expect any big change in their attitude toward us.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I am through with my presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we ought to go around.

SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask one question.

For 20 years, Mr. Ambassador, since we first started talking about this thing, the primary worry has been the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. I would say in all honesty that I don't worry about that 10 percent as much as I did 20 years ago. On the other hand, you have this new growth of military might in this new country that has the coercive policies that you describe, which is becoming much more of an apprehension to us, and I am sure to other countries, too.

With that premise, and based upon your experience, do you feel that the Communists are aware of the danger of the nuclear weapon, its capacities as a military weapon? Do you think there is any chance that they, regardless of what we do, will want to pre-

vent the country with this long border and this big population taking some decisive action to prevent them having that position as against the Russians themselves?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think they must undoubtedly be worried in the long range. What they say, and I think what they probably believe—they may be wrong in this—but what they say is, "This is a long-range thing; it will be a long time before they have any capability." What their actual attitude is, we can only guess.

But they certainly are worried about this thing. As I mentioned about this population growth—about 40 percent of their investments under the 7-year plan were to go into Siberia, and I think one of the reasons for forcing this as rapidly as they have been is to try to fill up that vacuum there which is very tempting to the Chinese.

But I think these people are well aware of what nuclear war means. Except for the Cuban venture, Khrushchev showed that he was, and his whole policy seemed to have that very much in mind. And I think these people were with him.

But whether they would be capable of doing something about it, preempting the Chinese, there has been no sign that they would. And I think there is this fact that they are Communist regimes. But this isn't necessarily excluded from future thinking.

Khrushchev once told me—if I may go off the record——

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I have a couple of questions.

EAST-WEST TRADE

Would you just comment briefly about the so-called East-West trade? You are familiar with the delegation of businessmen that went there and so on. What would you say about the significance of it, the advisability, probability?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think there are really two problems involved here, Mr. Chairman. One is the Soviet Union itself and the other the Eastern European bloc.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, they attach, I think, an exaggerated importance to trade with us. Every conversation, almost, I ever had with any of these people, and I had a lot with Kosygin—he would raise this question of trade.

Now, in my opinion, if we remove all of our obstacles to trade, the trade will never get very big. This is assuming, as I am sure is the case, that we would never give them big long-term credits.

But without that, I don't think they can sell us enough to balance trade. They are short of gold, we believe. If they can shift some of their trade from Western Europe to us—but some of it I don't think they can, because they are carrying on this trade, for example, by selling oil. We certainly are not going to take their oil. And in some of these countries, if they stop buying machinery from them, those countries are going to stop taking the oil. So they will not have that foreign exchange.

As far as the East European countries are concerned, I think we have great opportunity there. Each of them is developing now in a different way. They are not only becoming increasingly independent of the Soviet Union—they are going to remain Communist

countries, and there is a limit, of course, as to how far they can and will go, but I think they do want to be in a position, as far as their economy is concerned, not to be completely dependent upon the Soviet Union. They can sell enough things here to buy some of the plant and things that they need.

The Soviets have indicated that they are particularly interested now in buying technology and know-how, less in buying whole plants, although they still want those.

KHRUSHCHEV'S CRASH PROGRAMS

One of the things these people have now done is to cut back radically Khrushchev's plan for a massive buildup of the chemical industry. They are still going ahead very fast, but they had planned to increase their expenditures in this field this year by about $\$¾$ billion. Now I think they are cutting that back to about $\$¼$ billion. That is still a very sizable amount, but it is more rational.

Khrushchev always went in for these crash programs. And the very fact that he was trying to put across such a massive program meant he was disrupting everything else.

But I think we do have opportunities to continue this trend in these Eastern European countries.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE

The CHAIRMAN. What about political implications of trade, even though it doesn't amount to very much?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think it is very important, because all these people have always raised it with me, and they have said over and over again, "This is going to be our measure of whether or not you are really prepared to live and let live with us. This discrimination against us is something we don't believe you really want to improve your relations with us, as long as you maintain it."

The CHAIRMAN. What is your view about the consular convention?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think this is very much to our interest. I think the most important part of it is the protection of our people in there. I think whether or not they establish consulates—I think they would be useful. But this, to me, is of lesser importance than the protection this gives us for our people inside the Soviet Union.

SATELLITES MOVING IN DIRECTION OF YUGOSLAVIA

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask about the satellites, but I think you pretty well answered that question. In other words, you think the tendency will be for them to be Communist states, but with varying degrees of independence from Russia?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes, I think we are tending in the direction of Yugoslavia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Allow me just one question here.

Do you assume that they are gone as far as adopting the systems of the free West and that we have got to deal with them as permanently established Communist governments?

Ambassador THOMPSON. It depends how far ahead you look. I don't think communism is going to prevail forever. I think there will be socialism in the Soviet Union. I don't think they will ever get to communism. They don't have it anyway, and they admit it. The Soviets say they are in a period of socialism moving toward communism. I don't think communism is workable, even in the Soviet Union.

But as far as these Eastern European countries go, I think it would have to be a long-range process, but I think in time, if you develop something like the Yugoslavs have, it can move on beyond that, to where—certainly these countries are no longer going to be this completely monolithic, closely knit group. That is one of the greatest threats to us communism has always had, that once a country became Communist it was lock, stock, and barrel in a combination against us. If these countries start following independent policies, it is much less dangerous to us.

I don't know how much the Soviets can count on these satellite troops these days. I don't think they will be disposed to move at the press of a button, and the Soviets may need to continue to keep some Soviet troops in each of them to make sure they don't go the other way. This can grow.

CHANGES IN SOVIET STANDARD OF LIVING

Senator SPARKMAN. May I switch to another subject, and ask just for a brief comment?

My wife and I were in Soviet Russia in 1955. We went back again after the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—that was in the summer of 1963. I thought I could detect a great change. One change was—of course, this was only superficial observation—the way the people dressed seemed to me to have changed greatly from 1955 to 1963. Of course, all of the apartment buildings and housing and so forth——

I remember going by a department store. It was not the GUM but it was a store, at least. It had in the display window some of the best looking men's suits I have ever seen.

Has there been a real change along that line, the way the people live, the standard of living, and also any increase in consumer products that are available to the people?

Ambassador THOMPSON. The trend was up, and very rapidly. It depends on how far back you go. But in 1963, as you know, they had this disastrous year in agriculture.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was right afterwards. This was in August of 1963.

Ambassador THOMPSON. Incidentally, when we went down there, at that time, I asked Khrushchev how his outlook for agriculture was. "Oh," he said, "We don't know yet, but I think it will be about like it was the year before." This was in August of 1963. In September it was plain to everybody that they had had a great failure.

NEED TO INCREASE CONSUMER GOODS

One of the pressures on the government now, and one of the reasons they are, I think, going to have to increase their production of consumer goods, is this increase in the standard of living has lev-

eled off the last couple of years and people don't like it. So long as it was going up, even a little bit, they could tolerate it. But the pressure is from the public for this.

This is one thing I would like to say, that is, I think there is no question but what the average Soviet citizen is not interested any longer in the spread of communism. He believes in the socialist system. He has no interest in world revolution. He wants a better standard of living. This is his main concern—that and the maintenance of peace. These are the two things that preoccupy him.

So to the extent that they can have influence, the pressures on the Soviet regime are going to be toward accommodation with us, because they want good relations with the United States and the West, us particularly, because they associate it in their minds with a better standard of living. They say there cannot be any really serious problem as long as we get on with the United States, and if we do that we are going to have a better life.

Unfortunately, they don't have too much influence on policy, but the pressures are in that direction. And particularly now that you have this division between the party and the government, I think this will have some effect at least on their policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE TO CUBA

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Ambassador, I think this has been an excellent briefing. I want to thank you for it.

I have only one question. I wish you could make some comment on Russia vis-a-vis Cuba.

As I recall, the Cuban special ambassador that was sent to Russia got there after Khrushchev had been overthrown. As far as I can tell from the material we have read, he didn't get very far with the new group in working out arrangements for more aid to Cuba. Is that correct? Could you dwell on that just a minute, what you think we can expect as far as Russian assistance to Cuba is concerned?

Ambassador THOMPSON. It seems clear that they are feeling the weight of the aid they are having to give Cuba, and they don't like it. I think there are some signs they have been trying to push Castro toward an accommodation with us in order to get this monkey off their back.

Castro, as you know, seems to favor the Chinese more than the Soviets in this quarrel. It is going to be very interesting as to whether or not he will got to this meeting on March 1. If he doesn't send a representative, I think the Soviets are going to react pretty strongly. But he is quite capable of refusing to go, so this could, if it happens, put quite a strain on their relations.

I think the Soviets have a very strong interest, partly because of this fight within the Communist world, on maintaining a socialist regime in Cuba. But, at the same time, they would like not to have the burden of carrying it as much as they do. I think they are moving in that direction.

Senator MORSE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche?

THE SYSTEM FAILED UNDER KHRUSHCHEV'S LEADERSHIP

Senator LAUSCHE. At the very beginning of your presentation, you, in effect, said that the removal of Khrushchev was the result of his failure with respect to certain things.

While this development was being reported in the newspaper, I frankly did not think that our Government took advantage of what happened.

Now, why do you say that Khrushchev failed instead of that the system failed?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Well, the system failed under his leadership. I think there are weaknesses in the system.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you imply by that that the system, the Communist system, can succeed with proper management?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Again, to be strictly accurate, I think whatever you want to call it, the system they have, which is not communism—the system they have can succeed with proper management in building up their economy and dealing with their economic problems. There will always be weaknesses in it. And I think on a competitive basis with us, they will not do what Khrushchev said they would do, and overtake us. I just don't think they can succeed in doing that, but they can give their people a fairly decent life.

I think they have got a big industrial base now, and they will go on having problems. But I think these people will run it better than Khrushchev did. He tried to solve his problems by constantly reorganizing things. He did this over and over again.

KHRUSHCHEV WAS OPENING A LOT OF DOORS

Senator LAUSCHE. In your judgment, do you think it was a good thing for Communist Russia to remove Khrushchev?

Ambassador THOMPSON. From their point of view, I think at this stage it probably was.

Senator LAUSCHE. From our point of view was it a good thing?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I don't know what the answer to that is, Senator. I think from a very long-range point of view, our point of view long range, Khrushchev was opening a lot of doors and windows in that place, and I think this was good. I don't think they can go back and undo some of the things he did; for example, the de-Stalinization. This is not simply a question of not having Stalin at the top operating on the basis of terror, but it is a question of, throughout the system, whether or not each of these little fellows was going to be a little Stalin in his area.

I think his promoting these exchanges with the West, stopping jamming, letting our broadcasts in, letting us distribute a magazine, letting their people go abroad, all of these things are, to some extent at least, irreversible. So from that point of view he was good for us.

On the other hand, he was very much of a gambler. I think this Cuban venture was a very dangerous one, which I would doubt if these present people would engage in that sort of thing. So it is difficult to strike a balance.

IN THE U.S. INTEREST

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you say he asked for an increase in consumer goods, and that was one of the reasons that caused his removal. Was that in our interest or against our interest?

Ambassador THOMPSON. First of all,——

Senator LAUSCHE. You can answer that yes or no.

Senator SYMINGTON. You can, but he is an authority on this subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thanks for the implication.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think it is to our interest that they increase their production of consumer goods.

Senator LAUSCHE. If they increase their production of consumer goods, they decrease their production of military goods, and that would have been in our interest?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. So from that standpoint, it was a harm to our country to remove Khrushchev?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think these people, although they criticize him for this, I think they will do the same thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, you also said that it was rumored that he was working on a new constitution providing greater freedom for the Russian people. Was that good or bad for us?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think if it had gone through, it would be good. But we don't know what was in it. This is all rumor. He had made the statement—what he actually had in it, we don't know, or what they will put in it, we don't know. So I cannot really answer that.

Senator LAUSCHE. The point I am trying to make is I think the State Department erroneously approached this from the standpoint of good and bad that came to Russia, and not adequately from the standpoint of the good or bad that came to our nation. I don't think we took adequate advantage psychologically to let the Russian people know what a tragedy occurred to them when they removed Khrushchev.

ATTEMPTS TO DECENTRALIZE INDUSTRY

Now, you say that the most foolish thing that Khrushchev did was in trying to decentralize the control of the industry.

Ambassador THOMPSON. No, I said it was to divide the party into these two production units.

Senator LAUSCHE. That was trying to remove the iron control. Why was that foolish?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I meant it was foolish from his point of view. He cut his political support when he did this. But he was partly doing it to reassert party control over industry and agriculture.

Senator LAUSCHE. If he would have gone along with the iron control, he would have been solidified better with the Presidium than he was?

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is right.

LOOK AT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INDIVIDUALLY

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one more question—there are others here I want to ask.

Are we to assume that in this promotion of trade with Eastern Europe, we are accepting as a fait accompli the control that the Communists have over these satellite countries?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I don't think so. I think trade will, in a sense, weaken the control they have. I think each of these countries has to be looked at individually.

For example, the Rumanians have one of the most Stalinist type regimes of any of them, as far as their internal controls are concerned, but in their foreign policy they have gone farther than any of the others in trying to establish relations with the West and in showing their independence of Moscow. They have, for example, gotten some support for their regime by de-Russifying. They have taken away the Russian names of the streets; they have abolished the requirement for Russian in their schools.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where is that?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Rumania.

So I think we should deal with them each as an individual, and no longer discuss them as a bloc.

I think that we can—for example, by making a trade agreement with one and not with the other at the same time, you will increase the appetite in one for wanting this when we see what the other one is doing in trade with us, and this sort of thing. I think if we had more flexibility, we could advance our interests there.

TRADE AND LIBERATION

Senator LAUSCHE. You are not of the belief that by engaging in trade with them that we will more firmly establish the Communist philosophy that now prevails?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I don't, Senator, for this reason: In the first place, for the effect it has on their economy, whether they trade with us or not doesn't make much difference. They can get almost anything that we sell them from Western Europe now, and are getting.

But I think that by increasing these contacts, by having all this business flowing back and forth, this puts a restraint on their foreign policies to some extent. I think it tends toward—internally these countries will tend toward liberalizing the regimes.

EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY

Senator LAUSCHE. I have here a statement issued by the World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters with regard to American-Hungarian diplomatic relations. This statement, which I want placed in the record, points up that in Hungary there is still in control this iron hand. And while they do not fully object to the establishment of trade, they say, "Economic agreements should contain clauses which relate to certain civil rights of Hungarian citizens, abolishment or reduction of duties now collected from Hungarians receiving gifts from abroad."

If I send a package to Hungary, do you have to pay a tariff on that package that goes there as a benefaction?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I can not tell you exactly what the position is. Most of these countries do control what comes in, and they may not tax you, but they may tax the recipient, if they let him have it.

Senator LAUSCHE. No. 2, they say, "We ought to insist that there be a prevention of discrimination in hiring practices in corporations, organizations, and installations financed by American capital on the grounds of class, political or religious belief, or background."

That is in Hungary, the Communist country. Is preferential treatment given in the assignment of jobs to the Communists?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. What do you think of this proposal?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think, Senator, we don't have very much leverage on these people, because of the fact that they can buy elsewhere.

Senator LAUSCHE. Third: "It must be ascertained that any economic assistance will benefit the Hungarian economy. There must be adequate safeguards that the United States economic aid will not be used for Communist foreign aid or military purposes."

[The document referred to follows:]

A STATEMENT BY THE WORLD FEDERATION OF HUNGARIAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS WITH REGARD TO AMERICAN-HUNGARIAN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

Early this month representatives of the United States of America and of the present Hungarian government commenced negotiations which might lead to the so-called "normalization" of American-Hungarian relations. It is expected that, as a result of these negotiations, diplomatic relations between the two countries will be improved and that Hungary will receive a long-term loan from the United States. The outcome of these negotiations will no doubt determine the status of Hungary in the world and will influence Hungarian internal policies for several years to come. At this point the World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters finds it imperative to make itself publicly heard.

While the Federation welcomes any step that promotes cooperation between the peoples of America and Hungary, it would be disturbing to see any agreement which would serve only the one-sided interests of a dictatorial power established and sustained by foreign armed forces. We therefore wish to point out certain facts which cannot be overlooked in the negotiation of any agreement with the Hungarian Communist government.

1. *The Hungarian people are still governed by Communist dictatorial powers, based on a one-party system.* On December 10, 1964, the Supreme Court of Hungary sentenced Dr. Ferenc Matheovics, Dr. István Péter Keleti, Dr. János Klamar, Dr. Zoltán Teszlár and József Gerendás to 5–10 years imprisonment on charges of discussing the possibilities of a multi-party system (in this case the recreation of the Democratic People's Party).

2. *Hungary is still surrounded by an Iron Curtain:* barbed wire, watch towers, and mines, which were abolished early in 1956 by the Stalinist Rákosi regime and were re-established by the present administration. In 1964, 111 persons lost their lives from, or were seriously injured by exploding mines in the border zone.

3. *The law forbidding border-crossings is still in force:* those who make a desperate attempt to cross the Western border without a passport are sentenced to many years in prison. The 30 km. security zone within the borders of Hungary still exists: Hungarian citizens can travel to this area only by special permit.

4. Very reliable sources reported recently that *in the Central Penitentiary of Budapest*—only one of the many penitentiaries—*there are presently 453 persons convicted for political reasons,* most of them inmates since the 1956 revolution. Many other political prisoners have been convicted as so-called common criminals. The Federation has exact data concerning the above. There is still no word of those freedom fighters who were transported to Siberia by Soviet military authorities during the months of November and December 1956.

5. *Freedom of religion is still limited in Hungary,* in spite of the partial agreement between the Vatican and the present Hungarian government, which was designed

to be a compromise to preserve some religious life in Hungary. Father László Embödy, a Roman Catholic priest, was sentenced to five years in jail, on December 9, 1964, merely because "contrary to the law" he provided children with religious education. The government still maintains the Office of Church Affairs, which strictly controls all religious, educational and administrative activities of all churches in Hungary.

6. *Freedom of speech is non-existent:* the 7th law of 1946, and the resulting ordinances are in full force, making the slightest non-communist criticism of leading political personalities or of the program of the Communist Party punishable by long prison terms.

7. No social, religious, or political gatherings can be held unless they are convened upon instructions received from the government. Thus, *freedom of assembly does not exist.* The Hungarian Boy Scout Federation was disbanded in 1948, its re-establishment is still not permitted. Protestant and Catholic social organizations, Free Mason Lodges and private associations are still victims of the Communist regime and are still forbidden to reorganize. Even an unorthodox, but formally Communist association, such as the Petöfi Circle is not permitted today, although it was tolerated by the Rákosi regime in 1955 to 1956.

8. *All sectors of the Hungarian economy have been forcibly nationalized:* this has been accomplished in Hungary to a larger extent than in most Communist countries, and in certain respects to a larger extent at present than during the Rákosi regime. Hungary is the victim of a planned destruction of agriculture. Until 1956 the Rákosi regime forced only approximately 35 percent of the arable land into co-operative management. At present, 92 percent of the arable land is managed either under the co-operative system or as part of large nationalized farms. The nationalization and collectivization of the farm system has resulted in the fact that Hungary, once a major exporter of farm products for European and overseas markets, at present is unable to meet its own agricultural needs. By comparison, 75 percent of the Polish arable land is presently still under private management. The productivity of Hungarian industry, both quantitatively and qualitatively is well below the standard which could be achieved with the energy and talent of the Hungarian people. Hungary's economic assets are still being exploited for the benefit of the Soviet Union, however contrary to Hungarian national interests. Restrictive price, wage, pension and tariff policies affect the standard of living to such an extent that real wages relative to present day productivity are still on an extremely low level. Trade unions are merely part of the government machinery.

9. While Soviet troops have been withdrawn from most satellite countries, *Hungary is still controlled by Soviet armed forces.* The huge Soviet occupation army has recently been updated, in the sense that they have been provided with tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet forces located in Hungary are positioned in such a manner that they can occupy virtually all strategic points within 30 minutes.

The above is not meant to be an exhaustive list of facts; it is merely a list of examples relative to the circumstances existing in Hungary which in most instances, are hidden from the eyes of foreign visitors, reporters and diplomats.

It is our understanding that the bankrupt Hungarian Communist government is more than eager at this time to come to terms with the United States. Therefore, the negotiations now in progress could result in a treaty which would insure more regard for the basic human rights of the Hungarian people.

One principle should guide our negotiations with the Hungarian government; the cultural and economic aid in question should benefit the people of Hungary; it should not, in any way, assist the Communist government in consolidating its power. In our opinion, several methods could be used to accomplish this goal.

(a) The United Nations' Declaration on Human Rights should be enforced, and there should be absolutely no treaty with Hungary until all political prisoners have been released. A rock-firm stand on the part of the United States at this point, definitely would be successful.

(b) Reciprocity must be the rule in any cultural exchange agreements. The quantity of Hungarian books, newspapers, magazines and programs distributed or presented in the United States should not exceed the quantity of American publications (both in the English and the Hungarian languages), distributed or presented in Hungary. It is discouraging to observe that while copies of an official Communist publication, ("Magyar Hirek"), which is directed at Americans of Hungarian descent, are being distributed free of charge by the hundreds of thousands throughout the United States, every second week, American publications cannot reach the Hungarians behind the Iron Curtain.

(c) Economic agreements should contain clauses which relate to certain civil rights of Hungarian citizens.

c-1. Abolishment or reduction of duties now collected from Hungarians receiving gifts from abroad.

c-2. Prevention of discrimination in hiring practices in corporations, organizations and installations financed by American capital, on the grounds of class, political or religious belief or background.

c-3. It must be ascertained that any economic assistance will benefit the Hungarian economy; there must be adequate safeguards that U.S. economic aid will not be used for Communists' "foreign aid", or military purposes.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters wishes to point out that regardless of any treaty or agreement concluded between the United States and Hungary, and notwithstanding the fact that the Hungarian government might (by treaty) be forced to make certain allowances, the Federation will not consider such allowances as a compliance with the qualifications prescribed by the United Nations Charter. Nor will we consider these as compliance with the requirements put forth by the United Nations General Assembly in the investigation of the Hungarian case. While Hungary is occupied by a foreign power, and as long as the Hungarian people cannot express their choice of government and economic system in a free election based on a multi-party system, the rules and decrees of the United Nations remain un-enforced. While Janos Kadar and his government represent the Communist authority of Hungary, he and his government do not have the mandate of the Hungarian people.

The Hungarian people last expressed their free choice in October and November of 1956, by that epochal event which we remember as the Hungarian Revolution.

HUNGARIAN LIBERALISM

Ambassador THOMPSON. Again, I say that as far as building up their economy is concerned, they can get all they can afford to buy elsewhere. So I don't think we have much leverage on them.

Hungary, incidentally, is probably the most liberal of any of the Communist countries in letting people in and out. There are all kinds of Hungarians coming out and going back. And people can go in there quite easily. I was in Austria last summer, and a lot of these Austrian former aristocrats have no qualms about going in and out, visiting relatives there.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will get to another subject, and then I will close.

BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

You mentioned several reasons for the split between Russia and China. How important is the border dispute?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think it is very important as a long-range problem. I think that the Chinese are too weak to really push this very far now.

In Sinkiang they had some Chinese that complained that the Russians had encouraged a lot of people to come out, and they did come out—they wander back and forth across this frontier, and quite a sizable number of them come out.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one question and I quit.

What about the color question, between the oriental and the white Russian? Does that play any part in it?

Ambassador THOMPSON. It is playing a part. You know the Afro-Asians are having a meeting. The date is not quite firm, but it is supposed to take place this spring. The Russians are very anxious to attend, but so far they haven't got an agreement from the others letting them come. Russia says they are an Asiatic power, and the Chinese say they are not.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is a significant phase?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I apologize to the committee. I came in without knowing that we were following the system of rotation. I took my turn. I haven't had it, I took it, and I apologize and pass.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.

Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Bourke.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

MUTUAL HATRED

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, I just have two subjects I would like to present to you in trying to figure this thing out.

We have adopted a policy of hating Communists over here. I don't know why exactly. Primarily, I think because they don't believe in God. Certainly that was a good way to approach it—when I was in the Pentagon, and you wanted a bigger military budget.

They have adopted a policy of hating us, because they say we oppress people—just in generalities, we oppress people. Maybe it is because some of the people who hate them because they don't believe in God are the ones that oppress the people over here most, I don't know.

But in any case, you have got this hate business on both sides, and you have a bigger inroad in the Russians, I think it is fair to say—that our relationship with Russia is more friendly than it was 20 years ago.

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And then you have the fact that 700 million Chinese get up every morning and hate us, are told to hate us.

And hate brings wars. And we can no longer have this complete military victory that we thought of before.

With that problem, or with this premise, I am absolutely astounded. I am digging up facts and figures on the amount of trade that is being done by countries that we defend militarily and have given great aid to. For example, the amount of trade that Australia does with Red China is almost unbelievable.

Is it your thought that if we increase our trade we have a chance of reducing that hate and creating better understanding?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Let me say, first of all, that, again, as far as the Russian people are concerned, I don't think there are any people they feel more friendly to than the United States. Our tourists go over there, and they encounter that. Part of that is interest on their part. We are held up as the goal they are trying to overtake.

One of the greatest things I think we have done is these traveling exhibits we send around the country with young Russian-speaking college graduates as guides. The Russian people at these exhibits come up to them and start asking questions. We don't indoctrinate these youngsters. We just let them answer the questions honestly, the way they feel. And this carries great conviction. Almost invariably, except for the professional party types, there is really a great feeling of friendship, based, I think, partly on their realiza-

tion that friendship with us means peace and, as I said a while ago, it means a better standard of living, in their minds.

TRADE MAKES A DIFFERENCE

And I think that the fact that it can be said that we are not trading with them, the Communist party can exploit to some extent to dampen down this feeling of friendship. As I said, also, I don't think the trade itself would amount to very much, but I think it would have a great political significance, both with the government and also with the people, if they knew it was going on.

Now, China is another problem. I am not an expert in this field. But, there again, I think the fact that the Russians have cut off their trade with them—you know the Chinese have announced that they have discharged their debt to Russia, which was a very big one, by the imbalance in their trade.

The Australian trade was mostly, of course, in grain. They sent enormous amounts of grain.

Senator SYMINGTON. So did the Canadians.

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes, but I don't know what the effect would be on China. I would think it would be probably not very great, given their present mood and mentality. I think that in the Soviet and Eastern European countries it would increase the feeling of friendship.

Senator SYMINGTON. A little aside on that. Do you think that if we followed the British and the Canadians and the French and the West Germans and tried to increase our trade with Red China, that that would annoy the Russians?

Ambassador THOMPSON. They would be concerned, I think, if they thought it reflected a political move that way. Otherwise, I don't think it would have much effect.

EMPHASIS ON COLOR

Senator SYMINGTON. One more major point. The best book I have read on China is the book by the Pole, Horvath. In it he points out as far back as 1928 Mao Tse Tung was promoting the color situation.

You mentioned Castro, who is a colored man in the sense of being a Cuban, being closer to China. Nasser, of course, in a sense is colored. Chou En Lai [4] is working Africa overtime.

Is there any chance, in your opinion, that the obvious emphasis on color being pursued by the Chinese might bring us closer to Russia in a defense against that situation?

This is a very broad question, a philosophical question.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is a good question, Stuart.

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think so.

I think this is—the Chinese are using this to some extent in Africa against the Russians. There are several parts of the world where in a sense we and the Russians already have a community of interest, for one reason or another. For example, I think that both we and the Russians wanted to prevent the Algerians and the Mo-

[4] Premier of the Peopie's Republic of China.

roccans from getting into a real war against each other. At one point they were pretty close to all-out hostilities.

I think if this Communist movement goes on and really splits, the Chinese are trying to have their influence on the parties that will support them, not just confined to Asia. As a miminum they will, I think, if the split takes place, control all of the Asian parties, and this will also add to this business of it being Asia against the rest.

Of course, in Africa in some places there is some feeling on the color basis—it is not just black or white, but black or brown or yellow, because they have had the Indians in there and the Chinese. There is some worry on the part of some of these leaders about that.

But I would suspect, looking ahead, this color question is going to be increasingly important and whipped up by the Chinese.

Senator MORSE. Senator Symington——.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

JAPANESE TRADE WITH CHINA

Senator MORSE. Speaking about your comment on trade with China, didn't you think if all the diplomatic language is brushed aside, the fact remains that the Prime Minister of Japan made perfectly clear that they were going to continue to trade with China?

Now, of course, they have been trading on the black market with China for years, huge amounts. I had 3 years ago a delegation of Japanese businessmen in my office for a couple of hours, very much perturbed because, they said, in effect, they were being forced to trade on the black market with China, but they were trading. I think this has some bearing, even on the color question that you raise.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator, I could not agree with you more.

Just one more observation. We prevent all these countries from doing this trading, and then we contribute heavily to their defenses through our own military budget. The year before last, and again last year, I made speeches warning about the balance of payments development. You were good enough to be interested, but most people were not.

Senator GORE. I was. I thought they were great speeches.

Senator SPARKMAN. I did, too, and told you so at the time.

U.S. FAILURE TO TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Senator SYMINGTON. I notice a headline here, "U.S. Dollar Drain, a Large Turn." So my question to the Ambassador is, How long can we prevent Japan, where we put up a tremendous amount of money annually to prevent them, or in lieu of their trading with China—and how long can we let all these other countries that we support, at least indirectly if not directly, get the volume which gives them the price which makes them so competitive against our manufacturing in our own country, while it at the same time, because of ideological reasons, putting our nose up against trading?

I asked both Dillon and Hodges,[5] "Do you know of any highly developed industrial nation in the world except the United States which is not doing its best to promote its trade with countries behind the Iron Curtain?" Both of them, categorically, said no.

And when you see what the price of these goods, the value that they express in their lower standard of living, is doing to our own industry over here—which I really do know something about, based on some practical problems we now have in my State—my question is, Wouldn't trade not only serve to ease off the hate in the world, perhaps, but also very possibly improve our fiscal and monetary position over the long pull?

OPPOSITION TO TRADE WITH CHINA

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think, Senator, that we still probably should make a distinction between trade with the Communist Chinese and the rest of the world. Certainly one of the things that we tell our friends and allies is that we think that any gesture toward Communist China, given their declared policy, seems to us wrong at this time, that this encourages them to think they are on the right line and they will just continue this, and this is no obstacle toward getting on with the rest of the world because of the very aggressive nature of their declared policies, and from their objections. But certainly if you look at Europe, including the Soviet Union, our policy has been an irritant in our relations with our allies, where we try to pressure them, and it hasn't stopped them.

I think the trade itself is less, it seems to me, of a problem, than this business of credits. I can see why they might feel regardless of anything they should trade, but to give them long-term credits would be quite wrong, and this is almost more so in terms of the Chinese.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Ambassador, I think the very cogent argument that you made earlier with regard to trade between the United States and Russia, namely, that it is up to us, that they are going to get the same goods elsewhere, is equally true with China. China is going to get whatever noncombatant goods we would sell here anyway from Japan, from Australia, from Canada. We can't even hold our Latin American countries in line on this matter.

I happen to know a surprising amount of trade between Latin America and Red China is going on. This works both ways.

Senator SYMINGTON. I couldn't agree with you more.

Senator MORSE. It works with regard to Russia and with regard to China.

CHINESE GOOD WILL TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

Maybe it is wishful thinking—but I think there is a considerable amount of evidence in support of it—I want to continue to believe that you can get beneath the Chinese Communist leaders into a great reservoir of good will toward the United States among the Chinese people. I am far from convinced they are anything but the victims of the circumstance under which this dictatorship makes them live, and that there isn't a reservoir of bad will toward the

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[5] Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon and Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges.

United States in those people. You get rid of their hunger, and you give them some economic hope, and you may through your wheat and through your food be importing into China the greatest weapon for the overthrow of a Communist regime we have.

I think it is much better, may I say, than violating her border, or talking about violating her border, or following a course of action that is going to cause her, as surely as we sit here, I think, to get involved with us militarily over there.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

I want to ask one.

CONNECTION BETWEEN INTERNAL REGIMES AND FOREIGN POLICY

On this matter—I, unfortunately, was called out, which I dislike very much, but I had to go out a moment—about our relations with these countries, I was asking, just as I left, about the matter of trade. I believe it is fair to say you thought that even though the amount of physical goods or dollars worth wasn't too much, it had great political value and implication; is that correct?

Ambassador THOMPSON. That is correct. And I said while you were out, both with the government and the people.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to generalize—I am just trying to clarify this, and I would like you comment on it—that how they run their business within their borders, whether it be a satellite or Russia, is of secondary importance to what foreign policy they pursue?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that is correct, but I think there is some connection between there internal regimes and their foreign policy. For example, what you might call the more liberal trend inside, if that prevails, I think will have a favorable effect on foreign affairs, and trade does somewhat contribute to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think there is an interaction, but what should concern us primarily is how they proceed and how they act. I was thinking—the other day we had the Foreign Minister of Denmark. They call themselves a socialist country, don't they?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it the same in Norway and Sweden? Don't they call themselves socialist countries?

Ambassador THOMPSON. Yes.

MIXED UP IN TERMINOLOGY

The CHAIRMAN. We get mixed up in this terminology they use.

In Yugoslavia, most of the people you talk to call themselves a socialist country. They don't go about saying, "We are all Communists." They say they they are socialist. When they make a public speech, they don't deny they are a Communist country, but there is this sort of interplay between socialism and communism.

Then you go all the way over to the Danes, and they say they are socialist. I can't see that in Denmark the word "socialist" means much more than that the government is interested in the welfare of the people. There is no government ownership of the means of production any more than there is here, I am informed. The farms are all privately owned; the businesses are privately owned. They

have an extensive social security system, you might say, which we are moving towards.

Senator GORE. Medicare.

The CHAIRMAN. Medicare, and that sort of thing, which we are apparently doing. We have already done it to a great extent.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you will yield, you remember in your office that day when Hickenlooper and the West German fellow came over to talk to the National Press Club, they said they were doing everything they could to get all the business possible behind the Curtain. We asked about the credit, they said it was absolutely tops. We said, "What is the most prosperous country." He said, "Rumania."

We asked about Yugoslavia. He said, "We don't consider that a Communist country any more at all." And he said, incidentally, their credit is not very good.

ONE MONOLITHIC BLOC

The CHAIRMAN. What I was trying to clarify—it seems, to me at least, some of us—I have been guilty of it, too—we each one attribute to certain words or concepts our own interpretation, and everybody else has his own, which is often different. Is that true or not?

Ambassador THOMPSON. It certainly is true. I think you were also out of the room when I said none of these countries have a Communist regime as communism was laid out by Marx and Lenin.

Incidentally, when the Soviets planned their 20-year plan to come into what they called the era of communism, they had a pretty hard time, because they looked around to see what they would start giving out free first, and one of the first things they thought of was bread. Bread is already subsidized, and they have a terrible problem because not only farmers, but people living in the suburbs buy this cheap bread and feed it to pigs, and sell the pigs on the market. If they gave it free, this would be almost unmanageable.

But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that one of our main concerns about the Communist movement was this fact that under Stalin, any country that came into the Communist camp was really—then just enlarged that country. It was one monolithic bloc completely controlled by this one regime.

As these countries now begin to have national communism, or socialism, as it really should be, more or less along the lines of the Yugoslav model, this factor becomes of decreasing importance. I don't think we should exaggerate this at the present time. They are still very closely aligned to the bloc. They are in the Warsaw Pact. But these bonds are loosening.

It certainly is not entirely due to Khrushchev's going, and it is not entirely due to the quarrel with China. I think this was coming anyway. This thing was just getting impossible for them to manage. As their own economy and society has grown in complexity, centralized as it is, they had their hands full without being able to make judgments about how to run these countries that at that time they dominated. And I think it is really impossible for them any more to do it.

In addition to this, they don't have the internal assets that they can manipulate to do it. They don't control the secret police in these countries any more, as far as we know.

NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COMMUNIST NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is rather important, not on any immediate policy, but for understanding, that we try to get some common language that we use, that is, all of us on this committee and in this country, when we talk about these people. It strikes me that it would have been just as appropriate to describe the Stalinist era as the old-fashioned imperialism. Here was a strong country, and they sought to add to it, like the old Austro-Hungarian nation, whenever it could. It absorbed Bosnia or Slovenia into it, and it was a satellite, and they gradually broke up when it became weak. It is just as valid as this other kind of thing.

I was just handed an article from the New York Times this morning. This is a quote from an article of Max Frankel: "Imagine," said a Yugoslav diplomat, "How foolish I would appear to you if day after day I kept talking about the capitalist nations to describe the United States, Sweden, Spain, and South Africa, the way you still speak of the Communist nations to describe the Soviet Union, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, not to mention China. You deceive yourselves and prevent understanding."

I think there is a good deal to that. If we don't get our terminology right and be able to distinguish between these degrees, we just prevent our own understanding of what we are dealing with; is that correct?

Ambassador THOMPSON. I think that is right. Particularly with Yugoslavia, when we make statements about Communist countries—when they read that they say, "They are talking about us." But sometimes we are not talking about them when we say that.

NO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN IDEAL SENSE

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any Communist country in the world now?

Ambassador THOMPSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But we use this term all the time. What he means is, I think the ideal, that is, the objective of Marx and Engels has never been achieved. And I think you also stated either you think it is quite impractical, and it is not going to be achieved; that is, they are not going to be able to accomplish the objective of Marx and Engels.

Senator LAUSCHE. Of course not.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an unworkable thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. It was intended to create a state where you needed no government at all.

Senator GORE. Called the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the first stage, though.

Senator LAUSCHE. It would be an ideal state, where no government was needed to maintain order. All would be in harmony.

But they found out that instead of not having the need of a government, they formed a more powerful and dictatorial government. That is what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is just about like the old Czarist regime in new clothes.

Senator MORSE. It is perfectly obvious what they wanted to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I go out and say there is no Communist government in the world today, in this country——

DEVELOP MORE APPROPRIATE POLICIES

The CHAIRMAN. The reason we cannot is this confusion over terminology that we are talking about. We have repeated over and over the use of these words which are not an accurate description of what we are talking about. I think that it is high time a means be found to try to relate the language and words we use to the actual conditions and to discriminate between one situation and another. And then, maybe as a result of understanding what we are talking about, we can develop policies that are appropriate to each different situation.

I think this is a major problem. Of course, it always is. This question of communications is a major difficulty. I think you are a man that might contribute to this.

Senator SYMINGTON. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. I think the Ambassador has made a fine contribution here this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. He always does.

A DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Senator GORE. It seems to me that what we have in Russia is an adulteration of even the first phase. Instead of a dictatorship of the proletariat, you have a dictatorship of the Communist Party, which comprises less than one tenth of one percent of the proletariat. So far as it being measurable by Marx' and Lenin's teachings, it has no earmarks of it, but we say it is a Communist country.

I think I am going to quit saying so. I am going to say it is a country controlled by a dictatorship of a small Communist group or small Communist Party, which itself is not Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. It is kind of awkward to do.

DICTATORSHIP IN SPAIN

Take Spain—wouldn't you say in Spain it is far from a democracy? It is a form of dictatorship, and we begin to think it is softening and mellowing—I hesitate, most of us do; we don't like to talk in such derogatory terms any more. There was a time we did. But because it is more consistent with orthodox traditional concepts, we are beginning to sort of ease up on that situation, hoping that it is going to change when Franco [6] goes and become a much more liberal regime.

Senator MORSE. To close this seminar, I want to say that although you, I, and some others were very discouraged at the beginning this morning because we had much a small attendance here, nevertheless it was very much worthwhile. I think the briefing we got here this morning is going to show its influence in this commit-

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[6] Generalissimo Francisco Franco, President of Spain.

tee for quite some time to come. And I don't think that the few should be denied future briefings just because we find it difficult to get him here.

I think this was very much worthwhile. I want to thank the Ambassador.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask one further question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF TRADE

Senator LAUSCHE. For information—when you say the conduct of trade will have a political impact, what do you mean by the political impact?

Ambassador THOMPSON. There are two things. One, the leaders have always said, "We are going to consider your attitude toward trade as a measure of what your intentions are toward us, whether or not you are still trying to ostracize us," and so on. The second thing is the political effect inside, for example, the Soviet Union, where the people now know and the government keeps telling them we discriminate against them. This has an effect on their attitude towards us.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair:]

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order please. We ought to move right along, please. The Secretary must leave here at 12 o'clock, so if we will keep that in mind we will do it.

Now, as I understand it, the Secretary has no general statement to make, but simply submits to questions——

Secretary RUSK. I have a brief statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have a brief statement?

Secretary RUSK. Not a formal one, but an informal statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman and gentleman, I would like to comment briefly on two matters before we turn to questions.

First, I regret I am not able to go exhaustively into the question of the peace role of the United Nations in Southeast Asia. We are still working on that. Part of the problem is that Mr. Harlan Cleveland, my distinguished colleague in charge of U.N. affairs has been quite ill the last few days, and I want to consult with him if possible. We are giving it a thorough review, not simply in terms of recapitulating the matters that have been on our mind in the past but to look at those again in depth as a part of my commitment to this committee to reexamine the whole question.

DISARRAY OVER ARTICLE 19

I would, however, wish to alert the committee today, because the matter will be moving very fast next week in New York, to one highly relevant aspect of the role of the United Nations on such a question as Vietnam, and that is the article 19 problem. We can

anticipate if the matter goes to the Security Council that any constructive action that might be proposed would be vetoed by the Soviet Union, and therefore the role of the Assembly becomes of critical importance.

Today one would have to report that the Assembly is in a state of serious disarray over article 19. The immediate situation is that the Soviet Union has said that it refuses to make a voluntary contribution until after the General Assembly has passed a resolution setting aside article 19. We have felt, and many others, at least 50 of the members that we are in close touch with have felt, that it is not possible through a resolution of the General Assembly to set aside an article of the charter; that, if the Soviet Union would indicate that its voluntary contribution would be sufficient to eliminate the problem of article 19, ways and means could be found to let that occur without raising unnecessary questions of prestige.

The Soviets tell us that, in effect, they are not likely to be able to make a sufficient contribution because that would be looked upon by the world press as a major defeat for the Soviet Union. So, it looks as though we are coming up to another deadlock Monday when the General Assembly reconvenes.

There is a general feeling that a confrontation is not good for the U.N. We ourselves have not wanted one, although we have not shrunk from it, and so I am certain that there would be a good deal of opinion, if the matter is not resolved, that more time should be found to try to dispose of it through negotiation. There are those who are talking about simply adjourning the Assembly until the 20th Assembly should meet in September to give more time to settle the problem through negotiation.

The objections to that are, first, that there are many delegations who have particular issues that they want to bring to the General Assembly. The Afro-Asians have a number of items on the agenda, for example, they feel very strongly about.

DIFFICULTY IN RECONVENING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

There is in the background the danger that such a long postponement would be a substantial step in the direction of eliminating the General Assembly. In other words, that raises the prospect that the General Assembly could never reconvene and from that point of view this might be in the minds of the Soviet Union, who would perhaps like to get along without the General Assembly in the long run.

It would also mean it would be extremely difficult to have a special session of the General Assembly. If we, as we talked about in this committee once before, asked for special consideration of a particular subject such as Southeast Asia during which the issue of article 19 would be suspended, then there would be almost certainly a considerable effort made to add additional subjects to be considered by the Assembly, perhaps half of the present agenda of roughly 100 items, on the same basis.

So, this is a very serious problem, and if members of the committee would have any thoughts on how we dispose of or how we move on the article 19 problem in the absence of a settlement behind the

scenes, we will be glad. I certainly would appreciate those comments.

There is one possibility that we do not think too much of at the moment, and that is that the Assembly might proceed with its business recording its votes in the alternative pending a final decision on article 19 at the end of the session. In other words, count the votes both ways, with and without article 19, in the committees; then let the Plenary Session of the Assembly at the end of the session decide how officially to record those votes, depending upon the article 19 problem.

A DIVIDED ASSEMBLY

We would not like to disclose this figure publicly, and I am proceeding today on the basis of executive session. If the matter came to a straight confrontation on a sharp division of the Assembly on article 19, it is our present estimate that there would be 58 votes to apply article 19, 28 votes to oppose the application of article 19, and 28 abstentions. In other words, half the Assembly would probably vote against or abstain. That would give us the two-thirds vote, if a two-thirds vote should become necessary.

In other words, the position on article 19 in the Assembly is not nearly so unanimous as it was with respect to the troika proposals. I think that voting would improve in favor of article 19 when the debate occurs because it would be impressed upon the members that the General Assembly would be surrendering its only mandatory authority under the charter, and that the effect of not applying article 19 would be to make all contributions to the United Nations voluntary rather than mandatory, since they cannot be mandatory for some and voluntary for others.

But this is a serious problem which is yet unresolved. The Secretary General and the President of the Assembly are both working on it very hard, our delegation in New York is very active on the subject, but the committe should know that we do not yet see any clear indication from the Soviet Union that they will make a voluntary contribution of sufficient size to remove the article 19 problem from the agenda.

TIME AS A CURE

Senator CHURCH. Do you think time, Mr. Secretary, would cure that if the matter were postponed to the end of the General Assembly?

Secretary RUSK. We just don't know, Senator Church.

There is a limit beyond which the Soviets will talk to us on this subject, or we would wish to talk to them. We don't want to ask them for x amount of money on a bilateral basis and put ourselves in the position of dunning them in a way that would cause them to insist upon counterconcessions on one subject or another, or insist upon, say, a matching amount of money from us, for example, which they would be very likely to do—or an amount, a contribution from us which would be in the same proportion to their contribution as are the dues that we respectively pay to the U.N. We have taken the view that we have paid our bills, and that we cannot go down that trail.

Senator CHURCH. If I may, Mr. Chairman——
Secretary RUSK. Yes, please.

WOULD SOVIETS WALK OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY?

Senator CHURCH. I am heading up this particular subcommittee and I have followed this matter and am very much interested in it. I should hate to see the kingdom fall for want of a nail, and it seems to me that a direct confrontation no matter how it comes out might involve a serious loss for all sides. I am personally doubtful that we will have the votes after the Congo incident, perhaps we do, but if your estimate is right and we can prevail on a vote, what do you think the Soviet Union will then do, walk out of the Assembly, and if so, how could she come back or would she come back?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is entirely likely that they would at least walk out of the General Assembly. We think it is somewhat unlikely that they would leave the U.N. organically and officially. We think they would retain their seat on the Security Council.

OTHER DELINQUENT NATIONS

But the voting position has changed somewhat since January 1 because France now is among the delinquents. Although we do not believe that France would not stand out alone if the matter were settled with the Soviet Union, we do feel a softness among French-speaking African countries about applying article 19 while France is delinquent.

It is interesting that Belgium is prepared, although delinquent, to vote in favor of applying article 19, and they expect to pay the amount that would get them out of that role. It is rather interesting that Bulgaria in the last few days has paid the amount necessary to get them away from article 19. Whether this is a sign as to the attitude in Moscow or not, we don't know, but we doubt it, because the Soviet attitude as expressed privately seems to be more negative than that.

Now, from a parliamentary point of view, perhaps the most dangerous thing in terms of the voting position of the Assembly that could occur will be for the Soviet Union to make a substantial contribution but one that is not enough, say, a contribution of $15 million. That would cause, I feel certain, some of the smaller countries to say, "Well, in that case they have made an effort and, therefore, just let's forget about article 19." If the Soviets were——

Senator DODD. What would mean enough?

Secretary RUSK. It takes about $17 million on the peacekeeping accounts and perhaps another $10 million on the regular accounts to bring the Soviet Union within article 19, so $15 million would not be enough to get them over the 2-year line.

ADJUDICATING THE ISSUE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think we owe the Secretary a great deal for bringing this matter to us this morning. I don't think there is any matter on which we could spend our time better than to discuss this with the Secretary of State this morning. I think it is a great, great crisis involving the future of our foreign policy, which continues to be done.

I want to listen to him talk. I want to be very brief. But I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that I think much is at stake here. I think support for the United Nations is at stake, not only in our own country but around the world. I see nothing to be gained by the passage of more time in adjudication of this issue. This has been before the world, not only before the United Nations. The whole world has been talking about this for some time.

If the votes show that it becomes necessary that a majority of the members of the United Nations in effect want to amend rule 19, we had better find that out. Then we will have to decide, if that is the decision, how far we want to go in supporting any modification of article 19. But the simple case, I think, as international law is concerned, is that Russia and the others signed the charter, it included the article, the assessments were made, they protested the assessments, and the charter provides for World Court advisory opinion on that.

We talk about it being an advisory opinion, but that nevertheless is the legal procedure set forth in this charter for a judicial pronouncement as to the international law rights of the signatories thereto. When we say it is an advisory opinion, we simply mean that the charter doesn't provide for a litigious procedure by way of contest between two member countries, but it did say the meaning of this charter, the law of this charter, including article 19, will be determined as far as adjudication is concerned by the following procedure. We went through that, and the court said these are binding which, in my judgment, puts the law on our side.

RUSSIA IS TESTING THE WEST

It seems to me that Russia is using this to test whether or not we are going to stand by, the free nations are going to stand by and let her, in effect, undercut the underpinnings of this structure. If she wants to do that and gets support from it, it seems to me we ought to find that out now immediately, because so much else hinges on this. If she can get us to retreat on this, if she can get the free nations, to retreat on this, the retreat is on. Nothing will succeed more than this first retreat, and I don't think the charter is going to be worth much if you can scuttle it by, whether it is Russia or Great Britain or the United States or any other combinations in the future. If we are really going to preserve what our predecessors fought for at San Francisco, now is the time.

I think the world is entitled to know where the United States stands on this matter. I certainly don't think we ought to be putting our tail between our legs and running, because it may be that it might bring an end to the General Assembly.

But I close by saying if we follow—my present thought is, my present belief is, I will put it that way—if we follow the procedure that is entailed in one of the alternatives that you have outlined here this morning, which in my judgment is a form of a surrender to the Russians, I think the United Nations will lose most of its prestige at the grassroots of America, and I think we will lose most of our prestige in the grassroots of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

To me, it is a very simple issue. We are either going to stand by the signature that each nation put on that charter and carry out article 19, or let's face up to the fact you are going to have to have a whole reorganization of the so-called system of international justice through law by way of a world organization.

I don't think you can retreat on it. And I don't think you should retreat on it. We ought to fight this one out procedurally, right there before the world, with the world looking down on that General Assembly.

CONFRONTATION IF SOVIETS DO NOT PAY

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if Senator Lausche would excuse me for just a moment, I want to thank Senator Morse and just add, Senator, to the points you made about the advisory opinion of the court, that the General Assembly approved that opinion with a very large overwhelming vote. We take the view that this was not merely a recommendation of the General Assembly because this was on a subject on which the General Assembly has mandatory authority, therefore, that the General Assembly resolution on this subject was mandatory.

I agree with you on the legal analysis of it. There is no difference at all between us, and our present position in New York is that if the Soviets don't pay there must be the confrontation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask, because of the limitation of time I want to be sure that we make it possible to cover the whole field, was there anything else you were going to talk about?

Senator RUSK. Yes, I was going to speak about the situation——

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder, Senator Lausche, if it would not be well to let us go on and get this and then we will come back to you.

THE SITUATION IN LAOS

Secretary RUSK. I was going to comment briefly on the situation in Laos and the air mission which was reported in the press and decided upon and actually reported in the press since my last meeting with the committee.

As the committee has known, since May of last year, the United States aircraft have undertaken occasional missions in Laos. I think in June of last year we lost two planes which were reported in the press at that time. This commitment of occasional flights in Laos followed immediately upon the Pathet Lao offensive in the Plaines des Jarres. The Government of Laos asked us to undertake certain reconnaissance missions. We also at that time furnished the Government of Laos a considerable number of T-28 aircraft, which are being operated by the Government of Laos by pilots other than American pilots.

And throughout this period those T-28's have been conducting strikes of perhaps from 10 to 30 on any particular day. I mean this has been a regular air operation by the government forces against the Pathest Lao and the North Vietnamese elements that have been coming in in considerable numbers during and throughout 1964. We carry at the present time at least 10,000 North Vietnamese military in Laos, some of them organized into battalions, others being cadre for joint Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces.

In the interstices of these T-28 operations we have conducted armed reconnaissance. Those planes have on occasion returned fire in particular areas, and I suppose over the period of the last 8 months there have been from 6 to 10 strikes by our aircraft in Laos on particular targets that were of key importance to the Government of Laos or that were directly and intimately related to the substantial infiltration of the South Vietnamese.

There have been no losses that have not been reported publicly. That has been the basis on which we have been operating there since May of last year.

NO AIR STRIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM

There was a story out of Saigon today that talked about American and South Vietnamese aircraft hitting North Vietnam. These reports are not correct. Why they said this in Saigon, I don't know unless it was for some sort of home consumption. We have had not United States aircraft striking into North Vietnam. We have had no warships, as charged by Hanoi, no United States warships striking along the coast.

I have already informed the committee some time ago that there are active junk operations up and down that coast, north and south of the parallel, which have been going on for quite a long time in relation to the effort made by the North Vietnamese to infiltrate South Vietnam by sea, and those operations are South Vietnamese in character. We have not, ourselves, nor have the South Vietnamese delivered their strikes into North Vietnam, and South Vietnamese are conducting the operations at sea.

VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS

Now, the basis for such support for the Laotian Government, at its request, has been the massive violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords by the North Vietnamese. Those violations have ranged right across the board: First, the continued presence in Laos and the reinforcement in Laos of North Vietnamese military personnel by the thousands. I have already told the committee that our eye estimate is that those forces never went down below 6,000, even though we withdrew all American military personnel from Laos in 1962 accords.

Second, the continued use of the Laotian corridor for infiltration of South Vietnam since 1963. That has been increasing during calendar year 1964 and increasing very substantially.

Third, a refusal by the Pathet Lao to permit the International Control Commission to have access to those territories of Laos that are under Pathet Lao control. Again, a direct violation of the accords of 1962.

The Pathet Lao have not recognized the authority of Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of the country, although he left the Geneva conference of 1962 as Prime Minister, as head of the government, and with authority as Prime Minister throughout the country.

Those are major elements of violations which have preceded the additional help which we gave to the Government of Laos.

When the North Vietnamese furnish either men or materiel to anyone in Laos, except through the government, that, too, is a violation of the accords.

Now, on top of that we have insisted publicly and privately, I suppose, in at least a dozen conversations which I have had with Russians, Poles, that our object in Laos is complete compliance with those accords by everybody, but we have not taken the view that there is any principle of international law or policy which permits one party to an agreement to destroy it, to violate it on a massive scale, and at the same time to hold the other parties to the agreement to meticulous compliance with the same provisions. There is nothing that we would prefer more than to get to the complete compliance of those accords by all parties.

EFFORTS TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS

Now, one of the reasons why those operations are not made public on a day-by-day basis is that Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister, has been trying with great diligence in the past several weeks and months to bring the Pathet Lao to the negotiating table as the first step in getting back to a 14-nation conference on Laos. He now has outstanding an invitation to Prince Souphanouvong to join him in Luang Prabang so that the three factions, so-called, can discuss the situation and try to find some basis on which there can be a return to the 1962 accords.

In connection with those talks, Prince Souvanna Phouma has urged that there be as a little official confirmation as possible on particular air activity. Hanoi has been making a lot of claims about such activity, most of which are not so, most of which are not true. Prince Souvanna Phouma has urged us to take certain action from time to time but not to say anything official about it even though he recognizes that the actions themselves would become known, because he feels that that would get in the way of his effort to bring Prince Souphanouvong to the conference table.

This is a situation which, as I say, has been in course since May of last year. I think those earlier incidents were reported to the committee.

INCORRECT REPORTS

This latest incident had to do with a key bridge over which the North Vietnamese have been sending in hundreds of trucks at the end of the rainy season. It is, it was, a long bridge. It would greatly impair the supply facilities of the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces in Laos. Prince Souvanna Phouma had expressed the urgent desire some time ago that that bridge be taken out. Since his own T-28's could not do it, were not equipped with sufficiently heavy weapons, we decided we ought to do that.

The bridge was knocked out and, although there was very heavy anti-aircraft protection around the bridge because of its critical importance, the loss was two planes, both of whose pilots were retrieved. This is not from our point of view the kind of escalation into North Vietnam we have discussed here in the committee. It is a part of a general attitude and a general policy which we have been following since last May. I just wanted to comment on that

incident of yesterday and also to tell the committee that that news story out of Saigon is simply not correct, about South Vietnamese and United States planes hitting North Vietnam.

I would hope that if Senators feel that they wished to comment on this latest incident in any way, that they might be willing to refer to press accounts rather than to my testimony here, because it is of some importance to Prince Souvanna Phouma that we not ourselves publicly confirm any particular operation. Quite frankly, the New York Times account this morning, I can tell you, was reasonably accurate as far as the actual facts are concerned, and perhaps Senators would refer to that rather than to my testimony if they wish to discuss it publicly. I think that is the only comment I wish to make at this point, Mr. Chairman, in order to let the discussion and questions proceed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine.

Senator Lausche had started to ask——

Let me suggest to you, some of you have come in since we started, the Secretary has to leave at 12 o'clock. I wonder if we will hold ourselves, then, to 10 minutes.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will be 10 minutes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Ten minutes to each one.

MAINTAINING U.S. HONOR AND RESPECT

Senator LAUSCHE. With respect to article 19, each of the member nations of the United Nations has either by signature or by implication, in becoming members of the United Nations, subscribed to the power of article 19.

Secretary RUSK. By formal ratification, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Sure.

Senator LAUSCHE. We cannot, in the maintenance of our honor and the expectation that the world will respect our word, either ourselves depart from the provisions of the United Nations or give succor to others to depart from it. If we yield on this point, we will give encouragement for other unilateral efforts to nullify the provisions of the charter.

We should also remember that when we agreed to buy the bonds of the United Nations several years ago on the floor of the Senate it was insisted that we procure, in compliance with the provisions of the charter, an opinion of the World Court. That opinion was procured and held that obligations to finance Gaza and the Congo were part of the obligations that each member had to pay as a part of the United Nations operations.

In my judgment, it would be a serious mistake for us to yield on this point. We would be giving encouragement to Russia in other instances to threaten noncooperation unless we comply with their wishes.

I subscribe fully to what Senator Morse said on this subject. Our people will wonder what our word means if we now declare that Russia can forget article 19, we will not insist upon its enforcement. If you forget article 19, you might as well forget the whole—the sanctity of this charter of the United Nations.

LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY

Now, on another point: I have before me the protocol of 1962. It is in the book identified as "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam." The protocol itself begins on page 94. A reading of the obligations undertaken by the signatory nations clearly discloses that all we anticipated when we neutralized Laos has been swept under the table. The provisions have been violated, as the Secretary of State has just described, and I concur with what has been done with respect to the Laotian situation.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I include just one very brief remark on the article 19 point?

I am sure that Senator Morse and Senator Lausche were under no misapprehension on this. I was not in any sense describing any change in the U.S. decision, I was describing a parliamentary problem in the General Assembly. We take the same view with respect to article 19 and we are maintaining that view to the best of our ability in New York at the present time.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I understood that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. But you went on and pointed out what other alternatives there are that might be proposed.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. It was as to those alternatives that I was speaking.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. I had my turn yesterday. I think I will pass up.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Church.

CONGRESSIONAL POSITION ON THE U.N.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the U.N., of course, the congressional position was clear when we passed the resolution in the last session of Congress. I do think it ought to be pointed out, though, from a de facto standpoint it seems evident to me that Russia has won her point in that, so far as new peacekeeping missions are concerned, it is hard for me to conceive that another effort will be made to impose a payment upon major powers if they decline to participate.

Moreover, it seems to me that on a substantive basis, our two positions are not so far apart, since this is what we are striving to do as well as the Russians. There is a little difference in our position, since we don't want to see the General Assembly excluded entirely, but nevertheless the thrust of our new proposals is in the direction of the Russian position; namely, that the Security Council should decide upon the financing of these peacekeeping missions, and we want that because we are there and we have a veto power there. So, in substance, if we are going to look at substance, our positions at the United Nations are not so far apart as they might first appear to be.

I agree that there is great mischief that can come from a failure on the part of the General Assembly to support article 19. I think it would have a very deleterious effect upon the United Nations.

I would hope that we would have the votes. If we go to confrontation and lack the votes, the political impact in the Congress would be very severe, and I think it quite unlikely that the Congress in that event will come forward with appropriations that even compare with the appropriations we have consistently given to the United Nations in the past. I know you have that in mind as you approach this.

My only suggestion would be, since you have invited them, Mr. Secretary, is that in this debate that is coming up next week, I would hope that our Ambassador, Mr. Stevenson, would strongly stress in his presentation that an adverse vote on article 19 means that from here on out all contributions become voluntary, and that the United States will so regard it and that the Congress will so regard it and that the member states of the United Nations should expect that to be our reaction. I think this has to be very clear to the members before they vote, because otherwise they may vote under some misapprehensions that the United States will continue to give the same measure of support to the U.N. in the future as it has in the past, and I wouldn't want them to vote under that misapprehension.

ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I just comment very briefly on your very important statement?

It has not been our own view that the Security Council should itself appropriate the fund for peacekeeping. Those ought to be appropriated by the General Assembly, but the Security Council should to the maximum extent possible make the decision about whether to undertake the peacekeeping.

Senator CHURCH. I understand.

Secretary RUSK. There may be certain occasions when the Security Council can work out that the parties themselves can pay for it, as Saudi Arabia and Egypt with respect to the Yemen, for example, in which case these questions would not arise.

I would inform the committee that we have made strong representations to delegates in New York about the effect of the Assembly's ignoring article 19. We have said that our Congress would very clearly take the view that these assessments cannot be mandatory for some and voluntary for others and, although I did not wish to put an idea in the mind of the Senators before we get to the result and have to take a look at the total situation, I think we will win the actual vote. We have also said to them there will be some members of our Congress who would say that under those circumstances the United States should put itself in the position of the Soviet Union; namely, refuse our commitments until we are at least 2 years behind.

THE POINT THAT BOTHERS US

In other words, we have tried to put maximum pressure on the delegates on this point. They do come back to the point that both-

ers us. Some of the other delegates, in trying to test our view of this matter, say, "What would the position be of the United States if the Assembly by a two-thirds vote, which would not be too difficult to organize among the Afro-Asian mass of votes, if the Assembly by a two-thirds vote were to organize, in effect, military operations against the Portuguese in South Africa and assess us 32 percent of the costs?"

Well, that is not an easy question to answer. It's not an easy question to answer just off the cuff.

Senator CHURCH. I know.

Secretary RUSK. So, this is a point on which there is some community of interest between us and the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. But we are prepared to face that one. What concerns us is that having made these formal commitments, having taken action under the charter and having gone through the court and the action of the Assembly in reinforcing the decision of the court, that it is up to the Assembly not to abandon the position of the charter.

Senator CHURCH. I just have one question on Vietnam, Mr. Secretary.

THE LAOTIAN STRIKE

You explained the Laotian strike, and you have testified that the news report, which startled me and concerned me gravely this morning on my way in——

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I nearly had an automobile accident when I heard it over the radio—that there is no truth to it.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Let me ask you: If American planes have engaged in no strikes against North Vietnam, have South Vietnamese planes or planes that we have supplied them, piloted by South Vietnamese, undertaken strikes against North Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I put United States and South Vietnamese in the same category.

Senator CHURCH. In the same category?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. To my knowledge, and I am quite certain I would know this, neither United States nor South Vietnamese planes have struck North Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hickenlooper said he preferred to pass at this time.

Senator Aiken, you have just come in. Do you want to have your round? We are limiting it to 10 minutes.

Senator AIKEN. I will learn more if I listen.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Carlson.

POTENTIAL DIFFICULTY IN CONGRESS

Senator CARLSON. Briefly, I want to say this to the committee; I am sorry Senator Long has stepped out. He and I have sat in many conferences on this question of article 19. I think you have stated it very well. I have found no deviation from the feeling that they should pay, and we are going to maintain our position when that

time comes. That would be my view, at least as we continue up there, and I don't think we have any change of view up there at the present time.

It is a very difficult situation. I think all of us have stressed that if we don't get some reasonable solution to this thing, we are going to have difficulty in Congress. They might just as well know it, and I am one who is insisting that we maintain our position.

I would like to get to Vietnam with just one question. This week I had one of our Nation's businessmen in my office, and he has been in others, I assume, around this committee. I know him well, I have known him for years, and he tells about these operations where they pay cash for the privilege of operating on installations that we have built with our own money. This maybe ought to be off the record, I don't know, this part of——

[Discussion off the record.]

GULF OF TONKIN RETALIATION

Secretary RUSK. Of course, the committee knows when I replied to Senator Church that I should have added the exception, of course, the Gulf of Tonkin retaliation, where U.S. aircraft did strike.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, sir.

Secretary RUSK. I think I ought to complete the record on that point.

Senator CARLSON. I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

Senator Aiken.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BLACK MARKETS

Senator AIKEN. Do you get the reports I do of the enormous black markets in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Some. I wonder if—Mr. Bundy, would you comment on the black market problem?

Mr. BUNDY. We have had investigators going over these in detail, Senator. We don't believe they are of major extent but there are certainly some operations of that character.

Secretary RUSK. We have a pilferage problem in some cases.

Senator AIKEN. What became of the agricultural commodities that were shipped and, according to GAO, there was no record of their being received? Did that go to China or did it go to black market?

Mr. BUNDY. I doubt very much.

Secretary RUSK. We sent a special group, and my own inspector general has been out there to investigate this. I will try to report back to you on the results of that investigation.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right, Senator Morse.

A RUSSIAN VICTORY

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am extremely bothered by the possible hypotheticals that might develop and the alternatives that may follow. I wish to say I do not share the view that Russia has won, de facto, nor do I share the view that our objective is Russia's objective, to go to the Security Council. This would be news to me. I

think that out of this may very well come a recognition of the United Nations, depending on the outcome of this vote, that there need to be some amendments to this charter.

I tried to find some good out of tragedy, if you can ever find it.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is how it has to be done.

Senator MORSE. I think you have got to have the confrontation. I don't think you can sweep it under the rug any longer because if you did, it will be a Russian victory. I don't think she has, but she has maneuvered us out of our position a little bit. But I think we ought to hold to the charter as it now is and then be perfectly willing to give consideration to using the procedures of the charter for consideration of possible amendments.

Now, I have assumed for a long time that remaining in our Government there is a question about whether or not there should be some modification of the veto power in the Security Council. This might lead, at least, to a discussion of it. That would be a healthy thing.

There has been a lot of discussion as to whether or not we should have a modification of the voting formula that now exists in the General Assembly. It might lead to that. But to take the hypothetical you raise—you have got to face the ugly ones, too—so long as that charter is so written and they follow the rights under it and there are two-thirds of them, one, if you follow the course of action that you suggest, unthinkable as it would be from our standpoint, and certainly from mine, of serving such an ultimatum on the Portuguese, we would then have to determine whether we want to stay in the United Nations or get out. That is the procedure. Russia has got that choice now. Let her make it.

But I think that kind of an ugly situation might accelerate the possibilities of getting the charter amended. Let's face it. I think we have reached that time in the history of the United Nations Charter now where this crisis places upon us the duty of world leadership to see who will join us in that leadership in getting this charter cleared out. But I am opposed to our in any way following a retreating, compromising approach to Russia on the clear principles of the charter. I think that is what Russia is trying to maneuver us into and then she is going to say, "You see, the United States doesn't stand for principle. There is a price on every issue so far as the United States is concerned."

We can't maintain a system of international law any more than you can maintain a system of justice in our domestic courts if we followed that principle. I think you have got to the point in the history of mankind where you are either going to insist upon the kind of a juridical approach that many of us have been pleading for, or just recognize that the whole thing is a facade and when the chips are down you are going to put expediency first.

A FRESH LOOK AT THE CHARTER

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, this committee is a heavily burdened committee, but in connection with Senator Morse's observation the committee might wish to consider, now that we are in the 20th year of the U.N., undertaking a study of the charter, where it has come thus far by practice and interpretation and what the di-

rections of a fresh look at the charter might involve. I just leave that perhaps in the back of the minds of the members of the committee to see whether that might be a useful thing to do.

Senator SPARKMAN. We conducted a study on that at the end of 10 years.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Wasn't it contemplated when the charter was drawn that there would be a review?

Secretary RUSK. And we made proposals at that time in connection with that study.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. For the revision of the charter.

Senator SPARKMAN. We went out to different parts of the country and held hearings. I remember being out in San Francisco and, I believe, in maybe Los Angeles and Denver and Atlanta and different places.

REAFFIRMATION OF U.N. PRINCIPLES

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, may I just say in connection with this statement of the Secretary's, if we can ride this crisis out satisfactorily, Mr. Secretary, I should think that the occasion of the 20th anniversary at San Francisco is an opportunity we should not miss for dramatizing a worldwide reaffirmation to the principles and desirability and, indeed, importance of the United Nations, which doesn't just bring ordinary functionaries but which brings Presidents and Shahs and Potentates and Kings to San Francisco for what could be a tremendously important occasion, to bolster the prestige of the United Nations worldwide. I would hope we would take this into consideration as we look ahead toward June 21.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reinforce an earlier remark that Senator Church made, and that is that whatever the result of the confrontation, the effect on the U.N. is not going to be very good in the short run. I think in the long run it could be very wholesome but there is going to be, if the article 19 view which we and 50 others are supporting should win, as we think it would in a showdown vote, there is going to be a good deal of malaise. The other side will make an effort to exploit that to the maximum and try to unload upon us, as a single country, maximum responsibility for whatever unhappiness is lying around the General Assembly.

On the other hand, the Senators here know, perhaps better than I, the malaise that would develop on the other side if we were to lose that vote, so I don't think we can look forward here to something that we can all enjoy as a parliamentary or diplomatic victory in the usual sense. It is one of those harsh necessities of maintaining the charter, but there are going to be a good many wounds in connection with it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I haven't any comments. I wanted to explain to the Secretary why I haven't been able to be present earlier. I had other commitments that I had to attend.

I am impressed with the clarity and good sense of your remarks this morning. I am going to read the record over the weekend.

Secretary RUSK. Fine. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Williams.

LOST VOTES BECAUSE OF CONGO AFFAIR

Senator WILLIAMS. I just have one question: Mr. Secretary, assuming we would have a showdown next week on article 19, would the United States be in a stronger or weaker position from a voting strength position than we would have been 6 months ago? And assuming we postpone that for 6 months or a year, do you think our voting position would improve during that time?

Secretary RUSK. We lost some votes on the article 19 business because of the Congo affair. That is one. I think, Senator, you were up there. I think you will all agree with that.

Senator CARLSON. I agree fully.

Secretary RUSK. I think we have recovered some votes because of the refusal of the Soviets to try to cooperate with the majority committees that were trying to work on this matter. They rebuffed the Afro-Asian groups on several occasions, rebuffed the President of the Assembly, and rebuffed the Secretary-General.

I would think that the situation perhaps is, at the moment, today perhaps, three or four votes worse than it would have been, say, 4 months ago. I think we shall recover some of those in the course of debate when the General Assembly has to confront what it is doing to itself if it fails to sustain article 19.

I think if we had a postponement, that there is no clear indication that our situation would materially change. Now, obviously if the postponement—if the Soviets said they thought this could be settled if there was some sort of a postponement, if there was some sort of implicit indication that they might find some way to get out of this mess they put us all in, then the situation might be improved. But we don't see this at the present time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Clark.

COMPREHENSIVE REVISION OF U.N. CHARTER

Senator CLARK. I have long felt that a comprehensive revision of the Charter of the United Nations is essential to the proper functioning of that organization. I have been disappointed, as the Secretary knows, in the position hitherto taken by the State Department in that regard.

I welcome the suggestion of the Secretary this morning that this committee should take a good, hard look. To me, it is particularly important that a number of the present provisions should be changed, or at least a strong effort should be made to change it, if we are going to have any real success in developing the international institutions which, in my judgment, are essential to progress in the field of disarmament.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A VERY HAPPY WORKING COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. I should like to express a word of welcome to the Senators.

Senator SPARKMAN. I certainly join in that. I was not here last Friday and I am not certain Senator Case was here or not. I understand Senator Clark was here at that time. I want to express a welcome to both of you, as well as to Senator Pell, who is absent today. By the way, I am sure you know that this is a very happy working committee.

Senator LAUSCHE. Not always. [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Not always.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to put a little stinger in there. It is not always a happy, but it is a working committee. [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. We work together well. It is about as much a nonpartisan committee as there is in the Senate. We welcome you gentlemen in joining us.

All right, Senator Case.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Case, both the intellect and the handsomeness of the committee will be greatly improved with your presence. [Laughter.]

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman——

Senator MORSE. There is only one way to go on that.

Senator CASE. This man Lausche is so disarming that he can make me say almost anything. I should only say it is a great honor for me, and one that I have looked forward to for a very long time, and may I just say in a really not sentimental vein, but Alex Smith called me up yesterday and congratulated me and expressed his wish that I say to all of you, contrary to my own belief, that now the position of New Jersey has been restored to the affairs of the country, because he served on the committee and the Far Eastern Subcommittee.

But he sent his best to you and I express to you all and the Secretary and the rest that I am terribly happy to be here. I have no questions.

Senator AIKEN. The urban areas are now well represented. [Laughter.]

But I wish they would be as anxious to amend the U.S. Constitution as they are the U.N. Charter.

Senator CLARK. We are, but not along the lines you advocate.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you care to ask anything at this time?

ARTICLE 19 IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CHARTER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I don't think I will ask any questions at this time. I just want to say that I want to join with those who have expressed the feeling that the chips are down on this thing.

If article 19 doesn't mean anything, then the whole Charter of the United Nations means nothing. It is a fundamental part of that charter, and it has been supported by an advisory opinion of the World Court which, in my view, bears out some of my views on our turning over our whole international fate to a World Court. People who don't want to pay any attention to that won't, and we will.

And that is about what is happening here unless something of stability and determination on our part is done.

I think this issue ought to be forced, and I think we ought to find out whether it means anything or whether it doesn't. If it doesn't mean anything then we will have to see what we can do about the United Nations or some other organization or some other rearrangement if it is going to fall apart at the seams on this, because a score or more of nations will become immediately delinquent if you permit the Russians to do this. If the Russians do this they will put their thumb to their noses. We have enough of them now.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, your reference to a score is really quite accurate because at the moment 17 members, now that we have crossed over January 1, are delinquent in terms of article 19. We think most of those except France and the Soviet bloc will pay up before the matter is decided.

NATIONS THAT PAID

Senator SPARKMAN. How many have paid up? Did I hear or see that five had paid up?

Secretary RUSK. Nationalist China has paid, Bulgaria has paid enough to get within the 2-year rule, and we expect Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Belgium, perhaps South Africa, and Haiti will get off the list. The Soviet Union paid $3½ million yesterday, reducing the amount required for it to pay to $21.7 million.

Senator AIKEN. What did they pay the $3½ million to?

Secretary RUSK. To its 1964 assessment.

Senator AIKEN. Regular assessment?

Secretary RUSK. Regular assessment.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Morse.

CIA ACTIVITIES IN LAOS

Senator MORSE. On this committee from time to time we have information given to us, and the sources are sufficiently justified to take the time to ask the question that I now ask.

I have been advised that there is reason to believe that the CIA have recruited and financed and supplied material to the Lao Air Force, that these Laotians are really acting in behalf of the CIA in the various bombing and military acts that have been committed in North Vietnam and elsewhere.

Is there any basis in fact for that?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; we don't know of any Laotian planes that have struck in North Vietnam. The Laotian pilots are pilots trained through our military channels, not CIA; is that correct? In other words, the pilots are not part of the CIA operation.

Senator MORSE. The pilots have no connection with the Lao Air Force?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I did not go that far.

Mr. BUNDY. Not in connection with the pilots or the main elements there. I don't think there is any participation at all with respect to the regular Lao Air Force.

Senator MORSE. Are CIA funds used in connection with it?

Mr. BUNDY. I think not, sir. No, that is entirely MAP funding.

Senator MORSE. And American military do the training and to the extent that they accept the trainees do the recruiting, and not the CIA?

Mr. BUNDY. Actually—well, excuse me.

Secretary RUSK. Could I make a remark completely off the record at this point?

[Discussion off the record.]

ENCOURAGING LOATIAN TALKS

Senator MORSE. I don't think there is any doubt, Mr. Secretary, that the Geneva Accords of 1962 have been violated and violated. It has been violated not only by the North Vietnamese but probably by the Red Chinese, too. But there is an article in the 1962 agreement that seemed to raise a question as to whether or not the United States can justify sending in military personnel as such and participating in aggressive acts of its own to do the bombing. The obligation would seem to be to insist that the signatories of the treaty meet.

Would you tell the committee what we have done to try to get the signatories to the treaty to join in enforcing its terms and what, if anything, we have done to lay these violations before the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

We have not only been supporting but have been encouraging the talks among the three factions both in Paris and in Laos, trying to get them to agree on a basis on which they can go into a 14-nation conference. Second, we strongly supported the Polish proposal made some months ago, which was that the two cochairmen, Britain and the U.S.S.R., the three members of the I.C.C., Canada, India, Poland, and the Government of Laos, sit down to try to clear the way for a meeting of the 14-nation conference.

We would like to see that conference convened on a basis that has some prospect of success. Quite frankly, I think it is a very serious problem if that conference should meet and break up in complete failure, because that would greatly increase the dangers in the situation, because that could in effect lead to a denunciation of the 1962 accords and that would take the Soviet Union off of the hook with us about the accord.

If the three factions are unable to get together—and on that France has been trying to press them, the British have been trying to press them, we think the Russians may be using some influence in connection with the three-faction discussion—if that fails, there is a provision in the agreement that you referred to that not later than July of this year the two cochairmen are required to review the work of the I.C.C. Now, in preparation for that I personally feel that the two cochairmen might be able to start this chain into an acceptable kind of 14-nation conference.

SOVIET POSITION ON LAOS

Beyond that, Senator, I have, myself, talked repeatedly with the Russians about Laos, not only to keep them clear about their own commitments to us about Laos, but also to explore with them how we can get moving toward complete compliance with those accords.

I have been interested in some newspaper comments in the last 2 or 3 days that the Soviet Union is trying to strengthen its position in Hanoi, because one of the problems here is that just at the time that the Soviets made an international commitment to us, behind which we have certain sanctions available in terms of all the other questions we have up with the Russians, the Russians began to lose influence in Hanoi. Their ambassador in Vientiane seems to have no effective contact with or influence upon the Pathet Lao on the ground. And to that extent the Moscow-Peiping dispute produced a result there that weakened the 1962 accord. But we are trying to get that 14-nation machinery moving.

I should also say in confidence to this committee in this executive session that we are considering ways to get SEATO more formally into this situation in South Vietnam. The problem there is how to do it without incurring perhaps a French veto. We don't know what the French attitude might be, but we have that under very substantial study at the moment, following the discussion of these problems with this committee, and it may be something will develop along that line as well. We are not objecting to a 14-nation conference in principle, but the danger of a conference which collapses is very great; I mean there isn't much left beyond an acknowledgement of perhaps hostilities in some more serious way.

KEEPING POLITICAL WINDOWS OPEN

Now, the other side, and we are under no illusions about this, the other side at the present time has a capability of committing far more effort into Southeast Asia than it has yet committed. In other words, the possibility of a conference is not something we are ignoring. I mean they have 300,000 armed men in North Vietnam that are not committed. We have not in 8 months or so seen hostile aircraft either over Laos or South Vietnam. The Chinese organized forces have not appeared in North Vietnam or in Laos.

There are all sorts of things that are available to the other side if they want to escalate that they have not yet done. Therefore, we feel that the political windows ought to be kept opened, provided we can find a basis upon which Hanoi says, "We will leave our neighbors alone."

Now Laos, to my mind, although Vietnam is the major problem, Laos is a good way to test this because they can charge us with violating the accord. We can charge them with violating the accord. There are no overriding prestige problems about both sides saying, "All right, let's get everybody out of this business; let's get back to the accord of 1962." So that although Laos is the lesser problem, it may be a somewhat better political thermometer on what is possible in the various political tracks.

Senator MORSE. It is a very helpful statement.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask a question?

PHILIPPINE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

One columnist carried the statement about 10 days ago that the Philippines offered to make available 3,000 armed troops for South Vietnam, and he challenged the wisdom of what is being done in not utilizing that offer. I had not heard of it before and I don't

know whether, if we did accept them and send them in, whether that would be in violation of some agreement we have had.

What do you know about that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, this is something on which we have been working very hard. We do want more countries, and particularly SEATO members, to get more people in the field there. There are now, if you include some of the French technical assistance people who are not there quite on the same theory as perhaps the rest of us, there are over 1,000 nationals of other countries working in the field in support of the South Vietnamese today. We would like to see that go up several times, and we are pressing a number of other capitals in that direction.

President Johnson discussed that very frankly with President Macapagal, and it is intended—I will ask Mr. Bundy to comment on the situation as of today—but it is intended that up to, say, around 1,800 Filipinos might go into the field to assist in a great variety of ways in South Vietnam.

Where does that stand at the present time?

UNITED STATES WILL UNDERWRITE COSTS

Mr. BUNDY. That is in a very active state at the present time, with only the financing problem to be ironed out, Senator. The 1,800 will be predominantly noncombat, engineer types and technical people and economic people and so on. We hope they can be clustered in particular areas so they can become areas for which the Philippines feel a sense of identification and responsibility.

I think the first contingent will be going within the next 10 days. They have got some problems of financing. We have agreed to underwrite the cost of the movement. They are asking us to pay certain things beyond that as per diems and so on, which seem to us pretty steep, but we think we will get a substantial contingent and, as you know, we have arranged within the last 2 weeks to get a substantial Korean contingent, which will not include combat forces except to the degree necessary to provide security for men who are in fact operating in another way.

So far as the legal basis of all of these are concerned, they are on the same footing really that we would be and we are in our presence there. The justification is the same, that the Government of Vietnam has asked for this assistance to meet the massive violations of the 1954 accords by the north.

LIMITATION OF TROOPS UNDER GENEVA ACCORDS

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there a limitation on the type of assistance they can ask? Are they allowed to ask for armed troops to actually participate in combat or only the advisory aid?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the issue there is the same issue that we have in Laos. There was limit under the 1954 accords, but when the large-scale infiltration from the north began we crossed that divide, I think in 1961, by putting more U.S. personnel in there that would have been technically permitted under the 1954 accords. But, again, with a clear view expressed many times that we are prepared tomorrow to go right back to the 1954 accords.

Senator SPARKMAN. Anyone else?

Senator Aiken. You did ask a question?

DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGE IN LAOS

Senator AIKEN. How large is the bridge that was destroyed in Laos?

Secretary RUSK. About 125 feet long, and the center spans are in the water.

Senator AIKEN. And they were willing to have it destroyed, the Laotians?

Secretary RUSK. You mean the Laotian Government?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. They have been asking us to do it for some time because their own T-28's couldn't do that particular mission.

Senator AIKEN. They would be glad to have us replace it when the time comes.

Secretary RUSK. I am sure, sir, if friends of ours get control of that area, I think you and I both will be glad to replace it.

Senator AIKEN. I hope they won't get as impatient as Panama did over replacing a bridge.

FIGHTING IN LAOS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, going back to Laos, is there very much actual fighting going on there now, or have things quieted down some?

Secretary RUSK. There is very little actual fighting at the moment. There have been some North Vietnamese military unit movements into Laos and southward, into the panhandle area around the Tchepone area. Whether they are for operations in Laos or whether they are to provide personnel for infiltration into South Vietnam, we can't be certain yet. But we have had relatively little ground action since the T-28 operations began.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, due to the fact we are about to finish with the business of this morning——

TENSIONS AMONG HEADS OF LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. I wanted to ask a question about Laos.

I had a feeling that things were quieting down somewhat in Laos, both as to fighting and as to the close-in fighting among the triumvirate. Am I correct in that view?

Secretary RUSK. As I indicated, the ground operations have not picked up again with the close of the rainy season of any significant scale.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have answered that. What about the heads of government?

Secretary RUSK. There are still occasional rumors of tension among the so-called rightwing faction and the neutralist faction headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. We have tried to do our best to keep these people working together. We have had somewhat more success in Laos than we have had recently in South Vietnam in this particular regard. But I think in general, unless the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh launch a large-scale attack, that we are not likely to see an internal collapse or anything of that sort in Laos.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was the story that you——

Senator LAUSCHE. John, may I on that subject ask a question?

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Didn't Souvanna Phouma within the last week make a statement condemning the Pathet Lao about their incurring disorder and not cooperating in the development of a workable government?

Secretary RUSK. He does make such statements periodically, but he also has been pressing Prince Souphanouvong to come up to Luang Prabang and get some talk started.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WOULD BE CONSULTED

Senator SPARKMAN. The story you have referred to as coming out of Saigon you said there was no truth to, was that something about the South Vietnamese raiding North Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Striking North Vietnam by air?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, by air.

Secretary RUSK. I have told the committee previously about the junk operations on both sides of the parallel.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, you mentioned that; I was just trying to identify the particular story, because I haven't read the morning paper yet.

Secretary RUSK. I myself feel that strikes against the north are a part of the problem on which the leadership and the President would be in consultation, because this would be a significant development of the situation. I have reported the views expressed by members of the committee on that point at our last meeting. What has happened thus far is within the range of the policies that have been followed here for some months and I think, although a particular operation might come as a surprise, the general line is not new.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator Morse.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Anything further? Senator Gore.

EFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET RIFT ON VIETNAM

Senator GORE. I take it we, having concluded this, are prepared to return to a review of the situation in Vietnam. If so, I have some questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. It's free and open.

Senator GORE. Yesterday Ambassador Thompson gave us a very enlightening briefing, and I was particularly struck with one conclusion of his reported to the committee, to wit, that the Red Chinese were intent upon forcing a break with the Soviets in the arena of international Communist organizations, and that the relations between the Soviets and the West and the modus vivendi of those relations were not of sufficient importance that, even though the Soviets modified their policy, the Red Chinese would desist in this pursuit of a break. He supported his thesis very interestingly and somewhat convincingly, to me.

If that be the case, what bearing is a further deepening of the breach between the Soviets and the Red Chinese to have upon the situation in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. It is a little hard to see just how that particular matter will develop. You have observed, Senator Gore, that the Soviet line on Laos is rather different than its line on South Vietnam, that what it says about South Vietnam is almost identical with what Peiping and Hanoi say about South Vietnam. I think that is part of the contest between Moscow and Peiping for leadership of the world revolution, that is, leadership of the Communist camp.

I do think that if Peiping achieves a stunning success in Southeast Asia or against India, it would increase the prospects that the Soviet Union would tend to close the gap with Peiping by moving toward Peiping's ideological orientation and tactical orientation. On the other hand, if the Red Chinese are stopped along their present frontiers, the chances are improved that Peiping, at least by stages, will move further toward more of a line of peaceful coexistence. I don't expect that any time soon.

SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION WORKS TO UNITED STATES DISADVANTAGE

At the moment, the competition between the two in some instances works to our disadvantage. For example, with regard to Africa, even though the Red Chinese identify two enemies in Africa, imperialism, meaning us, and revisionism, meaning the Soviet Union, the competition between the two in Africa has the net effect of threatening Western interests in Africa. It is going to be a little hard to see how that develops. My own present thinking is that the Chinese problem is a major preoccupation in Moscow and that anything that they and we are doing or talking about is going to be simply a part of their problem with Peiping, that in the most basic sense the Peiping problem is their No. 1 foreign policy problem.

For example, when I was over in Moscow to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and I had some talks with Mr. Khrushchev on the Black Sea, it was quite clear he was almost absentminded. He didn't want to talk about serious subjects and we had the impression at that time that the Chinese problem was very much in his preoccupation. I think perhaps Ambassador Thompson has the same view; we have talked about this many times. I think this is the No. 1 problem, and I think we can expect the Soviet Union to continue to play a rather harsh public role, certainly between now and the March meeting of Chinese parties, where they are going to be wrestling with the question of leadership of the Communist world.

There has been an interesting contrast in the mood between their public statements, as put out by Moscow progaganda, and the private atmosphere and mood in private talks with, I say, four or five talks with, Mr. Gromyko. The private talks are far more cautious and reasonable and restrained and without adjectives, but the public attitudes reflect a very harsh, harsher view than in the closing year of Mr. Khrushchev's regime.

SOVIET ROLE IN LAOS

Senator GORE. Must not this problem is South Vietnam be viewed as but a part, perhaps a small part, of the total pattern for the next decade, perhaps, or quarter of a century?

Secretary RUSK. I think so, sir. That gives it more than just a neighborhood significance.

It was our impression, at the time of the Laotian settlement in 1962, that the Soviet Union had far larger fish to fry than Laos, for example; that they did not wish to see Laos become a matter of major contention between them and us; that we both could agree to leave it alone and let these 2 million Laotians take care of their own affairs.

Senator GORE. Therefore they joined in an undertaking to more or less vouchsafe stability and some sort of neutrality?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. Looking at it objectively, as a man from Mars might, you could make a good case that it would be in the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States not to tangle with each other over Laos if it can be worked out.

Now, in all these things you have to keep in the back of your mind a certain reservation on the question of good faith, but it has been in general my impression that the Soviets were prepared to deliver as far as Laos was concerned. Their ability to influence the situation did strongly decline when they lost their relative position in Hanoi, but they never did make any commitments to us about South Vietnam.

Now, you could say, and I couldn't disprove it, that simply meant that they knew that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists, that Laos would fall the next week; in other words, that they could take the view that they did on Laos and bet on South Vietnam, you see. But I have the impression that their attitude was more serious than that at the time of the 1962 accords.

UNITED STATES POSITION IN VIETNAM TEMPTS FATE

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you for giving an able and articulate statement of your position and the position of the administration. I would like to restate a primary concern that I was not quite satisfied with your response to the other day. Maybe I can state it in a different way.

If we attempt to take a longer view, it would seem to me that we may conclude that the three "major" powers, quote around major, are emerging in the years ahead. Shall we be one of the triumivirate, shall we be one of two, or shall we be one with two aligned against us?

Now, it seems to me that the present position we are in South Vietnam sort of tempts fate, that we run the risk of, the grave risk it seems to me, of being drawn into a major war with Red China. This might, it seems to me, have one or two consequences—there may be others you could foresee—either of the two of which would be unfavorable to us, either forcing, No. 1, a coalescing of Russia and China because we have here a confrontation between the capitalist nation and a Communist nation, if there is a Communist nation, or, No. 2, that we would be bogged down in a war with

Asia, leaving Russia free for more machinations in the Mediterranean and Africa and South America.

Your reply the other day was very effective, it seems to me, the possibility of a major war in Asia is something which we alone must not consider, and this impressed me. But I still am not quite satisfied that that is a sufficient answer to what I have termed, for want of a better term, tempting fate with a major war there.

SOVIETS DO NOT WANT ENTANGLEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think my answer the other day was not a complete answer. It was under conditions at the table when we were going around for questions—one is tempted not to talk too long in going over a particular point.

The problem that you pose is very much in the back of our minds and is, it seems to me, a conclusive answer to those who want to go rushing pellmell to the north.

Someone like Mr. Joseph Alsop can say, "If you go to the north, the other side will quit." Well, that is possible, but the problem you raise has also got to be taken into account by any President of the United States who makes a decision. Joe Alsop can write a column the next day and say, "I was wrong," but the President has to live with the result.

Now, we know that the Soviet Union is itself concerned with the policy problem that it would confront if there is a war between the United States and Red China, because its position would be terribly affected if it should leave one of its fellow socialist countries to be deeply injured by a capitalist, the chief of the capitalist world, without giving that country support. On the other hand, we do not have the impression that the Soviets are anxious to become entangled with us over Southeast Asia for a variety of reasons.

ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT POLICIES

But you pose a very real element in the problem, which is very much in our minds when we think about what the alternatives are in this present situation, and it is something that involves the gravest responsibilities of the President in looking at these alternatives. The alternatives, the major alternative, to our present course of action—and when I say "our present course of action" I am includng the continuing probing of the political possibilities of bringing these people to leave their neighbors alone—the major——

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary——

Senator MORSE. Let him finish that sentence.

Senator GORE. He was in the middle of an answer, please, sir.

Secretary RUSK. I think the major elements of either pulling away or pulling out, or having a big war, have the most far-reaching consequences. That is one of the reasons why we are trying the best we can to try to make this present course pay off, despite its frustrations, despite the difficulty, despite the fact that it consumes time, because to move from that large central course off on to the soft shoulders on either side of that course could lead to, I think, unpredictable results at the end of the trail. We just don't know where it would go. We can't know where it would go, because the other side in either event would be making decisions, too.

If they escalate, if they decide that they have got to do a lot more, then we have to face that. And somewhere down the end of the trail is the key question: If Hanoi and Peiping are determined to push into the Southeast and South Asia, either they have to be met or we have to abandon that part of the world and take the consequences. It is to avoid that decision that we are trying to make this present middle course work, if possible.

A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. It is all true, what you have said, Mr. Secretary, but I think there is another phase of the program suggested by the Senator from Tennessee. If we can move into a position now where we can call for a negotiated settlement of South Vietnam, we are going to put some of our allies in an interesting position, because I am satisfied our proposals would be reasonable and eminently fair and they will then endorse those proposals and that is going to get them into a position, it seems to me, of having to come out openly on our side and put Russia in a position where she can then negotiate with her Communist allies for such a reasonable fair settlement. I think we are at the brink of either/or at the crossroads of either moving into a proposal for a negotiated settlement that doesn't mean we are going to surrender, or moving on the other road toward more confrontation in Asia, which I think is going to lead to a massive war.

SOVIET SUPPORT OF CHINESE MOVEMENT INTO VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, are you pretty well satisfied that Russia is interested in stabilizing the situation in Southeast Asia? Do you think they prefer to take a hands-off attitude or in the last analysis would they support a massive Chinese movement to the south?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe they would under present circumstances support a massive Chinese movement to the south. But I would have to qualify that by saying that their estimators probably think if Hanoi and Peiping simply stay with it there is at least a fair chance they can succeed on the present track without their escalating that from the north. In other words, just as we are worried about both sides of it, so they are worried about both sides.

[Discussion off the record.]

CHINA'S ENORMOUS MILITARY RESOURCES

Senator CLARK. If the North Vietnamese and the Chinese were to commit their reserves, they have the potential, do they not, of overrunning both Laos and South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. They could do it insofar as Asian forces in the area are concerned. They have the military capability of doing it. We will be faced then with the problem of bringing to bear the enormous power, force we have in the area, to make it so expensive to them that they would not attempt to do that.

Senator CLARK. You think we could do that with air and navy or would we have to put troops in there?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. I have one further question.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead.

THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM

Senator GORE. I realize, Mr. Secretary, that there are no definitive, unchallengeable answers to these, what I think are fundamental, questions that I posed. My last point, on which I would ask you to make some further comment, really turns on the possibility of success or failure.

Now, in that respect, too, it seems to me, the difference between Cuba and Vietnam stands out, looms up. Cuba was clearly within our sphere of influence, within our easy striking power. South Vietnam is the opposite.

Our every effort there is plagued by the legacy of colonialism, the racial bigotry and hatred of the area, the religious contests underway, the logistics of support, the unfamiliarity with democratic processes. I thought this was illustrated almost offensively by the Prime Minister of Japan when he, in Washington, DC, made a speech in which he said flatfootedly that Western concepts could not prevail in Southeast Asia, that it must be an Asian settlement. This was almost an affront, it seemed to me, by a power so closely allied and so dependent upon our continued support as is the case with Japan. I cite the Japanese Prime Minister's statement, however, only as it relates to this question of the possibility of success or failure here. I would elicit your comment there and then I shall let you go to lunch.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first, I wouldn't read too much into what Mr. [Eisaku] Sato said on that particular point. He was counseling patience, because he felt the Western sense of impatience to get things over with in a hurry might impel us to take one of these other two courses. He was very anxious, in his private talks, that we not pull out of Southeast Asia. He is very concerned about the effect and impact of that. So, it was not our presence there or the effort there he was concerned about. He was concerned with the element of impatience to get things over with in a hurry an precipitating everything into immediate settlement.

I didn't know whether this is responsive or not to your question.

Senator GORE. Just let me repeat, I had cited his statement only as a further index to the doubtful possibility of success there.

COMPARISON TO CUBA

Secretary RUSK. You see, we must bear in mind also that in the Cuban missile crisis you could not explain the situation purely in terms of the location of Cuba because although the Soviet Union did not have a conventional capability to deal with the situation in Cuba, they had powerful conventional capability to respond in Berlin or in Iran, you see, and they did not elect to even go that far. So, I think that——

Senator GORE. Again, we might not elect to make the nuclear attack upon China. This would pose a problem for us.

Secretary RUSK. It is a dreadful issue that some of us live with 24 hours a day.

Senator GORE. Yes. It is an eyeball-to-eyeball situation—I believe you coined that phrase—which could become as real for us there as it could, or as it was pragmatic for the Soviets in Cuba.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

THE ENCIRCLEMENT PROCESS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely want to end this with just one observation.

The encirclement process is going on. The Chinese are in the Congo now in force, that is, their technicians, their people and advisors. They are in other places, and we are just not doing well in a number of places in the world. I think that has an impact on the Southeast Asian situation, and I hope we will begin to be a little more vigorous and forceful in some of these things.

I think this Congo situation is very difficult at the present time.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I think what Mr. Nasser is doing is bound to have a terrific effect on the attitude in the Middle Eastern countries as far as the United States are concerned. In other words, I think a lot of them are just watching here, and every time somebody kicks us in the teeth and gets away with it, it doesn't help our cause any, and it doesn't help our cause in Southeast Asia and many other places in the world.

There is an article in the January 8 issue of the Economist called "In the Face of Adversity," which is short. I don't put it in with any approval or disapproval, but I think it is the Economist's attitude on this South Vietnamese situation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, at 10 a.m., in executive session in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Chairman Fulbright presided over the meeting.

John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, briefed the committee on the world situation.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned approximately at 12:15 p.m.]

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Vice President Humphrey; Senators Anderson, Brewster, Dominick, Inouye, Kuchel, McClellan, Miller, Mondale, Pastore, Saltonstall, Stennis, and Tydings; Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This meeting has been arranged by the Vice President in order to give the Secretary of State an opportunity to discuss with interested Senators the relationship of the United States and the United Arab Republic. The action of the other body yesterday, I believe it was, prohibiting the use of agricultural funds for further extension of aid to the United Arab Republic has given rise to some problems, which I thought and the Secretary thinks should be explained to Members of the Senate.

Mr. Secretary, will you proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, thank you very much for giving me this opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say before that in this executive meeting he will undoubtedly discuss things dealing with personals which would be very embarrassing. I am sure everybody will respect the fact that this is an executive meeting and therefore not to be discussed or quoted outside this room.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, because if I am to be of assistance to Senators on this matter, it will be necessary for me to go into some extremely delicate matters that are highly relevant to the issue which the Senate will have before it in the next few days, matters which, if disclosed publicly, could cause us very severe problems in the area, not just with the United Arab Republic. Therefore, I appreciate the strictest approach to the executive character of this meeting.

I would like to apologize to certain members of the Foreign Relations Committee, because a few things that I will say will be repeti-

tious of matters that I have discussed in the past 2 weeks. Nevertheless, I would like to draw this issue together as a whole.

I do not wish today to be in the position of defending Nasser but rather of speaking to the problem of U.S. interests in the area. Nor is there any issue around this table, certainly not with me, about the fact that some of the things that Nasser has done have been irritating. We, too, have been angered at certain points, but that is not the end of the problem.

A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP

Over the past 3 years, we have been trying to work our way toward a more reasonable and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the United Arab Republic, specifically with Mr. Nasser.

On the one side he has been interested in economic cooperation with the United States. That is his principal interest insofar as Egypt's relations with us are concerned.

On our side, we have wanted a moderate policy on his part. We knew we could not change his unaligned policy. We wanted a moderate policy on matters of vital interest to the United States, a recognition of our interests in the area, and we wanted some inhibitions upon any pressures or temptations on his part to move closer and closer to the Eastern bloc.

[Deleted.]

EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA

Second, 2 years ago, there was high tension between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the Yemen. You will recall that we put a fighter squadron in Saudi Arabia. We made it clear to Mr. Nasser that we would support Saudi Arabia if he moved upon Saudi Arabia in any way. Yet that was a very fragile internal situation in Saudi Arabia at that time.

The present king, then Prince Faisal, was under threat of internal action against him. Four of his brothers had gone to Cairo as a part of the defector interest in Cairo. We were very much concerned that the situation in Saudi Arabia might collapse.

We went to Mr. Nasser and said that our interests in Saudi Arabia were very great, that we must ask him, insist, that he hold up and hold off the machinations which we knew were going on so far as Saudi Arabia was concerned. To the best of our knowledge, those did drop off very fast.

EGYPT AND LIBYA

Then about 2 years ago, you will remember that we had some agitation among some of the extreme elements in Libya directed at the Wheelus Base. We knew that those were connected with Egyptian stimulation and interest. Again we went to Nasser and said that Wheelus Base is of major interest to the United States in the area, "Come off this agitation." Under those circumstances the Wheelus Base problem has dropped off. It is relatively quiet.

Our discussions with the Libyans are in slow motion, and our position there is at the present time reinforced.

Senator GORE. Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

MORE THAN ONE CHANNEL

Senator GORE. You say you went to Mr. Nasser with this request or statement. Was this via our Ambassador or through an intermediary?

Secretary RUSK. We have used more than one channel. Most of this that I am talking about went through our Ambassador, but we have also had certain private visitors from time to time who took similar messages.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

ARAB BOYCOTT OF AMERICAN BUSINESS

Secretary RUSK. Then on other matters of interest to us, such as the Arab boycott of American firms doing business with Israel, again Egypt has been helpful in reducing the impact of this boycott. If I could have a chance later, Mr. Chairman, to examine the record, I might wish to suggest that certain of these details be left out of the written record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary RUSK. Rather than have to intrude off the record as we go along.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary RUSK. For example, the fact that Chase Manhattan Bank recently has been dropped off the Arab boycott list came about through the assistance of the Egyptians in the Arab discussions.

You know we have had problems with the Arab world for many years about Americans of the Jewish faith traveling in Arab countries. Egypt is by far the most moderate and the most openhanded in this regard. So far as I know, most Americans of the Jewish faith can visit Egypt freely without interference from the government, a matter in which we again have been pressing all of the Arab states.

But we have had some problems running in the other direction.

DISENGAGEMENT IN YEMEN

We tried to work out a disengagement policy in the Yemen under which both Saudi Arabia and Egypt would leave the Yemenis alone and let the Yemen work out their own government. That has not succeeded insofar as Egyptian troop withdrawals are concerned. Nasser has from 40,000 to 50,000 Egyptian troops in the Yemen at the present time. He is in deep trouble there.

The Yemenis have been unable to form a government. The last government resigned en masse, some of them went off to Aden, some went off to Saudi Arabia, and the new government has not been able to establish itself as a going concern. It seems quite clear that the Yemenis are being themselves fretful and resistant to the presence of the Egyptian forces.

That seemed to us to have a bearing on our aid discussions. We had said to the Egyptians at the time they were trying to negotiate a new $20 million commodity credit to continue a commodity credit

loan of some 3 years ago that was expiring, we said to them we did not see how we could justify an open-ended loan such as the commodity credit loan, "So long as you are incurring these substantial expenses in the Yemen."

Something over 2 months ago we broke off the discussions of that $20 million loan, and that was accepted by the Egyptians as a severe setback. They did not like it at all. Nevertheless, there we said, "We cannot proceed under these circumstances."

RESPONSE TO PARATROOP DROP IN THE CONGO

Then came our paratroop drop in the Congo. On that occasion, Mr. Nasser and some of his own advisers—I will come to those in a moment—apparently decided to jump aboard this Congo issue in the interest of asserting Egyptian leadership among the radical African states, such states as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, with Cairo hopefully, from his point of view, in the lead.

They permitted a mob of African students to attack our information library. I say permitted because the government was informed 2 hours before the demonstration occurred that the demonstration was expected and on the way, and our Embassy asked for protection. Adequate protection was not forthcoming.

So, although the rioters were basically African students responding to this paratroop drop, we held the Egyptian Government responsible for having permitted it to take place. They moved rather promptly with apologies, offer of compensation, and eventually a new building for the library to occupy. But because of their, what seemed to us to be deliberate negligence, we have by no means looked upon this as a closed incident.

THE AIRPLANE INCIDENT

I have already indicated to some of you gentlemen that we are not inclined to make to much of the airplane incident, the incident of the shooting down of a civilian airplane, because there is still a good deal of mystery about just what that plane was doing, why it seemed to go to the Cairo airport to land with Egyptian fighter escort, why it did not land when the fighters pulled away but headed for Alexandria, why an experienced pilot would have left the civil air corridor from Cairo to Alexandria to head off toward a restricted area in which maneuvers were going on on the part of the Egyptians. The pilot himself had a very colorful background, involved in many episodes in the past, and we do not feel we have the full story. But even there we said to the Egyptian Government, "At the worst you should have escorted that civilian plane, you should have escorted that plane to your frontier and then protested to us, wherein we would have made the investigation and made any amends that were required."

In this atmosphere of the USIS library and the shooting down of the plane, on December 22 the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economics called in our Ambassador in Cairo to take up with him an additional 200,000 tons of Public Law 480 [1] food. Our Ambassa-

[1] Food for Peace.

dor said, "Mr. Minister, I just cannot discuss any such subject with you under present circumstances." They exchanged—they had a glass of orange juice and our Ambassador left.

That was notified to President Nasser 2 hours before his Port Said speech on December 23. It was reported to him as an ultimatum. We have since discovered, and high Egyptian officials have so informed us, that the Ambassador's words were distorted to President Nasser. They were represented to President Nasser as an ultimatum, when in fact they were just as I said almost verbatim, just as I said it to you, and when Nasser made his speech, "Drink the Red Sea," when he made that speech, he was furious.

Meanwhile, he had publicly indicated that Egypt was sending arms to rebels in the Congo. Now, we take this particular issue with the greatest seriousness, and everything else is marking time until that issue is resolved.

U.S. ACTIONS ON AID

Now, here are he things that we have done with respect to aid relationships.

We have cancelled the discussions of a $20 million commodity loan. We are marking time on new projects such as a grain storage project of $70 million which has not gone forward. We have refused to discuss additions to the present Public Law 480 program, and we are unwilling to talk about a renewal of that program at the end of ths fiscal year, that is to become effective at the end of this fiscal year. All of these things are directly related to their position of sending arms to the rebels in the Congo. In other words, from our point of view, this is the key issue.

Now, with regard to the existing Public Law 480 program, this is the tail end of a 3-year program that was arranged 2½ years ago. Remaining under the program are about $20.5 million worth of wheat, about $5.5 million of vegetable oil, and about $8.8 million of tobacco, still not committed; that is, still not subject to purchase authorization under the existing agreement.

So that the narrow issue in front of us is whether we should cancel the remainder of this agreement, this 3-year agreement, under present circumstances, that is, cancel it by law, or whether we should maintain that particular thin thread of relationship with Cairo pending our efforts to clean up this Congo involvement which is now in process in terms of discussions, negotiations with several of the countries that are involved.

RESPONSES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

Let me say that we have been in touch with other governments from time to time on the general problem of our relationships with Nasser.

Israel does not wish us to break our ties with Nasser or to eliminate our presence in Cairo. It is of considerable importance to Israel that we have some presence in Cairo in order to be there in an attempt to moderate the attitudes and the policies of Cairo, to give Cairo some stake in reasonable relationships with the West and with ourselves.

Just yesterday, I had a message from a high personality in Israel whose name I am afraid I am not at liberty to tell you, if I may respectfully suggest that, who said that he was very much concerned about the buildup of pressures in this country to cut our connections with Cairo. He said this is not in the interest of Israel. He said these pressures are becoming more Israeli than Israel. That it is not in the interests of Israel for us to have no position whatever in Cairo.

We have been in touch with other Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, countries with whom we have far better relations than we have with Nasser, and——

The CHAIRMAN. We are greatly honored to have the President of the Senate here. [The Vice President entered the hearing room.] [Applause.]

Secretary RUSK. I had just commented that it is not considered by Israel to be in Israel's interests that our presence in Cairo be eliminated or effectively crippled, because some effective United States presence in Cairo is important to Israel's security and to the possibilities of moderating the attitude of the Arab world toward Israel.

The same is true of the neighboring Arab states, there are some of these Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, who from time to time feel themselves under pressure from Nasser. They will be concerned about our supporting Nasser's adventures but, on the other hand, they, too, wish us to maintain a presence in Cairo. King Faisal, for example, has said despite his known attitude toward Nasser and our close cooperation, he said, "I do not wish to ask the United States to quit feeding these brother Arabs among these lower classes here in the Nile Valley. I don't want to ask you to do that."

Now, looking at it from the negative side, it is almost literally true that the remainder of this Public Law 480 operation between now and the end of this fiscal year is about the only effective operational contact we have with Cairo in the sense that this is the principal interest they have in normal relations with the United States.

CANNOT PREDICT WHAT EGYPT WILL DO

Now, if that is cut, we cannot predict what Israel will do. We know some of the things they can do. They can resume their pressures against our position in Libya where there is a very fragile political institution.

The CHAIRMAN. You said Israel, you meant Egypt.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry, Egypt.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you cannot——

Secretary RUSK. What Egypt would do.

They could resume their pressures against our position in Libya, where there is a very fragile situation, and where a limited number of agents could cause a great deal of trouble in affecting our base in Wheelus.

They could resume their pressures on Saudi Arabia, although we do think that King Faisal is in a far stronger position to meet such pressures than he was 2 years ago. This interim period has been

used by King Faisal to very good advantage in strengthening not only his personal position in the country but in moving ahead on his economic and social development program which is making good headway.

Nasser has a great appetite for oil, and at the same time he has several thousand Egyptians who have been borrowed by Kuwait for administrative roles in Kuwait. Overnight he could cause enormous trouble in Kuwait, where there is no effective force that could deal with the problem created by these several thousand Egyptians there in the heart of the Kuwaiti administration.

And he could, presumably, step up his attempt to infiltrate in the Sudan and to send arms to the rebels. Thus far, that flow has been relatively modest and relatively ineffective as far as its military impact on the Congo is concerned.

Now, if he were to react as he did in the mid-fifties, and were to act irrationally and with vindictiveness, and were to go all out against the United States interest in the Middle East, there isn't much left for us to think about at that point except to what extent are we going to need some troops in that part of the world to support very important American interests, the position in Wheelus, billions of investments in the Arab world, our interest in the security of a close friend like Saudi Arabia. We feel that it is far better to permit us to continue to send the remaining bushels of wheat than to face a choice of perhaps having to send soldiers out in that part of the world. I don't exaggerate unduly when I make that statement.

PLAYING THE CARD

Now, it may well be that the executive will wish to suspend these additional shipments under the present agreements, the use to which we feel ourselves committed, because I want to assure you, gentlemen, we are making this Congo problem and the involvement of Egypt in sending arms to the rebels, the central major issue between us and Nasser at the present time. Our Ambassador got back in Cairo last night, and he will be seeing Mr. Nasser very shortly on that particular issue to press that point home.

But here is a card, and if you play it by legislation the card is gone. It is out of the deck. It is of no value to us at all. We can't use it negatively or positively, because we have played it. We need this card. It is one of the few cards we have in our relations with Nasser at the present time.

So, to those who came in after I started, let me say there is no issue here about irritation or anger with respect to some of the things Nasser has done. There is no issue here about my being in a position of attempting to defend what Nasser has done. This is not the problem. The question is what American interests require in this present situation. What I am saying is we need this card for a further period as a part of our effort to get Nasser to disengage from this Congo business and to get back to a position where we can work with him in a more normal fashion about a relationship that has been difficult at best, but which has produced some results in the past, in terms of moderation toward Jordan waters, in terms

of holding over the agitation in Libya about Wheelus Base, letting up on Saudi Arabia, moderating the Arab boycott of American business, opening up Egypt to travel of American citizens without discrimination with respect to religion, and points of that sort.

EXAMPLE OF INDONESIA

Let me illustrate the point, if I may in another respect. Let's take Indonesia, this same problem in Indonesia. As far as Indonesia is concerned, we stopped 13 months ago our Public Law 480 program for Indonesia. We let $30 million of that Public Law 480 program lapse because of Indonesia's policy, both externally and their failures to take the most minimum steps internally with their economy.

We do have a $3 million Public Law 480 program under title 3 being administered by American private volunteer agencies, church groups. It is very important in terms of what may happen in Indonesia in the months immediately ahead that we have that kind of private contact with groups in Indonesia, because the question of succession to Sukarno is a matter for public discussion there, and the prospect is that if that issue arises there will be a contest between the army on the one side, the Communist party in Indonesia on the other—the army being moderate, looking more toward the free world, and, of course, the PKI, a rivalry from which we have a very substantial interest.

But even though I would say to you we have not for 13 months used Public Law 480 title 1 in Indonesia, I would urge you not to make that a matter of law because we need the card. If you make it a matter of law, it isn't in the deck any more. We can't use it, we can't move quickly if an opportunity arises to bring to bear this important resource in terms of our relations with what might happen in Indonesia.

And so I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that after full consideration the Senate would be willing to leave this question open or to leave the President discretion in dealing with the tail end of this 3-year program, which is closing out on July 31 of this year. As I say, we may ourselves have to cancel it if we don't get some results on the Congo matter, but if you cancel it by law, then I don't see any cards we have to play in Cairo except force. I don't think any of us want to play the force if we can play it first with bushels of wheat. It is just as simple as that.

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Speaking for myself only, of course, I think you have made an excellent case. I will vote to remove that restriction upon you. You have the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. However we may feel about Nasser, we don't have that primary responsibility. We do feel very strongly about Nasser as you know, but as I say, speaking for myself, I have no question but that you are correct.

Senator Sparkman.

Senator Humphrey.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think the Vice President should be privileged to ask a question.

The VICE PRESIDENT. I wish to listen.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any comment you would like to make?

The VICE PRESIDENT. I fully agree with the position you have taken, Mr. Chairman. I spoke to Mr. Talbot about it and the Secretary, even though I must say my love for Mr. Nasser is at a zero point, but I think this matter of national interest is strictly American national interest. I think we ought to look at it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

SHORTENING UP THE STRING

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I shall be very brief. In other words, you feel that this is a part of foreign policy that ought to be left to the President to utilize as it can best be utilized in the national interest?

Secretary RUSK. I do, Senator, and I would like to add that part of the problem of our present relations with Nasser is that we have been shortening up the string. We did stop the discussion of the $20 million loan that they thought they had in the bag. We have refused to discuss their urgent requirements for increased Public Law 480. We have brought to a standstill some of the existing aid commitments we have already made in the past.

So that a part of his reaction here is it is a signal that we ourselves are shortening the string on him, you see. What I am saying is that this is practically the last bit of string we have, and it is a part of the leverage we need with him to try to get this Congo thing settled in the next several weeks here as an element of pressure on Mr. Nasser.

NASSER'S INFLUENCE IN THE CONGO

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that Nasser can be highly effective in regard to the Congo matter? Does he have sufficient control of it—if "control" is the right word—that he can more or less pull the strings?

Secretary RUSK. The scale of operations in the Congo is still so small that a relatively little effort can make a considerable difference. For example—off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

AMERICAN SELF-RESPECT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I will say at the outset that my basic inclinations now are and always have been to resist legislative interference in the Executive responsibility, but I think we have come to a time when the self-respect of America has become a great factor. By way of just general statement, I think that the United States has lost the respect of most of the world today. As I said to you some time ago, I fear that our own people in many places in this world are losing their own self-respect, which

to me is much more dangerous, because in so many places they are assuming an attitude of futility.

We don't know what to do. We give these people here and there, this, that, and the other thing, and they kick us in the teeth and they insult us. So from the standpoint of Nasser, I don't know of anything that in my very limited and probably inaccurate opinion has damaged us more in the Middle East that to have Nasser kick us all around the map and get away with it. It is a stimulus to every other little postage stamp country or bigger country to insult the United States and say, "We'll get more out of it if we insult them."

Now, I have had a little association with this. You will recall 2 years ago with your approval—I won't say that you thought I was the greatest man in the world to do this—but the cable did come through suggesting that it might be helpful if I diverted a little trip I was on from Cairo and went up to Saudi Arabia to see the then Prince Faisal when he was having trouble. I did that. That was just a few weeks before the recognition of the Yemeni Government and the tolerance of Egypt's invasion by troops to take that over.

It was represented to me in both capitals by our own people that there was quite a definite understanding that if recognition came through, warranted by certain other considerations which we don't need to talk about now, that Nasser would begin an immediate, or practically an immediate, and orderly withdrawal of his troops from the Yemen.

Frankly, I discussed that with Faisal, who expressed some doubts that Nasser would keep his word. I said I didn't know, I was not an official spokesman for the Government, but I had been authorized to say that I thought it was the basic policy, confirmed by a Member of the Senate, that we were standing quite squarely behind Saudi Arabia if invasion occurred.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

ARRIVAL OF THE AMERICAN SQUADRON

Senator SPARKMAN. We were not disposed to stand for Mr. Nasser coming in there and attacking either Jidda or Riyadh or any of those other countries.

Secretary RUSK. I believe you were there, Senator, at the time the squadron arrived.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I was there when the squadron arrived. It gave a tremendous lift to the Saudi Arabians to see our bombers flying around and so on, and it was very stimulating.

Since that time, however, Nasser has not kept one single agreement so far as I know. On the contrary, he has probably almost tripled his forces in the Yemen. The Yemeni Government has gone clear out the window. There is no Yemeni Government there except the Nasser overlords who sit there and run the show. The Yemeni Government has gone over, as you said a few minutes ago. Some of them escaped into Saudi Arabia.

Now, I have seen Nasser several times, twice very pleasant. He is a charming man when he wants to turn the charm on.He is quite a salesman. Once he was very irate and we didn't get along very

well, but so far as I know, Nasser has consistently and continuously, with a very few lapses, damned the United States for imperialism over the radio, in the newspapers. He has been utterly hostile to the United States. He has followed the Communist line right down completely. I know of no apology that has ever appeared over the Egyptian radio or in the newspapers for the burning of our library, for the things that went on there.

PAYMENT WAS A GOOF

We don't need to go into that detail necessarily, but I know the $20 million remainder of this donation there that was announced just a week or so after he burned our libraries and did this, that, and the other thing, I know that was a little premature or a little worse, if you want to put a different definition on it. It was not exactly authorized, but the impression it created—even the release of that created the impression that he could destroy our property and get $20 million more 3 weeks later.

Secretary RUSK. I think it is fair for me to say that later I told the Senate committee that that particular handling of that matter was a goof.

Senator SPARKMAN. I didn't want to get you into that necessarily, unless you wanted to get into it.

Secretary RUSK. No, I think that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. I realize it was not your doing.

Secretary RUSK. This was handled in a routine way without being politically alert to what it involved.

Senator SPARKMAN. But I can't avoid the mounting feeling from various sources—and once in a while somebody from a foreign country stops in to talk to me, and I don't always see what he says as the whole truth necessarily, but it adds up—the impression is that the United States is getting to the point where it is willing to be pushed around for some unknown reason, and that while they know we are probably the strongest country in the world, yet we are not strong in our convictions of a firm line of righteousness in international politics.

OMINOUS SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Now, this Congo business—I feel there is a very ominous thing there in the Congo from Algeria, from Egyptian supplies coming in through Sudan. I don't know how long this fellow who is in Uganda or Burundi, the fellow who leans toward us a little bit—he is trying to stop the flow across the border, I guess, but they have got a lot of supplies coming in there if they take the Cosmoline out of the guns and get the bolts working. I think that thing is itself mounting, and mounting very, very rapidly, with not a diminishing but an increasing amount of supplies being sent in through Egypt, with their consent and approval, and with the aiding and abetting of Algeria.

I don't know what we should do so far as Israel is concerned. I don't know that we should run our Egyptian policy for the sole benefit of Israel. I think we ought to run it for Israel and other countries. But I am afraid that we are not making too much progress in the Middle East because of this wait-and-see policy.

Is the United States going to stand for something over there? Are they going to permit themselves to be pushed around? If so, when do we start pushing the United States around? I am extremely concerned about it.

If Nasser had any nice side to his countenance, there are many things that he could do. If he believes in rights, as he says he does—and I don't believe he does, I think he is basically a dictatorial type—he certainly couldn't support some of the things that have gone on in the Congo, but then we know how these international things go along that line. He is playing a very vital and dangerous and strange game. But I don't necessarily advocate cutting this off by law.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

As I said, my basic inclination has always been to let the legislature keep out of the administrative discretion of the executive branch. We pass the laws and they have to execute them. But I don't see any reason why we shouldn't have some considerable delays and questions and maybe a lot of trouble and maybe not deliver this stuff for quite a long while and kind of look it over a little bit. I don't see that we have to rush around with ships to ship this stuff in.

Incidentally, do you have figures there to show the total amount of Public Law 480 aid and of all other kinds of aid, such as vegetable oils, tobaccos, and things like that that we have been putting into Egypt rather consistently? It runs in my mind that while the basic amount is alleged to be about 25 percent or a little bit more, that if you add all of them up, it comes nearer to 40 percent of their food and economic needs. They are living on us, and I don't think they could sustain very long this Yemeni imperialism which they have indulged in down there without being able to divert other things from their economy to the Yemen, because they are getting all of this stuff from us.

I think we have a fantastically powerful leverage on them, and we don't want Nasser necessarily—or I don't, anyway—to knuckle down and surrender everything and become a vassal of the United States. That isn't it at all.

But certainly he should become convinced that he has got to at least follow a middle-of-the-road policy of decency, and I am especially concerned of the fact that the Egyptian people don't know that he ever made any apology at all about the assault on our Embassy compound there, and that he expressed any regret whatsoever about that matter. He keeps on his own merry way, and that is the part of the trouble.

I don't think we are dealing today with what this committee thinks or doesn't think. I think we are dealing with what they will think on the floor of the Senate when these bills are coming up, and they are coming up. I mean they are going to be filed and they will be acted upon. But I think it is a very serious thing, and I hope administratively that we use quietly the administrative power which we have to just let some of these people know that they can't have their cake and eat it, too, in what we hope is the advancement of a free world.

Now having said that, I think I will close the brackets and put a period at the end of it.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we have a number of distinguished visitors, not on this committee, and in view of the fact we have had access to the Secretary, I would like to call on them if they have some questions.

AGRICULTURAL TRADE COMMITMENTS

Senator McClellan, my senior colleague, is chairman of the Government Operations Committee. Would you like to ask a question?

Senator MCCLELLAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one or two.

You say we are committed by the agreement that will not expire until the end of this fiscal year to supply Egypt with, is it 20 million dollars' worth of wheat?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. It is a 3-year program involving $275 million in wheat, of which $20 million is left.

Senator MCCLELLAN. What was that $5 million——

Secretary RUSK. $275 million, of which $20 million is left.

In the vegetable oil field, $22.9 million, of which $5.6 million is left; $17.7 million of tobacco, of which $8.8 million is left. The other programs have been pretty well completed under the original agreement.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Mr. Secretary, in the agreement were there conditions, obligations on the part of the Egyptian Government?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to inspect the particular agreement. It is not my impression that there were general political conditions involved.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Has that government broken any conditions, has there been a breach on the part of the government with respect to this commitment?

Secretary RUSK. I am not aware of breaches under the commitment itself. I am aware, however, of these very large policy questions which have caused us to move into a standstill on aid questions, including such matters as increasing the amounts they would like to have or discussing a renewal of this agreement at the end of this fiscal year.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I am only trying to find out now about that to which we are committed.

Secretary RUSK. Right, sir.

ABROGATING U.S. AGREEMENT

Senator MCCLELLAN. As I understand it, if we made no further agreement we would not in any way violate our obligation that we made. We are not committed to make it?

Secretary RUSK. That is beginning with the fiscal year 1966; that is correct, sir.

Senator MCCLELLAN. That is what I mean.

Secretary RUSK. We have no obligation to agree with them; whether it is to our interest is another thing.

Senator McCLELLAN. All that is involved here is whether we supply the remainder of this 3-year commitment; is that all that is involved?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. That is the issue posed by the action taken in the other body yesterday.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, the other body proposes by legislation to abrogate the balance of our obligation?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; although there is some question about the effect of that legislation yesterday. Some Members of the House did express the view that this would only involve the costs of transportation for these additional, say, $30 million in unexpired commodities and pointed out that these commodities have already been bought, they are not to be bought, by the deficiency appropriation of yesterday, and that the CCC could, for example, sell corn and use that money to pay the transportation.

I pointed out that that would not conform very well to the sense of comity between the legislative and executive branches, and I would hope very much that that kind of issue would not come up. But there is some legal question as to the exact application of the action taken yesterday, Senator.

ASSURANCES THAT NASSER WILL ACT HONORABLY

Senator McCLELLAN. If Congress yields on this issue—and that may not be the right way to present it, but you get the idea—if, in other words, Congress refrains from prohibiting the carrying out of the obligation by legislation, would you give us any suggestion now, would you make any comment with respect to what you contemplate will happen or will be involved in the beginning of fiscal 1966? In other words, do we continue to do this, or will this wind up this relationship until such time as Mr. Nasser can treat the Government with respect, give some assurances of conducting his affairs honorably with our country?

Secretary RUSK. It would be difficult to make a flat statement on that. I could not tell you today, for example, that the Executive would wish to continue the very things we are asking you to let us continue, because as I say, we are making a cardinal issue of the Congo question. If that is not resolved, I can see our relations with Egypt going further downhill than involving matters of this sort.

If that is resolved, and they get out of the business of arms to the rebels, then I think we will begin to climb uphill again. But in any event, I should think before there will be a renegotiation of any such arrangements for 1966, there will be a substantial new aspect to the situation and that we would be in close touch with the committee of Congress before any such agreement were made.

NEVER GIVE HIM ANOTHER DIME

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for permitting me to ask these few questions. My concern is, has been, somewhat along the line that Senator Hickenlooper has expressed. People read about these things all over the country, and it seems to me that many of our people were becoming exasperated with the idea that we continue to grant this assistance and then get no grat-

itude for it, instead getting insults, and I think there is a serious problem there.

I am inclined, I mean my thought is, I would like to see the executive branch take the necessary action. It has the authority to do it without Congress stepping in.

I don't know what action to suggest, and I am not trying to pass final judgment on it, but on the theory the Executive should, since this has been authorized, be the one either to tighten the string or make the decision to cut it off rather than the Congress, I think generally that would be through. Therefore, there would have to be or should be very exceptional situations maybe for Congress to step in. But looking to the future, it goes without saying that I would never vote to give him another dime until he apologized for the conduct he has been guilty of.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

ADMINISTRATION'S ACTION IS UNASSAILABLE

The CHAIRMAN. We have the minority whip here, the distinguished Senator from California.

Would you like to ask a question?

Senator KUCHEL. This does occur to me, Mr. Chairman: I think the position which the Secretary takes with respect to the almost constitutional duty to determine what administratively is going to be done is unassailable. I have to say by way of if not confession, at least recollection of an unhappy vote upstairs, I did vote, as you know, Mr. Secretary, for the amendment offered by the junior Senator from Texas [John Tower] last year against Sukarno. Everybody around this table has feelings, and at that very moment it was difficult for me to accept any theory by which a dime of American money would go there.

I want to say, I say it on the record, you have convinced me that it is in our interest to continue doing what we are doing there. However, much of what is on this record I take it is classified.

Secretary RUSK. Some of it highly classified, yes, sir.

Senator KUCHEL. Of course.

There are going to be restrictive amendments offered for varying purposes by some of our colleagues in the Senate which will revolve around Nasser, Sukarno, and so forth. I think it would be helpful for people like myself, Mr. Secretary, to receive the maximum on the record public statement of the executive branch before we would blacken our mind. I say that most sincerely. That is my only comment, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

U.S. AID USED AGAINST U.S. POLICIES

The CHAIRMAN. We have the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee.

Senator PASTORE. I used to be, I am vice chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to ask a question?

Senator PASTORE. The thing that puzzles me, if our contact with Nasser is to resolve the Congo problem and to put an end to his supply of arms to the terrorists, and if it is true that what we sup-

plied to Nasser constitutes 40 percent of his food supply—is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Within certain categories.

Senator PASTORE. If we took away the 40 percent, he wouldn't have the money to send the arms. I mean he would have to buy food for his people before he could buy arms to supply to the Congolese terrorists. It strikes me that if some pressure is brought to bear—I realize we have a commitment on this agreement, but after all, Nasser is not stupid. He knows that we are not going to expand his agreement as he desires us to do it and to do these other things that he wants us to do, and I am beginning to question whether the time hasn't arrived when America has to assert itself in order to establish its own prestige and respect.

Now, I don't mean by that that you have got to be cataclysmic about it and give an ultimatum, but I think this man ought to be made to understand if he doesn't stop sending these arms, he is not going to get the food and his people are going to go hungry. The gossip is—and I agree with my friend here from California—the gossip is among our people that what we are doing, we are sending food to Nasser and he is using the food in order to bank up his money to help his situation in the Congo, and you can't disabuse the people on the street of this thought.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that——

Senator PASTORE [continuing]. And that creates a very impossible proposition, because every time you vote out here, you go home and you have to answer for all this. When we explain that we give them 40 percent of the food that their people eat in certain categories, and at the same time this man finds the money to help an effort that means American dollars to stop, it looks to me like we are biting off our own tail.

EGYPT'S OTHER TRADING PARTNERS

Secretary RUSK. As far as the arms are concerned, he gets those arms by trading the cotton to the Soviet Union. He doesn't use foreign exchange for that. He trades stuff that we and others have little interest in.

Senator PASTORE. Yes, but he would have to get that cotton and have money to get food if he wasn't getting the food from us.

Secretary RUSK. I was agreeing with you on the relationship, and I thought I made it clear we do consider the relations between the two. If you decide this by law, we have no maneuverability at all, we have no way to play the pressure at all; it is done.

Senator PASTORE. I am not suggesting that. I agree with Mr. Hickenlooper; I think the Executive ought to do it. I think the Executive ought to be a little more firm about this, and if the Executive were more firm about this, I think that that would weaken the attempts on the floor of the Congress to pass these emotional amendments, and that is all they are. That is all they are, because you are on the same ball team as we are, I hope, and we are defending the same nation. Certainly you don't want to do anything to prejudice the security or the welfare of the American people, and you are doing the best you can do and exercising the best judgment that you have. But the fact still remains that I think the ad-

ministration itself ought to exert more effort and more firmness in convincing the man that he is not going to get this food if he doesn't stop sending these arms quick.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Anderson.

EXPLAINING THIS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Senator ANDERSON. I think I agree very heartily with what Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Pastore have been saying here. The great difficulty, Mr. Secretary, I think, is every time we are supposed in the Senate to save the administration, the House Members can go out and vote these things in the bill. That is fine, and they get it out of their system.

We have to go and explain to our people why we changed the thing. They don't understand all this business about the Executive and Congress. I generally end up voting the other way. I am tired of going home and have people saying, "Why did you let Mr. Nasser kick you around?"

There is a song about when did you quit kicking the dog around. There ought to be a song about stop kicking the country around. There should be something about burning down the library and replacing it. There is no talk about his making a commitment. You yourself admitted no commitment has thus far been made with anybody whatsoever.

Secretary RUSK. You mean about next year, you mean on his part?

Senator ANDERSON. Yes. It is just—that is a difficult thing. If you could pass a provision in the Senate, expressing our feeling a little bit, and the House—and I will agree with a decision to leave it to the Executive, I wouldn't feel so bad—but when we have to go home and say, "We didn't like what the House did and so we abolished it," what the House did is what we emotionally react to among ourselves.

Secretary RUSK. We were expecting this issue to be a major subject of discussion in connection with the normal legislative procedures, but the action yesterday, quite frankly, caught some of us by surprise because it came up on a deficiency appropriation on the CCC.

Senator ANDERSON. Mr. Secretary, this information you gave us this afternoon is classified. We can't go home and make the right kind of defense. If it wasn't classified we could make a good defense.

Secretary RUSK. I am well aware of that point and the point that Senator Kuchel made, and we will do our best to get some material that is available to help to explain it. I think we have a responsibility in that regard, and we will do our best on that, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN [presiding]. Senator Gore.

THE SENATE'S RESPONSIBILITY

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, the political liabilities which have been expressed here of defending the position which you wish the Senate to defend is recognized by all, and I am sure by you. But if

you had been on the hustings, as I was last year, and faced the Sukarno vote, you would be even more acutely aware of it.

But it seems to me that this is a responsibility which rightly belongs to the Senate. We have a constitutional responsibility with respect to foreign affairs that the House does not have.

I am going to support your position, not because it is easy but because I think it is in the national interest. I am extremely grateful personally, as I have been many, many times before, for the broadminded attitude that Senator Hickenlooper takes, and my friend from Arkansas, my neighbor. I think we may very well have more difficulty with the Sukarno amendment than this one.

MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH INDONESIAN MILITARY

For the benefit of the members who came in after you had made reference to the possibility of an Indonesian amendment, I would like to ask you if it is not a fact that you wish to maintain your contacts with the military, which is a significant military faction and power in Indonesia, because in the event of a contest for leadership following Sukarno's demise or the contest which arises otherwise, that the contest is likely to be between the military, which is inclined to favor the West, and us, and the political party that is oriented toward the Communist cause and particularly toward the Red Chinese. Is that the correct statement?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate the chance to comment very briefly on that point, because Indonesia is a case where we have practically stripped the deck of aid in the usual sense. As I indicated earlier, we allowed $30 million of a 3-year agreement under Public Law 480 to lapse unused because of political considerations. At the present time we have about, I think, a $2 million military assistance program for Indonesia. The man in the street would say, "Why on earth," and the problem is essentially the one as that you put.

The succession to Sukarno is a matter of public discussion in Indonesia because of Sukarno's health. There is at the present time a grouping of forces between the armed forces on the one side, and the PKI, the Communist party, on the other with respect to the succession when something happens to Sukarno.

Our Joint Chiefs, the Department of Defense, Department of State, are all unanimous that it is of vital importance to us to maintain certain lines, low level, discreet lines that we have into the military establishment in Indonesia for preparation of that day.

SUKARNO IS RIDING A TIGER

Here is how it works: Just before Christmas and again just this week, Sukarno was proposing to change his cabinet. He was going to eliminate Nasution as Minister of Defense. On both occasions the commanders of the armed forces, together went to him and said, "You can't remove this man." Nasution is the man who would be moderate and friendly in the event of a problem of succession.

Now, it isn't easy to explain why you have that kind of something called military assistance to Indonesia under present circumstances, because to explain it is to wreck it. As a matter of fact,

Sukarno himself has been talking lately about snipping this military assistance tie, because he is now beginning to realize what its purpose is.

So, this is a matter of major importance. As I say, we long since have ceased talking with Indonesia about ordinary economic aid. His economy is in a runaway inflation; inflation has doubled in the last 30 days. One dollar bill will buy over 300 gallons of gasoline today in Jakarta. Taking change home from the store is now in suitcases. In other words, he is riding a tiger there.

Senator GORE. So, it may occur without his demise?

Secretary RUSK. What will happen, we don't know. It is very important for us to have contacts with those who are going to oppose the PKI when that movement comes, and so we carry a small aid program.

Now again, you see, we don't have a Public Plan 480 program except through our church organizations and others who have private contacts, of about $3 million a year. But we would hope not to have law that prohibits us from having a Public Law 480 program for Indonesia, because within 30 days we might want a very substantial one if the right things happen in that country. We need to be able to move at the pace at which the situation demands, you see.

Thank you for your question, Senator.

Senator GORE. I thought, in view of the fact that several members had come in who had not heard this particular explanation, it might be well if it were done.

FUNDS FOR MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM

Senator ANDERSON. Who does the money go to when you send it to Indonesia? Does it go to Sukarno?

Secretary RUSK. That is for a military training program with our own Armed Forces with a few Indonesian military personnel.

Senator ANDERSON. Doesn't Sukarno control them?

Secretary RUSK. In this country.

Senator SPARKMAN. In this country.

Senator Carlson.

THE SENTIMENT OF THE PEOPLE

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, this is a difficult subject for me. I am a member of this committee and I appreciate the problems of the State Department, the administration in dealing in these international fields. I think that is the field in which it belongs.

On the other hand, the vote taken yesterday in the House was not just a vote on the Nasser issue, it was a vote that expressed the sentiment of the people of the Nation. You are talking about Panama and Cuba and Vietnam and all these things gathered together, and yesterday they had a chance to express themselves.

Now we are in a difficult position on the Senate side to reverse that, and while I am going to do what I can to go along, I am going to have some soul searching on this one, because to me it is an expression of the sentiment of the people against a program where

we are being pushed around continuously and our prestige is being reduced. I want to look this over.

I was wondering if there wasn't an emergency in this matter. Can we have a little time on that? Is that in the interest of our own Nation or should we have to act this week, or how urgent is this?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the problem of timing has to do with the need for the—it is a money problem for the CCC.

Senator ANDERSON. Commodity Credit.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what your farmers are calling for.

Secretary RUSK. From my point of view if this issue had not come up yesterday but waited for the legislative committees to get into, I would have been much happier.

Senator CARLSON. I would have been, too.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A COMMUNIST CELL IN AFRICA

Mr. Secretary, this worries me. On January 13 I asked for a breakdown and I didn't get it the way I wanted it, but we have given Nasser about $1 billion, given and loaned to him.

I want to support those people today who say that our prestige as a nation is being hurt badly abroad because of our incessant willingness to compromise any issue that comes up in order to preserve whatever it is, tranquility, I guess. What Senator Hickenlooper says makes a great deal of sense to me.

We are producing 40 percent of the food to Nasser. Yesterday we had a highly classified hearing with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and this is what the Senator from Rhode Island brought up.

To me, it made a great deal of sense what he said. He asked us to be very careful about information that he was giving us, and Nasser was deep in this furnishing of arms and ammunition and all other kinds of assistance without a question of a doubt, some food, to the rebels in the Congo. And he said that it would be very dangerous to the security of the United States to have a large Communist cell established in the center of Africa.

I want to make this respectful prediction to you, that the way things are going and based upon reading through the lines of this classified hearing, I don't think Tshombe is going to win out in this situation unless there are some radical changes in the way he is operating, general dissatisfaction with the mercenaries, failure to recruit additional ones, et cetera.

Right there on the border, the Sudanese, supported by the Algerians and Chinese Communists, are pouring this thing in with Nasser's active support. I don't see how you can come and justify to the taxpayers of the United States financing it, and that is what it is.

It is as Bernard Baruch said, "Give me one nonstrategic material" and one fellow said, "Bubble gum", and he said, "That is about it." The more food you give Nasser, the more you make it possible for him to aid the rebels in the Congo.

WE ARE TOO FRIENDLY TOWARD NASSER

I am chairman of this committee's Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and I have been out there quite a bit. I have always felt that the State Department in recent years—and I have been out there with the Assistant Secretary of State in this part of the world—are much too friendly toward Nasser. Just like, you remember, one time I was heavily criticized for feeling that we were too friendly toward India as long as they had Krishna Menon on that job, and we made a fight on the floor of the Senate and reduced Indian aid considerably, and they got rid of Krishna Menon.

But this situation to me, it is almost grotesque. It is either so complex that it is hard for the average person to understand, or it is so wrong that there is an element of appeasement in it that I can't absorb.

I don't know how I am going to vote on it based on the way it is cooked up in the paper, but I have talked to people from three different countries abroad in the last month, and they all told me that the foreign policy of the United States was costing us steadily more and more prestige abroad, because the story is around we will accommodate anybody, anyplace, anywhere in order not to have any trouble. This worries me a great deal.

Only yesterday, before this committee we had the head of all our intelligence come in here. Somebody asked him about the Congo, and he went into great detail of the dangers involved in the Congo and how Nasser was one of the two main contributors to that.

TOTAL ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT

I just think it is most unfortunate that we get ourselves in this position. This has been just—you know far more about it than I do, but I have watched it for some years—we have given them $946,900,000.

Secretary RUSK. That includes Public Law 480. I think it does, yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Total economic aid for the fiscal year when the United States first began—fiscal year 1946 through fiscal 1964, it has been $946,900,000. This isn't the way that I asked for it on January 13 before this latest crisis developed. But it is awfully difficult for us to justify this type and character of operation, especially as a lot of it is classified. I am really worried about it and want you to know that, sir, and I say this with great respect.

I have no further comments, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do hope that when foreign visitors attempt to make the point that you reported that you would be sure that they come from countries that are carrying their share of the load.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nobody is carrying their share of the load except the United States.

Secretary RUSK. Because this has been——

Senator SYMINGTON. You are safe on that point.

THINGS CAN GET STRAIGHTENED OUT

Secretary RUSK. This is a very important point to us these days. May I just say on the arms to the Congo, taking a quick look for a

second at those Eastern countries bordering on the eastern Congo, there has been a very important development in Burundi, through which some Chinese arms were coming from Tanganyika. We expect them to break with the Chinese in the next few days and throw out the Chinese Embassy there because of the assassination of that Prime Minister. We think that situation is moving very fast.

In the case of the Sudan, in the last few days, the Sudanese rebels in the south—Senator Hickenlooper, this will be of interest to you—the Sudanese rebels in the south have themselves destroyed the bridges on that trail coming into the eastern Congo. Some of the arms that the Sudanese have let come into the Congo have found their way into the hands of rebels of their own in the Sudan.

So, we think there is a pretty fair chance we can stop that line of traffic here within the next period. That it is not something that is in any sense being neglected. We are working on it very hard and there is a real possibility we can get this thing straightened out, but I can't assure you of that today.

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to add just one more point. You see this document. This is the aid that the United States has given to the United Arab Republic. I asked for this information as a result of a request from a constituent. Why does this have to be classified? Why do we have to keep secret from the American people what aid we are giving to Egypt?

Secretary RUSK. I don't see any reason why aid that we have given over a period of time like that needs to be classified.

Could we look into that, Mr. Lee?

Senator SYMINGTON. Everything we get around here is classified. We can't tell anybody.

Secretary RUSK. All right.

Senator KUCHEL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one short question?

Senator SPARKMAN. One short question.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

Senator KUCHEL. What is the relationship between the Soviet Union and Nasser's government. How, just in a phrase, would you describe it?

Secretary RUSK. The United Arab Republic has had very large scale military assistance from the Soviet Union. They have paid a political price for that aid. They are on that side with respect to nonalignment. Nasser has, on the other hand, kept pretty close control over the Communists in his own country, and as I indicated earlier on an off-the-record basis, we think there are some changes in the government that are in process that may improve that.

Senator KUCHEL. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Stennis.

ADMINISTRATION'S RECOMMENDATION

Senator STENNIS. I certainly thank you. I had to go out, and maybe some of McClellan's questions covered this, Mr. Secretary, and your answers.

Did you say or do you want to say now what your position would be in the excecutive branch—you asked us not to pass on this and I think you got a forceful point there—did you say what your recommendation would be? It may be premature. If you are not ready to say——

Secretary RUSK. I think all I can say on that at the moment, sir, is that we are making the Congo a central issue with Nasser at the present time.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, that is the point I was going to ask.

Secretary RUSK. We intend to press this. If we do not get satisfaction on that point, I think our relations will go further downward and I have no doubt it will affect problems of this sort. If we do get satisfaction on it, we would hope that our relations could improve somewhat in the months ahead. So, I would just have to say we will keep in touch with the committees and keep you informed on it.

Senator STENNIS. You want to keep the card on that, as you said, in the deck?

Secretary RUSK. We need the card in the deck to have something to play.

REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT FUTURE AID

Senator STENNIS. Does that contemplate, then, you may make an additional agreement with them?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; we have refused to talk about anything beyond that 3-year program which is about to expire. They have tried to raise for discussion supplements to this, 200,000-ton supplement in December.

Senator STENNIS. And you refused to talk about those?

Secretary RUSK. We refused to discuss them. They have intimated they would like to talk about a program to go beyond fiscal 1965. We said we are not talking about any such thing under present conditions, you see.

Senator STENNIS. Is it fair to ask you if that is your decision that you are not going to renew things with them, or do you still want that card in the deck?

Secretary RUSK. So much turns on what they do in the Congo.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mundt.

STATE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT VIGOROUSLY

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, as a member of the Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee, I sat in on these CCC hearings on the Senate side, and I don't think this has quite the urgency that you feel it has. In the first place, the CCC is not broke. It has $40 million now of unexpended funds. The House resolution, as I understand it, doesn't apply at all to the money that the CCC now has. It can only encompass this $1.7 billion that they are asking

for. So, you have twice as many millions of dollars as you need to carry out the $20 million obligation to Nasser if it really becomes a matter of paramount importance to do so.

Now, second—this is just one straw in the wind—I think you realize that unless the State Department convinces the American public and the Congress that it has more of a disposition to crack down on countries that burn our Embassies and insult us publicly and tell us to take our aid and go to hell or dump it in the ocean or something else, these are going to recur. We all recognize that theoretically the State Department shouldn't have a lot of Congressmen muddying up the waters and creating a restriction on how to operate, but human nature being what it is, unless the State Department can demonstrate that it is cracking down or doing something more vigorously, I think you can see the signs of the times as well as I. You are going to be chasing up here on every appropriation bill that comes along affecting the State Department. It will be Sukarno, it will be the Congo, it will be Nasser again, something at that time.

USE THE HOUSE ACTION AS LEVERAGE

Now, why don't you use the House action as a card in your deck, as an extra card? Why don't you just delay a week or so bringing this matter to the Senate? That gives you a chance to take your Ambassador over to Cairo and say, "Now, Mr. Nasser, this is what is happening." We are working with you and we are working with the Congress. We are all part of a system of government here and unless we can get some kind of reasonable cooperation from you, this type of thing is going to happen either by congressional action or if we avert that, we will have used up so much of our good will, we are going to use it up by Executive action." Even if we take the $20 million away from him, he is going to lose. I think within a week's time under negotiation, you can begin to find whether you can make such progress to give us reasonable assurance this thing is going to be done, or if you can't give any assurance we had better take it away from him.

Now, I feel this way about this voting business. You have come and asked the Senate for what is tantamount to giving a vote of confidence to Nasser and a vote of confidence in the State Department's turning the other cheek attitude toward him while he insults us and burns down the building. Suppose we did that. That doesn't solve your problem. It still has got to go to conference. It still has got to go back to the House. How are you going to get these House Members—it wasn't a very close vote as I remember, it was so—it was 30 or 40.

Secretary RUSK. It was 204 to 177.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, it was surprisingly lopsided.

Senator SPARKMAN. Twenty-seven votes.

WEASEL WORDS

Senator MUNDT. Pretty hard for a Congressman, having voted in a rollcall one way, to have to vote the opposite. If you don't like my ideas of delay and my ideas of recognizing we have got the money available, if you don't recognize my ideas of adding a card to our

deck, then I suggest you are going to have to do this: You are going to have to come up with some other suggestion than just say, "Repudiate the House action." You are going to have to come up with some unless and until language, weasel words—you fellows specialize in that better than I know—you can get some weasel words amendment that we might be able to adopt and put a patch on this particular thing and give the House a chance to save face, or you are not going to really solve the problem.

I think you have a real good chance in a week, 2 weeks. I don't think there is any real emergency. It isn't broke. It has the money, the testimony showed $40 million. They are not even beginning to repay what is owed the CCC anyhow, so this figure is out of the air. They have $2, $3 billion, instead of $1.7 billion. This is looking forward to future commitment. This has got to be done, but I believe we ought to delay this thing for a week or so and see what you can do in using this as a trump card.

Does it make any sense to you, or don't you believe——

Secretary RUSK. Senator, with the respect to the matter of timing on the deficiency appropriation for CCC, this goes considerably beyond my own responsibilities, and I think the leadership of the Senate has this matter under——

Senator MUNDT. They will cooperate with you on that. It is a problem, but they recognize this ties your hands. But I don't think you have given us any easy way to solve it or any quick way, the House having voted that way on a rollcall vote. Lots of us have been in the House. It is hard to come back 2 weeks later and say, "I made a stupid vote and I am voting just the opposite. My arm has been twisted." That is not a good answer.

LEGALLY BUT NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY POSSIBLE

Secretary RUSK. On the taking advantage of the possibilities of finding some money to go ahead with this particular thing despite the House action, or despite the action if it is sustained, that may be technically possible. I would hope, however——

Senator. MUNDT. It is legally possible.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. That we would not create such a gulf between the executive and the legislative branch. If the Senate and House joined together on this House action yesterday, and this action became the final action of the Congress, it isn't easy for the executive branch to disregard that to the extent of from a policy point of view.

Senator MUNDT. That is correct.

Legally right, but psychologically it might not be. I grant that.

Secretary RUSK That is right.

Senator MUNDT. That is why I say delay it for a week and get your boy to negotiate that week. Say, "Here, Mr. Nasser, this thing has come up in the Senate pretty quick. We have got to give them something to tell them." Isn't that a stronger argument?

Secretary RUSK. This is being done today or tomorrow. I don't know whether we will have this in position to give you a legislative answer when we are dealing with these unpredictable powers. As far as the weasel words are concerned, we are rather expert, if I may say so, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. You have done it before, yes.

Secretary RUSK. And we will take a look at that.

Senator MUNDT. It would be pretty hard, first of all, for the Senate to vote any confidence in Nasser, whom none of us like, and second, to get the House off the spot if we do it. So, if we got some other kind of language unless so and so happens, or until so and so happens, or state it in special weasel words and we pass it, then in conference you might sell that to the House. I am just giving you a practical legislative suggestion.

HIGH-LEVEL POLICY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have got to leave and I apologize to the other members. I don't want the record to appear that I am directing anything particularly to the Secretary of State here. There is no man in public government that I have a higher respect for, that I believe has a more complete, intimate grasp of the very problems we are talking about. We have talked a number of times about these things and I know he feels as deeply as any of us on these matters, but I only want to point out that this is not a sole decision of the Secretary of State nor of the State Department, necessarily. It is high policy administrative decision. I presume it involves the National Security Council. I presume it involves operations of the United Nations and many things. This is a high-level policy which I believe the Secretary of State and no Secretary of State would have completely in his own control.

So, these are not directed at you, Mr. Secretary, as an individual. My confidence in you is of the highest.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I know you realize these basic problems and understand this feeling, but the only point I am trying to make is that there is a feeling and it is a growing feeling—I turned loose two fellows in my office this afternoon that represent some important groups who are greatly concerned about the whole connotation of this thing—about where are we going. I think we might as well discuss it frankly here on these scores. But I didn't want you to think I was unduly trying to criticize you as an individual, and I realize there are certain limitations on any executive branch of the government on these broad overall policies. It is a high-level decision, but some decision is going to have to be made.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your personal remarks. I do want to say, and I am sure you do understand, what I said today represents my own convictions in this matter as well as the administration's policy on this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. You understand that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I understand that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Pell.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave.

Will you tell us something about the new government,[2] whether you intend to talk about the new government in Saigon, or do you want to defer that to some other time? Things keep changing over there and we have a continuing curiosity.

Secretary RUSK. This is another case of musical chairs. The same power groups are still there. It is almost a misnomer to call it a group. They are readjusting their own internal arrangement. It is unfortunate that this continues to go on, because it creates the impression and the fact of sort of a mess in the high command. Quite frankly, I don't think there is much I can say about it for the next 24 hours until we see what these people say their attitude, their policies, their determination to work together are. It is possible there could be some advantages in the events of the last 24 hours, but I have been through that six or seven times before. I just would be more honest if I would tell you that I don't know what to say today about it.

Senator MUNDT. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, when it crystalizes——

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Pell.

THE WEAPONS OF TACTICAL DIPLOMACY

Senator PELL. Normally, as you know, I am a great believer in the Executive retaining the maximum power in tactical diplomacy, but I must say in spite of that background, I have great sympathy for what Senator Mundt's views were particularly, because it would seem to me the Executive does not make use of the negative application of these weapons of tactical diplomacy as often as it might. It makes use of the positive application, and just for my own information I was wondering, when have you turned off, as a result of Executive action, Public Law 480 in the last couple of years?

Secretary RUSK. I gave the instance of Indonesia, where we allowed a $30 million tag end to lapse because of policy consideration.

Senator PELL. I was here at that. But are there other instances when things are going badly? Do we use it in a negative way?

Secretary RUSK. We applied the Hickenlooper amendment to Ceylon on the confiscation of American properties. There are many occasions where we have held up important aid actions until the other side came through with the conditions we had established one way or another. I would have to review to see to what extent, where we had taken negative action with regard to a specific policy issue.

WE HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE RESULTS

Senator PELL. When we go back to the people, they are always saying, "What have you done about it?"

Secretary RUSK. I wonder if I could be frank on that very issue, not with respect to your own statement on it at all.

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[2] On Jan. 27, South Vietnamese military officers overthrew the civilian government headed by Premier Tran Van Huong.

We have to live with whatever the result is. It is, if we go all the way to the bottom with Egypt and Egypt goes to its limit to injure American interests out in the Near East, we still have to live with that and try to do something about it.

I would be uncomfortable if we had some troops out in Libya in a shooting situation, and they said, "Why are we here," and I would say, "Nasser made a speech, the Congress got mad, and we cut our Public Law 480 for Egypt." That is not a good enough reason for troops in that area. Instead of soldiers to get this job done—because we have to live with the next step.

There have been many situations where, there have been two or three situations in this hemisphere where, we have been greatly tempted just to cut the cord completely. But we can't let a country in this hemisphere sink into the swamp, because we still have it in the hemisphere and still have to work with it, you see.

In other words, diplomacy almost never says, "You are at the end of the trail." As soon as you do that, then you let events take control, and you may not be willing to follow those events out to their conclusion.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I only hope I can explain it as lucidly as that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Inouye.

NASSER'S IMPRISONMENT OF COMMUNISTS

Senator INOUYE. Mr. Secretary, although this vote will be a very difficult one, you have been most convincing.

I was listening to the questions posed by Senator Kuchel on the relationship of Egypt with Russia. Some time ago I read an account where Nasser had imprisoned some Communists. I was just wondering, what was the Soviet Union's response to this action by Nasser?

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet Union has been rather persistent and rather patient in working away in those countries where it gets a rebuff of one sort or another.

Now, if you think about our frustrations in the aid business, for example, think of the fact that the Soviet Union has put 1 billion dollars' worth of military equipment into Indonesia, and yet the Communist party of Indonesia is supporting Peiping against Moscow, and yet Moscow is not abandoning Indonesia. They are continuing to work, trying to build their influence there in whatever way is available to them.

Now, in the case of Egypt, I think that we would have to say that today, in January 1965, the relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union are closer than they were in, say September 1964. Part of this is the other side of the coin of any deterioration of Egypt's relations with us. Part of it is the Soviet Union itself is supporting these arms into the Congo. We don't have it thoroughly documented, but our understanding from Soviet public statements is that the Soviet-made equipment which Egypt and Algeria are trying to send into the rebels will be replaced by the Soviet Union in the stocks of these two countries. So, I would suppose that the international relations between the UAR and the Soviet Union are pretty close at this point.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Miller.
Senator MILLER. Thank you.

PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

I think Senator Mundt had some practical observations. I am wondering, what would be wrong with changing this outright prohibition into a provision that in the case of any negotiation for future foreign aid, the Congress would have to approve the agreement?

Now, if this were done, it would seem to me that it would preserve your card in the deck, so to speak, because the Congress hasn't written in a prohibition. They just said they want to see it. It would give the House a basis for a compromise positions and, of course, this could be preceded by certain recitals relating to some of the things we object to, such as the Congo, furnishing of ammunition to the rebels in the Congo, the burning of libraries. Possibly we could sweeten up the kitty of the recital of the deliquencies of the assessments in the United Nations by the UAR and a few other things which you could recommend.

What would be wrong with that approach?

Secretary RUSK. I really think I would have to consult others on this before I could give much of a comment. I do think there would be some constitutional problems about the method by which foreign relations are conducted and the respective responsibilities of the President and the Congress. Also, because of the many delicacies in some of these problems, I am not sure Executive action ought to be accompanied by a legislative debate, either in one direction or the other, because the very debate itself can have an important, and in many instances an injurious, influence on the situation.

A WHOLESOME THING FOR CAIRO TO KNOW

Senator MILLER. That could be minimized, if not eliminated, by what you could furnish the Senate and the House.

I must say that I think that, as far as the constitutional aspects are concerned, I would have to defer to your people on that, but in effect that would be placing a negotiated agreement for foreign aid into the category of a treaty possibly. I can't see that this would be repetitious and would involve a lot of countries. We don't have many of these, thank goodness, but it might serve as a means for strengthening your own hand because, you see, you are in a position of saying, "Well, the Congress hasn't said 'No,' and we changed the House amendment so the Congress has revoked the prohibition, but they have to look at it and you know how they are." I think it would give you some bargaining power which maybe you don't have now.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would have to say in this private session that I think it has been—it is a wholesome thing for the Government in Cairo to know today that this is a major issue before the Congress and that the Congress is having to make up its mind about how it is going to handle it.

Senator MILLER. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I don't want to confess this too frequently, but this strengthens our hand in our present discussions with the Egyptian Government. What I am anxious about is that we not throw this card away, that we keep the card to play and, therefore, we don't do it as a matter of law. I mean a sense of the Congress resolution, for example, would be quite another matter.

A MIDDLE GROUND

Senator MILLER. I think your card-in-the-deck point is well taken, but I suggest to you that there may be a middle ground, and that is to withdraw the prohibition and in place of that put a requirement that the Congress approve it. Then you still have the card in the deck. Of course, it will be subject to Congress, but I just throw that out. You might explore it.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, my view on this is affected to a degree by the fact that we are not talking about a new or prospective agreement. We are talking about whether by law we cancel an agreement which has already been made.

Senator MILLER. Yes, sir, I understand that, but what I am suggesting is that we cancel out that which the House has taken and in lieu of that put this prosepctive thing in. Then you have given the House Members something to bargain with and to accept in lieu of this. I think it might be an approach to thinking about it.

Secretary RUSK. Let me report that back to my colleagues.

Senator MILLER. Surely. I am sorry to have detained you.

Secretary RUSK. I think I will need some advice on that before I comment.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, what has been the reaction to the House action in Cairo, or has there been any?

Secretary RUSK. May I answer that just off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. We appreciate your coming and spending the time with us.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JANUARY 28, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in informal, executive session at 4 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Sparkman and Aiken.

Meeting with the subcommittee was Juan De Onis, recently a New York Times correspondent in Cuba.

No transcript was taken of the meeting.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:45 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Lausche, Pell, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Pell, the nominations of Maurice Bernbaum, to be Ambassador to Venezuela, and Wymberley DeR. Coerr, to be Ambassador to Ecuador, were approved for report.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:46 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in an informal, executive session at 4:15 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman).

The subcommittee met with Irving Salert, Labor Attaché, American Embassy, Mexico City.

No transcript was taken, and no record of attendance of other members was kept.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present; Chairman Fulbright and Senators Church, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

The chairman announced as the first order of business the bill (S. 805), to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the fund for special operations of the bank.

On a vote to report the bill favorably, the Members were recorded as follows:

Yeas:
Senator Sparkman (proxy);
Senator Mansfield (proxy);
Senator Long (proxy);
Senator Lausche (proxy);
Senator Church;
Senator Dodd (proxy);
Senator Smathers (proxy);
Senator Clark (proxy);
Senator Pell;
Senator Hickenlooper;
Senator Aiken;
Senator Carlson;
Senator Case;
Senator Fulbright;

Senator Aiken announced Senator Williams wished to be voted in the affirmative.

Senator Symington passed.

Senator Lausche changed his vote from AYE to NAY.

So the bill was reported favorably, 15 YEAS to 1 NAY.

Donald W. Hoagland, nominated to be Assistant Administrator for Development Finance and Private Enterprise, appeared before the committee. Following his appearance, Senator Church moved that his nomination be approved for report. The motion carried unanimously.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcripts.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In retaliation for a Vietcong attack on an American barracks at Pleiku, which left 8 soldiers dead and 126 wounded, the United States launched carrier-based planes to bomb military targets inside North Vietnam on Feb. 7 and 8, 1965. President Johnson also ordered the evacuation of 2,000 U.S. dependents from South Vietnam. Noting that Hanoi had taken a more aggressive course, the President said: "We have no choice but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence."]

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m. in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator Frank J. Lausche presiding.

Present: Senators Lausche, Clark, Pell, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

Also present: Senator Jacob K. Javits, Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

Senator LAUSCHE. We would like to have a report. Will you proceed with your presentation?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BUNDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE FAR EAST

Mr. BUNDY. I have no prepared statement. I think we discussed my coming up here last week. I take it at this point you would rather have us say where we think we stand at this moment with respect to South Vietnam. I will discuss that, and if there is anything else you want me to get into within the calm waters of my area, I will be delighted to do it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Good enough.

Mr. BUNDY. There is not very much I can add factually to the information that has come out in the various statements at Secretary McNamara's and Mr. Ball's press conference and in the newspapers concerning the second operation which was carried out yesterday morning or Monday Saigon time, except to make clear, I think, what the members of the committee will have already read on what is clearly reliable authority in the newspapers, that the operation of Monday was the South Vietnamese part of Sunday's extended operation which was aborted because of weather. We were anxious not to give the impression, at least at this time, that we were getting into a steady or continuing course of action against the north, but, at the same time, it was basic to the whole agreement between ourselves and the Vietnamese that there should be a joint operation. So. there seemed to be very strong reason to continue with the intended Vietnamese part, and that is in fact what was done.

As of this moment we do not plan any further operations related to the incident, this particular dramatic series of incidents.

Senator CARLSON. Could I ask a question there?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, go ahead.

WHO ORDERED THE SECOND STRIKE?

Senator CARLSON. It fits right here. Was this second strike ordered through the White House or through our forces over in Vietnam?

Mr. BUNDY. It was ordered through the—well, it was ordered on the basis of the agreement reached with the South Vietnamese Government Saturday night, Sunday morning Saigon time, as the full scope of what would be done, so that it was Presidentially approved in the U.S. Government at that time, Senator, and that approval was renewed in the course of Sunday. This was really the first decision we had to face on Sunday morning, having learned that the Vietnamese part had been aborted, whether to go ahead with it and to continue to agree with the South Vietnamese Government that it should be done.

For the reasons I have stated, the President determined that it should be done, that we would give our consent. I think we are trying—I may say parenthetically—to be in the position where we are, for practical purposes at any rate, in control of operations against the north because of our control of the assets and because, as in this instance, the Vietnamese air force striking an unknown target required our Pathfinder and our Cap aircraft, and they would have real difficulty carrying this out without us.

That was the extent of our participation. I haven't the numbers right at hand. They were not large compared to the number of Vietnamese strike aircraft, which is about 24. They lost one.

HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OPERATION

The operation, incidentally, appears to have been a—well, not so incidentally—but in any case appears to have been highly successful. The eyeball reports reported about 90 percent of the target, which is a very clearly marked military installation and barracks area, was destroyed, which is at least a comforting indication that the Vietnamese air force with our training has learned to do this kind of job.

The strike was led by the Commander of the Vietnamese air force himself, General [Nguyen Cao] Ky, and they obviously put their best people onto it. They showed that, properly directed to the target, they can do the job.

They were flying the A1E aircraft Skyraiders, which are pretty good aircraft for this kind of pinpoint bombing, and they did a very effective job. It was just across the border, and some flak was encountered, but nothing serious, though they did hit one, as I say, and that got as far back as Da Nang, so the pilot was recovered.

In other words, that is the end of this episode, so to speak. I cannot say at this point what will flow from this. We are looking very hard at the possibility that if the North Vietnamese continue with this whole pattern of infiltration on a stepped-up scale, whether additional actions of this sort will be necessary. At this moment

of time, I cannot give you any report of decisions in that area, but they certainly are not foreclosed.

REACTIONS OF CHINESE AND SOVIETS

The other side of the coin, of course, is the reaction on the other side. I have the texts of the various announcements. I can characterize them briefly if the committee wants, but I think your staff has access to them. We can leave them with you. Hanoi has responded with a good deal of invective and has said that they will strike back repeatedly and hard and so on, but nothing that goes beyond what they had said on previous occasions.

The Chinese have reiterated the now rather threadbare formula, "We will not sit idly by," and have had demonstrations, we believe, in Peking. We do not know how big. But there, too, there is no significantly new note involved.

The Soviets, of course, were perhaps the one most to watch on this, and as we view it, the Soviets almost certainly had no part in the decision to take the obviously coordinated series of attacks in the Pleiku area, Tuy Hao, and Nha Trang on the early morning hours of the 7th, which provided the basis for this action. I mean they were the provocation. They were very definitely, as we have publicly stated, a test of our will in the circumstances, and I have noted today that our Ambassador in Moscow says he is inclined to agree with the speculation that Hanoi did this quite deliberately in order to put the Soviets on the spot with the expectation that the Soviets might be stronger than they would otherwise have been. But as I say, we do not suppose the Soviets had any part themselves in the decision.

KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

Now we have got a clear statement from Kosygin and another from Moscow which underscores their giving all kinds of assistance for the defense of North Vietnam and reiterates other language of full support, but in the circumstances, we are inclined to regard that, at least as a preliminary reaction, as not a violent reaction and not indicating at this stage, at any rate, any great degree of Soviet commitment to the conflict. I think it was a virtual certainty, even before this episode, that the Kosygin [1] visit would produce promises of military and economic assistance. We have some intelligence evidence—in fact, very reliable intelligence evidence, I can say in this committee—that the Soviets have already furnished substantial anti-aircraft equipment, particularly for the key airfield in the Hanoi area, which now has about 53 MIGs on it that the Communist Chinese sent in, 35 or 36, at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident and since that time.

So when Kosygin finally leaves—and we do not know at this moment when that will be; it was billed originally as a 4-day visit and that would end it the morning of the 10th, in other words, tonight, but we are not clear that he is definitely going to leave on schedule. It may be that there are further consultations in process

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[1] Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin visited Hanoi from Feb. 6 to 10, 1965 to discuss Soviet aid to North Vietnam.

and that more will be said before he leaves. We would expect his departure to include a nailing down, perhaps in more specific terms, of this military and economic assistance.

Now, in this area, as I say, we are as sure as we are sitting here that this will include air defense weaponry. It is not off the cards that it could include SA2 surface to air missiles, which would be significant additions. It may include additional radar equipment, ground control, and so on, all of which will considerably add to North Vietnamese defensive capabilities against air attack in an area where they are obviously highly sensitive and weak, and where the Soviets are in a much stronger position to supply it than the Chinese Communists.

SOVIET REENTRY TO INFLUENCE IN HANOI

I think in hindsight this has been very much part of a pattern of Soviet reentry to a position of some influence in Hanoi. The chronology, I think, is known to you, that Van Dong went up there, went to the Moscow anniversary celebrations in November, and was given something of a red carpet treatment at that time.

Prior to that, in January of last year, a little over a year ago, Hanoi had sent a mission to Moscow and it had returned in a clear atmosphere of disappointment, and at the same time the Hanoi journals and so on had swung sharply to the Chinese Communist line in the dispute between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. The Soviets are certainly very edgy about having been taken out of the position of influence in the Asian Communist parties generally. We have seen this with respect to Indonesia, where they are out politically in left field now, in Mikoyan's visit last June, which was a pretty undignified performance for a Soviet diplomat. They are concerned about being ousted from influence. They are concerned to get what support they can for participation in the Afro-Asian Conference—now, incidentally, postponed to late June and obviously having real troubles getting organized—because they feel that otherwise the Afro-Asian Conference will turn into a possible Chinese Communist vehicle of influence. So that these motives entered in, and I think Hanoi's clear need for air defense equipment provided a very natural entry point.

Soviet sources last week here in town were giving out the information that it was a cinch that there would be these undertakings to supply these things, and I think we will now see these. Whether they will be more or different as a result of the weekend, it may be very difficult to judge, and this will be something we will try to figure out.

MOUSETRAPPING THE SOVIETS

Beyond that, I might say that Ambassador Thompson called in the Soviet Ambassador on Sunday and gave him a very simple and straightforward explanation of what we were doing, making clear that, in our view, Hanoi had in effect mousetrapped the Soviets on this one, that we had obviously no choice but to act, and we were acting.

Senator LAUSCHE. How did they mousetrap?

Mr. BUNDY. By conducting this action at a time when Kosygin was in Hanoi, thereby putting the Soviets pretty much on the spot, and we had no choice.

I may say that I will mention one other thing that I think would be of interest to members of the committee. We have not made this public, but I think it is significant. We had for some time been considering another destroyer patrol into the Gulf of Tonkin. That has a legitimate mission of finding that certain technical information about their air defense, radars, and so on. It can do that while it is considerably off shore, and we would regard it at least as not provocative. One of these had, in fact, been scheduled to take place when the Kosygin visit was announced, and we decided that this was running a risk of misinterpretation to do it at that particular time, so we postponed it for the period of the Kosygin visit. We have informed the Soviet Ambassador to that effect to make clear our view that we did not want to in any sense put on something special during this period, and I think that may have some influence on them.

SOVIETS DO NOT WANT TO GET DRAWN IN FURTHER

At any rate, up to this point, their reaction has been in all the circumstances, as I say—we can only regard as a minimum reaction. I think they were bound to make some strong noise of what we had done. They have backed the whole North Vietnamese effort against South Vietnam as a war of liberation. We can expect no affirmative help from them at all on the contrary, but at the same time I do not think they want to get drawn in further if they can help it at this time. That would be the surmise one would make.

We may hear more from them. It is conceivable that they will start to put on pressures for a conference. So far that has not revealed itself. So at this point we have seen one shoe drop. It does not seem to have hit very hard. There may be another shoe coming either publicly or privately from the Soviets in some form. So at the moment we do not consider the immediate ripples to have died down fully until we hear a little more.

I think that about sums it up, Mr. Chairman, at this moment of time. I am sure it must raise questions in the members' minds.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I have not any particular questions to ask.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I have several, but they are of such a current nature; if you all know these facts, I am low man on the totem pole, and I will ask mine later.

Senator LAUSCHE. Frank.

Senator CARLSON. I do not believe I have any right now. I appreciate this discussion very much.

ANTICIPATE FURTHER STRIKES

Senator AIKEN. We anticipate further strikes on their part, of course, here, there, and everywhere.

Mr. BUNDY. I think there is no question the Vietcong activity will be at a high rate in the near future. We would expect that in any event.

Senator AIKEN. There has been public discussion about the security guard not being awake——

Mr. BUNDY. Yes.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. Somewhere. What were they doing that night?

Mr. BUNDY. This is a subject that I am reluctant to pose as an expert on, Senator, because you know I am not.

Senator AIKEN. This is all right.

DELINQUENCY, NOT COLLUSION

Mr. BUNDY. I have General Wheeler's material that he had this morning. He testified at length, I think, actually, over before the House Armed Services Committee. It does indicate that the Vietnamese guards were on their posts and that the half strength story that has appeared in the paper is not correct.

Senator AIKEN. That is not true?

Mr. BUNDY. Beyond that, I must say it would take more of a military man than myself to know whether there was delinquency of any sort.

Senator AIKEN. Well, delinquency, but was there any collusion?

Mr. BUNDY. Collusion I should doubt.

Senator AIKEN. You would naturally think of that.

Mr. BUNDY. I do not know. That has happened. I cannot deny it is a possibility.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has it been suggested anywhere?

Mr. BUNDY. I had not seen that suggestion, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. One would think it.

Mr. BUNDY. I think obviously they have some friends or are likely to have some friends in a place like this. They know the terrain and all that. They probably do not need very much.

I might say one thing that came into the same story—I think the Times stories of yesterday raised these doubts more strongly, and I cannot speak authoritatively on the security thing except that this material, which is what General Wheeler had, would indicate to me that the people were on the job. But whether there should have been patrols out and so on are matters that I simply do not know enough about in a military way.

Senator AIKEN. How near did the Vietcong get?

Mr. BUNDY. They got right up through the barbed wire. They cut their way through the barbed wire in both places, so they did get right in.

ESTIMATE OF VIETCONG

Now there is one interesting thing that appeared in the same story that I think is worth just noting to the committee. I think we did it in the press conference, but certainly in the letter to the U.N., we underscored that the mortars in the hands of the Vietcong come overwhelmingly from the north and are very frequently an infiltration element, which was part of the necessary connection between these attacks and the infiltration which was, after all, the type of target that was hit. We asked and got some facts on that. The estimate is that the Vietcong have about 130 of the 81 mm mortars and about 300 of the 60 mm mortars, and of those, accord-

ing to the best pick-up we can do, we have only 16 that could have been captured since 1962, and they have come in almost wholly since 1962, so although there are significant captures of small arms, even there a large proportion has come in the past in these areas of weaponry, the mortars and so on. It is the infiltration that is responsible. There is quite a direct link there.

U.S. GUARDS NOT FEASIBLE

Senator AIKEN. Do we not use any of our own guards inasmuch as this same thing has happened before?

Mr. BUNDY. That is true, sir, and I think the policy on that, again with deference to the military people who know this better, is that if we got into the business of providing our own guards—this was true at Bien Hoa, this is true wherever we have an installation—I think we asked, just to see, General Westmoreland what his force requirement would be to provide adequate security for all significant U.S. installations, and I think his estimate—and he is not the sort of fellow who would pad this—was upwards of 50,000 men to do a real job. That, of course, is a substantial burden on the Vietnamese forces, there is no question about it. But it just is not feasible, unless we wanted to enlarge our military presence enormously, for us to take on those security missions.

NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT ANTICIPATE RETALIATORY STRIKE

Senator AIKEN. Did the North Vietnamese seem to be anticipating the retaliatory strike?

Mr. BUNDY. We have no direct intelligence on that, sir, but there have been very clear indications in the past—notably at the time of the Bien Hoa attack—that they were on the highest possible state of alert.

Senator AIKEN. They should have expected it.

Mr. BUNDY. I think they expected it, but that is only supposition. I have no direct evidence for that.

Senator AIKEN. You would not say that they wanted it, that is, they would like to have it without much damage probably, but that has been going through my mind. It seems to me that they sort of set the trap where it was heads they win and tails we lose. If we had not retaliated——

Mr. BUNDY. We would lose very heavily.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. They would have put on their show for Kosygin. When we did retaliate, they still put on a show, probably for him.

Mr. BUNDY. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. We will have to wait and see how he is affected by it.

Mr. BUNDY. As I say, the evidence to date is that the Soviets have not reacted sharply, but I would not consider that the last return.

Senator AIKEN. It could be either way.

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, it could be.

Senator LAUSCHE. Joe?

MORE THAN JUST ANOTHER VIETCONG RAID

Senator CLARK. Bill, you may have answered this before I came in. What is the nature of the evidence which seems to satisfy the administration that this was more than just another Vietcong raid that started from South Vietnam and dictated from South Vietnam, as distinguished from the raid planned from Hanoi with possibly Chinese collusion?

Mr. BUNDY. We do not have a prisoner who has specifically reported on this episode. Pleiku is an area where the infiltration from the north comes down right through that area, and it goes over to the coast from there. That in itself is only circumstantial evidence. What we do have is a past very clear pattern from priosners, and occasionally from documents, recording—sometimes before, more often after the fact—the orders received from higher authority to carry out a specific thing which is, in fact, carried out.

Now, by that higher authority, in the light of all the circumstances and the testimony of other prisoners on how the instructions come down in general, we are convinced, and I think a terribly strong circumstantial case be made, that as a practical matter Hanoi does control any significant episode or set of episodes in itself, that it calls the shots on whether there will be incidents in Saigon or whether they will lay off, that it calls the shots on an operation of any real scale whatever, where it will take place and how it will be done. In this case, these operations—coming at the time they did and aimed as they were predominantly at Americans, although not exclusively, but predominantly at Americans—I would think the circumstantial case was just overwhelming that this was ordered from Hanoi.

ORDERS FROM HANOI

Senator CLARK. Is it your position in the Department that every one of these raids all over South Vietnam is ordered from Hanoi?

Mr. BUNDY. No, I would not go that far, but the evidence we have relates much more to the categories I have spoken of, and I think this clearly falls in that category. No, no, I do not think if you take Outpost X with a popular force platoon of 20 men, is an order from Hanoi. That is a local discretion order.

Senator CLARK. What is the official view as to how many Vietcong were involved in this latest raid?

Mr. BUNDY. I think it was a company or two in each instance. They were not major forces.

Senator CLARK. Pretty small?

Senator BUNDY. Pretty small, that is correct, but the nature of the objectives, the degree of preparation required to get and to move this close, the determination shown, everything pointed to something higher than a local commander's decisions.

Senator CLARK. However, the evidence is entirely circumstantial.

Mr. BUNDY. That is correct, sir. It is based on past analogy, and I suppose that has to be called circumstantial, but it is pretty conclusive to all of us.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Senator LAUSCHE. Jack, you are not a member of the committee, but you are welcome.

SOVIETS' MINIMUM GESTURE

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much. I express my appreciation to the Chair for the courtesy of having me attend.

Has the U.S.S.R given us any message on this subject, or are we relying on the fact that Kosygin has expressed himself?

Mr. BUNDY. So far we have had nothing going beyond the public statements, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. Does the attack upon the Moscow Embassy represent in our eyes some considered finding by the central regime in Moscow as contrasted from Kosygin on the ground?

Mr. BUNDY. If I may speak very frankly and not for revelation outside, our ambassadors reported that when they got wind that a demonstration might be brewing, they called the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office said, "We will handle it and keep it under control; just keep your cars off the street." So it looks to us as though it was kind of a minimum gesture.

What they are doing here, you see, is in large part related to trying to make a strong enough noise to show that they are still strong Communists, and indeed there is no question that they are strongly supporting the whole thing, and the demonstration would be part of that. That the demonstration took place, it is obviously an officially condoned or inspired demonstration, but it was, in fact, quite small in size.

ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN VIETNAM

Senator JAVITS. I gather you feel our position, from what the press says, is still tenable in South Vietnam. Is it your judgment from your contacts and discussions there that a majority of the Vietnamese people want us there and want to resist the Vietcong and so on? Are we blowing against the wind?

Mr. BUNDY. Sir, I do not want to sail under my brother's colors, so I will not claim firsthand observation in the last few months, but I think our view is very clear on this—that the great bulk of the people of South Vietnam do not want to have Hanoi or Communists rule them and that they welcome our support for this.

Now, it is true that you have had anti-American slogans and signs used in demonstrations. Notably this feeling was whipped up to some degree by General Khanh during the Christmas week at the time that we were having difficulties with them over their action in effect taking over momentarily from the civilian government, saying, "You just go ahead and govern," which did not seem to us to be effective government. It was not civilian versus military. It was a question of governing.

More recently this has come up in these demonstrations led by what I call the political Buddhists in Da Nang, up in the northern central areas where there has been a strong admixture of anti-American slogans. There appears to be a certain amount of this, but primarily it seems to be used to put the other fellow in a position of having to support us instead of being a nationalist Vietnamese. Nationalism is on the march out there, no question about it, and this is the nationalist state of the thing.

But the other side of the coin is that at no time have our enormous network of personal relationships at all levels been impaired in any way. It is remarkably friendly.

COMPARISON TO FRENCH POSITION IN 1954

You may have seen a very interesting dispatch by Seymour Topping in the Times last week. He is an old hand in the area, and he was comparing the atmosphere of Saigon, and even the position of an American now, to the position of French and Americans in 1953 and 1954 and very much to the advantage of today, saying in that period you could not be sure Frenchmen were being killed in broad daylight. Nobody would give you any information of any thread of this sort, and today the Americans by and large are treated in a perfectly reasonable way. There is none of this that appears to be a widespread local populist thing. That is not to say a Vietcong agent cannot put a bomb under a barracks, because this obviously can happen, but I do not think you read into that anything other than an agent's operation.

I would say that this is a danger. It is one that I was discussing at lunch the other day with a group of Senators. But it is at a very low level indeed, all things considered, and I think decidedly at a controllable level. I think the overall sentiment understands and accepts the need for our presence to help them and our own motives in doing so.

Senator JAVITS. Just a last question, Mr. Chairman.

NO EVIDENCE OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT

Is there any reappraisal of a Communist Chinese involvement in the picture, or is it still about what you have generally estimated it up to now?

Mr. BUNDY. No; we have had no reappraisal. Basically we believe that the personnel, as far as we can tell, entirely—we have not ever run down a reliable report of a Red Chinese presence in South Vietnam although we have had them—I cannot say it is out of the question—but we have never run one down, nor have the Vietnamese had a prisoner of clear Communist Chinese.

On the equipment side, there is equipment captured that is recent Communist Chinese manufacture. Lately there have been quite a number of 7.62 rifles, which are the standard Chinese rifle, also the standard Soviet rifle, but in this case we think it is of Chinese manufacture, and other items of equipment or one sort of another that were made in China. But our supposition is that it is more likely that that came down to the North Vietnamese and then was sent down by them.

We have not supposed that there were large direct shipments, although there may have been some in the days when we thought the stuff was coming into Cambodia and then down the river. We used to think some of that might be coming directly from Communist China.

But on the whole, we believe—and we think the factual evidence supports the belief—that this is overwhelmingly Hanoi's show and that they want to keep it this way. This is a very major factor. The Chinese-Vietnamese historical antagonism is present in the situa-

tion, while at the same time Hanoi wants all the support it can get. It gets it in large propaganda doses, and it got the MIGs when it needed them, when it thought it needed them after the Gulf of Tonkin.

So there is a very clear Communist Chinese role, but I am trying to paint a picture that it is auxiliary to the main effort which is a North Vietnamese effort. I think Peiping probably was pretty unhappy to have Mr. Kosygin going to Hanoi and to have the Soviet influence reasserted there. I do not think they know quite what to make of that yet. Now, I do not exclude their working together at all, but I think to this point it looks a little more the other way.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

Senator CLARK. Do you have any appraisal, Bill, of the extent to which the Vietcong army is a South Vietnamese army as opposed to a North Vietnamese army?

Mr. BUNDY. Yes. Let me, if I may, divide that into two parts. Your infiltration from the north—I think we have supplied the committee staff with copies of the intelligence report which we used as a basis for backgrounding the press on the whole infiltration problem.

The recapitulation now done raises previous estimates substantially, because within the last year the Vietnamese intelligence operation has vastly improved in effectiveness. They have really started doing the kind of careful cross-checking and unit identification that, as an old intelligence officer, would have been standard practice with us at any time.

What this much better factual base seems to establish is that the infiltration total since 1959, we call it confirmed 19,000, that is where you have double sourcing, both a prisoner and a document or two prisoners and so on. Probably, based on plausible and sifted single reports, another 15,000, and even that must be regarded as incomplete, because we get more information that tends to raise it, so that if anything, the whole picture is on the low side.

Senator CLARK. It is about 6,000 a year.

Mr. BUNDY. Well, it has varied from year to year, enormously. It went probably as high as 13 in 1962, dropped down to 6,500 in 1963, and in 1964 went up to the round number—I am giving an extrapolated figure here, because we are always late in catching up on this one—of 10,000, and probably somewhat higher. It has gone up again, and this is now more or less approaching the flood season, so that it may be going up quite substantially, and all of our observations in the infiltration area suggest that it is now very active.

HARDCORE VIETCONG STRENGTH

Now, coming to your point, relating those totals, suppose you have your 19 to 34—you have an estimate based on this——

Senator CLARK. Excuse me. Would they stay once they are there or would they go home?

Mr. BUNDY. Very few, we believe, go back, though we can't be positive; 19 to 34 have come from the north, and those are well trained, highly skilled fellows, we believe, military ranks, political

commissars, propaganda experts, and technicians and so on. They definitely, we believe, would form part of the hard core of the Vietcong strength in the south, which we estimate between 29,000 and 35,000.

If you take then 60,000 to 80,000 irregular forces, which are more local and may go out in the fields during the day and then come in for any particular action, as the percentage of the hard core, you have your 19 to 34, less casualties, less whoever may have gone back—and there may have been some flow back with information and things of that sort—I myself would come out with a guess that the infiltration from North Vietnam accounts for something over half the hard core, which I think warrants the conclusion that we have stated, that it is the mainspring of this thing and has been right along. Significant numbers of the Vietcong also undoubtedly are what we call in the intelligence business stay-behind forces, because there were pockets of Communist influence right through, even in 1954 to 1959.

Zone D, north of Saigon, Tay Ninh, up against—I might just show those on the map—Tay Ninh, up against the Cambodian border, this area, the peninsula with ready access, and the so-called Doza, which is in the area in the mountains here, have been Communist strongholds right through the best years of the Diem regime. So a considerable number were stay-behind Viet Minh going back to there, which I think you can tie to North Vietnam in a somewhat different sense.

Now, as to the number that are native North Vietnamese, there you have, up to the early part of 1964, the infiltrators that were picked up, and all the evidence as to their identity was that they were South Vietnamese who had joined the Viet Minh to fight the French, or later, but mostly to fight the French and then come back. That was a natural choice.

They knew the terrain. They had relatives. They knew the whole score. Since early 1964 they appeared to have reached the bottom of that barrel with a thud, because roughly 90 percent of the confirmed 1964 infiltrators for the first 7 months we now estimate to have been indigenous or native Vietnamese. I want to separate the ones who were native North Vietnamese from the ones who have come to North Vietnam. There is no distinction in principle, but just to cover the whole question.

A TWO-KIND RESPONSE

Senator PELL. Forgive me if I take a bit of time. I am new on the committee, and I want to clarify in my own mind some of these questions about Vietnam, so to go from the particular to the more general. In the particular, haven't there been many incidents of this sort where equally large numbers or larger numbers of South Vietnamese have been killed or wounded? Doesn't this indicate a sort of a two-kind response? We respond heavily for American lives and not for Vietnamese lives?

Mr. BUNDY. I think that is a very searching question, Senator, and it is one that has concerned us. It is correct to say that there have been surprise sneak attacks on Vietnamese camps, and some of these have produced as large or larger casualties, and this is a

matter that we have weighed in the past as to whether that should constitute the occasion for this kind of action.

I think timing had a good deal to do with weighing this action as heavily as we did, coming as it did right after the holiday, within two hours after the period when Hanoi rather publicly said there should be a stand down of military activity, and coming at a time when Kosygin was in Moscow. In all the circumstances, this one seemed to stand out as an attempt to hit us very hard and make us look as if we were totally lacking in determination if we didn't respond.

Now, I think we are going to have to get at this point that you have raised, because I think it is a very acute one. The kind of thing that is happening, for example, against the railroad line is pretty brutal and pretty sustained, and has now seriously impaired the railroad line running up the coast.

We are looking to see if we can classify and identify things. Now, I am not saying any decisions have been taken to see exactly what ought to be considered as the occasion for a response of this kind.

A BAD PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

Senator PELL. To my mind this would have a bad psychological impact——

Mr. BUNDY. I agree.

Senator PELL [continuing]. In the whole Asian area. The Vietnamese with whom I have talked seem always very concerned that we get terribly excited when three or four Americans are killed, but utterly unconcerned when 300 or 600 South Vietnamese are killed. I think when we respond violently to raids on Americans, we are on the one hand upholding our national position, but I am not sure we are helping our position in that part of the world.

POSITION OF THE CARRIERS

I want to ask you another question. Why were the three carriers so close together in the area? Normally they are on patrol, if my recollection of Navy tactics is correct, on a rotating basis.

Mr. BUNDY. I can't be as specific, again. This is a military question, but my understanding is that, in fact, one carrier was on station and two were steaming back to Subic. They had just been ordered back to Subic. We normally keep two in that area.

Senator PELL. But not three?

Mr. BUNDY. It so happened that they had been ordered to go back, that the relief had just taken place, so that we had three within calling distance. I am told by my military friends that particularly the Ranger, which was the one near Subic I think, that getting it turned around and in a position to launch planes was one very remarkable performance in the time. Three was not the normal station complement, but it was solely because there was a relief taking place at that particular moment.

VIETCONG WEAPONS

Senator PELL. Would it be correct to say that the largest weapons that were used by the North Vietnamese were captured 81 mm American mortars, not the majority, but the largest?

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, I think it is correct to say that the largest weapon employed was the 81 mm mortar.

Now, I went into this for a moment in my opening statement, because while there are categories of weapons where the proportion captured from Vietnamese forces, United States supplied, is quite large, it is very difficult to come out with any accuracy. Perhaps, oh, I don't know, just as a benchmark guess 30 percent of the small arms would be captured, would be my own best guess, based on incomplete captured totals in 3 years and so on.

In the case of mortars you can pin it down with some accuracy, because that is a pretty zealously guarded weapon in the Vietnamese forces. In 1964 all the evidence we have is that only four were captured, and going back to 1962, the best figure, sort of as a median guess, which goes beyond the actual reports, is 16, whereas we estimate, based on pretty reliable evidence of where they turn up and so on, that the Vietcong have at least 130 plus about 300 of the 60 mm mortars.

So in this case the percentage that is captured is really very small, and the evidence is overwhelming that those do come from the north. I think mortars first began to show up in the Vietcong forces in any size about a year and a half ago, and we surmised then, and some of them show it on the manufacturing place, that they came out of North Vietnam, in some places manufactured in Communist China.

CAPTURED AMERICAN-MADE WEAPONS

Senator PELL. Would you be in a position to hazard an estimate as to the percentage of the heavy mortars, how many heavy mortars were captured in this raid, the American-made ones as opposed to how many were Chinese?

Mr. BUNDY. As I said, our estimate is that they have 130 and they have captured at no time since more than 16.

Senator PELL. Of the 81 mm?

Mr. BUNDY. The 81's.

Senator PELL. How many did we capture in this last raid?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't know which raid you mean.

Senator PELL. Of the one that happened.

Mr. BUNDY. The one that happened I don't think we captured any. They got away.

Senator PELL. So in other words, our evidence is based pretty much not on captured weapons, but just on what we deduced from the firepower.

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, and the fact that this formidable total is present with only a very small proportion accounted for by ones that have been lost by South Vietnamese forces.

Senator PELL. To me there still would be an element of doubt as to whether the attack was made with American weapons or not.

Senator CLARK. How about ammunition? Isn't there a good deal of captured American ammunition being used?

Mr. BUNDY. Not very much. The Vietcong usually are not able to carry away ammunition.

There have been incidents where they got significant amounts, but by and large the capture ratio, I think I am right on this, is

rather more the other way, because the government will succeed in occupying an area and remove the ammunition, which is seldom true in the Vietcong case.

Senator PELL. And you can't tell from the missiles, because the missiles can be changed and scattered.

Mr. BUNDY. No, you cannot prove it. You do not have—and I wouldn't pretend otherwise—direct evidence that these mortars came on X date from North Vietnam, or that the ammunition that was used came on X date. I don't think in the nature of things you would expect to have that, but the circumstantial evidence would be very strong that that was the case.

WAITING TO REACT VIOLENTLY

Senator PELL. Is it conceivable—I must say just from hearing this presentation and reading in the press—is it conceivable that we are trying to mousetrap the mousetrappers in the sense that we wanted to have an incident at the time Kosygin was there, so as to push the North Vietnamese in this direction?

Mr. BUNDY. Absolutely not. I can say flatly that we were in not a totally extraordinary state of alert, but a high state of alert. I assure you, Senator, we don't play with American lives in this way.

Senator PELL. We were not waiting for an incident to react violently?

Mr. BUNDY. No indeed, we were not. Most certainly we were not.

WHAT TERMS ARE ACCEPTABLE?

Senator PELL. Now forgive me. On a more general basis—and you will remember we discussed this a few days ago, Bill, those of us who are new on this committee, at least, have problems answering these questions when we go home.

From a general viewpoint, from the public viewpoint, what are the terms that would be acceptable to the administration under which we would pull out?

Mr. BUNDY. An independent and secure South Vietnam, in a word, with adequate assurance of its being left alone.

Senator PELL. Would a similar accord such as the Geneva accord for Laos be satisfactory or not?

Mr. BUNDY. No, I think not, although there would be room for argument on this. A key provision of the Laos accords is that Laos is not free to receive, other than very narrowly stated military advice, military personnel.

Senator PELL. Forgive me. That was also a clause in the Vietnamese thing that we violated probably more than any other nation.

INTERPRETATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORD

Mr. BUNDY. I could go back over the history of that. The Vietnamese—there are three provisions. Cambodia was unlimited, both as to numbers and as to nationality. Laos was limited, but quite generously as to numbers, and limited to the French. Vietnam was not limited as to nationality, but was limited to numbers equal to the numbers of the French the date of the signing of the accords, and that took a little interpretation.

The interpretation that took in the military technical people raised the military figure to about 600, and that was in fact our figure up to President Kennedy's decision to go in on the advisory basis in November-December 1961. There is no question that we have been way above that number, of course, since then, on the basis that the whole course of conduct by North Vietnam was such a total violation of the Geneva accords that under what I think is a well established principle of international law, other people operating within the framework of the agreement—and, of course, we weren't a signatory, but did say we would do nothing to upset it—were relieved from any obligation that they might have. I think that is a sound justification.

A LAOS-TYPE SETTLEMENT

Coming back to your question would a Laos settlement work in Vietnam, if Hanoi really were out and if there had been adequate verification machinery establishing that Hanoi was no longer infiltrating people, and quite possibly I think one would want to at least try to get the people who have the key cadre, who have come down within these figures I have spoken of, if you had a situation where they just plain were out, then I think it possible that Vietnam could stand on its own feet with a very minimum external presence. This is what we mean when we say we would be prepared to withdraw.

Now, whether it could go clear down to zero might be a matter more of psychological than of practical consequences, that as you now have a highly trained Vietnamese army with a lot of equipment, if the thing were down to quite manageable proportions, it might be able to carry on, but it might still make a psychological difference to have them able to call on a limited number at that time. Therefore I would have doubt whether the kind of total exclusion of foreign military personnel provision that is in the Laos agreement would be appropriate for Vietnam.

A REARTICULATION OF AMERICAN WISHES

Senator PELL. Has any thought been given to a rearticulation of the American wishes for the whole area?

Mr. BUNDY. Yes. I think we have stated it more or less repeatedly in general terms. I have tried my hand at writing things of this sort, to speak frankly.

Senator PELL. I read your speech.

Mr. BUNDY. That says in general terms what we want is a Southeast Asia of independent countries going about their business as they see fit, without being hit by external interference and aggression, as they are now being hit. It is very simple.

We have from time to time, and I have referred to it in a number of speeches, also expressed our desire to support and, where appropriate, contribute, subject of course to appropriations and so on, to such development projects, particularly as the Mekong Valley project, which is now in a position where it has racked up all kinds of things that could be done to put in power and so on all along the Mekong Valley, and knit the area together. That has got a lot of constructive stuff in it, and it has got a very zealous group of plan-

ners working up at the U.N., and it has had the World Bank look at its projects, and the Japanese do some good exploratory work. There are a lot of building blocks there.

At this point, when you look at any one of those, you are hit by the security situation, just bang. You just can't get it put in. But if the security situation were resolved, there would be a great deal more that could be done.

Of course, right along we have been working in this thing in the economic quite as much as in the military field. If you look at Thailand, for example, and the enormous amount that has been accomplished there, you can see our peace aims almost visible before you. If your point is that we should state this more, I am inclined to agree, and I think this is one we will work on.

INTERESTS OF GREAT NATIONS

Senator PELL. You don't think that there is a general view in the world that great nations have particular interests when it comes to small nations and their borders?

We recognized that, in fact, at the time of the Hungarian revolution, when we didn't move in there and left the Soviets there. I think the Soviets have recognized it in their attitude with regard to our behavior in Latin America. There Bay of Pigs would be a good example.

You don't feel that we are insisting perhaps a little too much on having a pro-American neutrality in that part of the world?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think we need, as a matter of our national interest—what we want is to see them independent, and if they choose to adopt or even by treaty they were compelled to adopt a nonalliance structure—I am speaking now of Vietnam, I think this would be improper for the Thai at present. The Thai are in an alliance, value it, and I wouldn't change that. But with respect to Vietnam, we have repeatedly said that we would perfectly understand, and this indeed was the Geneva accords of 1954, that there would be a provision that it should not be a part of an alliance.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IS NOT A U.S. BASE

As far as China's concern for not being threatened in the adjacent countries, we have never regarded, and this would be true from a military standpoint, Southeast Asia as a good base area. It doesn't make any sense.

We have got vast power deployed, particularly at sea, from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and so on. We don't need it as a base area, and we have never envisioned it as a base area.

The kind of strength we had in there, the 600 in Vietnam, we had a few hundred in Cambodia—of course, now we have gone—and we have had comparable small numbers in Thailand, up to recently, up to the time that this became critical. I don't think that a reasonable man sitting in Peiping's shoes could have regarded those at any time as a threat. Now, it may well be that Peiping has the same view of what its security interests really require.

In fact, we had a very interesting report the other day of Chou En Lai talking to a Frenchman, in which he said, "We want cordon

sanitaire," which means countries that are Communist in this area. It reminded me all too unhappily of the way Stalin used to describe Russian interests in Central Europe. One can argue abstractly that in the past Chinese interests in Southeast Asia wanted no more than vassal and tributary states, but Communist logic goes further than that.

U.S. NOT SATISFIED WITH NEUTRALITY

Senator PELL. Bill, if you will forgive me, I think past events do not completely show that we are satisfied with neutrality. I would call to your mind the affairs in Laos, where with CIA support the right wing attempted a coup. I would call to your mind what happened in Cambodia, where again, with the CIA or with some Western connivance, efforts were made to oust King Sihanouk. I think the feeling in that part of the world is not what you say, and evidence proves it.

Mr. BUNDY. Those are events or periods about which I am not competent, nor should I testify. I have my own views about them.

I can only say I think the position we have taken on Laos was a right position in relation to the position that that so-called nation had occupied in the area. We have consistently taken the position, as I have stated for some years now, and I think it is the right position—I won't try to get into the history and where the mistakes were made in the past. I don't really think that helps us at this point.

Senator PELL. I think it does, to get across our policy in the area. Those of us who have traveled there were with the strong feeling that the general thought is we are not content with a neutral area. We want neutral pro-West there, and I think the administration has not taken steps to allay this fear.

Mr. BUNDY. All right. I have stated the position that I think is the proper position we have taken on this. Of course, we would be delighted to see the governments sympathetic to and having ties with the West, and so on.

What we do not need, what our national interests do not require, is a position that could properly be regarded as in any real sense a threat from that area to Communist China or, indeed, to the North Vietnamese regime. As much as we deplore those regimes, I don't think we could now expect to displace them, conquer them, or anything else without the kind of a major war that we are not prepared for.

WOULD U.S. LEAVE VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Going back to Vietnam, what do we do if after a series of new governments one comes in and says, "Really we would rather you went home?"

Mr. BUNDY. I think that would be a very difficult question. I hope it doesn't arise, and I see no immediate signs of its arising.

Senator PELL. But if it does, would we depart?

Mr. BUNDY. I just cannot say. I think it would be extremely difficult to remain, although we have major national interests in the maintenance of that area. The pure effectiveness of what one could

do would be very doubtful at that point. We would then appear to be highly in the position of the French.

MORE SUPPORT FROM ASIANS

Senator PELL. Talking to the Vietnamese and Asians, another question that they raise is why don't more of our Southeast Asian friends—I am not talking about white New Zealanders—but why don't more of the Japanese, of the Filipinos, Malaysians carry some of our load there?

Mr. BUNDY. I think we can leave the Malaysians out. They have got their hands full.

Senator PELL. They are pretty busy.

Mr. BUNDY. And I may say the British are making a very major contribution by their actions in support of Malaysia. As you know, they have about 50,000 men in the area at this point, so I don't think we can fault them for not playing a real part. You were referring specifically to the Asian regional countries, that is, other than those.

Senator PELL. The ones who are less conspicuous.

Mr. BUNDY. Yes. Well, let's take them in a series. The Thai have been of the greatest help in the whole Laos situation, and I think the members of the subcommittee have been informed on the matter. I could go into detail if you wish.

This is a matter that they have not wished to publicize. We have naturally acceded to that.

They have played a very useful role indeed in Laos over a period of some years, and conspicuously since last May. Their main job, as they see it, is to defend their own borders and to deal with what is now starting up in their northeastern areas, the beginnings of something that looks very much like the South Vietnamese pattern, and as you probably have noted, the Communist Chinese came out with a pretty flat statement that they were forming a so-called Thai movement. So I think we are beginning to see something in that, and that has got to occupy them.

PHILIPPINE SUPPORT IN VIETNAM

Now the Philippines. Frankly, we would like to see a very much larger contingent of Filipinos in Vietnam, and we think they could be effective. When Macapagal was here on his instigation, although we have been parting in general for some months in this area, the matter was raised, and we thought we had an undertaking for a substantial contingent.

Negotiations on that have been a bit disappointing, among other things on financial issues. I say this frankly to the subcommittee, because they have been asking us to pick up the tab on per diem rates equivalent to what their attachés get in Washington, which comes to a cool $10 million for a contingent of 1,800 men.

Senator LAUSCHE. Ten million dollars for what period?

Mr. BUNDY. Ten million dollars for a year, Senator. We don't think that is a sound principle. It is out of key with what we have been doing to help quietly other nations, such as the Koreans, who are supplying a contingent of 2,000 men, or the Chinese nationalists, who are supplying technical and economic people—not mili-

tary people, because that has not seemed wise and would increase the chances of Communist Chinese intervention.

But the Filipinos have so far not got further than a small contingent of about 34, and I am hoping to get out there next week to talk about this. Our Ambassador has been doing everything he can.

It is hung up on financial matters now, but also I think because in an election year in the Philippines, Macapagal thinks he has got problems. I think he himself would wish to do this, but an election year in the Philippines is a very hard time to get constructive action. So that is not nearly as good as we would like it to be, but not for lack of trying on our part.

Those are some of the key ones. There are others.

NON-VIETNAMESE HELP FOR VIETNAM

Senator PELL. To put it another way, of the 24,000 Americans, beyond them, how many non-Vietnamese people are there helping?

Mr. BUNDY. It is about 1,000, if you count about 450 French.

Senator PELL. How many nonwhite ones?

Mr. BUNDY. Nonwhite, I am sorry, I did see that. I will have to supply that, I am afraid, Senator, but that is the round total.

The Australians and the Chinese nationalists are the most numerous. The Australians have their advisers in the field on the same basis as ours, and I think we are going to see an increase. I am actually going from this meeting to a meeting with the Australian Minister of Defense on this subject.

MIGHT WE BE WRONG?

Senator PELL. The point I am trying to get across, and perhaps clumsily, is that if we are really so right and reflect the national wishes of that part of the world, shouldn't there be a far larger number of people of the oriental race there than of the caucasian race?

Mr. BUNDY. We would very much like to see that, Senator. Now, the fact is that——

Senator PELL. Do you think we might be wrong, that might be one reason they are not rallying to the cause?

Mr. BUNDY. No, I don't think it is for lack of understanding and support. The Japanese, of course, have their Constitution inhibiting them on military people. Sato was very firm, and he referred to it in his Press Club speech in the same sense, that we were doing the right thing; he was totally in support of it. They have given some economic help, but not as much as we wish.

The Koreans have been total support, and they are now sending this 2,000-man contingent. It is going to be a very interesting thing to see how it works. I think it can do a lot of good, but I don't know how it will fit in. There is the language problem and so on. There will be difficulty. But I think it is the right thing to do and to try out.

With the Philippines, I am afraid the Filipinos generally are a little longer on talk than they are on action, although they regard their security as deeply involved. They don't put their money where their mouth is.

DISCOURAGE USE OF TORTURE

Senator PELL. One final question, not to be a bleeding heart here. Have we taken any action to discourage the use of torture as a common method of extracting military information?

Mr. BUNDY. We have constantly sought to discourage that in every possible way. Not only is it inhumane, it is ineffective. It doesn't get information. I happen to have in my office a colonel who has been through this, and he said he is just getting terribly aroused about it and just argued until he couldn't do it any more. Don't do it, it is just dead wrong, and it is ineffective.

Now, these are Asian habits of warfare. They are very hard to eradicate. The Vietcong do it too, only I suspect they do a more subtle job and sometimes a brainwashing job. But as we saw in Korea, the habits are not very gentle in this area.

We certainly do not condone, and we have used everything we thought was effective to try to get it reduced and eliminated, not with much success.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

START UP WITH A BANG

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to ask a few questions. You have spoken about mousetrapping of Kosygin and that they wanted to test our purpose.

Why did they choose this time in making the attack, in your opinion?

Mr. BUNDY. I think, sir, that it has a relationship that they wanted to start up with a bang of that season. Tet is the lunar New Year holiday that ended on the 6th, and they waited two hours after they ended it. So that may have been a partial factor.

But I think a larger factor almost certainly, and as I have said, this is the view of our Ambassador in Moscow—Ambassador [Foy] Koehler is an old student of Communist behavior—they may well have supposed that we would be confronted with exactly the kind of choice which Senator Aiken described. If we let it stand and did nothing, Hanoi and Moscow could safely conclude that we just weren't with it.

EXPLOIT SOUTH VIETNAMESE WEAKNESSES

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it possible that it was their opinion that with the disintegration of the supposed government and the disorganization that existed, they thought this was the appropriate time to strike and that we would not respond to the challenge?

Mr. BUNDY. I think that is entirely possible, sir. I think they would probably have reasoned that if we did not respond, people in Saigon, who, despite all our statements of determination and so on are occasionally infuenced by what third nations say we are going to do—and there are third nations who are saying the Americans are trying to seek a way out, there are occasional utterances here that tend to create that impression, which they don't know how to evaluate—they may well have thought that Saigon, the people in Saigon, would decide that we weren't with it, and that would further weaken the already difficult political situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did the New York Times carry a story urging that we pull out?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't recall any story to that effect, nor is it their editorial policy. Their editorial policy has been arguing for negotiations now and for acceptance of something along the lines of the French neutralization plan. But I don't recall anything that has spoken of pulling out, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. In your opinion have any discussions that we have had here at home and on the floor and on the public platform about pulling out given them encouragement to make the strike?

Mr. BUNDY. I am reluctant to respond to that, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. You don't have to.

Mr. BUNDY. But the honest answer would have to be, "Yes."

REASON FOR KOSYGIN'S TRIP

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, will you again state what in your opinion was the principal reason of Kosygin going there to Hanoi?

Mr. BUNDY. I think there are some reasons one can state with certainty and others on which one can only speculate. The ones one can state with certainty are that the Russians wished to reestablish a position of some influence with the Hanoi government for internal Communist bloc reasons. They also wished particularly to establish, reestablish some positions with an Asian Communist party in order to emphasize their claims to be an Asian power, with a view to the Afro-Asian Conference and other elements of that. I think you can say those things with assurance.

I think they were also entirely prepared in general to support the effort with these particular defensive weapons on which they have large capabilities. Now, beyond that point——

SOVIET MOTIVES IN VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Does Russia have primarily in mind a unification of the Communist effort of China, Hanoi, Russia, or is its primary purpose to wedge itself into a friendlier and more acceptable position with the Asians?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think it is a clear choice there, sir. This is in a speculative realm, but my own belief would be that they would like to see a Communist North Vietnam and a Communist all Vietnam, that they would like to see this effort succeed if it could be done without serious risks.

They would not particularly welcome, and in fact probably they would be opposed to, an expansion of Communist Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, and therefore they might hope that they could establish a position with Hanoi that would enable Hanoi to stand out as a nationalist Communist regime that would achieve its own ambitions, which I am sure extend at least to Laos and Cambodia, but let it go at that. That is just speculation, though. It could become a partnership. I never would rule that out. But I think this is the more likely present bet.

MILITARY UNITS FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. The Cincinnati Inquirer had a piece written by one of its correspondents that went to South Vietnam, stating that

evidence was in the possession of our officials in South Vietnam that organized militarily equipped units from North Vietnam were shipped into South Vietnam. What, if anything, do you know about that?

Mr. BUNDY. The evidence of prisoners captured in 1964 is entirely clear that the greatest numbers of these have been trained in an identified location near Hanoi, and in military units at the time of training. When they come down, this same evidence indicates they come in smaller groups and that they tend to disperse when they reach South Vietnam to form what might be called in our Army filler replacements for existing hardcore units, or in some cases the cadre for new units; that although they are trained as units, they do not come as units, and they do not reassemble as units. This has led to a certain amount of semantic confusion, but that is the accurate statement of what the evidence indicates to this point.

Senator LAUSCHE. There is no evidence at this time that they have come in in organized militarily equipped units? They have been trained in Hanoi, but have come down in trickles of small groups?

Mr. BUNDY. That is the predominant pattern, sir, yes.

COINCIDENCE OF VISITS TO VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Was your brother's visit to Saigon [2] tied in with Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam for the purpose of working out some plan of extrication?

Mr. BUNDY. Absolutely not, sir. It had no connection.

Mr. LAUSCHE. No question about that?

Mr. BUNDY. It had been planned before we had any word Kosygin was going. It was exactly as it has been stated to be. It was a standard consultation at a time when it was most unwise, it seemed to all of us, for the Ambassador to leave Saigon.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have there been any talks, with Russia, acting as an intermediary, with Hanoi?

Mr. BUNDY. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. To work out a plan of pulling out?

Mr. BUNDY. There have not been. I may say that I don't mean to imply that we haven't made our standard position very clear to them, but we have never had anything that would in any way justify the term "intermediary", nor have they ever attempted to convey to us, with any authority at any rate, what they thought Hanoi's position was.

WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

Senator LAUSCHE. The President seemed to have designedly given as a reason for being in Hanoi the commitment that Eisenhower made in 1954. That statement is in conflict with the repeated presentations that have been made before this Foreign Relations Committee by the Secretaries of State under Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, concerning our presence there.

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[2] McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to President Johnson, arrived in Saigon on Feb. 4.

The testimony here has been that our presence there is not only to fill this commitment, but to protect the security of our Nation. Now, will you tell me what your understanding is as to why we are in South Vietnam?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think there is any inherent conflict there, sir. We moved into the situation for the same reasons that we are these now, because the independence and security of South Vietnam is important in itself and because South Vietnam is a vitally important part of the whole area of mainland Southeast Asia, and what happens there vitally affects the security of all the free nations on the Asian perimeter.

I happened to have been in my CIA capacity an alternate on the NSA Planning Board at the time the decisions were taken reflecting the decisions of the Eisenhower administration. I don't think there has been any change at any time in the reasoning, which has always looked both at South Vietnam in itself and at South Vietnam in the strategic context, and of course particularly since 1959 and 1961 at a third factor, which is the sort of prototype character of this conflict as a war of national liberation, as a testing ground of this technique.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are we in there at all insofar as our own security is concerned?

Mr. BUNDY. I think we have no other reason anywhere in the world, sir, and I think that is basic.

NO ALTERNATE EXCEPT RETALIATION

Senator LAUSCHE. It is very important to those of us who are making public arguments that there was no alternative except to retaliate, to know whether we are going to be left out on a limb by some undergound negotiations going on now about pulling out. I want to ask you again, is there anything being done to abandon the position that we have been in the last several years?

Mr. BUNDY. Absolutely nothing, sir.

DIVISIONS OF NATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Can you tell me why in the past there was created North Korea and South Korea, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, Laos as an independent nation? What was the reason for creating this division?

Mr. BUNDY. The reasons differed, sir. North Korea and South Korea were divided as a result of agreements with the Soviet Union on the areas in which each side would be active at the close of the Japanese war. I don't have the details on those. I have never looked into that, not in that much detail, but that was the basis at any rate.

And then what had been intended as a temporary division, while arrangements were worked out for a unified Korea, was of course ruptured by the North Korean attack with Soviet support, and then by the whole course of the Korean War, which wound up in effect with a different but still roughly similar demarcation line between the two, with unification to be worked out.

The division between North and South Vietnam has a different history arising from the Geneva accords of 1954, of course, with

which I am sure you are familiar. That created the 17th parallel, again containing provisions for free elections, but it was a mockery to think of free elections in the north, and that provision wasn't carried out.

CREATING A NEUTRAL BELT

Senator LAUSCHE. Was there any purpose in creating these divisions and setting up Laos as a neutral nation to create a belt between what is Communist Russia and Communist China, and India and the other nations?

Mr. BUNDY. I am afraid, sir, it would be more accurate to describe the 1954 accords as the best that the French could get, and not to ascribe any more sophisticated purpose to them. I think that is simple fact.

Laos was set up as a country because it had been an administrative area and had some vague national history, although it is a pretty frail nation in any circumstances.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did you mean by saying nationalism is on the march?

Mr. BUNDY. I think all through Asia and throughout the world, really.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you mean the orientals as an ethnic group are on the march?

Mr. BUNDY. I think there is a growth of what I would call Asian consciousness that is a very major factor in the Far East, sir, at this time, and basically that is healthy. They have been in the past colonial dominated, dependent in one way or another. They should be standing on their own feet, but it also leads to the kind of outbreaks we see from time to time. I differentiate those. There are many reasons in different places.

VIOLATIONS OF LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, just one or two more questions. We created what was supposed to be a neutral Laos, with the coalition government.

Mr. BUNDY. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. That has not worked out as we anticipated.

Mr. BUNDY. It has not, sir, because the Communist side has persistently—"violated" is too weak a word—simply not accepted.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, it violated every part of the 1962 accords.

Mr. BUNDY. I can think of no major part that they have complied with, sir.

Senator PELL. Will you yield for a moment on that?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator PELL. Would it not be correct just as a matter of history that the first real violation was when in the late 1950's some of our more active people in that part of the world were not content with a neutral regime, and a little money goes a long way in buying votes in that part of the world, and they got a rightwing government in, and that is what started this slide?

Mr. BUNDY. Senator Lausche, I am sure, was referring to the 1962 accord.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. BUNDY. I have expressed myself on this. I do obviously have private views about this, but I don't think they are really useful in discussing the present position.

NO PEACE AFTER GENEVA ACCORDS

Senator LAUSCHE. The fragmentation of French Indochina was anticipated to being about peace, but has there been at any time since 1954 a peaceful attitude on the part of North Vietnam with respect to South Vietnam?

Mr. BUNDY. I would say no, sir, although they did not actively begin sending in guerrillas until about 1959. Their attitude throughout was one of stating that the subjugation of the south was a basic national objective.

Senator LAUSCHE. And isn't that also true about North Korea and South Korea?

Mr. BUNDY. I would say so.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think the transgressions have come from the north, from China, from Hanoi, from Korea.

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think there is any doubt, Senator, that Hanoi with respect to Vietnam, and I think also with respect to Laos and Cambodia, and Communist China with respect to Thailand and the rest of the area——

Senator PELL. Forgive me, I have not denied they came from the north. I said that we both are guilty, however.

STRONG AMBITIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, if we pull out of South Vietnam or enter into an acord, a new one—we already have two practically, we have the 1954 and we have the 1962 with Laos—can we anticipate that Red China will keep its word, let's say, with respect to Thailand, Malaysia, and the other places?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think you can assume that the ambitions will not be present very strongly, Mr. Chairman. I think it would be a question of reestablishing with respect to Vietnam the essentials of the 1954 accords, which provided for non-interference by other states. That is the basic provision that has been violated. But I think also, frankly, one would have to look to a much more effective machinery than was created under the 1954 accords to see that that was carried out.

POLITICAL PICTURE NOT ENCOURAGING

Senator CASE. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was unable to be here. I had another meeting with General Wheeler, and I couldn't be in two places at once.

Did you at the outset express any general view as to the way the things were going and what the chances were and so forth?

Mr. BUNDY. I stated this episode in a sense is at its end, but I don't think one can say what the future may bring, Senator, because of the infiltration as a basic element in the situation and pressures and so on, the possibility of additional North Vietnamese actions. We really can't take it much further than that as to that aspect.

Now, I have not talked to the political side. On that I would say that it is not an encouraging picture really, but there are some possibilities that this event may be at least temporarily helpful in getting the people to pull together and stop their bickering and so on within Saigon.

I think it will certainly strengthen General Khanh's hand. This is a man of ability who is on the political side inclined to be somewhat tricky, and who has not inspired a confidence by his political performances, but he is a man of ability, and I think the pendulum has swung back toward a very dominant role for the military, reflecting that they really didn't mean honestly to turn it over to civilian control as they said in September. That is a fact we could not really control, and we have never abstracted, talking about civilian government as opposed to the military.

If that produces an effective government determined to prosecute the war, it would obviously be something we would support fully, and it may have real promise in it. I can't say that as of now that is going to happen. I think the chances of its happening may have been somewhat increased by the clear evidence that we are in this in a very determined fashion, which willy-nilly there have been doubts in Saigon.

PROBLEMS WITH BUDDHISTS

You have serious political problems. The political Buddhists have this apparently lasting habit of asserting their power, which is, I think, diminishing, but they do not have an honest religious issue, now, which they may have had at some period in the Diem regime, although always in the nature of discrimination rather than persecution. I think there is an unsolved question there.

The ideal would be to break away the political Buddhists from the more responsible Buddhists. This is something that we have been urging.

In the armed forces, the senior generals have had their personal rivalries and differences. That has got to be ironed out, so there are plenty of problems in the political situation, but I would be in touch more hopeful that this event will have a coalescing effect. I can't say that we will see something that could really be called an effective government in Saigon in the short term, because I don't think that that is in the cards, but they might at least make a start.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Case, Senator Carlson has been here since 3 p.m. and he did not ask any questions.

Senator CARLSON. I had an opportunity.

Senator CASE. I don't think I shall interrupt any more. I would rather listen to somebody question who knows how.

Senator LAUSCHE. You will understand, won't you?

Senator CASE. You couldn't offend me, sir. Go ahead.

TURNING INTO AN AMERICAN WAR

Senator CARLSON. Frankly, I am a little embarrassed now myself, because I have been here and I appreciate very much, Mr. Bundy, your frankness and your generosity in giving us this time, because

you have certainly been generous with your time, and you have discussed this very frankly.

In listening through this entire discussion, then I get to the final conclusion. Now, as we look back on the three days' developments which have taken place, there are some indications that this is rapidly turning Vietnam into an American war. I wanted to get your comments on it.

First, you know we had our planes strike targets in North Vietnam in retaliation for these Vietcong raids in South Vietnam. Second, we have sent a Hawk antiaircraft missile battalion, that has been set up as I understand it. Third, General Khanh is reported to have said that Americans would knock out any Red Chinese planes that tried to attack South Vietnam.

Now, the question of course with me is, Are we getting more deeply involved, or is that our plan?

Mr. BUNDY. We have no further plan at this time, Senator, but I have spoken of the kind of thing that could create very powerful arguments for further actions, so that I don't want to imply that the book is closed; only that this page is turned.

We are very sensitive to this appearing to become an American war, and this was one reason we have been at pains to emphasize, and it is the fact, that the action in this instance was very much jointly decided upon between ourselves and the Vietnamese, very, very willingly on their part. I think you can see this was a major reason why we had no objecton whatever to the Vietnamese carrying out their part on Monday morning, which they were unable to carry out on Sunday because of weather in the chosen target area. So that they have had a hand in this, and I think that is very important that they should have.

In that sense it differed from the Gulf of Tonkin. We have tried to stress that although the attack on the Vietcong side was predominantly against American installations, it also includes villages of the Vietnamese and so on that were burned out.

ASSURANCES TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

I think you raised a very major point that we will have to be weighing very carefully on this. We have a knife-edged war, quite frankly. On the one hand, as I say, regrettably but understandably, we have constantly to assure the Vietnamese that we are in there to stick with this. That is up to a point, in fact, it is essential to our influence with them, to their getting on with their part of the job, which is the major part of the job. This is their war.

The other side of the coin is that if they ever think we are really taking it over, this could drive them back to bickering, cause them not to fight with the determination that is required, because the effort in the south, which is fundamental, and the fundamental thing—to slow down. I think you have hit on what I would regard as our central problem on this point.

INCREASED AMERICAN TROOPS

Senator CARLSON. My next question was going to be if the military situation continues to deteriorate, are going to put in any more of our own forces to try to reverse this tide?

Mr. BUNDY. The irony of it is that in a strictly military sense, although there have been some small increases in recent months in the areas that are subject to one degree or another of Vietcong control—and I might say control is a difficult word—but in some relative sense the tide has certainly been against us, but not alarmingly or abruptly. On the military side, as I think you may have noted the results during January after this what was a defeat, but a defeat in which the Vietcong had heavy casualties at Bien Hoa, two things? The Vietcong were not able to mount any other operations of any real scale during the month, and the government forces had about 10 or 11, of which 11 were very clear successes, inflicting by far the greatest casualties in any months of the war. There are verified casualties in most cases, because when you win you can count them. The total casualties, I think, in the killed alone for the month were over 2,200 on the Vietcong side.

Senator LAUSCHE. What month?

Mr. BUNDY. This is the month of January, sir, and just on February 6, the last day of Tet, there was a Vietcong ambush in Chuong Thin, which was rebuffed in the order of something like 200 casualties in the one action alone. So there is plenty still to work with.

The South Vietnamese military forces have maintained their morale and their effectiveness to an extraordinary degree. It is almost as if it were independent of the political difficulties in Saigon. So that there is still an awful lot to work with.

WEIGHING THE SITUATION HEAVILY

Senator CARLSON. Could I ask you if there has been a policy decision on expansion of this war in case the situation continues to deteriorate?

Mr. BUNDY. Sir, I cannot say at this point. We are weighing the situation very heavily, very hard.

We are, among other things, waiting to see—we do not want to act in such a way as to drive the Soviets, I am speaking frankly, into the arms of the Communist Chinese or to commit them more deeply, and we want to see—what their total and final reaction is to this whole episode, so at this moment we are just holding our fire. But I have referred to the serious nature of the infiltration problem and the kinds of action the Vietcong are capable of that would be very difficult not to respond to, so as I say, the book is still open.

Senator CARLSON. Thank you very much.

UNITE VIETNAM AGAINST CHINA

Senator CASE. Just a very broad question on the relationship of Communist China to the North Vietnamese. Robert Elegant, formerly of Newsweek——

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, he is an old hand.

Senator CASE. He argued that we should have as a specific objective the creation of the joint front of the North and South Vietnamese against the Communist Chinese, and rely upon the natural forces of South Vietnam nationalism against the horde from the north. I am not trying to divide this thing, but it makes a very

pretty story, I assume, so far as there is any value in it, as to long-term objectives.

Is there anything to this? Do you have anything more than a prospect of endless fighting, with only the military on our side, and no chance of the natural forces developing in this area working for us, instead of against us?

Mr. BUNDY. Sir, I don't know, I think that really almost comes in two parts. Is there no end to this?

I think if you have effective government in Saigon that the kind of techniques have been developed, the way the army has held together even in difficult times, would give me considerable hope that this thing could be started moving up. I don't predict that, but it could be.

I think the pressures on Hanoi are not inconsiderable, and they include the very fact of Vietnamese national feeling against the Chinese being right in there. I think they would not wish to take serious risks of actions for which they would have to call on the kind of support from the Chinese that would get them into a position from which they would find it hard to extricate themselves.

They took great pains in 1954 to get the Chinese out as fast as they could. They would not want to have the Chinese forces running through there, if they could possibly help it. So that the prospect of that coming about, if they go on taking certain risks, and if they are forced by the nature of the conflict in the south to take risks, because their own morale is at stake here too, if they take the kind of casualties they took in January, this is hurting—as though there are not insignificant pressures on their position.

NORTH VIETNAM IS A COMMUNIST STATE

Now, if I may refer to Mr. Elegant's conception more broadly, I think there is no question that the Communist North Vietnam is now a nationalist Communist state. But I don't draw much comfort from that, nor from the picture of how a possible Communist Vietnam or Vietnam would behave from that fact, because I think it would differ in two very major respects from the kind of situation in Yugoslavia, which has sometimes been used as a parallel and which perhaps Mr. Elegant would have in mind, in that there are Vietnamese ambitions at the least in Laos and Cambodia, and to some degree in Thailand, and I think they would be completely willing partners with Communist Chinese pressures, which I think would be the principal form of pressures that we are seeing in Peiping's statement about the patriotic Thai against Thailand. So I think they would work right in tandem.

It would not be a very comforting picture; in fact, it would be a very menacing one. So that is the major difficulty I find with the picture of North Vietnam and South Vietnam united on any Communist basis.

If the south could be reestablished as an independent and secure thing, of course we would wish to see a reunification of Vietnam in due course as a free nation.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Church (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Smathers, Clark, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

The subcommittee heard Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland on the future of the United Nations.

No transcript was kept of the meeting's proceedings.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:40 a.m. in room 4219, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Clark, Smathers, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case. Senator Pell also was present.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee favorably approved for report the nominations of Douglas MacArthur to be Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Robert C. Good, to be Ambassador to Zambia; C. Robert Moore, to be Ambassador to Mali; Raymond R. Guest, to be Ambassador to Ireland; Thomas C. Mann, to be Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs; Angier Biddle Duke, to be Ambassador to Spain; Geoffrey W. Lewis, to be Ambassador to Mauritania; and the routine Foreign Service list of nominations and appointments in the Foreign Service, dated February 1, 1965.

On motion by Senator Case, seconded by Senator Clark, the committee also approved for favorable report the nomination of W. Averell Harriman, to be Ambassador at Large.

On motions by Senators Clark and Sparkman, the committee also approved for favorable report the nomination of Jack Hood Vaughn to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, the committee also approved for favorable report the nominations of Homer D. Babbidge, Jr.; Walter Johnson; Roy E. Larsen; and Arnold M. Picker, to be members of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at noon.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Long, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Case.

The committee proceeded to the mark-up of S. 672, to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended.

On roll call, the bill was unanimously approved for favorable report. Senator Clark was granted permission to file separate views.

The committee then passed to the consideration of the measures (S. Con. Res. 4), to authorize distribution within the United States of the film prepared by the USIA, entitled "Years of Lightning, Day of Drums"; (S.J. Res. 8), of similar title; and (H. Con. Res. 285), to allow the showing in the United States of the United States Information Agency film" John F. Kennedy, Years of Lightning, Day of Drums", (ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 25, 1965).

The question of the above measures was put over to another meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session in 10:10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

David E. Bell, Administrator, AID, testified on aspects of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearings.

[The committee adjourned at 1 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session in 10:05 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Symington, Pell, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

David E. Bell, Administrator, AID, Jack Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and others, appeared and testified on aspects of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which concerned Latin American affairs.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearings.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session in 10:10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

Senator Hruska appeared on behalf of the nomination of Dwight J. Porter, to be Ambassador to Lebanon. Mr. Porter appeared on his own behalf also.

On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, seconded by Senator Mundt, the committee approved for favorable report the nominations of Dwight J. Porter, to be Ambassador to Lebanon, and Armin H. Meyer, to be Ambassador to Iran.

On motion by Senator Pell, and by unanimous consent, the committee approved for report the nomination of Walter M. Kotschnig, to be the U.S. Representative to the 21st Session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, and without objection, the committee approved for report and original resolution authorizing the participation of the Senate in the next meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.

The committee then held discussions on the measures (S.J. Res. 8); (S. Con. Res. 4); and (H. Con. Res. 285), of similar titles, to authorize the distribution in the United States of the USIA film "Years of Lightning; Day of Drums". Senator McGovern made a statement on the measure (S.J. Res. 8).

Following his appearance, the committee by consensus asked that the joint resolution be reworded to overcome some objections to it.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearings.

[The committee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1965

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In 1965, members of the Foreign Relations Committee made several attempts to restructure the American foreign aid program. On March 4, Chairman Fulbright introduced a measure to separate economic aid from military aid. Senator Morse then introduced the Johnson administration's bill, which combined economic and military aid. The Foreign Relations Committee commenced hearings on foreign assistance on March 9, and on March 30 it voted 9 to 4 to accept Morse's motion, thereby rejecting Fulbright's. The committee reported the bill. S. 1837, on April 28.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.R. 7750 on May 7, and the House passed the bill on May 25, by a vote of 249 to 148. On June 14, the Senate passed an amended version of H.R. 7750, providing for multiyear appropriations in the future, rather than the traditional annual appropriations. House members of the conference committee refused to accept this amendment, and enactment of the bill was delayed for 2 months due to the disagreement. Senate conferees at last conceded, and the original administration bill was accepted with only minor reductions in authorization. The House agreed to the conference report on August 19, and the Senate on August 24. President Johnson signed the bill into law on September 6, as Public Law 89-171.]

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m. in room S-116, New Senate Office Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

AN OMNIBUS BILL OR SEPARATE BILLS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You have seen the memorandum. There is a very short 1-page memorandum where the staff has attempted to in one page give the situation. The basic issue, as they state here, is whether the committee is to consider an omnibus bill or separate bills for economic and military assistance or whether we should recommend—I don't know that we need take any action necessarily if the military aid bill is referred to the Armed Services Committee.

I have heard purely informally, just as gossip around, that Stennis intended to introduce the military aid authorization, but I don't think he has done it. I didn't regard it as my responsibility to ask him to do it one way or the other.

I think the first question to be decided is this question that Senator Morse and I have discussed at various times, both here and in

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other forums as to whether or not we should attempt to break the bill down at least insofar as dividing the economic from the military. I think that is the main question.

I have had my say. I am perfectly willing to go over it again if anybody is interested. I made my point both on the floor and in two or three speeches, and there is a background memorandum here, if anybody is interested in a little bit of the historical background, and also a memorandum has been prepared by the staff on procedures with respect to Presidential foreign aid messages. It goes back to 1947.

Senator MORSE. What is that?

Mr. HOLT. It is what you asked for the other day.

Mr. MARCY. It is the summary of action.

MISTAKE IN SEPARATING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

Senator MORSE. I have had my say, too, Mr. Chairman. My view is that I think we are making a great mistake in separating military from economic aid. You show me an underdeveloped country in which there is a large amount of American military aid, and that aid determines the foreign policy of that country as far as the United States is concerned in large measure. I am always concerned about foreign affairs being turned over to the Pentagon building for undue influence.

I think it is a very salutary thing for the Pentagon building to come through the Foreign Relations Committee in respect to its aid program. It should leave no doubt as to its subordination to the State Department. It is quite a different thing from appropriations for the Pentagon building for the defense of this country.

I think we are fooling ourselves if we think that military aid has much to do in many instances with the defense of the United States. Pakistan and India are good examples. I would be perfectly willing to have the Pentagon building run the defenses of the country, but I am not going to support a separation of economic and military aid. I think they are inseparable in any underdeveloped country because working together they determine the foreign policy in a large measure of our country in that country.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman.

RELUCTANCE TO MAKE CHANGES

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator will yield to me for a question?

What puzzles me of your attitude, you are more critical of the present program than anyone. You are the most critical, and yet you are most reluctant to make changes. You say salutary and they have been coming here and yet in the same paragraph you say it is terrible. This is what leaves me puzzled about it. You yourself want to preserve it and yet you are more critical of the way it works than anybody in the committee.

Senator MORSE. I don't know why you say that. I don't know anybody in the committee who has offered more proposals for changing it than I have. I just don't believe that you should change this procedural handling of it, but I certainly am for changing its substance.

The CHAIRMAN. But you——

Senator MORSE. All the amendments I have offered heretofore and will offer this year show the changes. The sad thing is that here around this committee table time and time again there hasn't been too strenuous objection to a lot of my proposals for change. But the feeling seems to have been that the changes ought to come voluntarily from downtown. They will never come voluntarily from downtown. You are going to have to impose it on them.

CRITICISM OF MILITARY SPENDING

The CHAIRMAN. I think the difference between a change of procedure as to how it is administered—I mean to change it from a figure for development loan from 780 to 700 or 600, it seems to me quite a different kind of change to say that his should be better administered in a multilateral agency or in the case of military aid that the primary responsibility should be in the Armed Services Committee.

I think that the facts will show that numerically, at least, more criticisms by the GAO have been directed to the military assistance than at the economic, certainly the economic lending. There has been more of the economic grab program. This is a factual matter. It is run by the military now, subject to political clearance by the State Department. We have been told in many cases that the State Department's political considerations are the reason for certain military programs. We have had examples, I think, in Ethiopia, the type of thing of paying rents for a base in Morocco or in Libya where there is a situation of mixed motives. That is true.

Senator MORSE. I think in some of that, Bill, if you get into cases, I think there are more cases where the Pentagon proposes aid for military purposes than the State Department. They develop a close relationship with some military leader in some country, who probably has gone through their War College or training program, and they are going to build up that group in that country. It has a tremendous effect on American foreign policy in that country, and that is why I think this committee ought to maintain its jurisdiction and work out with the State Department the changes that ought to take place in all aspects of foreign aid.

EXERCISING INFLUENCE OVER THE MILITARY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think, Wayne, that we have exercised or will ever exercise very strong or effective influence over the military. If any committee can, it is the Armed Services Committee. I doubt very seriously whether they do.

Senator MORSE. The members of the Armed Services Committee tell me they are even thinking about resigning from the committee because they don't intend to sit there as rubberstamps. That Armed Services Committee exercises no control over the military.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't either so far as I can see.

Senator MORSE. We should, we have the opportunity to and, I think, the duty. The fact that we have it doesn't mean we can.

MOST DIFFICULT BILL

The CHAIRMAN. Another approach is this, of all the legislation in 22 years of the Congress I have ever had to deal with, this is the most controversial, the most difficult. It has taken longer to enact it, it has attracted more irrelevant amendments than any other bill, and this is the general reason why I think some new approach should be had. Something new.

If you have a better idea—you said one day you were going to introduce your own bill. You introduced the administration's omnibus bill. I was hoping we might have that here to consider, something that you really wanted to support. As I understand it you are not really for any of the bills that are before us now.

Senator MORSE. Not in their present form.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. I thought you were going to introduce your own.

Senator MORSE. I am going to introduce what will amount to a rewrite of the administration's omnibus bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Well——

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't have anything more to say. I don't want to bore the committee.

The Senator from Kansas.

NEW AUTHORIZATIONS

Senator CARLSON. I have been late so I don't know what the discussion has been before I came in. I have been trying to resolve this in my own mind. I think an argument can be made on both cases. I have one question. We have a proposal of a $3.4 billion aid program.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the appropriation request.

Senator CARLSON. $3.4 billion. Now, the bill the chairman introduced is $1.8 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. New authorization is $846 million but there is already authorized under the two items for development loans and Alliance for Progress the difference between $846 million and $2.2 billion.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

Well, regardless of the amounts, a substantial portion of it, maybe 40 percent of the $3.4 billion, maybe more, would be military aid.

The CHAIRMAN. $1,170 million.

Senator CARLSON. All right.

PERSONNEL ADMINISTERING FOREIGN AID

My question gets down to this: We have an administrative setup of 27,000 people administering the foreign aid bill. Assuming we don't act on military aid, what happens with personnel? Do we turn it over to the Defense Department? Do we keep our people down there? What happens to that?

The CHAIRMAN. I would hope they would let a large amount go. I have some other proposals I am going to offer about cutting down the number of countries we are operating in, particularly with small amounts. But most of the personnel in the field having to do

with military aid are on the military. They are not what we call MAP programs; they are military personnel assigned to this program.

Mr. HOLT. That is the way a military assistance program is administered.

Senator CARLSON. You mean the Defense Department runs it and not the AID Department?

Mr. HOLT. The Defense Department runs the military aid program; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They run it now, I think the difference is——

Senator CARLSON. I am just trying to find out what is happening.

The CHAIRMAN. Pat is the best authority we have got. You can ask him these questions. He has been fooling with this.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID INTERTWINED

Senator CARLSON. I was interested the other day when Bell said there were 72 countries that were getting economic aid under the pending legislation and 56 countries getting military aid. Some of them get economic and not military.

Senator MORSE. You see, Frank, I can't see how you can separate the two. They are so intertwined. Go into your AID posts—and I have been in them in many places around this world—and your AID posts are interwoven with personnel from the economic side of the State Department and the Pentagon side.

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate the chairman's position on this. I know we have got some real problems with it. I would like to make some changes, but I don't want to let the impression come out that we have an aid program that has come down to $1.8 billion when the fact of the matter is we are going to vote substantial money.

THE MEANING OF AID

The CHAIRMAN. And I raise in that connection, What do you mean by "aid?" After the war it had a feeling under UNRWA of relief and it was motivated primarily for humanitarian reasons. We appropriated a lot of money to the starving people even in the Communist countries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the Communists took it over.

The CHAIRMAN. In the cold war we got involved in defensive measures. Now it seems to me primarily what the aid means to the people, and it does to me, what is intended to aid a country in developing its economic potential.

This is what we should concentrate on, at least as far as the civilian goes. The military aspect of it is not intended to build up a country to produce more and so on. It is a part, as I see it, of a defensive posture of the Western World.

Senator CARLSON. It does have economic effect, though.

The CHAIRMAN. In the long run I doubt if it is a good one.

Senator CARLSON. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a kind of a stimulus and it takes the place of actual economic development in a country. It diverts the money to a purpose which I don't think can help, but that is a matter of argument. But we are in this economic field and particularly in the underdeveloped countries it ought to be, it seems to me, really con-

centrated upon developing their economy and not their military powers. This military aid—we are talking about 80 or 90 percent of it, I can never keep these percentages, Pat, help me on this—is concentrated in four countries, isn't it? And these are strategic countries. The big part of it is in about four countries.

A BRIDGE IN LAOS

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, we have a good example of what has happened recently when through our military aid we blow up a bridge in Laos and then we take economic aid and build them a new modern bridge instead. I think that there was coordinated action there, but at the same time I think they should be separated.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is in a virtual war condition. The military assistance is $1,170 million requested. This is military equipment and training. It is programed for 54 countries, but more than half is for five countries, Vietnam, Korea, Turkey, China, and Greece—21 countries are for less than $1 million. It is this so-called presence there that they have, but it is primarily Vietnam, Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, and Greece, which are strategic areas that the military believe are essential for our military defense. They really outline these programs. They determine what it is, they are in control of it, they administer it, and all that aspect of it.

In these little countries of less than $1 million, you may get more of an element of what Senator Morse is talking about, I mean, of trying to influence the direction of the military officers. In some cases, I think it is useful and has been useful as was stated here the other day regarding Latin America.

About the only stable element in many of those countries is the military, whether you like it or not. They are the only organized group that can influence the course of affairs outside of anarchy, and I think in many cases the training program is useful.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude by saying that I would like to get this program underway and we are going to have to wrestle with it. Maybe if we separate it we can get along better. I just want to be helpful but I do have questions, really serious questions. I am not quarrelsome about it.

A PACKAGE OR SEPARATE ITEMS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I told you last year when you brought up this question, and I told you again this year, that I rather thought we ought to consider it as a package but if you wanted to consider it as a separate matter I would raise no particular objection, that I would go along because I didn't have too positive a feeling on either side.

I think a very strong case can be made for either side of this question. It depends entirely on what your perspective is and what your objectives are. I think you can make a case that this military assistance program, separate from our purely military defense of the country operations, the overall defense of the country, that military end of this program is an arm of foreign policy to be selectively used to promote stability and all this sort of thing between these countries. I think an argument can be made that way.

On the other hand, I think you can argue that military things ought to be in military hands. But when you get down to that point, I think the military assistance program which we have today is not run from the Pentagon necessarily. I think it is basically run from the State Department. That doesn't mean the overall American arms posture is run from the State Department, that is, the training of our military personnel, the development of new delivery systems and all that sort of stuff; that is strictly military. But I think the State Department has a lot to do and probably the controlling voice as to where this military assistance goes and what use will be made of it, and it has got to be on the theory that it will contribute to the strengthening of our foreign relations posture in this country and other places.

But you get it out of hand a little bit—in other words, what controlling interest does the Pentagon have in whether or not military officers from Uruguay or Timbuktu or what-have-you come here for training and indoctrination necessarily, as compared to what interest does the State Department have in indoctrinating those people in the general political forms in which we would like to see this arm of our foreign policy? That is where I don't know. I still feel the same way.

I have got no hard and fast position on this. As I said, I told you last year that whatever the committee wanted to do either way didn't make much difference to me and I am the same way this year. I think if we want to try it that way it will be all right with me or if you want to go the other way.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

KEEPING AID FIGURES SECRET

Senator CLARK. I am trying, as Frank Carlson is, to work myself into a position to make a decision on this. With your permission, I would like to ramble for about 2 minutes in order to elicit your reaction to my present state of mind.

It seems to me we are dealing fundamentally with a procedural question and it is kind of a mistake to let it get into a higher realm of policy. It seems to me also pretty clear that both the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee have a legitimate interest in military aid historically and any other way. I share Senator Hickenlooper's view at the moment that it doesn't make an awful lot of difference which way this thing goes and therefore, other things being on balance, I would be inclined to support my chairman.

But in trying to work out my own dense fog in this matter, listening to most of this testimony, it has seemed to me that it is almost impossible to have a value judgment on any of the items which are contained in either of the economic or military parts of these various bills unless you are permitted to make an analysis on a country-by-country basis of all the different kinds of aid that are going to that country, military, economic, Public Law 480, international, Sino-Russian.

I don't understand yet why it is considerd verboten to bring out in the open the aid that is going to Ecuador or Korea or wherever

else, the total picture of it. It seems to me the State Department's excuse is not very plausible; namely, if we tell Ecuador what Peru is getting, Ecuador may want more. Even the most primitive country must know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the trouble, they all know although we claim to keep it secret.

Senator CLARK. I think it is ridiculous to keep it secret.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say on that the past programs are not classified but it is before you conclude your agreement. I think they have a valid argument, you don't want to put in the law and say we are going to give Ecuador $20 million when in the final analysis it is subject to negotiation and if they don't agree to do what you want them to do they won't get it.

Senator CLARK. I don't want to put it in the law but I want to know what it is so I will be able to talk about it.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. They know what has been done last year and so that information is not supposed to be classified.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They bring the tables here and tell us exactly what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. They tell you. This has always been the situation, not to make public in advance what you propose to do because these are all changed in negotiation.

JUSTIFY MILITARY AID

Senator CLARK. Let me make my final point then: I would be perfectly prepared to go along with a suggestion that we confine this bill to economic aid if we have some testimony before the committee which will attempt to justify the military aid so that we could see the whole picture in each country. As you know, I don't know whether you noticed it or not, I asked and was told I would get a chart which would show the different categories of aid, military, economic, Public Law 480, and the like for each of the countries that are in the program. If I get that I can make some kind of a primitive value judgment whether they are asking too much for Taiwan and not enough for Korea and vice versa.

If I get that information, and chairman feels strongly about this and wants to separate the two bills, this is a procedural matter to me of not cosmic importance and I would be prepared to go along, but I would like to see the military testimony to justify what the omnibus bill asks for in all-out terms so I can see what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is in the books they have prepared project by project. It is broken down.

Senator CLARK. It is largely a question of how you organize the information. You can't sit down and go through that book. What you have to do is sit down and make up that chart. I would rather have them prepare it for me. What I would like to do is ask a few questions of the military people who prepare the military aid program in order to get a balanced picture of all of the aid at which point I would be perfectly willing to go along on reporting out only an economic bill, but I don't want to report out only an economic bill without having any basic information based on testimony and opportunity to cross-examine what the military want and why they want it.

Senator MORSE. I would like to make comment on what Senator Clark says, Mr. Chairman.

I don't think this is predominantly a procedural matter at all. I think it is one of the most vital substantive issues you are going to have before this committee in regard to carrying out the committee responsibilities in directing American foreign policy.

Now, if you decide that you are not going to consider military aid in your markup of a bill this year, nothing in the world can stop military aid from being added on the floor of the Senate as an amendment. Then you are going to have a bill, a large part of it on which you had no hearings.

In either case, I think the Foreign Relations Committee will have effectively abdicated its jurisdiction over military aid which means you have no voice left in military alliances that are formed by the Pentagon building through aid, political and economic commitments that the Pentagon building will make in connection with military aid. That is substantive; that is not procedural. That is foreign policy.

You say the Secretary of State has eventually a veto. I have two comments to make to that. Whatever the Secretary of State does—I am going to have Pat report in a moment, on a memorandum I asked him to prepare for me on what the Secretary of State does—but whatever the Secretary of State does will be devoid of a Foreign Relations Committee check on this aspect of foreign policy. What the Secretary of Defense and what the Secretary of State do in regard to the military aid aspects of foreign aid is of vital concern to this committee, if you are going to carry out your duty.

We are the checking committee on foreign policy, not the Armed Services Committee. We are not the checking committee on the Pentagon building in respect to what it spends or proposes to spend for the defense of this country. And you never hear me say that I think we ought to intervene in authorization requests for the Pentagon. That is the Armed Services program. But the Armed Services Committee really, in my judgment, has no right to exercise jurisdiction over the question of what type of deals and commitments and promises are made by the Pentagon in respect to military aid for a foreign government. We ought to keep our check on that.

Take a look at what the present law says in regard to coordination with foreign policy. I read from section 622:

> Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State. The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representatives of the United States Government in each country under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated with political and economic considerations and his comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs authorized by this Act, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance program for a country and the value thereof to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby:

Your law recognizes the direct relationship between military aid and foreign policy. Your law nominally, nominally, and I emphasized the work "nominally," places the final control under the Secretary of State.

Now, if that is so important that the Secretary of State is given that final jurisdiction, then I say this committee can't abdicate its jurisdiction to the Armed Services Committee. We have a duty to follow through.

Take supporting assistance. Why, supporting assistance is foreign policy.

Senator CLARK. Will you yield?

Senator MORSE. I will yield at any time.

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE

Senator CLARK. I wonder if we should let a matter of this importance get into a dispute as to the jurisdiction of two Senate committees. After all, the committees are the creatures of the Senate and it will be the Senate and not the committee that will have the decision. What is wrong wth having joint hearings with the Armed Services Committee on the military aspect of this program?

Senator MORSE. We have in the past invited the Armed Services Committee to attend our hearings, frequently. But we have never relinquished the finality of our jurisdiction over foreign policy, and I would be very much opposed to that. If Pat doesn't mind, I asked Pat to prepare a little memorandum on how this so-called veto of the Secretary of State is exercised, and Pat, you speak for yourself. He prepared for me the memorandum. Tell me what you find is the administrative procedure down at the State Department.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Mr. HOLT. The Foreign Assistance Act provides, as Senator Morse just read, that under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible, among other things, for determining whether there shall be a military assistance program for a country and the value thereof.

The Secretary of Sate has delegated that authorty to the administrator of AID who is to exercise it in consultation with the Under Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, as appropriate. That is the administrative chain of command, so to speak.

REPORT BILLS SIMULTANEOUSLY

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the Senator from Oregon: What would be his attitude if we considered the economic bill and then presented it separately and then considered the military aid bill from an authorization point of view, separately, so that when it is presented on the floor, even though they both come to this committee they are not mixed up in one package when it comes to debate and action on the floor.

What is you attitude toward that?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, report them simultaneously.

Senator MORSE. What did you say, George?

Senator AIKEN. I say report them simultaneously. The chairman had just made a suggestion which I was about to make, that we retain jurisdiction over both phases of foreign aid but consider the military and the economic separately and report them as two separate bills.

Senator MORSE. I was about to say that. Of course, it is obvious from my argument that I have maintained the last 2 years—we met down at the White House, many here in this room that were at the White House, last year with a pretty difficult session one night that lasted almost to midnight over this proposal to separate military and economic aid. The President was, in effect, host, but he was chairman of the meeting. As a result of that meeting it was subsequently decided by the administration not to separate them because there was a considerable amount of opposition. Bill Fulbright was on the other side and did a magnificent job in presenting his point of view and it was not separated then.

I would prefer the omnibus approach. That is the reason I took then, for the reasons I set forth this morning. But what I am concerned about, the heart of this as far as I am concerned is that if it is separate that the Foreign Relations Committee maintain its jurisdiction over the foreign policy of this country as far as the checking powers of the Congress are concerned.

CHECKS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Many of you don't put the emphasis that I put upon this matter of checks upon the executive branch of Government, but it is a deep-seated conviction with me. I want to see this committee keep its jurisdiction over foreign policy. I have heard no argument that I think is sound that shows that foreign military aid is not basically foreign policy. I would, of course, go along with the proposal that we have two separate bills, that we report them simultaneously but we maintain our jurisdiction. That is my goal. I think you do get for the first time into a question of choosing procedure when you decide whether or not you have an omnibus bill or two separate bills. I say all right, that is a procedural question. I happen to favor the omnibus bill because I think you are going to find even in the consideration of your two separate bills that you are constantly moving from one domain to the other in a given morning.

But I would go along with that. But I strongly urge that we not give up our jurisdiction. One second more and I am through. I am concerned about what Pat has found out down in the State Department. Sure the Secretary of State has to delegate, but now it is a question as to whether or not when the Secretary of State delegates he ever gives any review of what his delegated authorities decide.

The CHAIRMAN. He doesn't delegate to anybody in the Pentagon. The people he delegated to were all State Department.

Senator MORSE. I still say I want to see the Secretary of State on top of it at all times more than a matter of form. I want to know that the Secretary of State has reviewed the recommendations of the head of AID and that in effect the recommendations of AID don't become final.

NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SEPARATING BILLS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I am personally a little disturbed about the idea of separating these two. I think the question is, Is this military assistance a part of the foreign policy and actually a part of our aid program? If it is, I can see no justification for separating the two bills.

Senator CLARK. The statute just said it was.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We can change the statute, you know. We can do that. I am not—what they said—I know the statute says that. But here we are proposing the procedure as to whether or not we shunt the military aid over to the military committee and that would seem to me to fly in the face of the existing statute.

If it is a part of our aid program and foreign policy program, I can see no justification for separating the two bills and filing two simultaneously out of this committee. If it is not, if it is a military matter and should be considered by the military people, then I can understand the followup reasoning on that to send it over to the military committee. But I can't follow the filing simultaneously of two bills by this committee. I can't follow the theory.

Senator AIKEN. I proposed that as a peace offering, letting the whole Senate decide whether they want to put them together or not.

REASON BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE

The CHAIRMAN. I may say the real reason is not a theoretical or logical one. It is based upon experience, as I point to the last 2 years and even to a lesser extent in the previous years. This bill in the last 2 years has been the last bill, it has taken more time, it has caused more controversy, it has attracted more irrelevant amendments even than reapportionment and restrictions on wheat sales, things that had really nothing whatever to do with it.

Senator MORSE. Fishing boats.

The CHAIRMAN. Fishing boats, the 3-mile limit. You can go on indefinitely. There were 80 amendments.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You can't stop that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might if you proceed in a more orderly way. Because it is an omnibus bill there is more apprehension and misunderstanding of it. They lump the figures in it. The ordinary person who has not studied it says we have given away $111 billion since the war and they attribute it to the aid program, when the aid program, actually, what we call aid here, is a small part of it.

The figure for AID and its predecessor agencies ever since World War II is only $38.2 billion, of which grants were $29 billion and loans $8.8 billion. Of that $29.3 billion, $13 billion was the Marshall Plan, so you cut that back. The Marshall Plan is a very special kind of bill that everybody, I think, agrees was a necessary and effective one.

The criticism all goes to the new kind, but the other part, the difference between $28 and $111 billion, is accounted for by all kinds of miscellaneous, primarily $33 billion in military assistance. I don't think the public or the Congress thinks of it in these terms.

They think we have given away, a giveaway program, to foreign people $111 billion.

In one sense that is true. In another sense it isn't attributable to this aid program which this bill deals with and it is prejudiced by that. People have developed a very antagonistic attitude toward it. I think it has become, nationwide, the most controversial bill.

PROLONGED DEBATE

The Senator knows how long we took last year and the year before even longer. There was, as I recall it, nearly 8 weeks of prolonged debate after practically all the business was finished, attributable to this bill. So, it is not a reasonable or logical thing to sit down and talk about this bill but what we have actually experienced in the Senate in this legislation for the last 2 or 3 years. I think many of the debates go on in this because some of our colleagues, not on this committee, many of them haven't followed it very much. They read some of the policy and some of the outside activities and they make lots of speeches that I think do harm to our foreign relations in criticism of some of these people of other nations who shouldn't be criticized in many cases.

But I think it is—it has gotten to be almost a scandal every time we bring it up up there. These amendments, the ones last year, I thought were silly; I mean offering amendments to create cemeteries in Poland and in Italy. This committee didn't offer them, as I recall. I don't remember who offered them. But this causes an ungodly amount of controversial debate. I know of no other bill like it.

A QUESTION OF GERMANENESS

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I am not at all sure that by dividing the bill into two you will in any way eliminate this problem. You might multiply it.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you multiply it?

Senator GORE. You would have two bills instead of one.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is concentrated on one, I think an understandable segment of it. If you present piece by piece——

Senator GORE. Any amendment that would be germane to any part of one bill would be germane to some part of one of two bills.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It isn't a question of germaneness.

Senator GORE. Well, what is the question? The chairman——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean under our rules it doesn't have to be germane, you can offer an amendment to either one of them.

Senator GORE. The chairman, it seems to me, has properly become exasperated, at least understandably exasperated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that.

Senator GORE. But I am not impressed that the solution he suggests would be in any way eliminate the source of his exasperation. It might increase it.

DANGEROUS SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Now, as to whether or not military aid is foreign policy, let me suggest that the most pressing, and I think the most dangerous, example of foreign policy right now is in Vietnam. That is military

aid in large part. The only practicable check, if the Congress wishes to exercise it on that, is on military aid in this bill or in the appropriation bill. I am not sure it would be wise for Congress so to undertake. But should it desire to do so, this is the most effective and most immediate and, as I know, the only certainly effective approach.

So, it appeals to me quite strongly that this committee should keep its jurisdiction, its proper jurisdiction. It appeals to me quite strongly that it is impractical, almost impossible, to separate the economic from military aid on the lines of foreign and military policy. They are intertwined. To me they are inseparable. So, however onerous the burden is, it seems to me that this committee has no choice but to undertake it. I have expressed my view on this before, but I think that we should continue with the bill, one bill.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHOULD JUSTIFY ITS POSITION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On another phase of this bill, I probably would be one of the last people in the Senate to say I would be willing to be controlled by the executive department of the Government as to what we do, but inasmuch as these matters have to be administered not by the Congress but by the executive department I am wondering if we might think about getting somebody over here from the executive department to justify their position. I think they ought to take a position.

I don't think I was at that meeting at the White House last year that Senator Morse talks about, but here is what they did last year: They sent fellows gumshoeing around the various offices trying to get a consensus and then they used their own judgment as to what they sent over here.

Senator MORSE. That is exactly what they did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But we don't have anything in the record here. If the administrative end of the Government feels it is imperative this should be in one bill, they ought to come here and say why and justify it. If they feel that it is a matter of little consequence whether one bill is an aid bill and the other bill goes to the Armed Services Committee or what, I think they ought to present their viewpoint for the guidance of this committee, not the control of this committee, but for the guidance and for the information of this committee, and I don't think they have done that yet. They may have talked in back of their hands to some people, I don't know. But our committee as such has not had the benefit of their administrative views on this thing.

DECISION MIGHT BE PREMATURE

Senator AIKEN. It seems to me that about all we have learned this morning is that there is a request or demand for hearing on the military assistance section of this bill. Therefore, we may be a little premature in trying to arrive at a definite decision at this time. So, why don't we have a couple of days hearings on the military section of the bill and then decide whether we want to report

one or two bills, and if one bill, what kind of a bill it should be; why don't we do that?

If there is a demand, Senator Clark and I think Senator Morse and some of the others, for a hearing on the military section of the bill and some apprehension over giving up jurisdiction over military assistance by this committee, why don't we have a couple of days hearings and then decide what to do about a bill?

The CHAIRMAN. That might be——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not sure we need 2 days of hearings.

Senator AIKEN. Whatever is necessary, 1, 2, or 3.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my point that the administration which administers this bill, that means the whole ball of wax, ought to present their views.

Senator MORSE. I do, too. You say we can change the law, but the law as it presently reads, as we have discussed here this morning, leaves no question in my mind about the jurisdiction of this committee. And we shouldn't abdicate it.

TWO FACETS OF MILITARY DEFENSE

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say one word.

I think the trouble comes when the military defense has got two very distinct facets. Part of this is straight out military. Take Vietnam, somebody mentioned. This is not military aid, even in the concept of foreign aid. This is an actual war going on. We have got our own troops over there. We have got Marines and we have got 25,000 people there. As far as I can see this is the conduct of a war. We are not aiding South Vietnam. We are doing it ourselves primarily.

Senator MORSE. It is our war.

The CHAIRMAN. There are other areas, I mean in the case of a little aid to Portugal or Iran, in which we are not carrying on a war, we are aiding them in that. One is a military assistance for a political purpose. Another is straight out military activity, I think as an illustration in Vietnam. You do have this kind of mixed up situation with regard to military aid in contrast to economic aid to Latin America which has a very clear-cut purpose.

I think because this is highly complicated it contributes greatly to the difficulties on the floor. I may say, it is not only the onerous nature of it, but I get from other chairmen you know, giving me the devil and the "What is the matter with the Foreign Relations Committee, why does it get into trouble, why do you keep us here from 3 to 8 weeks longer than anybody else?" You also know, I needn't tell you when we have hearings on these very important questions we would do well to get an array of four or five members here. They don't care to come. They never have, it is nothing new. This has been throughout the area. The Senator from Iowa blew his top last year about coming in at the last minute after four or five had heard the evidence and then going all over it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have blown the last 5 years but it doesn't do any good.

SOMETHING IS WRONG

The CHAIRMAN. I have never seen any bill like it. All of this contributes to my feeling that there is something wrong with aid as it has been handled.

If you want to go on in exactly the same way, I think you will encounter the same thing. What I have been struggling for is what can be done to at least change the approach in some way. I am not necessarily committed that we must give up all jurisdiction, but I am looking for some way to make a new start at this thing. To where we don't run into again this year just what we have had for 2 years. This is not just a philosophical difference. It is trying to meet a practical situation. We have actually experienced it. This is no theory of what we had. You all know what we had, and it is very painful, not only to me but I think everybody concerned.

All the Members of the Senate get very impatient with this thing, carrying on as it has for 2 years, and how do you meet it? It is a practical question. It is not just theoretical as to what should be done to this or that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.

ROLE OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

First I want to express my complete sympathy with the chairman's position, and second to apologize for being late. I have just been to a briefing from General Johnson in the Preparedness Subcommittee on the South Vietnam situation.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I think the military part of the bill could very well go to the Armed Services Committee. I think I am the only Senator who for many years has sat on both committees and you might be surprised at some of the results that would come out of that being done from the standpoint of what the results would be.

Anyway, I heard the chairman present his position, I believe it was about last April, on this matter, as did many of my colleagues, at the White House. The more I have thought about it, the more I think it was right and the more I think it would expedite the foreign aid position in the Senate and in the bill itself.

I also feel that we are being taken for a ride on economic aid by sliding this money into these so-called soft windows of the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. I think the aid is billions of dollars more than we are telling the American people it is. I think maybe if we got rid of this military picture it would give us a chance as a committee to give a more thorough analysis of the logic or the lack of logic in the economic aid. That is my position, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to speak.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

MILITARY DOMINATION OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

Senator MORSE. I couldn't disagree with the Senator from Missouri more than I do on his position, first, because of the existing law. Under existing law the military has no authority to be the determining voice in regard to military aid. Second, because it is

going to feed a feeling that is growing in this country of more and more military domination in the affairs of a civilian government. Third, because I think this committee has a clear duty to maintain its jurisdiction over all aspects of foreign aid. We are not trying to take jurisdiction away from the Armed Services Committee over the defense of the country. What we are doing is simply saying that the Pentagon building, when it has proposals that involve foreign policy, has got to come through this committee and not through the Armed Services Committee.

You let the impression get abroad in this land that in these critical times the military is being built up at the expense of a complete check over them; you are headed for trouble. I think you can do either one of two things: You can follow my preference of an omnibus bill, which some Senators around this table have supported this morning——

EXPLANATION OF AN OMNIBUS BILL

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by "omnibus bill"? Explain.

Senator MORSE. The President's bill, economic and military aid combined. Or you can follow what George Aiken offered as a peace offering, having two bills but the committee maintaining jurisdiction, one economic aid and the other foreign aid, and you offer them to the floor of the Senate at the same time. Or you can follow Joe Clark's suggestion, when we get into the military aspects of it, we perhaps formalize more than we have in the past, although we have offered this in the past, have joint hearings with the Armed Services Committee so they can come in and be heard in connection with the military aid aspects of it.

But you aren't going to solve it procedurally by deciding to separate them here because you are going to have to face it on the floor of the Senate. As Senator Gore pointed out, you are going to have the same amendments and probably more if you separate them. I think it is the kind of a hassle that ought to be avoided.

I close with this. Bill has a right to be exasperated. I only want to say that I think where we have fallen short before on this committee is that around this table there has been pretty much of a consensus of opinion that something ought to be done substantively with foreign aid, but for the most part we have just warned the administration to do something about it next year, and the next year.

NOT COMING TO GRIPS WITH PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN AID

Bill Fulbright has had ideas on a reform of foreign aid substantively that ought to have been enacted into law 3 years ago but he has been waiting, that is my interpretation, he has been waiting for the State Department to do something on its own. It hasn't done anything on its own. He wants to know what can be done this year. We have got a lot of amendments or we have a lot of ideas that I understand he is going to put in amendment form that he will find Wayne Morse voting for.

I think this is the year in which we ought to keep our jurisdiction. We ought to actually this year pass the reforms that we think

ought to be adopted and then you won't have all these amendments on the floor of the Senate.

We haven't brought to the floor of the Senate for 3 years a foreign aid bill that in my judgment comes to grips with what as individuals we know happens to be wrong with foreign aid. We just haven't come to grips with it and I think that is the problem, not a procedural problem at all.

So, my plea is let's go ahead, let's start having some hearings on the military aspects of it and then follow Bourke's suggestion, let's decide then what procedure we may wish to adopt. But I think if you have these hearings, get started with them, this year you can come out of here with a foreign aid bill which most of us will be voting for.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I may have misstated myself, I didn't mean to go ahead and have hearings. I said we might consider, this is only a suggestion, inasmuch as the law presently says that this military aid is a part of the foreign policy of the United States and so on, that we might consider calling in authorized administration representatives to come over here and justify this view one way or the other for our guidance.

Senator MORSE. That is all right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And after that we could decide whether we accept their position, whether we disagree with it, or just what on what goes on.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat in a peculiar position herein in agreeing with about all that has been said on both sides. I am just wondering if we can't solve this very easily by putting all economic and military aid in countries with which we are at war and let that go to the Armed Services Committee and the countries with which we are not at war we have all of it in this committee.

CONTRAST IN RESPONSE TO MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say just one more thing, and this is the first time I have ever spoken on this. I agree with the Senator from Oregon, there is something wrong in the way this situation is handled. I agree with the chairman it looks ridiculous. We go up on the floor of the U.S. Senate and we pass a $50 billion bill in 30 minutes for the national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. And we take 8 weeks fighting over $3½ or $4 or $5 billion, depending on how you look at it, in the foreign aid bill. Somebody says if I had my druthers, I have my overs, and despite these long-haired Beatle-looking professors that run around talking overkill, it is a fact, in my opinion, that primarily because we have the three separate services we have a lot of overkill, and that is after we hit the first time, and that costs us a great deal of money.

Then we have got the overlove people who are only happy if they can give some of your and my money away, and everybody else's.

Then we have the overhate people who see a Communist under every bed and won't sell wheat to Russia because it will hurt the United States and that costs more money so we have been putting

out a lot more money than is necessary for the security of the United States. That is beginning to reflect itself in some other critical problems like, for example, balance of payments.

I would think, and this is what I said might be a surprise, that the best way I know to generate some real discussion about the military bill itself, which goes through for $50 billion in 30 minutes, as we all know, or an hour, very seldom a vote, and so forth——

The CHAIRMAN. It is unanimous when it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is unanimous. Everybody agrees to that, and I want the committee to know with great respect, and I hope some of the people here think that I have had some experience in this field, that I am quite worried about certain aspects of this military budget. So with those premises, I say to my friend from Oregon that my thought is not to relieve this committee of any obligations but to stir up some real debate as to what our military defenses are.

Now, you are going to see something which perhaps makes a lot of this discussion theoretical, in my opinion. You are going to see more and more foreign aid given to fight a war that will not be part of the military budget of the United States.

Senator GORE. Will the Senator yield?

Senator SYMINGTON. I will be glad to yield to my friend from Tennessee.

CAN TWO BILLS ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM?

Senator GORE. What I can't follow is how this situation of which the chairman is justifiably exasperated and of which you complain is going to be in any way solved or alleviated by having two bills instead of one. The same amendments will be in order, the same political speeches on the floor, whether for a graveyard for the Poles or the Yugoslavs or whatever. They will have two opportunities instead of one.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I could ask you—I would like to think while I am trying to answer you to the best of my ability, but my off-the-top-of-my-head answer is that many people on the Armed Services Committee do not believe in foreign military aid, and that is one of the reasons why there has been no effort on the part of the committee to get into this picture. I think that there would be more discussion and justification of foreign military aid if there were two bills and one bill were submitted and justified by the Armed Services Committee.

As it is today, the merits or demerits of the military aid program are swamped in the discussion of the merits or demerits of the economic aid program and vice versa to some extent. It is a long delaying process.

It seems to me that you would have a more general Senate participation if there were the two bills, one coming out of the Armed Services Committee and one coming out of the Foréign Relations Committee, of how much we should do on a military basis in supporting these various countries with weapons.

MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE

Senator GORE. Do you desire more debate, not less?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Senator GORE. That wouldn't solve the chairman's problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. But that is on the floor of the Senate and my premise is I don't think it is constructive. In the 12 years that I have heard the military justification, today there is not 5 percent discussion on the floor of the U.S. Senate of a $50 billion military bill as there was when I defended a $13 billion bill. I think that is wrong, and I just thought in the shifting of this situation, because it makes no difference to me, I am on both committees and see it both ways, that you would have a more thorough discussion of the justification of military aid, of putting it this way. I think that you would have the same type and character of discussion of military aid, which ties in very closely to military appropriations per se, that you do now, and much of it due to the distinguished Senator from Oregon on economic aid.

Senator CLARK. Stuart, would you yield?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator CLARK. Before you came in, Pat Holt read to us the present law which very clearly puts the responsibility for military aid to other countries under the Secretary of State, to the complete exclusion of the Secretary of Defense.

Would you want to change that law?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would answer you this way: In the first place, I am following the thinking of the chairman, which over a period of a year now has impressed me a great deal. Second, my answer would be that I would not want to give the Secretary of Defense any legislative prerogatives over the Secretary of State.

Senator CLARK. Wouldn't it follow that we should retain jurisdiction?

VIETNAM IS A MILITARY MATTER

Senator SYMINGTON. I do think that the question of the Secretary of State's authority and the question of the Secretary of Defense's authority in this field are in theory relatively unimportant because of the President's interest in the problem and the way he is delegating authority. I would say today that I am impressed with the fact that the Secretary of Defense today already is, you might say, at least as much of a spokesman for the South Vietnamese, whatever the term is, goings-on, as is the Secretary of State. I feel that if you had this thing move over as part of the military situation that—naturally, I don't want to break the law and I don't want to see the Secretary of Defense have any more authority in the political field than he has today, but I do feel that today the situation in South Vietnam is 95 percent a military matter and 5 percent a political matter.

Senator AIKEN. Who is running that war?

Senator CLARK. Bill, would you want to change the law? It seems to me if the law isn't changed then we ought to maintain jurisdiction. If you want to change the law then it is something else.

The CHAIRMAN. As a practical matter the way it works now, the military actually do practically everything in the administration of the military. It says subject to—really as a practical matter they confer with the State Department. If it were done for political purposes I am sure that the State Department recommends particularly these smaller countries in which political operations justify military aid.

Take a case like Vietnam, we call it military aid. It is a war which we are in, and 99 percent of it is a military aid.

Senator SYMINGTON. No question about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I don't agree with that. I agree the physical activity is 99 and nine-tenths percent war. But I don't agree from the theoretical viewpoint of the worldwide impact or U.S. interests that it is, or at least I don't accept it as, anything except a political program implemented overwhelmingly physically by military action, yes, on the ground. Physically it is overwhelmingly a war.

But it just isn't a war as to who will win the battles and see whose flag will go up here on the flagpole. To me it has much deeper significance or it couldn't be justified.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I say something?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

SEPARATE BILLS TO AVOID CONFUSION

Senator LAUSCHE. I feel that there should not be a separation of these two items. My judgment is reached primarily because of the confusion in which most of us find ourselves in trying to ascertain what the total aid is that we are giving to these foreign countries. In the combination of the two services, we at least have a chance to relate in the one bill what we are doing.

On the floor of the Senate when we discussed the additional aid to the Inter-American Bank we had to stretch out and inquire what other aids are we giving. In my judgment we could act more intelligently if they were all brought under one roof, rather than have each one being separated into a different item.

The result is that we are doing one thing with our right hand and the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. It is on that basis that I would oppose the separation.

Last week I read into the record a discussion of the history of the foreign aid bill. That history was prepared specifically to show that from the very beginning it was considered essential that these two services be considered together. If any changes were made since 1947, they were in the direction of solidifying the combined consideration rather than separating it.

I don't know whether it was the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army that issued this historical discussion. I want to repeat that it shows that every time a change was made, it was intended to keep the two services combined in one bill to insure intelligent consideration of the whole subject.

That is all I have to say.

AID ITEMS THAT THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT HANDLE

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there are a lot of things that also affect the aid that doesn't come to this committee now, such as Public Law 480; it doesn't come to this committee budget at all. The Ex-Im bank is lumped here—the overall figures—it goes to Banking and Currency. In the House, all international financial institutions such as IMF and International Bank don't go to Foreign Affairs Committee but they go to the Banking and Currency Committee. This is under the existing laws of the rules of the two Houses. So, you don't get a complete coverage of our foreign activities even under the omnibus bill.

Senator GORE. That is no argument why we should make it worse, more proliferating.

The CHAIRMAN. I am inclined to think that it is. We don't have any trouble, at least legislatively, on Public Law 480. It goes through. It is recommended by the Agriculture Department and it goes through relatively peacefully. This is the only one that I know that attracts the kind of controversy that it does. All of the aid somehow or other in the public mind is attributed to what we call AID. This $111 billion that has gone down the rathole, as most people who oppose it say, is made up of funds from all these other sources. They have never come before this committee.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BEFORE OTHER COMMITTEES

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, to illustrate what happens, I went to the Commerce Committee meeting this morning, and to my great astonishment I found up there a bill not sponsored by the administration which will give an additional $500 million, Wayne, to the Export-Import Bank to be loaned under guidelines completely different from the present capital that is being loaned. There is an example of things happening in another committee that affect our international positions, which you probably would never have known about.

Senator CLARK. The Export-Import Bank is supposed to be under Banking and Currency.

Senator LAUSCHE. There you are.

The CHAIRMAN. That is where the jurisdiction is.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you had better tell A. Willis Robertson about it because it is a specially promoted bill.

The CHAIRMAN. That jurisdiction, of course, has been well-established. I don't think there is much prospect of bringing it in here.

CONTINUE WITH HEARINGS

If I understand the discussion up to this point, maybe that is a proper way to proceed, to continue with hearings. We have bills before us, no one, I assume, objects to being precise about whether a particular bill is the subject of that hearing. We have had hearings already, the preliminaries at least, on the economic. We will have hearings on the military and then decide how we present it later on.

Senator MORSE. I think that is the way.

Senator CARLSON. That would please me very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the consensus here?

Senator MORSE. That is the way to proceed.

SENATOR MORSE'S AMENDMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to present a bill, your own ideas of it?

Senator MORSE. I am going to present the omnibus bill modified by a long series of amendments so it will be modified in a bill.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to incorporate in a single omnibus bill?

Senator MORSE. I am going to incorporate all my amendments to the administration's omnibus bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you present a clean bill incorporating it?

Senator MORSE. I can't possibly do that. I don't need to do it that way. I will take the administration bill and modify it with a whole series of amendments and offer that.

Senator AIKEN. Are you going to offer them on the floor so they will be printed and available?

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to offer them in committee?

Senator MORSE. I will offer them on the floor and they will be sent to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be sent to this committee?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't know that there is anything I can do about getting attendance here. As a gratuitous comment, I know of no committee on any bill, including this committee, that has ever been as divided about a piece of legislation as this committee has been for 5 or 6 years.

Senator MORSE. They won't be this year. I honestly don't believe it will be this year.

CONSENSUS ON PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. This committee has never been even reasonably in agreement about support of a bill, in contrast to most committees I have served on where they usually get together and generally support it.

Then if I understand the consensus, we will continue with hearings, that is every day we can, for the next several weeks, including the military. Of course, we could have the military—however we may decide it later on and see what you want to ask them about.

Is that correct?

Senator MORSE. I think that is something we ought to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anybody in disagreement with this program?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me that it could add to confusion if we go ahead and have hearings on the military and then decide we don't want it and turn it over to some other committee. It is a lot of wasted time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure about that. Even assuming that we in the wisdom of the committee decide, in the last analysis decide, we would not wish to vote out a military bill, just to use the hypothetical, it wouldn't have been wasted. In judging size and type of

all that goes into the economic, it is not irrelevant to know what the military is doing.

EXAMPLE OF PAKISTAN

Senator MORSE. Take Pakistan, for example. Suppose you are having a hearing involving aid to Pakistan. A member of this committee could be perfectly justified in asking the administration to send in a witness who could tell us about the military aid to Pakistan, what the relationship of it is to the economic aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we have the books already that are available to the committee. They have all of the total proposals that include the military along with the economic. That is available to anybody who cares to study it.

Senator MORSE. Except the policy justifications, and that is the important thing. To give me the figures on the economic aid and the military aid to Pakistan is empty. That is an empty vessel unless I can fill it up with a discussion of the policy that brought the vessel into being. I want to know why you have x dollars for economic aid and y dollars for military aid and what the interrelationship is because that is what is going to determine the total foreign policy of Pakistan.

ISSUE READY FOR CRYSTALLIZATION

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want to give the impression that we are going to be several weeks on that.

Senator MORSE. I don't think you are going to be.

Senator AIKEN. It may be but I wouldn't let it be the impression.

Senator MORSE. Bill is so disturbed about what happened in the past years, but what Bill doesn't fully appreciate is what happened in the past 3 years has got us to a point where we are ready for some crystallization this year. I don't think you are going to have all the problems you think you are going to have.

Senator CLARK. What do you want to do, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I say it looks as if a majority certainly clearly are in favor of going ahead and having hearings and deferring a decision as to the form in which we will report the bill or two bills or no bill, I suppose, until after we have had further hearings.

Senator MORSE. I think that is sensible.

Senator CLARK. I am for that.

INVITING THE MILITARY TO TESTIFY

Mr. HOLT. For some guidance on that, tomorrow the Comptroller General will be here, but beyond that nothing is scheduled. The staff would welcome guidance on who you want scheduled for next week and when.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have to negotiate that with them. They are still occupied in the House. I would take it from what was said here that the staff should immediately undertake to set up further hearings with the economic and when and if the military is available on Tuesday or Wednesday to ask the military to come and present their case.

Senator MORSE. I think so.

Mr. HOLT. This would be Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler?

Senator MORSE. Whoever he wants to bring along.

Mr. HOLT. Or just McNamara?

The CHAIRMAN. McNamara usually is first, whenever he can come, and followed with whomever they designate to answer specific questions.

AID TO VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest, inasmuch as this is primarily a ground and sea operation, that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army be included as witnesses before this committee.

If we are going to vote for hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of aid, and it could well be billions of dollars of aid, because we are not at war in South Vietnam, as we all know——[Laughter.]

This is simply an operation of cooperation with the South Vietnamese Government. I think we ought to get more details of the nature of this aid

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any problem?

Mr. MARCY. Mr. McNamara is prepared to give answers in the House in public session, if you want to go through that and bring him back in executive session which has been sort of a normal procedure in the past.

Senator SYMINGTON. My point is with respect to the able Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary in the State Department. There is not a person around the table that will admit but what we are talking about a military operation. If we are going to talk about voting money for a military operation, we ought to know before we vote what we are voting it for and why.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, it is a military operation as I tried to make it clear, but if it is just a military operation it isn't justified. If there isn't any controlling purpose over and above that justifies the military operation, then it is a different thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was just having a little fun.

MORE INFORMATION ABOUT TACTICAL ASPECTS

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me we are talking about the relationship that a proper solution to reconcile the military and economic is the military could well propose programs in their view as military with the Secretary of State, and this committee for that matter, in the position of either approving or disapproving.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually that is what has been taking place, I think, existing. It could take place under the two bills.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't say he is wrong or not, but I would like to defend the Department of Defense in this matter with my good friend from Oregon. I do not know whether it is true or not and I don't say it is wrong, I have no criticism of it, but the person who is considered the personification of the hard line in South Vietnam in the newspapers is the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, so that part to me is not quite as important as the broad political or even the broad strategic military situation, as the

committee getting more information about the tactical aspect of this thing.

I think the people to testify before this committee in every way without any reservation of any kind is the Defense Department. That being true, I think what we want to do is pass into the tactical aspect of the problem because it is the tactical aspect of the problem almost day to day that is requiring the steadily additional commitments.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection then?

Without objection we will proceed to set up the hearings.

Mr. MARCY. Public first with McNamara?

The CHAIRMAN. Public first with McNamara. I don't know whether you need public beyond that. It always takes more time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you have a public hearing?

Senator MORSE. You have to have a public start with him and come back in executive session.

Mr. MARCY. You can always have him in executive session and edit it.

Senator MORSE. I think you should have it public and then in executive.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you accomplish if you have a public session?

Senator MORSE. You accomplish something pretty basic in this form of Government. You have the heads of the executive department to appear before the American people.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only thinking out loud. I remember the MacArthur hearings. They set up the fact that they edit the executive sessions and go over it. Inasmuch as there are Americans fighting and dying today, it seems to me if we want to get the maximum number of facts in the shortest possible time, we could put out some form agreed upon by both sides so that no military secrets are released and move farther faster than if we had an open session. If we have an open session, pretty soon we get into open disagreements about the guts of what is going on, and I think everybody knows about that already.

Senator MORSE. That happens to be the democratic way.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we can have, of course, Bell and anyone else down there that he always brings up, others, if you want to ask them questions about it.

HOW MANY HEARINGS ARE NECESSARY?

Do you have any idea how many more hearings you think are necessary for this bill?

Senator AIKEN. Make them short.

The CHAIRMAN. I am willing.

Senator AIKEN. Just as few as we can get by with, but all that are necessary.

Senator MORSE. I am not going to ask anything more than I feel I have to ask. I do think we ought to have Bell in executive session. I want to ask some questions about how they are handling at the AID level this delegation of authority. It is pretty important that

we know. I am a strong advocate of starting out with a public hearing and then going into an executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning we will start out with the Comptroller General, and then next week——

Mr. MARCY. We will get McNamara as early as we can in public session next week.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if he can't come before Wednesday, we will have Bell and someone from AID on Monday and Tuesday. We have got to move on it. We have a lot of other things that are being held up because of this bill that we ought to be working on.

Senator GORE. Anything else?

ALICE IN WONDERLAND POLICY IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, if you forgive me——

The CHAIRMAN. Not unless you have something to offer.

Senator AIKEN. I move the debate now cease.

Senator PELL. In the first hearing when Rusk or McNamara comes up, what I am confused about——

The CHAIRMAN. We have had Rusk.

Senator PELL. We did, but I still don't fully understand what our policy is in Vietnam. It seems a little like an Alice in Wonderland talking about a program unless we know what our objectives are.

I don't mean to be a discordant fellow, but it leaves me unhappy. How can you have a program unless you know what your objective is?

TOGETHER OR SEPARATE

The CHAIRMAN. The staff has suggested—I would guess from the discussion this morning that this committee will handle the military bill either separately or together; is that correct?

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is quite clear.

Mr. MARCY. This committee is the point, not the Armed Services Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed with it.

Is that correct?

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't know. I wasn't here all the while.

The CHAIRMAN. The question of whether it will be handled separately or together was left until after we had had some hearings on it.

Bourke, is that your understanding of the sentiment of it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to be the sentiment. I will go along with it, except I will just have to say I don't think it is a wise procedure.

We ought to consider them all together or separate them and send it to the military committee. I don't see that you accomplish anything except adding to confusion. If you separate the two bills and then vote them both out of this committee, you are going to have amendments to both of them; I think that is a valid argument. But I mean I am not raising any objection. I think that seems to be the consensus of opinion from the people here.

Senator LAUSCHE. But from the standpoint of taking testimony, this committee will take the testimony on both phases of the bill. Whether it shall be sent to the Senate as one bill or two bills shall be determined at a later time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is a good consensus of opinion, but I don't think that necessarily meets the issue that you raised.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry Senator Sparkman wasn't here, because it looks as if the committee is inclined toward his handling of the bill.

Senator MORSE. No, sir; you are going to handle the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir; we will wait until we see how the committee decides it in the final analysis.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General of the United States, and aides appeared and testified on aspects of the foreign aid program.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearings.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:22 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

David E. Bell, Administrator for AID, and John H. Funari, Coordinator, Legislative Presentation, AID, testified on the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and printed hearing.

[The committee adjourned at 12:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:07 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

William S. Gaud, Deputy Administrator, AID, testified on the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearings.

[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

The committee considered the bill (S. 693), to amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

On motion by Senator Lausche, and without objection, the committee voted favorably to report the bill to the Senate. Senators Long, Sparkman, Pell, and Mansfield were recorded by proxy in favor of the motion.

William S. Gaud, Deputy Administrator, AID, testified on aspects of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript and published hearings.

[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1965

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:10 a.m. in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Long, Clark, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

This hearing was published in 1965 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENT OF DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROGRAM LOANS AND SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE COMMODITY PROGRAMS [P. 555]

We have persuaded and been able to persuade the Korean Government to limit its budget deficit, to hold down the defense requirements, and to put more funds into economic investment. We have used our supporting assistance as a bargaining tool in this direction.

However, we have simultaneously been reducing the supporting assistance in Korea. Three or four years ago it was about $200 million, this year it was $75 million, and next year we hope to reduce it to $65 million and to develop the program from a supporting assistance to a developmental basis. Under these circumstances we have tried to use the commodity assistance in the Korea case to contribute to permanent and lasting economic improvement.

This is not, however, the standard or normal pattern for using supporting assistance in commodity support. More typical under supporting assistance is the Vietnamese or Lao situation in which supporting assistance is very important and very valuable but in which none of us would claim that it is contributing to a very rapid progress toward economic independence and the end of the need for all.

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EFFECTIVE USE OF PROGRAM LOANS [P. 557]

Mr. BELL. The second qualification is that in the Latin American instances, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, in each case we have used this system of quarterly reviews and disbursements. We have not done that in the Indian, Pakistan, Turkey, Tunisia cases which I think are the only other cases there are.

I am not sure we shouldn't. But we have not done so thus far. We have felt that India and Pakistan particularly and Turkey in the last 2 or 3 years, and Tunisia, have been proceeding on a somewhat more stable basis than the Latin American countries. They have not had the very severe and instant problem of inflation. They have not had to make as much of a reform in their own policies and, therefore, we have felt up to now that we have been able to make a basic agreement that could run for a year.

Now, I repeat we have been quite impressed with the effectiveness of the Latin American technique. It is something very significant, and obviously all of this stays out of the press and out of the public knowledge, but it has been very impressive to us privately to see the extent to which this has given even us a basis for a thorough, once a quarter review of figures on exactly what they have done. They know from our action in the Brazilian experience a year and a half ago that we are serious about this and, therefore, it has worked very well indeed.

Whether we should use the quarterly system in other parts of the world we haven't yet decided.

HYPOTHETICAL CASE

Senator MORSE. To be sure I understand your policy, discuss with me this hypothetical case. You make a program loan to country Y and you pay it in the first quarter. If you notice in beginning of the second quarter that the government is moving further and further to the left and you became satisfied that the government is going to go communistic, do you then reserve your right under your program loan policy to give them no more money after the second quarter?

Mr. BELL. It is question we haven't faced in exactly that form and I will have to give you a hypothetical answer.

Senator MORSE. I know.

Mr. BELL. All of our loans, and particularly our program loans, carry some sort of general phrase, the exact legal language I have forgotten, that we can suspend this at any time in the interests of the United States—just about as broad language as that—and therefore, my answer to you is that we would not only have the ability under the terms of the loan to hold it up, but the policy question would depend on the exact circumstances of the case. But certainly under the case you cite or you hypothesize, if a country was moving toward a Communist takeover, there would obviously be a point at which we would feel there was no point in struggling against it any longer—it was going to happen and why put any more money into the situation.

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CRITERIA FOR GIVING ASSISTANCE [P. 558]

Mr. BELL. In this sense our attitude is known, and the political forces within a country are working with the knowledge of our attitude. Quite plainly, for example, the Government of Indonesia knew for the last 2 or 3 years we were not prepared to provide economic assistance unless they were prepared to undertake a serious attack on their own inflation and on their other economic difficulties. They have continually protested this privately, argued with us privately, and we just flatly held our ground.

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AID TO "QUESTIONABLE" REGIMES [P. 559]

Senator MORSE. I want to move from a hypothetical to a few specific cases. It is said by some critics that the United States has used its AID program to shore up and support some very questionable regimes, to wit, the military junta in the Dominician Republic, the military junta in Honduras, and non-democratic governments in Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador. Some also point out that under the Geneva accords we had no right at all to involve ourselves in the establishment of a government in Vietnam, which John Foster Dulles obviously did when we set up the Diem government.

The Geneva accords on the truce line provided for an election in 1956, which we did our best to prevent. Therefore, we used aid in Vietnam to influence the type of government that was set up.

Irrespective of the rightness or wrongness of it, my question is, what is your defense of the AID program to these governments which, in the instances I mentioned, are anything but democratic governments?

Mr. BELL. Well, in the Latin American cases in recent years, there has been——

Senator MORSE. Excuse me. Mr. Reporter, go back and add this to my question. It is also said that even this year with the situation in Chile, the United States, through its AID program, directly involved itself by AID announcements in advance of the election that they favored the administration that was elected. If anybody has any questions about it, I may say that I, too, was very anxious to see to it that that administration was elected, but it has not got anything to do with the abstract principle that confronts us in the field of foreign relations which is whether or not the United States should use aid money to influence the internal governmental policy in any country.

Mr. BELL. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Ecuador, which are typical cases in recent years of juntas, military juntas, we have tried to follow the policy that I think was worked out, and worked very well, in the case of Peru a couple of years ago, namely, of saying to the government in question, "We recognize that de facto you are the government of this place. We are unhappy that there should be a departure from constitutional principles. What are your plans for going back to constitutional arrangements? When are you going to have some elections? How are you going to get out of this junta situation?"

When they have given us some sort of reasonable satisfaction, or at least we feel we have got the maximum out of them in regard to that question, we have been willing to start on a limited basis an assistance program or, more broadly, we have been willing to resume fairly normal relations with that government. Now, in the Peru case this worked fine. A military junta was in for a while, they did provide for elections, elections were held, and Belaunde was elected, and the situation is better from the standpoint of constitutional government than it has been for years.

It is not going to work that way in each and every case. The Ecuador one troubles us particularly at the present time because there does not seem to be any effective alternative to this junta, but that does not imply that we like the situation or that we support the junta. It is that we are continuing to look for an alternative, and we are continuing to be prepared to use aid for such bargaining effect as it may have.

I do not want to exaggerate the power of the aid weapon in these cases, or the aid tool. It is not all that significant in many instances, and the question that we have to ask is can we bring any effective influence to bear. If we can, we are prepared to do so.

In the Paraguay case this has troubled me particularly, and I am very glad I am going to have a chance to go down there at the end of next month to the Inter-Development Bank meeting. I have never been to Paraguay. It seems to me that there can be arrangements and devices by which we can contribute to the loosening up of that society and its somewhat gradual transition to a more democratic situation.

Our aid program to Paraguay has been quite limited, and relatively, in part limited, because we were not prepared to tie ourselves strongly to this government. The aid we have given has been given to a situation in which this government is in power, so that you can argue that we have certainly not been trying to overthrow this government, but we would like to see a way to contribute to the evolution of the situation in Paraguay.

Now, in Chile you are entirely correct. We had a very strong view as to where the interest of the United States lay in the end, of peace and freedom and progress in the Western Hemisphere in the outcome of that election.

We are obviously inhibited, and have to be inhibited, in the extent to which we—to do anything that can be interpreted as outright and overt intervention in the political process in another country. Anything that we have done or anything that we did which might have been so interpreted could easily have backfired very badly and harmed the candidate we would like to see win much more than anything we did might help him. So the inherent nature of the political process in a country that has elections necessarily limits what we can do, and does so limit us.

Evidence of what I was saying earlier about working with economic instruments which have only a limited and indirect effect, but within those limits we certainly try to help the groups and forces which are, from our point of view, progressive, democratic, and reform minded.

It may sound, Senator, as though we were engaged all the time in a lot of political maneuvering in other countries. This is not the way it looks to me sitting at my desk.

The way it looks to me sitting at my desk is that most of the things we are doing, most of the time, certainly most of the money, is involved in situations where this is not an issue.

In India, for example, we are not involved; the Indian political evolution has been moving along. We generally approve of it, but we have not had anything to do with it, and our aid is not directly connected with it.

The same is true in Pakistan, the same is true in Turkey, in Nigeria, in Brazil. We did not have anything to do with the Castelo Branco regime coming in.

So the bulk of the situations that cross my desk, and the bulk of our funds are used in ways that are not directly related to political issues, but there are cases in which these political matters are very much involved.

I do not know that it would pay us to go into the Vietnam matter. It will have to come out of the record, but I think the committee is well aware that in the closing months of the Diem regime, we were, in fact, trying to use our economic assistance, as well as all kinds of persuasion of other kinds, to persuade him to change some of the policies that neither you nor we would think were sensible.

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GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF ARGENTINA [P. 560]

Senator CLARK. Just for brief comment: The Argentine figure is disturbingly low in terms of the gross national product even though the annual population growth is pretty low, too.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Is there any particular explanation for that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; there is. The Argentine Government for the last several years has not adopted policies which would step up the rate of economic growth in that country.

Argentina is a country with relatively good resources, and not over-populated in the standard sense of that term. They have had a quite rapid rate of economic growth in past years, but not recently. They have a relatively advanced degree of competence in public and private management.

But the political process in Argentina in recent years has been a very difficult one. They have been trying to rid themselves of the incubus of the Peron years, and to get a political process started which could permit them to follow a democratic system again after getting rid of Peron nearly 10 years ago.

The Illia government came in 17 months ago, and there are considerable hopes for it, but they have not thus far distinguished themselves in the economic field.

We think that the problem is right there, it is the policies of the Argentine Government in the economic field which can quite rapidly and readily move up the rate of economic growth and, therefore, I think your concern is warranted, and I think that is the place where the essential change has to come about.

Because of this, we have not, we do not have, a major assistance program in Argentina.

We have indicated to them time and time again that we are prepared to provide assistance if and as they did adopt the kinds of policies which would make our assistance a real contribution to the kind of change that needs to be brought about.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA

Senator CLARK. That leads to the next question about Argentina. In view of those facts, and I am entirely in sympathy with your program, why are we still giving them pretty substantial military assistance in comparison to other Latin American countries?

Mr. BELL. Well, it is—I have forgotten the figures——

Senator CLARK. $12.4 million to Argentina for military assistance as compared to economic assistance of a total of only $2.5 million.

Mr. BELL. The military assistance in Argentina has not been that much except for this one year, as I believe.

Senator CLARK. No; if you will excuse me, it seems to have gone up drastically. In 1961 it was $1.4; then it was $2.2, $2.3, and suddenly in 1964 it started zooming up to $12.1; $12.9 in 1965; $12.4 in 1966.

Mr. BELL. That was precisely the point I was intending to make. That we had not had a substantial military assistance program there. One was started within the last year or so, and it has been a program, military assistance program, directly related to the effort to enlist, to support the positive and progressive forces in the defense establishment.

The amount of military assistance in relation to Argentina's own defense forces in not very great. This is a sizable country with significant military forces in being.

Senator CLARK. What are they going to use the military forces for? It is for more than just the maintenance of civil order, isn't it?

Mr. BELL. Yes. There is——

Senator CLARK. Isn't there a threat, particularly with the erratic behavior of the Argentine Government, that you would find that military force used to turn against Chile and Brazil?

Mr. BELL. Well, I think that is a rather remote threat, which is certainly there is the remote sense.

But the purpose of the effort—obviously there is always some risk in these things—but the purpose of the effort is to contribute to the stability of the Argentine situation.

REDUCING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA

Senator CLARK. What would be the objection from the AID point of view if we eliminated all military aid to Latin America except that which was directly connected with maintaining civil order? In other words, why do we give them these airplanes and other vessels and other toys, so to speak? Is it necessary, in your opinion, to do this in order to keep the military in these countries more or less on our side?

Mr. BELL. No; I testified previously, before this committee, that compared to the situation 3 or 4 years ago, we have tremendously reduced the volume of tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, and so on,

which are going under military aid to Latin America, and increased and shifted the military assistance program toward one which is principally related to internal security.

However, I think it would be improper to say there is no problem of hemispheric defense. Quite the contrary, there have been instances in the last couple of years when we have felt it would be quite significant that there were naval forces which could join with the United States in interdicting the traffic to and from Cuba, and to that extent it makes good sense to have a country like Argentina, assuming political stability and assuming that they are with us in the OAS, have some reasonable but limited naval capability.

It is that kind of situation, Senator, that is involved here.

Senator CLARK. The thing that disturbs me, Mr. Bell, is that military aid for Latin America has gone up from a figure of $51.2 million to a request of $77.2 million in 1966. While I would agree with you in general terms, the military is inching up all the time, and the amount of aid is increased without any, that I can see, parallel threat which makes this desirable.

In other words, the situation with respect to domestic tranquility is certainly no worse in the coming fiscal 1966 than it was in 1961. Yet you have increased your aid by 20 percent.

Mr. BELL. In part, I think, Senator, that is reflective of the situation, reflective in the fact that we did not have a very good bead on the real nature of the threat and were not organized to meet it very much.

If I am not mistaken, of the $77 million, perhaps $20 million or more of the request is for training, and the equipment part of it has not changed very much in dollar amount. It was changed in concept, as I indicated, toward jeeps, communication gear, engineering equipment, and so on. I think——

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WHY INCREASE FOR TAIWAN, GREECE, AND TURKEY

Senator CLARK. If we take that as a basis, I am quite concerned—and would like your comments—as to the additional buildup of the military aid for Taiwan, for Greece, for Turkey, and for Korea to such an extent that the military request for 1966 is going up again, whereas ever since 1962 they started to go down.

The explanation for this, when I asked Secretary McNamara and in minor depth with General Wheeler also, is Vietnam. The situation is very dangerous over there and therefore we have to increase the military aid to Taiwan, to Korea

And then in Greece, they told me, well, the Bulgarians are arming; and in Turkey, well, the same situation exists in the Soviet Union as before. Just in general terms, I am skeptical about all that, and I would be happy to try to have you allay my skepticism.

Mr. BELL. Yes; the increased figures that you see there that you cite, Greece, Turkey Taiwan, and Korea, in a sense they are statistically or arithmetically correct. They do not, however, imply the policy change that you drew, the inference that you drew, from them.

The policy with respect to our support for the forces in Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea has remained the same over the last

several years. What has happened is that because of the requirements in Vietnam during each of the last 2 or 3 years, and certainly notably in the present year, we have had to shift funds away from the modernization of the equipment for the forces of Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea, and use those funds in Vietnam. What is indicated there in the 1966 request, we are asking for funds to get back on their track of modernizing and supporting the Greek, Turkish, Taiwanese, and Korean forces. So that there is no decision whatever to increase the military forces or our military assistance program in those countries, but during 1962, 1963—well, anyway 1963, 1964, and 1965—I cannot recall 1962—we have had to shift funds away from those programs, and each year, incidentally, the budget requests looked just like that one does.

We thought we were getting funds in fiscal 1965 that would enable us to strengthen this modernization program for military equipment for those four countries, but we have had to shift the funds away and use them in Vietnam. This is one of the reasons why we are asking for this special authorization for Vietnam next year. We have had very serious concern about the degree to which we have been postponing modernization in these four countries.

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CIA AND AID [P. 564]

Senator MORSE. Does the CIA have any authority at any time or is it given any authority at any time to use AID goods with which to bribe, buy off, or influence governmental officials in a foreign country?

Mr. BELL. Not AID funds; no, sir. It should not be on the record, I suppose, but they have funds of their own for various purposes which are appropriated to them. We do have a number of relationships with the CIA which I could go into, but I would prefer to keep it off the record.

Senator MORSE. Unless it is on the record I would prefer not to go into it.

The CHAIRMAN. On that, will the Senator yield? I would like to know if he knows off the record how much they have in this field, in answer to the Senator's first question.

Senator MORSE. Of course, I never object, I only express for the record at this point. I have been going through the record, Mr. Chairman, for the past several years, and it is interesting when you go through the record and you know certain things have been said in a hearing, and you never can find it on the record. If these are going to be executive records, I do not know why they should not be executive records with everything on them.

The CHAIRMAN. That suits me all right.

Senator MORSE. I have been checking, for example, on certain testimony, Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt have been looking for certain testimony, which just is not in the record—it has been said across the table—which will have a great bearing on the matter of public policy.

But I certainly am not going to say that you cannot go off the record. I am merely saying we should have everything on the record and keep it executive.

Mr. BELL. Fine. On that understanding let me say this: [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. What is an illustration? I am lost as to just exactly what I am talking about.

Mr. BELL. Could I give you a hypothetical example?

The CHAIRMAN. Give a hypothetical example?

Mr. BELL. Right. [Deleted.]

I do not want to give you the impression, Mr. Chairman, that this is a very extensive process, but the agency does have a few such economic activities.

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ARE AID FUNDS USED TO PAY AMERICAN CREDITORS? [P. 598]

Mr. BELL. In recent years, in a couple of cases, Brazil is one and Chile is another, this has involved in part a rescheduling of debts. The American Government has urged that in such cases debts to private people, Americans and other private people, should be included in the rescheduling, and this was done for instance, in the recent Brazil case. It was not only the governments to which Brazil owed money that agreed to stretch out the payments over several years, but also the Brazilian Government undertook on our urging to work out arrangements with private creditors in the United States and in Europe, and have done so under which the private suppliers' creditors agreed to a rescheduling of the debt.

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INFORMATION REQUESTED [P. 604]

Senator MORSE. The presentation book indicates that loans of $25 million which were made to Peru in fiscal 1964 have not been announced pending settlement of the oil company problem. As long as the loans are made anyway, what is gained by not announcing them?

Mr. BELL. They have been authorized, sir, and have not been signed with the Peruvian Government, and all of them have now been deauthorized. We have decided they have been pending long enough, and we will just take the money back and use it somewhere else.

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NEED TO DECREASE ASSISTANCE [P. 606]

Mr. BELL. We have grant military aid to Spain which is related to the base rights, and to limited contribution to their stronger military forces. But I quite agree with you that included in the policy of the United States Government is to reduce and eliminate that grant military assistance over the few years. Indeed, it has been substantially reduced from earlier levels, if my memory serves me, in the current agreement which runs about $50 million a year, I think.

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DO U.S. INTERESTS REQUIRE AID [P. 607]

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking primarily about Africa. I suggested the other day there were about 22 countries that we could get out of without any harm to our national interests. You assumed in your answer there that the interests require aid. I wish you would examine that a little more carefully because I don't quite understand it.

Mr. BELL. Well, these are independent countries that exist, they are members of the United Nations, they are members of the Organization of African Unity. They are on the world scene. The area of Africa is certainly not, in my opinion, as immediately vital to the security of the United States as is Latin America or as is the Far East.

On the other hand, it does seem to me that what happens in Africa is of very great concern to the United States, and the survival and progress of these small states makes a difference to us. As the leading world power interested in freedom, progress and freedom around the world, we have an interest in their success.

What does it take to express that interest? Here I think there is a real question.

I have personally come to the conclusion, Secretary Rusk has come to the conclusion, neither of us very easily, I might add, or without a good deal of concern and worry about the point, we have come to the conclusion that it makes sense for the United States in many of these cases in Africa to help them usually in the smaller cases with a technical assistance project or two, which does the following things:

First of all, it is useful as the country in question undertakes to expand its own capacity for meeting its people's needs because, as we help them build schools or establish universities or agricultural experiment stations or whatever may be involved, we are making some significant contribution to their progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, that is the very issue—I do not think I got my point across to you—that you seem to play Santa Claus to the whole world.

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, everything that happens in the world has some effect on us whether it is in the free world or anywhere else. That is the broad principle.

I do not quite follow as to why we have to be in Africa. The assumption that we do because it is to have some effect, can be applied nearly everything that happens in the world. That is too broad an answer to my question.

Mr. BELL. Well, it is narrowed, among other ways, by the following points:

First of all, there is obviously no need for us to provide aid to a country that has sufficient resources of its own. This is why we are stopping our aid to Libya, because they are well off, and this will be true of a number of the newer African countries. Gabon, as an example, has basically very good mineral resources, and they are not going to need aid for very long.

But take a country like Senegal, like Guinea, like Upper Volta, whose President is going to be here today or tomorrow—these are

countries that do need outside help, there is no question about that; and then the question is, Is it sufficiently in the U.S. interests for us to contribute to the help that they need to have?

The only point I am making is that so long as it is a relatively small cost to us, and it can be administered without any difficulty, I do not see any reason why we should not do so.

Normally, as I repeat, it is a technical assistance project or two. It has the great benefit of helping them to receive much larger assistance from the ex-European metropole to which they were formerly connected as a colony. If they were not able to say to their people, "Yes, look, the United States is helping us, as well as France," they could be politically very vulnerable internally by opposition politicians saying, "Look, they are not interested at all. The only place we are getting economic aid is France," and obviously that means they are still colonies, is what they will say.

IS THERE A NEED FOR A U.S. PRESENCE? [P. 609]

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose, under the established political procedures we should have a consulate—I question whether or not you have to have a State dinner tonight for Upper Volta, this seems to me rather silly and a waste of the President's time—not in all cases an ambassador—but you have either one; that should be enough. I am questioning your policy because I would like to see it defended on the grounds of our interest.

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THE CONGO AS AN EXAMPLE [P. 610]

Mr. BELL. The only point I am trying to make, sir, is the Congo case is a much bigger, a much more significant case in which our security interests were conceived to be much more seriously involved. I am not an expert on it. I cannot cite you chapter and verse.

It is my understanding it was precisely because the Belgians were not able and not willing to do all that was needed that we went in there whenever it was in 1959 or 1960. You know, the decision may well have been wrong, but it was a serious judgment, and that is what was at stake.

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NEED FOR BILATERAL PROGRAMS [P. 611]

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, you are mentioning countries which, for all practical purposes, are colonies of France. The French control all the business and own all the business property in places like Senegal. Why in the world we should be in there giving them aid, I just cannot understand.

Mr. BELL. Because they are independent, sir, and because politically they are indeed independent, and because politically they are having a major effect in Africa and in the United Nations, and it is very important to us that their growth, their progress, be in the direction of basically an open society, and one with which we can work and which will be heading in international matters in the same direction we are.

[Deleted.]

Mr. BELL. Would you mind leaving this off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. It is not hay.

That is a separate problem from this, and I think it has much to do with the attitude that our friendship is the kiss of death. I do not think you are at all solely responsible for that attitude. [Deleted.]

OPERATIONS OF U.N. SPECIAL FUND [P. 613]

The CHAIRMAN. What is your estimate of the effectiveness of that part of the program?

Mr. BELL. I think it is doing very well. I believe strongly that Mr. Paul Hoffman administers the Special Fund on very high standards. I think he is handicapped to some extent that under the U.N. system when he wants to get something in the field of education, he has to work it through UNESCO. When he does something in the field of agriculture, he has to work with the FAO, and his standards are higher than theirs—their standards are not as high as his. He is continually having a battle with them supervising and monitoring the use of his money.

He is raising their standards gradually, but they are still far from what they have to be.

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SITUATION IN GUINEA [P. 613]

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask you about another case? Some time ago, about a year ago, it was brought to my attention a proposal for you to guarantee an investment by Harvey Aluminum in Guinea for the operation of properties which Guinea had confiscated from other American and Canadian Companies. Do you remember that case?

Mr. BELL. I do very well. We have been following it very closely.

The CHAIRMAN. I recently wrote you a letter, last week, which may not have yet reached your office, your desk. This is being again revived, and you are being asked, and I was told seriously considering, giving a guarantee without a provision for reimbursement or any proper settlement with the former American companies who initiated this enterprise.

What is the attitude?

Mr. BELL. The situation is as follows: We are considering an application from Harvey for an investment guarantee.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Now, we have told Harvey and we have told the Government of Guinea, we have told the aluminum companies who were in the previous consortium we were not prepared to issue a guarantee unless there was an assurance, very carefully worked out assurance, that any claims filed by the previous concessionaires would be handled in a proper manner.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there turns out to be a very serious legal question as to whether that previous consortium was or was not expropriated. The Government of Guinea maintains——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. The Government of Guinea maintains—and there are a number of distinguished American lawyers who agree with the Government of Guinea—that the previous consortium stopped its work, and it was because of this that the Government of Guinea said, "Perhaps you have forfeited your concession and we are going to take this back." Since then they have worked with a new company.

This is a legal issue, and this has to be faced. We have said to the Government of Guinea and to Harvey that there must be a sensible arrangement on this issue, such as an agreement to go all the way to arbitration or to use the World Bank's new arbitration service that——

The CHAIRMAN. Is that functioning?

Mr. BELL. They have agreed on the terms of it, and I believe it is now out for ratification among the different governments. But in any event, we said to the Government of Guinea, "You must commit yourself now to a fair system which will assure a fair settlement of those prior claims, if any."

No claims have been filed. What the other aluminum companies have been wanting to do was to get back into the concession. I do not blame them. It is the world's largest bauxite concession. But the Government of Guinea is adamant on that point. They have been thoroughly unwilling to let them back in and have instead signed an agreement with Harvey.

Now, there are other questions related to the Harvey concession and its planned development. First of all, Harvey is ready to put in a good deal of money to develop the bauxite. There has to be a railway and a port, and the Government of Guinea has an application in there for the World Bank to finance a railway and a port, so that we and the World Bank are cooperating in parallel here. We are in very close touch, and the World Bank's attitude toward the matter is essentially the same as ours—and that has to be a fair and proper method of disposing of the prior concessionaries' claims, if any, before we are willing to support this new development.

At the moment it is very much up in the air as to how this is going to come out, but we are very conscious of the interests of Reynolds and Alcoa——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not as much bothered about the interests. It is the principle of allowing a country—they say, of course, it was confiscated.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a very difficult concept. I remember Mexico, where they did not confiscate it. They just would not let them put up the rights to where they would sell. Technically they would not be confiscating. Technically it is like the Brazilian traction.

Mr. BELL. Technically they had a contract with Guinea where they had to do a certain amount of work by that time if the concession was to be valid. They did not do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the government put any obstacles in their way?

Mr. BELL. The government says not.

The CHAIRMAN. The companies say yes.

Mr. BELL. It is not that simple. The companies say the Government of Guinea was becoming a Communist government at that time.

The Government of Guinea points out that another company, Fria, in which Olin Matheison is involved, did go ahead and did put money into Guinea at a time when there was a lot of concern on whether Guinea was going to be Communist. Fria is in there now and operating quite effectively, so there is a feeling on the part of the Government of Guinea that not only did Reynolds and Alcoa stop their development process at the time when they had the go-ahead, but they also exhibited no confidence at a time when Fria did exhibit confidence.

I sound as if I am arguing against Reynolds and Alcoa. I am not at all. All I am saying is I don't know where the rights of this issue are or would come out on close examination. What we are trying to do, what we are insisting on, is that a proper adjudication forum be agreed to and be established before we are willing to do anything on this alternative line.

Senator CARLSON. Was a development loan made to the government and then reloaned in some instances?

Mr. BELL. No. There was no loan in this case, sir. The private companies put in their own money. They started to develop this railway line and port. They say they put about $20 million in it. I do not know whether the figure is right. That is their assertion, and I have no reason to question it.

They were supposed to go ahead and put, I think it is, another $150 million on top of that, which would have made the thing a going economic concern.

The Aluminum Company, this was 3 or 4 years ago, was unwilling to put their own money into it. At that time, they came to the U.S. government and said, "Will you put up this money?" That was long before I was associated with AID; it must have been 1961, I guess, because George Ball was involved on behalf of the United States Government, and finally said, "No, the United States will not put this money in. You fellows have to face this one on your own. You have got a concession." At that point the thing came to a head. Whether they stopped work and the Government of Guinea took back the concession or whether they were prepared to go ahead and the Government of Guinea would not let them is, I think, probably the crucial point in any adjudication that takes place.

As I say, there are Americans independent of them who say the Government of Guinea has a pretty good case, but I do not know. I am not trying to indicate any judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what the facts are. The circumstances are we would guarantee an investment involving $28 million that another American company put in, which are taxpayers, too, and I think it might be very galling to them. This was tied in some degree in the development of Ghana and, of course, the Volta Dam and all that, which we are committed to and which looks also very difficult.

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GAO REPORT ON SHIPMENT OF CARS [P. 618]

The CHAIRMAN. In many countries where you do operate there is that problem of the black market because many of them are soft currency countries.

Mr. BELL. Right. We fired a couple of fellows in Brazil 2 or 3 months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. For doing this?

Mr. BELL. Yes.

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[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Church, Lausche, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Dodd.

The chairman stated the first item of business was whether the committee wished to consider the administration's aid omnibus bill, or the bills introduced separately which dealt with the economic and the military phases of foreign aid.

Mr. Morse moved that the committee proceed with the omnibus bill. The Chairman offered a substitute motion to proceed with two bills.

On a call of the committee, the members were recorded as follows:

Yeas: Senator Long (proxy). Senator Clark; Senator Aiken; Senator Fulbright.

Nays: Senator Morse; Senator Lausche; Senator Church; Senator Dodd; Senator Hickenlooper; Senator Carlson; Senator Williams (proxy); Senator Mundt (proxy); Senator Case.

So the substitute motion was lost, 9 to 4.

On a call of the committee on the original motion, the members were recorded as follows:

Yeas: Senator Morse; Senator Lausche; Senator Church; Senator Dodd; Senator Clark; Senator Hickenlooper; Senator Aiken; Senator Carlson; Senator Williams (proxy); Senator Mundt (proxy); Senator Case.

Nays: Senator Long; Senator Fulbright.

So Mr. Morse's original motion was agreed to, 11 to 2.

The committee then agreed to proceed to the markup of the omnibus bill, and to substitute for its text that of the same omnibus bill being used by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, under the number S. 1367.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Church, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The committee proceeded on its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The Chairman announced that Senators Symington and Mansfied wished to be recorded in the affirmative on the vote that separated the economic aspects of foreign aid from the military in two bills.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[After discussion and markup proceedings, the committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Church, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Gore, Church, Lausche, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Also present: Senators Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Inouye, McIntyre, Brewster, Miller, Monroney, Bayh, Kuchel, and McCarthy.

Staff of the Foreign Relations Committee: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Tillman.

Staff of the Armed Services Committee: Mr. Darden and Mr. Braswell.

The CHAIRMAN. We are all very pleased to have our Ambassador to South Vietnam with us this morning, and the committee has invited the members of the Armed Services Committee to meet with us inasmuch as we both have a great interest in this matter. I am very pleased that Senator Stennis and other members of this committee could be here.

Senator STENNIS. We are delighted to be here, Senator, and appreciate your invitation.

The CHAIRMAN. We, of course, would want you to participate and feel at home and free to participate in the discussions.

The Ambassador does not have a prepared statement, but he is thoroughly prepared nevertheless to make an introductory statement after which we will have some questions.

Mr. Ambassador, will you proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am very happy to be back again before the two committees. You are very considerate to have a joint session to allow me to tell you a single story.

I thought it might be useful for a background of our subsequent question period to run over some of the principal events in the last 2 or 3 months which have a direct bearing upon our problem in South Vietnam. I would divide these topics into two parts: The first, those factors bearing upon the pacification, that is to say

upon the military aspects or paramilitary aspects and, second, those factors bearing upon the governmental aspects.

GROWTH OF VIETCONG STRENGTH

I would say during the last 3 months one of the most visible phenomena has been the growth of the Vietcong strength. We never know exactly when strength is brought into South Vietnam, when infiltration occurs. You can't meter it at any given point. We are never really sure of our figures but gradually we get indicators, we capture prisoners, documents are intercepted which indicate that at a certain time in the past infiltrators came in.

It is quite apparent over the last 6 months there has been increased infiltration, particularly in the northern provinces in South Vietnam, that is the areas of the first corps and the second corps which is just below the 17th parallel.

This infiltration has been both by land and sea; we have had very dramatic evidence of the extent of the sea infiltration in terms of weapons in the recent caches found on at least three sunken boats. The largest one was the one in the Bay of Vung Ro.

The effect of this concentrated effort to build up strength in these provinces has resulted in a considerable deterioration in certain parts of central Vietnam, particularly in the second corps provinces which are on the seacoast such as Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces, and Quang Ngai province to a certain extent. This is not a surprising development because it has been apparent that since the drive last year in the delta area was unsuccessful, it was quite likely that the Vietcong would adopt a favorite counter tactic of severing the country more or less in half by driving a wedge across the central provinces to the coast, separating Da Nang and Hue from the areas in the south.

FLOODS AND TYPHOONS

The Vietcong were assisted by the very heavy floods and typhoons last November which destroyed many bridges on Highway 1, which is the arterial highway which runs up the coast, and on the railroad which parallels the highway. The typhoon knocked out a great number of bridges and communications, and then the Vietcong moved units into the area and forced the villagers to tear up the tracks of the railroad; so they effectively cut the principal arteries of communication in this particular area.

This has presented a problem to us, a military economic problem, because the northern provinces are very heavily dependent on imports of all sorts from the south and Saigon areas. Since we cannot use land transport, we are obliged to develop air transport and more particularly sea transport. This has been one of the matters I have been discussing with the Pentagon and Navy in order to get additional ships of amphibious types to supplement commercial sea transport.

I think all arrangements have been made. I think we have no crisis at hand but we certainly are under a requirement to develop ports, across the beach unloading facilities, and that sort of thing, to be sure we can bring in our supplies freely and easily.

NEW REFUGEE PROBLEM

Another consequence of the development of Vietcong strength in this area has been a new refugee problem. At the time of the typhoons last November we had a considerable refugee problem occasioned by the floods and the rains. That generally was disposed of except for a rather small hard core of refugees whom we cannot resettle. However, in the last 3 months, as the Vietcong have pushed out of the highlands and moved into the piedmont, thousands of Vietnamese farmers have left their homes, left their land, left everything except what they could carry on their back and fled to the city.

We have over 200,000 such refugees in the principal urban centers north of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh province. This is a problem for the government. It is an administrative problem which they are moving on reasonably well. Their intentions are good but inevitably the relative inefficiency of all governmental processes is found in this kind of relief work.

We are backing them up to the hilt. Again, we see no long-term problem we can't handle, but we have something serious to deal with.

I would just remind you of this, there is a certain psychological plus here that ought to be noted in the fact that these people were not pushed out of their homes. They were not driven out at bayonet point by the Vietcong. They fled in advance of the Vietcong, simply being unwilling to live in an area dominated by them, which certainly shows a stamina and strength of character which is admirable.

PROBLEMS WITH PACIFICATION PROGRAM

In general terms countrywide, the pacification program is very spotty. I mentioned the areas where it has grown worse, where there is clearly a degradation in certain provinces.

In the area around Saigon we have made some progress. The so-called Hop Tac program for moving out from the city of Saigon in concentric circles reached its yearend objective within, say, 5 percent. It is still moving, not spectacularly, but gradually improving the situation in the vicinity of Saigon except in the southeast sector where we did not have originally enough troops to saturate the area.

The figures on population control which, if accurate, should be a very important indicator, suggest that we are not losing this war; we are just not winning it in terms of recapturing the people.

We have moderately satisfactory data now reported monthly from each provinces by our own people who are on the ground, which indicates that there hasn't been much change, detectable change, in our ability to control the population. About 20 percent, more accurately around 23 percent, is in areas which we concede are Vietcong controlled and hence we concede that the Vietcong controls about that percentage of population.

GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY

About 47 percent, we would say, is government-controlled, almost without limitations. That leaves roughly 30 percent in a sort of no-

man's land where the influence of the government is highly variable, sometimes quite strong, sometimes very weak.

Now, those figures, as I say, have not moved materially over the last 3 months. What have we been doing to——

The CHAIRMAN. How is that distributed, urban and so on?

General TAYLOR. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Just complete that, how is that distributed in geographical terms?

General TAYLOR. The big cities, of course, contribute a large part of the percentage that is indicated as government-controlled.

Senator CLARK. A large part of the 47 percent?

General TAYLOR. A large part of the 47 percent is accounted for by the large urban blocks.

The CHAIRMAN. And I thought you were going to say such a percentage of area was controlled by South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. I didn't put that figure in. I deliberately left it out because that is a highly misleading figure.

Sometimes the press will say two-thirds of this country is Vietcong controlled. That is not true. Such a figure simply indicates the area the government does not control or something like that.

But there are vast areas within such a figure, the mountains and forests and jungles that nobody controls, nobody wants to control. So to measure this situation in square miles of government control is highly misleading. I think the population control is the only true indicator, although I must say the accuracy of the data is always somewhat suspect; you just can't prove it is entirely right.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Ambassador, did I understand you to say this 47 percent that is government controlled is largely urban?

General TAYLOR. Urban population enters into that figure and is a major factor.

Senator CHURCH. A major factor.

THE MATTER OF MANPOWER

General TAYLOR. What are the measures we have been taking in this period either to extend the advantages or offset the disadvantages?

Well, first, in the matter of manpower, we know from past experience in other counterinsurgency movements that a very high predominance of strength must be on the side of the government. I know of no successful counterinsurgency in the past, recent past, at least, where the government forces did not have a preponderance of strength of something like 10 to 1.

During 1964 we had a preponderance, we thought, of about 5 to 1. We know that was not true toward the end of the year simply because we were not initially aware of the extent of the infiltration. We think now that for 1965 we are entering this year with about a 4-to-1 advantage, if our estimate of Vietcong strength is about right.

We would like to change that ratio to our advantage, if possible, and General Westmoreland has recommended and the government here has approved a maximum intensification of the recruiting and training for the armed forces, for the paramilitary forces, and for the police. We would hope to add to the armed forces something

like 160,000 additional trained men by the end of the year and to increase the police by about 20,000 additional police by the end of the year.

If we achieve this, that will be good. It will really be a major accomplishment on the part of the government.

VIETCONG RECRUITS

Unhappily, if we go back and look at the graphs which show the upward curve of the Vietcong, if they are able to continue at the intensified rate which they apparently achieved at the very end of 1964, they can come out with a strength which will match our growth and maybe exceed it a little bit. In other words, we may still find we are marking time relatively, even if we make this increase. I would stress, however, that that statement assumes that the Vietcong can match the estimates and that is a question.

But there it is really a manpower problem for the VC and one which they have to work at hard in order to replace the very heavy losses the Vietcong sustain in the field.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where do the Vietcong pick up its replacements?

General TAYLOR. A great deal, Senator, from the north. We now know that most of the recruits, most of the new people coming in—they are not recruits, they are trained soldiers—are North Vietnamese who have never been in South Vietnam before. They come directly out of the armed forces of North Vietnam or they are conscripted in North Vietnam, trained, and sent south.

So, that is the new factor which has entered the picture in the last 6, 7, 8 months. In addition, they continue to recruit locally, very largely by terrorist methods. They must be at the bottom of their barrel because we find among their local recruits boys 14, 15, 16 years of age, which certainly shows they, too, are having serious manpower problems.

Senator GORE. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. We wanted him to complete and then I will go around the table under a limitation of time to give everybody an opportunity.

Senator GORE. All right.

INCREASED U.S. PARTICIPATION

General TAYLOR. Further significant actions are those which involve increased U.S. participation. The most spectacular and the most dramatic action, of course, is the use of our aircraft in conjunction with the aircraft of South Vietnam in attacking targets north of the 17th parallel. Also we are now using our Air Force jets to supplement the South Vietnamese Air Force in South Vietnam. We are doing this very largely in attacking area targets in the so-called war zones of the Vietcong where we know the areas are completely VC controlled and where the principal camps, the principal bases of the Vietcong are found.

We have also, of course, brought in the Marines to assist in the defense of the airbase at Da Nang and finally the 7th Fleet is becoming more and more active in reinforcing the South Vietnam

Navy in the surveillence of the coast. That would conclude discussing the factors bearing on the military aspects of the situation.

INTERNAL POLITICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I often say that I spend far more time with international political relationships and that sort of thing than with the war against the Vietcong. Actually this preoccupation is part of the war against Vietcong, because you don't wage a successful war against the VC unless you have a successful government in being.

You will recall the Huong government fell on January 26 after several weeks of attacks on the part of the Buddhists who claimed that Huong was anti-Buddhist and thus a threat to them. When we talk about the Buddhists, as I am sure you gentleman have heard me say before, I am talking about the Buddhist Institute which is one segment of the Buddhists in South Vietnam.

When we talk about a Buddhist problem, it is not a problem of religion, not a problem affecting the 80 percent of the population who are practicing Buddhists. We are talking about the political-minded Bonzes who run the Buddhist Institute. They are capable of turning out crowds, riots, demonstrations frequently supported turbulent elements of the students both in Hue and Saigon.

Huong could have ridden out this attack from the Buddhists. In fact, he had them on the ropes to a certain extent until General Khanh, the commander in chief, after having promised me on January 25 that he was going to continue to support the Huong government so that I felt relieved enough to get on a plane to go for a conference in Bangkok, as soon as I left town pulled the rug out from under the Huong government, and Huong fled for his life into asylum in the British Embassy.

This simply illustrates the fact, the inevitable fact, that any government in Vietnam depends upon support of the armed forces. Whom they will support will stand, and those they won't support will fall.

THE QUAT GOVERNMENT

An interim government lasted until February 16, when the present Quat government came into power. Now the Quat government we like. We think it has promise. We had known Quat when he was Foreign Minister under Khanh. He has shown greater breadth and ability in the rather short time he has been Premier than I would have credited him with, based upon his performance as Foreign Minister. He is intelligent. He is perceptive. He has a political sense. He is not like Huong, who was a very courageous man who met every issue nose to nose without any maneuvering, without any flexibility whatsoever.

Quat is far more sophisticated than that. He knows how to say the right thing to the Buddhists and Catholics and thus far has had the support of the armed forces. He is not afraid of the political situation with respect to the minorities. He says he can handle them. But he is definitely afraid of the generals.

As a matter of fact, all of the civilians are. They should be, because they have seen their colleagues thrown in jail and very badly

treated by the military leadershp in the past. So, the real question in his mind is, Will his generals be loyal?

We had one very fortunate event; namely, the eviction of General Khanh, who while the most able of all the generals, was a thoroughly unprincipled type, highly ambitious and constantly maneuvering so that getting him out of the picture has resulted in a settling of the turbulence which was formerly in the ranks of the generals.

We still have some troublesome characters among the generals, two or three I could mention, but by and large as a group they seem to be convinced of the error of their ways in the past and disillusioned with the attractiveness of playing politics in Saigon. Most of them seem sincerely dedicated to the proposition of going back to fighting the Vietcong. How long that attitude will last I don't know, but for the moment it looks rather good.

Now, that then would cover my remarks on the political situation.

PLUSES AND MINUSES

Let me sum up the pluses and minuses as I see them at the present time. I have already alluded to several of them. Among the pluses are, first and foremost, our willingness to use air pressure on the leadershp in Hanoi.

Second, our willingness to use U.S. strength more freely and in more ways than we were willing to do over the previous years. Third, the departure of General Khanh from the scene and the relative tranquility which has appeared among the generals and also among the politicians as a result.

Fourth, Quat's own personal character. As I say, he is promising. In him, you have an intelligent man, a man properly oriented and one who is really trying. Whether he can accomplish what he wants to do, of course, remains to be seen.

Finally, as a result largely of our military actions in the north and somewhat from the limited success of the Quat government, a very perceptible change in morale has occurred. The attitude, the atmosphere in Saigon is quite changed, as is the attitude among the armed forces. Throughout the country, the reports are of great enthusiasm over the feeling that "at long last we are able to punish the enemy directly in some form of offensive action."

So much for the pluses.

On the minus side, the old perennials, the continued ability of the Vietcong to recoup their strength to replace their losses, the relative manpower shortage—the manpower gap, if you wish, although I would not like to use the term "gap"—in the ranks of the military, paramilitary, and police forces in the south; and finally the continued uncertainty about the government, can it make the grade or can't it. It is just too early to make any real predictions.

So, those are the pluses and minuses as I see them at the present time.

VICTORY MUST BE WON IN THE SOUTH

We have certain broad questions, as we look to the future. The first I would say is how to orchestrate, how to conduct our military

program in the weeks and months to come, and how to relate that military activity in the north to our continuous efforts in the south to do better in pacification. I preach daily to my Vietnamese friends the truth which I deeply believe that while our use of military force in the north is essential and a most essential step forward, victory will only be won in the south when we have a government able to control its own people, use its own resources to eliminate in-country guerrilla strength which is still formidable and which will require a long term for liquidation in spite of our successes in the north.

Mr. Chairman, those are the principal observations I wanted to make at the outset. I would be very happy to discuss any part of my presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

In view of the very fine attendance this morning, I would suggest we proceed under the 5-minute rule. I will start with two questions. Then we will try to accommodate as many as we possibly can.

INCREASE IN U.S. TROOPS TO VIETNAM

Mr. Ambassador, have you recommended or do you recommend that we substantially increase the number of American personnel to be sent to Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. I think we are obliged to increase it somewhat, but I am not prepared to say how much. I went over with General Westmoreland before I came what he feels really necessary to round out and utilize the resources we have in the courtry to the best and maximum effect.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a rumor that they are considering 350,000 American personnel. Is there anything to that?

General TAYLOR. I have never heard of such a figure; there has been discussion, long-range discussion of sending anything ranging from several thousand individuals to sending three or four divisions, but there certainly has been no decision for any of these larger figures and personally, I would not support them now.

Senator CLARK. You would not?

The CHAIRMAN. You would not?

General TAYLOR. Not at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not prepared to say how many you would wish to recommend?

General TAYLOR. I would say General Westmoreland should have all the individuals and units to balance out what he needs at the present time, and I think we ought to round out the Marines which are now a truncated force in Da Nang. At least, I would go that far. I reserve judgment, though, on how much farther.

WHAT KIND OF A VICTORY

The CHAIRMAN. How do you foresee the ultimate outcome of this struggle? When you say victory and so on, what do you have in mind when you use the word "victory?" What kind of a victory, in other words, do you think is practicable and feasible, not just desirable?

General TAYLOR. Of course, what we would like to end up with is a South Vietnam that is not threatened by communism and is able

to choose its own government and be a respected member in the society of nations. I would think in all logic we would be willing to say the same for North Vietnam. We want the entire area to become stabilized, and we can't do it, I think, on a single-country basis. Perhaps we should stress more than we have that we are interested in both countries and actually willing to take a benevolent attitude toward the north if indeed the government there will mend its ways and cease trying to impose communism on the south.

FREE ELECTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. When they say we will return to the 1954 agreements, does that include your idea of what might be worked out?

General TAYLOR. I am not quite sure what is meant by that, Senator. Certainly that could be a part of any proposal. It seems to me the 1954 agreements allow us a base upon which to build, but the situation has changed somewhat since then.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, one essential that is referred to is that the 1954 agreement provided for free elections within 2 years after, well, from 1954, in July 1956 they would have free elections. They weren't held.

Do you think this is a feasible way to settle it?

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't think you could have free elections within 2 years from now. I think the acceptance of the free election as a goal is as thoroughly sound today as before. We don't know too much about the problem in specific terms.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

STRATEGIC USE OF U.S. TROOPS

Senator STENNIS. General, we were talking about extra personnel now and you said you hadn't decided on how many you would recommend, but what do you have in mind to the extent they would be committed when they got there, whether it is two divisions or three or even more?

Are you thinking just in terms of going no further than we are going now, our military personnel, and are you thinking in terms of kind of a combined command?

General TAYLOR. The first thing we have to decide is what kind of strategy, what we expect to accomplish in 1965, which is a relatively easy period to talk about. Are we willing to take this impasse, this stagnation of pacification?

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me just a minute, to make clear I was thinking of their use internal to the country, I wasn't thinking of the coastline or the air but their internal use on the ground.

General TAYLOR. The first thing is we have to choose one of three strategies, I would say.

The first would be to conclude we can live with the present situation and that we are not going to lose the country in 1965 with what we have in the country. We will not worry about this manpower shortage to which I refer and wait and see what the effects of our pressure on the north will be. That is one course of action. I personally would not recommend it. I would not recommend it because I think it is too risky.

The second course of action would be to say "No," to the above conclusion, we must also make progress in South Vietnam because that in turn will influence the will of Hanoi, bearing in mind the whole purpose of this exercise, as I understand it, is to get the leaders in Hanoi to change their behavior in the south and accept the fact that it is a losing gambit and they can't win. If they are winning in the south or doing pretty well in the south and suffer in the north they may well say, "We can ride this out. We will ride it out."

I think we have to show either progress in the south concurrently or at least show the problem is going to get too tough on them in the south. That requirement to me argues for some increase in U.S. forces.

MORE DIRECT ENGAGEMENT

Senator STENNIS. That is an excellent point, but aren't we already to the position there that we have got to engage larger numbers and more directly internally and also got to push ourselves more into the actual management of the local government? Aren't we already to that spot?

General TAYLOR. I would say we are at the point where we certainly have to contemplate increases in U.S. manpower in sizable numbers.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General TAYLOR. On the second point of taking control of the government, I just don't know what that means. I accept that we have to do better with the government, but I don't know exactly how that is going to be accomplished.

Senator STENNIS. In other words, it is apparent we have got to move with more effectiveness at both of these internal levels to supplement whatever good the bombing may do in the north.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. I judge my time is up.

Those were my main questions.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, if I could complete it, do you contemplate asking approval of the Congress for a substantial increase in manpower?

General TAYLOR. For the armed forces?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Or do you feel that you won't need to consult Congress if you wish to send 300,000 men?

General TAYLOR. I couldn't answer that. I just don't know what the problem would be back there.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator Hickenlooper.

FOOD SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Ambassador Taylor, what is the food situation in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. The information we have now is it has been short in North Vietnam. There has always been some rice deficit,

and I know it hasn't gotten better. There is nothing I know of that suggests it is critical.

NO SIGN OF NEGOTIATIONS FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In connection with the particular logical or mental attitude in those areas, as late as last night on television I saw the President's statement at his news conference that he knew of no suggestions on the part of the North Vietnamese or anybody else for any negotiations. They were just a blank wall. Yet we find constant agitation, not only in our own country but other countries. I think Britain took the lead yesterday in some 11-nation invitation; they are busy trying to find a solution which under the present circumstances would seem to be a solving us out of the problem, with no concessions or no meeting on any kind of a basis on the part of the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, to really settle this thing.

Does that kind of a psychological agitation constantly go on? Do you think it has an adverse effect, first, on the South Vietnamese, perhaps that we are getting ready to pull out, and second, on the North Vietnamese, that we are winning this game now, to keep in there and pitch.

General TAYLOR. Yes, I do think it has an adverse effect. The word "negotiation" in South Vietnam is highly suspect. Even if you use it very carefully, you are likely to find it twisted in some way so that there is a misinterpretation.

I think also the converse, if we look overanxious to negotiate at this time, obviously it is great encouragement to the north. I see no tendency on the part of the officials of our Government to enter into such negotiations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

General TAYLOR. The President has made that very clear. It is these well-intentioned bystanders who are doing most of the talking at the present time.

BOMBING OF U.S. EMBASSY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any information you can give us as to the origin of the bombing of our Embassy?

General TAYLOR. We know it was done by a Vietcong who was killed, they captured the man who was driving the motorcycle on which he tried to get away. The driver apparently was simply hired for the purpose.

We know of these gangs, these sabotage gangs, roaming in the Saigon area on whom repeatedly we get police reports. Like all such reports, however, 10 times they are wrong and 1 time they are right, so it is awfully hard to sort these reports out and know which one to take seriously.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just thinking, we hear people say periodically in the paper, I heard in the last couple of days, "bomb Hanoi in response to Hanoi's bombing of our Embassy in Saigon." I wonder whether it is really fixed that it is the North Vietnamese who are responsible for this bombing or whether it is the internal guerrillas in South Vietnam or a combination of both.

General TAYLOR. Insofar as moral guilt is concerned, everything they do can be fixed on Hanoi. That is where the direction comes, that is where they claim the credit. They cheer, obviously knowing in advance of the event and ready to exploit the psychological effect of the outrage.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you very much.

I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson.

POLITICAL OR MILITARY PRIORITY

Senator JACKSON. General Taylor, for a long time it was said that the problem was primarily political in order of priority.

Would you say that the situation has deterioriated now to the point where the need for massive military effort is quite essential in order to bring the political situation around?

General TAYLOR. I can't ever distinguish——

Senator JACKSON. The chicken-and-egg business.

General TAYLOR [continuing]. Between the chicken and the egg. It must be together.

For example, the bombing in the north raises morale and improves the government. The government gets a feeling of confidence. The government performs a little better and the word gets around that the government is performing better so that the troops fight better. So, everything is really linked together.

Senator JACKSON. There has to be a shift in emphasis; does there not?

I gather from your testimony here you must continue to do the political job, but to the extent we can improve the military side of this it has a very substantial impact on the political side of the problem. Is this a fair statement?

General TAYLOR. I think that is true, for the reasons I indicated. Again going back to the leadership of Hanoi, to show we are willing to put whatever strength is necessary into the country to be sure in the long run we are going to win it has a great impact. That doesn't mean we will win in a month or even at the end of a year.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING IN NORTH

Senator JACKSON. How effective is our bombing effort in the north? I know I think you said something, I read in the paper, that in the beginning it was primarily psychological, and I thought that was quite clear.

But are we reaching the point where we are doing some real damage to them?

General TAYLOR. Our bombing is very good against the chosen targets. I think the performance of our pilots, both Air Force and Navy, is superb. They have done what we have asked them to do, but we haven't asked them to take on such targets as would cripple the industry.

Senator JACKSON. I say the next step would be economic targets.

General TAYLOR. We have a long way to go. We can always do that if that seems to be the right course, but the military target

system is far from exhausted and we can go for months with military targets.

Senator JACKSON. Of course, if their radar is out, that is a logical priority so that our planes can operate more effectively without warning.

General TAYLOR. Yes, that facilitates it. The radar targets are, incidentally, not all destroyed. So, we will have to go back and do restrikes. The radar targets are small targets and hard to hit.

Senator JACKSON. Right.

VIETCONG INFILTRATION

With reference to the infiltration of the VC from the north, what has been done as result of the bombings insofar as that infiltration is concerned?

General TAYLOR. We can't be sure, Senator Jackson, whether it has had any effect or not. As I often indicate, we learn about infiltration well after the event, but I would be surprised if it has had any effect. It seems to me that further infiltration is the only response that Hanoi can take. They have no air force to respond, they have no navy, and they must respond on the ground. They can do it in two ways, by stepping up what they have done in the past or taking the great risk of opening a conventional war below the 17th parallel. The latter they have not undertaken yet, and I don't think they will.

SINO-SOVIET SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator JACKSON. In all of this, you have to take the calculated risk of not going to the point where you drive the Russians and the Chinese together.

What is your general thinking on that?

General TAYLOR. Well——

Senator JACKSON. If you will give us a little background on what you think the Russo-Chinese situation is in the north.

General TAYLOR. You just have the feeling that the two are farther apart than they ever have been. The gap seems to be almost immeasurable for the moment. However, the Soviets plainly are uneasy about the situation since they want to maintain the leadership of the Communist world but still don't want to get into Southeast Asia, don't want to make a commitment, and would like to get along with us in a more cooperative way than they have in the past. So, they are in an unenviable situation.

You certainly have no feeling that they would want to do anything unless we put greater pressure on them. Those actions we have taken thus far are obviously well below this point. I don't think we are even close to it.

If, for example, we took out the Mig bases in North Vietnam tonight, I think that would be a fairly bold action. That might be a thorn in their flesh. But we are operating, I think, quite safely in what we are doing, and I certainly see no desire on the part of the Russians to get closer to the Chinese on the basis of our actions thus far.

Senator JACKSON. Is it true from what information may be available to you that the Chinese have refused to grant transit privi-

leges to the Russians to bring in supplies? The Russians apparently indicated this in an indirect statement in Moscow.

General TAYLOR. I have seen the statement that you have. That is all the information that I have.

Senator JACKSON. But you have nothing beyond that?

General TAYLOR. Nothing beyond that.

Senator JACKSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNANESE TO THE SOUTH

Senator GORE. With respect to the movement of the members of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces into South Vietnam, which is, I believe, the first time I have heard this stated, has this movement been in units or entirely by individuals?

General TAYLOR. We thought for a long time, and I think we probably would still say, that we don't know of any formed tactical units, such as an infantry company or battalion, marching down and going into battle. We do know of march units that come down, individuals assembled for the purpose of coming together in a package.

Senator GORE. Now, are those South Vietnamese trained in Vietnam or North Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. I am referring now to the latter.

Senator GORE. All right.

General TAYLOR. They will often come down in a march unit of 100, let's say. Usually, on the way they have apparently broken up at various points and gone as filler replacements into various Vietcong units. There has been some evidence that in some instances they have been used as a unit without breaking up, but still no indication they have been tactical units of the North Vietnamese Army before coming down there.

Senator GORE. How many do you estimate now in South Vietnam of this category?

General TAYLOR. I can answer indirectly by saying the last official estimate which was promulgated was that the main force units in South Vietnam were about 34,000. That was put out 2 to 3 months ago.

Senator GORE. Whose estimate was this?

General TAYLOR. This was our intelligence people in South Vietnam and concurred in by the intelligence people here in Washington. Our local people in Saigon now think that that 34,000 is low and probably should be over 40,000, maybe as high as 45,000. Now, that is the so-called hard core main force units. They are the pros. In addition to that they will have 80,000, something like that, of local guerrilla forces, so we are talking in terms of between 120,000 and 130,000 VC in the country.

Now, going back to your point, how many of those are from the north who have ever been south, we don't know except that we do have the feeling that about 80 percent of all the infiltratees in the last 6 months have come from the north without ever having been in the south. But I can't then tell you just what number that 6-month block represents, but the presence of North Vietnamese is a very significant development and suggests that they are running

out of South Vietnamese in North Vietnam whom they can send back down.

At the time of partition, thousands of South Vietnamese who were Communists moved north. They became a pool from which Hanoi created most of the forces that they have in South Vietnam and now that pool seems to have run out and the Hanoi leaders are having to use their own people.

TRAINING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

Senator GORE. One further question and my time will have expired: To what extent from our intelligence reports is there further training of more North Vietnamese for infiltration into South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. We can't isolate that element of the training program and analyze it on that basis. We know where a couple of training camps are. Apparently they are continuously in business.

Senator GORE. Of what size?

General TAYLOR. Outside of Hanoi they have one that has several thousand trainees in it all the time. Presumably they are moving out and in due course come south. I would only say we know of no increase, no suggestion that their training base has been expanded.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, since this was a brief reply, if I could ask one further question—would it be reasonable to conclude from your statements here that you have not detected any substantial evidence of preparation of mass movements into Vietnam, South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. That is correct. We have no provable indicators of that kind.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask the minority whip, the distinguished Senator from California, if he would like to ask a question.

Senator KUCHEL. I do.

AID TO VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS

First, I support the administration in whatever military decisions are made by the administration. That is not for me to question. I do, however, most sincerely wonder whether our exertions in aid to the civilian population have been all that might be expected. When we were briefed on Pleiku, I had the kind of a feeling that the civilian population in the villages near our military installations there might well have been of additional, of some assistance to us.

So, my question would be are we improving our aid, educational aid, health aid, all kinds of assistance, to the plain people in the villages in South Vietnam, Mr. Ambassador?

General TAYLOR. We certainly recognize the importance, Senator, in doing just what you say. We now have Americans at the provincial level, both military and civilian U.S. personnel. We have now had in many of the districts—a province is made up of districts—a small military team. These are all military personnel. This military team helps training the local provincial forces and popular forces, but more importantly assists the district chiefs in doing nonmilitary things, such as being sure that the pig program is work-

ing, and that the fertilizer comes down on time, acting as sort of an expediter for the government civil programs.

You gentlemen are aware we don't execute these civil programs ourselves. It is machinery of the South Vietnamese Government that does it, and we stand alongside trying to expedite and being sure that the programs move. I would say our supervisory ability in the field is far better now than it was a year ago.

Weakness of government shows up very quickly in this area but its defects are usually not defects of good intention, it is just clumsiness and inefficiency of either new officials or untrained officials.

Senator KUCHEL. Plus some of our own people in that field, would you say?

General TAYLOR. I think we have good people in the field, but it is just the fact that the best of people have difficulty to get Vietnamese to do something. Believe me, that can be a real problem.

Senator KUCHEL. We are improving, however, in that.

General TAYLOR. I would say we are doing better than we were.

Senator KUCHEL. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MORALE OF THE VIETCONG

Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that this stepped up activity of our pressure on North Vietnam had increased the morale of the South Vietnamese. Have you any indication of what effect this has had on the morale of the Vietcong who have been engaged in this action?

General TAYLOR. We can't measure that but we certainly feel it must have had a substantial effect. I think it is not only the effect of knowing that their base is being attacked, but this is an attack upon the myth of the great strength and unity of the Communist world. Nobody is rushing to help Hanoi, and the very fact that they are not forming ranks against the imperialists certainly to the faithful of the party must be quite a shock.

Senator CANNON. What effect has it had on their communication and control. It seems to me that they would have an extremely difficult time, at best, providing communication and control among their various units in the south. Does this seem to be creating an effect?

General TAYLOR. I can't verify that it has, and for the good reason that the communication centers in the north are all in the cities, and unless you went for the cities and embarked on their attack by air we are not going to affect the principal points in their communication system.

Senator CANNON. Do they seem to have a good control system in the south or are these units out operating independently?

General TAYLOR. No, no, they are all tied in by radio. They have very good communication.

Senator CANNON. They have a good radio communication control?

General TAYLOR. That is right.

SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator CANNON. What is the situation with respect to some of the other countries in that area, of getting involved? We have heard a lot of criticism and the suggestion that some of the other Southeast Asian countries should be involved in this with us.

What is your feeling on that?

General TAYLOR. Of course, Laos and Thailand are very much involved, Thailand largely in support of Laos and Laos indirectly in what is happening in South Vietnam. You really have to consider the efforts of the three countries as an entity.

Insofar as the introduction of third-country forces into South Vietnam, there are 15 nations now represented in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. How many?

General TAYLOR. Fifteen.

Many more have given help, but insofar as permanent personnel are concerned—

Senator CANNON. Fifteen actually represented?

General TAYLOR. Actually represented. Now, maybe that is misleading because this representation runs from a small Italian medical team, let's say, to a Korean detachment which has 2,000 men in it, so there is wide variation in the extent of the aid by them.

Senator CANNON. Would you list for us the countries that are involved there with us?

General TAYLOR. I would have to communicate it to you. I just don't have it with me.

Senator CANNON. You could furnish that to us.

[The information referred to follows]

FREE WORLD AID TO VIETNAM

MARCH 25, 1965.

Thirty-two Free World nations are providing or have agreed to provide aid to Vietnam.

Twenty-three nations having provided aid include: Australia, Canada, Republic of China, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Nine other nations have agreed to provide aid: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, India, Iran, Netherlands, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Negotiations are underway between the Government of Vietnam and most of these 32 nations for more aid, and with additional nations for new aid programs.

Of the 32 nations, 10 original nations were providing aid prior to July 15, 1964 when the Government of Vietnam made its major request for increased Free World assistance. The 10 original nations are: Australia, Canada, Republic of China, France, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States. The original nations, with aid programs and working relationships already established in Vietnam, are continuing major forms of aid previously committed. Their new and expanded forms of aid have also been substantial.

The Free World aid now provided assists both military operations and economic progress. Four forms being provided include:

1. Free World personnel in Vietnam, as operational units and as advisory technicians. Reports from Embassies in Saigon indicate that personnel now in Vietnam under governmental arrangements, aside from the United States, number 3,067. Of these 723 are civilian; and 2,344 are military personnel, with the majority of the military assisting Vietnamese forces and a substantial number engaged in civic action such as rural construction and medical tratment. Free World personnel, aside from Americans, are now in action at many locations in the provinces of Vietnam, ranging from Hue in the north to Long Xuyen in the southern delta, encompassing each of the nations's four military corps areas.

2. Vietnamese abroad, in study or training under governmental arrangements. They now number, aside from the United States, 607 in 9 Free World nations.

3. Goods and materials provided or specifically agreed to include substantial amounts of many items such as textbooks, ambulances, cement, medical supplies, iron roofing, windmills, petroleum, hamlet tools, and medical and technical high school equipment.

4. Construction of installations, by major Free World grants or credits, includes powerplants, university and high school buildings, industrial complexes.

SUPPORT FROM THE PHILIPPINES

Senator CANNON. I noticed in a speech that someone made in the Philippines that they apparently have some support in there. Is that correct?

General TAYLOR Yes, they already have a number of medical teams in the country, doing excellent work. They are very carefully picked people.

Incidentally, the representatives of all these countries are first class. They are an elite that have been selected, and they represent their countries very well.

Now, the Philippines have also been making sounds of intentions of sending sizable reinforcements in addition to those present. We have had several visits from officials of the government and also a delegation of a reserve officers association. They are talking in terms of a combat team or something of that sort. I would certainly welcome that kind of reinforcement, but I understand that the large contribution is running into political opposition in Manila so I don't know how we are going to come out.

Senator CANNON. Do you feel it would be helpful to our position and to the overall contribution if these countries did make more of an effort than they are making at the present time?

General TAYLOR. I think it is very important to have this evidence that not only the Americans are fighting the war out there, but that there is the Western World, and especially the free countries of Asia who are definitely committed to the struggle. So, do I think it is important.

Senator CANNON. I must say that this news that there are 15 countries there has certainly not been given much dissemination over here. We have consistently heard criticism. For example, I have heard people criticize publicly the fact that the Philippines weren't helping, and the Australians, and both of them are helping.

General TAYLOR Both of them are represented.

Senator CANNON. I think that this would be something which would certainly improve our posture if it were publicly emphasized a little more that these countries were giving assistance.

General TAYLOR Yes, I will see——

TOTAL INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. What is the total involvement of them?

General TAYLOR Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The total of all 15? The total personnel?

General TAYLOR Again, I would say 3,000 or something of that order.

The CHAIRMAN. All together?

General TAYLOR. Of that order. I would like to get it for the record.

Senator JACKSON. Would you also include, Mr. Chairman, the number that the British have in Malaysia which is adjacent to it? I think that is around 55,000 naval forces and air units.

General TAYLOR I will get it.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO MALAYSIA

APRIL 7, 1965.

Britain has made a major commitment to assist in the defense of Malaysia and to assist in the economic development of that country. The defense agreement between the two countries provides that they will cooperate and make such action as considered necessary in the event of a threat or armed attack on the territory of Malaysia or British territories in the Far East. British leaders have repeatedly affirmed the determination of the British Government to honor this commitment.

At the present there are approximately 50,000 Commonwealth troops, preponderantly British, assisting Malaysian forces in the defense of Malaysia. From the period April 1, 1963, when Indonesia guerrilla activity in Malaysian Borneo began, until November 30, 1964, the extra costs to Britain for operations in defense of Malaysia totaled about £5½ million or $15.4 million. In that period British casualties were 49 killed and 82 wounded. In 1964 Britain made grants to Malaysia for defense totalling $21.33 million. (Britain is committed to provide $85 million for military aid and economic development in the period 1963–65.)

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Britain has special responsibilities for the economic development of the Borneo states of Malaysia. In 1964 Britain granted $5.66 million for development in these states plus an expenditure of $660,000 for overseas allowances for British expatriate officers who continue to provide vital administrative and technical services in those states.

In addition to the direct assistance from Britain to Malaysia, British military officers, technicians and administrators fill a considerable number of key positions in Malaysia. For example, Britain helps Malaysia by making available officers who hold important posts in the Malaysian Air Force and Navy, and to a lesser extent, in the Malaysian Army, even though the expenses of this program are borne by the Government of Malaysia. Britain, of course, plays a major role in the economy of Malaysia, being a major source of investment capital and industrial technology. Britain provides educational facilities and training for more Malaysians than any other foreign country.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

CONDITION OF REFUGEES

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Ambassador, could you give us an idea of what percentage of the 200,000 refugees moving into the cities are reasonably able-bodied men?

General TAYLOR. Not very many.

Senator AIKEN. They are mostly women and children?

General TAYLOR. Women and children, youths, and so on. Most of the able-bodied people are in the armed forces of one side or the other.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

General TAYLOR. In most cases these people are on our side, they are already in our forces.

Senator AIKEN. They are carefully screened and regardless which side they are on they feel their families will be better cared for if they get under our jurisdiction?

General TAYLOR. They don't want to live under VC control.

Senator AIKEN. They don't want to live under them.

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

Do you agree with the press inferences that North Vietnam is not anxious to become dependent on China but is looking to Russia?

General TAYLOR. We think that is right.

Senator AIKEN. To more of their assistance?

General TAYLOR. I think that is quite reasonable.

Senator AIKEN. That seems to be a natural thing to do. Suppose you run across a Russian ship carrying missiles and other equipment into North Vietnam, what do you do about it?

General TAYLOR. First, I don't think we would ever know such a ship had anything on it. Second, it is on the high seas where we have no authority to do anything about it.

Senator AIKEN. You have no authority to do anything unless it intended, tried to land its goods?

General TAYLOR. On the high seas obviously we have no authority over any foreign ship.

Senator AIKEN. No likelihood of any trouble with Russia in that field.

REASONS WHY NORTH VIETNAM REJECTS NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Hickenlooper asked you this—what would you say is the main reason that Hanoi again, according to the press reports and to the President, is unwilling to negotiate, gives no signs of ever desiring to negotiate? Does Hanoi feel eventually they will win or are they putting out this story simply for propaganda purposes?

General TAYLOR. I think it is always interesting to try to sit in the other fellow's chair and see how this situation looks to Hanoi, to Ho Chi Minh and his associates. Up until a few months ago, they were certainly sure they were on the road to victory. They had it virtually in the bag and only our change of policy now raises some real question marks as to how it can come out.

I think Ho Chi Minh would say he had about three alternatives. The first is to keep on doing what he is doing, winning in the south, as he would describe it, hoping not to be hurt too badly in the north and maybe these Americans won't go very far or maybe anyway they will be pulled off by third parties. So, let's say as choice No. 1 for Ho Chi Minh, keep on doing what we are doing. If he doesn't like that then he has to look at two other alternatives, and they must look rather bad to him.

The second one is to keep on doing what he is doing but call in some help from the outside, from the Communist world, to bolster North Vietnam against the imperialists. The Russians aren't going to help except perhaps with equipment of some sort, so the Chinese are the only people nearby who can bring him—Ho Chi Minh—any real assistance, yet that is the last place he wants to go for

help. He doesn't want to become a Chinese satellite. I am deeply convinced of that. So, that is a very poor, unattractive alternative.

The third alternative is to mend his ways, to give up his ambition to absorb South Vietnam and see what he can get out of negotiations in exchange for that retreat. How can he get something that might offer his country some hope from alternative three?

Now, as for this latter alternative, he doesn't know what is in it. He doesn't know what he can get or what he might not get. So, he is almost bound to stay on course No. 1 until he sees more clearly what alternative 3 might hold for him.

WHO WOULD WIN AN ELECTION IN THE SOUTH?

Senator AIKEN. If there were an election in South Vietnam now, which side to you think would carry the election?

General TAYLOR. There is no question about it.

Senator AIKEN. That our side would carry the election?

General TAYLOR. No question about it.

Senator CASE. What is the answer, sir?

General TAYLOR. Just no question about it. Bear in mind all of these people in South Vietnam had a chance to go north. The only people that would vote Communist now are those under Communist control.

Senator AIKEN. Our allies would win the election.

When you refer to the 15 nations having some forces in the area, did you include the French?

General TAYLOR. They are listed sometimes because they do have a tremendous battery of professors in the schools.

Senator AIKEN. On which side?

General TAYLOR. They are the teachers. They have kept their hand on the school system.

Senator AIKEN. But they are included in the 15?

General TAYLOR. I think they probably are.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, I think they probably are.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

GROUND FORCES NEEDED TO COMBAT GUERRILLAS

Senator LAUSCHE. You state that there was an aggregate of about 130,000 Vietcong. What does the experience indicate of the number of ground forces that are needed to combat one guerrilla expert?

General TAYLOR. I mentioned that in our discussion of manpower, in successful counterinsurgency campaigns such as the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya it has always been a very high percentage, 10 to 1, sometimes as high as 20 to 1. However, I would not suggest we need any preponderance like that now, since we have advantages in South Vietnam which nobody ever had before on the counterguerrilla side, largely in terms of our mobility and firepower. By "mobility," I refer largely to the helicopter operations which give us capabilities, the surprise movement and striking ability which magnifies the effectiveness of our forces.

Senator LAUSCHE. You expressed alarm about the ability to find replacement forces. On the basis of comparison, is the ability to

solve the replacement problem greater in the north or lesser than it is in the south?

General TAYLOR. Replacements for VC?

Senator LAUSCHE. Replacement of ground forces. Which of the two can solve the job without the intervention of any foreign country, with the greatest of facility, the north or the south?

General TAYLOR. That is supposing all foreign assistance here withdrawn from Hanoi?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

General TAYLOR. And from South Vietnam. In this case, South Vietnam would be at a tremendous disadvantage because of the infiltrated army which is on their soil which would have to be rooted out, and they don't have that means to do so without our help.

Senator LAUSCHE. So, that would mean if there is to be at least equality of strength of ground forces maintained, South Vietnam must procure outside help.

General TAYLOR. That is correct, and the corollary to that, Senator, if I may add, is that any satisfactory solution must involve two things; one, that Hanoi cases to infiltrate forces and materiel and, second, this clandestine VC army is broken up, dismantled, and disposed of. Then we can go home.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we pulled out now, would South Vietnam go down the drain?

General TAYLOR. It would; yes, sir.

ALTERATIVES TO SENDING TROOPS

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting to another point, undoubtedly you have discussed other courses that we might follow, and I am familiar with them, but immediately is there any conspicuous other course that has been discussed to be followed rather than sending in, let's say, 300,000 or a 100,000 or 150,000 men? That is, call in SEATO, go to the United Nations, return to the Geneva Pact or 1962 Pact?

General TAYLOR. All of those, of course, are political actions which obviously have the defect of any kind of premature negotiation. We are just not in any condition to proceed into any negotiation of that type at this time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it still the definite view of yours and the military that we cannot afford to pull out without affecting the security of our country?

General TAYLOR. It is certainly my opinion. I feel reasonably sure that remains the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mention has been made of going back to the 1954 Geneva Pact. If we can go back to that—by Hanoi quitting the violation of it, I suppose?

General TAYLOR. That is right, and disposing of the guerrilla army in the south.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is the only way it can go back to it?

General TAYLOR. I think those two conditions must be met.

Senator LAUSCHE. Otherwise the pact is violated and you can't go back to it.

General TAYLOR. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd.

TIGHTENING SECURITY MEASURES AT U.S. BASES

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Ambassador, what has been done to tighten up the security measures so as to prevent further surprise attacks such as took place at Pleiku and Qui Nhon?

General TAYLOR. Considerable has been done in increasing the security forces, checking procedures, verifying that emergency equipment is immediately available. But I must say, and I am sure General Westmoreland agrees with me, there is no such thing as absolute security in this business. You can eliminate any foolhardy exposure but you simply cannot have enough troops, either United States or Vietnamese or any other kind, to protect a big airfield and prevent a small party at night from coming in, perhaps on a sampan in the many rivers, setting up two-millimeter mortars and firing 50 rounds into the target. Defense against that sort of thing just can't be had.

We also have the problem of our billets. Take in Saigon, this attack on the Embassy. Obviously this could be done. We have had as many people around the building all the time as we felt was reasonable. The guards this time were very alert. They caught this terrorist almost on the spot, but still not fast enough to prevent the bomb from going off.

So, there is no complete security in this. There can only be the application of common sense to try to eliminate undue hazards.

GUNRUNNING BOATS

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. What are you doing to step up your interdiction of gunrunning boats such as the one that was destroyed just offshore from Phu Yen province?

General TAYLOR. We think that we have done about as much as we could utilizing largely Vietnamese naval resources which are not very large.

Now, the 7th Fleet has come in with everything it has; everything we think we can use properly has been made available to us. As a result, a considerable amount of U.S. naval strength is being deployed along the coasts and arrangements have been worked out in connection with surveillance, so if necessary we can board and search Vietnamese vessels as the agent of the Vietnamese Government. We are in the course of negotiating this arrangement at this time.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Are you continuing to get any defections from the Vietcong to any degree?

General TAYLOR. Yes, we do; not a large number but a few all the time.

BOMBING ATTACKS ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Recently we read about bombing attacks upon the South Vietnamese forces by South Vietnamese planes. Is this just something that will happen in any situation or——

General TAYLOR. Of course, it happens very rarely.

Sometimes it results from the very hard decision when the Vietcong take over a village or town, whether you are going to use your weapons against it or are going to walk away and leave the town hostage to the Vietcong. Moreover, the element of human error in bombing is always present. We have made such errors and so have they. In a civil war setting, where the friendly population is intermingled with hostile forces, obviously the chances of error even greater.

All I can say, I am afraid incidents are bound to happen and it is deplorable when they do.

NO CUBANS IN VIETNAM

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Is there any indication that the Cubans are sending volunteers to Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. No Spanish-speaking Vietcong yet.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Are you satisfied with the quality and the quantity of equipment of our forces?

General TAYLOR. I am indeed.

There is really nothing to the press reports from time to time. Senator Stennis had a very thorough investigation of it.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

BRITISH IN MALAYSIA

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, just one point I wanted, the Senator from Washington raised it but it comes to mind.

The Senator from Iowa and I spent a week at Bermuda with the British parliamentarians. They let us know, or at least I gathered personally they wanted us to know, they had 50,000 troops involved in Malaysia, they had three-fourths of their fleet tied down and at least stressed the fact that we certainly were not pulling out of Vietnam until their own operation was complete.

Are we operating a joint operation in that area?

General TAYLOR. Are we operating with them?

Senator CARLSON. Yes, sir.

General TAYLOR. No, sir, in no direct sense. Obviously we are interested in their campaign, just as they are interested in ours, but they are entirely parallel and no direct contact between the two.

Senator Carlson. They were not hesitant in discussing it very frankly with us. Of course, they felt that it is Southeast Asia, we are over there and they are, and I just wondered.

General TAYLOR. They think they are contributing to a common cause, and I would agree.

Senator CARLSON. I would agree, too, and that is the reason I mentioned and asked if there was any joint operation underway.

General TAYLOR. No.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

SUCCESS RATE OF TACTICAL BOMBING

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Ambassador, earlier you testified in response to another question that thus far, as I have your answer, thus far there was no positive evidence that the bombings at Hanoi

had resulted in a diminishing infiltration southward. It would take some time to be sure, but since North Vietnam has no way to respond by sea or by air, it might well be that their only response could take the form of an increased infiltration southward.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I believe that. Since the purpose of the bombing is to effect some change in Hanoi's present determination to pursue the way, and since the bombing is our reliance in doing this, can you cite, are there other examples where bombing has had this effect?

I think of the unsuccessful bombing of Britain in breaking the determination of the British, the bombing by Germany was never successful until troops actually came in and occupied it; Korea, which was so extensively bombed for so long, which didn't break the fighting spirit or diminish the capacity of the North Koreans to continue the war to push southward.

Do we have on the basis of past experience some indication that this tactic might prove successful in this case where it didn't in others?

General TAYLOR. First, I would say that the air attacks, the bombings are only one part of the overall program, and I don't think it will by itself have the result. I think we must do enough in country either to show the North Vietnamese that they can't win in country or at least that it is going to be so tough in South Vietnam that they have to back away from the issue. So, we must look at the in-country situation in South Vietnam, as well as the attacks against the north.

Your other point, of course, is well taken. I have thought about it a lot. The fact is we know that, in wars where a nation is at stake, bombings have not had a decisive effect, but here, of course, this is different. This is not an unconditional surrender type of situation. We don't want North Vietnam. We want the North Vietnamese to live. We want them to prosper. We want them to be an independent nation, independent of China as well as of the Soviet Union.

So, there is not a question of saying the option is your life or slavery, but rather the question is, Are you going to give your life in order to plunder a neighbor or occupy a country which you really don't need as a peasant? The simple people don't feel the need of anything or getting anything.

So, the incentive in this case seems to be quite different. I hope it would be quite different.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with you, and that leads me directly—and I agree with your answer wholly that the bombing alone will not suffice. It has to be coupled with fighting in the south and other things as well. It is the other things as well that trouble me the most.

HO CHI MINH'S CHOICES

You said in response to another question that if you put yourself in Ho Chi Minh's seat in Hanoi and thought of his three alternatives, course No. 3 would be the one that we would hope he would choose.

General TAYLOR. We would like to get him onto course No. 3.

Senator CHURCH. Right.

You said that in that connection he needs to see more clearly what course No. 3 might, in fact, offer him.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with that. This troubles me a great deal about our present policy since it is very difficult sometimes for the White House to see clearly what is being said on the floor of the Senate, what the problem is in communicating with Hanoi. What are we undertaking to do is get the message through as to what package No. 3 might in fact contain for him if he were to incline in that direction.

General TAYLOR. I think some general statements by our leaders have had that as an objective among other things. There are Secretary Rusk's frequent statements that we are not out for unification of North and South Vietnam; we are not trying to destroy the Hanoi regime; the suggestion that economic measures might be considered for the entire Southeastern Asia, if we had a relatively peaceful situation. All of that is a rather general presentation of possibilities. This is not my department frankly, but I would think it is probably premature to be too precise until we see a little farther, until we go a little farther down this road to see what the possibilities might be.

I think we on our side should be looking at a number of alternatives. I am sure that kind of thing is being done but it is not time, I think, for us to lay out a negotiation package and say, "Here is the full content of the package."

Senator CHURCH. I think a specific package—but I think this is the chief weakness of our policy at the moment, because it seems to me that if I were sitting in his place wondering what this package might contain, based upon what thus far has been revealed, I would be very puzzled myself.

General TAYLOR. It may be a weakness if we wait too long. Personally, I think it is too early now to be putting out feelers.

Senator CHURCH. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

USE OF NONLETHAL GAS

Mr. Ambassador, I personally feel that the use of the antiriot type of nonlethal gas was justified, but I am just wondering what happened in Saigon to make this matter get blown out of all proportion.[1]

General TAYLOR. I hate to go into the gas question. I hope we have said enough about gas for a long time. At the outset, it was simply a completely false press story that went out over the wires without anybody knowing about it. Until we got the blast from the United States we didn't even know there was an issue around, and then it was fumbled to the extent that, not knowing the extent of the problem, it was handled rather casually and it wasn't really nailed right on the nose as it should have been the very first time.

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[1] On March 22, 1965, the State Department revealed that the United States had supplied "nonlethal" gas to South Vietnamese forces.

It was just one that failure for 2 or 3 hours to say the right thing which allowed this momentum to develop which went around the world in an amazing fashion.

I went back over the record and couldn't find any misbehavior on the part of any of our people except a slowness in appreciating they had a real problem on their hands.

[Discussion off the record.]

UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator INOUYE. I would like to follow Senator Lausche's question a little further. In your views, what would be the probable effects or consequences of complete withdrawal as it affects not only South Vietnam but, say, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and so forth?

General TAYLOR. Of course, if we did it just as you suggest, abruptly like pulling the plug out of the bathtub, it would create a condition of panic in some countries if we literally started jumping on ships and airplanes and started coming home. But it would not happen that way. We would have some preliminary warning that might ease the problem somewhat. But any way you dress this up, it would be abandonment of an ally to whom we have publicly committed ourselves to stay from here to completion. It would affect our international relations, our international credibility in every country in which we have relations worldwide.

Sooner or later all of these southeastern countries would be absorbed into the Communist bloc. I doubt that it would happen overnight, but the consequences would be fairly rapid and a country like Thailand, already threatened by a potential subversive insurgency, would certainly try to make some accommodation with the Communist world, realizing that otherwise inevitably they would go down the drain.

So, the loss in Southeast Asia, the effect on Indonesia and the entire Western Pacific area would ultimately cut off our influence in Asia and leave us pretty well isolated insofar as that part of the world is concerned and our international relations worldwide in Europe and every place really damaged. That is just a capsule reply to a very basic question.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

HOLDING BACK THE NEWS

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Ambassador, are the American people and Congress being told all the bad features of what is developing over there or is some of the news being kept back from us?

General TAYLOR. I think the only thing being kept back is the good news, I can't find much about that in the papers here. No, sir, there is nothing concealed that I know of about anything that goes out there except those operational matters which should not be divulged.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF GAS

Senator WILLIAMS. In line with the question of Senator Inouye, who made the decision to use this gas?

General TAYLOR. I really don't know. This has been an authorization which has been on the books for some time. It never struck anybody as being of the slightest importance. When it was used the first time, as Ambassador I don't even know about it—nor should I know they had the plan to try it out someplace where they had the question of attacking a friendly village under Communist control.

Senator WILLIAMS. I gathered that the series of statements that were made by the top officials that they knew nothing about the decision having been made is what helped spread the wildfire.

General TAYLOR. I think the President made some statement to the effect that obviously the chief of police in Boston would not call him to ask permission to use a gas which is used throughout the world and this was such a low-level action that nobody ever questioned it.

Senator WILLIAMS. That was a good statement.

But the first statement, the news I gathered was he just didn't know anything about it, had not been consulted.

General TAYLOR. He didn't know because it was such a low-level thing no one ever thought of insulting him.

DESERTIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Senator WILLIAMS. How are the desertions of South Vietnamese troops?

General TAYLOR. Still too high, but better than several months ago. We have a real problem in the use of manpower in South Vietnam. Just those elementary things as looking after their own people, making the military service attractive, such things have never been thought of in South Vietnam until the last couple of years.

Now we are working very hard on the desertion questions because this is a most uneconomical drain of trained manpower. After my discussions here, I am going back now to review once more the reenlistment bonuses, the treatment of dependent families which have been entirely neglected in the past but which now is an area in which we are helping, but I don't think enough. So, I think there is a great deal to be done to improve the desertion situation, which is slightly better but still unsatisfactory.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is desertion in the South Vietnamese troops much greater than it would be in the north?

General TAYLOR. We just really don't know. Most VC can't desert because they have no place to go with their home 1,000 miles in the north. Desertions also are not quite the same thing as with us, because many times it is simply extended absence without leave and it reflects the fact Vietnamese have not had a reasonable furlough or leave policy. Also the personnel records have been kept so poorly that you find that a man will leave, let's say, a regional force unit and go enlist in the police because the pay is better. He has just changed jobs. He really hasn't deserted his country. There are all sorts of things in the personnel field that are fouled up.

Senator WILLIAMS. Not necessarily deserted to the north.

General TAYLOR. Almost never has he deserted to the north. Usually he goes back home because there is trouble, trouble in the family or the crop is in bad shape or something of that sort.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre.
Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PRESS COVERAGE HAS IMPROVED

Mr. Ambassador, bearing on something you just said, would you say that our whole effort down there suffers from bad press?

General TAYLOR. It has over the years. I think the press is getting a lot better. During the Diem regime, the latter part of it at least, there was a constant feud between the press and the government and since we were working with the government, it was against us also, directly or indirectly.

Now we have over 200 reporters representing the Western press. They represent a major problem in keeping them informed, keeping them oriented in the right direction, and we spend hours, endless hours doing just that in background briefings for them.

I think the output of the press has improved very materially in the last year. Just two or three hostile reporters or professionally unreliable reporters can stir up trouble for us. This article on gas was not shown to us. It could have been immediately corrected. Just a small number of bad correspondents causes an enormous amount of trouble.

LACK OF INTELLIGENCE ON NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Ambassador, I have been vexed a few times in hearing testimony on our effort in South Vietnam by what appears to me to be a lack of intelligence on our part on North Vietnam. It occurred to me that since one of the basic difficulties in fighting the Vietcong as I understand it is that they are one thing by day and another thing by night, it looked to me as if there was a great opportunity for us to infiltrate North Vietnam in order to know on the ground what is going on.

Now, you are satisfied—I know that you are not satisfied, but do you think we could do more on trying to gain more intelligence on North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. I don't know of anything that should be done that isn't being done. We spend a tremendous effort on this and I quite agree with you the end product is entirely unsatisfactory, but it is the old business of penetrating a police state that has been in business now for over 10 years. They set up their whole machinery to prevent infiltration, to prevent the kind of espionage you have in mind, so in spite of efforts being made we just don't get very far.

Senator MCINTYRE. For instance, in your earlier testimony you indicated something along the line that we know of two training centers that they had.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator MCINTYRE. To me it seems that the South Vietnamese could do an awful good job on bringing in all sorts of information which would have to be evaluated, of course, so that you could know practically what is going on every minute up there.

General TAYLOR. You can't do that. People can't get in and information can't get out, except to a very limited extent.

Senator MCINTYRE. But you feel every effort is being made?

General TAYLOR. We are thoroughly aware of the need. Intelligence has been a problem from the outset, but it is still not satisfactorily solved.

STABILIZING THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MCINTYRE. Just one further question.

Since this political instability which we suffer from is one of our principal impediments is it possible—and I realize it takes a delicate hand, I realize it takes a subtle hand—can we in the future more effectively participate in the Government of South Vietnam ourselves, to lend the stability?

General TAYLOR. I hope so. I sincerely hope so. I like your point that this is a delicate business, because it is. It is something you can't order, you can't buy, you can't dictate. You have to combine persuasiveness, reasonableness, force of character, all these things which are hard to weigh.

But bear in mind that when the Diem regime broke up in November 1, 1963, we knew almost nobody in South Vietnam except a small coterie around Diem. We weren't allowed to. He accepted us at arms length, so that in the turmoil that followed his downfall, we didn't know who were the potential leaders. Actually, there were some pretty good people around, and we are gradually getting to know them.

So, being in the business longer we ought now to know better, because it is all a question of getting the right personalities in the government. I believe we can do better, although as I say there are some promising names——

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

MILITARY CAPABILITY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

Senator CLARK. Mr. Ambassador, do the North Vietnamese have a military capability of sending a regular ground force army south?

General TAYLOR. They can take all their ground forces and order them south any time they want to.

Senator CLARK. How extensive would those forces be?

General TAYLOR. They have about nine division equivalents, in reasonably good shape. They could give us a real problem in holding the northern provinces until we could get additional forces.

Senator CLARK. We would have to bring in American troops to stop that, wouldn't we?

General TAYLOR. We would.

CAPTURED ARMAMENTS

Senator CLARK. To what extent are the Vietcong utilizing captured armaments, weapons, and ammunition in their fight against us?

General TAYLOR. They have a certain amount of that, but their logistics system is now so extensive that most of their equipment is imported, Russian models made in China.

Senator CLARK. Are they not still capturing from time to time American made weapons and using them against us?

General TAYLOR. Oh, yes, they get them largely from the popular forces who are the village guards, who necessarily have limited training. They are in very exposed positions so they have been quite a frequent source of arms to the enemy.

Senator CLARK. This would raise the further question of how effectively the writ of the Saigonese government runs in the populated areas outside the big cities. Is the Saigon government effective?

General TAYLOR. It all depends. You can take a map of the country and in various colors showing degrees of government control, it looks like Jacob's coat. In some places control is good and life is quite normal. From that situation, then you can pass to the situation where the government is in general control but there are occasional atrocities, raids—banditry and robbery and things like that exist. Then you can go into another phase where you can circulate on the roads throughout the province in the daytime but at night you have to hole up, and from there you can keep descending until you get to a situation where the VC really are in charge.

Senator CLARK. So, there is a constant danger of raids that will pick up our arms and ammunition at night and use it against us the next day?

General TAYLOR. Yes, in some areas.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

CHINESE IN VIETNAM

Senator BREWSTER. General, have you come across any Red Chinese personnel in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. No. We hear reports of this all the time, but we haven't verified it.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know of any Red Chinese advisers or personnel training officers in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. We know there are some up there, at least in connection with the training of the Migs.

FIGHTING AN INFANTRY WAR IN ASIA

Senator Brewster. You indicated they have nine divisions, and should they commit them we would have to utilize our land forces.

Secretary McNamara earlier before the Armed Services Committee said under certain circumstances we might commit from six to eight divisions. I have had it in the back of my mind that our general policy was not to commit land armies to the Asian continent.

Would you comment on that general situation of fighting an infantry war on the mainland?

General TAYLOR. Nobody wants to utilize U.S. ground forces. It should be very—we would first utilize our air forces, which should be effective since the enemy air is not good. But if they want to mount a major land attack, somebody has got to get forces out there to hold the territory, while making our air superiority felt by the enemy. This, of course, would not be alone the United States. We would expect to have the SEATO forces represented and might get other countries. But you can't hold ground without the use of ground forces, so in the case of an invasion of Southeast Asia by

ground forces it would necessitate the use of ground forces on our side.

EVIDENCE OF GROUND ATTACK

Senator BREWSTER. Would you give us your intelligence of suggestions of ground attack?

General TAYLOR. We see no evidence that either Hanoi or Peiping is thinking of this kind of ground attack.

Senator BREWSTER. Is our surveillance, aerial or otherwise, sufficient that we would have warning of a buildup?

General TAYLOR. I would think so.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you have any reliable estimate on the damage in personnel or materiel that our bombing has done?

General TAYLOR. We received reports from various sources.

First, of course, by our photography we know the physical destruction. Of the loss of life we get rumors at various points. We are not out to kill people as a matter of policy but inevitably this takes place. We attack their barracks but usually by this time the North Vietnamese are out of the barracks because they know they are dangerous places.

Nevertheless, we have had reports of several hundred soldiers killed or wounded in attacks on some of these major installations. We have very carefully avoided civilian population so the damage to civilians has been very slight.

Senator BREWSTER. What percentage of their radar network has been knocked out?

General TAYLOR. Probably most of that attacked, but a good deal of this bombing has been going on since I have been away and I haven't seen any figures on effectiveness. The initial strikes were good in the sense the bombing was in the general area. The radar itself is just a pinpoint about the size of this table. In many instances, it was not actually struck. You have to go back, if you want to keep the radars down you have to have repeated bombing.

Furthermore, they are mobile and can move out from one area and to another. Then it requires some time to discover exactly where they are again.

NAVAL BLOCKADE OF NORTH VIETNAM

Senator BREWSTER. One final question: Do we contemplate the imposition of a naval blockade on North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Like all things, Senator, we have looked at that as a possible course of action, but no one is proposing it at this time. It would be quite expensive. It would be somewhat risky in the sense we would have to deploy our ships right under the aviation of Hainan Island and we just don't feel—and also create many international problems we don't think are worth taking on at the present moment.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up a little bit more and perhaps expand on the questions Senator Brewster was talking about.

AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS IN VIETNAM

Is it my understanding, and I am sorry I was not here from the very beginning of your statement, that we are now planning to introduce American ground troops in numbers of several divisions?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Perhaps planning in the sense of making a plan, but not with the sense of intending to do so.

Senator CASE. I mean intending now to do it, taking the initiative.

General TAYLOR. No, sir, the initiative has not been taken. We are looking over this every important question. I think there is pretty general agreement we will have to put something in to help cover the manpower gap which exists during the rest of the calendar year. Suggestions vary from the one extreme of a number of divisions down to light reinforcement—reinforcing the Marines and perhaps establishing one or more bases along the coast through which we could pass forces rapidly.

Senator CASE. It seems to me that this is a major step.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it could be.

RESCIND THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

Senator CASE. One in which I am not sure that the resolution that we adopted in regard to the President's authority here empowers him to take. This is my personal view about this. I think if the country felt that it did empower him to take it, there might be considerable pressure for rescission of the resolution. Some talk of this has already come to the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. To do what, I can't hear you.

Senator CASE. To rescind the resolution. I think it very serious, just that consideration is necessary because if we get in there with 100,000, 200,000, 300,000 American troops or white troops of any kind and turn this into white against Asians, it seems to me we may very well have done many things, including elimination of the great advantage that we have of trying to keep the South Vietnamese on our side, or roughly at least against the Chinese, and we will be making it possible for them to override all other considerations and take over eventually in an area in which we are not going to spend the Nation's strength all the way.

I don't mean to suggest that I don't support the Government up to now. I do. I support the line to be followed. But I think this is a very grave question of the change in policy or a change in actions by our Government that requires more than just a determination by the Security Council and the President.

General TAYLOR. I share your concern, Senator Case, but I would like to emphasize there is no such decision which has been taken. It is just simply we are looking at a shortage of manpower and asking ourselves what could be done to meet it.

MOVE SLOWLY AND PROGRESSIVELY

In my own judgment we should move into this progressively and very slowly to see what the impact would be on South Vietnam itself. The last thing we want to do is to suggest we are taking over the war and the Vietnamese can stand to one side.

Senator CASE. May I just throw out for your comment, as you wish, I think this has some bearing upon this question of unhappy relations, unhappy feeling on the part of a considerable part of the press, and of the public, too. It disturbs all of us when we get reports from the Times and Times reporters, Commonweal, and other magazines that we are accustomed to look on as responsible, not necessarily to be followed, judgment, but not ragtag, bobtail people, although some of them are involved.

If we are going to move into an area of change of this sort, I mean into a change of involvement of the magnitude that you suggest, it seems to me we ought not to do it little by little by little with nobody's decision except the initiative taken by the other side. That is another thing that troubles me, too, and I know you can't make any comment on that and I will just stop now, but I did want to understand as far as I can your understanding of the situation, which I take it is that we are getting ready for this if North Vietnamese involvement or use or introduction of troops is sufficiently great or the need just in the way the battle is going requires us to do it, we are prepared or at least thinking about putting in several hundred thousand American ground troops.

General TAYLOR. Again, I would just say we are thinking in these terms. We have a manpower problem. We are not quite sure how great it is, but we are determined not to lose this thing. No one at the present moment is willing to say the large figures you cite are the ones that we will end up with. I sincerely hope we won't.

HO CHI MINH'S POSITION IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator CASE. On another matter, do you have anything to say about whether Ho Chi Minh is out or losing out in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I know nothing to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. The paper reported the possibility this morning.

Senator CASE. Yes, yes, it did. It suggested it may have already happened. Pro-Peiping forces—I am not going to ask you to go into too much speculation, but if it should be he was losing out would you think it would be to pro-Peiping forces?

General TAYLOR. He certainly is caught in the middle between the Russian and the Peiping groups. How much danger he is in, I don't know. He is certainly a respected name, and he is respected in South Vietnam whether you are a Communist or not. The Vietnamese have a great regard for Ho Chi Minh.

The CHAIRMAN. He threw out the French, didn't he?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He was the George Washington.

General TAYLOR. Yes, he was the George Washington.

GRAFT AND SCHEMES

Senator CASE. Just one other question: Are graft, get-rich-quick operations a serious problem?

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't say it is a serious problem. Grafting goes on to some extent. We find very little evidence of diversion of our aid and that sort of thing. We check on it just as much as we can at various control points. We never know for sure whether the

right farmer gets it, but we know distribution to the right areas is accomplished.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

THE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE

The CHAIRMAN. I want to pursue a little more of the same question that Senator Case and others have raised about this matter of putting in major ground forces. It would seem to me from what you said while you haven't made the clear-cut, formal decision, in essence the decision has been made to proceed unless the North Vietnamese very unexpectedly say they are sorry and they will go home. You said that you and the Joint Chiefs believe it is vital to our security and there is this gap and, therefore, we will have to fill it.

General TAYLOR. We are not sure of the extent of the gap, that is the point. This is an estimated gap which should be verified.

INTERPRETING THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. I am reminded that many of our leaders in the past, I think, I believe my memory is correct that Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Dean Acheson have said we should never get involved in a land war in Asia under any circumstances, if we can possibly avoid it, which comes back to this question: Is the resolution which we passed last summer after the Tonkin affair interpreted to mean a full authorization, approval by the Congress to send either 300,000 or 500,000 or 1½ million people to South Vietnam?

Is the administration taking this view and do they interpret that they would have no need to come and consult the Congress or the Senate or the Armed Services Committee or this committee if they are going to decide to put, well, 150,000 men. You have about 30,000 now, don't you?

General TAYLOR. Around 28,000.

The CHAIRMAN. 28,000.

What about it? I think this is a rather important matter. If we are going into the land war conditions, we ought to be consulted.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me inform you MacArthur's statement was that we had two chances, one in China and one in Korea; when we missed those two chances, all other chances are gone to fight on land.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly could stand correction, because my memory is bad.

Senator LAUSCHE. Substantially it is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Substantially a succession of our leaders have said we should not be involved in a land war in Asia.

General TAYLOR. Certainly no one wants to get involved.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't want any war at all.

General TAYLOR. I said this same thing and have been an opponent to commitments of land forces, but I want to go back and repeat, Senator that no one that I know of in Government is talking about the figures you have been talking about. This was raised, the question was asked me about the press comments about three or four divisions going into South Vietnam. What are the facts?

The facts are that a very careful examination of possible ground reinforcements is going on today, and General Westmoreland is convinced he needs individual and small unit replacements of several thousand right now, without any question about divisions. I am convinced he is right, up to this point. I personally have no feeling yet as to what might be required beyond that, but certainly no one is approaching a decision of this magnitude at this moment, and I am sure if it ever arises that this committee would be most thoroughly consulted.

CONGRESSIONAL ADVICE IGNORED

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how to put it. As I recall it, in 1960 there were less than 700 people out there. We now have 28,000. You won't put 300,000 all at once, you can't do that. It is only 10,000 at a time, I suppose is all that move in reasonably, but I am reminded, we were consulted, as I recall it, when a decision was being considered to put about 50,000, I think, into Laos. I vaguely remember a conference with Dirksen, Hickenlooper, a number of people who were involved, and the question was up, they were seriously considering it, if my memory is correct, and nearly every congressional member said they wouldn't do it. Whether that influenced them or not, I wouldn't know.

But I remember there was such a conference. It was put up in that way, and I think you remember, Bourke, you were there. I think nearly everybody said, "Well, that is going too far," and the same argument was made, that we don't want to get bogged down with our ground forces in Asia, it isn't worth it. So, you know what happened.

But now, you saw in the paper—I don't remember who said that there is being considered 350,000 men. I didn't mean all at once, but what you have said about if we make up our mind to hold Southeast Asia, and you said in another passage that this is vital to our security and that the Joint Chiefs joined you in this view—it seems to me the only conclusion you can draw is that you are going to do this.

General TAYLOR. Only if we have a massive attack. This discussion was in the context of a massive attack out of North Vietnam or out of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Or if we don't win without it. If this bombing doesn't work and they just continue to be able to blow up our Embassies and so on, that also is losing, isn't it?

General TAYLOR. No, these are just some of the incidents that go with this kind of warfare, and we are going to have to take it over a long period of time.

VITALNESS OF VIETNAM TO UNITED STATES SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would explore just a little bit more just how vital this is to the security of the United States, because it wasn't very long ago that I didn't know where Vietnam was. We had no interest. How has it become so vital to us that this particular piece of real estate must be retained at all costs?

General TAYLOR. I don't think I can do much better than I did in response to a previous question, Senator. It is simply the fact that

Vietnam is a very important element in a very important piece of real estate; namely, Southeast Asia, a country to the defense of which we have committed ourselves publicly. For us to walk away from this one——

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we made a mistake in committing ourselves publicly.

General TAYLOR. We would make a bigger mistake if we give up there, Senator.

CRITICISM IN JAPAN

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. But there is a good deal in the paper. This morning there is a piece out of Tokyo:

> The reputation and moral position of the United States in Asia has never been so low as they are now, the influential newspaper Asahi Shimbun declared today in a two column editorial. And it would be deplorable indeed if, as a result, distrust of the United States mounted in Japan.

That is very disturbing to me.

Japan just says, it goes on, it is a long one, it says:

> Criticisms of Washington policy in Vietnam by the leading Japanese newspapers have been especially conspicuous lately in view of the more conservative line adopted by the most influential organs in recent years.

In other words, they have been very friendly up until now.

COOPERATE WITH THE RUSSIANS

Another piece in this morning's paper says:

> In fact, it is an open question whether China sees the United States or the Soviet Union as its main adversary in Vietnam.

But what it leads me to at least think is that maybe we are missing an opportunity in not following what you said was the third alternative and in cooperation with the Russians. I didn't know they were our agent in the Communist camp but if that is the attitude they are taking, by the Chinese, that maybe we are a little too inflexible and a little less imaginative as we might be in taking advantage of assistance from the Russians in persuading Hanoi to your third suggested course.

General TAYLOR. I certainly don't think we would be loath at all to use the Soviets to persuade Hanoi. We would use any third parties that offer reasonable hope of helping to accomplish a common goal.

The CHAIRMAN. I just haven't seen any evidence that we are.

General TAYLOR. We are not supposed to show these things above the surface.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are inhibited to tell this committee——

General TAYLOR. You would have to ask the Secretary of State about this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think you ought to talk about it?

General TAYLOR. I am not the Secretary of State.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can we infer that the supposed impunity with which we have hit Vietnam, that there have been some discussions with Russia?

General TAYLOR. Don't infer that from anything I have said, Senator Lausche.

The CHAIRMAN. We have two very distinguished visitors this morning. Before I go back, I wonder, Senator Monroney, would you want to ask questions?

Senator MONRONEY. It has been very informative to me to hear the erudite questions which have been asked.

STRENGTHEN THE VIETNAMESE POLICE

One question I would like to ask—has anything been done to strengthen the local police? At the time I was there, there was discussion of taking the dischargees from the national army or from the national guard type of army to strengthen local police and keep order in villages that had been liberated that still were subject to nighttime raids.

General TAYLOR. A great deal has been done in Vietnam since you have been there, along the lines you suggest, and also a general effort of making more attractive the police service. And I am happy to say, we doubled the rate which were previously targeted for 1965, and we are on schedule at the present time.

Senator MONRONEY. There is some hope that some villages that have been liberated and sanitized, cordon sanitaire around them, they will not have to be again liberated?

General TAYLOR. They will. There will still be a shortage of police until 1966, but we are closing the gap much faster.

Senator MONRONEY. With the training going forward, and it will be an elite police. I think that seemed to me to be one of the vital areas that we needed that was missing the national attention and I know local attention by our forces over there.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator MONRONEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bayh, do you wish to ask questions?

Senator BAYH. I appreciate the hospitality of the committee. I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Miller has just come in.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I had to go to the White House.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

AIR FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS ON AIR STRIKES

Senator MILLER. Can you tell us whether or not the air strikes in North Vietnam are being carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Air Force people?

General TAYLOR. Recommendations of what?

Senator MILLER. Of the Air Force, and by that I mean are the recommendations of the Air Force being carried out, or is there less than the Air Force recommendations being implemented?

General TAYLOR. I don't see the Air Force recommendations per se. This kind of thing, you see, would be dealt with and recommended by the Joint Chiefs as a body rather than by a single service. Once the program was approved here in Washington, then it is sent out to Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC, and he parcels out the tasks to his Naval Air component and to his Air Force component.

Senator MILLER. Do any of those recommendations originate with you?

General TAYLOR. I am always in a position of being on the sidelines watching and putting in suggestions. I am not in the channel of clearance or anything like that.

Senator MILLER. I understand, but I would imagine they would attach considerable weight to your recommendations and invite them.

Have you made any suggestion for any more air strikes or more or different targeting than we have so far implemented?

General TAYLOR. No, I would say the program that is being implemented now is generally consistent with what I have suggested.

Senator MILLER. I see.

NON-MILITARY TARGET

Do you anticipate if there is no noticeable change in the situation after another, say, 30 or 60 days of concentrating exclusively on military targets, that we might well direct some air strikes on economic-type targets?

General TAYLOR. It is always possible, but I would doubt that we would exhaust our remunerative military targets in that period of time.

Senator MILLER. I understood you to say so, but I am just wondering even though we had not exhausted the military targets if we might not then get into a mix of military and economic targets.

General TAYLOR. We could if we felt that was a desirable thing to do. As of today, I wouldn't think so.

Senator MILLER. But can you see that as a strong possibility, say, after 30, 60, or 90 days?

General TAYLOR. I would say it is a possibility, but hardly a strong possibility.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just reminded, when the question of sending four divisions to Germany arose, we had quite a debate in the Senate about the advisability of sending them.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis, do you have another question?

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. AIR LOSSES

Just to follow up on this, General, what is your appraisal or idea of our air losses in making these raids? Have you looked into that? Do you have an opinion—medium, light, heavy?

General TAYLOR. I am really not a qualified expert on this.

Senator STENNIS. I know.

General TAYLOR. Our Air Force people study, of course, these losses, to see what the circumstances are.

Senator STENNIS. What you know about it, you don't think it is too high or unusually high, do you?

General TAYLOR. No, I think we are bound to anticipate something like that.

Senator STENNIS. Of course, we are going to have losses, but you don't think they are running too high?

General TAYLOR. Of course, any loss is too high.

Senator STENNIS. I mean your military expectations.

General TAYLOR. I am not surprised at the number of losses we have had.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

USE OF NAVAL POWER

Now, it is said to us—I don't say this, but it is said to us and we get mail to this effect, talking about these troops over there—all you have got to do is just use our naval power, air naval power, and our air power, and we would knock the daylights out of them. We can choke off Red China and, you know, everything that way. I know there is a pickup in the mail, to point out what you see in this thing. Of course, we could use our naval power to great superiority, could we not, if we decided to?

General TAYLOR. You are talking now about an extension of the war, not guerrilla action.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General TAYLOR. Everything, all our contingency plans are geared to using our air and naval power to the maximum.

Senator STENNIS. Geared to our striking force?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. No doubt about us having tremendous reserve power and available power in all phases of those fields?

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

MOVING TOWARD A LARGE-SCALE WAR

Senator STENNIS. This matter of putting those land troops in there—I tell you, that is where the serious part comes in. It looks to me like we are moving rather rapidly in that direction on a large scale.

Frankly, I think Senator Fulbright has well raised the points here—are we going to do all that and just keep on doing this under this resolution we passed last fall? We are making a decision here in a way, Congress is, that that is the way it will be, if we don't intervene or assert ourselves.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. You gentlemen had a talk with General Johnson when he got back, the Chief of Staff of the Army. He gave a very fine report, he is a knowledgeable man, as you know, and he was right there on it, but he feels the need of more ground troops, as you know, considerable numbers of them.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did he say?

Senator STENNIS. I don't know now that he gave any figure, but he thinks we already are at that point. I am sure you have advised with him.

But he just confirms what you say here. So, it looks to us as laymen that we are moving rapidly in that direction.

HANOI'S OPTIONS

Would you restate those three courses that you said Hanoi had open, just briefly restate them?

General TAYLOR. I would say the first course is to keep on doing essentially what is being done, accepting the losses from bombing,

but assuming the Americans will not carry these attacks to the ultimate conclusion.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General TAYLOR. Two, to keep on doing what they are doing in the south but seek outside help, which means inevitably asking the Chinese to come in.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General TAYLOR. And the third is to agree to abandon, at least temporarily, the efforts to absorb South Vietnam in exchange for other advantages, compensating advantages and wondering what they might be.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, that third one is the one I wanted to hear.

COMMUNIST WEAPONS

By the way, these weapons you mention—you find it to be Russian models made in China?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. And it is a very high grade of ammunition and weapons, too, small arms, these weapons that you found?

General TAYLOR. Yes. of course, when you see a captured lot of weapons, you find a tremendous mixture of all sorts. It must be a logistician's headache to supply them all with differing ammunitions, but lately there seems to be an effort to standardize on a family of Chinese weapons of 7.62 caliber.

Senator STENNIS. Very good grade quality, I mean it is first class.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have the Chinese adopted the NATO caliber?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is 7.62, isn't it?

General TAYLOR. It is not—yes, you are right, that is the caliber, but this is a slightly different shaped round. It is not identical.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought they modified it so they could use our captured ammunition.

General TAYLOR. No, sir, it is not identical.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else have any questions?

Senator CARLSON. I would like to ask just one.

SOLDIERS ADVISED NOT TO TALK ABOUT VIETNAM

We have had boys come back and tell us that they had been advised not to talk about the situation in Vietnam.

Is that correct?

General TAYLOR. I don't know of any such instructions, Senator. It may have been the case, but I certainly am not aware of it. I don't know why they would be so instructed.

Senator CARLSON. These people report that they were not allowed to talk about it, and they got their orders before they left.

That is all I have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator.

DRAFT EVASION IN VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't know whether this was asked of you, but to what extent has the Government of South Vietnam encountered difficulties through young men refusing to respond, or after they have responded, having deserted from the forces?

General TAYLOR. There is considerable draft evasion, as you might expect. Largely because the government in all its ups and downs and the inefficient administration resulting from those changes has not enforced its own law. Only now are they tightening up to the point where evasion becomes difficult, but still not difficult enough. We mentioned desertion in a previous discussion as something still serious, but which is improving somewhat, but it still requires a great deal of attention to making the military service more attractive and to getting more incentives for retention.

NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. If we pulled out or if we created a neutral government of North and South Vietnam, in your opinion would that bring about an end of our troubles or would we find a duplication of the South Vietnam and Laotian situation in Thailand, in other places?

General TAYLOR. I think this is one of the several possible forms of Communist takeover, because neutralization in the south is just a preliminary to absorption to a Communist state in the north. All of the disadvantages that were cited previously would apply to that particular arrangement. It would be perhaps more gradual, but the end product would be essentially the same.

Senator LAUSCHE. Anyhow, if we did neutralize South Vietnam, would that be the end of our problem?

General TAYLOR. No, it would just give it a different form.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Communists like to take one nation, one by one, getting control of one and then go on to the next.

General TAYLOR. That is their tactic for moving forward.

Senator MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Case——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Case.

SUPPRESSION OF NEWS

Senator CASE. On the question that was suggested by Senator Carlson, you have many, many areas of war and war theaters. We are disturbed by the constant suggestion that there is suppression of news, distortion of news, and all the rest of it by our authorities there in Vietnam. Is it your judgment, and I take it you are not directly involved with the military control of news, that the situation in regard to freedom of information and freedom of access to information by American and other reporters is different from normal situations, than in other situations of this sort?

General TAYLOR. We have never quite been in another situation like this. I have never been in a combat situation or a quasicombat situation where the press has access to anything like what they get in South Vietnam. It is a curious situation, of course, because it is really not our war, technically speaking, and we have to work out for our reporters viable relationships with the Vietnamese authorities. We are always more or less in between the two.

I don't think there is any ground for reasonable complaint from the press with regard to access to news. They have been spoiled in the past in being given access to operational information, which I don't think they should ever have had. This laxness is now being tightened up and this action is resulting in a number of complaints.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUYE. Yes, I have just one question.

CHINESE RESPONSE TO AMERICAN TROOPS

Much discussion has been had this morning on the possibility of using American troops in large numbers in this conflict here. If we did use, say, two or three or four divisions, would you think that the Chinese would respond?

General TAYLOR. I don't know. It all depends on what Hanoi wanted. The Chinese might indeed force their aid, so to speak, on Hanoi, to have a compensating presence in the north, but added ground strength in the north would not affect the overall situation. What we are concerned with is the internal guerrilla problem, and that would be the justification for the introduction of our forces. Again, I go back to my former statement and say I see no reason for the introduction of anything like the three or four divisions, in spite of the fact that number has been mentioned in the press. So, I think you might get some Chinese reaction, more or less to indicate, "Don't forget we are still around," but in the sense of starting a war on that basis, I can't imagine such a Chinese reaction.

Senator INOUYE. But are we prepared in case the situation warrants the presence of American troops?

General TAYLOR. Oh, yes, we have contingency plans for American forces almost every place in the world in almost any combination.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Miller.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KEEP THE PRESSURE MOUNTING

Mr. Ambassador, in response to my previous question about the possibility of getting into a mix of air targets, including economic targets, you indicated you didn't think it was a strong possibility. What troubles me is that I can see not a terrible amount of reaction if, for example, we augment our forces by another 20,000 or 30,000; we start getting up to around 50,000 more troops in there or 75,000 or 100,000—and that seems at least to be in the offing—we are going to have a lot of correspondence from people back home. And I, for one, would find it difficult to satisfactorily respond to that correspondence if I could not assure them that we were trying to hit economic with military targets to make Peiping feel that this cost of continued aggression is too high. Do you think I am missing the mark on that reaction or not?

General TAYLOR. No, I certainly sympathize with the points that you raise, that we should show no reluctance to do all that is necessary to keep the pressure mounting. I do think as I look at the military target system and the fact that the attack of industrial

targets inevitably involves civilian casualties, that we should move to that target system only with very good reason. And I think we still have the capability of hurting amply by attacks on the military target system within the timeframe mentioned.

Senator MILLER. In other words, you think by concentrating on the military targets with, let's say, a few thousand additional troops going in there, that we have a reasonable hope that Peiping, or that Hanoi will cease and desist?

General TAYLOR. I think we have a chance. It is far from being an open-and-shut case.

Senator MILLER. Yes.

General TAYLOR. We will never know until we try.

Senator MILLER. All right.

TROOPS FROM OTHER NATIONS

The second question is: If we are going to have other additional troops in there, would you care to discuss the possibilities of obtaining some or all of those additional troops from some other countries, and what the potential impact of bringing Red Chinese forces in would be if these other type troops came in; for example, Nationalist Chinese, Filipinos, Thailanders, and others?

General TAYLOR. I think certainly we would like to have representation from all these countries except perhaps the Chinese. We have no objection in using the Chinese nationals, but the South Vietnamese would have. The Chinese are anathema, north and south, the Vietnamese just don't like them, no matter who they are, whether Red or Nationalist, so that I am sure we would find objections from the Vietnamese.

The use of Filipinos, Australians, New Zealand troops, all that should be tried. I think it would be excellent if we had representation from them. Of Koreans we have a representation, but still not in combat forces.

Senator MILLER. What about Thailand?

General TAYLOR. Thailand is helping very materially in Laos. We really think they are carrying their load by what they do over there.

Senator MILLER. Thank you.

THE CLIMATE AT THE U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. I know Mr. Reston, who is a very reputable reporter, he has that reputation, said this morning, one of the ironic aspects of the Johnson administration position here at the United Nations is that while the President feels the United States is trying to uphold the principle of the United Nations in Vietnam, many delegates to the U.N. regard the United States as more aggressive and rigid in that war than the Communists. Would you agree with that?

General TAYLOR. I don't know the climate at the U.N. I think we certainly have not fought the international psychological battle as effectively as we should. One is allowed to forget the atrocities going on day after day, hour after hour in South Vietnam.

In the discussions of Vietnam, the dropping of one bomb makes news, and that diverts the attention of the Western World from the

conditions which have existed in South Vietnam for years, and which we are undertaking to correct.

A TITOIST GOVERNMENT IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Reverting to this third proposal of yours that I have been trying to develop in my own mind or trying to interpret what you have in mind, what is might lead to, would you regard what we would call a Titoist-type of Socialist-Communist country in all of Vietnam as being unacceptable to us under any circumstances?

General TAYLOR. It all depends on how it came about. If it came about as a result of our capitulation and against the will of South Vietnam, I would say it is unacceptable.

The CHAIRMAN. No, if it came about—I am talking at this time, trying to understand the third proposal Ho Chi Minh has. Supposing you brought this about. You said he would quit what he is now doing in return for some kind of, you didn't specify, but some kind of assistance, I believe you said, or some kind of concessions.

General TAYLOR. A picture of the situation that would follow his capitulation,which would not be a disaster to his country and which might even benefit his country.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think of it as capitulation on either side. I wonder if you had in mind whether some such situation could be brought about by agreement. Would this be, if you agreed to it, would it be acceptable to us?

General TAYLOR. It wouldn't be acceptable to the people we want to help. They don't want to be Titoist Communists or any other kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we don't know that.

U.N. SUPERVISED ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM

I am constantly reminded by someone, we are the ones—the Diem government refused to go foward with an election in 1956. It is usually alleged that the reason Diem would not allow the election is he was afraid to lose it. Therefore, with our backing, although it had been specifically stated in the agreement of 1954 that there would be an election in July 1956, such election never came about. It has been alleged—I don't know, of course, but it was alleged they didn't want it because they thought they would lose it.

Now, there never has been a test. You say they wouldn't win it. I don't have any idea whether they would or not. I imagine some people will vote for anything they think might get them rid of this fighting even though they don't like the kind of regime that would result. It might be better than being shot at everyday. I can imagine people taking that view.

General TAYLOR. You still can't have elections under the present conditions, because they have some of the problems Diem faced; namely, the inability to have elections uncontrolled by the Communists in many of the districts in the provinces.

The CHAIRMAN. The proposal, as I understood it, in 1954—and the Secretary of State has time and again made generalized statements that we would like to go back and genuinely abide by 1954, which means leave your neighbors alone and so on—but one of the

provisions was this provision that you have elections, I think under U.N. supervision. I know that elections even in this country sometimes suffer from lack of supervision, but in any case that would be the way you would approach it. I am just wondering, is this the sort of thing you had in mind when you said the third one?

I am not clear entirely what you have in mind when you say there is this third alternative that Mr. Ho Chi Minh might follow.

WHAT LOOKS FAIR TO HO CHI MINH

General TAYLOR. There are numbers of things that could be brought into consideration. Which ones would be appropriate at the time, we don't know now because the situation hasn't arisen yet for our making any kind of proposition of this sort, but we want two principal things from the north. We want them to stop interfering with the south, and, second, we want them to call back the people they have got in the south and allow this country to live as it wants to do.

We have two things to offer: one, cessation of bombing, and two withdrawal of our forces. That would look like a fair deal to me. Whether it looks fair to Ho Chi Minh, I don't know. But that kind of pairing off of advantages is what I have in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. How can you be so sure how the election will go, if you had a fair election under U.N. supervision, how do you know?

General TAYLOR. I would be willing to take a chance. All these people in South Vietnam had a chance of becoming Communist in 1954 and they didn't do it. Millions of them in the north gave up everything they had in the north an came to the south. They have had the advantage of seeing what happens under Communist rule in Hanoi since that time, and I am sure you——

The CHAIRMAN. I was under the impression they didn't have a pleasant life in Vietnam since 1954.

General TAYLOR. Where the Vietcong are, they don't have a pleasant life, but where the government is in control they have a happy life by comparison with the north.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS

Senator CLARK. May I ask one question? I had to leave, Mr. Ambassador, having asked you whether the North Vietnamese have a military capability of sending substantial forces south. You said, as I recall, they had seven or eight divisions.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Could you give us any opinion as to their intentions as distinguished from their capabilities? Why is this not an alternative which Ho Chi Minh might consider?

General TAYLOR. It is an alternative, but not a very attractive one, because there they would have a war on their hands, which means no holds are barred. This present modest air effort against them would be completely changed, and everything they would have above ground to the north would be destroyed. Furthermore, with the Vietnamese reinforced by our forces, they would have no reasonable chance of ever taking South Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. But that is based on the assumption that the American people and the President would be prepared to commit quite substantial ground forces in a war on the continent of Asia.

General TAYLOR. That is right.

Senator CLARK. Against an Asian opponent. And I wonder if that assumption isn't a basic one. I am not just at all sure we would be willing to do that and, therefore, the alternative might appear to be——

General TAYLOR. If he thought there is any real doubt as to the extent of our commitment, you are quite right, Senator, it would be a dangerous thing. I would hope there is no one in this Government who has that doubt.

ANOTHER DIEN BIEN PHU

Senator CLARK. Would we not be concerned with a Dien Bien Phu?

General TAYLOR. I would not want to embark on a ground campaign with any degree of happiness, but rather than accept a defeat that would be more disastrous than engaging in this type of operation, I would be willing to do what was necessary to prevent defeat.

Senator CLARK. This is what is worrying us about considering a war escalation which might end up in a major war which, from where we sit, would be a disaster.

General TAYLOR. I appreciate that, but I just point out that as any reasonable man views the pros and cons and the dangers and hopes and fears on both sides, the advantages are on our side. You can well say, "Your mind doesn't work the way Ho Chi Minh's does," and that could be true. But if we are going to be a leader in this world, we are going to run risks, but we should only run risks when we have the odds in our favor, and the odds are in our favor in this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. The odds are in our favor?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To what?

General TAYLOR. To defend Southeast Asia as opposed to what would happen on the other side, if they undertake massive military operations against us.

Senator CLARK. The French thought the odds were on their side.

General TAYLOR. The French failed. There is a different problem today, and we haven't tried to solve the Vietnamese problem by the French approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster wanted one more question.

BURNING OF JUNGLES

Senator BREWSTER. One final question, General. We have read that we have dumped oil and napalm over thousands of acres of jungle in an attempt to burn out Vietcong whose actual position we didn't know. Are these reports true, and can this attack possibly be effective if it is true?

General TAYLOR. No, it is not true in the dimensions you are talking about. There has been no burning out jungles indiscriminately. We are able, however, by various devices to locate head-

quarters and military installations in a zone. It may be several miles on each side without being able to pinpoint it, largely because of jungle conditions. We are now using bombing rather than napalm to attack these area targets. Sometimes, I am quite sure, we are successful; many times, I am sure, we missed. But it is still worth the effort by rendering life highly uncertain for the VC in these areas. I would use napalm without any hesitation when it would be effective, but we certainly have no idea of burning out jungles indiscriminately.

REBUILDING THE CHANCERY

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions? Here is your last chance, he is going back home.

By the way, I see you are going to rebuild the Chancery. Why don't you build it out of contingency funds? Why does it have to wait for appropriations? [2]

General TAYLOR. That is a question I can't answer.

The CHAIRMAN. You asked us for $1 million for a building, but you don't want to ask us for 300,000 men to send over there that may cost $50 billion, how about that?

General TAYLOR. When that day comes, Senator, you are going to be consulted, I am perfectly sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure?

General TAYLOR. Furthermore, the day isn't here yet for that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This happened since you left, I understand. But is the building such that it can't be repaired; why do we have to build a new building?

General TAYLOR. First, Senator, it is an old building. It is a firetrap. The elevators don't run.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we own it?

General TAYLOR. We don't own it. We pay an excessive rent. We could have bought the building several times on the rental we pay. It is not secure. We have had a very desirable piece of land for a number of years, just opposite the British Embassy in an area that can be secured. I would say the United States with all it represents in Vietnam is entitled to a fairly good building.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you build it underground, no place for them to throw their inkwells?

General TAYLOR. Then we would be accused of showing a war psychology, I am afraid.

The CHAIRMAN. You are making up your mind to be there a long time, and I think you ought to put it underground like Hitler's bunker in Berlin.

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I don't envy you your task.

General TAYLOR. It is a good job. I recommend it to any of you Senators.

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[2] On March 30, 1965, the Vietcong bombed the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, killing 17 people, injuring 183, and damaging the building.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you have many problems. We are not critical of you, I am sure, even though we are very worried about the implications of some of our involvement out there.

General TAYLOR. I appreciate these feelings.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A lot of people tell Senators where to go, but I don't think many of them have gone quite so far as to tell them to go to Saigon.

Senator STENNIS. We are glad to have you out there. We are fortunate to have you there.

The CHAIRMAN. When are you going back?

General TAYLOR. Tomorrow night.

The CHAIRMAN. Be careful. It is a very dangerous thing, I am afraid. I have no panacea to offer to you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Best of luck to you.

General TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 5, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S–116, Capital.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Church, Lausche, Smathers, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1965

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Pell, Gore, Lausche, Church, Smathers, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Also present: David E. Bell, Administrator, AID; Douglas MacArthur II, Department of State; Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1965 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENTS OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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[P. 621]

The CHAIRMAN. I think I express the sense of the committee in stating that the reduction in sum authorized for the military was motivated not by a desire to reduce such funds for Vietnam but rather by a desire to reduce military assistance to certain other nations, more specifically Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, and India and possibly Korea and Taiwan. At least they were the ones that were discussed in connection with that matter.

DEFICIT IN FISCAL YEAR 1965 PROGRAM

Secretary MCNAMARA. Now, since the time that was appropriated, last year, we have had substantial increases required in our programs for Vietnam and Laos. As you see, we stated the changes to the program since approval for Vietnam have added $73 million to the original $205 million, up through January 31 of this year, and added $27.8 million to Laos to the original $15.6 million, and that is a total of $100.8 million.

Now, to finance that $100.8 million we have requested and received a transfer of $55 million and that gave us $1.227 billion as you can see, but it left us a deficit as you can see after the transfer of $45.8 million. In addition to that deficit we found the savings from prior year programs of $42.2 million less than anticipated, and that is the meaning of the line that reads "Reduction in recoupments and reappropriations," so we have a deficit as a result of those two actions of $88 million.

To finance that deficit I have planned to reduce the programs for Greece, Turkey, China, and Korea by the amounts shown.

The reduction in Greece of $18 million, Turkey, $20 million, reduction in China $25 million, and Korea $17 million, and a miscellaneous additional reduction of $7 million adding to $88 million.

Each of those reductions is very substantial because I draw your attention to the line labeled Greece. Originally in the 1965 program we planned $80 million. That in itself was a substantial reduction from the average 1961 and 1962 which had run $111 million. The $80 million must be reduced $18 million in order to finance these increases in Vietnam and Laos.

Turkey, we had originally planned $131 million, that is down from the 1961, 1962 average of $180 million. $131 million we proposed to reduce still further by $20 million, and the same for China and Korea.

These reductions have not yet been concurred in by the Secretary of State, and Mr. Ball can speak for himself and Secretary Rusk on that point. It is the Secretary of State's strong feeling that these further reductions totaling $88 million are excessive and contrary to our national interests. But he will speak to that.

I plan to continue to recommend them. I believe that we can accept them in 1965, assuming we have an adequate program in 1966. But this remains a point at controversy between the Secretary of State and myself. I talked to him just before he went to CENTO on Monday, and he in effect said he reserved his right to take this controversy to the President, if necessary, upon his return, he feels so strongly on the matter.

Now assuming that I reduce the programs by $88 million and, therefore, have the program in balance, we still——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that is for this fiscal year.

Secretary MCNAMARA. This is for this fiscal year.

The CHAIRMAN. The $88 million.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The $88 million.

I mention this as a prelude of discussion of fiscal 1966 because what it means is that we are in a deficit condition in 1965; a deficit militarily and a deficit politically. So great a deficit that the Secretary of State does not believe that he can accept it even for 1965.

FISCAL DEFICIT IN SIGHT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1965

In any event beyond the requirements I have already outlined we have ahead of us these estimated further additions, and these are the requirements that have built up between January 31 and April 5. It looks as though we will require $45 million more for Vietnam, $9 million more for transportation costs, $7 million more for certain complicated packing, crating, and shipping charges, and

$4 million more for miscellaneous and $3 million more for credit assistance for an additional $78 million and we estimate further between April 6 and June 30, $25 million more requirements will develop for Southeast Asia and, therefore, there is an additional deficit of $103.8 million to be financed for the fiscal 1965 program alone, assuming that the Secretary of State and I come to agreement on the $88 million reduction which, as I point out, he still objects to.

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FISCAL YEAR 1966 COUNTRY PROGRAMS [P. 623]

Secretary McNAMARA. First, we have shown Vietnam as $230 million. That is $120 to $130 million below the likely fiscal 1965 total. It is quite unrealistic. The actual will far exceed $230 million. We will, therefore, have to utilize section 510, I am sure, in fiscal 1966 to provide for the excess.

I have shown Laos as $43 million. That is the same level at which we are expending funds in fiscal 1965. There is no possibility of cutting that. I have shown Thailand at $27 million, and in the parenthetical note have said this is $6 million below fiscal 1965. We have strong protests from the Ambassador now being reviewed by State and Defense, objecting to the fiscal 1965 level, and as you see the fiscal 1966 level is $27 million below. The Ambassador is stating that the fiscal 1965 appropriation is inadequate to provide the funds necessary to increase the counterinsurgency capability of Thailand at a time when we have ample evidence that the North Vietnamese are infiltrating into the northeastern portion of Thailand and laying the base for subversion in that area.

NATO INFRASTRUCTURE

Item No. 4 is the NATO infrastructure at $70 million. This is a commitment. We have no means of reducing it. I do believe that the percentage share which we are bearing of NATO infrastructure is excessive; it runs at 30.85 percent. We have already instructed our Ambassador to seek to cut that for future programs to 25 percent, and down to 20 percent for——

The CHAIRMAN. How long is that commitment?

Secretary McNAMARA. The commitment extends through the approved programs of the 4 years 1961 to 1965. But these will run in terms of appropriations into years probably 1966 and 1967 at 30.85 percent and it is impossible for us to cut it at this time. I believe our percentage for the next year should not exceed 25 percent and beyond that should not exceed 20 percent. We have very serious problems in reducing it to that level.

Mr. Ball can comment on them to you. But in any event, we have already instructed Ambassador [Thomas] Finletter we will not accept further infrastructure commitments of 30.85 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the most galling of all of them.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is galling to me, but it is a commitment and one I think we will have to live up to and, therefore, unless the total NATO program is cut——

The CHAIRMAN. De Gaulle didn't live up to his; he owes us $6 billion. Give him a credit.

Secretary McNAMARA. Of course, it is not only De Gaulle but it is Western Germany and Great Britain and so on. I would cut it if I could but I can't. I simply call it to your attention. If we want to cut $115 million in the program we can't cut it from that program because of our past commitments: $19 million is a reasonable share.

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CREDIT ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY SALES [P. 624]

Secretary McNAMARA. Item 8 is $50 million for credit assistance. It is through credit assistance of this kind that we are able to exercise the leverage to make the sales of U.S. manufactured goods to Australia and other countries that are financially able to procure and finance their own equipment. It would be a serious mistake to reduce the credit assistance and I would not propose to do so even though the total were out.

The next one is Denmark——

Senator MORSE. Could I ask the Secretary one question?

I understood you to say that $50 million is, in a sense, an investment on our part that we are going to get back as they pay off, is that your point?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; and we are going to get it back with interest. We use this in some degree as a guarantee fund, we obtained authority of the Congress to guarantee loans made by Export-Import Bank and other financial institutions, so this exercise or leverage effect will probably make sales associated with the $50 million approximating, let's say, $6 for $1.

So, we might have a $300 million sales program tied to this $50 million of credit assistance.

Senator MORSE. Could it be said in one sense it is sort of an installment-buying credit arrangement?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; that is correct.

And the countries using it are such countries as Australia, Austria, Italy, and other countries of that kind, that are fully capable of financing their own equipment and yet this is a way by which we are able to obtain the sales for our own manufacturers.

You may have noticed in the last several days some very vitriolic statements made by representatives of the United Kingdom denouncing the practices of U.S. arms manufacturers in selling to European countries. I think they are quite without foundation. We are not using unfair methods but we are putting on a strong sales campaign, if you want to call it that, to obtain our share of military equipment sales, and we will have sold through this year about $7 billion worth of U.S. manufactured equipment in the past 4 years.

Yesterday, I announced, for example, the agreement under which the British maintain the option to purchase a billion dollars' worth of F–111 aircraft for the United Kingdom. I will comment on that later if you wish.

In any event this $50 million is one of the sources of funds to facilitate and lubricate such sales agreements.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, are those $7 billion sales made at a cost, at a loss, or at a profit?

Secretary McNAMARA. These are at a full profit to U.S. equipment manufacturers.

Senator AIKEN. There is no loss to them?

Secretary McNAMARA. No loss, absolutely not. We are not subsidizing.

Senator AIKEN. You guarantee the payment?

Secretary McNAMARA. In most cases they are for cash.

As a matter of fact, in sales to Western Germany they pay in advance of delivery, cash.

Senator AIKEN. There is no aid involved?

Secretary McNAMARA. Absolutely none.

Senator AIKEN. All right.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that is exactly the type of item I enthusiastically approve of. I think we ought to expand this just as much as we can.

Secretary McNAMARA. I fully agree and to do so I have set up a sales department in the Department of Defense that does nothing but work on this, a man by the name of Mr. Henry Kuss is in charge. He is a magnificent administrator. It is through his efforts and the efforts of the rest of us that we are achieving these very, very substantial sales to the United Kingdom and others.

MILITARY PROGRAMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

To digress just a moment to comment further on yesterday's announcement. I don't think there has been any more significant action by the British Government in the last decade in relation to the arms industry than that which they took yesterday. They in effect closed out their combat aircraft industry, manufacturing industry, by cancelling the TSR-2 program. This will lay off 20,000 individuals; it will gut their airframe and engine manufacturing industries. It carries with it a tremendous political risk in cost, and we have been working with the Prime Minister and his Ministers of State and Defense for months to arrange this deal. The press, of necessity, obscured the outlines of it to reduce the political cost to the Prime Minister.

The press reports that our agreement is an option for the British to purchase the F-111. This was stated in that form because it would have been an almost impossible political task for him to state on the same day that he was both gutting the British airframe and engine manufacturing industry and entering into a billion-dollar contract with the U.S. airframe and engine industries. The fact is we have an agreement under which we will sell F-111's to him, but as I say we have announced it as an option agreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I don't like to divert this discussion at the moment, but there is a collateral disadvantage, I think, in that, too. It seems to me that we will be losing the skills in Britain on many of these things which have been proven to be significant over the years. I don't see that they have got any other course at the moment, but I am just wondering what is going to happen to their skills and their skilled people there that are fully as good as ours in many ways because they have developed some things we haven't.

Secretary McNAMARA. This their problem, of course.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know, but it is a free world problem.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I realize that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But we are selling their skills and the inventive genius to the free world. I don't say that should block the deal.

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is this problem and we have sought to acquaint them with it and also help them solve it. The TSR-2 is a perfect illustration of the much broader problem. That plane would cost twice as much as the F-111. They began work on it 4 years earlier. It flew supersonically 40 days earlier. It is not as effective an aircraft, so it cost twice as much, it took twice as long to build, and it is not as effective.

Now, this illustrates their difficulty. They are spread too thin. They are trying to do too much with too little, so we have said to them, "Concentrate. Don't spread yourselves across the entire range of airframe and engine design. Concentrate on those fields that are most important to you and in which you have the greatest requirement and for which you will have the greatest capability, and we will assist you. We will enter into joint research and development projects with you, and we will endeavor to procure some equipment from you. If you specialize, you will help yourselves and help the rest of the free world."

So, I think this is a step in their interest and ours.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I have some understanding of the overriding difficulties they have. This last explanation would indicate they will not necessarily dissipate their skills.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because after all they have some pretty good skills over there.

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MILITARY PROGRAMS IN WESTERN EUROPE [P. 626]

Secretary MCNAMARA. The next item is labeled "Denmark" and states this is the final payment on a prior commitment. We agreed to provide certain military assistance to them. They agreed to raise their defense budget from unreasonably low levels at which it was initially planned, and this $3 million is the last of the military assistance program for Denmark. I have stated personally to the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister of Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Norway, that we will not enter into additional military assistance commitments with them. We will only conclude the commitments that have been made in prior years. This is the last payment on the one to Denmark.

The same thing is true of Norway. This is one of the remaining commitments due on prior commitments—payments due on prior commitments to Norway.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, how much more is due to Norway?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Norway, I would guess it is about $30 million. I can tell you exactly. No, it is less than that, it is $22 million, $19.6 in 1967 and $1.5 in 1968.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is this $34.4?

Secretary McNAMARA. In addition to this $34—and I may have misled you slightly—it is the Danish commitment. This is the last payment unless they exercise an option under the terms of which in return for expenditures by them, it seems to me it is on the order of $30 to $45 million we would expend, $7½ milion in 1968 and $7½ million in 1969. But they haven't yet exercised the option and I don't know whether they will do so.

In any event, as far as Norway is concerned, there is $34 million for 1966, $19.6 for 1967, and $1.5 million for 1968. In return for that, they have previously agreed that they will raise their defense budget, which they have already done from the inordinately low levels which it was initially planned, they will modernize their forces, and they will procure a specified amount of equipment in the United States for dollars.

COMMITMENT TO IRAN

The next item, 11, is a portion of a remaining commitment to Iran. When the Shah was in this country in 1962, I believe it was, at President Kennedy's instruction I negotiated with the Shah an agreement under which in return for our military assistance they agreed to reduce their forces from 200,000 to 160,000. We felt they were unnecessarily diverting men from their civilian economy to their military. The men were improperly equipped, poorly trained, surplus to the military needs, and should be returned to the civilian economy. The Shah agreed to do this in the amount of 40,000 men in return for our agreement to provide certain equipment for which $45 million is requested in fiscal 1966.

Senator CHURCH. How much longer will that agreement run?

Secretary McNAMARA. That commitment runs for about 3 more years, and it is in the amount of $40.8 million for 1967, $30 million for 1968, $24.7 for 1969 and I frankly can't tell you now the extent to which it extends beyond that but I will be happy to get it for the record.

Senator CHURCH. I would appreciate that.

Secretary McNAMARA. But this is a good illustration, and there will be others as I go down the list, of the degree to which through our military assistance program we exert a leverage on the economic and defense planning of the nations with which we deal. We refuse to provide additional military assistance to Iran unless they cut back their forces.

COMMITMENT TO JAPAN

Now, in the case of Japan, this is the final commitment, with the exception of, I think, it is $400,000 that lies beyond this $1.6 million. We have said to Japan that they are capable of financing their own defense, that we will refuse to enter into new commitments for military assistance to them. We believe they must increase their defense budget in the future. I have said this to the Prime Minister and to the Defense Minister. It is going to be very difficult for them to take the action necessary to provide for their own defense because of the clause in their constitution which prohibits them from raising armies, and because of the political prob-

lems that all of you are more familiar with than I, and the psychological problems carried over from World War II.

But we do not believe we should continue to support the defense of Japan.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA

Item 13 is a commitment to India, $49 million. Here is another illustration of where we have used the leverage of the military assistance program to substantially affect both their defense program and their civilian economy.

I told Chavan, their Defense Minister, that we would refuse to continue this military assistance program unless they cut back their planned military force strength, which was excessive, unreasonable, and unless they reduced their foreign exchange expenditures, which they had budgeted over a 5-year period. We forced them to reduce the foreign exchange expenditures planned for military equipment by 35 percent, and we obtained a written agreement from them to that effect, and for that we have agreed to continue our military assistance. We considered that they were weakening their economy; they had planned an excessive increase in both their defense budget and the military strength. They would be far stronger militarily if they expanded more slowly and more effectively, if they sought to increase the quality rather than only the quantity of their forces, and if they increased rather than reduced the portion of their resources devoted to the civilian economy. In return for an agreement, subject, of course, to the acceptance of that by Congress of $49 million, we received a written agreement from them to cut their foreign exchange and their military force structure.

Senator CHURCH. Does this understanding extend beyond this year?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It extends for a 5-year period.

Senator CHURCH. At roughly this level?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Every agreement that you have referred to and the others that will follow contain the provision that the amounts that are committed in advance are subject to the appropriations of the Congress?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Exactly so.

Everyone carries that written clause, and I am quite aware of the fact that the Congress can say, "Well, you may have made that agreement but it carried the loophole and we propose to exercise our right to deny you the funds to carry it through."

But I would point out that there has been very hard bargaining in every one of these agreements and every one of them, I think, contrary to what you read in the newspapers reflected the actions of the U.S. Defense Department to strengthen the economies of these foreign countries because in the long run their security does depend on the strength of their economy and we recognize that and we utilize our military aid as a lever to force them to that action. These illustrations I have given you are illustrative of that.

RENTAL PAYMENTS

Now, the next four items, 14, 15, 16, and 17 are nothing more than rental payments, paid in the form of military assistance and there is no possible opportunity for reducing those. As a matter of fact, the rent in effect for the Ethiopian facility is likely to increase. The rent for the Portugal Azores bases hasn't yet been agreed upon. We are just at sword's point because of Angola, and the Portuguese refuse to even discuss the matter with us. For all practical purposes we are occupying the Azores bases rent free, but at some point that agreement will have to be renegotiated and we will again have to pay rent for it. In any event, the $38.9 million is rent pure and simple.

SPANISH BASES

Senator GORE. You skipped over Spain and that seems to me to be the most excessive of all.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, that is not illustrative of the average rents we pay, because we entered into a 5-year agreement with Spain, and we are paying the rent in effect in the first 2 or 3 years. I can give you the figures for Spain to show the point which I am making.

In fiscal 1964 the program was $39 million. In fiscal 1965 it was $8.9. In fiscal 1966, $20.8; 1967, $11; in 1968, $3; and 1969, $1.

Senator GORE. That satisfies me.

Secretary MCNAMARA. So, I think it is fair to say the assistance runs about $20 million a year.

Senator CLARK. Would you give us in just a few sentences, Mr. Secretary, the justification for maintaining the Spanish bases?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; we have two primary justifications. One is that we use the southern coast of Spain for naval purposes. We have Polaris submarines based there and by so doing we reduce the number of Polaris submarines required.

Alternative bases would be in Scotland, and we reduce the number of submarines required by the difference in transit time from Scotland to the southern coast of Spain, and this is of great value to us. This is by far the cheapest way to achieve deployment of *X* number of Polaris submarines under the water in the Mediterranean.

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SPANISH BASES [P. 628]

Secretary MCNAMARA. And when we did that, we asked that Spain take over the responsibility for its own air defense. We said we are either going to remove the early warning equipment and the radar equipment associated with that air defense and the squadrons or they were going to have to pick them up and finance them.

They have chosen themselves to operate these and we have turned them over to them. This has substantially reduced our domestic budget costs because those were not military assistance funded through the basic defense budget.

In any event, the airbases serve first the function of advance bomber bases and second, the function of in-transit bases. We are continuing to maintain them for that purpose, although we have reduced the number of bases required for that purpose, and reduced the number of personnel at those bases.

Senator CLARK. Aren't they becoming obsolete?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir, not for in-transit bases. If we had to move into portions of Africa or the Middle East, we would find those bases absolutely essential to our movement.

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FUTURE NEED FOR OVERSEA BASES [P. 628]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I frankly just haven't studied the situation in sufficient detail to answer the question. But I do know that we badly need them between now and 1969 or 1970 and, furthermore, that the rent of $20 million a year is not at all excessive. We are paying a far higher rent, if you will, for our facility in Ethiopia in relation to its value and cost to Ethiopia than we are for the Spanish bases and I neglected to mention that as a subsidiary agreement to the basic rental agreement with Spain, they have agreed to purchase, I believe it is $50 million worth of military equipment in this country, and pay for it standard prices.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, can I ask two quick questions?

You mention we have our Polaris submarines now based in Spain.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. I have a recollection at the beginning of your negotiations you had difficulty getting permission from Spain; is that true? When was that changed?

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]

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EFFECT OF TURNING FACILITIES OVER TO SPAIN [P. 629]

Secretary MCNAMARA. What it does mean, however, is that the Spanish have had to increase their defense budget because we have turned over to them facilities which we in the past have financed the operation of, radars, as an illustration. I think one F-104 squadron, if I recall correctly, at any rate the air defense equipment we have turned over to them, the value of which will be charged against military assistance but the operating cost of which they will have to pay for through their own defense budgets.

This caused considerable friction during the negotiating. This was one of the reasons why they said they wouldn't provide Rota facilities for submarines, because we were insisting not only that we cut down the rent but that they pick up the operating costs of these air defense facilities we had previously operated. We said, "Well, you don't perhaps need the air defense, and therefore, you have the option of terminating it or financing it, and you can decide." They said, "Well, we do need the air defense because you are in here, and you are going to draw upon us to fire the Soviet Union. That Rota base is a very important base, and the Soviets will target it. We will have to defend against it, and you are forc-

ing us to pay the costs of defending the Rota base when you are the ones who draw the Soviet fire upon it. That is unreasonable." We argued it out and we finally got them to agree that whatever air defense they needed they would pay for.

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PROGRAM IN LIBYA [P. 630]

Senator CHURCH. What is the present prospective value of that base? Also in conjunction with Libya, I wonder if David Bell could tell me what our present program is in the field of foreign aid?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The Wheelus base in Libya is of great value to us because that is the only major gunnery and bombing range we have for our European based fighters, and the alternative to using Wheelus for that purpose would be to periodically move them back into this country at, of course, much greater cost. So, we are very anxious to continue to use the Wheelus base for that purpose, although there is some doubt as to whether we will be able to continue its use indefinitely. In any event, the program of $2½ million of aid is a very small price to pay for, in effect, rent for that base.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

How long does our present agreement for the continued use of the Wheelus Air Force Base last?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I should know and I don't. Maybe Dave does.

Mr. BELL. I think it is for 1970.

It is for several years yet, although there has been some talk in Libya of the desire of the Libyan Government to renegotiate our base rights but that has not yet come to actual fruition.

So far as your question about economic aid is concerned, we have no request beginning in fiscal 1966. We plan no economic aid to Libya at all because the oil revenues have been mounting rapidly and we believe the Libyans can afford whatever outside capital and technical assistance they may need.

There is a small qualification for that. If we could have two or three individuals as high level economic advisers to the Libyan Government, we would be glad to provide that. It might cost us $50, $60,000 but there is no opportunity to do that at the present time and we do not have it in our plans.

Secretary BALL. To some extent, let me say, this situation so far as Wheelus is concerned is a function of our relations with the UAR because if Nasser really sets out do it, he, by an incessant propaganda campaign, could make the situation a very difficult one for the Libyans.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary.

LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Secretary MCNAMARA. The next item, 18, in one line shows the total military assistance for Latin America, $77 million for 18 countries.

I will be happy to go into that later to whatever degree you wish, but it is a very small amount in relation to the size of the area.

Here again, we are seeking to restrict the expansion of military forces rather than to finance them. We use our aid as a lever to prevent the nations there from building forces which can be used for aggression and for attack on their neighbors.

Nineteen is——

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, could you pause for a moment with the Chairman's permission, on 18.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir, surely.

Senator CLARK. What concerns me on this Latin American request is that it has gone up from $51 million in 1960 to $77.2 million in 1966, and I am at a loss to understand why it is necessary to increase rather than to decrease the military aid for Latin America.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, 1951 was an unusual——

Senator CLARK. 1961.

Secretary MCNAMARA. 1961 was an unusually low year—1962 was $72 million; 1963 was $68 million; 1964, $69; 1965, $73. The price level changes alone would account for that difference. We have had requests from both Ambassadors and military commanders there for amounts far in excess of the $77 million which we are proposing, and when you recognize the number of countries involved, 18, it is an extraordinarily small amount. There isn't any part of the world in which defense expenditures are as low as they are in Latin America, and it is our objective to keep the low. We use the military aid as a lever to that end, and I don't think we could accomplish that objective at a lesser amount.

Senator CLARK. Actually this is a policy question for the State Department rather than the military; isn't it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I think that is fair to say, because it is——

Senator CLARK. You don't expect this money is going to help defend Latin America against communism?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Absolutely not.

But it will defend it against communism by providing a higher degree of internal security. I am confident of that, and this is——

Senator CLARK. To the extent the money goes for that and not to acquire airplanes.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir, Brazil has an aircraft carrier, which is an absolute waste. We should never finance that kind of equipment for Latin America, and this budget doesn't finance that kind of equipment.

There is great pressure within Latin America to acquire sophisticated modern equipment of value only against overt aggression for defense of the hemisphere or for defense against overt attack by other nations within Latin America. We are not financing that kind of equipment.

Senator CLARK. You talk about 18 countries, but actually the major part of that is for 4, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru. You gave a justification for that the other day. I don't want to go into it again. I am skeptical of the need for that much money.

Secretary MCNAMARA. There are many others involved. Bolivia—for example, I don't remember whether you mentioned Chile, Chile receives $9½ million.

Senator CLARK. Bolivia is very small and I understand the necessity for that. I have some difficulty understanding some others.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Brazil, I can't imagine any more effective relationship between that and, our country and the Brazilian military in the last 3 or 4 years. We have stabilized the political situation and I am sure Secretary Ball will tell you would have been much less stable had we not had a military assistance program.

Senator CLARK. Sure, but it is largely to keep the local military happy and to give them some toys to play with. Isn't that correct?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, I wouldn't phrase it exactly that way.

Senator CLARK. You are on the record now.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the assistance we give them in the form of civic action, for example, and internal security equipment——

Senator CLARK. I agree with you on that.

Secretary MCNAMARA [continuing]. Meet their internal purposes, tie the Latin American military to us, give us an opportunity to exert political influence on them, and therefore it is both in their interests and ours.

Senator CLARK. It keeps the junta happy.

Senator AIKEN. Besides that, Mr. Secretary, the Brazilian military tries not to hurt anybody. They don't have casualties anyway, I notice.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very good.

Go ahead.

Senator CHURCH. Where did Brazil get the aircraft carrier, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MCNAMARA. This was many years ago and I assume we must have contributed to it. But there has been no financing of aircraft carriers or similar equipment in recent years.

Mr. BELL. I think it is from the British as a matter of fact.

Senator CHURCH. What about the cruiser that Chile has that unbalances the budget every time it goes to sea?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can't answer the question. Again we have not given that in my term.

Senator CHURCH. Recently.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is right.

We have absolutely opposed the acquisition of what I would call sophisticated weapons, weapons that are designed to be used against their neighbors rather than to protect the internal security.

Senator CHURCH. Does that include jet aircraft?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That includes no jet fighter aircraft, with the exception of Colombia, for which we have provided either two or four, I have forgotten which, F–86's in the fiscal 1966 program. This is to fulfill past commitments and to provide them with aircraft they use against the what they call bandits; I don't know whether they are bandits or subversives in their country.

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TYPE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROGRAMMED FOR LATIN AMERICA
[P. 633]

Secretary McNAMARA. I would just like to say what has been supplied in the past and what is being supplied currently. We have supported the Latin American countries in the past with weapons that were designed primarily for use against overt aggression of the kind that you are speaking of. We are not now supplying them with that with one or two minor exceptions.

The lists of equipment that are in your books and that I can expand on if you wish, that we are planning to supply for 1966, do not include that type of equipment. The aircraft list, for example, includes helicopters, transport aircraft, with the single exception of it is either two or four F-86's for Colombia, which is a special problem in itself. I fully agree with your basic point.

Secretary BALL. Might I just add one footnote, Mr. Chairman, to what Secretary McNamara has said?

When I was in the meeting of the NATO Council last week, which was an extraordinary meeting because there were people there from the capitals, Mr. Spaak and some of the Deputy Foreign Ministers and so on, I presented the problem of Latin American arms and particularly the desire of the military in many of the countries in Latin America to acquire them as a kind of prestige or status symbol. I proposed to the NATO countries that the key—those NATO countries that are capable of being arms suppliers—that we get some kind of a self-denying ordinance on their part that they didn't go down, as some of them have been doing recently, and titillate the ambitions and fancies of the military by presenting and offering a lot of sophisticated equipment, which simply stirs up their desire to buy this stuff even though they may have to divert funds that ought to go into other purposes. We are going to follow this by bilateral discussions with these governments to try to see if we can get them to stand down on this.

Secretary McNAMARA. The French——

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary, we have to go.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will go rapidly, Mr. Chairman.

Item 19, a total of $17 million is what we call free world orientation, largely training of foreign military personnel in 18 countries.

Items 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, therefore, are really at the heart of the problem because it is only in these areas that we stand any real chance of cutting in the event it were necessary to take $115 million out of this.

MILITARY PROBLEMS FACED BY GREECE

I draw your attention to the parenthetical information opposite each of these countries starting on 20, 21, 22, 23 where I show the 1961-62 average for Greece.

For example, it was $111 million. We are proposing $75 million for 1966: this simply shows the magnitude of the reduction that has taken place in these countries since 1961 and 1962.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it; 1964?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. 1964 was, I can give you the figure. You may recall, by the way, that 1964 was cut $400 million, and we had

a very serious problem as a result of that and had to slash these programs, but in 1964 in Greece the total was $69½ million.

Senator CLARK. 1965 it was $62.4 million.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. You are going up again to $75?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct. But the problem is that in 1964 and 1965 we failed to adequately provide for military assistance to these countries and we are going to cut 1966 again. We are going to have to change our alliances and our relationships with the nations. We just cannot continue as we are.

Here is the problem in Greece.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, you don't mean we have to change our alliances with the nations on the basis of supplying these at a given figure.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do, indeed.

Senator CHURCH. We are talking here about even if the present tentative reduction of this committee were sustained and even if it were confined entirely to the framework of this program to the five countries you have referred to, we are talking about a 20 percent reduction at most.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Right.

Senator CHURCH. And certainly, our alliances are not so fragile that that move would destroy them?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Let me tell you the problem and let Secretary Ball comment on it. If I have overstated the case, he can correct me. But let me also digress to say that as of this moment the Secretary of State has refused to agree with my reduction in the fiscal 1965 program for the very reason that he feels it will force a change in our political relationships with Greece, and here is why.

Since 1959, the Soviets have modernized the Bulgarian Army. There are 10 Bulgarian divisions. They were nonmotorized infantry rifle divisions in 1959.

Since that date, they have been mechanized and they now have seven motorized and three tank divisions.

The combat aircraft, the tanks, the artillery pieces supplied by the Soviets to Bulgaria substantially exceed the numbers that we have supplied to Greece.

The Greeks are at such a disadvantage today versus Bulgaria, for example, the Greeks have 153 fighter aircraft, Bulgaria has 345. They are at a disadvantage in mobility, particularly in tanks. They are so outranked and outnumbered in their artillery that without any question the Bulgarians can defeat the Greeks, push them out of the northern part of their country.

Now, the Greeks have said to us, "Either you are going to have to agree to continue this military assistance program at a higher level than in recent years or we are going to cut back our forces, one or the other, because we cannot sit here a target for Soviet aggression, a recipient of your commitment, and see you act in a way that prevents you and prevents us from fulfilling that commitment."

Senator CHURCH. I think this is a policy question. I would like to ask, Secretary Ball, are the Greeks presently fearful of an invasion of their country from Bulgaria?

Secretary BALL. They are always conscious of it.

Senator CHURCH. Is this something they are anticipating and you are anticipating?

Secretary BALL. From time to time we have got very serious, almost panic tremors through Greece when they see some troop movement on the Bulgarian side. That makes them think there may be some kind of new threat.

Senator CHURCH. Is it your estimate that Bulgaria is actually posing a threat to Greece?

Secretary BALL. Certainly the Bulgarian capability is such, in that it is capable of taking advantage of a world situation to move.

Senator CHURCH. If such an invasion did occur, is not Greece a part of the NATO alliance?

Secretary BALL. Certainly.

Senator CHURCH. Are we not committed to the defense of Greece?

Secretary BALL. Let me say I wouldn't anticipate such an invasion except in the context of a very much larger disturbance around the world, but I take it what we are really concerned with is to provide those defenses that will enable these countries to act in a situation where they may be threatened and that threat is not likely to occur as an isolated matter. In other words, let's assume that there is a general continuance of the kind of relationships that exist between East and West. I wouldn't look for a Bulgarian move in isolation. It would be part of something very much bigger.

But nevertheless it is something we have to be on guard against. It is something that the Greeks are very conscious of. There is this historic desire for Mediterranean ports that exists on the part of more than one bloc country.

ROLE OF NATO COLLEAGUES [P. 634]

Senator MORSE. What about our NATO colleagues? Why don't they come in and help, if there is any danger of invasion of Greece by Bulgaria, although I want to say—you speak about the tremors that go through Greece, my feeling is that the tremors go through Greece every time there is any discussion about reducing the military aid. That is what causes the tremors.

Why doesn't NATO come in and be of greater help?

Secretary BALL. The other NATO countries?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary BALL. Well, that is a question that goes to very much larger problems than just a question of helping Greece.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Let me answer it, Senator Morse.

The other NATO countries, in our opinion, have not been spending enough on their own defense. I might just as well admit that. But we have used our influence in the last 4 years to increase their budgets and they have. Now, when I say the other NATO countries, I would exclude the United Kingdom from this conclusion because they have been spending 6 to 7 percent of their gross national product on defense and that is an adequate expenditure.

West Germany has not been expending enough, nor has Italy, nor have Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. We have forced them, and literally forced them, to increase their expenditures.

West Germany has increased its budget 53 percent in 3 years. The average NATO defense budget has risen 35 percent in 3 years. There's a tremendous expenditure. We need it badly. We need it on the central front, however, and they have nothing left over despite these huge increases to further add to the strength of Greece.

I would say one further thing, that contrary to what you may think, the Bulgarians have a capability and would exercise that capability in isolation from other major moves against NATO. I can visualize many situations and we have had hints of many situations in which the Bulgarians can snip off a piece of northern Greece and would do so. The Cyprus-Greece-Turkey situation is one illustration, and either we are going to have to change our commitment to Greece or we are going to have to continue a program of military aid.

Secretary BALL. Let me say that I may not have made myself as clear as I meant to. When I said that it would be done in the context of some other disturbances, I had in mind the Cyprus situation as a case in point.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is a good illustration.

Secretary BALL. But the Bulgarian capability, which is a capability based on Soviet and Czechoslovak weapons that have come in, in very large quantity to make quite a modern armed force out of the Bulgarian Army, is something that is real and present. It isn't a theory. It is a fact, and the Greeks are very much aware of it.

Senator CHURCH. Let me ask you one question so that the question is perfectly clear in my own mind.

NATO AS A DETERRENT

Within the framework of NATO and Greece being a NATO partner, are we, the United States, not committed to the defense of Greece in the event of an attack upon it?

Secretary BALL. Yes; certainly.

Senator CHURCH. Does not Bulgaria know this?

Secretary BALL. Yes; certainly.

Senator CHURCH. And the Soviet Union?

Secretary BALL. They are perfectly aware of the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me that the real and effective deterrent is the commitment of the United States and the significance of the NATO alliance. Any modest trimming of this particular program is not going to be very meaningful in terms of decision on the part of Bulgaria as to whether or not it is going to invade Greece.

Secretary BALL. I would say this: It is going to be very important in terms of whether Greece is going to contribute to its own defense or not. I mean if you say the real deterrent is the American promise to intervene in case of an aggression against Greece, then the answer of the Greeks would be, "All right, we will do nothing." But the fact is——

Senator CHURCH. I think that overstates it, if I may say so. I think that oversimplifies and overstates the case and stretches it beyond the breaking point because what you are doing here is increasing a program over and above the 1964 and 1965 levels. The

question is whether that increase is really necessary or the lack of it would result in a decision on the part of the Greek Government to not do its part in maintaining its own defense. I find that hard to agree.

Secretary BALL. As Secretary McNamara will tell you, 1964 was a year of no modernization. In fact, it was a year of slipping back, because it was a year of no modernization because it went down substantially at that point.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, so far as Bulgaria is concerned, doesn't Greece have a defense pact with Yugoslavia and Turkey, and even though Greece and Turkey might fight each other, do you think that either Yugoslavia or Turkey would permit Bulgaria to overwhelm Greece without having anything to say about it?

Secretary BALL. I can conceive of a situation now in which Turkey might permit Bulgaria not to overwhelm Greece, but as Secretary McNamara suggests, take a bite off bits and pieces of it, as the relation between the two governments at the moment exists.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I say, George, that it is our opinion—and when I say "our," I mean not only the opinion of the Joint Chiefs and myself, but the opinion of the senior U.S. military commanders in Europe—that today Bulgaria could snip off the northern part of Greece and a portion of Turkey and that neither Turkey nor Greece could stop it. This is because of the tremendous inflow of Soviet equipment into Bulgaria in recent years, an inflow which is far in excess of what we have supplied to these countries.

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OBLIGATIONS OF NATO ALLIES [P. 635]

Senator MORSE. There is great division in this committee. As the chairman knows, I shall support substantial cuts. I would be perfectly willing to take the whole $115 million out and make perfectly clear to NATO it has to assume this obligation.

When you talk about Bulgaria being able to cut off a tip in Greece, maybe get a tip of Turkey, too, I am not persuaded by it, not only because of the NATO obligations but what we are going to be doing with our air power. You talk about Wheelus Base, we talk about these other bases this morning, that air power is going into action quickly and that will stop Bulgaria cutting off the tip of Greece or the tip of Turkey. They know what price it is going to cost them. That is why we are supporting keeping those bases there.

I have one other observation and then I will close for your comment. Secretary McNamara has referred several times this morning to the fact that by following this military aid program, we have forced this country to increase budgets or to decrease budgets and so on.

I think that is what is precisely wrong in part with our military aid program. We are using our military aid program, I think, to force governments to do our will and we ought to stop it.

I think that is why we are getting growing criticism of our military aid program, because we are using it really for what amounts to political intervention in these countries. I think we ought to figure out what the minimum is necessary for the defense of our

military interests and appropriate that, and these countries had better look to their own defenses beyond that point.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, let me say in response to the last point that, of course, that is exactly what we have done.

In the case of India, we have determined the force that we think is the minimum required to support our own military security and insisted that the Indians not expend funds greater than sufficient to provide that force, and that we not expend funds greater than sufficient to provide that force. Essentially that is the same approach we have taken with respect to these other nations.

Now, second, as to our air power and its ability to defend Greece and Turkey, the fact is we could not, in utilizing our air power, prevent the Bulgarians from snipping off parts of Greece and Turkey today. This is the conclusion of all the military experts and it is my conclusion as well.

Senator MORSE. If they knew you were going to retaliate it would have a great inhibiting effect on their following that course of action.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is perfectly clear that a small slice of salami, in their opinion, may not lead to retaliation. We are obviously not going to use our strategic air command if the slice of bologna is small enough, and they know that. They are very likely to take the action to cut it off, therefore.

Secretary BALL. The dilemma, Senator Morse, we are always confronted with in a limited war or a limited aggression, is how effective the overall deterrent may be unless there is a force on the ground that is able to stop this aggression and check it and give time for something to be done.

REQUESTS FOR VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. The last point I make, Mr. Chairman, they can answer it by way of memorandum later, saving your time and theirs. I may be mistaken in my understanding of the situation—you can clear it up—but I would like to have the record show, Mr. Chairman, how much military aid is going to go to Vietnam under the requests. My understanding is that the Defense Establishment is asking for $125 million more this year than last.

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REQUESTS FOR VIETNAM [P. 637]

Secretary McNAMARA. First, as to the facts, Senator Morse, we spent $219 million on military aid in 1964 for Vietnam. We requested $205 million for 1965 so, therefore, there was not a major reduction of total of only $14 million between 1964 and 1965.

Our actual expenditures in 1965 for Vietnam will be on the order of $325 million, I believe, far in excess of what we requested.

For 1966 we are requesting $230 million, undoubtedly below what will be necessary, but at the same time the request was made up, many months ago, it appeared reasonable. But I don't believe that the facts would support the conclusions as to how we may have manipulated the funds.

The other point as to whether open end authorizations are required, I think could be discussed in relation to the combat situa-

tion we find ourselves in there and the need for prompt action, because of unforeseen requirements particularly when Congress is out of session.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I wish you would go through the other items quickly and then we would like to have questions.

Senator MORSE. You understand, Mr. Secretary, both of you, why I have to go.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, before the Senator from Oregon leaves, may I raise this parliamentary question now? This past Monday I made the motion to reconsider.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you would make it.

Senator SMATHERS. I said I would make it and I would make it today. I would like to make it today after the committee has had the opportunity to hear Secretary McNamara and Secretary Ball. As I gathered, that is still in order, and I would like to say——

The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Senator SMATHERS. I would like to say I propose sometime today, when they have concluded their testimony, to make a motion to reconsider. What I am saying is if you want to leave a proxy, I am supposed to go up there, too——

Senator MORSE. I will be very brief.

I am opposed to considering it today. I understand you have a lot of proxies who have not even heard the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. I think this committee ought to go into session and discuss our points of view in regard to what we have heard.

BREAKDOWN OF CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON THE EXECUTIVE

I am completely unconvinced on what I have heard thus far; in fact, I am convinced more than ever that we ought not only cut that by the figure I suggested yesterday—and it is another illustration of whether or not you are going to have absentees who haven't even heard the discussion to proceed to cast votes here by proxy when we haven't had the opportunity for us to have a roundtable discussion on what is happening.

This a further illustration of how I think there is more and more a breakdown in this whole system of congressional checks upon the State Department and the Pentagon building. I shall oppose, Mr. Chairman, any vote on this matter until we can get back into executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to come back this afternoon?

Senator MORSE. What chance have I got to come back this afternoon, handling the education bill on the floor of the Senate? I will be glad to come back tonight. I am a night owl. I think we ought to have a committee meeting every night.

Senator CHURCH. This is a thing we ought to discuss without any rush attempt on the heels of the presentation today. To reach a vote is not necessary, and we ought to think about and consider some of the things——

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have a meeting tomorrow morning. We can step it up to this afternoon.

Senator CHURCH. Tomorrow morning. I would be against an immediate and precipitous vote on this.

AVOID UNDUE DELAY

Senator SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, may I just say this: There are many bills that come before this committee and other committees which I am opposed to and I would like for them never to be voted on and I disagree entirely with the position taken by the majority. That doesn't mean that I have the right never to have a vote, and it doesn't mean——

Senator CHURCH. We are not talking about never having votes.

Senator SMATHERS. Nor does it mean we unduly delay after everybody is ready to vote or the majority is ready to vote that you cannot have a vote. As I understand it, after I brought the matter up on Monday, I said at that time there were a number of Senators who did want to ask questions, who would like to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator SMATHERS. And I did not insist at that time that we have a vote, although I think the Senator from Iowa and others stated that it had been the practice of this committee that when a motion to reconsider was made that the committee could then vote on it forthwith.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator SMATHERS. So, I said I wanted to agree. I wanted to cooperate. So here we are. If we are going to vote tomorrow morning, that would be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable to you?

Senator SMATHERS. That would be agreeable to me.

GIVE THE PRESIDENT A CHANCE

Senator AIKEN. I want to say something there, Mr. Chairman. Every vote we have taken so far has been a tentative vote.

Senator SMATHERS. Right.

Senator AIKEN. If we would take a final vote, it would be a hell of a mistake to take this one item out and have a final vote on it tomorrow or today.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would it be tomorrow?

Senator AIKEN. Because it should take its place with all the other items, too.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be other items to vote on tomorrow.

Senator AIKEN. Why should we take a tentative vote on every other item on this bill and take a final vote on this one?

The CHAIRMAN. We have gone through the bill once. It is time now that we take final votes on all the items.

Senator AIKEN. We should take final votes on all the items.

The CHAIRMAN. You can't take them all at one time. We will take them in order.

Senator AIKEN. I want to hear the President speak tonight. I want to give him a chance.

The CHAIRMAN. You will hear him, but I think tomorrow we ought to take a vote on this in accordance with our previous agreement. We have been through the bill entirely, once. Now, it is

time—whenever there is a controversial vote, why, we will have it——

Senator AIKEN. I don't know whether you can have the committee look worse or not, but it would make the committee look worse if we take a position and then 3 days later we reverse ourselves.

Senator SMATHERS. May I say even though we voted tomorrow, if it becomes apparent there was a change of opinion you can always move to reconsider. This is always a parliamentary avenue that is open to us at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go on with our witnesses here. We will thrash out what the procedure is, but I do think we ought to vote tomorrow morning on this item, along with others I would vote on.

Senator AIKEN. Let's start at the beginning of the bill.

ITEMS LEFT TO CONSIDER

The CHAIRMAN. There are only a few items, I think, that anyone will wish to consider.

Senator MORSE. Twenty, Mr. Chairman. That would not be my definition of a few.

Senator SMATHERS. I think I have been reasonable. I think I am always trying to be reasonable; maybe not, but I try to be. I would hope if we didn't vote today we would agree to vote tomorrow on this particular item.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, or at least all in favor of voting tomorrow say, "Aye."

I think we ought to vote tomorrow on this and other items. I would like to vote today on some other items if the committee is agreeable.

Senator AIKEN. The administration will not muster its full strength by forcing your vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's finish with these witnesses and we will thrash out the parliamentary situation later.

Go ahead.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I will try to cover the remaining items in one or two sentences.

PROGRAM FOR TURKEY

In the case of Turkey we were averaging $180 million a year for 1961 and 1962. We have cut that a third to $119 million for 1966.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it last year?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Last year it was $111.

Senator CLARK. $111.2 million.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that fiscal 1965 or 1964?

Secretary MCNAMARA. 1965. I want to say that the units of Turkey are short about one-third of their major equipment. The bulk of the army equipment is World War II vintage or earlier for which repair parts are no longer available, and on which maintenance costs have become excessive.

At the end of fiscal 1965, that is June of this year, they will be short, for example, 11,000 trucks, 14,000 trailers, 500 armored personnel carriers, 700 M–48 tanks—now this is a relatively obsolete

tank according to our standards. They are still using M-24's which are practically ineffective in combat.

PROGRAM FOR CHINA

The next is China for which we propose $104 million, compared to the average of $163 million in 1961 and 1962.

Senator WILLIAMS. What was China last year?

Secretary MCNAMARA. China last year was about $71 million, but you can see what happened.

Because of what happened there, we literally have cut out the heart of that program.

Senator WILLIAMS. What was it in 1964?

Senator CLARK. $82.1.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, $82.1.

The CHAIRMAN. We are told China's military force is too large for their own domestic affairs and much too small to invade mainland China. What is the excuse for keeping this?

Secretary MCNAMARA. This establishment should probably be cut back from 10 to 12 percent. They have a force of around 600,000 men and we believe we can take 12 percent out of that. As a matter of fact, the military assistance program is based on 88 percent of their present force. But clearly we can't do that at a time when we are bombing North Vietnam and at a time when China, Communist China, and North Vietnam are putting the pressure on Southeast Asia that they are today. It would be disastrous under these circumstances to reduce the force of China.

The same thing applies to Korea. Undoubtedly that force is 10 to 12 percent too large on the ground and could be cut back, and the military assistance program proposed therefor is based on 88 percent of their present force. But again, as in the case of China, it would be disastrous for us today to cut back the strength of Korea. Imagine the signal that this would give Peking of our intentions in Southeast Asia if we forced these reductions at the present time.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, these are not reductions in China. It is a 40 percent increase. What was it last year in Korea?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Last year in Korea?

Senator WILLIAMS. And the year before.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The total was $128.5 million and the year before $147 million, but just because we have had two years of near bankruptcy doesn't mean we should continue for a third year.

What happened—we were forced by circumstances in 1964 and 1965 to cut the heart out of the Republic of China and the Korean programs, and we cannot continue to do that in 1966 without seriously reducing their strength.

In the case of Korea, they have 162 jet aircraft facing 409 North Korean jets. Now, you can imagine the position we are in when we say to them, "We are not going to give you more jet aircraft because we can't afford it. We don't have any program."

Pakistan, we are proposing $40 million for 1966.

[Deleted.]

Secretary BALL. I think what is happening in Pakistan is a government which is being pushed on two sides, being pushed very hard by some of the left-wing forces that have been capitalizing on

the problems with India to try to bring about a closer relationship with China, and that at some point this could be a price that would be paid for a closer relationship with blood. I think the last thing we want to do is to be pushing them in that direction at the moment. Certainly the posture of our relations with Pakistan are nothing like as good as they were 2 or 3 years ago.

Senator CHURCH. How much have we spent over those years which have seen this deterioration of relations with Pakistan on military equipment?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have been spending roughly $40 to $50 million a year in the past 5 years.

Senator CHURCH. During this period we have seen this deterioration?

Secretary BALL. Seen this deterioration as a result of the attack on India and the fact of the change in India and the fact we have been assisting India in building up the defense establishment.

Secretary MCNAMARA. One further comment, Mr. Chairman.

The last item, "the Philippines," where we are proposing $22 million. As you know, they are facing potential aggression from Indonesia, and this is a certain minimum that they require to prevent infiltration of agents and develop a reasonable force to oppose the type of pressure that Indonesia is presently bringing to bear on Malaysia.

I have nothing further to add and I will be quite happy to respond to your questions.

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SIMULTANEOUS ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN [P. 638]

Secretary BALL. Now, the problem of India again is simply to respond to a demonstrated vulnerability of India across the high mountains to the north which was shown in 1962 when the Chinese launched their aggression. India then went through a sudden wakening and realized that they could not go on in this rather happy unreality in which they were living, in which they considered that they could—a policy of neutrality was an adequate defense to them against all the wickedness of the world.

India decided that it had to begin to protect itself and called on us and the British to help them. Working together, we were able to assist them to build a defense which can be a very real deterrent against Chinese aggression and which can move, and already has moved, the Indian people toward a much more realistic appreciation of the facts of life.

So, India is no longer playing a rather anti-American role in the councils of the nonaligned countries but is actually being very helpful to us during this period.

In addition there is another factor which I think we have to take into account and which affects not only India and Pakistan but Taiwan and Korea as well and that is the repercussion of the development of a nuclear capability on the part of the Chinese which is something which gives especial sensitivity at the present time so far as their feeling of security is concerned.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Secretary McNamara, your Department has in mind definitely that there can be a 10 to 12 percent reduction of forces in Taiwan and Korea?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. But this is not the time to make the reduction because of the problem that now faces us, that is your position?

Secretary McNAMARA. I feel that way, and the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State feel even more strongly than I do that this is not the time.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have been contemplating the reduction?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, we have.

Senator LAUSCHE. But in face of the troubles that are now existent you believe that it would be a most inopportune time to execute that judgment which you had about it?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is quite correct, Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am in complete agreement with you. It will be a notice to those enemies of ours in the Far East that we are not conscious of what is happening.

Senator CASE. Are we basing our aid program on the assumed reduction?

Secretary McNAMARA. We are. We are basing it on 88 percent of the total. So from the point of view of the military assistance program, it is as though the reduction has occurred. From the point of view of the domestic economies, it is not as though the reduction had occurred.

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FRANCE'S ROLE IN NATO [P. 640]

Senator WILLIAMS. In view of the fact that they seem to have a surplus of gold in France now, is there any possibility of getting them to pay a little larger percentage of their share?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think none.

It is not for lack of trying.

Secretary BALL. Let me say I would underline that.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is it because of the lack of concern on their part as to the need of the NATO defenses?

Are they willing, would they be willing, for them to be abandoned or dropped or just let us carry it if they don't?

Secretary BALL. I might say a word on that. The French attitude, I think, is based on several things. It is based on the fact that France believes that the possibility of a move by the Soviet Union and the bloc against Western Europe is not very realistic, that the tensions in the past have in fact diminished, and that this isn't likely to happen given the continuance of the American nuclear umbrella over Europe.

France is, therefore, devoting its military budget not to meeting its NATO requirements but to developing a force in fact which it regards as a primarily political instrument rather than a military one. I think I am quite right in saying this. I have just been talking with some of the——

Senator WILLIAMS. I understand so far as France is concerned they would have no objection if we withdrew from Europe.

Secretary BALL. That is not at all true. I think the French would be terrified if we would withdraw from Europe and to leave the front uncovered and particularly if we were to withdraw our commitment to use our strategic nuclear power for defense here.

WHY NOT SCARE THEM?

Senator AIKEN. Why don't we scare them?

Senator WILLIAMS. That is the point.

Why don't we ask them, if they do feel it is necessary, if it is, then kick in to help and if they don't, let somebody mention the fact that we may be considering that.

Secretary BALL. Unfortunately there is more than France involved here. There is the whole of Western Europe and primarily there is a question of Western Germany, which is terrified at any suggestion that we might move even a company out of the forward strategy, the forward commitment. This is a very delicate political situation which exists between ourselves and Western Europe at the moment.

We have one country which is the country, but nevertheless only one, which is playing a political game based on an assumption which is at best a somewhat dubious one, that there isn't any real chance of serious frontal aggression by the bloc against Western Europe, and which is attempting to build up its own position in Europe at the expense of everybody else. It is not very attractive but it is a fact, and what it is relying on as much as anything else is the continuance of American sense of responsibility. Our difficulty is that if we abandon a responsible position in Europe, we can see a fragmentation and a breaking down of Europe to return it to a position which would be dangerous for all of us.

Senator WILLIAMS. I am not suggesting we abandon it but just wondering if we could take it over to France, because it seems to me she is sitting back secure in the knowledge that our responsibilities to the other countries will protect her and she can just sit back and——

Secretary BALL. You see, if we would go to the French and say, "We are seriously thinking of withdrawal because you are not assisting us in staying there," this would be from the French point of view a political weapon that they could use against the United States. Then they can go to the Germans and the Europeans and say, "This is exactly what we told you about the Americans, they are not serious. We can't depend on them, you have to look toward France and Europe for its own defense over the long period." This would tend to undercut the effectiveness of our position.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

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EFFECT OF COMMITTEE'S PROPOSED CUT [P. 641]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, earlier I asked—I am still puzzled about your statement in regard to basing our figures on a 12 percent reduction at the same time the reduction will not be made this fiscal year.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I said that our military assistance program is based on 88 percent of the current force levels in the Republic of China and Korea, whereas their domestic budgets are based on 100 percent of those force levels. By this I simply mean that there are 12 percent of the military personnel for whom we are not supplying new equipment or replacing obsolete equipment, but who are unavailable to their domestic economies for contribution to the gross national product of those nations.

Senator CASE. Why do we do that? Why is that a good idea?

Secretary McNAMARA. We are quite correct, I think, in basing the military assistance program on 88 percent of the strength, but we dare not move with them to reduce their total strength because of the signal it would give to Communist Chinese and the other Communist nations at a time when they are putting such pressure on Southeast Asia. Were the Republic of China and Korea to reduce their military power today, it would indicate irresolution, lack of will, lack of willingness to face this threat of the Communist Chinese, and would be exactly the wrong signal to send to Peking today.

Senator CASE. Has our aid in the past several years been on the basis of this more than actual?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have made studies within the last 18 months in the Defense Department which have led us to the conclusion that the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea forces could be cut 10 to 12 percent, and it is those studies that are the foundation for the statements I made today. Prior to that time, in effect, the military assistance program was based on 100 percent.

Senator CASE. Are these countries going to maintain this using 12 percent—I mean supply 12 percent out of their own economies?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. There will be a deterioration of the equipment in those forces over a period of time, assuming that they are continued in existence for any extended period.

Senator CASE. I guess you have said everything that can be said.

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REAPPRAISAL OF FOREIGN POLICY [P. 641]

Senator CLARK. Mr. McNamara, you made as brilliant a defense of what I consider to be a rather obsolete foreign policy as I have heard in a good, long while and I commend you for standing up for the conventional wisdom.

I would like to ask you this in all good humor—and shifting my field rather quickly—in your judgment do the North Koreans presently have a military capability of, by themselves, overrunning the South Koreans on the basis of the troops we have there, the troops the South Koreans have there?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted] the North Koreans, because of their greatly superior force could, I think, overrun the South Korean forces unless we introduce substantial U.S. forces in their defense.

Senator CLARK. Now, would the extra money you ask for South Korea go far to remedy that situation?

Secretary McNAMARA. It would be a step toward remedying it, and it is exactly the kind of step that I think we should take, not

only in the case of Korea but the Republic of China as well. I do not believe that we should place ourselves in a position such that we must carry on the day-to-day combat operations around the world to deter small aggressions by members of the Communist bloc.

I think perhaps Taiwan offers a perfect illustration, although South Korea would as well. Within the past 24 months, the Communists have on many occasions shelled the Republic of China.

Senator CLARK. You mean the offshore islands?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The offshore islands.

Senator CLARK. Why do we hold on to them? That is a political problem.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Beyond that, they have accumulated invasion forces across the straits from the Republic of China. They were deterred from using those invasion forces and deterred from carrying on an invasion against the Republic of China, not solely because of the defense commitments of the United States to China but by the very force of the Chinese themselves. I think it would be a serious increase in our risk worldwide were we to weaken the forces of the nations on the periphery of the bloc and say to them, "We will supply through our power your day-to-day requirements for deterring small aggressions."

Senator CLARK. Are you suggesting, Mr. Secretary—maybe you are—that the Chinese Communists have a present capability of invading Taiwan?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They do not have a capability of doing it without paying a very substantial price. Taiwan has a capability of exacting that price in the short run, giving us time to come in with our forces, and because the Communist Chinese see the price that Taiwan could exact, they are deterred from carrying out these small aggressions.

Senator CLARK. Do you not really think it is our fleet and our air power that have prevented the invasion of Taiwan?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir, I do not. I am absolutely certain that unless the free Chinese themselves had a capability of the kind they currently have, that Communist China would have invaded a portion of the Republic of Taiwan unless we had been willing to vastly increase our deployment in that area.

Senator CLARK. When you say a portion, you mean Quemoy and Matsu?

Secretary MCNAMARA. More than that. I am certain they would have——

Senator CLARK. What else, the Pescadores?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir, I am certain. I think they would have picked up Quemoy and Matsu and the Pescadores, and probably more than that in the last three or four years, had not the Republic of China had the forces it has at its disposal or had not we vastly increased our deployment in the area.

Today, for example, our carriers are fully deployed off the coast of Vietnam. They are not deployed in the defense of China today. If the Republic of China's forces were not as large as they are, we could expect aggression from Communist China, or in order to deter it, we would have a deploy additional carriers or additional land aircraft into that area.

Senator CLARK. We have them, have we not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have them, but we need them elsewhere.

Senator CLARK. Where, in Western Europe?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We need them to back up our forces in Western Europe and our forces in Southeast Asia today. So the forces of the Republic of China are definitely a substitute for additional U.S. forces which, if provided, would cost three or four times as much as those in the Republic of China.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I will just make the observation and then I am through—I know this will not please my friend from Ohio——

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to ask you——

Senator CLARK. I am not a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us not get into an argument. Wait until we get through with the witness.

Senator CLARK. I want to make the suggestion that to me there is a sense of pressure for expenditures which cannot of themselves be justified by reason of the present situation in Vietnam where, in my opinion, we are already overextended. I hope our policy there will be appraised in the course of the next several months.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Secretary BALL. May I just make one comment on Senator Clark's last statement with regard to the situation in the Republic of China?

I have not discussed this with Secretary McNamara, but I am sure he would agree that if the time should come when there would be Chinese volunteers introduced into the fighting in South Vietnam in any quantity, that the possibility then of applying troops from Taiwan could be something that might serve a very real purpose to the defenses of the area.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes; I am sure that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

ASSISTANCE OF ALLIES IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Secretary McNamara, one of the points of this military program is to make substantial allies for us. One thing I am struck with is the absence of these allies in Vietnam. As a matter of information, how many allies are presently with us in Vietnam and in what quantities?

Secretary MCNAMARA. There are 30 nations supplying men and/or money to the defense of South Vietnam, but most of them are supplying very small numbers of men and very small quantities of money. I do not wish to exaggerate, therefore, the amount of assistance we are obtaining.

I think what we have to look at is the worldwide contribution of our allies to the defense of the West. Great Britain is carrying the prime responsibility for the defense of Malaysia today and is supplying substantial men—tens of thousands of men—to that defense.

Australia is associated with Great Britain in that effort. Australia has nearly doubled the level of its defense budget within the last 18 months.

Senator CLARK. It was scarcely anything to start with.

Secretary McNAMARA. I was going to say a long-delayed move to raise it toward a reasonable level, but we should not underestimate the action they have taken to increase their defense. They have put into effect conscription and they have nevertheless, as I say, doubled their annual defense budget so they are contributing as much as their society can accept at the present time.

The Thais are contributing forces in Laos at the present time. They are training Laotians. They are allowing us to use their bases for strikes against—the infiltration strikes in Laos—and against the North Vietnamese targets.

The Philippines are fearful of the threat on their borders from Indonesia and are very reluctant to move forces into Southeast Asia as a result.

The Koreans, as you know, have supplied 2,000 men in South Vietnam at the present time.

Senator PELL. They have not arrived.

Senator McNAMARA. Yes; they have arrived. There are 2,000 Koreans in South Vietnam at the present time. Eight of them were wounded Friday or Saturday by a Vietcong attack.

The West Germans have increased their defense budget. They are extended as far as they can go and, by the way, the West Germans have bought from us $2,400,000,000 worth of equipment in the last 3 or 4 years.

Senator PELL. The query I had—perhaps you could submit for the record; I am curious about it—is what is the number, as opposed to money, of men of our allies presently engaged physically in Vietnam?

Senator McNAMARA. I will be happy to. The numbers are: Koreans, 2,000; Australians, a couple of hundred; and the other details I will supply.

Senator PELL. I would be interested in that.

[The information referred to follows.]

Free World Assistance for Vietnam

Country and nature of aid:	*Persons in RVN*
Australia—Combat advisors, aircraft and crews, medical aid, technical aid, civic action aid, radio stations	200
Canada—Medical aid, scholarships, wheat	1
China—Agricultural aid, psywar assistance, electric power aid	124
Germany—Professors, technical experts, credit, 30 ambulances	23
Italy—Surgical team	17
Japan—Electric power aid, medical aid, ambulances, transistor radios	80
Korea—Karate instructors, Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, combat engineers with security forces	2,106
New Zealand—Army engineers, surgical team, educational aid	32
Philippines—Medical aid, psywar assistance	34
Thailand—[Deleted.]	
United Kingdom—Police instructions, professor, educational and technical equipment	12
Netherlands—Surgical team	10

NOTE.—The French, though their policies in South Vietnam differ from ours, continue to have a number of educators, medical and technical personnel there.

REASONS FOR PAYING BASE RENTALS

Senator PELL. Another question that bothered me is in connection with the rental of bases. I think back to World War II when friends and allies did not particularly charge each other for bases. I

think back to Spain when the Nazis had a base which they had without charge.

How did we get into the habit of charging?

Secretary McNamara. I think when you look at Libya, Ethiopia, you would expect societies, with the economic and political problems they have, would charge us for base rental. In the case of Spain, if you put yourself in Spain's shoes, they are accepting a tremendous risk when they make these bases available to us. They are not a part of NATO. They do not have the guarantees of NATO to defend themselves, and yet by the fact they have introduced our bases, they are drawing upon themselves potential attack by the Soviet Union, and therefore assistance of something on the order of $10 million a year for the facilities they are giving us I think is very, very small indeed.

In the case of Portugal, currently we are providing $700,000.

Senator Pell. I think the record should show the Spaniards did not charge the Germans in World War II.

In India, I was struck when you were going through there with the fact that the majority of troops seemed to be poised on the Pakistani border. I remember when the Chinese were coming in, I happened to be there, and they would not take away the divisions from that border. I wonder if you would give us some idea of what percentage roughly of the troops or the installations in India are directed toward Pakistan and Pakistan toward India; Greece toward Turkey and Turkey toward Greece.

Secretary McNamara. Well, let me take the last first. Essentially none of the Greek and Turkish forces are directed against each other. At times of great tension in relation to Cyprus there may be qualifications to that estimate. But the Greek and Turkish forces without question have been designed to protect each other and to protect NATO and not to carry on aggression against each other.

In the case of India, I would wish to check this figure for accuracy before it goes into your final record, but I think it is fair to say slightly more than 15 percent of the Indian forces are deployed in position to defend India against a potential Pakistani attack. I think that in thinking of Pakistan and India, you must recognize, as you know better than I, that their problem is an age-old problem extending back centuries, and the result of religious conflicts between the Moslems and the Hindus. The fact is that unless we were exerting the pressure we are on each, the instability in the area would be far greater than it is, and this religious conflict is not going to be resolved quickly.

It would be far worse than it is were it not for our efforts to assist both and our pressures on both to dampen down the level of conflict. We have forced India to change their deployments, and they are deploying a lesser percentage of their force today in positions against Pakistan than they were three years ago.

Senator Pell. But it is striking that in the only moment of crisis when they fought Communists, they still would not take away the troops from the Pakistani border.

Secretary McNamara. As you know, there was a bloodbath. I have forgotten the numbers of personnel killed, but it was in excess of 500,000; 500,000 people killed in the friction between Pakistan and India. If you were a political leader in one of those

nations, I am sure even though you were under attack by the Chinese, you would still recognize the possible eruption again of that kind of conflict and protect yourself against it.

Secretary BALL. Let me say, Senator Pell, that the significant thing when India was attacked in 1962 and when it was really in a state of shock because they were scared to death of what was happening to the northern front, there was no move by Pakistan to move against India at that time.

Senator PELL. But they still wouldn't move their troops.

Secretary BALL. They moved some.

Senator PELL. Very few.

Secretary BALL. But the significant thing was that there was no aggression, they did not take advantage of that situation.

Senator PELL. Secretary McNamara, you didn't answer my query as to what percentage of Pakistani troops are poised on the border.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will have to check it for the record.

Senator PELL. I think the record should show, also, in Greece, at least in my own travels through Macedonia and Thrace, that the majority of the Greek military establishment is centralized and is equally poised to go in any direction. It is not poised along the Bulgarian border.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is not the case. The majority of the Greek forces are not poised in a position that would allow them to protect Greece against Turkey.

Senator PELL. In the central part. They are not deployed along the border, just as much along the Yugoslavian as the Bulgarian.

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are not worried about Yugoslavia.

Senator PELL. They are not worried about an attack by the Yugoslavs?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are not deployed to utilize their force against Turkey. There may be some danger to the southern portion of Greece and they are deployed in relation to that.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

PLANS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask one or two questions that may bear upon this.

It seems to me that your basic assumption with regard to Vietnam is that our present policy will continue or that you don't expect to succeed in bringing this to any close in the foreseeable future, I should say.

Secretary BALL. I think we necessarily will have to proceed on the assumption that it may be a very long-term affair.

The CHAIRMAN. And be an expanded operation?

Secretary BALL. I think that is an assumption one has to make.

The CHAIRMAN. This leads me to the question we have talked about from time to time, what are the plans with regard to increasing the personnel in Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, if I may go off the record here—I do this only because we do not wish any public announcement of this, and I just want to emphasize that by going off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

I want at least to say for the record when we had questions before, I am reminded of the case of Germany, that the Congress felt it was correct and proper that we should be consulted in the major movement of personnel. We debated for a long time, quite a long time, whether or not we should send the divisions to Germany, you remember that, don't you, Mr. Secretary.

It looks now as if the Administration is assuming that no further consultation or approval from the Congress is necessary in view of the resolution of last summer. Is this true, is this the attitude?

Secretary BALL. No, Mr. Chairman. I would say that the President has every intention of keeping the closest consultation with the Congress on all moves of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly have no official notice whatever that you are planning to put those numbers in.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many does England have in Malaysia?

The CHAIRMAN. About 50,000.

Secretary MCNAMARA. About 50,000.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

The CHAIRMAN. I remember when we were consulted, it was proposed that we put about that many people in Laos. The Congress at that time, those that I was familiar with, looked with a dim view on it and they didn't do it.

Senator LAUSCHE. We made a mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what the responsibility of this committee is, whether or not we should be kept advised and whether or not we should approve. It seems to me we should. I am inclined to think that this kind of increase of 100 percent of what we now have is almost bound to lead to much further enlargement of the war. I would think that you ought to have the support of the Congress in that.

Senator MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I think there is a difference between adding logistical personnel, Engineer Corps personnel of the kind I have outlined, on the one hand, which I do not believe will lead to enlarging the war and, on the other hand, introducing major combat elements such as a division of personnel. I am certain that it will be the President's desire and purpose to consult with the Congress, the leadership of the Congress, members of this committee, before undertaking any combat moves of personnel that would potentially enlarge the war.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see how you can help it, unless this present course results in some form of ceasefire or otherwise, that we are moving very much in that direction. I am not saying that this is not necessary. I don't like it. That is another matter—it doesn't matter what I like—I am speaking now about what the proper relations of the Executive and this committee are with regard to a very major commitment here, which is in a sense, I think, contrary to our past policy.

I have said before, we all did, the leaders of this country, the Presidents and others have said in the past that we should never become involved in a land war on the continent of Asia. This used

to be a kind of a principle of our foreign policy, but it seems to me we are rapidly going into it. This is a political matter, I suppose.

Would you have anything to enlighten the committee in this respect, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary BALL. I would certainly subscribe to what Secretary McNamara has said, that there would be every intention to consult with the Congress on a move which appeared to engage us in a land war in Asia or appear to enlarge the American activity to the point where it could very likely lead to an expansion of the war.

This is a move which arose out of the talks that we had with General Taylor when he was here, and this is simply a move in aid of the existing arrangements that we have. There is no fundamental change at all in our relations with the Government of Vietnam or in our activities in South Vietnam.

Now, let me say that we have got two problems here, and I think we ought to keep them quite separate.

IS PRESIDENT KEEPING CONGRESS INFORMED?

I think as far as authority goes there is no serious question about the authority of the President to do anything that he needs to do in this situation, not merely because of his inherent powers as the Commander-in-Chief and his responsibility for American policy, but also because of the resolution which was passed in August. But there is no intention to rely on that authority and neglect what seems to us and to the President, certainly, to be an essential element in the effective relations between the Executive and the Congress which is constantly in his mind; namely, to keep Congress informed. He has been keeping the Congress informed on almost a weekly basis.

The CHAIRMAN. I wasn't aware of that. What has he been doing to keep the Congress informed on a weekly basis?

Secretary BALL. For one thing, the receptions with the Members of Congress and the conversations he has had with the leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean those briefings we had at the White House?

Secretary BALL. Well, which were an opportunity for questioning as well as for the——

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't interpret them as that. I didn't realize that is what that was. I thought it was purely a briefing.

Senator SMATHERS. May I just say this right here, that yesterday at the leadership meeting the President talked very candidly for about an hour and 15 minutes about nothing but Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

Senator SMATHERS. To Senator Mansfield, Senator Long, myself, and Speaker John McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert, Hale Boggs.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I should have addressed my question to you. You ought to inform the committee, then, if your——

Senator SMATHERS. I would only say this, that I have heard the President say on numerous occasions very frankly that he wants to stay in touch with the Members of the Congress, and I think in many ways he is doing an effective job in that respect.

Now, I have not heard, he didn't tell us yesterday, for example, even though we discussed it, as I say, for an hour and 15 minutes, the war in Vietnam—and I have heard him say over and over again, "If you fellows have got the answer to this thing that is simpler and better than that, let's hear it." We don't ever seem to, nobody has ever yet come up with a better answer.

SENDING TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you they were sending 25,000?

Senator SMATHERS. No, he didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think it is a significant factor?

Senator SMATHERS. It is significant, and I am satisfied, as the Secretary said—you asked him a question, he wanted this off the record, and this all ought to be off the record because it has not yet been done.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator SMATHERS. But it is planned. I am certain before it is actually done, to put the machinery in operation to bring it about, that they would come over here, and tell this committee about it.

Senator CLARK. Somebody told Evans and Novak yesterday because it was in their column this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. When I asked General Taylor this question when he was before us, it is my memory that he stated that he thought they contemplated between 4,000 and 5,000 men. This was only a week ago.

This is what bothers me a little. Taylor should have known what the plans are, but I think the record will show he said about 4,000 or 5,000 men.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion to ask the Secretary a question when he discusses this with the committee, do you not think without shadow-boxing that the chairman of the committee and the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee ought to be the men he ought to confer with when speaking about conferring with this committee rather than talking about somebody else being down to see the President?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I understand.

Senator WILLIAMS. I understand this committee has not been consulted, and as one down at the bottom of the committee I do not expect to be consulted, but I think the chairman and the ranking member of the committee ought to be consulted and not have to read this in the newspaper as to what is going on.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it is important to differentiate between new moves that will influence the course of the war, raise the risks, as the chairman mentioned a moment ago. These are not those kinds of moves.

FOREIGN REACTIONS TO VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to be contentious about it, but yesterday or last night on the radio and so on, the Russians are beginning to react. You know they are interrupting our access to Berlin. This is the same thing that happened once before. I regret it very much, because it looks as if the so-called peaceful coexistence or whatever kind of coexistence we thought we were moving toward is

being thrown out the window. I think this whole attitude is becoming much more serious.

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FOREIGN REACTIONS TO VIETNAM [P. 645]

Secretary BALL. Mr. Chairman, let me speak first to the specific matters you have mentioned. So far as the problems in Berlin are concerned, all of the evidence we have, including all of the intelligence that we have, would indicate that—I think this might be off the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Secretary BALL. With regard to Japan, the Sato government has been very firm and very clear and very faithful to this whole matter of South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. This is what disturbed me. Did you read that story?

JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITED STATES-VIETNAM ROLE

Secretary BALL. That Mainichi, which is the largest newspaper in Japan—in fact I think it is the largest newspaper in the world—has on its staff quite a number of Communists on the editorial staff and has taken a critical attitude.

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AIR INCIDENTS OVER BERLIN [P. 650]

Senator WILLIAMS. In connection with the problem we are having in Berlin right now, when I stepped out a moment ago to telephone, I was asked by the press if you had commented on the fact that some of the MIG's fired over Berlin this morning. Do you know anything about that? Or is it just a "fishing" by the press?

Secretary BALL. No, we understood they were, they had or were, planning to fire some blanks over West Berlin.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning?

Secretary BALL. Do you have any more information?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No; I don't have any other information.

Secretary BALL. This was the information I had before I came up that they had flown over Berlin with intentions of firing.

Senator WILLIAMS. The question asked me was, Have you commented on the fact that they had fired?

Secretary BALL. I have no specific information that they have fired.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did you have advance news they were planning to do it?

Secretary BALL. We had some intelligence information.

MIG ATTACKS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of MIG's firing, do you have a good explanation of why MIG's can shoot down 105's, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

Secretary McNAMARA. Poor execution of a poor plan, about what you would expect.

The CHAIRMAN. I hate to hear you say that.

Secretary McNAMARA. About what you would expect in the first combat engagement of both planners and operators. This was the first time these pilots and the first time these planners had engaged in air combat.

The fact was that the bridge was so important to the North Vietnamese and was very heavily protected by ground fire, and we knew that. It is a very difficult target to take out, and we knew that. We therefore sent 48 F-105's against it in waves of 4, 12 waves of 4 each.

The first five waves went in, bombed the target, but had not cleared the target area when the sixth wave arrived on the scene.

The sixth wave had the option of either orbiting in the area or returning to its base. It chose to orbit in the area, circling around above the target waiting for the target area to clear before it carried out its bomb run. The area was partially covered by haze. As these aircraft orbited, moving in and out of the haze, four to six MIG's came through the haze, attacked two of the F-105's without the F-105's knowing them. The F-105's were handicapped in maneuverability because they were carrying externally loaded bombs to extend their bomb-carrying capability, and were shot down.

There is no question in our minds but what tne F-105's are vastly superior aircraft to the MIG's 15 and 17. The 15's have participated in the Korean War, and the 17's have been introduced in 1954.

I think it was simply one of those unfortunate experiences that we frequently find in combat situations.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else before we adjourn?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

EFFECT OF TERMINATING ASSISTANCE TO GREECE, TURKEY, INDIA, PAKISTAN

Going to peripheral nations, what would be your reaction, inasmuch as there is supposed to be contention between Greece and Turkey, and to prevent them posting their guns against each other, if we decided to quit giving aid to both?

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Lausche, first, it would weaken their capability for defending themselves against Soviet aggression and thereby weaken our own security, and, second, it would reduce the leverage we can exert on them to dampen down the conflict over Cyprus.

Secretary Ball, who has carried the weight of the effort in that regard, can describe it far better than I.

Let me simply say it is as a result of his efforts and the result of the leverage which our military and economic aid programs gave him that we are not at war today over Cyprus.

Senator LAUSCHE. Going to India and Pakistan, let's pull out our aid to both of them. What will the result be? Will it affect our security?

Secretary McNAMARA. Two results——

Senator PELL. Military aid, you mean, don't you?

Senator LAUSCHE. Military aid, yes.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Without question in my mind there would be Communist aggression against one or the other or possibly both within a period of 2 to 3 years and this would produce instability, political and military, on the area which would definitely be adverse to our interests.

Senator LAUSCHE. Looking at it from another standpoint, with respect to Greece and Turkey, let's decide which is best able to serve us and give that one aid and not the other; also with respect to India and Pakistan, which can best help us, give aid to the one that can help us and not the other, what will the result be with regard to the security of our country?

Secretary MCNAMARA. To the one that did not receive aid, there would be but one alternative and that would be to first move toward neutrality and then beyond neutrality toward accommodation with the Communists that lie just outside their borders. Obviously this would be adverse to our interests and would introduce political and military instability.

Secretary BALL. Let me say to Senator Lausche that the one thing we don't want to see happen in these fights, quarrels between partners of ours, is that those quarrels become polarized on a cold war basis; that is, where one of the members is driven into the Communist side and then you have the Communists supporting one and the free world supporting the other and then you get a cold war fight in these vital areas.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you have succeeded in preventing that?

Secretary BALL. So far, we have.

WISDOM OF REDUCTIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, this question, to which the answer will be self-evident. If, in this critical hour we are going to reduce our aid to Korea and Taiwan and others, wouldn't it be also well to eliminate the conscription law in our country and let the world know that we are solidified in a firm purpose to defend our country? You do not have to answer it. How far do you go in reducing aid?

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I say this, there is an important implication to what you are suggesting. If we do substantially change our military assistance program, and I would submit to you that a cut of $115 million which must be taken out of four or five countries that are receiving $400 or $500 million—25 to 35 percent cut in those countries, therefore—is a substantial change in the military aid program, if we substantially change our military aid program we should reconsider our entire defense budget.

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[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Thursday, April 8, 1965.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Smathers, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The committee resumed its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The business was laid aside temporarily to hear testimony from James R. Johnstone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Buildings, on the bill (H.R. 7046), to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, in relation to the American Chancery at Saigon, Vietnam.

Following his testimony, the chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, Senator Sparkman, laid before the full committee the names of James G. Lowenstein and Peter B. Riddleberger for appointment to the staff. His motion that their appointments be approved was adopted unanimously.

The chairman laid before the committee certain nominations, and on motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the names of Henry H. Fowler, to be U.S. Governor of the International Monetary Fund; U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and a Governor of the InterAmerican Development Bank; William B. Dale, to be reappointed U.S. Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund; Palmer Hoyt, to be a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information; Morris S. Novik, to be a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information; Morris B. Abram, to be U.S. Representative on the U.N. Human Rights Commission; and Walter M. Kotschnig, to be U.S. Representative to the 12th Plenary Session of the Economic Commission for Europe.

The committee then resumed its markup of S. 1367.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Long, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

The committee continued its markup of the bill (S. 1367), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

On motion by Senator Sparkman that the bill be reported favorably, the members answered to their names, as follows:

YEAS: Senator Sparkman; Senator Mansfield (proxy); Senator Long; Senator Church (proxy); Senator Symington (proxy); Senator Smathers (proxy); Senator Clark (proxy); Senator Pell; Senator Hickenlooper; Sentor Aiken (proxy); Senator Carlson (proxy); Senator Mundt; Senator Case; Senator Fulbright.

NAYS: Senator Morse.

The staff was ordered to poll all absent members on their vote on the final reporting. Mr. Gore, Mr. Lausche, and Mr. Dodd later stated they were in favor of the motion to report.

So the bill was reported, 17 to 1.

Mr. Long and Mr. Mundt both declared that their affirmative vote did not pledge any action to support the bill on the floor of the Senate.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12 noon.]

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Clark, Pell, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

One thing I wanted to get a report on, is the progress, if any, which is being made on the article 19 issue, because this is at the very core of the survival of the United Nations. Mr. Ambassador, could you comment on that?

STATEMENT OF HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Ambassador STEVENSON. The Secretary General is conducting talks with individual states. The Committee of 33 has met. We have laid before them our position. The Soviets have presented their position. Other states are in the process of presenting formal statements of their position.

Trying to look a little ahead, I think with regard to the debts of what we call the delinquents, that the most productive approach is to restore the solvency of the United Nations. Many members think this approach is likely to be more successful than one emphasizing article 19.

Our plan is to work this spring and summer toward receipt of contributions required to restore the solvency of the United Nations.

U.S. POSITION ON ARTICLE 19 ISSUE

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, what is the U.S. position on the article 19 issue?

Ambassador STEVENSON. If it is all right, Senator, I think maybe the best way to state our position is either to read to you now or put into the record what we put into the committee up there.

Senator CARLSON. Just discuss it generally.

Ambassador STEVENSON. It is as follows:

First—for the record let me put in the statement made before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on April 22, 1965, by the United States Representative.

Beyond that, let me say that it is too early to tell for sure what is going to happen. Negotiations are going on in New York. U Thant and the President of the Assembly, Quaison-Sackey, are conducting consultations both inside and outside of the committee set up by the last Assembly to pursue this matter. Discussions cover ways of settling past arrears and possible new arrangements for future peacekeeping operations.

In summary, our position is:

(*a*) The charter specifically gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

(*b*) The charter specifically does not give the Security Council exclusive responsibility for dealing with peace and security issues. The General Assembly, under the charter, has always had authority to make recommendations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security, including recommendations for the establishment of the United Nations peacekeeping operations—as stated at our hearing this morning;

(*c*) It would be in the interests of the organization to maintain the principle of collective financial responsibility for the operations of the organization;

(*d*) The General Assembly, under the charter, has exclusive authority to apportion and pass assessments to cover the expenses of the organization—in which respect our view differs from that of France and the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that last one?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That the Assembly, under the charter, has exclusive authority to apportion assessments to cover the expenses of the organization. They take the position that only the Security Council can make financial arrangements relating to peacekeeping, because only the Security Council has authority to authorize peacekeeping.

(*e*) The United States is prepared to consider procedural modifications preserving the basic principle of collective financial responsibility if the members think it desirable to take into account any strong political objections to peacekeeping operations on the part of a permanent member of the Security Council; and

(*f*) The United States is prepared to consider and negotiate any proposals consisent with these principles.

Now, that is the position that we have stated at length.

POSITION OF SOVIET UNION

Senator CARLSON. What is the Soviet Union's position?

Ambassador STEVENSON. The Soviet Union's position is that only the Security Council has the authority to institute peacekeeping measures, procedures.

Senator PELL. Only the Security Council?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Only the Security Council—that it has exclusive authority, and that the General Assembly has no authority. And as long as, according to their interpretation, it has exclusive authority, it has authority for all purposes, including financing.

In this respect, we disagree. We say they have primary authority, but that the General Assembly has residual authority to recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. To recommend?

Ambassador STEVENSON. To recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. To the Security Council?

Ambassador STEVENSON. We have always said to recommend to the membership.

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY SECRETARY GENERAL

Now, one of the proposals that may interest you, that has been made and is included in the Secretary General's paper on peacekeeping, to meet the Russian and French position part way, is that the Security Council has primary responsibility, authority, for instituting peacekeeping measures, and in the event that it is unable to act, that the General Assembly may recommend. Its recommendation, however, should go to the Security Council for reconsideration.

Senator CARLSON. Looking at it just from a U.S. standpoint, if I understand you correctly, the Security Council could, under that provision, establish assessments which would go to the United Nations. Then, based on their recommendations, they would come back to the Congress of the United States for our share of the contribution for peacekeeping.

Would that be right?

Senator CLARK. A veto would kill that.

Senator CARLSON. The veto is not in the Assembly.

Senator CLARK. I thought he said the Security Council.

Senator CARLSON. As I understand it, the Soviet Union wants to make it mandatory that the Security Council can make assessments.

Senator CLARK. Not without the veto, though.

MEMBER NATIONS COULD ABSTAIN

Senator CARLSON. There will always be a veto. But assuming it was not vetoed, would that not go through the United Nations and come back to us as a Congress?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Surely, if we supported the peacekeeping recommendation. But you will notice in the last point that I made here, the United States is prepared to consider procedural modifications preserving the basic principle of collective financial responsibility if the members think it desirable to take into account any strong political objections to peacekeeping operations on the part of a permanent member. By this we mean to say that if a permanent member makes it known in the Security Council that it is against a peacekeeping operation, but chooses not to veto it, that it could be exonerated from paying for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then as a practical matter, if the United States opposed a peacekeeping operation in Latin America—the Dominican Republic, for example—they could not force us to help pay for it if we opposed it, but they could send one in?

Ambassador STEVENSON. If our proposal was adopted, we could either veto the operation, or we could abstain and declare we would not support the operation financially, and then we would be exempted from contribution.

ACTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The CHAIRMAN. If we veto it in the Council, the Assembly, even under our position, does not have the authority to override a vetoed proposal; is that right?

Ambassador STEVENSON. The Assembly, under the uniting for peace proposal, under the practices that prevail, has the power to recommend where the Security Council has been frustrated by a veto.

The CHAIRMAN. But the recommendation is not self-executing?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No.

Senator CLARK. But in effect, would that not mean there would be a voluntary peacekeeping effort which would be participated in by those members of the General Assembly who desired to do so?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is correct.

Mr. CLEVELAND. The only case of this is the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East—the only time the General Assembly has ever established a peacekeeping operation. In that case, they established it by recommending to the governments that they help the Secretary General set up a force, and then by passing a mandatory assessment to support the Secretary General's expenses in doing so.

Senator CLARK. Is this Korea?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No, this was the UNEF in the Gaza Strip. This is the only 1 of the 12 that has been a General Assembly operation.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I have great interest in this, and I appreciate this little discussion.

All I want to do, Mr. Ambassador, is to get us in position where we will not have too much difficulty in the Congress, because this is a shift of positions, as I see it.

We have said to our people nationally that after all, the Soviet Union and other countries in arrears are going to pay. Now we are beginning to shift it some, and we are going to have to take a little work to get that done, in my opinion.

DEALING WITH THE DEFICIT

The CHAIRMAN. What you are proposing is prospective in operation. This still does not deal with the accumulated deficit.

Ambassador STEVENSON. No, we are talking about the future, not the past. And I said at the outset, that with respect to the past, it is our view now that we should put the emphasis on restoring the solvency, rather than the application of article 19. I was loath to talk about this out here, because clearly the position we are going to take up there is the universal financial responsibility of all the members.

I am frank to say I think when the showdown comes in the autumn, that what we will find is that the membership will not support us on this, and they will take the position that we should continue to negotiate some solution of the matter—if it has not been resolved by voluntary contributions during the summer—to restore the solvency. And in order not to deprive the Soviet Union and France in the vote in the General Assembly, that they will insist that the Assembly proceed with voting as usual, and that the subject of article 19 not be raised.

Senator CARLSON. I want to be helpful, if I can.

Ambassador STEVENSON. It is going to be tough.

THE CONGO OPERATION

Senator CLARK. Is not the intransigence of the Russians in this regard due, at least to some substantial pragmatic extent, to our present policy in Vietnam?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No, they took this position long before Vietnam. They have taken this position, I would say, consistently since 1956. It has longer history than that.

It is very curious—in the case of the Congo operation, there were four resolutions adopted by the Security Council authorizing the Congo operation. Three of them the Soviet Union voted for. On one it abstained. They are now taking the position that a peacekeeping operation authorized by the Security Council, which they say has exclusive authority, they still will not pay for—truly an intolerable situation. And this started in the summer of 1960, after Lumumba failed and they lost influence, or any hope in the Congo operation.

TAX ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Senator CLARK. I suppose it is entirely quixotic, is it not, to think that in the foreseeable future you might be able to get an agreement in the United Nations to create some kind of a very small tax on international trade which would automatically finance the United Nations, or take it away from this constant confrontation, people not paying their dues and so forth?

It would be relatively painless, because the amount of money needed on the total value of international trade would be very small indeed.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I think it is doubtful that anything of that kind is possible at present. Some future means of financing it by that kind of universal tax, we have discussed for a good many years, and I think it is conceivable that something of this kind might ultimately come to pass. But it does not seem to be very likely in the present atmosphere.

I think right now we are confronted with two things. One is what do we do about the past, and what do we do about the future?

My guess is that we will be able to do something about the past by accepting voluntary payments to restore the solvency of the organization, and that the Russians will make one, but that the price of making it will be that in the future—that the next Assembly will not raise the question of article 19, and they will proceed to vote in the usual way. In this they will have the overwhelming support of the membership. So much for the past.

As to the future, we will find our views and the Russian and French view—our view being the majority view by far—will not be reconcilable. This would not upset us at all, because that would mean everything would continue as it presently is.

SOLVING THE VIETNAM AND GERMAN PROBLEMS

Senator CLARK. Would it be your view that in order to strengthen the United Nations and bring it to a point where it really would be pretty effective in peacekeeping and disarmament, we have to first solve, on a bilateral or perhaps a multilateral basis, the critical political problems which are getting everybody upset, which seem to be Vietnam and Germany?

If we got those two out of the way on some kind of diplomatic arrangement, would this not create a relaxation of tensions?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Surely if we could resolve some of the major political conflicts that have divided the world since the last war, it would grease the wheels for a whole lot of things that would follow on.

Senator CLARK. It is hard to say which comes first, the chicken or the egg. Maybe they both have to go along side by side.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

ARTICLE 19

Ambassador STEVENSON. I really have not done the whole question of article 19, Mr. Chairman, adequately. I think perhaps Harlan might have something to add.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think as we come down the road here—I think I would summarize it in this way: We do not have anything to gain at all from a negotiation, a real serious negotiation, about the future of the authorizing arrangements for peacekeeping, because the present situation suits us.

The Security Council is the first port of call. We have got the escape hatch, the General Assembly. You have the residual power of the General Assembly to act by recommendation.

On the financial side, I think we have got to assume that future peacekeeping, for the foreseeable future, is going to be done mostly on a voluntary basis, more like Cyprus. That means—I think we have to do it that way if we are not going to permit the United Nations to operate under the very low ceiling of what the Soviets will agree to and what all the little countries will agree to. In other words, if you are really operating on every member's responsibility, you have to get the Soviets on board, and you also have to get Paraguay and Chad and everybody else on board, too. France, of course, is another element.

So, in practice it seems to me what we are looking forward to, in the next few years at least, is a United Nations in which you get a kind of universal symbolic umbrella over operations, three-quarters or more of which are essentially free world, plus Japan, plus a few other countries, in realistic sponsorship. Now, you can get that umbrella placed over the operations in the future in the Security Council if the Soviets will play, or at least will abstain as they did in Cyprus, or in the General Assembly if most of the Africans and

Asians will play. If neither the Soviets nor the Afro-Asians will play, you have to figure out some way to do it outside the United Nations. And that is about the present structure of world power, I think, in this matter.

AFRO-ASIAN REPRESENTATION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator CLARK. Will that be affected at all by the amendments to the charter giving the Afro-Asian nations more representation on the Security Council?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I do not really think it will, because the balance will be about the same as it has been in the Security Council. We have kind of calculated this up and down and under various contingencies, and it comes out about the same way as it would come out now. So, I do not think actually it affects the situation very much.

PEACEKEEPING ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS

Ambassador STEVENSON. I would like to add one thing, Mr. Chairman, for the record, to what Secretary Cleveland has said, and that is, looking at this thing down the corridor, collective peacekeeping arrangements through the United Nations are a valuable adjunct to the U.S. foreign policy. What we have to be prepared for is to support the United Nations and peacekeeping operations, even if others do not play.

It is in our national self-interest to have this exist for this purpose and to support it, without insisting that all the other members cooperate in any rigid form. Historically, we have found that more and more peacekeeping has been on a voluntary basis by those who choose to, or by those who participate, who are paying, as in the case of Cyprus today. The important thing is not the rigidity of article 19.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is right.

Mr. CLEVELAND. The danger, I think, is if so much concentration is on the question of the Russians paying, as such that the General Assembly will give the Russians, in consideration of their paying what they should have paid anyway, some real diminution of the General Assembly's power. So, you will not get the checks and balances in the United Nations system that seem to us to be advantageous.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On April 25, 1965, army units sympathetic to former President Juan Bosch overthrew the civilian government of the Dominican Republic. Four days later, the United States dispatched 405 Marines to Santo Domingo to protect and evacuate American citizens. By May 5, some 20,000 American troops were in the city.

[In a televised address on May 2, President Johnson explained that the United States "had no desire to interfere in the affairs of a sister republic." However, the President said that he had received a warning from the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo that Americans would "die in the streets" unless he sent troops. "There was no time to talk, to consult, to delay, for in this situation delay itself would be the decision," said the President, "the decision to risk and to lose the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands." President Johnson further charged that Communist leaders trained in Cuba had sought to use the disorders to gain control of the Dominican Republic, and vowed that he would not permit another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere.]

FRIDAY, APRIL 30, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Church, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Williams, Mundt, Case, and McCarthy.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are delighted to have the Secretary of State here this morning. He has consented to come and brief us on the South Vietnam situation, and I assume he will tell us about the Dominican Republic.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I do regret I am under a very great pressure of time because of the Dominican situation. I won't be able to stay very long this morning, unhappily.

I would like to start, if I may, with the problem in the Dominican Republic.

COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR THE DOMINICAN COUP

Very briefly, last Friday night the PRD Party, Juan Bosch's party, initiated an attempt to overthrow the government of Reid Cabral, who is one of the civilian junta who had been ruling the country for the past many months. They succeeded in toppling Reid Cabral,[1] but two things immediately happened. One is that the armed forces intervened to try to insure against the return of former President Juan Bosch and in the process became divided among themselves. Some elements of the army joined in the pro-Bosch movement, and the air force, the navy, and certain other elements of the army formed a junta in an attempt to establish a military junta form of government to prevent the Bosch return.

The second thing has been even more serious, and that is that the Communists came out immediately and joined in this effort. We have identified eight well-known Communist leaders who are very active at the present time in leading armed groups. We know there are about 40 to 50 Dominicans in the Dominican Republic who have been trained by Castro.

I think it is important not to confuse unduly the moderate, liberal elements in Bosch's party with the support that this violence is getting from these highly organized, extreme left elements. Some of the moderate elements in Bosch's party have separated themselves from the extreme left and have been in conversations with the junta about a possible coalition arrangement of some sort that would exclude the Communists from the situation.

But given the conditions of violence in the center of the city, led by political elements and strongly reinforced by thousands and thousands of just disorderly looters, the situation has been that there has been no government, no authority, no one able to maintain law and order.

EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

We began the evacuation of our citizens, several hundred of them were grouped at the Ambassador Hotel for evacuation, but we were informed by the military junta that they could not guarantee their safety. We were told by our Ambassador that the Americans were being subjected to violence and threats of violence. As a matter of fact, there was shooting into the Ambassador Hotel. So, the President decided to put in Marines to insure the safety and the safe evacuation of American citizens.

Actually, when the Marines first went in, they apparently got there just in time because the polo field on which they were being assembled was already coming under fire from some of these irresponsible armed elements.

Well, as you know, we have about 1,600 or 1,700 Marines ashore there. Meanwhile, the matter had been discussed informally with the OAS.

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[1] Dr. J. Donald Reid Cabral, civilian leader overthrown by coup on April 24, 1965.

OAS SLOWNESS

One of our problems here is that the OAS procedure, taking into account the necessity for representatives to consult their governments and so forth—the OAS procedures find it very difficult to keep up with the pace of events in the Dominican Republic.

The OAS met last night and cast two important resolutions pending a further meeting tomorrow morning, unless we can get them together again this afternoon. Those two resolutions together provided for a call for a cease-fire and the establishment of an international neutral zone of safety; that is, a zone which would extend from, in effect, the polo field and Ambassador Hotel up in toward the center of town as far as the National Plaza. It would include the Embassy area, a good deal of the residential district in which many foreigners are living. And we hope that will have some sort of stabilizing influence on the situation. Our forces in the Dominican Republic are in the process now, in touch with both sides, to create that zone of safety.

The situation, therefore, is very fluid indeed. The so-called rebel group, those who rebelled against Reid Cabral last Friday night, does contain a number of elements. There seems to be no one who can speak with any authority for them or to control the actual violence.

The situation downtown in Santo Domingo, in the main business part of town, is very bad indeed. Hundreds have been killed, thousands have been wounded. The hospitals are overcrowded. They are short of supplies. We are trying to get in hospital equipment and medical supplies and personnel to be of some help there, if we possibly can.

Our Peace Corps people are down there in the center of the so-called rebel area helping in the hospitals, trying to deal with this. They are having to operate on people without anesthesia. It is just a very chaotic situation.

We want very much to move in pace with the OAS in dealing with the situation.

SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. INTERVENTION

There are a good many people in Latin America who will be very suspicious of anything we do with our own forces, under the old shadow of intervention, and there are a good many of them who think this is an issue just between Juan Bosch and the military junta.

The involvement of the extreme left here is not at all clear to the hemisphere yet. We have been trying to get in touch with various governments about that. We ourselves do not wish to identify the extreme left with Juan Bosch personally, because it is quite clear that on the island there are a good many followers of Juan Bosch who have nothing to do with the Communists and do not want anything to do with them.

But we are determined to take every effort that is necessary to maintain the safety, to the extent that we can, of the Americans who are still there. There are several hundred scattered around the island. And, of course, we feel very strongly about the matter of not permitting these extreme leftists to set up a dictatorship at the

expense of the Bosch party as well as the other center and right-wing groups or the other elements in the population.

It is a difficult and potentially very dangerous situation that may require further action. We are, on an hour-to-hour basis, in touch with our forces and our Embassy in the Dominican Republic.

I might pause here, Mr. Chairman, to see if there are any questions or comments anyone wishes to make at this stage.

The CHAIRMAN. What we really came to discuss was Vietnam. This was the main purpose of this meeting.

Senator CHURCH. I have a question or two, Mr. Chairman.

AIRBORNE TROOPS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The radio said this morning they had 4,800 Marines in there.

Secretary RUSK. I'm sorry. I did not mention the airborne troops that went in earlier this morning to reinforce the Marines. When I mentioned the Marines having gone in on the first day, and during the day yesterday—this morning we did put in two battalions of airborne troops, because the commander there felt that the Marines standing alone would not be sufficient to do the job if the situation got out of hand.

Senator CHURCH. What is the total force now, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. We have about 1,600 Marines and about 2,000 airborne troops, a total of about 3,600.

Senator CHURCH. Is a force of that size required for the purpose of protecting American lives?

Secretary RUSK. The judgment of the commanders on the spot—now, we have two requirements at the present time. One is the protection of American citizens and the protection of the American Embassy, which was under fire all day yesterday.

ESTABLISH A NEUTRAL ZONE OF SAFETY

Second, to establish this international neutral zone of safety, which the OAS has provided for last night.

Senator CASE. Who would guarantee that?

Secretary RUSK. We are in touch with other governments today about getting contingents of reservists from other countries involved in that. But at the present time, the idea is that with the consent of both sides, we would in effect take on the security responsibility for that zone for the present. The OAS called on both sides to cooperate in establishing such a zone.

We have taken out about 2,400 people already, of about 12 nationalities. There are a good many more who are asking to be taken out.

SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

Senator CHURCH. With the OAS meeting, what initiative are we going to take in the OAS to secure some collective action, looking toward a solution to the problem? I mean is it possible that the OAS can be used to facilitate the establishment of a government that is not based upon present military dictatorship that we support, or the left wing that we fear, but rather upon the consent of

the people getting back the constitutional processes based upon popular referendum?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I want to say that we are not supporting this present so-called junta as a government of the Dominican Republic.

Senator CHURCH. Didn't we respond to its request to go in?

Secretary RUSK. We responded to its request for assistance in taking care of the safety of American citizens, because they were those who seemed to be as responsible as anybody for what law and order was possible. That is the limited basis on which we have been dealing with them. They do not have the muscle or the power or the political following to establish a government as they are now constituted.

Last night we proposed to the OAS that they send a commission down there to get on with the cease-fire and to assist the Dominicans in talking out arrangements among themselves for the constitution of a government.

This military junta that you are talking about had announced when it was formed that it would hold elections in September. But the OAS commission idea was not adopted last night, because representatives did not have instructions and they asked that that matter be taken up tomorrow morning. They met for 14 hours during the day yesterday and they said they were completely fagged and had to have instructions, and so they voted down our request for another meeting today. We are going to try to get another meeting today.

As I say, the problem is to keep the OAS moving at a pace that keeps up with the events on the island. There will be some difficulty in that, because I am sure many of these people do not have instructions from their governments. However, the thought is that the OAS should take on the job of determining how the Dominicans can be helped to constitute a government there.

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me that unless we can get back to sound principles and use the OAS to pave the way toward the establishment of a government based upon popular consent, we will find no durable solution.

Secretary RUSK. I think that's right, Senator. I think the one thing we have to keep very much in mind, though, is that we do not want some of these worst elements there, who have no popular following themselves. We do not want those worst elements to find a durable solution, you see.

BOSCH WAS INEPT

Senator CHURCH. The Bosch government was based on popular concern. A military junta replaced it. We were satisfied to do no more, because it was an anti-Communist junta. But I think that the failure of that military clique to proceed to elections is probably one of the reasons that has brought on this revolt. That is why I say unless we can find a path back to popular self-determination on the part of the people of the island, I think we will continue to have increasing difficulties.

Secretary RUSK. You recall when Juan Bosch was elected President he had 60 percent of the vote. We had rather high hopes for

him at the time of his election. He soon proved to be a man who was completely inept at administration and running the government—I take it we are very much in executive session here, Mr. Chairman. People like Muñoz Marin, Betancourt, Figueras of Costa Rica, tried to work with him during that 7 months in which he was in office, to try to help him put together an administration that could run the country, but things continued to deteriorate, economically and otherwise. He has lost considerable support in the country as a result of that experience.

We had a recent poll from down there, subject to the vagaries of polls, indicating that former President Balaguer [2] would in an election now get something like 46 percent of the vote, that Juan Bosch might get about 24 percent, that Reid Cabral would get about 6 percent, and other individuals would go on down from there.

So that we did a great deal to try to make Juan Bosch make a go of his administration. We did not have anything to do with the military effort that finally threw him out.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could go to Vietnam.

COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION

Senator MUNDT. I would like to know if you can elaborate a little more on these 40 or 45 Communists, the nature of their training and participation?

Secretary RUSK. They are Dominicans. They were trained in subversive tactics and techniques, the same sort of techniques that Castro used in Cuba and that other elements have been working on in other countries. We expect considerable disorder in several countries over the May Day business. There are various reports that May 1 is going to be a day of demonstration, long before this Dominican thing came up.

I do not know that I can add much more to that. They had gone to Cuba, they had been trained, they are back in the Dominican Republic, and the security forces there apparently did not keep a close enough eye on them when this particular situation developed.

Senator MUNDT. Military or political?

Secretary RUSK. Basically political, but highly trained in arms and riot technique, organization of groups in a situation of this sort.

The CHAIRMAN. The night before last Admiral Raborn said they had identified three Castro Communists.

Secretary RUSK. I think we said three the other night, and we have identified five more by name as persons directly involved in the present disorders. There were 40 to 45 others known to be training, known to be in the Dominican Republic. We have not identified all of those by name actually involved in this particular situation, but we assume they are there and are very active and busy.

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[2] Former President Joaquin Balaguer, who was ousted by a coup in 1962.

CUBAN INFLUENCE

Senator McCarthy. Any reading on the reaction in Haiti, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rusk. We have had very little from there so far. Nor do we have any confirmation of any of the reports that any personnel have come in from Cuba during this business. We have been patrolling very actively with that in mind, and we have not confirmed any such movement.

Senator Hickenlooper. They will come in as soon as the Communist leadership down there gets established, I think.

Secretary Rusk. I think if the Communist leadership got control of this situation, there undoubtedly would be people coming in from Cuba.

Senator Hickenlooper. If we don't take care of that situation down there, we're going to have another Cuba, and the OAS moves like molasses. It has its various reasons for moving slowly. They want to have revolutions in their own country lots of times, and they don't want to be criticized.

GET THE MARINES OUT QUICKLY

Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, before we go to Vietnam, I would like to indicate my grave dissent with the point of view just suggested by Senator Hickenlooper. My own strong feeling is that we get the Marines out of Santo Domingo as quickly as the safety of the Americans will permit. The damage done to our overall foreign policy by permitting naval officers to make statements about foreign policy on the spot, I think, is very severe.

I hope we would move through the OAS in accordance with the rules of law which we ourselves have established and that force would be held to the absolute minimum. I do not criticize the sending in of Marines to protect American lives—perhaps it is necessary.

The Chairman. May I start the Vietnam discussion by asking this question?

WILL ADMINISTRATION SEEK CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION?

It is evident from the press and from what we have heard that there is a substantial increase in our manpower that we are sending out there. It is continuing. And I anticipate it is going to continue at a greater pace.

Is it the intention of the administration to request any further authorization or approval by the Congress, by this committee, the Senate, or the Congress for what appears to be quite an enlarged operation from that which was contemplated last summer when the resolution was passed after the affair in the Gulf of Tonkin?

I just wonder what is the attitude of the administration.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, we have not, quite frankly, taken that up for systematic discussion. We do not now have a plan to ask for further resolutions on this subject unless there is some substantial development from the other side in the general scale of operations, unless the situation takes quite a different turn.

We have there now about 34,000 troops. It is very much under contemplation that it might be necessary to add to those forces ad-

ditional forces of the type that are involved at Da Nang. For example, there is the very large Bien Hoa Air Base near Saigon, where we have a very large concentration of American planes equipment and personnel that we feel need further security reinforcement—and also where we can relieve South Vietnamese forces to take on the direct antiguerrilla operations during the forthcoming rainy season. It may also be necessary to build an additional airstrip which would require personnel, both for protection and for the accommodation of—for the operation of American aircraft.

We do not at the present time have in mind such a change in the scale of forces, I think, to raise that question as an immediate problem.

A CHANGE IN SCALE

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me there has already been a change in scale from what we had a year ago, that is, last August, when you had this attack—at least we believed it to be an attack—upon our ships in the night. We could never identify them very well. But anyway, I don't think that contemplated even the large scale increase in troops that you have now.

Traditionally, when we send large numbers of foreign troops abroad, the Congress is consulted, and usually their approval is sought. It seems to me this already is quite different from what was contemplated at the time of last August. Don't you think so?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, one could not foresee in detail last August what might be required. But we do consult with the leaders of Congress about significant moves on such matters. I would think that it would be quite disadvantageous for the Congress to take up a resolution which dealt with numbers of troops rather than policy—unless we get to the point where a declaration of war is involved.

If the President were given the freedom of action that the Commander in Chief would need to deal with the situation, the numbers involved would have to be substantial, and that itself could be inflammatory and increase the risks of larger reaction from the other side. Whereas if we, within the lines of existing policy, keep in touch with congressional leaders about the more important moves, we feel we have both the policy consensus and the kind of consultation that keeps the two branches of the Government in close contact on these specific moves.

WE ARE WAGING WAR ON NORTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What bothers me, at least as chairman of the committee—it is all very well to go down and have a briefing period but when this resolution was before the Senate last summer, and I took a part in advocating it, Mr. [Gaylord] Nelson and others raised some questions. This is on page 17823, August 6, I think it was—this is quoting Mr. Nelson.

> But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive branch and the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission. That would concern me.

I responded:

I do not interpret the joint resolution that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years.

That is, the existing mission, I thought, was a rather limited one.

But in effect, for practical purposes we are waging war on North Vietnam. I do not know whether this constitutional practice is completely outdated or not. But it would seem to me not out of order if we are going to send 30,000, 50,000, 100,000 men, that the Congress might have the say about it.

We debated 3 or 4 weeks, I think, on whether or not we would put troops into Germany, a very vigorous debate, and that was not even an active war going on. Here we are bombing them daily, and I suppose at any time we might start bombing them even more.

COMPARISON TO TROOPS IN GERMANY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the troops were put in Germany and the debate occurred afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't remember that. Were they? There was a lot of complaint about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The statement of the administration was that we did not contemplate putting troops into Germany, and within about 2 months after that they put the troops in there, and then we had the debate afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. I will stand corrected on that.

Anyway, it was a matter that the Congress was very interested in, and we finally did approve it.

NO WISH TO EMBARRASS THE ADMINISTRATION

This operation in Vietnam has obviously become quite controversial. A lot of us have been quiet. We do not want to embarrass the administration. We have not discussed it in public. Some have, some have not. I am quite sure some that have not done it who would like to have, but they did not wish to embarrass the administration, because we realize this is a very difficult situation.

However, I would think it would be wise if the administration could make up its mind to present the matter to this committee, and at least to the Congress, as to how much and how far they are contemplating going.

Secretary RUSK. Well Mr. Chairman, it is very hard to look into the future to that extent.

I would like to comment on two or three aspects of this, on the political side.

PROPOSED CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE

As you undoubtedly know, Mr. Gromyko apparently has agreed to issue invitations to the Cambodian conference. We have the impression there that the Soviet Union would like to find some way to reduce the dangers in this situation and not get caught in the position of failing to support a fellow Socialist country.

At the present time it appears that Peiping is trying to sabotage the Cambodian conference. Now, Hanoi apparently is prepared to

go to such a conference, at least based on their recent joint communique during the visit of their leaders to Moscow.

We have the impression that Hanoi is not yet convinced that it cannot win in the south. We also have the impression that they are relying heavily on the buildup of international and domestic opinion in this country to cause the United States to in some way pull back from the situation.

Now, I personally believe that if we are to have any chance of settlement of this problem, in a way that is consistent with the broad commitments that we have made and with the general interest of the free world in that situation in Southeast Asia, that Hanoi must understand that it cannot win by military means in the south and that it cannot afford to make the decisions to escalate this war on its own initiative to a very high degree.

RELUCTANCE TO SEEKING CHINESE HELP

We think they have some reluctance about calling on the Chinese for help and getting the Chinese involved there. So that our purpose here is to try to get these signals to Hanoi in such a way as to bring them to the table in a mood to call off what they are doing.

One would be skeptical about these things, but it is of some interest that in Paris Gromyko and Couve de Murville renewed their commitment to the agreements of 1954 and 1962. Now, this is of some importance in terms of what is going on inside the Communist world.

You have got the extraordinary situation where Peiping has just within the last 2 days blasted Moscow for being in a conspiracy with the United States to sell out Hanoi. And you have Albania saying that the help which Moscow says it is sending to North Vietnam is simply a trap which is a part of that conspiracy of Moscow to sell out North Vietnam.

We do not, ourselves, believe that the other side wants a larger war in this situation. But we do not see yet the crucial evidence that they are prepared to pull back on what they are doing. We are watching what happens on the ground there very carefully.

We do not yet see signs of the redeployment of forces in the Communist world, whether in North Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union, pointing toward a major intervention in Southeast Asia, across into Laos, South Vietnam, or Thailand. So that we do believe that there is still some possibility of exploring——

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is some, but I do not think it encourages it any by our continuing to increase our forces and for them to increase theirs. I think we are not encouraging the right people, myself. I think we are playing into the hands of the Chinese, just to be frank about it.

I know we disagree about this situation.

EISENHOWER ON VIETNAM

I come back to one—and then I will quit on this one point. I am reminded of this business of the congressional participation when there was a change. I want to read just a very short paragraph

here. This is from Mr. Eisenhower's book "Mandate for Change" on page 345.

> The ever persistent, gnawing possibility was that of employing our ground forces in Indochina. The war had been going on for a long time. Unless the French were successful, a great many people would be swept under Communist control. We helped the French in the ways open to us and they were losing ground. Still they were convinced that only they could devise successful military operations there. Nevertheless, I let it be known that I would never agree to send our ground troops as mere reinforcements to French units to be used only as they saw fit. Part of my fundamental concept of the Presidency is that we have a constitutional government, and only when there is a sudden, unforeseen emergency should the President put us into war without congressional action.

Now, this is no longer a sudden emergency. This is a gradually escalating war, with 34,000 troops. It has been growing rapidly. It grows almost daily.

We read in the paper at least that you contemplate some more to protect those who are already there, and then they require some more to protect them. I think they do not do anything to encourage agreement.

CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IS WARRANTED

I think, from what you have said about the Russians—I read the same thing in the morning paper, and I think the logic of the situation is that the Russians would like to see some kind of a conference and would like to see this thing settled in a way that did not throw it all into the hands of China. But I do not think we are pursuing policies that encourage this. This is where we differ. This is why I think the participation of Congress is warranted, because there are a lot of people here—all of us represent part of the United States, and we have our different views. I may be in the minority. But I think the Congress, when it has gotten this serious, this committee and others are entitled to have it discussed.

I do not agree with your reasoning about the way it is developing there and that what we are doing is inclined to bring about a settlement. I think it is the other way. I am not at all sure that the administration wants to bring about a settlement, even if they could—not everybody. I don't know what they all think. But there are people I think, who think we have missed the chance to have a showdown before and now we have another chance, and they would like to have it now. This may be, in the light of history, a correct view. I do not happen to think so.

Senator CLARK. Would the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I have had my say.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do want to comment on the very last point there. I do not know anyone in the administration who looks upon this as an opportunity to do in the Communist world or do in Hanoi and Peiping—or using this as a pretext for the situation. If these people would stop sending their men and their arms into the south, this thing could be wound up very quickly, and we would be one of the first ones to be glad to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Who else? Senator Hickenlooper, do you have questions?

With Secretary Rusk's limited time, I took too much time. I apologize for that.

DIFFICULTIES WITH A NEW RESOLUTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would just make this comment: I seriously question a renewed debate on this situation right now. I might have some reservations on many things in the past, but I do not know how we could debate this situation without completely laying out all of our programs. And I do not think in an activity of this kind, to telegraph your punches to the enemy right down the line—we've got a bear by the tail. I do not see that we could accomplish anything by renewing the resolution or a discussion. It would seem to me that it would only add to the conviction of the Communist forces there that they are winning this thing and that we are running for cover.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, if we were to try to draft such a resolution, to put it through the Congress, expressing the agreement of the Congress in sending some more troops in, would it not almost be a declaration of war, whether you want it to be so interpreted or not? I don't know how you would draft such a resolution.

Secretary RUSK. I can see very great difficulties about a resolution that would spell out the numbers of troops. For example, if it were a very large number, that would make the possibilities of bringing this thing to a settlement and a conclusion, I think, much more difficult. I do not quite know what the Congress would wish to say much beyond the resolution of last August in terms of the policy and the attitude and the responsibilities laid upon the President to deal with the longstanding policy of the United States.

Senator WILLIAMS. That's my trouble. There may be a lot of things they would like to say, but I do not know what we could say that would not make more damage than help.

Secretary RUSK. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am not speaking formally for the President on this particular point. I will certainly report the discussion around the table this morning to him.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

FIGLEAF RESOLUTIONS

Senator CLARK. I would like to be on record as supporting the chairman. It seems to me we are presently at war with North Vietnam, despite the resolution of last August. I doubt if that is a constitutional war, without a declaration of war by the Congress. I would hope he would accelerate our efforts to get to the conference table. I think the sooner we get there, the better. The situation is headed for catastrophe. The Secretary knows my views, because we had a candid and friendly discussion about it a few weeks ago. I have not altered them. I think the chairman is right.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, on the particular question of a declaration of war, I do feel that that would almost certainly set off a chain reaction and make it more difficult to keep this matter under some sort of control. I think no one underestimates the extent of the fighting. But it is still true that most of the fighting, a very large part of it, is being handled by the South Vietnamese.

There is advantage in some of these figleaves that have been used in the postwar period, where you do not follow everything to its logical conclusion and say that a status of war exists, because

you are trying to pull it back from the situation and get it back to a peaceful basis. I'm afraid that a declaration of war on our side would pose very great problems for Peiping and for Moscow with respect to what they do in that situation. We certainly do not want them to get into the business of declaring war.

Senator CLARK. It would be far better, Mr. Secretary, if we did not have to declare war, but if we could get to the conference table.

NEED FOR MORE FREQUENT BRIEFINGS

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, you know, this is agony for everybody. I do think that if we had the feeling that we knew what was going on—we have this constant repetition in the New York Times, generally regarded as a responsible organ of communication, of suggestions—George Aiken picked one up, we have all heard this one for weeks—that we are using a thousand planes to do a job that a couple of men could do, for sake of effect, perhaps. We ought to know something about this thing. I think the President is a great fellow. I support what is going on so far as I understand it. But it does not make it any easier to give this support—it makes it very much more difficult if we are constantly faced with the repetition of these things. You support the Government, but this is what they are doing.

There is a limit, I think, to how far you can go on the basis of this sort of shadowbox play business and that sort of thing—not that it is not very serious. I think you understand the substance of what I say.

Secretary RUSK. On matters such as that which you attribute to Senator Aiken, I think this is a problem of more frequent briefings about what the situation is there and what is going on, how it looks, and what these aircraft are doing, what the effect is, what the South Vietnamese forces are doing, what is happening, and such things as the cleanup operations, the rates of recruitment, the moral factors on the two sides, defections from the Vietcong, and all those things. We perhaps ought to find some more frequent way of briefing, so that you will have a clearer picture of the situation. We certainly will be glad to work on that.

Senator CASE. Considering everything, I still support the administration. I think it would not be useful to have a new resolution.

ADMINISTRATION'S USE OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I think there is one problem with regard to Congress. So many administration spokesmen defend or justify the actions in South Vietnam and are inclined to say we are doing this because Congress more or less instructs us to do it in a resolution of Congress. The chairman cited the question that Senator Nelson raised. I do not think there is anything in the testimony of any administration spokesman at the time of the hearings that indicated any such expansion as is now taking place. The chairman was speaking on the basis of information he had received during hearings. I think if the administration is going to push this line, that the resolution is the basis for their action to a large extent, then you are going to find more and more Members of

Congress saying, "If this is the case, maybe we had better take another look at the basis of the authority which we supposedly gave."

Would you accept that the administration spokesmen have been citing the resolution?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. I think when you put together the various declarations of policy, commitments of policy over the last 10 years, the resolution of the Congress last August is an important element in that matter. I think the SEATO Treaty has a direct bearing upon this situation.

But I do not quite see how this issue, Senator, can contribute toward a peaceful settlement of this situation on terms that are consistent with our interests. This is the problem that bothers me a great deal at this point.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman—doesn't that depend a little bit, Mr. Secretary——

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND PUBLIC OPINION

Senator MCCARTHY. I have one other question. You said you had a strong belief that the North Vietnamese or Vietcong were counting on a loss of public support for the effort in Vietnam. Is that merely a speculative sort of thing or do you have some evidence, communiques, statements that people have made?

Secretary RUSK. This is a delicate problem, because I don't in any sense wish to seem to put any pressure on anyone who is expressing views contrary to those of the administration. It would not be appropriate for me to do so, and we are not that kind of a society.

But it is true that the other side quotes evidences of disagreement very frequently. Mr. Federenko did before the United Nations the other day, at considerable length. Someone that we are in close touch with ran across the Liberation Front people in Algeria, the Vietcong representative in Algeria, and found they were intimately informed with expressions of people all over the country here on this point. They kept quoting these things over and over again. So that we know that they do pay a great deal of attention to this, and that they make judgments—they seem to be making judgments that international opinion and domestic opinion is going to help them in accomplishing their purposes there.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say something at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt has a question.

ANOTHER RESOLUTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, if that is true—and I think it probably is—and the reason they hang on so tenaciously, the Communists in Hanoi and elsewhere, is because they feel there is a slackening of enthusiasm in this country for a continuation of our stand, then I would think maybe there is some merit to the chairman's suggestion that a resolution enacted by Congress specifically to the point of Vietnam might tend to disabuse the Communist world of that conviction.

I go back to the Eisenhower resolution that we passed on the Channel Islands. It seems to me that that was pretty successful,

and we do not have much trouble with the Channel Islands any more. The animosities are there, but the shooting has pretty well been abated.

If I were sitting there on the Communist strategy board trying to decide whether to continue or whether to negotiate, I think that I would pay some attention to these major New York City newspapers—I would pay some attention to the fact that Members of Congress, private citizens, columnists, are becoming apparently increasingly critical of the administration policy, without very definite rejoinders from the administration to what was being said.

To be perfectly frank, I would get encouraged from my point of view whenever the President says, "We will give you $1 billion if you just kind of pull back and negotiate." I would look at that as a manifestation of growing disenchantment with the present procedure. Just what language you could engage in to make that clear—I would not want a resolution talking about numbers of troops, but a reaffirmation of American policy toward Vietnam specifically. The resolution of August 10 is a pretty ambiguous base on which to project reasons why we continue what we are doing in Southeast Asia.

I have refrained, because I thought it was in the national interest, from saying anything publicly at all critical of the administration policy. But I must admit that I believe we are losing public opinion in Asia. For one reason or another, the support is not as strong as it used to be.

AUTHORITY TO ESCALATE THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I think that's quite right. That is true in my mail. I feel very personally involved in this in the light of the debate that took place last August. I have not read it all.

I would like with the permission of the committee to ask the staff to prepare to insert in this record for our information the pertinent parts of that debate relating to this question of the authority that you escalate the war if you like. I do not want to delay this, but at another place—this was in response to a question from Mr. Morton and one of Mr. Brewster.

"This action is very limited, the best action I think to deter an escalating or enlargement of the war." This is the way I presented it to the Senate. This resolution was intended to deter escalation. "If we did not take such action, it might spread further. If we went further and ruthlessly bombed Hanoi and other places, we would be guilty of bad judgment, both on humanitarian grounds and policy grounds.

But all through it I think what I had in mind, as one of the spokesmen for the committee, was that this tended to a very limited action there in response to that particular thing and not an enlargement of it with ground troops.

Senator MUNDT. It certainly was not as specific or as precise as the language that we used in connection with the Channel Islands. Everybody understood what that resolution was about. This one is pretty ambiguous.

MORE AIR ATTACKS

I would like to ask one further question in connection with what Senator Case said. I think it would be very helpful—it certainly would be to me, if I'm going to continue to support the policy—if we knew a little bit more about what we were actually trying to do. For example, I continue to read in the press about a great big buildup of the guerrilla forces, or the Communist forces, the anti-American forces, however you want to define them, in South Vietnam where we have got the marines there. If my information is correct, we've got a tremendous buildup of potential striking power inside of South Vietnam. If we've got all these planes, I just wonder why we don't clobber the hell out of those particular installations south of the border and clean it up there, rather than concentrating so much north of the border. I have no anwer to that. To me it is an insane policy. I haven't said so publicly, but I do not see why we do not clean them out where they are south of the border first.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there are about 3,000 sorties a day run in South Vietnam. In other words, there is a very major air effort in connection with that.

Senator MUNDT. They are not the ones getting in the newspapers.

Secretary RUSK. That's right.

CANNOT SILENCE THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC

Mr. Chairman, I would like to underline the point that I made earlier. My comments on what Hanoi says or may be thinking, or is at least putting in their propaganda about opinion here, is in no sense any effort on my part to limit or restrict the freedom of debate or discussion, anything of that sort. I would not want to surrender my own freedom to speak my own views on these matters, and it certainly is not my intention in calling attention to that matter in another context to leave any such implication.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say that in the first place, but I am glad you reemphasized it, because it seems to me that even if the Congress was completely compliant and silent, that you still have, in a free society, other free men who would choose to speak up if by conviction they thought our policy wrong. Therefore, since you cannot silence the press and the public, you cannot eliminate this problem. But certainly, the Congress has a special responsibility, and Members of this Senate owe it to their own duty, I think, and to the trust they hold to speak up when moved by conviction. That's the kind of society we have. If it handicaps us in matters of this kind, when we are facing totalitarian societies, that's the price we have to pay.

Secretary RUSK. I agree with that, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Now, with respect to the matter of a resolution, I do not know what could be accomplished by another resolution. The one that we have gave a kind of carte blanche to the President, even though we may not have understood it so. I agree that we are at war with North Vietnam today, but I think that any formal declaration of that fact by the Congress would be the worst

possible move. I really cannot see how we can usefully serve ourselves by further formal declaration on the part of the Congress.

But I do believe that there must be a continuing debate on this question and that we ought to undertake to open a dialog for peace in Southeast Asia. We ought to discuss the general framework within which a political settlement might take place, and individual Senators ought to express their own views as to this. We should try to develop some kind of political consensus if that's possible. We ought to try to apprise the American people of the kind of alternatives that face us out there. I think in the long run this will assist the President, because it may increase the options open to him, and conformity tends to put him in a vise.

So, I just wanted to make it clear that so far as I'm concerned, I think the debate has been useful, and I think that the debate should continue. As one Senator, I intend to speak up in the future as I have in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

AREAS OF INFLUENCE

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I must say I agree. Personally, I do not see the purpose of a resolution. If you vote against it, it would be like voting against motherhood, and it would cause more harm than good, I think.

Mr. Secretary, one point here bothers me. Whether we agree or not publicly, I think the world tacitly recognizes the fact that there are areas of influence, which is one of the reasons we did not interfere in Hungary, one of the reasons we got the Russians out of Cuba, and it's one of the reasons why the world is not too excited about us being in the Dominican Republic with two Marines for every American civilian. But what bothers me in Vietnam is, whether we like it or not, that it is in the immediate area of influence of a rather large nation.

In talking to my own constituents, when they come back from the military service there, I have yet to meet one who says that his being in the Vietnamese social environment is in any sense welcome on the part of the Vietnamese. These are friends of mine—they get the distinct impression that the local people wish they were out. When I talk to less humble military people and ask them whether they have military solutions in mind, what they see is the military end, none of them see real military success coming from the present tactical course we are embarked upon.

HANOI'S DIRECTION OF THE VIETCONG

With that as a background, I was wondering if you would give me the answer to two questions. One is, I know you believe that the things in South Vietnam are completely related to North Vietnamese direction at Hanoi, but what is the evidence of that? How much of this is disaffection, and how much of this is Hanoi-directed?

The other question I have is, What will we do when we run out of tactical targets? There are just so many bridges south of Hanoi. We are faced with the alternative of bombing Hanoi or just bombing trees then.

Senator CLARK. In other words, Dean, how much wiggle room have you got left?

Secretary RUSK. Could we leave this part of it completely off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

A CEASE-FIRE

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, assuming you are correct—whatever may be the reason for doubts, owing to the past—assuming that you are correct in the fact that Hanoi is directing and has control of the war in the south, why, then, would it not be in our interest to call for a cease-fire as a prelude to negotiations; that is to say, a cease-fire in the south, an end to the bombings in the north, to set the stage for an unconditional discussion that the President has offered?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have not only stated our position that if you will stop doing what you are doing, our fellows can begin to go home the next day—we have done that many, many times, publicly and privately. We also specificially have put up to the other side weeks ago the question that if the bombing in the north stops, what else will stop?

We do not believe that there is any indication that the other side would come to the conference table on the basis of a genuine cease-fire.

Senator CHURCH. My question is, what would be lost to us, regardless of whether or not in your estimation they would respond? What would be lost to us by making it clear.

It's a little different to say, "If you quit doing what you are doing, we'll quit doing what we're doing. This is a lot different than calling for a cease-fire on both sides as a prelude to negotiations. I cannot see what would be lost to us to call for that, even though they might not respond. In fact, if they did not, we might emerge in a stronger position than we are now.

Secretary RUSK. Stronger in what respect, sir?

Senator CHURCH. Stronger in respect to the general opinion of the world with regard to the war in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. You know, that sort of thing——

Senator CHURCH. I don't see what we would lose by it.

Secretary RUSK. It might make some people feel better for a few days, but I would say that the general effect of the Baltimore speech ran about 10 days, and now it has sort of run out. Now people say, "What else can we do?" I don't know.

Senator CHURCH. These are legitimate questions that ought to be raised.

Senator RUSK. Yes, Senator. I am not objecting to the question. I'm just giving you my views on it.

WHAT ELSE WE CAN DO

Senator CHURCH. The question of what else we can do is a question we should continually be asking ourselves, if our purpose is in fact to negotiate a settlement.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I hope that you——

Senator CHURCH. I just think that a call for a cease-fire might be useful.

Secretary RUSK. I hope you believe, Senator, that this is the sort of question on which the President and I and the Secretary of Defense literally brood 24 hours a day, because the purpose here is to get this situation straightened out consistent with the security of these nations in Southeast Asia, without a larger war. That is the overriding purpose.

I would suppose if there is any possibility of a cease-fire as between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, it would be far easier for the other side to let it be known that this is possible privately than to seem to be saying publicly that they are abandoning the Vietcong, which for them is what a cease-fire mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Right on that——

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I must leave in 2 or 3 minutes because I have an overriding commitment on this Dominican problem.

REVIVING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the French and Russian agreement, is this administration willing to abide by the 1954 Geneva agreements, if they should be revived, and if the Russians and the French and others—would we literally abide by the provisions of the 1954 agreement, or is that out the window?

Secretary RUSK. We have said many times that we would like to go back to both of those agreements, but let me make it quite clear. I do not believe that North Vietnam is about to comply with those agreements in the field of free elections and that sort of thing. Therefore, we have to keep in mind that the totality of those agreements—and those agreements also include that if there are differences about how one proceeds, they are not to be settled by force.

No, we are prepared to go with the 1954 and 1962 agreements. I have talked about that many, many times to Mr. Gromyko. Compliance with the agreement on Laos would be of the greatest possible importance, and the 1954 agreements were agreements that tended to determine the peace of Southeast Asia.

Now, the south never did invade the north, send guerrilla forces into the north. These 1954 agreements were paralyzed by action taken by the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the reason they did not have elections in 1956?

Secretary RUSK. It was quite clear that the north was not going to have any elections in 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. How was it clear?

Secretary RUSK. Internationally supervised free elections. They made it very clear at that time they were not going to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

TACTICAL TARGETS

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, the answer to my other question, which was what do we do when we run out of tactical targets south of Hanoi?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is still a considerable backlog of targets in the military area.

Senator PELL. Not just trees?

Secretary RUSK. No. And also they are undertaking these route reconnaissances with respect to military convoys.

ACCEPTING A COMMUNIST VIETNAM

Senator PELL. One other question. Would we be willing to accept in the end a nationalist, Communist, total Vietnam like Yugoslavia, in that area, if this is the final outcome of an election?

Secretary RUSK. If you get into the election business, naturally you accept the results, but I personally do not believe that would be the result. They are a very long way from that in South Vietnam. I don't think that would be the result, if they had a chance to have a free election.

Senator CHURCH. That might be in our interest to propose.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. We have repeatedly said and the South Vietnamese repeatedly said they would like to get free elections as soon as they can. We would not object to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would we propose it? Can't we propose something?

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., a recess was taken to reconvene in executive session.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MONDAY, MAY 3, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Church, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Also present: Senator Javits; and Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, will you come around, please?

Let the committee come to order. Some of the others have expressed their intent at being here, but I think we ought to get started.

Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you here. Do you have a statement? It may be well for you to make a direct statement to us.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS C. MANN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Mr. MANN. I don't have a statement, Mr. Chairman. I can give you a short statement if you wish or just answer questions, if you would prefer.

Senator MORSE. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the Secretary always does such a remarkable job in outlining the Department's position, to bring us up to date—the fact that we had the briefing and unfortunately I couldn't be here, we had the briefing from the Secretary on Friday. I think we ought to pick up from there and have Mr. Mann brief us from them.

Mr. MANN. We are getting up a chronology of these days and nights which have sort of run together. It is hard for me to separate them. But the—did the Secretary cover the point up to the——

Senator SPARKMAN. He was here Friday morning.

Mr. MANN. And in point of time, what had happened up to that time?

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

Senator CASE. Only about 4,000, according to him, American troops there.

Senator MORSE. I wasn't here, Mr. Secretary.

OAS COMMITTEE

Mr. MANN. If you talked about that many troops, that meant that we had at that time gone into San Isidro and also in this international zone. We did go to the Organization of American States, and they passed a resolution on May 1 deciding to establish a committee composed of representatives of five member states, to instruct the committee to go immediately to Santo Domingo and to do everything possible to obtain the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions; also to offer its good offices to Dominican armed groups and political groups for the purpose of obtaining urgently a cease-fire, the orderly evacuation of people, the carrying out of an investigation of what had really happened, and ordering them to make a report back to the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

That committee reached there yesterday afternoon, a five-man committee. It met with the Nuncio who, as we had, made several efforts to obtain a cease-fire. It met with the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Mr. Mora, who had gone down a day or two previously, with members of the junta. My understanding is that as of this moment the OAS five-man committee is now attempting to meet with the rebel leaders inside the part of the city held by the so-called rebels.

The rebel leaders were not able to offer the OAS committee any assurances of their safety, so that they have requested and have been provided an escort both within the international zone, which has been infiltrated. There is some shooting going on there, although it is of small dimensions.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION ESTABLISHED

Last night we established a line of communication between the international zone, where the Marines are and from which point most of the evacuations have taken place, certainly all of those by boat, and the section east of the river, where the paratroop battalion is located, so that the two segments of the armed forces would have overland communication with each other. Up until this was done starting at 11 o'clock, 12 o'clock midnight last night, the only communication between the paratroopers on the east side of the river and the Marines on the west side of the river in the vicinity of the Ambassador Hotel and inside the international zone has been by helicopter or by boat.

That is the situation as of the moment. There is still sporadic sniper fire within the rebel-held part of the city, I should say the southeastern part of the city, which is the heart of the business district where most of the business establishments and some hotels are and where a middle-class and, by Dominican standards, fairly wealthy class reside.

The area north of the line of communication is a poorer area, the northern part of the city. There is also some sniper fire going on there, but I would say relatively quiet as compared with several days ago.

The Embassy itself, as you know, was under attack both by rifle and machinegun fire almost continuously for 2 or 3 days, and with the consent of the rebel groups, the perimeter of the international

safety zone was extended so as to put two blocks between the Embassy and the rebel zone itself.

TALKS WITH CAAMANO

We are doing everything we can to maintain a cease-fire, to establish communication with the rebels, to avoid over-identification with either side, either the junta side or with the rebel side, to discover as much as we can who is leading the rebel forces inside the rebel perimeter. We have a number of names—Mr. Martin was sent down, having had personal knowledge in connection with some of these people. He has been in and talked to Caamano.[1] They met in a drugstore at the corner, and we know the group of people who were with Caamano at that time.

Caamano himself is the son of a Trujillo general who had the reputation of, who didn't have a very savory reputation, put it that way, who is now in exile in Florida. The son who, I believe, is middle aged—I am only giving you preliminary information, I only got this this afternoon.

Senator CASE. What does "middle aged" mean?

Mr. MANN. I would say late thirties to late forties, early fifties.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is youth.

Senator MCCARTHY. For a revolutionary that is middle aged.

Mr. MANN. For a revolutionary that is middle aged. He himself was a police official until he was recently discharged some few weeks ago in a shakeup they had there. The only people that he has have no known Communist connections, nor do any of the people, this small group that were with him, except for one, who is reported to have been paying $100 a month to the June 14 movement, which is the Castro movement in the country.

We are simply not very clear at this time how much authority the Caamano group has, how many of the rebels they actually control—they pretend to control all of them—and how much control Bosch has.

DISSIDENT MILITARY GROUPS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the Secretary at that point, I am trying to get an identification here of the parts of the rebel movement. I would like to ask this question, if I may.

Is it true, Mr. Mann, that part of the rebel forces represent a splinter from the Dominican army and are under the command of some army officers who heretofore have been part of the military establishment but broke with Wessin y Wessin?[2]

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir; they are a small group of dissident army, navy, and air force officers still with Caamano, for example. A larger number who originally were dissidents have apparently taken refuge as of several days ago, have taken asylum in one Embassy or another.

Senator MORSE. These are not Communists?

Mr. MANN. As I say, the small group with Caamano, who are the only people, to my knowledge, that we have been able to establish

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[1] Col. Francisco Caamano Deno was elected president of a provisonal regime in Santo Domingo on May 3, and served until Sept. 3, 1965.

[2] Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, leader of forces opposed to Juan Bosch.

contact with so far—only one of that group is believed to have been connected with the Castro movement, but in addition to that, Senator it is very dubious that Caamano is in control of the hardcore Communists whom we believe, at least all the signs suggest, have had a great part to play in this rebellion.

A NORMAL REBELLION

I might tell the committee that the rebellion started off as a normal rebellion. A small group of army officers arrested the chief of staff at one of the garrisons, the chief of staff of the army and his chief deputy, and gained control of communications.

Another group took over a radio station and began to broadcast to the people that the revolution was over and had been successful, which is not unusual in revolutions of this kind. The arms at this garrison and later arms which came into rebel possession when the police fortress and other garrisons fell were distributed to civilians, and what was noteworthy is the great speed and rapidity with which known Communists, people who we have identified up to this time, some eight whom we are in the process now of trying to expand this list as we find out better what happened, went into the streets, organized mobs, riffraff, passed out submachineguns, machineguns, rifles, to people of all ages and became certainly a major paramilitary force in the early, early hours of the revolution.

We have identified some 45 people who have returned to the Republic of Dominica since last October, many of whom have had training in Czechoslovakia, China, Russia, and Cuba, and we know at least we believe, that they were in the Dominican Republic at the time the revolution started. We believe that they are still active and are in control of a considerable amount of weapons and have a considerable number of people under their control.

The tactics that were used early in the game over the radio, such tactics as when the air force, which remained, I won't say loyal but which created a junta of its own, began strafing what they thought were rebel strong points, wives of air force officers who were taken as hostages were put up in prominent places and it was announced over television—one wife, at least, was paraded on television, saying, "If you do any strafing, your wife will be the first one to be killed."

SUPPORT FROM CUBA

The tone and tenor of the messages coming out over the radio had a strong Communist Castro tinge to it. Unconfirmed reports as of yet—as of large sums of money that may have come in from Cuba, but it is too early yet to say whether there is any basis for this.

I might say, Senator, that it will probably be 10 days to 2 weeks, maybe as long as 6 weeks or 2 months before we can reconstruct in great detail and with almost complete assurance what really happened hour by hour as this thing progressed.

ECONOMY WAS IN SHAMBLES

It got out of hand in my own estimate largely because in those early hours, let's say, the first 36 hours, largely because the army,

navy, and air force themselves were uncertain. There was no great support for Reid Cabral, the President who fell. He found the economy some months earlier in a shambles where Bosch had left it. The costs of producing sugar, and this is a sugar economy, had gone up to 9 and perhaps 11 cents a pound when the world price had dropped to as low as 2.5 cents a pound, so that they were not only bankrupt but running deeper into debt every day.

There was widespread corruption in the army. Trujillo had allowed the army to place orders for military equipment, soft goods, as well as hardware, and it was an open secret that the military got commission from all of this. He tried to—he eliminated their import duty privileges. He put the buying of goods in the hands of civilians. He tried—he eliminated the chief of police on the ground that he was corrupt, and made changes, talking about Reid Cabral. There was quite a good deal of dissatisfaction with this.

In order to reduce somewhat the enormous deficits of the government-owned sugar estates, really the old Trujillo estates, he had to fire 8,000 people from the sugar mills, and we at the same time were putting money in to help him stay afloat. He increased pressure on collection of taxes, which alienated people who were paying taxes. I didn't see, we didn't see any signs of great love and affection for Reid and his austerity program.

LINES ARE HIGHLY PERSONALIZED

The result was that the army, the part of the army that normally would have been expected to have been loyal, didn't make a move for about 36 hours. I think it is very likely that many of the original rebels thought that maybe Balaguer was coming in. Others thought that Bosch was coming back.

The Commies probably had other plans. It was only when the return of Bosch was announced from San Jose, Costa Rica, that all of the, really the anti-Bosch elements united and formed a junta which is now fighting the rebels.

So, the lines are highly personalized, characterized by great and deep personal hatreds. In a small island of that kind, going back into the Trujillo days, as to who has popularity, I can tell this committee very much off the record, if I may go off the record——

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. May I say on a procedural matter, Mr. Secretary, it doesn't involve you, what you just said was on the record the other day, put on by Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, I have expressed myself in other hearings before, that due to the fact these are executive meetings and this is a secret document I shall object hereafter to anything off the record.

PROTECT AMERICAN NATIONALS

Mr. Mann, you could be of help to me, if I might ask a question or two, because I asked for this hearing today. If you will take us back to Friday—on Friday I took the position, and I take it now, that the President had a perfect right to go into the Dominican Republic on the basis of the information given to us Friday, that the government that was recognized in Dominica could not assure protection of American nationals and other nationals, too. I took the

position that I certainly felt, both from a humanitarian standpoint and also from the standpoint of the President's legal obligations to our own country, we had a right to go in and protect those people, but that I was waiting for further evidence as to whether or not our purpose in going in was beyond that. And that question has been raised again today, you know, by others as well as by the senior Senator from Oregon.

Now, when the Secretary was before us the other day, the record shows he stressed the situation of our nationals, but he didn't say anything about the American forces going into the Dominican Republic to be sure that the rebels did not win. It seems to me that since Friday, that has been a new development in the situation from the standpoint of the announced policy of the executive branch of Government. I think we ought to have a discussion of that.

If you would discuss with us as to whether or not we can justify without formal approval of the Organization of American States—and you can help us to tell us what approval, if any, we really have for that course of action, of going in there to participate in taking sides in regard to a revolution. I don't need to tell anyone on this committee I don't want to see a Communist stronghold develop in the Dominican Republic, but I have grievous doubts as to whether or not the United States has any right to proceed to take sides in a revolution.

I have a little difficulty, and you are more familiar with it than I am, with article 15 of the charter, which says:

> No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of a state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.

Article 17 says:

> The territory of a state is inviolable. It may not be the object even temporarily of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state directly or indirectly on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

Article 18 says:

> The American states bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.

AN UNDESIRABLE ELEMENT

Now, the majority leader can speak for himself, but on the floor of the Senate this morning, he made a speech with which I associated myself as to the obligations of the Organization of American States. He expressed hope, I think it is a fair paraphrase, that they would consider setting up an Organization of American States for us to maintain a stability down there.

But what bothers some of us, Mr. Mann, and I believe this is going to be the debate in this country for some time unless we can get it clarified very quickly, is that now the President in a statement to the Union has made clear that we are in there apparently to see that this undesirable element, evaluated by us—I think it is undesirable, but nevertheless it is our evaluation—does not win.

That concerns me because I think it will be misinterpreted in Latin America, with the charge—and we are being charged with a violation of the charter.

I would like to have you comment on those observations for my edification. I would like to also have you brief us as best you can as to what hope you think we have that this will be turned from an American occupation beyond evacuating nationals into an OAS occupation, because if it isn't, I don't see how we are going to escape the charge that, whether you like it or not, this is a return to gunboat diplomacy and intervention in spite of the charter.

Those are in broad outlines some of the things that worry me.

UNITED STATES IS NOT TAKING SIDES

Mr. MANN. First, Senator, on the factual side, I would like to make it abundantly clear that we are not taking sides either for or against the junta or the rebels. It would have been an easy matter to resolve the juridical problems that you referred to had we, for example, wished to have recognized the junta, the new junta.

There was ample basis for doing this. It was a time of disintegration of public order. It was the only organized group in the country. It claimed to have authority, and had we recognized the junta, the juridical problems would have disappeared simply because we received a request from the junta for unlimited military assistance in order to enable them to restore order against Communist elements.

This would have been the—and I might add that this is his secret, we haven't stated this to anyone. We didn't take the easy road, the easy juridical or legal road, because we thought this would have put us in a posture in opposition to a rebel group, the exact character of which we were not certain of at that time.

We didn't wish to oppose a revolution of the right kind moving toward a greater degree of democracy and reform. We thought there were elements, and still believe that there are well-meaning, well-guided groups within the rebel movement, which is not one cohesive movement by any means, who might have been forced by this kind of action into a union with the Communists. We hoped and still hope to be able to divide off the non-Communists from the Communists.

I want to make that first point very clear, that it would have been easy to find a way around the two articles which you read. Our position then would have been precisely the same as it is and has been precisely the same as it is and has been in many other situations where we have gone in at the request of the government, such as, for example, the landing in Lebanon. Indeed, our whole juridical base in Vietnam, I think, rests on this.

UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT

Senator MORSE. I don't want to interrupt and you can stop me if you want to finish your statement, but you raised this problem with me. We have recognized the government in the Dominican Republic against which a revolution is now being conducted. What has happened to that recognition? You take the position that government no longer exists.

Mr. MANN. We haven't taken an official position on that but the fact is that it has ceased to exist. They still have an ambassador here, they have a representative in the United Nations, but as far as finding anybody in the Dominican Republic who asserts that the Reid government is still in control of the country or is about to gain control of the country, I don't think that there would be any basis in reality for this.

Senator MORSE. It was the government that told our Ambassador they couldn't protect our nationals, on the basis of which we responded. As the President told the Nation, we responded to the information they gave us through our Ambassador to go in to protect our nationals. We recognized the government for that purpose.

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I think recognition is a matter of intention.

Senator MORSE. A matter of what?

Mr. MANN. Recognition is basically a matter of intention.

We don't call the junta which made this request the government. We call it either the military committee or the military force or the military junta, but we have not recognized the junta government.

A NEW JUNTA

Senator MORSE. But isn't what you now call the junta government just an extension of the original junta government which we recognized?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, it is quite different.

Senator MORSE. In what way? It is an arm of it.

Mr. MANN. The junta government was composed of, I believe it was a triumvirate. The president of it was Mr. Reid. Mr. Reid is now in hiding.

Senator MORSE. He does not cease to exist.

Mr. MANN. His cabinet has dispersed. None of the organized political groups of the country apparently have any allegiance to that. The rebel government itself under the PRD formed a junta, a new junta, in the first hours of the revolution, which itself disappeared a few hours after it was announced. Then the third junta, which is the one I am referring to, is totally different. It is composed of moderate military officers who had no position in the Reid Cabral administration and who were supported by the majority of the army, navy, and air force elements and which, no doubt, if in quieter times would find some support—I don't know how much, frankly—amongst the people. But this is entirely different from the Reid Cabral government, both in terms of personalities, in terms of point of time, in terms of the entire situation.

RECOGNITION OF THE CIVILIAN COMMISSION

Senator MORSE. I want you to help me with this because I don't find myself in agreement. When was it, Marcy, we recognized the junta government in the Dominican Republic that set up a three-man civilian commission to be its administrative arm, how long ago?

Mr. MANN. About a year—well, I have been here, let me see, Senator, I came January.

Senator MORSE. Before you came.

Mr. MANN. I came January 1964. This had happened before I got here. It—this must have been in the late part of 1963; that is memory, though.

Senator MORSE. Over a year and a half ago, I think. I want to fix the time.

Mr. MANN. I think that is approximately correct.

Senator MORSE. I want to fix that general date. We were told then that we had to recognize that because it was a recommendation of the State Department because the Wessin y Wessin group were going to overthrow that civilian commission, to all intents and purposes, but fronting for them anyway—we were going to overthrow them for one reason because they had not been able to deliver U.S. recognition.

A whole combination of factors entered into it, and over the objection of some of us we recognized that government. That is the government with which we have been carrying on diplomatic relations. As far as I know, it is still the government in diplomatic relationship with the United States. Whether some of the people are in hiding or not seems to me quite immaterial. That is the only government with which we have diplomatic relations.

NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUNTAS

Now, you speak about a new junta. What is the relationship of this new junta to the government that we recognized a year and a half ago?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I would say no relationship at all.

Senator MORSE. Does the State Department take the position that the new junta overthrew the government that we recognized?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I have just tried to state that the Reid Cabral junta—let's call them by name so we can identify them—the Reid Cabral junta with which we did have relations and with which this is a fine legal point, I think, really irrelavant to the questions you are raising, has in fact disintegrated and disappeared. It was replaced or attempted to be replaced by a rebel junta composed principally of PRD members. That is Bosch's party.

Senator MORSE. That is right—which we have never recognized.

Mr. MANN. We didn't recognize that junta because it didn't last more than about 5 hours.

Senator MORSE. I know.

Mr. MANN. This junta fell and many of the people supporting it took asylum in the Embassies, which was one of the things alerted us, the moderate elements in what you might call the original revolution were certainly diminished in numbers. We knew by the numbers that took asylum in those early days when extremist elements came to the fore.

Now, after that government appeared and disappeared, what you might call the Bosch junta for lack of a better name, another junta appeared on the scene headed by a lieutenant colonel whom I understand is a moderate and fairly well regarded, presumably selected with two others, I think an air force man and a navy man, in an attempt to conciliate what you might call the extremists on both sides. That, the Benoit,[3] the French pronunciation is Benoit, I be-

[3] Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit.

lieve—is the junta that we have not recognized. That is the junta which did send us, and I repeat this is highly classified up to now, two separate requests, and it is this junta that stated in addition to requesting assistance, that they were no longer able to maintain order. It is this junta which is the only semblance of an organized group in the country.

The Dominican Republic today is absolute chaos, without any effective government in control of the streets of the capital city or, so far as we know, in communication with the interior.

THE WESSIN Y WESSIN FACTION

Senator MORSE. Two more questions on this point because I think it is basic.

Of course, the Wessin y Wessin group have gone into hiding, but the Wessin y Wessin group were still remnants of the government which we originally recognized. Wessin y Wessin was the one quoted so frequently in the time of discussions down in the cabinet room about whether we should recognize the military junta government that we did recognize. After all, they had worked out an arrangement with him and his group whereby this civilian commission had been set up supposedly to administer the country.

I said then it was nothing but a front. The power behind this civilian council was, of course, the Wessin y Wessin military group.

Now, they haven't yielded to the Bosch rebels. They are still, according to my information, fighting the Bosch rebels. Why do you say that the government we recognized has completely disintegrated? I think it has been routed but I still think you would have to make the finding that the only goverment that we have recognized and continue to have diplomatic relations with is the government, and I use it for want of a better descriptive term, the group that was headed by General Wessin y Wessin.

Mr. MANN. Senator, maybe this is a semantic term, but when governments fall in Latin America very often the personalities who are in opposition in favor of governments continue to exist. Very often military comands change. I have asked to check to see whether Wessin is on the so-called Benoit junta. My recollection is that he is not. I think that also—and these things are happening so fast, I wouldn't want to be held to details—I think that his position has been altered, that is, his official position in the truce.

Senator MORSE. Accurately or inaccurately, the press stories continue to quote him as though he were speaking for a government. He is available to the press.

FORMIDABLE OPPONENT

Mr. MANN. I think there is a great deal of confusion about Wessin y Wessin. If I might stop on that, on the personality of the man——

Senator MORSE. I would be delighted.

Mr. MANN. I don't know him personally, Senator. I can only repeat to you what the staff, what their opinion is, and I hope it is objective. I believe it is objective.

Wessin y Wessin is unique, or let's say rare, amongst Dominican generals in that, first of all, he has a reputation—and we believe it

is well-founded—of not having taken graft. He was not a Trujillo supporter.

He is a very devout Catholic, a man who prays a great deal, lives a rather austere life, a man who has no political ambition as far as we know and believe. And I think we ought to at least keep an open mind on the possibility that some of the extremists found him a more formidable opponent than some of the others who were not respected in the country, and that they have concentrated their propaganda attacks on him.

Now, I don't really believe from everything I have heard that Wessin y Wessin is going to emerge in the future, nor does he want to emerge, as far as I know, as a dictator or a political leader.

Senator MORSE. He is formidable all right. It is perfectly clear he was the head of the coup that led to the overthrow of Bosch and protested the attempt on the part of Bosch to bring the military under constitutional control by way of civilian control. He certainly was over his head in the Dominican politics at that time and was one of the leaders in setting up the junta that we subsequently recognized.

Mr. MANN. There is no doubt that he holds strong anti-Communist feelings. There is no doubt that he turned against Bosch because Bosch demonstrably was, I don't want to use an exaggerated word, collaborating with and encouraging the Castroite June 14 movement. On this fact alone many of the people in the Dominican armed forces broke with Bosch and indeed did throw Bosch out. This was the thing that resulted in Bosch's overturn more than any other one thing.

WESSIN'S INDECISIVENESS

Now, I have just had confirmed, Senator, that he is not a member of the Benoit junta. I believe that he has been relieved of command of troops simply because he is not a violent man. He is more of a religious man, and it is true that he was in command of a great deal of the army more at the time the revolution broke out, but he never really committed his troops to action.

What really happened, Senator, as this thing developed over the days, the disintegration was almost complete, not so much because of the great strength of the rebels but because, some people are saying, of the indecisiveness of Wessin. His San Isidro camp was on the east side of the river. He didn't even bother to secure the bridge across the river which was his only access to the heart of the city. He sent his tanks into the city. When they met with resistance, he withdrew them again to the San Isidro base and has participated very little in the fighting.

Senator MCCARTHY. Who controls the army now? To whom did he yield his command?

Mr. MANN. I would say that technically the junta itself—they are all army officers—technically they are commander in chief of the armed forces. I am not sure about this detail, but I believe Wessin was shifted from one command post to another. I don't think it was an elevation in terms of military power.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I have a suggestion.

Mr. MANN. It is a very confused picture, though, Senator, and I think we ought to look at it and talk about it as long as you want, because I think as the facts emerge we are going to be very close together.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is that, Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. I think you are probably right.

FORM OF THE REVOLUTION

But I want to try to get rid of some of the confusion on the record. I think we ought to pick a date before this revolution started, the nearest date to it, I don't care what date it is, but the date before this revolution started. I would like to have this record show the government of the Dominican Republic on that date, and I would like to know who was in charge of it and what the relationship was between the junta that we recognized a year and a half ago and the group that were running the country as of that date.

I think what you will find—and this is what I want to be corrected on if I am wrong—I think you will find that the group we recognized was in control of the government as of this date, and it was using a civilian council or commission or committee or whatever you want to call it to do the administering. Now, that is the government with which we had diplomatic relations. Then a revolution started.

That revolution—this I don't know, did that revolution take two forms? One, a split within the government itself, so that now a new junta within that government rose up in opposition to the old junta. Then, in addition, you had the rebel forces with a segment of the Dominican army being the spearhead to which, we are now told by the administration, if I understand the President's speech correctly and understand this transcript correctly, apparently some undesirable elements crept in, which gives rise to the charge that there was a danger of setting up in the Dominican Republic another Cuba. That gives an excuse for the United States to go in in violation, according to some of our friends in Latin America, of the Organization of American States charter.

USE OF THE OAS

I would like to get that clarified on the record. Then I would like to get clarified on the record the steps that had been taken by the administration vis-a-vis the Organization of American States.

I would like to know, for example, how many members of the Organization of American States Council, if any, approved the sending in of our first troops in the Dominican Republic. I would like to know what approval we have received from the Council of the Organization of American States in respect to the subsequent steps that we have taken. Third, I would like to know what the present status is of the relationship between the United States Government and this five-man commission that the Secretary has already talked about, and what prospects we have, if any, that the Organization of American States will, to follow the suggestion of the majority leader this morning, come on in and take over the responsibility for maintaining law and order in the Dominican Republic as the controlling body instead of the United States staying there as

the controlling body acting unilaterally. The issue that we ultimately have got to take sides on is whether or not we are going to, as a Congress, authorize the United States to occupy the Dominican Republic outside the framework of the Organization of American States.

I think Mr. Mann put my position quite accurtely when he said he thought when we got all the facts out we might not be too far apart. I hope we are not apart at all. I did the best I could last Friday—I got a lot of criticism for it but that never bothers me—I did the best I could last Friday to say that I think on the basis of the facts that were given us, our Government had a clear obligation to go in there and protect American lives. That is still my position.

GRAVE DOUBTS

I have grave doubts if the facts are, as I am afraid they may be, that our Government has any right to be in there taking the position the President took over television that we are going take such steps as necessary to be sure that the rebels don't win. I hope we are not going to take the position that if the people of any Latin American country decide to have a revolution, in fact, that the United States calls it a Communist revolution and we are going to move in unilaterally and stop it.

We signed the Act of Punta del Este and the Washington agreement binding ourselves with other Latin American countries to stop the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. I am willing to join in that joint effort, but if we are going to substitute ourselves for the charter, why you are headed for, I think, repudiation in the Western Hemisphere. You are going to play right into the hands of the very Communists we are trying to stop.

I would like to get this matter legally clarified so we can all go before the American people and say, "These are the facts. We have this kind of unified support under the Organization of American States." If we have it now, the State Department has done a remarkable job of keeping it from us, because I haven't talked to a Senator today, and I have talked to a good many of you, who say anything other than, "I am completely confused." That is why, I thought in fairness to the administration and the committee, I asked for this meeting this afternoon.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Mann, can you take up from there?

Mr. MANN. I will do my best, sir.

The Senator can help me with one question at a time. I think we can make better progress.

Senator MORSE. I will help you in any way that I can.

ROLE OF REID CABRAL

Mr. MANN. I think we have been discussing up to now whether the Benoit junta is identical with the Reid Cabral government junta. My own opinion on that, Senator, is that they are entirely distinct.

Reid Cabral since January 1964, when I have been reading the traffic and keeping up with the problem, was the effective Presi-

dent of the Dominican Republic, not Mr. Wessin or any other group of military officers. Now, it is true——

Senator MORSE. You see, Mr. Secretary, was he the civilian leader of the council or commission that they, that is the Wessin group, set up?

Mr. MANN. This happened before I got there. My memory is that Reid Cabral was a member of the original civilian junta.

Senator MORSE. That is my understanding, too.

Mr. MANN [continuing]. That he remained on that junta, that one or two people dropped off and were replaced.

Senator MORSE. That is my understanding.

Mr. MANN. But Reid Cabral was the junta in terms of the man who made the decisions and exercised the authority. He was a strong man.

Senator MORSE. But originally appointed, originally appointed by the group, the military junta of which Wessin y Wessin was a part, that overthrew Bosch. That is where he came from, and he was the one they were going to overthrow, the Wessin group were going to overthrow, if we didn't give recognition to the Dominican Republic.

RECOGNITION UNDER KENNEDY OR JOHNSON

So, we went ahead and gave recognition to the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MANN. This happened during Mr. Kennedy's time, before I got here.

Senator MORSE. No, it happened during the beginning of this Johnson administration.

Mr. MANN. I will have to check on the dates. Mr. Kennedy died in November. I got here really in December and didn't take over until January, but by January 1, and I believe, this I am certain of, I was under the impression that the Peruvian recognition question, if my memory is right, if these were settled—this is a fact on the record I can check. I don't think it decides what we are talking about.

Senator MORSE. No, but I don't want to leave the record this way.

I simply want to say that President Johnson called Senator Mansfield, Senator Dirksen, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Fulbright, and myself to the Cabinet Room for a long discussion with Under Secretary of State Ball because Secretary Rusk was out of the country. He had Martin, who was still Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, and he said, "I have called you down here for an emergency briefing that I was given earlier this morning by the Under Secretary. I want you to hear it and give us your advice."

It was then that Ball and Martin told us that the State Department policymakers were unanimous in their recommendation that the junta should be recognized, that was the Wessin y Wessin group, because they were about to overthrow their civilian commission. They said, "It is going to be bloody, it is going to be anti-American. The leftists have already fled into the mountains. We think they are about to get Castro support, and our recommendation is that they should be recognized."

I opposed the recognition at that time. I thought we ought to insist on what I called the return to the constitutional system. That was in the Johnson administration. It was on Tuesday, and the following Saturday the President recognized the Dominican junta.

I had a conference with him afterward which he can tell you about. He wasn't too certain that that was the course of action he should follow but he was inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to those who were recommending the recognition.

Now, I tell you that to fix the date.

Mr. MANN. I wasn't here at that time.

Senator MORSE. At that time this was the Wessin y Wessin group. I think this man you are talking about was the chairman of that civilian commission that Wessin y Wessin was about to overthrow.

U.S. JURIDICAL POSITION ON RECOGNITION

Mr. MANN. Senator, may I—I believe the main thrust of your question is what our juridical position is on this thing.

Senator MORSE. Now.

Mr. MANN. If I could talk to that.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Mr. MANN. My first point is that by having recognized the rebels it would have been easy to avoid this issue, but it would have been at a tremendous cost to our moral position throughout the hemisphere. I want to say again for the record that we are not trying to oppose a revolutionary takeover by a non-Communist group in the Dominican Republic. We are not supporting, we have not recognized, the Benoit junta. We are there attempting, as we have from the very beginning, to arrange a cease-fire precisely because we didn't want to create a situation of utter and complete chaos which would give the Communists a maximum opportunity to take over as they did in Cuba.

We have not been successful. We thought we had arranged it even before we went to the OAS, four separate times. Each time one side or the other—according to my information it was the rebel side that insisted on shooting. Our position, therefore, is one of impartiality as between the contesting forces there today.

Now, we have taken the hard road precisely because of the moral principles that you are talking about. Our present legal position is based on, really on two separate facts.

HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION

The first is that we think that in a situation which has reached that stage of chaos and anarchy, it is not intervention under the charter to go in and evacuate Americans and try to save lives.

Senator MORSE. I agree to that.

Mr. MANN. Now, this is still our basic position.

Some 3,000 people, including many nationalities—I don't remember the number, it may be as many as 30—have been taken out at their request. There are still hundreds of Americans in the country who have not been able to reach the evacuation points and whose lives are in great danger.

It is not really necessary from a technical juridical point to go beyond our present position, to go beyond the humanitarian evacuation thing to justify our present position there. We did take this up with the Organization of American States. They did pass the resolution which I summarized a moment ago.

SENDING OF U.S. MARINES

Senator MORSE. Will you date that? Can you date that, Mr. Secretary, when you first took it up with the organization? Did you send our Marines into the Dominican Republic before you took anything up with the OAS?

Mr. MANN. Let me stop here by way of parentheses and give you a chronology of the OAS activities.

Senator MORSE. That is what I want to hear.

Senator WILLIAMS. Tell us also when you sent the first Marines in there.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. I heard somebody make the statement at lunch today that the Marines were sent in about 5 hours before you called a group to the White House. I do not know whether it is true or not, but I just heard it.

Mr. MANN. I have somewhere in all this mass of papers, or I was sure I did have—here it is—take these one at a time. On April 27 at 11 a.m. the Uruguayan representative to the OAS, a Mr. Oribe, called on Mr. Vaughn and asked whether the Inter-American Peace Committee could be of any assistance.

Mr. Vaughn urged Mr. Oribe to call a meeting of the Peace Committee. That was done that evening. The Peace Committee met at 4 p.m. on April 27. The Dominican Ambassador Bonilla [4] gave an account of the facts in connection with the revolt up to that time, and the Inter-American Peace Committee took no decision at that time.

On Wednesday, April 28, at 10:30 a.m., at a regular meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States, different from the Peace Committee, Ambassador Bonilla made a report to the council on the developments in the Dominican Republic. He highlighted what he termed the Castro Communist involvement in the revolutionary movement. The council took note but took no decision at that time.

At 9:30 p.m. that night, all Latin American Ambassadors here in Washington were advised by telephone of our decision to make a landing in order to evacuate Americans.

Senator WILLIAMS. What date was that?

Mr. MANN. 9:30 p.m., April 28, Wednesday.

SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

At the same time, we requested a convocation of a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States for the next morning.

At 10:30 on April 29, Thursday, there was a special meeting of the council of the organization at the request of Ambassador

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[4] José Antonio Bonilla Atiles, the rebel government's delegate to the OAS.

Bunker, who reported that we had commenced evacuation proceedings. The council of the organization at our request aproved—I say at our request, I am not positive of this—with our support approved a message to the Apostolic Nuncio, as dean of the diplomatic corps in Santiago, requesting that he arrange for a cease-fire.

We commenced discussion at that time, at the same meeting, of ways of implementing the inter-American mechanism. Venezuela announced at that meeting its intention to request a convocation of the organ of consultation under the OAS Charter under the Rio Treaty.

There was some debate, which I would like to talk about later, Senator, a legal problem here, of which of these instruments was really appropriate. At the request of others, a recess was declared in order that the representatives to the council could obtain their instructions from their governments.

CONVOCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

On April 29, which was a Thursday, at 4:29 p.m., a telegram left the State Department requesting all of our Ambassadors to urge Latin American governments to support a convocation of a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

At 10 p.m., in a meeting which lasted until 2 a.m., on April 30, 1965, that is a Friday into Saturday morning, the council met to consider a Venezuelan request and a Chilean note asking for a meeting of Foreign Ministers under Article 39 of the OAS Charter. During this meeting the United States formally proposed to advance the date of the meeting of Foreign Ministers from May 1 to April 30. This failed to achieve a necessary majority, with 10 in favor, 1 against, and 7 abstentions. The council decided to convoke the meeting of Foreign Ministers for May 1 by a vote of 18 to 1, after we had failed to get an earlier date.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, I did not hear you say when you sent the first Marines in.

Mr. MANN. I think the Marines went in—excuse me, sir, I will find you the exact hour. I have not slept about a week, and these days and nights run together.

Senator MORSE. Take your time, Tom.

REPORTS FROM THE EMBASSY

Mr. MANN. If I may, by parentheses, by way of OAS proceedings, if I may come back to that, I had not quite finished—I think at 5:16 p.m., on April 28, this was Wednesday at 5:16 p.m., we received a report from our Embassy in which the entire country team reported that the situation was approaching the chaotic, that police were clearly on the defensive, they had lost control of the situation; that Benoit of the junta had sent a formal request to supply troops, that they could no longer protect American citizens. The Embassy made a recommendation that troops be landed and that Americans be evacuated as soon as possible.

I want to emphasize that this was—at this time we were talking about was—nothing more than a ship pulling up to the area of the Ambassador Hotel, putting on shore enough Marines so that the helicopters off of the aircraft carrier could come to the beach, pick

up several hundred Americans who had gathered there in fear of their lives, and take them back to the naval vessels.

At 6:30 p.m. on the same day, April 28, Wednesday night, a telegram went out authorizing them to pick up these Americans on the beach and to evacuate. That is what is called the "landing," although it was not a landing in the sense we are talking about today.

Now, to relate this then to the——

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Williams started to ask you a question.

SCARY REPORTS

Senator WILLIAMS. No, that is all right. The first group were landed in there at 6:30?

Mr. MANN. That is when the telegram left. It may have taken them an hour or two. They were at the port of Haina, about 7 miles west of there, and there had been some fire there. The government told us they could not guarantee that the Americans could reach that port, which is the port for Santo Domingo. They were collected on the beach near the Ambassador Hotel because this was the safest place for them, and I might tell the committee at this time how "scary," to use a modern word, it seemed to us in reading the messages.

The Ambassador Hotel is a very large hotel, a luxury hotel, and there were several hundred foreigners, mostly Americans, in it. A large rebel group, I have heard—I am not sure of the numbers, but I think maybe as large as 200 or 300—armed with tommyguns, came in and emptied all Americans out of the hotel—I am stating this now on the basis of memory of telegrams that I read in those hours—got them outside the hotel, separated the men from the women, ordered the women back into the hotel, lined the Americans up against the wall as if they were going to shoot them, and didn't, then didn't pull the trigger. So that the President felt, and I must say that everyone shared this feeling, that we had an obligation to get in there before something dreadful happened. It was that chaotic.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did I understand you to say the first initiative was with the OAS April 27?

Mr. MANN. It was that very night, and——

Senator SPARKMAN. That was April 28.

Senator MORSE. April 28.

Mr. MANN. April 28. We had started the day before with the Peace Committee, and the council had heard it, but we did not call a meeting or start calling the Ambassadors until we made these decisions under these urgent circumstances.

THE PEACE COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. For the record, would you define the "Peace Committee," Mr. Secretary? What was the Peace Committee?

Mr. MANN. The Peace Committee is a committee which in the past had, and still does have, primary responsibility for resolving disputes between states.

One of the problems was that it was not clear to us or to the Latin Americans that this was a dispute between two states. I want to emphasize, too, something which the Latin Americans really do not understand yet—I think they will when the facts get out—that we did not expect the situation to deteriorate that fast. We had no reason to expect that the Wessin forces and others would not be able to maintain a semblance of order, and the deterioration was almost immediate. It was so prompt, it was almost immediate, and with the stories about the threats to American lives, the radio haranguing the people to go out into the streets and kill, with that many Americans there, with all of these arms having been passed out, with the looting that was going on, the burning, the shooting, the sniping, by this time the Embassy was under heavy fire, we thought we had no alternative at all but to do what we did do.

Now, we did not forget at this very same time when we were taking this serious decision we had to have time. It took us an hour to call the meeting and to get a decision; we had to get the cabinet officers in and ask to find out how many forces we had and what our possibilities and resources were. At the same time we were doing that, Senator, we did the best we could at that moment, which was to ask each OAS director to call his Ambassador and explain to him as best he could what the situation was.

URGING A RAPID VOTE

We also informed them we were requesting a meeting of the OAS signers. That meeting was actually held the next morning.

Senator MORSE. April 29.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

We requested our Latin American friends to continue in continuous session to decide to convoke a meeting of Foreign Ministers because the council itself had no power to act. The way the organization is set up, the ministers have to be convoked. To get a decision to convoke the ministers cost us precious time for which we are blamed, but which, in fact, we have no responsibility for. We were ready to vote immediately, and we have since been urging them to proceed as rapidly as possible. They adjourned today at a meeting which is now going on, in order to get further instructions.

I think we can demonstrate hour by hour, if we combine what was happening down there with what we did up here, that we did the very best we could.

NEED FOR A CHRONOLOGY

Senator MORSE. I think that is a good point for me to make, Mr. Secretary, to the chairman, an official request, that I think this committee owes it to the State Department and to ourselves to ask the Secretary of State through Mr. Mann to have prepared for inclusion as a supplement to this executive record a detailed statement of the chronology of all the events involving the United States, and setting forth the steps that we took vis-a-vis the Organization of American States and the organs therein, and also the steps that we took in the Dominican Republic.

I think we ought to have, Mr. Chairman, in one memorandum a step-by-step chronology as to what our executive branch of Government did in respect to this matter, and I make that official request.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me that would be very helpful.

[The document referred to follows:]

APRIL 14, 1965

Early p.m.—Assistant Secretary Vaughn met with officials from the State Department and CIA to discuss the worsening situation in the Dominican Republic. After a review of the critical position of the Reid government, Mr. Vaughn decided to order Ambassador Bennett to return to Washington the following week to join with State Department and other officials in an examination of our short and intermediate-term policy toward the Dominican Republic.

APRIL 24, 1965

Early p.m.—Department operations center notified S/S, Read, ARA and DR Duty Officers of reported coup.

Radio stations announce arrest of army officers. Coup rumored. 1,000 people around palace. Curfew to be imposed 6 p.m. Military officers denounced curfew, called people to streets to celebrate overthrow Reid.

Bennett called operations center from Georgia for briefing.

Radio Santo Domingo recaptured by Reid. Attachés report junior and noncommissioned army officers in revolt. Air force, army chiefs staff loyal to Reid. Wessin position unclear.

Late p.m.—Wessin supporting Reid though rumors are rebels control other areas.

Curfew fairly effective. All Americans safe.

Reid on radio. Reports all calm, he is in control.

Political force behind insurrection unclear. Spontaneous groups predominantly pro-Bosch, some pro-Balaguer. Toughs provoking trouble undoubtedly extremists. No doubt PRD in forefront from offset.

APRIL 25, 1965

Late a.m.—Triumvirate resigning, turning over government to Montas Guerrero pending formation of three-man junta headed by Mota.

Early p.m.—Prensa Libre director searched for by crowd shouting for his head. Director is in Guatemalan Embassy which has been under siege by mob for hours.

Tanks, soldiers around palace with reports of mob of several thousand heading there with sticks, etc., guns. Reid asked for intervention.

Crowds out of hand. Pepsi Cola and Prensa Libre director's car burned in front of Guatemalan Embassy, where situation serious although police protection enroute.

Radio Santo Domingo reported triumvirate overthrown by armed forces and country was returning to constitutionality and would be governed by Bosch.

Various political parties met and asked United States to push for moderate, noncommitted interim government.

Radio Santo Domingo said Wessin was only holdout and Bosch would return when he surrendered. Called on other army officers to lay down arms and for people to go into streets to support Bosch and his Congress.

Reliable reports that Bosch just told Molina Urena to accept provisional presidency, was preparing own return.

De los Santos announced air force will fight to prevent return of Bosch. Wessin has agreed to support air force. Both believe fight is now against Communists, not exclusively with rebel elements of army. Situation confused. No identifiable authorities exercising control.

Lists businesses and homes reportedly sacked but violence so far directed only against supporters of triumvirate and Trujillo.

Air force flying over palace to prevent swearing in of Molina and allow formation of military junta. (Mota, Benoit, Ubiera).

Late p.m.—Air force fired at palace and rebel headquarters at 4:30 p.m.

Split developing in army.

Radio Santo Domingo urged all people to support rebels, stay in streets.

Bosch broadcast essentially same urging.

Embassy summarized situation. Wessin, De los Santos, Rivera decided to fight to keep Bosch out. Hopes United States will not have to commit itself to either side.

Appears junta which promises early elections is present best hope. No one talking of return of Balaguer or triumvirate.

Families of air force paraded on TV with announcement they were being taken to bombing targets "so they also can be assassinated."

APRIL 26, 1965

Early a.m.—Military statement promised elections September 1, 1965.

Radio and TV in rebel hands.

Dominican Air Force, De los Santos began bombardment and Wessin began attempt to cross bridge into Santo Domingo. Both requested U.S. troops and were told we had no such plans.

Navy joined Molina.

Wives of air force pilots taken by rebels to bridge to be in line of fire. Radio Santo Domingo exhorted populace to sack pilots' homes.

Wessin-De los Santos position weakened and asks for U.S. intervention. Embassy recommends against and told Wessin et al. not to expect U.S. troops. Embassy believes there is serious threat of Communist takeover, supports creation of a military junta promising September elections. United States show of force may be needed later but not now.

Department—Brazilian Ambassador to U.S. Magalhaes called Brazil desk officer for briefing on DR. They agreed to stay in close touch.

Early p.m.—Department—Chilean Ambassador Tomic and Chile desk officer briefly discussed DR situation at lunch.

Department—Brazilian Minister Carvalho e Silva was briefed by Brazil desk officer when former came to State for a meeting on other matters.

Ambassador suggests informing Bosch of extremist elements.

Department—Asks Embassy to evacuate 100 Puerto Ricans at Resident Commissioner's request.

Acting Mayor of Santo Domingo called Embassy to request they do "something" to alleviate present dangerous situation.

Rockets and/or bombs around palace. Police evacuating people nearby.

Embassy advising Americans to prepare for evacuation.

Embassy given 1 hour by De los Santos to try to reach leaders to arrange confrontation of rebels and De los Santos and avoidance of further bloodshed. Embassy trying urgently but communication problem makes them pessimistic.

First antirebel radio broadcast begs Dominicans to stay home, support air force and navy in fight against communism.

Department—Department notified Embassy we'd received requests from Americans in DR to be evacuated. Thus United States asks immediate cease-fire to permit evacuation citizens of any nation.

Late p.m.—Molina appeared on TV at 3:45 as provisional president of DR.

Unconfirmed reports indicate police colonel beheaded by mob and head paraded through streets.

Both sides will declare a cease-fire for evacuation. Embassy suggests April 27, 6 a.m. Evacuees will gather at Embajador and leave from ships at Haina.

APRIL 27, 1965

Early a.m.—Dominican government planning to request agreement for known Castro supporter as Ambassador to United States.

Embassy estimates 1,000 are seeking evacuation. Requests that no helicopters land because of small arms fire.

Casualties between 100 and 200. Lists drugs needed.

Evacuation plans hampered by rebel plans and lack of communications. Neither side seems willing to negotiate.

Late a.m.—Air force announced beginning of strikes against rebels.

Department—Brazil desk officer called Brazilian Ambassador to United States to bring him up to date. Ambassador said he would notify GOB.

At rebel leader request, Embassy urged antirebels to negotiate and postpone bombardment.

After rebel guarantee of safety, rebels fired at Embajador. No American casualties.

Department—Uruguay's Ambassador to the OAS, Oribe, came to see Mr. Vaughn at the former's request. He was the first Latin American Ambassador to mention to State the belief that the OAS should be involved. He felt the IAPC should be concerned and the OAS called into action and Mr. Vaughn heartily agreed. There was some talk of Oribe's taking action but he said he had only talked to the DR Ambas-

sador to the OAS so far and further was not a member of the PIAC. Since the U.S. was an PIAC member, it was agreed that Ward Allen, Deputy to Ambassador Binker, call the IAPC together.

Department—United States objectives are restoration of law and order, prevention of possible Communist takeover, protection of American lives.

In SD newspaper, Caribe, SD Archbishop calls for ending bombing. Acting dean of diplomatic corps asks for life and property protection for Dominicans and foreigners. Caribe reports police and army deaths, calls for end of fratricide. More sackings.

Early p.m.—Department—Ward Allen requested the Colombian Ambassador to the OAS, who is chairman of the IAPC, to convene an urgent IAPC meeting. He also called the dean of the diplomatic corps, Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa, in Sevilla-Sacasa's role as Nicaraguan Ambassador and member of the Peace Committee. He called the Dominican Ambassador to suggest that the Ambassador be prepared to brief the IAPC.

Efforts to bring sides together have failed.

Reports are some Dominicans believe planes bombing are United States, so people urged to move against Embajador and Embassy.

Evacuation from Embajador to Haina completed without incident.

Dominicans believe U.S. planes involved in bombing, 300 rebels were at Embajador shooting with tommyguns. Ambassador urges Boxer move into sight.

Department—The IAPC met. Participants were Colombia, Argentina, the DR, Nicaragua, and the U.S. After hearing the DR Ambassador report of the revolt's origins, developments and apparent growing Castro-communist involvement, the IAPC considered whether it had any jurisdiction to act under Resolution IV of the 5th meeting of Foreign Ministers. No decision was taken, nor did the DR Ambassador request IAPC or OAS action, but the Argentine and Colombian Ambassadors stressed the need for the IAPC to keep informed of further developments.

Department—Deputy Assistant Secretary Sayre briefed the Venezuelan Chargé Perez de la Cova.

Late p.m.—Department—Costa Rica's Chargé called the Office Director for Central American Affairs to request the Department's assistance in evacuating Costa Rican nationals in the DR. He reported hearing of many atrocities there.

Ambassador urges police chief to restore order after "these bloody days."

Haina evacuation complete. All Embassy personnel have returned safely to SD.

During day.—Department—Ecuador's Ambassador to the U.S. Larrea and Peru's Chargé Gerberding were briefed on situation, especially with reference to the security of their nationals in the DR. They both recognized the need to protect U.S. and foreign nationals and the threat posed by Communist agitators helping to exploit the breakdown of law and order.

APRIL 28, 1965

Early a.m.—Members of provisional government (Molina, Caamano, Ramirez) called at Embassy. Embassy felt they were prepared to negotiate to avoid further bloodshed. Ambassador said Communists had taken over their movement and peace must be arranged. Declined to attend negotiations of opposing groups on grounds this is a Dominican matter.

Heavy gunfire continuing. Embassy residences hit.

Summary situation: Known Communists have been in palace. Some radio announcers are June 14 members. Communists clearly committing full resources. Molina said he couldn't control mob. Arms indiscriminately given to civilians, including known Communists. Looting, sacking. Rebel radio inciting mobs. Castro flavor on TV. Rebel tactics at limit of human decency.

Molina, Lovaton in asylum. Acting dean of diplomatic corps, Colombian Zarote, says issue quickly turned into Communist vs. non-Communist.

Late a.m.—Embassy recommends acceding to De los Santos request for 50 walkie-talkies.

Department—At the conclusion of the regular meeting of COAS, the DR Ambassador reported on events, highlighting Castro-Communist involvement.

Disorder unabated. Armed civilians shooting, looting.

Junta formation progressing.

Early p.m.—Radio announces junta of Benoit, Casado Saladin, Santana Carrasco, purpose to prepare for democratic elections.

Department—United States strongly disapproves return of Trujillo groups.

First National City Bank looted, police stations overrun by rebels.

Heavy bombing, air force advises civilians to evacuate.

Junta needs communications equipment.

Department—The Venezuelan Chargé was again briefed, this time by the Office Director of Venezuelan/Colombian Affairs. Perez de la Cova reiterated his interest in keeping informed so that he could inform his government.

Benoit telephoned Bennett requesting Marines. Bennett believes they were unwarranted at that time.

Secretary General of PRD says PRD no longer connected with struggle. If rebels win, it will be extreme left victory.

Conditions worsening. Embassy asks Washington to consider armed intervention.

Junta asks in writing for U.S. military assistance.

Situation much worse. American lives endangered; Ambassador urges landing Marines.

Late p.m.—Department—Marines are authorized to land to evacuate. Will announce in Washington that (1) action taken because Dominicans notified United States they were unable safeguard lives our citizens; (2) United States urges both sides cease-fire; (3) United States hopes differences can be resolved.

Marines landed. French have ship evacuating French nationals. Evacuation help offered to diplomatic corps members. Colombian Ambassador asked for U.S. protection of other embassies. Was refused on grounds of insufficient Marines. U.S. fully cooperating with Nuncio's and others' mediation efforts.

Police Chief says he cannot protect Americans. Benoit again requests U.S. military intervention. Delegation of U.S. citizens believe leftist mobs will sack homes. Embassy urging Americans to Embajador. AID office broken into. Evacuation area being fired on.

Department—ARA Office Directors briefed all Ambassadors and/or Chargés by telephone or a personal call on the DR developments; that many Latin American Ambassadors in the DR had requested U.S. help; that the Marines had landed; that extremists among the rebel group had grown; and that the U.S. was requesting that a special OAS Meeting be held the following morning.

"Paredon" shouted during shootings. Victims marched along streets, executed at wall.

Department—Ambassador Bunker called the OAS Secretariat to arrange the Thursday morning OAS meeting.

Riot control totally ineffective, members deserting. Looting, sacking of houses of British residents. British Embassy reports wounded lying on floor of hospital.

Embassies invaded.

During day—Department—The Office Director brought Ecuador's Ambassador and Peru's Chargé up to date.

APRIL 29, 1965

Early a.m.—Dominican Red Cross estimates 400 dead, 1,200 wounded. Surgery being performed without anesthesia or intravenous fluids.

Benoit writes American lives are endangered, he can't protect them, requests temporary intervention.

Nuncio very concerned over leftist domination of rebel movement.

Ambassador is against intervention for any reason unless conditions change.

Reid Cabral, Ramon Caceres request asylum in U.S. Embassy. Embassy sure they'd be killed if found.

Late a.m.—Department—Panama's Ambassador to U.S. Arias called Panama Office Director to say he'd talked to his President and was awaiting the latter's instruction.

Department—DR Ambassador Bonilla came to see Ambassador Bunker.

Department—The Brazil Office Director and Ambassador Magalhaes spoke and the Ambassador stressed his full support of the U.S. Government position.

Department—At special meeting of COAS, Ambassador Bunker reported landing of Marines to protect American lives and secure evacuation of U.S. nationals and others.

Ambassadors of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica expressed distress at turn of events in DR and indicated concern over U.S. unilateral action. Under instructions from their government they called for hemispheric action to consider this new urgent problem and the convocation of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers (MFM) was raised.

The COAS also approved a message to the Apostolic Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo, requesting that he arrange for a cease-fire. The meeting was recessed in order for the representatives to seek instructions on convoking an MFM.

An immediate circular telegram was dispatched instructing the U.S. Ambassadors to urge the member states to support a convocation of the MFM and all the OAS representatives were requested to recommend to their governments that they be given authority to vote in favor of such a meeting.

Police incapacitated. Junta troops' morale very low.

Early p.m.—Embassy transmits copy of junta request to OAS that it make immediate study to determine when free elections can be held in DR.

Department—Remaining Marines on Boxer ordered ashore.

Bombing, strafing continues. Red Cross burying people where they fell. Street incidents frequent.

Emergency food desperately needed.

Meeting diplomatic corps SD decides there is no basis for diplomatic intervention this time. U.S. Ambassador given list of food needed by all Embassies. Embassies of Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Mexico violated. Colombian Ambassador said he'd cabled Bogota that without Marines, DR will be another Cuba.

Tons of beans, flour, milk, oil distributed by U.S. Requests more.

Heavy sniper fire at Embassy. Embassy Salvador violated. As result, Ambassador asked Navy to bring ships near shore.

Marines fired on at 1:40 p.m., returned fire.

Troops if land would go Hotel Embajador, maybe later secure residences between there and palace, where most Americans live. Mobs looting; largest battle in history of DR.

Evacuees continue.

Department—Brazilian Ambassador brought up to date on developments by a State official.

Department—Mr. Brandt of the Venezuelan Embassy was brought up to date by a State official.

Late p.m.—More forces needed.

Department—Suggested international safety zone for all foreigners and OAS action to achieve political settlement.

Department—Bunker telephoned OAS Ambassadors from Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia.

Department—Ecuadoran Ambassador and Peruvian Chargé brought up to date by a State officer.

Department—The COAS was resumed to consider the Venezuelan and Chilean proposals for a ministerial meeting. Venezuela's request offered an action for convoking the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty and the MFM under the charter. The COAS acted on the Chilean request for an Article 39 MFM, which was approved by a vote of 18–1 (Uruguay)–1 (Dominican Republic). Uruguay voted against the proposal because its government considered the revolution to be an internal matter and the DR abstained because the reason given for convoking the meeting did not explicitly state the Communist threat. A U.S. proposal for the MFM to convene on April 30, rather than May 1, lacked one vote for approval. At the close of the meeting, the U.S. made an advance presentation to the COAS of a resolution for adoption by the MFM calling for the naming of a committee of the MFM to investigate the situation in the DR and calling for the cooperation of all the member states. A circular telegram was sent to our Embassies instructing they seek approval of the resolution for prompt adoption by the MFM.

Department—Informs Embassy of landing of 2,000 more troops to protect U.S. citizens.

APRIL 30, 1965

Early a.m.—Department—President announces 1,700 Marines ashore.

Nuncio still active trying bring opposing sides together, praised United States for performing humanitarian action in sending Marines.

Department—Magnet, Chilean OAS Ambassador, called Bunker.

Department—The Brazilian Ambassador was again briefed by State.

Department—Reported OAS call for cease-fire and neutral zone and urged Embassy to persuade compliance and solicit assistance of diplomatic corps.

Department—Bunker arranged with Mora to fly to DR.

Early p.m.—British Embassy reports appalling situation. Streets full of dead. No water in hospitals where halls are filled with wounded. Street fighting continues as does reign of terror.

Two hours earlier American Embassy attacked by snipers. Heavy firing at Embassy and residence all during previous night.

Department—Mr. Mann called Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Margain.

Department—Ambassador Stewart met with Betancourt. Betancourt stated United States would be in embarrassing position and under increasing pressure from Latin Americans unless it induced OAS to move fast. He advocated Figueres' plan for OAS caretaker government for DR with agreement of the principal Dominican parties. The group would be buttressed by token forces from OAS countries and would make preparations for elections within a short period of time.

Department—Bunker talked with many Latins prior to OAS meeting. Decided no resolution on Mora trip—rather that Bunker would announce it.

Department—Mr. Mann called the Mexican Foreign Minister, Carrillo Flores, and reassured him that we were not going back to the "old days" and told him Ambassador Freeman would be showing him a cable explaining our position.

Department—Special OAS meeting. At this meeting Ambassador Bunker briefed the COAS on the landing of U.S. airborne troops and the situation in the DR in accordance with our promise of keeping the council informed. The Secretary General reported of the communications he had received from the Apostolic Nuncio and his efforts to effect a cease-fire. At the initiative of the United States, the Secretary General was authorized to go to Santo Domingo to establish an initial OAS presence and to prepare the arrival of the OAS Committee which was expected to be designated by the MFM. The meeting was primarily informational and there was no discussion of OAS action.

Late p.m.—Department—Requests Embassy to assure food is given to all factions.

Barricades, grenades, roadblocks, outrages, populace's fatigue at killing reported.

Department—Panama's Ambassador to the U.S., Arias, called Mr. Vaughn to offer his assistance in the COAS. Mr. Vaughn conveyed his hope for a cease-fire and stated his belief that the most effective cease-fire would be through an agency of an OAS investigative committee present in the DR. He said the problem remained of when such a group could be constituted and sent and that in the meantime the United States was establishing an international zone.

Radio Havana attacking Wessin savagely. Rebels reportedly refusing passage of ambulances. Hospitals unable to cope with wounded. Police guards not at all Embassies. United States meeting to request supply of food to Guatemalan, Ecuadorian, Mexican Embassies.

Cease-fire signed. Two Marines killed. Eleven wounded. Arms being shipped to interior. Ambassador Martin arrived.

During day.—Department—Ecuadorian Ambassador and Peruvian Chargé were briefed by a State official. They began to indicate their concern that OAS was in fact presented with a crisis, i.e., a threat to hemispheric stability. The question of contributions of military units was discussed as well as the heavy cable traffic between here and Ecuador and Peru.

Night of April 30; and morning May 1.—Department—All Latin American Embassies were called and briefed on U.S. position in Dominican crisis.

MAY 1, 1965

Early a.m.—Need more ships for evacuees.

Martin present. City quieter in night. Nuncio read cease-fire.

Early p.m.—Telephones out. Electric plant under rebel attack.

More troops needed.

Some U.S. businessmen have changed minds re evacuation, have sent families out.

Rumors that rebels re-arming during cease-fire.

Department—Substantially same conversations as before were held with the Ecuadorian Ambassador and Peruvian Ambassador and Peruvian Chargé.

Department—A State official for Colombian/Venezuelan affairs conversed with the Colombian Ambassador to the U.S., Uribe. Uribe said he favored a multilateral force. He hoped the OAS would have the authority to determine when the international forces (not U.S.) were no longer needed in the DR.

Department—After the organization of the MFM during the morning session, the country positions began to take shape. The U.S. had two resolutions submitted: (1) calling for the establishment of a committee to go to the DR; and (2) calling for military contingents from other member states. A Mexican resolution reaffirmed the duties of the member states under the charter, particularly those of non-intervention, and called upon the U.S. to withdraw its troops. The Chilean resolution also called upon the U.S. to end its unilateral action as soon as compatible with its humanitarian mission. At the request of the Brazilian and some other delegates, a plea

was made to separate the urgent matter of gettting a committee appointed from the more doctrinal points dealing with the principles of the charter. A compromise resolution was worked out, based on a portion of a Mexican draft. It was co-sponsored by seven member states (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and the U.S.) and the MFM adopted it by a vote of 19–0–1 (Chile).

A committee composed of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama was appointed. The United States arranged for transportation of the committee to the Dominican Republic and the committee departed from Washington on Sunday, May 2 at 6:30 a.m.

Caamano promised Nuncio and Martin there would be no power station attacks.

Department—The Brazil desk officer spoke to the Brazilian Ambassador suggesting Brazilian participation in a multilateral peace and suggested Brazil consult with other Latin Americans. The Ambassador responded to the recommendation by drafting a cable to his government strongly urging our suggested course. He declared that he wanted to emphasize that the instructions which he and the Brazilian Ambassador to the OAS had received to support the U.S. at a difficult time reflected a position of conscience and not a bargaining position.

Department—Messrs. Mann, Vaughn, Sayre, and Betancourt met at the Peruvian Embassy. Betancourt's position, as expressed the previous night, hadn't changed.

Late p.m.—Department—U.S.S.R. asking for Security Council meeting.

500 evacuated today.

Extremists reported ready to fight on for return of Bosch. Several thousand armed civilians.

Department—The Brazilian Ambassador called the Brazilian desk officer to exchange information.

MAY 2, 1965

Early a.m.—Department—OAS team arriving, empowered to investigate "all aspects" of DR situation and submit report with recommendations ASAP. Embassy to render assistance as requested.

Martin makes second SitRep: Reports meetings with Caamano at rebel Headquarters. May 1. Caamano stated people want Bosch back, that he and other Bosch supporters are in full control of 25,000 armed men; that rebels will honor cease-fire and agree to ISZ as mapped. Martin says Caamano is "dangerous man," intelligent, crafty. Could become DR's Castro. Not crazy, as some think.

Martin reports: Rebellion began as pro-Bosch, now taken over by military and Castroistite extremists who are effective leaders. No political revolution now in sight; cease-fire now in effect but very shaky. "Hate and fanaticism on all sides make it probable that further military action will be necessary."

SitRep: 700 persons evacuated Saturday, in ratio 1:4 A/Cs to non-A/Cs. City relatively quiet by May 1 nightfall; rest of country is calm.

Early p.m.—Nuncio and Mora thank President Johnson. Embassy passed quiet night and day; no attacks.

Mora requested to inform Caamano of impending move to establish corridor across city by U.S. troops. Mora concurs with the necessity.

Department—Bennett instructed to tell Mora and OAS team that U.S. is establishing "line of communication" between San Isidro and ISZ, to obtain their concurrence if possible, and have them announce publicly the move just prior to movement of troops.

Embassy emphasizes impartiality of troops.

Department—Solomon appointed coordinator of U.S. relief effort in DR.

Late p.m.—OAS team arrived.

As of 8 p.m., 2,500–3,000 evacuees taken out by United States, of which 1,500 U.S. citizens.

MAY 3, 1965

Early a.m.—Bennett and General Palmer met with OAS team evening of May 2, obtained concurrence with link-up of U.S. forces. OAS team met earlier with LA Ambassadors, were "appalled" at what they heard, stated situation much graver than had suspected. Chairman of OAS team thought that return to Washington might be most useful thing team could do; Bennett asked them to stay on, at least in their majority.

SitRep: OAS members stated they had not realized situation was so bad in DR; U.S. businessmen's group supports Embassy's interpretation of Communist involvement in rebellion; link-up of U.S. forces via city-wide corridor effected during night;

Caamano refused to guarantee safe passage of food distribution trucks if identified as U.S. Embassy plans to begin relief food distribution today.

Department—Bunker called Brazil's Magalhaes and Bolivia's Diez de Medina.

Department—Secretary Rusk saw Betancourt.

Early p.m.—Department—OAS general committee met in closed session. Bolivia called for joint action on humanitarian and Communist takeover grounds. Ecuador opposed unilateral action as direct violation of OAS Charter. Brazil announced full support of the U.S. resolution for military contingents. Bunker gave situation report on U.S. activities, said U.S. would help transmit supplies and personnel from all points. The U.S. resolution calling for urgent aid to DR was approved.

Bunker then argued for contingents from other members. He emphasized that U.S. regretted no such force available in time, and U.S. acted in absence such force. Ecuador and Mexico wanted to ask investigating committee for more troops, but Argentina said troops now there should first be internationalized. Plenary session then opened and approved U.S. resolution for urgent aid.

OAS Commission in unanimous agreement that U.S. action prevented chaos or worse. Panamanian Ambassador to DR states in letter to commission that chaos was near when U.S. intervened, recommends inter-American military force.

Department—Instructs Embassy to push suggestion regarding getting government in DR going again, in conversations with OAS team.

Department—LA Ambassadors to DR who wish to have their embassies included in ISZ should request OAS team to seek Caamano's agreement to do this, and request their respective FOs to support them in petition. No action toward extension of ISZ until agreement with Washington.

Late p.m.—Department—General Committee of MFM met to consider proposed drafts. Chile opposed U.S. draft on ground the charter does not justify multilateral armed force, and U.S. has violated article 15 by unilateral action. Chile said meeting must condemn U.S. action. Colombia called for a truly international force under supreme authority of OAS. Bolivia and Paraguay announced support for U.S. draft. Ecuador wanted purposes of forces more precisely defined. Costa Rica lamented U.S. intervention but said system should not be paralyzed by elevating single principle of non-intervention to exclusion other principles, particularly representative democracy. Uruguay said they would vote for withdrawal of U.S. troops before establishment of inter-American force and added present inter-American anti-Communist instruments do not envisage mission outlined by the President May 2. Mexico reiterated that it would not legalize act it considers contrary to principle of non-intervention. Ambassador Bunker closed emphasizing U.S. objective was to protect lives, restore order, and assist in recovery of the DR.

Bennett states there are many reports that rebels are giving up organized resistance. Caamano is apparently trying to work a deal with composition of provisional government. OAS meets with junta.

Department—The Haiti desk officer met a first secretary of the Peruvian Embassy, Augusto Bayona, at a party. Bayona was extremely critical of (1) the U.S. "lack of form" in failing to consult with or at least inform Latin American Presidents of the dispatch of Marines, and (2) the "humanitarian" justification of our actions. He conceded that Peru is unalterably opposed to a "Castro takeover" but that U.S. procedures were so appalling they overshadowed any practical results. He finally stated that the multilateral force approach idea was too late and that the Latins couldn't swallow such a transparent device for justifying ex post facto U.S. intervention.

Department—Mr. Mann talked to Betancourt on the telephone re the latter's statement on his visit with the President today.

MAY 4, 1965

Early a.m.—Martin states that according to info from General Imbert, rebel leadership is mostly ready to surrender but fear execution by DR police.

Department—Bunker and Venezuela's Tejera talked twice. Bunker called Sevilla Sacasa.

Department—Bolivian Ambassador to U.S. Sanjines, called Bolivia desk officer to inform him that Boliva would support U.S. in OAS and UN.

Department—Bunker met with Venezuelan Tejera.

Department—Ecuadoran Ambassador to U.S. Larrea called Ecuador desk officer to see if Department had any information confirming rumors the former had heard that Rio Conference might be postponed. He was told we had not heard rumor and had no information.

Rundown on food shipment distribution and medical supplies given. Military situation much quieter—6 killed, 49 wounded in combat since April 29.

Department—Haiti's Foreign Minister Chalmers and Haitian Ambassador to the U.S. Theard saw Mr. Vaughn and indicated their complete support of the U.S. position.

Department—Mr. Mann talked with President Betancourt on the latter's statement on his visit with the President yesterday.

Early p.m.—Department—The Acting Representative of Argentina to the COAS, Gobbi, called Ambassador Bunker's deputy who informed Gobbi we were continuing negotiations with Venezuela and Colombia and were hoping for a satisfactory formula.

Department—Ambassador Bunker's deputy, Ward Allen, called the DR Ambassador to the OAS, Bonilla Atiles, to give him Embassy Santo Domingo's reply to Bonilla's idea to send 30 Dominican doctors to the DR.

Department—Panama's Ambassador Arias telephoned the Panama desk officer to state his belief that on the multilateral forces issue, he could count on 12 votes in favor of the U.S. resolution and 3 definitely opposed (Chile, Uruguay, Mexico). Arias thought Colombia might support us, in which case Peru and Ecuador might also.

Department—Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Allen called Ambasador Sevilla-Sacasa (Nicaragua) to arrange for postponement of the OAS meeting from 3:00 to 4:30 p.m.

Department—Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Allen met with Venezuela's Ambassador Tejera to discuss Ambassador Bunker's statement and the paragraph 3 change.

Department—White House Sit. Room reports telecon with Bowdler in SD, stating OAS Commission's recommendation to MFM that multi-national force be set up at disposition OAS.

Department—Ambassador Bunker again met with Venezuela's Tejera.

Department—The Brazil desk officer called the Brazilian Ambassador, Magalhaes, to tell him Governor Harriman and Brazil's President were lunching together today to discuss the DR. Ambassador Magalhaes again reiterated his support of U.S. position.

Bennett reports receipts of OAS team request for extension of ISZ to protect all embassies in SD.

Department—Gobbi of Argentina called Ambassador Bunker's deputy, Allen, again. When Allen gave him the new paragraph 3 and the statement Ambassador Bunker would make, Gobbi replied it was magnificent.

Department—The Uruguayan Chargé, Galbiati, called the Uruguay desk to ask whether Ambassador Harriman was going to Uruguay. He was told we had recommended such a stop. He was asked what would be the position of the Uruguayan delegate to the UNSC and he replied that he was opposed to intervention in any form. Galbiati doubted, though, that Uruguay would introduce a resolution and we expressed the hope that Uruguay would take the position of her Foreign Minister, i.e., that while the SC had a legal right to interest itself in a matter under OAS consideration, the SC does not necessarily always find it convenient to do so.

Department—Haiti's Chalmers and Theard saw Secretary Rusk and indicated their complete support of the U.S. position.

Department—The Brazilian Minister Carvalho e Silva telephoned a Brazil desk officer to state that the reports he had received were that the OAS meeting would consider various proposals, that each would be discussed but that no voting would take place until discussion of all proposals had been completed. He assumed, therefore, that voting on the "joint U.S./Brazil proposal" would not take place today and inquired whether this was what the desk officer had in mind when speaking with Ambassador Magalhaes earlier in the day. He was told that the officer had not referred specifically to a "joint U.S./Brazil proposal" but had merely indicated generally that voting would probably not take place during today's afternoon session.

Late p.m.—Department—Prior to and during the MFM meeting, the U.S. delegation had the following contacts:

(1) Minister Simon Arboleda (Colombia) stated Colombia's idea to propose an impartial inter-American force under the OAS. The OAS would decide the number of troops and duration of their stay but U.S. withdrawal of troops should not be a precondition to passage of the resolution.

(2) DR Ambassador Hebron and Minister Gonzalez expressed dismay that a new government had been formed by the rebels and that at least Venezuela might recognize it. They said Caamano's election might be challenged since the same Congress had only last week elected a provisional president who had since taken asylum in an embassy, presumably without resigning his post.

(3) Haiti's Ambassador to OAS, Baguidy, discussed emergency aid.

(4) It was impressed upon Brazil's First Secretary Pinto the essentiality of OAS states making troops available to the OAS.

(5) Peruvian Secretary Sabogal and Mexican Advisor Borrego criticized the U.S. for intervention, said we were not there for humanitarian reasons only and that the Rio Treaty rather than Article 39 of MFM was the proper vehicle.

Department—The General Committee of MFM met. They agreed all future meetings would be public. The report of the OAS investigative committee in the DR was read and included a statement that the committee believed it would be useful for OAS members to establish an inter-American military force under the OAS. Ambassador Bunker reported U.S. emergency food and medical contributions. Peru quoted its Senate's and House's resolutions criticizing U.S. action and the inter-American forces idea. Mexico recounted the history of the principle of non-intervention and said the Dominicans can decide their form of government without interference. They were convinced inter-American principles would be reaffirmed and the American crisis overcome. Ecuador stated it would not support unilateral or multilateral intervention on the grounds the charter does not permit preventive action and MFM was an improper forum to conclude a new agreement authorizing such action. Ecuador said it would vote for the Mexican resolution calling for troop withdrawal. Costa Rica stated that the DR's life was at stake and the OAS must act, noting that the DR had not protested intervention. Chile asked the OAS committee to report on whether or not the DR had requested unilateral or collective action. Venezuela called for OAS action, said troop withdrawal would be disastrous, that Communist involvement provided a real danger. Brazil strongly supported the U.S. draft and said the Mexican resolution was superseded by collective actions already authorized. Salvador favored adoption of the U.S. draft with amendments. Colombia called for an inter-American force under OAS and a cessation of criticisms of the U.S. The DR representative thanked supporters of the U.S. resolution, said he represented the military junta headed by Colonel Benoit. Ambassador Bunker closed with a plea to accept the committee recommendation for combined military forces.

Bennett and Bowdler report a new cease-fire draft by OAS team, to be presented to Caamano and Colonel Benoit of junta; OAS asks for U.S. cooperation with its terms.

MAY 5, 1965

Early a.m.—Texts of OAS memos to U.S. Ambassador report agreement on both sides to negotiate cease-fire. Says U.S. cooperation indispensable.

OAS requests U.S. assistance in evacuation of asylees.

Food stocks exhausted but United States supplying at distribution centers. Backlog in evacuation. International zone extended.

Insufficient troops protect Guatemalan Embassy located outside zone. OAS planning return to Washington as soon as Act of Santo Domingo signed.

Late a.m.—Department—Brazil desk officer called Brazilian Ambassador Magalhaes to report on Harriman's meeting with Brazil's President. Magalhaes reiterated support of United States.

Department—Mr. Vaughn's office called Magalhaes to express gratitude for Brazil's support.

Department—State officer called daughter of Ecuador's Ambassador in DR to report the latter OK.

Increasing number of weapons being turned in at U.S. checkpoints. Three Marine battalions ashore, one landing. Food still scarce.

Department—Costa Rican Ambassador Facio called the Central American desk officer to report on his OAS speech and request that the President see Figueres.

Department—The Ecuador desk officer called Ecuador's Ambassador Larrea to inform him that safety zone now includes Ecuadorian Embassy in the DR. In response to Larrea's questions, officer confirmed connection.

Early p.m.—Mr. Mann saw Betancourt, Figueres, and Gonzalo Facio re Betancourt's proposals on DR.

Department—Panama's Ambassadors Arias and Calimari reported to Panama officer that despite criticisms of U.S. LA countries glad United States moved in. Thought if Colombia supported United States Peru and Ecuador might.

Embassy urging formation of provisional government junta or OAS will need to establish one. Caamano says military leaders will accept anything worked out.

Department—Betancourt reported to State's Ambassador Stewart his belief the U.S. multilateral force resolution would pass. He confirmed he, Figueres, and Muñoz Marin had encouraged acceptance of the resolution. He said the Chilean and Peruvian Ambassadors had agreed to nominate Betancourt and Lleras Camargo as OAS commissioners if U.S. resolution on this passed. Venezuela would nominate Figueres and United States would nominate Muñoz Marin.

Department—The Ecuador desk officer informed Larrea, their Ambassador to United States, of a cable we'd sent for them and evacuation plane for Ecuadorians.

Department—Chile officer was told by Chilean Ambassador Tomic that United States showed complete disregard for OAS, that United States could have influenced and could still influence any government in DR, that a Communist-controlled government could not emerge, that United States and Chile should seek viable political solution. Tomic denied Chilean Ambassador Magnet stated U.S. should be punished. Desk officer rebutted and warned U.S. goodwill to Chile was jeopardized by Chilean actions.

Early p.m.—Brazil desk officer telephoned Magalhaes with situation report.

Department—Bolivia's Ambassador Sanjines called on Mr. Vaughn and reported President Johnson's expressing gratitude for Bolivia's support.

During day.—Department—Bunker and Allen in constant session with Colombian Ambassador Oribe, Argentine Delegate Gobbi, Costa Rican Ambassador Facio, and Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera.

Late p.m.—Department officer told by Ecuador's OAS Ambassador that he disliked both United States and Chile proposals due to fear permanent inter-American armed force would develop.

Department—Bunker aide talked with Ambassador Clairmont, El Salvador, to insure support of OAS force and opposition to proposal to seat a representative of Caamano group.

Late p.m. and early a.m.—Prior to and during OAS meeting, Bunker aide had following contacts:

(1) Complimented Paraguayan delegate Yodice on his statement of support during previous session. Yodice gave substance of his much stronger statement he was instructed to give along with his favorable vote at this session.

(2) Melo of Argentina seemed hard-put to accept likelihood that amended U.S. resolution would be adopted. Feared if OAS condoned U.S. action, even Argentina might some day have reason to fear intervention.

(3) Talked to Honduran Ambassador Midence re position on U.S. draft and noted he had not made a statement during the preceding two meetings of the General Committee. He described briefly the nature of his statement for session about to start.

Late p.m.—Department—Bunker aide conversed with Ambassador Jacome, Ecuador, to urge shift from negative position. With the operations center, arranged telephone conversation of Jacome with his Foreign Minister in Ecuador. He made speech against before conversation with Quito, and could not change later.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken.

ARRANGING AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE

Senator AIKEN. I was going to ask the Secretary, were the Bosch forces and the junta both accepting the OAS commission? Who does that leave to bring into the fold before they can really start establishing law and order in the government?

Mr. MANN. I think this is the important question of the hour, whether the OAS commission, even this afternoon, may be talking to these rebel forces, whether they can arrange for some kind of cease-fire——

Senator AIKEN. They have just——

Mr. MANN [continuing]. Effective cease-fire, and in some way in which we can get these people talking to each other, this has been our objective from the very first hour.

Senator AIKEN. The ticker has announced that both sides have accepted it. I wonder who is left outside? Is there a third force to be dealt with and, if so, what is it?

Mr. MANN. I do not know that there is any organized third force. We are not sure what the relationship is between Caamano, who is a pretty tough fellow himself, a cop himself—he is not a great politician——

Senator AIKEN. He is an offshoot of the junta?

Mr. MANN. He is in charge of the rebel forces, so-called rebel forces. I am using the word "rebel" because they have no ostensible formal organization.

Senator AIKEN. You mean the Bosch?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. We can call them the Bosch forces.

BOSCH AND THE REBELS

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask that question. Is it definite that the rebels and Bosch are hand in hand?

Mr. MANN. I think some——

Senator SPARKMAN. It was a little confusing at first report.

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. It was originally referred to, I think, as the Bosch rebels.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I think that I can only say that we are not precisely sure that anybody is really in control of the rebel forces. I think there probably must be, and we won't know this for another 24 or 36 hours, simply because when our people in there are shot at, and even the OAS commission requested safe passage and it was denied by this fellow Caamano—the hatreds there generated, the speeches being made in which Bosch and Communist leaders appear on the same platform, inciting Dominicans to kill all Americans on sight, and this sort of thing, is going on now. We are very hopeful that the OAS commission can arrange, let us say, Caamano and some of his people who have committed some pretty terrible deeds in terms of lining people up against the wall and shooting them down, maybe they can get together with the Benoit bunch, and we can build from there.

I think what we are thinking of is a new provisional government around which people can rally, recover from this thing, and begin to think in terms of preelection activity and ultimate elections.

STRENGTH OF THE REBELS

Senator CARLSON. Is there any estimate of the numerical strength of these rebels and these offshoots?

Mr. MANN. Yes. I have seen estimates. Bosch is claiming 50,000. I think in terms of people who have been given machineguns, tommyguns, rifles, and that sort of thing, probably as many as 10,000. In terms of the number of people who have been fighting, who are using these to shoot inside the rebel-held part of the city, probably no more than 2,500. We believe it most probable that the residents in the part of the city that they hold are terrorized and that there is a great deal of looting which is taking place, coldblooded political vengeance, shooting people down, this sort of thing.

I would say we would expect of this bunch, maybe—and this is only a guess now because our information is so fragmentary—maybe an equal division between the people of Caamano, who claims to be Bosch's principal lieutenant, and, perhaps, the Communist forces. It may be split half and half.

What the relationship is between Caamano and the Communist forces we do not know. We even have reports that the Communists at one time decided to bury all of their weapons in the city because they thought Bosch was coming back, and they would wait a while

and then knock him off, and they were planning ahead for this kind of a situation.

Unlike non-Communist groups, these Communist groups get orders. They have discipline. They have plans; they carry them out with great speed and with a great deal of forward planning.

But our aim is the same as it was before, to get a cease-fire, to find some way to restore order, to make sure out of this that democracy prevails. I think if we are speaking of democracy, we can say that we do not believe it would be a service to democracy if out of all of this comes another Castro-type regime in which free elections are never permitted.

Senator MORSE. I do not think anybody quarrels with that.

MEMORANDUM ON LEGAL RIGHTS

I would like to formalize my request, modifying it as follows: I would like to have the committee approve that Dr. Marcy send down to Secretary Rusk tonight—I do not think we ought to require him to go through Secretary Mann—a letter that sets forth, based on our discussion here this afternoon, a request for a memorandum of chronology based upon the discussion we have had this afternoon, as to just what has happened as far as action by our Government is concerned, from the very time of the outbreak of this revolution, including all the steps that we have taken with the OAS and its agencies, as well as with the various groups in the Dominican Republic.

Then, second, I would like to have the Department supply us for executive use only, both of these for executive use only, a legal memorandum that will put us in a position to answer the charges that are made and are going to be made concerning whether or not we have acted within our legal rights, both in regard to the evacuating of our people and in regard to our obligations under the Organization of American States and the Rio Convention. I would like to make that a formal request.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.

Senator Church.

UNILATERAL INTERVENTION

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I have been listening for an hour, an hour and a half, mainly to get all the information that you are here to supply us. It seems to me on the basis of what I heard, two things are clear. One is that we cannot be certain really as of now about the nature of the role or the extent of the Communist control, although we had some evidence to suggest there was a definite Communist element there. Second, the discussion of the juridical basis leaves me pretty cold. I cannot really see where we can make much of a case on that ground.

What we have done plainly is to intervene unilaterally, first for a rescue mission, and then we have added considerably more troops for a purpose that is different from the original one. I think in that step we have assumed a very special and grave responsibility because obviously the presence of American troops has altered the course of revolution. At the best or the worst it is a matter that probably all of South America will debate. I think, therefore, that

we have a very grave responsibility to see to it that as a result of this unilateral American military intervention the end consequence is neither the establishment of another military junta nor certainly any form of Communist government, but rather a genuine democratic regime that is based upon the consent of the Dominican people.

If we do not come out of there, then the repercussions of this action we will live with for years and years to come, and I think the impact will be most hurtful to the interests of this country. On the other hand, if we do come out well, then I think we have made a case that we not only can stand on and live with, but a case that can be useful in connection with other crises elsewhere in the hemisphere in years to come.

IMPORTANCE OF FREE ELECTIONS

I only want to stress the importance I attach to the one statement you made, Mr. Secretary, that we hope to move now toward a provisional government that can restore order and then, under the principles I have grown up to believe in, free elections and an opportunity for the Dominican people to choose their own government. In connection with that, I would hope that our own troops could be removed as speedily as possible and that the OAS could come to play a meaningful role. My chief interest now is where we go from here.

Mr. MANN. Let me say that we concur completely in your suggestion that the end result of this operation should be a true democracy. We hope that we can achieve this.

I think there will have to be a period of reconstruction and consolidation and a restoration of order. I think there will have to be some kind of provisional government.

On the first point that you make, I would not want to leave this committee with the impression that I personally think that the Communist danger is very small. Castro started out with 12 people, and what you can do with a very small group in a situation of chaos like this where there is no law and order, if you walk away from that too soon, Senator——

Senator CHURCH. Of course, I did not suggest that it was either great or small. I suggested only that we could not be certain on the basis of evidence that is in.

Mr. MANN. The question is not really at this moment who controls these mobs. I think the answer is clear as to that. The question is if we were to walk away or if we had not gone in, who would have emerged out of all of this chaos as the Government of the Dominican Republic? I would rather put it that way because I think these are the terms we are thinking in.

OAS CHECKS ON U.S. ACTIONS

I wonder if I might talk about something that is very basic that I mentioned to this committee before, and I think we need your counsel on this. The Organization of American States Charter was signed in 1948, if I am not mistaken. The U.N. Charter was signed in 1945. The Rio Treaty was signed about this time.

Now, the purpose, essentially, of the OAS Charter, the principles written into it, sovereign juridical equality, nonintervention, self-determination, et cetera, the essential purpose of this was to check the power of the United States. They wanted to check our power because of our interventions during the days of Wilson and during the days of Theodore Roosevelt, the interventions.

The difficulty we are now finding ourselves in, and I think this is quite serious for the Nation, is that no one foresaw in the mid-1940's that the great problem of our decade is how you prevent Communist subversion in a collective way, in a legal way. It is simply not written into the charter, and I would suggest to those who are interested that we begin thinking about the definitions of "self-defense," the restrictions which were placed on that, the definitions of "armed attack," because these documents are written in terms of 19th century aggression, armies marching across frontiers, fleets shelling a port, that sort of thing. The kind of aggression we face today in this hemisphere, and it is just as dangerous and in some ways more deadly, is the aggression by terror, infiltration, and by violence.

REWRITING THE CHARTER

Senator MORSE. May I say, Mr. Secretary, the Treaty of Punta del Este and Washington Agreement call for just a reconsideration of the articles of OAS that you are talking about. How can they agree with Punta del Este and the Treaty of Washington, how can they agree and not apply unless there is some rewriting of the charter?

Mr. MANN. Exactly.

Now, when we come to the issue of rewriting the charter, this is really what is going to divide the Latin Americans. We will be criticized, Senator, on superficial technical grounds, if I may use the word "superficial." Mexico, for example, is going to adhere to strict nonintervention.

Underlying that thesis is, and this is consistent with their vote last July at the OAS, that it is perfectly all right if every Latin American country in this hemisphere goes Communist. Whether Castro holds elections and gives his people a freedom of choice is not really important so long as there is no outside influence by the United States. Intervention by Russian communism and that sort of thing is perfectly all right.

Now, we are going to be faced with that in the weeks ahead. I would suggest that, I would hope that, this month at the Rio conference we can raise this very basic issue, and we can say that it is all right to talk about United States intervention and to tie our hands, but who is going to tie the hands of the Russians and the Chinese and the Cubans.

THE REAL INTERVENTION

Really you can make a very good argument on the basis that the real intervention in the Dominican Republic took place when these 85 people were trained to overthrow the Government of the Dominican Republic, to institute in its place a Communist dictatorship. I will be surprised if in the coming weeks we do not get some pretty

good evidence to support this, and I would say that in point of fact what we are doing in there now is taking a counterinterventionist attitude, trying to make sure that out of all of this chaos the Dominican people themselves will have a free choice, not a choice dictated by a committee or anything of that kind, but a free election. I would say the best defense against communism in this hemisphere is a free election.

But we must not be naive about the forms. Latin Americans and their culture are not like the Anglo-Saxon culture. They have highly centralized political systems, not federalized. They have highly centralized economic systems, great power in the federal government, and culturally they are accustomed to voting for, in favor of, the party in power.

Now, we must not be so naive to think that just the mere holding of an election is democracy, because if we get to that point then if we lose one inning of the ball game we have had it. The Communists will never lose, and we have to look at this, I think, in greater depth and in terms of the great threat which subversion poses for our own security and our own survival in this hemisphere.

There are now guerrilla bands in Venezuela, in Colombia, and we have a report in today from a good source in the Venezuelan party, the Communist Party, that because of the critical attitude taken on juridical principles of the Venezuelan Government, on May 4 they are launching attacks against us in Venezuela, against us on a large scale, including murder of American officials.

CLOSING OF THE CAMPINAS SUGAR MILL

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I have one other question. I notice every rebeliion has to have a little fuel to feed on, otherwise the leaders do not succeed. Did the closing down of the sugar mill in Campinas make any contribution to this rebellion? I believe they were the largest employers in the island.

Mr. MANN. I think a great many things—I am not familiar with that mill, but the drop in the price of sugar in a country which had a sugar economy was the worst blow of all.

Senator AIKEN. It was the lifeblood or a good share of it.

Mr. MANN. The United Fruit Co. closed out its banana operations, which was another blow to the economy, and it created widespread unemployment. The attempt to reach some balance in their budget was another important factor because this increased unemployment.

The birth rate in this country, like many others, is very high. The capacity of governments to govern efficiently and keep this growth rate up and that sort of thing is very low.

Senator AIKEN. Probably letting them bring in tractors after they got rid of Trujillo made it worse.

CHEATING ON THE COFFEE AGREEMENT

Mr. MANN. There is another factor. They have been cheating on the coffee agreement. They exported too much coffee because they desperately needed the revenue, and then were cut back.

Senator AIKEN. Not our friends at Santiago—they would not do that, would they?

Mr. MANN. Yes sir.

REBELLIONS AGAINST PRIVILEGE

Senator CHURCH. To get back again, Mr. Secretary, I think none of us on this committee are consciously naive about the Communist menace nor the techniques that are employed.

Mr. MANN. I am sure you are not. That never entered my mind, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. But I think there is an opposite side to the coin that you mention. On the one hand, we have the problem that the Communists are using methods of infiltration and subversion to bring down existing regimes, and a relatively small number of well-equipped and highly disciplined Communists might, in fact, bring down a government and then impose a Communist government against the will of the people.

This is a very serious problem, and I agree with you when you say popular elections are one of the best protections against a Communist government. I do not think the Communist government has yet been established on the basis of popular elections, and that is a pretty good record.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. On the other hand, we have to look at the opposite side of the coin, because every tyranny in this hemisphere is not Communist in character. We were born, our own national security was based upon principles that we have since avowed, the right of a revolution against tyranny as resting with the people. We still profess to believe this, and if you got a military junta or a corrupt tyrannical government of one kind run by a clique of privileged people, and the mass of the people have no way to control it or direct its affairs, rebellion may be the only method that they can use. It was our only method at one time in our own history.

I cannot foresee revolutions of that character occurring within the next few years in which there will not be some Communist elements attached, either trying to infiltrate the movement or take it over. So, we are really on the horns of a dilemma.

On the one hand, we have to protect ourselves against Communist infiltration; on the other, not to try to use American power for the purpose of perpetuating other forms of tyranny elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Mr. MANN. I think you have just given an accurate statement of U.S. policy, Senator.

PERMIT PEOPLE TO CHANGE GOVERNMENTS

Senator CHURCH. So, if you are going to revise this charter in ways that are meant to cope with the Communist problem, we also have got to find a method for permitting the people to change governments that are unsatisfactory or oppressive, otherwise unwelcome, and I do not know how that can be done. I do know that we are not going to be able to intervene, I should not think, in every country in Latin America with American military forces wherever we find that there are Communist elements connected with some kind of uprising. I think that kind of doctrine might be a most self-defeating one.

On the other hand, the Caribbean is a place of great sensitivity. In view of our experience with the Cuban Government, I would believe that to have us simply say in our own self-interest we have had to move in, and having experienced a Communist government in nearby Cuba that made that island a missile base only 2 years ago that threatened the very life and survival of this Nation, there is good reason, I should think, that we would not want to see a similar government established in the adjoining island.

But I think, having done that, we have assumed a very special responsibility that cannot be easily shirked now—and I know there would be no disposition on your part or on the part of the President to shirk it—that is to see that this thing comes out with some form of government that is based upon the decent respect for the people of the Dominican Republic and represents a government of their own choice and acceptance.

IRRATIONAL APPEAL OF NONINTERVENTION

Mr. MANN. Let me say that on the question of democracy, which I agree with you is related to this question of communism, our consistent position over the years has been since 1945, to my knowledge, in support of collective action. I say collective action because unilateral action simply for the purpose of changing a government, be it democratic or dictatorial, is proscribed in the charter and by treaty.

Starting in 1945 we had proposed this time and time again. We have been in a minority of six to as little as one. I hope we will propose it again this month, but I do not know with what success, because this idea of nonintervention has such a tremendous and even irrational hold on the minds of many Latin Americans that they may not be willing to have any kind of collective action. Certainly we are going to move in the direction of proposing again, and stating very clearly, many of the principles that you have just stated.

Now, I think I did not mention this on the juridical side: If we wanted to do this, and we may eventually, if we had to, we could say that this is justified on the grounds of self-defense. This has certainly occurred to us many times. I have been thinking about it for 2 years.

We hesitate to take that position publicly right now because it would raise other questions of various kinds. But certainly another Russian missile base there—and I think if that half of the island went Communist, Haiti would fall within 30 minutes, and if you cannot stop it there because of this and that and the other, then you cannot stop it somewhere else, which is much more difficult, say, in Venezuela or Colombia, which is in great danger today; even Panama is in great danger.

REACTION IN HAITI

Senator AIKEN. How is Haiti receiving all of this excitement?

Mr. MANN. They hate the Dominicans so much that they wanted to be appointed to this commission.

Senator MORSE. Who is that?

Mr. MANN. The Haitians.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say this: The Secretary has been most generous with his time. He has not slept for a week, and it seems to me that he is entitled to a little rest. I think, after all, I can appreciate what he has gone through.

ACTING ON NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE

Senator MORSE. I can, too, Frank. I only want to say I completely associate myself with Senator Church's remarks on the essence, it seems to me, picked up by the Secretary, which is that if we cannot get collective action, even if we cannot get them to agree to carry out their agreements to the recent acts to which they have subscribed, the time may come in the very near future when we have to say that in our national self-defense interests we may have to follow such a course of action.

Now that, in effect, modifies, I think, at the present time the charter, and that may cause some to say that we are, in effect, withdrawing from the charter, but we will cross that bridge when we get to it. But if it ever comes to the point, as Frank Church has pointed out, if I interpret him correctly, that our national self-interest requires us to protect ourselves, then they have got to make up their minds whether they want a part of the charter pledge to have collective action. They either mean collective action or they do not. You and I have lived through some of our negotiations with the Mexicans in Ecuador, the Argentinians down at Punta del Este, and we finally got them at least to go along and sign the final act.

I raise these points, Mr. Secretary, because I think the American people are entitled to know of a full objective statement of our position. That is why I have asked for the material I have asked for.

Mr. MANN. I would be glad to give it to you, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me that will be most helpful.

I think there is a good bit in what Senator Church has suggested, although it seems to me that it would be most difficult to work around to that point right now. My own feeling is that the best way to work this thing is through the OAS, and do our best to work it out that way. It seems to me this matter of saying we are doing it as a matter of self-defense ought to be just about the last recourse.

Mr. MANN. That is the way we have felt, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I want to thank the Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 12:30 p.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Lausche and Hickenlooper.

Without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of Charles W. Adair, to be Ambassador to Panama; Henry A. Hoyt, to be Ambassador to Uruguay; Nathaniel Davis, to be Minister to Bulgaria; Henry J. Tasca, to be Ambassador to Morocco; and William Royall Tyler, to be Ambassador to the Netherlands. The nominations of William C. Foster, to be Deputy Representative of the United States on the U.N. Disarmament Commission, and Jack Hood Vaughn, to be Representative of the United States to the 11th Session of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the ECOSOC of the United Nations, also were approved.

The bill (S. 1368), to amend the Peace Corps Act was passed over.

The bill (H.R. 7064), to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926 in relation to the American Chancery at Saigon, Vietnam, ordered to be reported favorably subject to a poll of the committee. A poll later authorized the bill's report.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Gore, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The committee reconsidered the bill (H.R. 7064), to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1962, in relation to the American Chancery at Saigon, Vietnam, and the conclusion to abide by its report on the day preceding was concurred in.

The committee next considered the resolution (S. Con. Res. 17), to express the sense of Congress against the persecution of persons by Soviet Russia because of their religion, and passed it over for a future meeting.

The committee next considered the bill (S. 1368), to amend the Peace Corps Act, and passed it over also for a future meeting.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:10 a.m.]

U.N. RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

THURSDAY, MAY 6, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol, Senator John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order.

Mr. Foster, we are glad to have you with us, you and those accompanying you. Proceed as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY: AND GEORGE BUNN, GENERAL COUNSEL, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you probably recall, the Secretary of State had hoped to testify before you a week ago tomorrow, and because of events that you are familiar with, he was unable to be here. In view of the possible urgency of this matter, he asked that I come down from New York, if your committee could meet, so that we could discuss this rather sensitive area with you for the purpose of attempting to ascertain the general reaction of the committee to this particular proposal. This is a sensitive proposal. It is classified as secret, and I am sure that the committee will bear with us in our request.

Senator SPARKMAN. The copy that I have says it is declassified.

Senator CLARK. Have you tabled it?

Senator SPARKMAN. Declassified following tabling at the United Nations.

Mr. FOSTER. It has not yet been tabled.

[The draft resolution follows:]

DRAFT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION

APRIL 22, 1965.

The General Assembly

Recognizing that aggression in any form is contrary to the principles of the Charter,

Considering the particularly grave dangers to international peace and security which would result from an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons,

Noting, with appreciation, the decision of a number of States not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security,

Recognizing that the danger of aggression with nuclear weapons against nations which do not possess them emphasizes the need of such nations for assurance of assistance to resist such aggression,

Welcomes the intention signified by Member States approving this resolution that they will provide or support immediate assistance to any State not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and *calls upon* all other States to associate themselves with the objectives of this resolution.

Senator CLARK. How come the date April 22?

Mr. FOSTER. That was the day it was approved by the Committee of Principals, and that is what I wish to put before the committee.

CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

You will recall that following the Chinese explosion in October, the President, being concerned with the effect of that explosion on the world, and particularly on the Chinese neighbors in Asia, made a statement in which he set forth for the purpose of reassuring some of the countries there and for the purpose of perhaps holding the Chinese in check, a generalized offer to support nations of that area against possible nuclear attack. We believe that the Chinese may in the near future be planning another test. This has raised concern throughout that whole area, and it is something that, while no military threat to the United States, nonetheless does raise a threat to some of our friends in that region, and we have been attempting to find ways in which we might protect the U.S. interest.

There are two highly important interests which we see in that area. The first, of course, is the one in which we have undertaken to protect the independence of countries in Asia from nuclear intimidation from China now that China has some capabilities in this field. We are hopeful that we will find a way to prevent their exploiting this newly developed capability of theirs. Second, of course, is the very urgent problem that the United States has been facing for some time; namely, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries around the globe. The two interests are obviously interrelated.

The Chinese, if they are able to get a lot of prestige from this development on their part, certainly will be harder to contain in Southeast Asia, and nuclear proliferation will obviously become more likely because the pressures to move in the direction of proliferation are vastly increased. India is now an example of that.

The President in October, and because of that double concern, made a statement 2 days after the Chinese test. The first one—and I quote what he said at that time: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, they will have it."

Now, that was a good statement. It was reassuring. But since that time we have been giving detailed consideration, we have had a number of discussions and meetings, as to what further steps ought to be taken to meet these two basic interests of the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask a question?

Mr. FOSTER. Surely.

THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the Committee of Principals? Is that the name of it?

Mr. FOSTER. The Committee of Principals is a committee that was established actually during President Eisenhower's administration in order to bring together the pertinent agencies of the U.S. Government interested in nuclear weapons and the security interests.

Senator SPARKMAN. This, then, is a proposal of ours. In other words, that committee is not made up of a committee of member nations.

Mr. FOSTER. Oh, no. This is a committee of the principal officer of the following agencies: State Department, Defense Department, CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission. It includes the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of this Agency—the Agency I have the honor of heading—the Director of the United States Information Agency, the President's Special Assistant on International Security Affairs, and his Scientific Assistant.

Senator SPARKMAN. There has not been any discussion with member states yet.

SENSE OF THE SENATE

Mr. FOSTER. No, and this is the purpose of our appearance before you today, because it is obvious that this is a problem we are going to face almost instantaneously. In fact, two of the speeches on Tuesday made direct reference to this. India, in its speech, said that while it had no present intention of going the nuclear weapons route, which it has the capability of doing, it felt that they and other nations would be forced to do this unless certain actions were taken, amongst which they mentioned the fact of some kind of a U.N. resolution which would give to the nonnuclear states at least a generalized offer of support against nuclear attack. Therefore, before we take a position which is recommended by the Committee of Principals publicly at that U.N. Disarmament Commission Conference, or before we discuss it with our allies—we have not put this up to NATO—we felt it important that we ascertain in a general sense whether this was something the Senate or some Members of the Senate would feel was desirable and therefore we could speak of an intent on the part of the United States to adhere to this particular form of resolution.

Senator CARLSON. May I ask, as I catch it—this is the first I have heard of it—would it be under the sponsorship of the United States?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. We want to be in a position to stimulate hopefully a nonaligned nation to introduce this and to discuss it.

We want to be in a position, when it is put forward by others, to state that the United States under certain conditions would support this proposal. Since this is a fairly broad statement of intentions of the United States, we wanted to as broadly as possible represent the intentions not only of the executive branch but also of the legislative branch.

Senator CLARK. Is it your view, Bill, that either this committee or the Senate would take any action in this regard or is this purely an executive matter?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, this at the moment is simply for following out the philosophy which we have attempted to follow, consulting with the Senate before we engage in some of these highly delicate situations to attempt to elicit at least the general reaction of you distinguished gentlemen to what we are proposing. We are not asking for any affirmation. It would come up in perhaps a somewhat different form than it did come up. But if this is something that is way off base, we would like to learn of it before we get into it. It is, however, something that the executive branch has considered at considerable length and believes would help to meet these two basic problems which I referred to earlier.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST AGGRESSION

Senator CARLSON. It occurs to me—if I may interrupt once again—that this is a very worthy suggestion, but I wonder if this is a very propitious time to bring something like this up in view of the situation we are getting involved in here, there, and everywhere internationally.

Mr. FOSTER. This would in no sense, Senator Carlson, limit the United States in its use of nuclear weapons against aggression. This is really directed to offsetting the progress that the Chinese have made by what they have done so far. I think as to the propitious time, I cannot think of a more propitious time to really attempt to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capability around the world.

Senator CARLSON. I would thoroughly agree with that, but on the other hand it would be so much easier, in my opinion, to handle this when we were at peace around the world than to try to build up this situation.

Mr. FOSTER. Strangely enough the Soviet Ambassador in Washington a few weeks ago—and I can state this in view of the nature of this hearing—invited me to lunch, and as I came in, he said, "I presume under the present circumstances you are unemployed," and I said, "Not at all, Mr. Ambassador; actually I am busier than ever."

"You may recall that this Agency was born during the crisis in 1961 following the Berlin Wall," I said; "You may also recall that following the desperately threatening period in the fall of 1962, that was the time when we achieved the test ban and the hotline and the limitation on the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit." I said, "This is a highly appropriate time."

To you, sir, with all respect, I think it is an appropriate time, because there are so many countries who are now at a possible point

of decision, a political decision, as to whether they are going to go the route of nuclear weapons.

U.S. OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

We do believe so firmly that if a number of nations holding control over nuclear weapons increases, with each increase there is a greater chance of an accidental or perhaps a deliberate attack. And so it has been the policy of the United States for many years to try to keep the control of nuclear weapons in the fewest possible hands.

Now, with the Chinese threat, somehow one has to provide other than just a general statement that we are against proliferation. You have got to give some incentive to these people not to go this route other than the purely economic one which we are all familiar with.

Senator CLARK. What are those countries?

Mr. FOSTER. The obvious and immediate ones, Senator Clark, are India, which is faced with this threat, having been attacked by China within the last 2½ years. If India were to go the route of nuclear weapons, Pakistan obviously has a tremendous incentive to go the route. If those two go, then Japan says, "In this whole region we have got to think about it." The Israel-U.A.R. confrontation, if nuclear weapons get out in that area, is one that almost immediately will consider going nuclear weapons. Sweden has been debating whether it should go.

These are all nations that have the scientific capability.

Senator CLARK. And the friendly West Germans.

Mr. FOSTER. And the West Germans, of course, if this begins to spread, having scientific capability and having industrial capacity, would be under real pressure to go this route as well.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do they have the raw resources?

Mr. FOSTER. Most of them have actually nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes, Mr. Chairman, and every peaceful power reactor has some capacity to produce plutonium which will provide the raw material for nuclear weapons at least to a limited degree.

DEFINING AGGRESSION

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask two or three questions that come to my mind. I want to say that no one is more strongly in favor of some action that will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and curb their uses than I am. But I am wondering if there are not some problems in connection with this.

For instance, as soon as I read it, I wanted to ask you if the U.N. has ever succeeded in defining "aggression."

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Who determines who is the aggressor?

Mr. FOSTER. The committee for that purpose.

Senator SPARKMAN. You say there is a committee?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, I believe that is true; is it not, Mr. Cleveland?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. The committee where?

Mr. FOSTER. At the U.N.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know, but has that committee not been in existence for 15 years?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Ever since 1945 I guess, and it has not been able yet to lay down any acceptable definition.

Mr. FOSTER. That is one of the reasons this is stated in the general terms that it is, in that each country—and this has been very imaginatively phrased—each country can make its own determination of what it considers an act of aggression. The last paragraph in that proposed resolution was made over toward this end, and particularly so that the United States itself would have the flexibility in making this decision.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Right now in Vietnam we say North Vietnam is the aggressor, and all the Communist nations and some of the nonaligned nations, probably even some of our own friends, say we are the aggressor. How is that determination going to be made?

And I would like to ask this question which does not bother me as much as the other one because I think there is an answer to it: Under the terms of this resolution, would we be forbidden to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam or in Vietnam?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. There is no prohibition against first use by us within our determination and in the best interests of protecting the security of the United States. In our supporting vote, if there were such a vote come to pass in the United Nations, we, in explaining our vote, would make it perfectly clear that this is not a prohibition on first use of nuclear weapons and the decision for that first use would be ours.

It is the policy of the United States not to commit aggression as you know, and we have taken those undertakings under the United Nations Charter. This is consistent with the principle under which the United States has always functioned.

DETERRENT TO AGGRESSION

Senator SPARKMAN. What would be left, then, as a deterrent to Red China using it against India? That would be the first use. China would say that she had the right to determine whether or not there was aggression.

Mr. FOSTER. But if she committed an act of aggression in our definition, we would have the right under this, and would have the right to call on others to go with us to the assistance of India had China attacked her. This is a decision we do not make presently.

Senator SPARKMAN. With nuclear weapons?

Mr. FOSTER. We could. There is no prohibition on it.

Senator CLARK. Will the Senator yield?

It seems to me, as this resolution is worded, that the definition of aggression would be up to us. It would seem to me the way the definition is worded that the definition of aggression would be up to us. If we do not think it is aggression, we are not bound.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would it not be up to Red China? Would it not be up to Russia? Would it not be up to any nation that had nuclear weapons?

INNOCUOUS RESOLUTION

Senator CLARK. I think to that extent the resolution may be to some extent innocuous. On the other hand, I think this being a United Nations General Assembly resolution, we, in adhering to it, I would think, would retain the right to determine for ourselves whether the resolution had been brought into effect through aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons.

There is nobody to tell us what to do. This does not go to the World Court or the Security Council.

Senator SPARKMAN. Suppose, for instance, we used nuclear weapons against North Vietnam. Could Russia say that we were an attacking nation and justify herself in using nuclear weapons in retaliation?

Senator CLARK. In my opinion, she not only could, but should, if we were foolish enough to do that.

Mr. FOSTER. She is already calling us aggressor there. This is no change.

Senator SPARKMAN. Sure.

Senator CLARK. She could do it whether we had the resolution or not.

Mr. FOSTER. And they do it very vigorously and have been for the last 2 weeks at New York. These have been dastardly, mean, and vicious attacks. But that does not change this. This says that each state approving this resolution says that it will provide or support immediate assistance to any state not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression, which we would define for ourselves before we would give that support, in which nuclear weapons are used, and call upon all other states to associate themselves with this objective of the resolution.

So, the definition would remain in the hands of the nuclear states or all of those who signified their intention under this resolution.

ATTACKS ON MEMBER STATES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, this resolution only goes to an attack on a member state.

Mr. FOSTER. The intention is signified by member states, but it says "immediate assistance to any state not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of." This is no limitation on the U.S. use of nuclear weapons when it decides that it is in the interests of the United States so to do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that. I am just trying to get the context here. The fourth paragraph says: "Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

Now, the next clause says: "Recognizing that the danger of aggression with nuclear weapons against nations which do not possess them emphasizes the need of such nations for assurance of assistance to resist such aggression." Then the welcoming clause says that they will provide support collectively or assistance to any

state not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

I am just wondering if all of this, in referring to any state, does not refer back to members of the United Nations.

Mr. FOSTER. It is most importantly directed to the members of the United Nations, and it was designed hopefully so that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think it means anything because if bombs are going to be used by one nation against another, why, the fat is in the fire anyway.

Mr. FOSTER. It is an attempt to reassure several nations which feel that they possibly are threatened by this new nuclear capability and an attempt also, recognizing that the Soviet Union would not directly enter into this without China adhering, perhaps will allow them to vote for it in a way to assure India that the route of nuclear weapons is not the proper route to take.

PROTECT NONNUCLEAR STATES

Now, if we may not get that. We would propose—we have not yet done this—to discuss this with India, which has publicly suggested that one of the things that would be necessary in their minds to prevent other nations, they and other nations, from going the nuclear weapons route would be an assurance under a U.N. resolution that states would support these nonnuclear states against nuclear attack.

The five nations who are nuclear powers include China, which is not a member of the United Nations, but the other four are, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France. It is hopeful that the bland nature of this would allow Russia to support it and we to support it and France to support it and the United Kingdom to support it. This indeed would give to not only India, but to these other nations to which we have referred, some assurance that they would be protected if they do not build their own nuclear weapons. This is what we are trying to prevent.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any indication of the Russian attitude?

Mr. FOSTER. No, and we do not intend ourselves to solicit that. We would hope to elicit that. We hope the Indians might do this.

Based somewhat on the reaction of this committee, we would propose to go to the Indians actually first and suggest to them that they might go to the Soviet Union with the thought that the United Nations in this present session or at some other session in the fall could join in the support of such a resolution.

This is not the only thing to do to get nonproliferation. This is one of a number of things which we have also on the table, of course. We are still suggesting a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We are still suggesting a freeze and a cutback on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Senator CLARK. Were we not at one point suggesting a nonproliferation agreement with the Russians out at Geneva?

Mr. FOSTER. Oh, we continue to do that. We are still suggesting that. We have suggested it. Governor Stevenson in his speech a week ago said that this continued to be one of our objectives. The

Russians said it is one of their objectives, but we have had some difficulty getting their joining in that.

CASE OF VIETNAM

Senator PELL. It would seem to me—and correct me if I am wrong—one of the definitions of "aggression" is not what you are doing but where you are. There is no question presumably in South Vietnam the North Vietnamese would be the aggressors. But in North Vietnam I do not see how it could be said we are not the aggressors because it is their country where they do not want us to be.

In South Vietnam they want us to be. It would seem to me that if this is passed—maybe it is a very good thing because I happen to believe in limiting the use of nuclear weapons—but if it is passed, what we are saying is we are free to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam, and we will not use them in North Vietnam where we would be the aggressors; would that be correct?

Mr. FOSTER. No. If North Vietnam were a member of the United Nations, and if the nuclear members of the United Nations were to determine that this was an act of aggression on our part, it would be possible for the other three nuclear powers to state that we had committed an act of aggression with nuclear weapons. It must be with nuclear weapons, as you note from this.

THE FIRST NATION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator PELL. But I think in the world as a whole, outside our own borders, the general thought—and I must share it—is that the first nation to use the nuclear weapon in anger would probably be the United States. This needs to be laid at rest. But I am wondering if the reverse side of this resolution here, which I think would be very good indeed, would sort of lay that at rest, because it would indicate we would not use them and we would expect the mutual exchange, annihilation, if we did.

I would submit that my interpretation is that a reasonably intelligent fellow reading it in the press would say, "Well, the United States would not use them except in defense, would not use them in aggression." You just finished saying it did not matter if you were a member state or not. You refer to any state.

Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator PELL. Therefore if we are using them in a state where they do not want them, that, to my mind, would be aggression.

Mr. FOSTER. Of course we do not consider in the executive branch that we are the aggressor in North Vietnam. We consider that an attempt to stop their aggression.

Senator PELL. It is an interdictory action.

Mr. FOSTER [continuing]. Against South Vietnam.

Senator PELL. But I would like to ask from the viewpoint of law, would I be correct in my interpretation of this?

Mr. FOSTER. I will leave to my distinguished legal advisor, Mr. Fisher, to come up and answer that from a legal point. I do not think so, but this is a layman's opinion.

Senator PELL. I am not a lawyer, of course.

WHO DEFINES THE "AGGRESSOR"?

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, in answer to Senator Pell's question of who defines who is the aggressor, it is not necessarily aggression to put force in a country where it is not wanted if that is in response to a previous attack.

Senator PELL. It is not hot pursuit.

Mr. FISHER. Oh, no. For example, I would not say that the British bombing of a German port in 1939 was aggression. And the British did bomb German ports shortly after the German attack on Poland in 1939.

Senator PELL. They declared war first.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, but whether they declare war or not is not the key to whether it is aggression or not. This was a defensive action. There may be differences of opinion, and there obviously are in this room from what I have heard, as to who is aggressing where in the Vietnamese situation. But I do not think the fact that you apply force where you are not wanted makes you an aggressor.

I would say the British were not aggressors, just to give what I think is an obvious case, but it is the same point, when they bombed German ports following the German attack on Poland in early September 1939. I do not think there would have been aggression had they done it with nuclear weapons had they had those weapons available at that point.

THE AGGRESSOR IN VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Do you not think if we dropped nuclear weapons on North Vietnam now we would be the aggressors?

Mr. FISHER. I do not think we are the aggressors.

Senator CLARK. In North Vietnam?

Mr. FOSTER. No, I do not think we are an aggressor.

Senator CLARK. You should have heard some of the debate yesterday.

Mr. FOSTER. I have been listening to the debate. I have been listening to attack 20 times a day for the last 2 weeks as to our being an aggressor, but that does not make it so.

Senator GORE. Your saying that we are not does not make it so either.

Mr. FOSTER. That is right. That is why we made this resolution such that the definition of who is the aggressor is up to the individuals who support this resolution in the U.N.

Senator GORE. I dare say if you took a vote in the United Nations as to whether or not we were an aggressor against North Vietnam that the vote would be overwhelmingly "Yes."

Senator CLARK. I think if you took a secret vote in the Senate of the United States you might get the same opinion.

Senator PELL. Therefore this resolution would be very good because it would inhibit us from using nuclear weapons in North Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

Senator CASE. I would not agree with that position, but some people do.

Mr. FOSTER. I do not think it puts an inhibition on the military use if indeed it is determined that our national security interests are affected.

Senator CLARK. I think we are really arguing how many angels can dance on the end of a needle.

DEEP FEELING AGAINST PROLIFERATION

Mr. FOSTER. Let me say this, gentlemen. We believe that this, if we can support it—and we do not know that it has a chance of getting the support of the Soviet Union—we believe if we can support it, however, it has the opportunity of putting some limits on the incentive to proliferate nuclear weapons in the mind of certain nations.

We think that is a very important objective, and we think it is something that may make it possible to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons if associated with some other things; not of itself, agreed. But it is a part of the structure which can lead to that end, and we think therefore it is worth attempting. This is the judgment, as I indicated earlier, of the Committee of Principals, and I think that we are going to get something of this sort in the United Nations, because there is a deep feeling on the part of the nonnuclear nations that against China they want some kind of assurance.

The President's statement of last October was a help. This would go to add to that assurance, and India and some of these other nations have indicated that they are going to introduce resolutions bearing on this.

We would like to control somewhat more directly the form of resolution. We believe this would do it and do it in a way that protects the interests of the United States.

Senator CASE. How many people do you think the intention would be expressed by? I think a lot of countries would like to be the beneficiaries of the assurance. How many people would give it?

Mr. FOSTER. We would be hopeful we would get the four nuclear powers which are the important ones, of course, to be on the line on this.

Senator CASE. Why should not all these countries get into line and give a little assurance? We do not say we will give assistance by nuclear weapons.

Mr. FOSTER. They can call upon all other states to associate themselves with the objectives of this resolution.

COMMITMENTS TO ASSISTANCE

Senator CLARK. As I read this resolution, whether they have nuclear weapons or not, they are committed to give assistance.

Senator CASE. I do not think so, Joe.

Senator CLARK. Let us read it carefully.

Mr. FOSTER. This will provide——

Senator CLARK. "The member states approving this resolution," they will provide or support immediate assistance. It does not say "nuclear." I think this would commit Togo to come to the assistance of India.

Senator CASE. This is getting in by a back somersault.

Mr. FOSTER. No, they could provide assistance in other ways, and if they sign it, I think this is a statement of their intention so to do.

Senator CASE. I am sorry, I did not read the resolution this way. I thought you could do two things. You could approve of this resolution, and then you could or could not give the intention as a separate matter.

Mr. FOSTER. No.

Senator CASE. But you think the act of voting for the resolution does give the intention, express the intention.

Mr. FOSTER. States their intention to provide or support immediate assistance, and that is the purpose, to get an almost universal commitment of that sort.

TACTICAL WEAPONS

Senator CARLSON. Talking about nuclear weapons, now of course we are getting down to what can be very small weapons too in this age that we are living in. This is not missiles necessarily.

Mr. FOSTER. No, we do not attempt to differentiate.

Senator SPARKMAN. As a practical matter, though, it would include tactical weapons.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it does, any nuclear weapons.

Senator GORE. As a technical matter, it does not include atomic weapons.

Senator CLARK. Does it not?

Mr. FISHER. I think it is general usage now, nuclear includes both fission and fusion.

Senator GORE. The general use, but technically it does not.

Senator CLARK. Did you think it was not desirable to include chemical, radiological, and biological warfare, which to my way of thinking is perhaps an equal menace?

Mr. FOSTER. We thought it would not be desirable to do that. It raises too many other questions. Our real objective here is to get the broadest possible support. If you get into that, you raise a whole host of additional questions, and this appeared to be one that had a better chance of getting universal support than if we enlarged it to include that other type of weapon.

POSITION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has this been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have they taken a position on it?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. The Joint Chiefs consider it might have the following advantage to the United States. It might put the Soviets in a difficult position in their relation to the Chinese, if they were to join with the U.N. members in undertaking to provide assistance. It might further isolate the Red Chinese.

Senator GORE. How is that? China has a weapon.

Senator CLARK. It would commit Russia.

Mr. FOSTER. But Russia would be signing this and would be signing it against the possible use by China against a nation with nonnuclear capabilities. We are hopeful that Russia can sign it even

though that is the case, but it is not as direct an association of Russia in an action which might be taken against China.

Senator GORE. It seems to me that that reasoning assumes our hands are going to always be clean and someone else's are always going to be bloody.

Senator CLARK. But this commits Russia to support India against China.

Senator GORE. It commits them to support North Vietnam against us in case we use the weapon, too.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

Senator CASE. Do not say use, though. Of course, the term "aggressor" is an ambiguous term.

Mr. FOSTER. It is ambiguous, and certainly the ambiguities are deliberate in this.

FRENCH RECOGNITION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this associated question? I heard a rumor a little while ago that Mr. de Gaulle is getting ready to recognize this revolutionary regime in the Dominican Republic. Have you heard anything about that?

Mr. FOSTER. I have not, but I just came down from New York this morning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have heard it as a rumor.

Mr. FOSTER. We have no official notice of it that I know of.

POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES

I should say, Mr. Chairman, that the Chiefs do point out several advantages in their opinion for this. They also say there are certain possible disadvantages, but they believe on balance that the proposed resolution presents a course of action that is not inimical to the security interests of the United States, and they interpose no objection.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, could we have read the possible disadvantages.?

Mr. FOSTER. I would be happy to do it. Let me read the advantages first, if I may, because I think they are really overriding, which is why they came out with what they came out with.

The proposal supports the existing U.S. position as stated by the President on October 16, 1964. The proposal ought to be acceptable to most nonnuclear nations because it provides for general U.N. assistance rather than unilateral support, thus avoiding alignment with either power bloc.

The resolution might raise the following problems for the United States: It would result in an additional political consideration relating to U.S freedom of nuclear action. It could not be expected, however, to influence significantly a U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in view of the more momentous factors which would govern such a decision.

Modification of the resolution during U.N. negotiations might possibly result in development contrary to U.S. interests.

Well, in that case we would not support it.

It is uncertain whether the resolution will in fact provide enough assurance to dissuade nations from seeking their own nuclear weapons.

I agree it may not, but it is worth a try in our opinion.

And then:

The Joint Chiefs agree on balance that the proposed resolution presents a course of action not inimical to the security interests of the United States, and they interpose no objection.

That is a standard Joint Chief's conclusion, as you know.

We think that this is well worthy of exploration. As I say, we have not explored it. We have held this up, but we are faced with the real probability of the introduction of other resolutions which will be less favorable to our point of view within the next week or so in this Disarmament Commission. We would like, therefore, to start negotiations in diplomatic channels with the Indians.

NO FORMAL ACTION BY CONGRESS

We have checked with our ambassadors in each of these countries—New Delhi, Mr. [Chester] Bowles, the United Kingdom, which is another nuclear nation, with Mr. [David] Bruce—and they are both enthusiastic about this as helping to meet some of the problems as they see them from their field posts.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is your purpose just to explain it to us?

Mr. FOSTER. Just to explain it to you and to try to——

Senator SPARKMAN. You do not ask for any formal action.

Mr. FOSTER. We ask for no formal action, but we want you to be informed as to what we propose to do unless the objections you have are so serious that we would have to reconsider. As I say, this is the recommendation of the full Committee of Principals, which includes all of the interested agencies headed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the AEC and the CIA and the Space Agency and the President, represented through the White House assistants, and my own agency and the USIA.

Senator CLARK. Has the President seen this?

Mr. FOSTER. The President has seen it.

Senator CASE. May I ask a question?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

NONNUCLEAR NATIONS

Senator CASE. Bill, what would you think about striking out the words in the fourth line from the bottom in the last paragraph, "not possessing nuclear weapons"? I raise this to sharpen the point. It might be well to assure everybody.

Mr. FOSTER. The nonnuclear nations are the ones who are taking the lead in attempting to develop resolutions since they feel that the have nations are a class apart. In fact, there is a real division between the have's and the have-not's in a nuclear sense. This effort is therefore directed toward reassuring that particular group of nations, and they are the ones who are taking the initiative in trying to do something that we may not be able to accept.

Senator CASE. I can see that, but why not get India and all these neutrals on our side in case of China——

Mr. FOSTER. They would be on our side if we were attacked.

Senator SPARKMAN. The real purpose is to discourage——

Senator CASE. They are not invited by this to be on our side because we possess nuclear weapons.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. The real purpose is to discourage countries not possessing nuclear weapons——

Senator CASE. I understand.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. To discourage them from developing them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If this were signed and China attacked India with nuclear weapons, this would call upon all other nations to come to the assistance of India.

Senator CASE. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. To give them assistance. I do not know what that would mean.

Senator CASE. It would not for England and others with nuclear weapons. It is only for the benefit of nonnuclear powers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would guess the theory is that the nuclear weapons states would have to look after their own affairs.

Senator CASE. Perhaps that is good. I do not know.

AIDING THE CHINESE

Mr. FOSTER. If we did this, it is pointed out to me that the United States would intend to aid the Chinese Communists if they were attacked by the Soviets. I am not sure this is something we would want to do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. China has nuclear weapons.

Mr. FOSTER. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have one they let off, and we think they have got some more.

Mr. FOSTER. If this suggestion were followed, then we would have stated our intention to go to the aid of——

Senator CASE. Did you think of that just now?

Mr. FOSTER. Somebody thought of it just now; yes, sir.

Mr. FISHER. That was thought of just now. The principal consideration—and I must confess it is hard to think of an answer to it—is the fact that the primary purpose of the resolution is to discourage the potential nuclear power from becoming a nuclear power, and that being the object of the enterprise, there is a split on that, the theory being, as Senator Hickenlooper expressed it, that the nuclear powers should be able to take care of themselves.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche.

PENDING THREATS

Senator LAUSCHE. Are there pending now any threats of the nature contemplated to be confronted by this procedure that motivated you in presenting this resolution?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, Senator Lausche. The threat is that India is having indeed a political debate as to whether they shall go the route of making their own nuclear weapons. We are attempting to provide a form of assurance that, No. 1, will tell China that this is something that will be dangerous, and, No. 2, we will reassure India if it follows its present course of not going the nuclear weapons route. We are hopeful that with the general support to India—which they had asked for in their speech on Tuesday morning—that this sort of thing would help.

Now, we would not introduce the resolution. We would propose, after this discussion, to go to India to see whether this is something that they would like to propose, would like to discuss with France and with the Soviet Union and with the United Kingdom, and when it came to the floor of the United Nations, we would hope that we would be able to join in stating that it is the intention of the United States to take this course.

We would also at that time make it perfectly clear that this does not prohibit first use of nuclear weapons by us in our defense of our own interests.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any other condition now existent that motivates the promotion of this policy?

Mr. FOSTER. It has been the policy of the United States to in every way possible achieve nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and we have been pressing for a nonproliferation agreement ever since the nuclear weapons was invented in 1945. We have done this at Geneva, we have done it at the United Nations. We have had general expressions of support of this from many nations around the world including the Soviet Union.

This is to make it more specific, in view of the Chinese explosion, that the member states of the U.N. would propose to give immediate assistance to those who are subject to an act of nuclear aggression.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has India asked our Government for help in the development of nuclear power, or has it said to our Government, "Whether you help or do not help, we feel that in face of the posture of China, we must enter this field"?

Mr. FOSTER. They have said that at the moment, sir, they are not going to enter the nuclear weapons field. They have said that they will use their nuclear capabilities for peaceful uses. They are under considerable political pressure within the country, however, to consider the development of nuclear weapons. They have stated publicly at the U.N. this week that unless nonnuclear nations are to get some general assurance through the U.N., it is likely that they will be forced to go the route of nuclear weapons, and they have therefore in effect asked the U.N. for this matter of assurance.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator LAUSCHE. Going to the Middle East, what will be the situation with respect to the Arab Republic and Israel if a resolution of this type is adopted?

Mr. FOSTER. We would hope that this would reassure both of them in their present course of not going the route of nuclear weapons. This is not only designed for India. This is designed for all the possible nuclear weapons manufacturers, producers that are faced with this problem over the next several years.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there likely to result in the Middle East the argument by the Arabs that Israel is closer to the possession of the effective nuclear bomb than the Arab Republic and that therefore this is bad judgment to pass this?

Mr. FOSTER. I do not think so. In fact the United Arab Republic has been one of those who has suggested that this sort of a resolution would be useful in this section of the U.N.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any other questions?

A STATEMENT OF INTENTION

Senator CASE. This would bind everybody who voted for it; would it not?

Mr. FOSTER. It would be a statement of the intention of everyone who voted for it that they would take this course of action if there were an act of aggression with nuclear weapons.

Senator CASE. Would it be desirable to suggest it not be effective until *x* percentage of the members voted for it?

Mr. FOSTER. I think to be effective actually it will have to have almost unanimous support. I think this could be one of the conditions that would make it effective.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is not in the nature of a treaty, is it?

Mr. FOSTER. No, it is not a treaty. It is a statement of intention.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would be passed by a vote of the General Assembly, I take it.

Senator CASE. I would not want to see a lot of nations get off the hook just by abstaining.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They get off the hook anyway. The Russians are off the hook on article 19 now.

Senator CASE. Its value, I suppose, would depend somewhat on——

Senator LAUSCHE. What are the arguments made against this within your own family?

Mr. FOSTER. This has the unanimous support in the Committee of Principals, Senator Lausche, which includes all of the interested agencies in the nuclear field.

THREE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES

Senator LAUSCHE. Have any arguments been made against it from any source?

Mr. FOSTER. The Joint Chiefs had said that there are three possible disadvantages, but they do not oppose the resolution. They say the resolution might raise the following problems for the United States:

> It could result in an additional political consideration relating to U.S. freedom of nuclear action. It could not be expected, however, to influence significantly a U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in view of the more momentous factors which would govern such a decision.
>
> Modification of the resolution during U.N. negotiations might possibly result in developments contrary to U.S. interests.

As I said before, if that were the case, we would not support.

They say:

> It is uncertain whether the resolution will in fact provide enough assurance to dissuade nations from seeking their own nuclear weapons.

I agree, of itself it would not. This has to be associated with a number of other acts which we are proposing, including a nonproliferation agreement, and this would make the possibility of a nonproliferation agreement greater.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you expect us to say something on it today?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. We ask for no formal motion. We simply want to have expressions of opinion as to whether this in your opinion is wise in the interests of the U.S. Government.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any other questions?

Mr. FOSTER. May I bring up another question, Senator——

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER [continuing]. Which is related to this?

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore, I have got to take a long distance telephone call. Would you take the Chair, please. I apologize for having to run off, but I have had this commitment.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you for allowing us this opportunity, Mr. Chairman.

[Discussion off the record.]

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, this, too, has to do with nuclear policy. Last year, more than a year ago, at the Geneva conference, President Johnson proposed that renewed consideration be given to the verified cutoff and transfer of nuclear materials. The Soviets rejected that publicly and privately on the ground that the transfer was no disarmament. We had lots of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; offering to transfer 60,000 kilograms did not do anything to reduce nuclear destructive capabilities, and this was so because no nuclear weapons were to be destroyed.

Now, it is true that the actual destruction of weapons had no particular military significance to us as long as the transfer had dedicated the nuclear explosives to peaceful uses and not weapons. Therefore, in the old proposal we left open whether the nuclear explosive would come from weapons or stockpile or from new production. We do not think it makes much difference to the Soviets either, and we think this objection of theirs is probably purely propaganda.

Some of our allies have also said that in offering to turn these materials over to peaceful uses we should destroy some weapons in the process. And so for purposes of offsetting this alleged objection of theirs, we have been studying whether it would be possible to destroy some weapons and obtain the material which we would turn over to peaceful uses from those weapons.

This may indeed be a real objection on the part of the Soviet Union. I think the British, in their request that we consider destruction of some nuclear weapons, really felt that this had some virtue, and for them it may indeed mean the destruction of some weapons that they would use. We have studied this. We have discussed it with all of the interested agencies—the AEC, the Department of Defense, and the White House—and the amounts of U-235 that we would propose to include in this new offer would be the same as in the past. We had offered publicly to transfer 60,000 kilograms of U-235 weapons grade if the Soviets would transfer 40,000, in view of the fact that we believe their stockpiles are less than ours.

DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

We have put this before the Committee of Principals for their consideration, and it has been approved by the Committee of Principals that we now offer, in making available this amount of material, to destroy nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons in the process of obtaining the 60,000 kilograms of U–235.

Senator GORE. You do not specify what model.

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, we do not. Of course you, sir, as a member of the joint committee, are aware that this is a moving art and that we obviously would take it from weapons that are going to be replaced and are obsolete. So, we believe that it would be useful to take the initiative with a proposal which involves the actual destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons. This would allow us to counter this Soviet propaganda attack. It would show the U.S. desire to cut down destruction capabilities, and it would shift the discussion in the UNDC.

We would propose to do this at the UNDC if we ever get down to constructive discussions there, and I am hopeful we are going to. It would give us the advantage here of making this clear before the 114 nations. The actual negotiation of it would go to the ENDC, which we are hopeful now, more hopeful now will reconvene sometime in June.

INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION

Senator CHURCH. Would the destruction of these warheads take place under some form of international inspection?

Mr. FOSTER. We have a general proposal on this, Senator Church, that we have been working out the the detailed procedures for verification. Of course, we would have to observe them. They would have to observe us. But we do not want in that process to reveal any of the technology that is still, we believe, secret.

The technicians have studied this and have come up with procedures which they are quite sure will do this, and this has been agreed by the Committee of Principals. So that we could afford a reasonable demonstration of the actual destruction, and we could assure that the material came from the weapons destroyed and at the same time prevent the disclosure of this sensitive information.

The way we would propose to do it in very general terms—inspectors from both sides would look at the outsides of the weapons before the destruction, and they would look at the fissionable material and the scrap metal left after the destruction. We would not look inside, and they would not look inside ours. This would be a bilateral process between us and the Soviet Union, because nobody else really counts in this. I suppose international inspectors could be around but the real purpose would be that we wanted to be sure that they had actually produced enough fissionable material to meet the requirements. We have not introduced this yet. We have held this for the appropriate time.

We have spoken to the United Kingdom on this because of the fact we do know that this would give them some problems, their not having the number of obsolete weapons that we have. But their new Minister of State for Disarmament—with whom I have dis-

cussed this—has assured me that the United Kingdom would join in this, even though it gives them some political difficulties.

Now, we would like to do this during the course of the next two weeks if the conditions of the U.N. are favorable to a truly constructive speech which we hope might be made sometime next week or the week after. I cannot assure you that we will do it, but I would like to put before you the fact that we do intend to do it, and the Committee of Principals has all agreed that this is something that would be useful in U.S. interests to do.

AMOUNT OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

Senator CASE. How large an amount of fissionable material would it be?

Mr. FOSTER. 60,000 kilograms.

Senator CASE. They also?

Mr. FOSTER. Oh, the British is much smaller than that.

Senator CASE. 60,000, 40,000 and what?

Mr. FOSTER. 60,000, 40,000 and maybe 10,000; I do not know the exact amount.

Senator CASE. Some ratio, however.

Mr. FOSTER. We would make this a U.S. proposal to which the British would say "me too," but the amounts would have to be negotiated at Geneva. The Soviets have never done other than attack us on this, stating this is a way to get rid of theirs without our giving up an actual nuclear weapons.

Senator CASE. And all of the fissionable material that you have——

Mr. FOSTER. Would come from obsolete——

Senator CASE [continuing]. Would come from weapons.

Mr. FOSTER. Would come from weapons which we would be destroying.

Senator GORE. I find myself favorably inclined.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, sir.

Senator CASE. No assurance against replacing these.

Mr. FOSTER. Oh, no, sir, and we would make available at the same time through this process—and would ask the Soviets in turn to do the same—some plutonium, because this would be developed, but we protect the treaty, you understand. We think this has real value as something new that we can get the group at New York to encourage us to go back to real negotiations at Geneva by this new throught.

Senator GORE. Any questions?

[No response.]

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your time and attention.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might say on this resolution, I have seen it before, and I have been searching it to see whether there is any great plus or minus in it. I do not see that there is any minus in it on our side. I do not see that there is very much plus in it, but there may be a little more plus than minus, and I do not see that it hurts anything to try.

Mr. FOSTER. And, Mr. Chairman, all of this is very sensitive.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 10, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

By unanimous consent, and without objection, the committee approved for favorable report the bill (H.R. 6497), to amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize an increase in the International Monetary Fund quota of the United States.

The committee passed over the resolution (S. Con. Res. 17), to express the sense of Congress against the persecution of persons by Soviet Russia because of their religion.

The committee then considered the bill (S. 1368), to amend further the Peace Corps Act, as amended, but delayed final action on this measure.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:35 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 11:10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Clark and Case.

On motion by Senator Clark, seconded by Senator Case, the committee approved for report the nominations of Anthony M. Solomon, to be an Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Leonard C. Meeker, to be Legal Adviser of the Department of State; George A. Morgan, to be an Ambassador to the Ivory Coast; Warren W. Wiggins, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps; and Mercer Cook to serve concurrently as Ambassador to Gambia.

The committee passed over the bill (S. 1368), to amend the Peace Corps Act.

The committee next considered the measure (S. Con. Res. 17), to express the sense of Congress against the persecution of persons by Soviet Russia because of their religion. On motion by Senator Clark, and without objection, the concurrent resolution, as amended, was approved for favorable report.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:20 a.m.]

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Jones, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you here this morning.

STATEMENT OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, ROVING AMBASSADOR

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be back here again in this room and before this committee, which has a very special meaning for me indeed.

On April 20, as the representative of the President, I went to New Zealand, Australia, the Philippine Islands, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Vietnam, India, and ending up in Rome. The publicly stated purpose was to nourish the alliance, to acquaint these governments with our aims and intentions in Southeast Asia, lay myself open to questions, and get any advice and opinions which they might have.

[Discussion off the record.]

MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. LODGE. The results were good in Australia, the Philippines, and Korea. The Australians are going to send a battalion to Vietnam. The Philippine President, President [Diosdado] Macapagal, has sent a bill to the congress for an expeditionary force to go to Vietnam which has passed the House and which is up in the Senate today, I think. In Korea they have sent a force of 2,200 men and an excellent medical team, and I believe would send some more. In New Zealand they said our request would be carefully considered, and they asked me off the record whether a battery of field artillery would be acceptable.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say a battery of field artillery?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador how many would that be?

Mr. LODGE. 150 to 200, as I remember it. In all these countries, in all these governments, without exception, I was assured privately that they are all glad that we are in Vietnam. They all hope we stay. They all hope we win, and they all agree that Communist China is the real enemy.

In the case of Australia they will come right out and say so, and say so with conviction and with eloquence. In some of these other countries they will tell it to you privately. But privately or publicly, they all say that.

What they want is constant reassurance of our determination. From an Asian viewpoint, the less talk there is about negotiations and the less talk there is about when we get out, the better.

CHANGING APPROACH TOWARD SEATO

There is a good deal of interest in some of these countries in changing the approach toward SEATO. We have been following the idea that SEATO must operate by unanimous consent. There is quite a school of thought developing that there is not anything in the SEATO charter that requires this, and that a good case can be made for any two or more members of SEATO agreeing and getting other countries to join with them to provide a sort of international aegis for our activity in Vietnam.

That is something I wanted to report because the SEATO agreement came to this committee. It is a thing that might interest the members.

CHINESE OUTRAGE OVER VIETNAM

In Hong Kong—I always like to stop at our Consulate in Hong Kong because we have got some very good men there who have lived in China a long time and speak, read, and write Chinese. They say that the Chinese Communists are outraged—that is the verb they use—by what we have been doing with regard to the Vietnam problem, that it goes contrary to what Mao Tse-tung thinks we ought to do, and that it has sort of thrown them off their stride.

Those are the highlights of the trip to these different countries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say it goes opposite to what Mao Tse-tung thinks we ought to do.

Mr. LODGE. Thinks we should be expected to do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not quite understand what you mean.

Mr. LODGE. Well, in the book when they have done as well as they have as regards subversion and terrorism, we are supposed to give up. We are supposed to get divided.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not go according to plan.

Mr. LODGE. According to plan, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. According to Mao Tse-tung's plan.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

"WE BELIEVE THAT YOU MEAN WHAT YOU SAY"

Mr. LODGE. Those are the high spots of the visit to the different countries. I would like to devote the rest of my time to Vietnam, but before doing so, I thought I might read a statement which was made to me by a very high ranking man in one of these countries. This is a copy which I sent back to the President, because I thought it was so interesting. This man said this:

> Since the end of World War II the United States has said, "The Communists shall not conquer Western Europe," and Western Europe was not conquered.
>
> The United States said, "We will not be driven out of Berlin," and you were not driven out of Berlin.
>
> The United States said, "Korea shall not be destroyed," and Korea was not destroyed.
>
> The United States said, "the islands of the Straits of Formosa shall not be captured," and it was not.
>
> The United States said, "Lebanon shall not be subverted, and it was not subverted." The United States said, "Get out of Cuba, and the interlopers left Cuba."
>
> Now you say you will not be defeated in Vietnam, that you will not allow this small country to be thrown to the wolves. We believe that you mean what you say. We trust you, your sagacity, and your strength. On that trust hangs the hope and freedom of peace in the world.

I wrote this down as this man said it.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LODGE. I thought it was a clear-cut statement and one that every member of the Foreign Relations Committee can take some satisfaction in, because this committee has so much to do with building this record.

THREE-WAY CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

Now I would like to talk about Vietnam, where I have spent most of 2 days.

There is a three-way conflict in Vietnam. One is the bombardment of the north, which is largely a U.S. activity. Second is the pitched battle with battalion size Vietcong units, which is the United States and the Government of Vietnam. Third is the job of overcoming Communist subversion and terrorism, which by its very nature must be done by the Vietnamese themselves.

There are many ways in which we can help, but still they must do it, and if this job were 100-percent successful, the rest of the activities would take care of themselves. This overcoming of subversion is much the most complicated for us, because it involves weaving together various specialties—propaganda, political organization, military, the police—and as soon as you have done that, conducting the census, issuing identification cards, having a curfew, and combing through each precinct or each hamlet with a fine-tooth comb to get terrorists out, and then, as fast as you have done that, as quickly as possible bringing in your clinics and your teachers and your agricultural experts in order to appeal to the whole land.

A PROPER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

The best thing that has ever been said, I think, about Vietnam by any American was said by Bedell Smith in 1954 at Geneva, when Georges Bidault, who was then Prime Minister of France,

said he was going to relieve General Navarre for the defeat of Dienbienphu. Bedell Smith said this: "Any second-rate general could win in Indochina if there were a proper political atmosphere."

And so overcoming Communist subversion and terrorism involves all of these things woven into one.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask a question?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. To be sure I understand, did he mean proper political atmosphere in France or in South Vietnam.

Mr. LODGE. In South Vietnam, on the ground in South Vietnam. When you say that the Vietnamese problem cannot be solved exclusively by military means, that does not mean, in my judgment, that it can be solved by diplomatic means. It means that you must have a more effective program of practical application in South Vietnam. Having, as we have, a good military program, good economic program, good social programs, good informational programs, good technical programs, as we have, and all separate, does not constitute practical application, as you gentlemen know perhaps better than almost any other group in this country.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LODGE. It is greatly to our interests to learn how to do that, not only for South Vietnam, but because this is the tool that they are planning to use in other parts of Asia and in Africa and in Latin America. In fact, in my judgment this Communist subversion and terrorism is the greatest external threat that the United States confronts, greater than the nuclear, because we have a great superiority in the nuclear, and this does not cost them much in money, it does not cost them much in weapons. They have got some clever ideas, some ruthless execution, and they go ahead and do it.

COUNTERSUBVERSION PROGRAM

So this was the phase that I looked into. I cannot give any testimony about the bombing of the north or about the pitched battles around Da Nang, but I did look into this countersubversion and terrorism program. We ought to have a more affirmative name for it.

Now, we have what is known as the Hop Tac area, which are the seven provinces around Saigon, which embrace 40 percent of the population and in many respects the most strategic part of the population. In the last 4 months we finally got going on the plan to pacify, to overcome subversion and terrorism in that area. In 4 months 430 hamlets including about 360,000 people have been dependably pacified. That is very small. I am not even sure it is the beginning of the beginning.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say "dependably pacified," just what do you mean?

Mr. LODGE. I mean that in spite of all the legalisms which they have inherited from the French law and French administrative jurisdiction, they have apprehended several hundred terrorists, imprisoned some, and executed others. I mean that they have been able to hold 200 popular elections for village chief and village council, which presupposes a very considerable degree of tranquility if

you are going to do that. That is the last thing to do. It means that there are many well-authenticated cases of people giving information to the government about where the Vietcong is, which is the key to the whole thing.

You remember when Robert E. Lee was fighting in the South, they were telling him everything, and when he got into Pennsylvania, they would not tell him anything, and what a tremendous influence that has on war, particularly this kind of war. It means that the Vietcong are having a hard time recruiting in these hamlets, and they are kidnaping and abducting young men. In the opinion of our military, it means that the pacification of these 400 hamlets means that Saigon is not under siege with mortar shells landing in it, which would have been the case had this not happened.

NO MOMENTUM

I found when I was there that I spent most of my time preventing dreadful things from happening. You do not get any credit for that in the papers, and yet, by golly, that is what a man in government has to do, and this is in that category. So, these 400, if this endures, it is good. But there is no momentum. The thing is not moving ahead.

That, I think, is for two reasons. One, the main force of the Vietcong has doubled, and with men from the north. They are not getting them. They are bringing in soldiers from the PAVN, the so-called People's Army from Vietnam. Some of them are coming in in units, and some of them are coming in individually and beefing up the Vietcong main force. Of course, when that happens, that increases the demand on your military. That reduces the degree to which you can expand this Hop Tac program, because in the first instance until you get your militia really trained, your regular army has to provide the order.

The second reason why there is no momentum is that I think what I said before, there is inadequate practical application. I have searched around for the ideas that have some appeal out there. One is government is the servant of the people. That has tremendous appeal. I think you know that there is a saying in Southeast Asia which goes way, way back, that there are five evils that afflict mankind: fire, flood, storm, robbery, and central government. Those are the scourges that man has to put up with.

Senator CASE. That sounds like a——

Mr. LODGE. They practice local automony. That is what they have got that really works.

Something that would make the government look like a help would be good. Then no corruption has a great deal of attraction, because they all know about that. Then the soldier helps the farmer. That has attraction.

Magsaysay built the whole movement against the Huks in Luzon on the soldiers helping the farmer. He was enough of a leader, a dynamic enough man to get the soldiers to help the farmers, and for the land. To the tiller in a country where almost 90 percent of the people are farmers, that has a tremendous appeal. A man has his land, you give him a rifle, and he will defend his land. I am glad to report that in the executive branch, they are working on an

urgent basis on a program to use some of these funds that have been appropriated to get land distribution going.

LAND OWNERSHIP

The CHAIRMAN. Is it still owned by large landowners largely?

Mr. LODGE. It is like everything else about Vietnam. It is very hard to generalize. They have got 43 provinces. You have got a different situation in every one. Certainly the big rice plantations in the delta, I think some of them undoubtedly are. And there are three kinds of businesses in——

The CHAIRMAN. Do the French still own a lot of land there?

Mr. LODGE. The French own some of their own plantations, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do they not confiscate them and redistribute it?

Mr. LODGE. That is it, that is exactly it. That is the same idea that struck me.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say, "That is it," that does not answer the question. I mean that respectfully. Why do they not?

Mr. LODGE. Lack of gumption, lack of bureaucratic energy. If what we have in Washington can be defined as a central government, then what they have in Saigon has got to get a different name, because we tend to throw—when I was there—you would throw 40 or 50 demands, suggestions at the government. It is just useless.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing happens.

VIETNAMESE LACK A SENSE OF NATIONHOOD

Mr. LODGE. Nothing happens.

You have got Dr. Quat, who is a very nice man, a very intelligent man, a very good man, a good man in any country. He has got practically nobody to help him, and you come in with a whole lot of requests from USIA, requests from CIA, requests from AID, requests from the State Department, requests from the Pentagon. If he can do one thing well and get it done and then move on to the next thing, that is the most you can expect.

Even the Government of Communist China in its early phases—and it took them 22 years to get power, incidentally, in Communist China—all they could do at first was land, and they did that. Then they would go on to something else.

They have not got the traditions of nationalism that we have. They have a strong sense of peoplehood without a sense of nationhood. To them there is no contradiction at all between detesting Chinese domination—which they all do in a very, very emotional way—and at the same time having a terrible row with the guy 3 miles away. A lot of them do not see that they have to get together, and before a nation——

Senator SYMINGTON. May I go back and ask you one more question?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. If it is in order, Mr. Chairman.

To clarify, when you say a percentage, a number of those eight counties or provinces around Saigon, and you have illustrated what they were doing, what percentage of the total around Saigon would that be roughly, where they have really made progress?

Mr. LODGE. In the total of the seven provinces?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. There are 5,600,000 people.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that 40 percent of the population of the country?

Mr. LODGE. South Vietnam is 14 million. This is very small. These 400,000 are .003 or something like that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of the total number.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, in the country.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. LODGE. But if we can get a technique, if we get a procedure, then we ought to be able to wholesale this. That is why I say I am not even sure this is the beginning of the beginning, but if it endures, then it might be. And then we might be on our way with something really fundamental, because I do not think that this thing is going to stop. I believe in the economic plan for the development of Southeast Asia. I think it is extremely useful, but I also think they are not going to stop until you have shown that you can overcome subversion, terrorism on the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. Local level.

Mr. LODGE. At the local level, because otherwise how do you know when you do have talks that you have got any kind of an assurance that a peaceful condition is going to continue? You cannot depend on an international control commission to enforce it. You have got to depend on the Vietnamese themselves being able to enforce it, and that means again you come right back to it. They have got to learn how to overcome subversion.

In the countries that are stable out there—like Thailand, for instance—85 perent of the people own their own land. Nothing makes for a stable society as much as that.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

There are some other psychological factors that I noted. One is—this is when I was there, but it was brought up to me again—that the psychological program is terribly dreary. The Communist program has dances and guitar players and comedians and all that kind of thing. The program on our side tends to be very serious documentary films. What these people like, and I discovered this when I was there, they like old U.S. westerns, and they like Laurel and Hardy and Abbott and Costello, and there has been some kind of a bureaucratic deadlock which has made it so that these things have not gotten out. I think that that deadlock has been broken and those films are going to get out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, go ahead.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want to break in unduly there, but on this program of appealing to these people, you say they send dance teams around, the Communists do, and so on. Have we not

been following out there for a number of years this idea of sending not hymn singers, or whatever they are, not hymn, but these people who sing the news and go around and entertain the villages? Have we not been doing that for years?

Mr. LODGE. My impression when I was in Vietnam——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Playing these funny things that are square and all that sort of stuff?

Mr. LODGE. I think maybe in India, but when I was there in Vietnam just the other day, the net effect was dreary, and it needs to be made warm and funny and interesting and exciting.

As a great friend of my wife's and mine—we were there with a Catholic nun who had been there for 30 years, and she came to us to see if we could not get the U.S. Army people to let her have the American westerns and the American slapstick comedies for her to take and show, and we would fix it up. But, of course, that is not good enough. It ought to be organized, and I think we are going to get that done.

Another thing that I was told by our USIA people is that many of these atrocity pictures showing the Vietnamese soldier with a knife at the throat of the Vietcong prisoner are what they call gag photographs. The photographer gives the soldier $5 if he will do it, mostly not American photographers, but the photographs are sold in this country.

THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM

Other items that I think might interest you, the Chieu Hoi program, that is the defector program, had the best week it ever had in the week May 1 to May 8—494 people came in. Of that, 254 were military, 130 were Vietcong political workers, 52 weapons, 49 grenades.

The CHAIRMAN. They surrendered?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, they came in, that is right, came in and surrendered. It is the biggest week they have had since the program began in 1963. I always think that the low point in Vietnam was April 1963, and if you measure—this measures from that, and it is the best week they have ever had. Of course, 1 week is not enough.

CRITICAL OF A POLITICAL APPROACH

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you about that. In February some people came in to see me; they first went to Hubert Humphrey, and then he came over to my office. Mr. Marcy was there, and we had a conference about this business. There were three of them who had been out there. You may know them. I cannot recall the names. One of them was Fraleigh.

Mr. LODGE. Fraleigh, yes, he used to be in USOM.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know him?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The very point they made is what you are making here about this political aspect. The main thing they stressed is exactly what you are saying, and they went into it at great length for 2 or 3 hours.

One thing, for example, that I can remember that they cited specifically was the new AID man who had been brought down from Korea.

Mr. LODGE. [James S.] Killen.

The CHAIRMAN. Killen, a very good administrator, but they left the impression with me he was absolutely cold to this sort of political approach. He wanted to make it efficient. He was drawing back the administration of the distribution of aid to the people. He was centralizing it. It had been sent out to the local people, and he was changing this and putting it through the central government. They thought this was against the best interests on this ground, that it was depriving our local people of an important political thing, distributing it themselves, you see, and seeing that there is no corruption, as best we could, and all that. They thought that this move would kill it. They were not questioning his motives but his wisdom from a political point of view.

They also stated that there were people who regarded themselves, large numbers in certain cases of these local people, who regarded themselves as patriots, non-Communists, but that they had been fighting the central government. They thought with the proper appeal such people could be persuaded to defect, to come over, but our people had a very adamant attitude that, by God, they were not patriots and they were not going to accept them except some form of unconditional surrender.

In other words, they were very critical of the political approach only, and for a lack of understanding of the Tammany Hall principles. They made exactly the same plea you are making. One man was a General Lansdale who worked with Magsaysay.

Mr. LODGE. I know him.

The CHAIRMAN. He cited exactly what you are citing.

Mr. LODGE. He is the Colonel Hillandale in the book "The Ugly American."

The CHAIRMAN. The only thing that impresses me, you are saying almost exactly what they said. The real crux of the matter was a need for local political appeal to these people.

Mr. LODGE. Absolutely.

EVALUATION OF GENERAL TAYLOR

The CHAIRMAN. I mentioned this to the President and got a very cool reception that General Taylor and the others knew better. They also said General Taylor is a fine man and all this, but he has no political appeal. He is formal. These small people come and talk to him, and he is always very stiff. They feel embarrassed, and he cannot get down on the intimate personal relationships with them. They were not trying to discredit him personally, but he is not that type of man.

We got a very cool reception to this idea. I just relate that because it happens to be quite in line with what you are saying.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was Taylor sent over there as that type of man? Was Alex Johnson not sent over there as that type of man?

The CHAIRMAN. He is also an important ambassador. These people do not unbend very easily. I do not think there is much dif-

ference about them. They were saying what we need is just what you are saying.

BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I can remember the Boston police strike when there were no police in the city of Boston, and people were running down the main street breaking shop windows and molesting women and everything else. What happened? The rank and file of civilians were organized. Gov. Calvin Coolidge at that time put out armbands for every man who was 25 or 26 years old and well disposed, and they became acting policemen.

In the Bronx in New York you read about this organization of citizens who go around the apartment houses with walkie-talkies all night to give protection.

Senator CASE. That is in Brooklyn.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, this is the same thing. There is terrorism. There is a breakdown of the forces of law and order who never existed in many places, and so what do you have to do? In each of these hamlets you have to get a citizen to be chairman. He has to have a committee of young men who have a stake in the community, and then you have to build them up, your American native to go through them in order to build them up.

I say the word "doctor." The doctor is a little fancy, but the young man we have trained who is able to give out 17 different kinds of pills, if you have got something that can cure you with one of those pills, he is a good man to know.

You have the schoolteacher, the fellow who knows how to raise pigs and pineapples, and so on, and they come in through him. He can make the village chief secure. The village chief is the one the Vietcong always go for. They have cut off the heads of something like 16,000 village chiefs. So, the citizens make the village chiefs secure, then he can begin thinking about the safety of the community and you begin to get an upward spiral.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Cabot, have you not got a chicken-and-the-egg business here, though?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, you have.

DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF TERRORISM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Here is the village chief which from time immemorial, as I understand it, has been rather looked to as the head man, and he is the boss fellow, at least for a period of time. The citizens have not necessarily been schooled in the assumption of personal responsibilities such as we understand it. And the Vietcong come in and chop off the head of the head man in the village. Well, that would make a lot of people hesitate to become candidates for office.

Mr. LODGE. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I suppose if we had that in this country, there would be fewer announcements in the primaries——

Mr. LODGE. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. For the leading offices, and so on.

But certainly I agree with the philosophy that you are announcing here as the desirable objective, and I hope we are making progress. I think there is some evidence that we are perhaps, but a lot of this we have been doing.

I have been out there twice, and I fully realize the ability of an individual to become an expert on a country. We can all become experts on a foreign country in a few days, so I try to guard against that a little bit.

We have been doing that ever since we went in there. I have been up in the north part of Vietnam. I have seen the programs that we have started there toward trying to get these people to get a little land, the hill people, trying to get them settled rather than migratory if possible. I spent a day out there trying to get these people to do something to do, little patches to raise whatever they raise up there, and so on.

They had a land reform program going during that period of time. But when this terrorism gets in, that is where I get confused frankly, very confused, between the theory of, well, this idea that you cannot settle this militarily. To me that is not a specious argument, but it is not a complete argument at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Say that again.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say this argument that you cannot settle this militarily in South Vietnam, there is a certain validity to that, yes. I do not think we settled too much in World War II, or maybe World War I. I am not so sure military success always settles things. In fact, it hardly ever does. They lose the political. I am convinced, and I certainly admit the validity of this in my own mind, that political stability is the essential there, but you cannot go on political stability alone. Just like the Boston police strike, you have got to have a force.

POLITICAL AREA IS BEING NEGLECTED

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is saying you go on the political alone. He is not saying political alone.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You pick up the paper every day——

The CHAIRMAN. Not either-or.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Stop the shooting business and stop all this foolish business and people will be so happy about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that anybody is saying that, just to stop it and get out. But what we are neglecting is this other.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not so sure we are neglecting it.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they fired Fraleigh, and Taylor does not like Lansdale because he does not go along channels or something. They sat on me down there when I even raised the question. This was subversive.

I think they are right, and they fired Fraleigh because he objected to the program. You saw that in the paper.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know Fraleigh except that one time, but what he said over there makes sense to me, just like you are saying. This is the area of neglect. He is not saying pull out the Army and quit fighting. He just said in this area they are not pursuing it.

He gave in detail how he was in touch, or had been, with the leaders of some of these youth groups and others, trying to conciliate, but that these people never had an opportunity to talk intimately, and he thought in proper circumstances with people like the General and others, that there is nobody that can contact them in the way you contact a ward heeler or a ward leader. That is all they were saying, that this area is neglected, and he thought it was a great mistake to centralize and distribute goods through the government's central agency rather than pursue what they were doing when you were there, which is to send it out to the local areas and let them try to use it to build up the village chiefs. Everything they said was almost the same as you are saying, and according to them, Killen and the new regime were trying to strengthen the central government by giving them the right to do it.

But I think you are right, to do it at the local level and let it come up. They thought it was right, and they fired him. That was the big difference in the approach.

BEGIN WITH THE PEOPLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not disagree with the absolute necessity of political stability, and you have got to begin with the people.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you do it though?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But my own question here—and it is a question, not an assertion, because my expertise goes not much beyond 10 days, so I will not write a book on the subject. We have been at that now for some years, and my contention is that you have got a people who for 1,000 years have been used to a certain type and kind of authority of one kind or another. As I understand it, a lot of it is village authority there, localized, little centralized authority, with very little contact, if any, with the central government except when the tax collector comes around, and no particular interest in the village over on the next rice paddy or over the hill.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, Cabot says we ought to make a great drive toward building at the local level and everything that we can do to get the Vietcong, particularly the southern Vietcong, to defect.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing could be more important than that. This fellow gave examples. I cannot remember the names. He named them, groups that he knew or he thought were willing to come in if the central people would in a sense invite them in, promise them, you know, immunity; he would take them in as partners, and he said we would not do that. They were suspect.

Mr. LODGE. You have got 2 million Hoa Hao; you have got 3 million Cao Dais.

The CHAIRMAN. He named all these people. I do not know the names, but he made a lot of sense to me and he did to Humphrey, and they just did not take to this at all. I remember it so well.

[Discussion off the record.]

GENERAL TAYLOR AS AMBASSADOR

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to make one observation in defense of a constituent of mine, Max Taylor. I was out there before he went out there and before you did, and you could not beat the backslapping. It was really going on great, especially the people in the aid program. You would have thought it was just one happy family and that everything was going very fine. Nevertheless, pretty soon there was a total collapse. Taylor has never been a master of ceremonies at the Shoreham.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not criticism of Taylor.

Senator SYMINGTON. It has been before.

The CHAIRMAN. Taylor is a general. I would not expect him to be a ward heeler.

Senator SYMINGTON. The fact that you are a general does not mean necessarily that you are a cold and aloof person. I do not think that he is a cold and aloof person. I have known him for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. He would not be to you. By gad, you were the Secretary of Air.

Senator SYMINGTON. The point I am making—I agree with Bourke, there is a definite military position here, and I think you have got to have a compromise at the top if you want to do further developments in the political and diplomatic fields. I am much impressed with what Cabot says this morning about the progress they have made in the field, but I should think that the people under Taylor—I just do not think that everybody with an idea can get to see the Ambassador right away, or various people. I think there has got to be some form of decentralization or delegation, no more than you could do it with the head man over here.

I think that Taylor represents the very best we have to offer over there from a military standpoint, if the military is important.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it is important.

PRIMARILY A MILITARY OPERATION

Senator SYMINGTON. With all due respect to the central government, it is primarily a military operation today. I would hope there could be a supplement of what he is trying to do as against a replacement of this concept.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too.

Senator SYMINGTON. Especially since a lot of people are getting killed over there.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. It is a supplement. It is an area they are neglecting. That is all they were saying, and that is all I think you are saying, that this is the area that needs the greatest emphasis now, not many more bombers where they blow themselves up. My gad, they apparently have more than they know what to do with, but in this area they have more to do.

DEFINITION OF VICTORY

Mr. LODGE. Perhaps I can contribute some light on this which is very important.

In October 1963 President Kennedy sent me a telegram asking me how I defined "victory." After a great deal of thought I wired back that I would define "victory" as the day when the young Vietcong wakes up in the morning and says, "I am not going back today," and the reason he is not going back is, (*a*) because he thinks he will probably get killed if he goes back—now, there is your military—and (*b*) "I am not going back because I look around me, and I see the rice and the fish and the ducks and the coconuts and the American aid coming in, life looks pretty good right here." And so he concludes not to go back. That is how it happened in Malaya, and that is how it happened in the Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in the Philippines.

Mr. LODGE. Nobody understands this better than Ambassador Taylor does, because in the report that he made in 1961, he stresses the political side. He constantly stressed it to me in all the many conversations I have had with him. June a year ago, 1964, we got a paper initialed by all the different U.S. agencies represented in South Vietnam—the Embassy, the Army, AID, CIA, and USIA—on a coordinated politicomilitary plan, which had never been done before, and then had it initialed by the Government of Vietnam.

Of course, getting a paper done is a lot of work, but still you have only got a piece of paper when you get through unless you do something about it. Then they had all these upheavals last summer, and it was only 4 months ago that they got going on it, and it was General Taylor who has carried this out, who has pulled the Americans together in Saigon to be a team, and who has always stressed the importance—I have always said to the French people and so on that nobody understands better than the American military the fact that there is not an exclusively military solution, and if you have a 100-percent military result and a zero political result, the result is zero, because 100 times zero equals zero.

General Westmoreland, General Harkins, all know that a competent handling of the political side is the best thing that can happen for them. In fact, if the political side was as far along as the military side is, we would be on our way now.

PULLING THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIDES TOGETHER

Now, in Malaya again, which is an interesting thing to study, although it is not exactly the same as Vietnam, they had an executive who is the one who pulled the political and the military together under the head man, and then go all the way down into every hamlet where they have one. We are, I think, working toward that end.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have anybody, do you think, that is really qualified in this area, the political area, under Taylor and Johnson, who has this particular area under his main responsibility?

Mr. LODGE. No, not at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Why should we not have somebody that is a specialist in this particularly?

Mr. LODGE. I think it ought to rank with Army, AID, USIA, CIA. It ought to rank right with it as far as Vietnam goes and as far as tropical underdeveloped countries around the world go.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the AID man ought to be——

Mr. LODGE. I think this countersubversion ing is an end in itself.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Like an AID man ought to be essentially a politician because he uses that aid politically.

Mr. LODGE. Of course, but you know I think the President is very aware of all of this.

The CHAIRMAN. You have told him this.

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his response to this point?

Mr. LODGE. I think he is very, very well aware of it. I do not need to say in this room that he understands politics and the importance of it and the detail that goes into it. I think he is well aware of all these things we are talking about.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

INKSPOT OPERATION

Senator AIKEN. I would like to ask Cabot if he has read Hanson Baldwin's column this morning. If so, do you think there is any substance to it?

Mr. LODGE. I am sorry, I have not read it.

Senator AIKEN. He states in the New York Times that the United States may modify Vietnam tactics, and then goes on to say that we have established strongholds along the coast which will ultimately be occupied by 500,000 American troops cooperating with the South Vietnamese who will then carry out what they call the Ink Blot Operation, working their way gradually inland. Hanson Baldwin is not hostile to the administration, is he?

Mr. LODGE. Not so far as I know.

Senator AIKEN. Is this a trial balloon being sent up to get the reaction or what? It is in this morning's paper. I just happened to see it.

Mr. LODGE. We are following the inkspot concept as regards this Hop Tac area, because we are taking Saigon as a big secure area. It might not be secure compared to some places, but relatively speaking it is secure. You get blown up once in a while. As we are going out from there in concentric circles. That is one thing that we are doing.

Most of the cities are secure within the city—Cantho, Mytho, Nhatrang, Danang, Quinhon, Hue. Within the city you are all right. Then there are some roads that you can use in the daytime, but you cannot use them at night. You have got to make a map of this country. You have got to have one map for the daytime and another map for the nighttime.

I think there is merit in having these perimeters at these ports. There are a number of very good ports along the coast, with deep water. The Camranh Bay, for example, is the port where Marco Polo stopped on his way out to Canton. It is where the whole Russian fleet went in in 1901 on its way to Japan. We can have forces there, and they can be supplied and maintained, evacuated, and everything else. I am for doing that. I am for using American troops, and I think using American troops for that purpose is a logical thing to do if for no other reason than that it relieves the Vietnam-

ese troops to do this kind of countersubversion thing which only they can do.

I think this is a good thing. I think the bombings are a good thing. I do not think either of them are a substitute for learning how to overcome subversion.

A SERIES OF AMERICAN BASES

Senator AIKEN. Apparently he anticipates a series of American bases. I assume that they could be used for operations in any other part of Southeast Asia also. But he says it is estimated a total of about 500,000 Americans might be needed and years of fighting might be required.

I have not read the whole thing myself, but it is in the Times. It states that the United States is considering changing its strategy there, but that would not be locally a change of strategy.

Mr. LODGE. I do not know anything about the details of this or about the figures, and I do not think that this would be done at the expense of our effort on subversion. I certainly hope not, because we must resist the temptation to look for sort of quickie gimmicks that will get us out of this thing without solving the subversion problem, because I do not think you are ever going to get out of it until you do so.

HANOI AND CHINA

Senator AIKEN. To what extent has Hanoi succumbed to the Red Chinese controls?

Mr. LODGE. I was told on this trip by one chief of state that Hanoi is a complete and utter satellite and pawn of Red China. I do not agree with that statement. This was the only chief of state who thought this. None of the others thought so. Our own people in Hong Kong do not think so. All the best qualified people here in the executive branch do not think so.

I believe that Hanoi has still considerable freedom of action. It is debatable. There are some people who think they could not stop this even if they wanted to, that the Chinese would not let them, but I believe it is worthwhile trying to put pressure on Hanoi.

Senator AIKEN. You think that Hanoi is then conducting the war. If we negotiated with anyone, sat down with anyone, would you say it would be Hanoi?

Mr. LODGE. I privately doubt whether you are ever going to get negotiation.

Senator AIKEN. So do I. I read what you said the other day, that eventually it might run out.

Mr. LODGE. It will be because of what I told Senator Kennedy, one morning the young man will decide not to go back, and that is it.

Senator AIKEN. That is what happened in Korea.

Mr. LODGE. In Korea, Malaya, and Luzon. This is not like Western Europe. It is not like that at all. All of a sudden they decide that it is not profitable, it is not a good thing to do. The individual decides it, and he just stops.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, we have no war, and if there is no war, it will come to an end.

Mr. LODGE. The statement that all wars end in negotiation really is not quite accurate.

Senator AIKEN. The religious wars ended that way. It was only these modern political-diplomatic operations in Europe that did it that way.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, but our war against Germany in World War II did not end in negotiation. It ended in total surrender. The Germans had no negotiating position.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I ask this question?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir.

FRENCH INTERESTS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Following the chairman's thought about the French ownership of a lot of land around the delta, et cetera, et cetera, is one of the reasons that de Gaulle is acting the way he is acting because of the fact that in a lefthanded manner he is interested in economic survival out there of French interests?

Mr. LODGE. The French colonists in Vietnam, whom I got to know very well, are anti-de Gaulle almost to a man. They hope further that we will succeed. They have no influence at all with de Gaulle. That is perfectly clear. You have got 450 French high school and university teachers who make a tremendous contribution. You have got two hospitals with doctors. You have got the French businessmen who manage the rubber plantations, and you have French lawyers and professional men.

I would be surprised if this were true. It is an interesting thought.

I believe that what de Gaulle really wants is to shrink us down.

The CHAIRMAN. Undermine us.

Mr. LODGE. Shrink the United States.

I think de Gaulle has never recovered from the fall of France, emotionally from the fall of France in 1940. He wants France to be a great power. Of course, France cannot be a superpower like the United States or the Soviet Unon, and he thinks that by shrinking us down, it will make France look bigger. I think he has a notion, an absolutely subjective notion which is not based on anything that has ever been said to him by any of the many excellent French experts. I do not think any of them have ever recommended this policy. He has never been to Indochina. He thinks of this that way. And I would doubt if he was interested in French property in Vietnam.

The French in Vietnam do not think so. They regard him with great absurdity. That is just a guess. It is a very interesting question.

EVALUATION OF DR. QUAT

I thought you might be interested in a few words about Dr. Quat, whom I consider to be a good man. He is a brave, intelligent man. He is not a dynamic, colorful, persuasive political leader. I wish he could become one, because if this country could produce a man like that, it would really solve a great many problems.

The fact that the Filipinos had Magsaysay and the Malays had the Tengkus is a tremendous factor. I have not abandoned the idea

that this man may become that. But so far he is a brave, honest, and intelligent man, and I think we can all be thankful for that.

Senator AIKEN. Who is that?

Mr. LODGE. Dr. Phan Huy Quat. He disbanded the military council only recently, which is quite a remarkable thing to do, particularly when you consider that the military council is the group that created him. Of course, it was the right thing for him to do because, (*a*) the military ought to be under the civil power and (*b*) nothing is worse than for the army to be immersed in politics. It means every general is thinking about politics all the time and not giving his attention to the military. So this was an excellent thing to do, and he went ahead and did it.

I am talking about Dr. Quat, the Prime Minister. He scheduled elections for the provincial councils for May 20, and he is just doing the best he can everyday. Of course, to be frank, in that country you never can exclude a coup, and so the fact that you have got a good man as Prime Minister must be counterbalanced by the fact that you do not know how long he is going to last.

EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING

I think the strikes against North Vietnam have had a very good effect in South Vietnam. I called on the apostolic delegate who says that the position of Catholics has greatly improved as a result of the bombings, that there are areas opened up to priests where they never could go before, that it has created a better state of mind.

I think——

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, I would like to understand that. Better state of mind where as a result of the bombing?

Mr. LODGE. Throughout South Vietnam. I think the Catholic clergy, I think the army, I think the officials all feel more optimistic. I think anything that means that the Americans are united and determined and are not watching the clock is the thing that makes the South Vietnamese go.

The Buddhist thinking as of the day I was there—I do not undertake to predict how long any of these states of mind will last—certainly shows a great evolution in the last year.

[Deleted.]

[Discussion off the record.]

RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is his organization political or religious?

Mr. LODGE. I do not know how you divide that up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I mean by that is this, Is there a deep-seated feeling among the Buddhists that they are being put upon by the Catholics and vice versa, or is it a reach for power by a certain coterie of so-called Buddhist leaders who have become politically ambitious rather than religious leaders?

Mr. LODGE. I only know a few of them well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a very confusing thing.

Mr. LODGE. I know many quite well, and I know Tam Chou. Tri Quang was the one that came into the Embassy in the middle of the night, and I kept him for 6 weeks. There is nothing otherworldly about him. He is interested in what is happening in the

parleys of his country. He refuses absolutely to accept any post, but I would say that the number who were as interested as he is a very small. I would think that rank and file of Buddhists—however many there are, 4 or 5 million, I do not know—are just ordinary people going about their business, and they get married and have funerals in the Buddhist pagodas and that is it. I think there are few political minded, and that is my guess.

Senator MUNDT. Do all 4 or 5 million follow a Buddhist leader, or do they have their chiefs?

Mr. LODGE. The whole thing in Vietnam politically and otherwise is decentralized. They have a sense of peoplehood without the sense of nationhood.

Senator MUNDT. You are not telling us they have a republican form of government over there?

Mr. LODGE. They have not got a republican form of government at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

BEING OF ONE RACE

Senator CASE. I want to ask you this since you have repeated this. Just what does this mean as opposed to nationalism?

Mr. LODGE. It means that they have a sense of being of one race.

Senator CASE. This is South Vietnamese as against North Vietnamese or Indochina against China of what?

Mr. LODGE. I think all of the Vietnamese people, south and north, have sense of being Vietnamese and of having a language and a literature and art and a culture.

The North Vietnamese have had a strong Communist police state apparatus imposed on them. In South Vietnam they have this feeling and they have this fear and detestation of China, but that does not lead them to the conclusion that they ought to stop this row that they have been having for a long time with the fellow who is 10 miles off. They are roughly the way Germany and Italy were in the 19th century when you had a lot of separate principalities and small groupings, and then Bismarck put it together and made Germany, and Cavour put it together and made Italy.

This country is in the process of becoming a modern nation state, but it is not a modern nation state now.

Senator CASE. The identity these people feel is with the Vietnamese, north with south, and with each other or——

Mr. LODGE. There has only been one country in history, north and south. Everything is decentralized. In South Vietnam you have 2 million Hoa Haos, 3 million Cao Dais, seven distinct kinds of Montagnards that have not even got the same root. Then you have small other religious tribal sectarian groupings. You have got 100,000 Chams who pertain to Java and so on.

So, it is not surprising that there has not ever been a really unified North and South Vietnam except nominally for a period of about 50 years. So, the idea of a unified North and South Vietnam, I think, is very, very far away.

The process of integration is going very slowly. That is the slowest thing. You can teach people how to handle rifles, and you can teach people how to raise pigs, and you can teach people all kinds

of things. One of the slowest things, one of the slowest changes you ever bring about with people is how to organize society.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

BUDDHIST MORALE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

You mentioned that the Catholics were very much revived by the bombings you might say, that their morale went up.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would that not also be true of the Buddhists in South Vietnam, at least to some extent, and if not, why not?

Mr. LODGE. It is. Tri Quang said to me that he applauded the bombing, and he wished that it had come sooner. This is a man who is supposed to be a neutralist. I just say he is a question mark. I do not know what he is. I cannot tell. He is a man—a Buddhist clergyman who perhaps has a weaker sense of nationalism than most, because the thing that interests him is the Buddhist movement. He thinks in terms of Japan, Ceylon, India, Burma, Thailand. Nationalism is not a big thing in his life. You start talking with him and you say, "How are you going to prevent yourself from being gobbled up by China unless you create a nation state?" And he says, "Yes, that is right," but you have to reason with him first.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Mundt.

MORE PROGRESS IN LAND TENURE PROGRAM

Senator MUNDT. Cabot, are we doing everything just right now in South Vietnam, and if not, what changes would you suggest?

Mr. LODGE. I think we have made a start on countersubversion, which I think is the crux of this thing. There are 400 hamlets, as I said.

The CHAIRMAN. He covered that pretty well just before you came in, but I would like him to repeat what he said about the political aspect. I think that is the crux of it.

Mr. LODGE. You can have a first-class military program, economic program, social program, informational program, technical programs without having something that is good, effective, practical politics. It has to be woven together to make a whole, because this is a politico-military problem. That is what Bedell Smith said. He said any secondrate general would win in Indochina if there were the proper political atmosphere. Mao Tse-tung says, "War is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed," and these are the two wings of statecraft.

If our political effort were as far along as our military effort, we would be in very good shape. This is a hard thing for us because it does not harmonize with the organization of our Government, and I believe we are making of countersubversion an end in itself, which we ought to do, and which is on a par with military, Embassy, AID, USIA, and so forth. That is what we are going to have to do, not only for Vietnam but I believe this subversion, terrorism is what

the Communists are planning to use in other tropical underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. I think in the executive branch this fact is realized, and progress is being made.

I think more progress could be made, notably as regards the land tenure program, which in a predominantly agricultural community is of the utmost importance politically and psychologically, and in the executive branch today that is actively being developed at the present time, using some of this money that Congress has voted to bring about a land acquisition and distribution program which I think would be a body blow to the Vietcong.

LAND REFORM IN NATIONALIST CHINA

Senator MUNDT. I was told by a very knowledgeable visitor to Vietnam recently that the Nationalist Chinese are doing the best job for us in trying to get their concept of land reform adopted in Korea, because they seem to be pretty much akin to each other, and that they have available in the Republic of China plenty of people who understand how they handle that program. He says, "Why do you send in so many Americans when you could fly over some of those knowledgeable Chinese who know how to deal with the agrarian problems of their country and work it out in Korea?"

Does that make sense or not?

Mr. LODGE. Certainly Formosa and Thailand are two countries where land is distributed and the little man has his piece of land, and nothing is more conducive to a stable society. I think the agricultural system in Formosa is a model and is something that the Nationalist Chinese deserve great credit for. I also think that USOM deserves credit for the big program in Formosa. There are Chinese Nationalist experts there now, and maybe it will be possible to use some more. That I do not know.

VIETNAMESE APPREHENSIONS ABOUT THE CHINESE

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if they would be suspect just because they are Chinese.

Mr. LODGE. This again is a very sensitive subject. There are two oriental countries that are always welcome in Vietnam. One is the Koreans, and one is the Filipinos.

There is a feeling of apprehension about the Japanese and the Chinese; the Japanese because the memory of World War II is still fresh, and the Chinese because they are afraid if you bring in the Nationalists it will bring in the Communists. It sort of gets to be big league. So, you always have that to contend with.

Chinese troops, regular organized divisions of Chinese Nationalists, I think would not be acceptable. I think Chinese advisors are, and there are quite a few there. There are more there than appear, as a matter of fact.

FINDING A CAMPAIGN MANAGER

The CHAIRMAN. Could you go one step further in this same point you made with Senator Mundt? Have you got any concrete recommendations for our information about approaching this political

problem? Do you have any suggestions about how to get at this political problem?

Mr. LODGE. I do not think there is anything that requires legislation here.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for our information.

Mr. LODGE. I think Congress has done everything that it can.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean by way of a bill, but I meant purely for our advice.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, it should be regarded as an end in itself on the same level of importance as the military, as the economic, as the informational, as the CIA, as the Embassy. It should be on the same level of importance.

Senator SYMINGTON. What should be?

The CHAIRMAN. The political.

Mr. LODGE. The political, the countersubversion. The most descriptive phrase is very awkward, countersubversion-terrorism. I do not use the word "counterinsurgency" because that is so broad it covers everything, and it really does not mean very much. What you are talking about is how you are going to overcome subversion-terrorism, and this requires an executive who can pull all the different things together—the military, the economic, the social, the propagandistic, and so on, and in Malaya they had an executive from the top man right on down to the provinces and the districts and the villages and the hamlets who would be sort of an organizer.

The CHAIRMAN. Kind of a Jim Farley.

Mr. LODGE. You might call him a campaign manager, except this is an application where you can get your head cut off. That is the difference. But this is real grassroots. When you have terrorism, the only way you overcome it, it is like a fly fighting a lion. The tactics that would be used are not usable by the other. You have to mobilize the totality of the population to give security to the security officials, and then they can go to work on the terrorists, and anything having to do with organizing the totality of people, the rank and file, involves politics. It involves people who make themselves liked. It involves people who can get the loyalty, who can get the rank and file of people to adhere to the government.

NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Senator MUNDT. I agree completely with that concept and have so argued with Dean Rusk at times, but I do believe it requires legislation.

Mr. LODGE. You think it does.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I do. Senator Symington, Senator Case, and I and many others have been trying for years to try to establish some kind of chain mechanism whereby we can get the kind of experts in this field required to do the job. I think it is important that you get the right kind of Americans trained to launch this kind of political warfare. I think it is idiotic to assume if you send somebody to Korea or Vietnam with a glitter in his eye and a textbook in his hand that he is going to become a political expert.

Mr. LODGE. I agree with that.

Senator MUNDT. We need Cabot Lodges and people of that type, trained and with know-how. I think years ago we had that concept, but we are never going to get it up to that level. We train your economic and military fellows. You train the diplomatic fellow, but when it comes to this kind of a rough business which you are talking about, we do not train them.

Mr. LODGE. I agree with that.

Senator MUNDT. I had a young Korean in my office the other day trying to find someplace in the United States he could go to learn to be a successful bureaucrat in a democratic government in Seoul where, he says, "Everybody is stealing and they do not have the proper kind of efforts." But he believes in freedom, and he wants to go someplace, and there is no place he can even go in the whole free world. I think it takes legislation.

PRODUCING SOME PERSONNEL

Mr. LODGE. I defer to you on whether it takes legislation, but I certainly agree with you that this ought to be regarded as an end in itself, and that we ought to be thinking of producing some personnel.

Senator MUNDT. That is right.

Mr. LODGE. Not very many but a certain number.

Senator MUNDT. Well-trained.

Mr. LODGE. Who are political organizers abroad, who are trained, and who are experienced. One of the things I hope will happen in Vietnam, that we will develop some Americans who know how to do this, so that we can use them in other places.

You see, one of the things that makes it so difficult is that the local people have actually to do it. It is the American that had to teach them and organize them and so on. There undoubtedly was some Russian one day who instructed Mao Tse-tung. We do not know who he was, but he did. Then Mao Tse-tung went ahead with the Chinese Revolution.

Senator CASE. And Castro.

Mr. LODGE. And somebody instructed Castro, and we are trying to instruct these people in the Hop Tac area, and we are doing it in sort of a shoestring basis, because we have never faced up to this as a major threat. Well, it is a major threat. It is just as big a threat as infantry or air power or anything else is.

ROLE OF THE CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. May I make this observation and ask your comment? I think you said counterinsurgency-terrorism.

Mr. LODGE. Countersubversion-terrorism I call it.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we have anyplace to train those it would be, as of today, in the Central Intelligence Agency, at least to some extent. Yet there is consistent heavily running criticism, which I have always thought was unfortunate, of that Agency, especially since they cannot answer it, especially by the so-called liberals of this body, of that Agency.

So, actually if what you are saying is correct—and it impressed me tremendously—there is not anyplace in the Government that

we are now—following Carl's statement—there is no place in the Government that we are doing anything about doing what you say.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is the CIA not doing it?

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me just finish—about what you say is in your opinion the most important thing to do out there, because there certainly is not anything in the State Department about it.

Mr. LODGE. The other things are important, too.

Senator SYMINGTON. The State Department spends a great deal of time criticizing either overtly or covertly all the activities of the CIA. I was just wondering what you think ought to be done, if this is as serious and as important a matter as you say it is, what you think we ought to do about it.

Mr. LODGE. Of course, in doing this, experience of American practical politics is helpful.

Senator SYMINGTON. But a campaign manager over here is trained not to lose his head, except theoretically.

COMPARISON TO CHINA

Mr. LODGE. Yes, that is right.

The thought that I would like to leave—I have reached the end now—I would like to leave this one thought. When I visited China in 1929 it was, if anything, even more disorganized than Vietnam is today. I remember it very well. Yet both China and North Vietnam are effectively organized now, not democratically organized and perhaps not as elaborately as we are, but well enough to take one program such as land tenure and get it well started and then take on another, which is plenty fast enough.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the method by which they have done that has been a method of force.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, exactly. And so in Vietnam we face nothing less than the momentous question: Can the decentralized, oriental, Confucionist country become strong, orderly, effective without becoming Communist. Now, that is the question, and it is hard to imagine a bigger or more central question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The land reforms in China, as I understood it, in the main were largely enforced by going in and cutting the heads off the landlords.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They had regular head cutting bees over there.

Mr. LODGE. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They had a celebration and festival and chopped the heads off of all the landowners. That is the way they got land reform. Now, we are not going at it that way.

Mr. LODGE. No.

NOT REALLY DEMOCRATIC

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not our theory to go in and use brutality and force and terrorism to control and keep control of these things. Our problem is how to do it in what we are pleased to call a democratic manner.

Mr. LODGE. What we are trying to do really is not democratic. In that country it never occurs to anybody that you settle anything

important by voting. You hope it is humane, we hope it is just, and we hope it is effective, and certainly when you carry out this procedure of a census and identification cards and passes for the movement of goods and persons and curfew, and then you comb through each precinct and comb the terrorists out, the ones that are guilty ought to be executed. If the result is going around cutting people's heads off, when you catch them, you ought to execute them.

Senator MUNDT. Cabot, have you made a study as to how they did this land reform on Formosa? I have a hunch it was a pretty strong centralized government to get it done.

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes.

Senator MUNDT. That is what we should do, something like that.

Mr. LODGE. We are a long ways from settling important questions by elections in Vietnam, but to do things fairly and justly—these people have not got much of a feeling for settling things by elections, but they have got a highly developed sense of fair play and justice as we have, and justice and honor and incorruptibility are very highly prized out there.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That completes my statement.

UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL NEEDS

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very informative. I have been very impressed by your analysis of the problem. I hope you have persuaded the Executive. I was distinctly under the impression that they did not have the realization as to where the major problem is. They thoroughly understand the military, and we have, God knows, put in enough planes and things like that. I still do not believe they understand the point you are making about the need for grassroots political organizations.

Now, the way to get these people—we have got lots of politicians in this country, not all in office. I do not know these people, and I cannot say, "Well, you ought to send Fraleigh" or people like that. All I can say is they have had the same ideas you have, and they have had some significant recommendations as to how to go about it. My impression is that the administration likes those suggestions.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, my impression is that the President thoroughly understands this.

The CHAIRMAN. If he does, I think it is a result of your briefing on it, it seems to me.

Senator MUNDT. Do you have any documentation of that understanding in statistical terms? We have got I think 35,000 American military people there, maybe more, maybe 50,000. How many trained political operatives do you think we have there? Have you got a list of those?

Mr. LODGE. I do not think I can give it to you statistically.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we have many? Can you generalize?

Mr. LODGE. This is the thing that is basically done by the Vietnamese themselves. You need advisers, instructors in political organizations. They do not necessarily need to be Americans. There are

people from other countries that could do good work, too. This is in its beginning stages.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the same impression you do about this. It is very distinct in my memory that we have had repeatedly from the time Cabot Lodge was Ambassador and talked to us, and the Secretary of State and Max Taylor since he has been Ambassador, and McNamara as head of the military establishment in this country—they have said repeatedly here, at least in my recollection, that the political settlement and responsibility in this country and its amalgamation was absolutley essential to a successful operation here, and that the military thing was an adjunct and a protecting device.

Now, we started out some time ago, some years ago, with the village strongpoint philosophy, which was basically an attempt to establish a political stability and a political responsibility in strongpoints which would flow out——

The CHAIRMAN. By military means. He is suggesting we do it the other way, by political means to enlist them as members of the political organization.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But meanwhile you have got to have the police force to keep order.

Mr. LODGE. You have got to do both at once. A man is not going to adhere to the government if he cannot sleep at night. You are never going to get his vote.

NO EVIDENCE OF A GOOD POLITICAL LEADER

The CHAIRMAN. It is not either-or, it is not this or that. It is both. We have done the military, it seems to me, to a great extent.

Mr. LODGE. We have done a very good job.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is political.

Mr. LODGE. We have done a very good job in the military.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. This is easy. It is according to our regular organization. We have got lots of military people. We have got lots of weapons. But on the political things I have seen no evidence that any good political leader is doing what you are saying.

The reports on Killen—he is head of the AID. He was brought in there with no previous knowledge. He does not speak French. He knows nothing about this, but he is a good administrator, a tough, hard-boiled administrator. His idea was we are going to organize this, bring it in and centralize it and everything will go out through the government. This was supposed to enhance the central government's prestige because they were doing it, and it is just the opposite of what you are saying ought to be done. You go out and start at local levels and give the local fellow the prestige of distributing aid and of teaching and so on and working with the decentralized system they have.

This is precisely what Lansdale and these other fellows said, and that is why they objected, and that is why they got fired. After they had been here—Fraleigh, and there were three others; I do not remember their names; I have got it in my notes. It was just shortly after they came here, and the administration heard about it and thought they were being disloyal to Killen, and so they fired Fraleigh.

Lansdale was not out there. He was only coming in to give advice, because of an experience in the Philippines.

Mr. LODGE. He has been in Vietnam, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Along back in Diem's era.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But he had not been recently. He left, I think, in 1957.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

EVALUATION OF EDWARD LANSDALE

The CHAIRMAN. He did have some acquaintance with it. I was very impressed by what he said. I do not know him any more than that, but certainly you have stated how they succeeded in the Philippines, and he was only saying let us do it the way we did in the Philippines, because of his experience. Would you want to give any opinion of Lansdale yourself? Do you know him?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any idea?

Mr. LODGE. He is a very brilliant man who has a real feeling for this type of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why they do not use a fellow like that because of his experience in the Philippines. I was told he is not in the good graces of the Pentagon, that he said things that they did not agree with, so he was on their blacklist. That is what I was told.

Mr. LODGE. I do not know about that. He is the original Colonel Hillandale, if you ever read "The Ugly American."

The CHAIRMAN. I read it a long time ago. What did he do? Refresh my memory.

Mr. LODGE. He is the hero of that book who goes out and works with the people in the villages.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess that is what offended them.

Mr. LODGE. It is a book worth reading. Burdick and Lederer really know Southeast Asia, and while it is a novel and it is overdrawn in some respects—and I do not agree with all that they say about the State Department, I think they are somewhat unfair on the State Department—nonetheless, it has some very interesting things in it, and General Lansdale is the original Colonel Hillandale in this novel. He, of course, knows a great deal. I have seen him several times here in Washington in the last few months.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody that had this experience in the Philippines it seems to me would be very appropriate to this, as you have just said.

Mr. LODGE. You do not need many Americans in this work.

NEED FOR CATALYSTS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. You need a director.

Mr. LODGE. You need a few to be the catalysts.

The CHAIRMAN. That is it.

Mr. LODGE [continuing]. To get the Vietnamese going. They have to do it, you see. There are some things out there we can do as Americans, but this is the thing they have to do.

Senator MUNDT. I would like to reinforce what has been said. For years now we are not doing the things politically that have to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. I agree this has been stated generally.

Senator MUNDT. I agree with it completely, but here is the point. So far, we have been able to find out—the staff tells me we have 70,000 Americans in the field. They will sit down and tell us how many American military we have. We say, "What have you got in the political end?" Nobody has been able to identify as many as half a dozen. I say, "Do you have a thousand?" I think——

Mr. LODGE. It is incidental. The political thing now is done by an Army officer here who happens to have an aptitude, a USOM man here and so on.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. The thing is not set up as an end in itself, and I think it should be, and I think it will be.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it will be?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What makes you think it will be?

Mr. LODGE. Because I think there is a realization of this in the Government at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. I sure hope you can develop this. If there is anything we can do, if we say we heard what you said, and we think it makes sense——

Mr. LODGE. There is always a lot you can do, as you know. You see, what Senator Mundt says is true. Everybody talks about it.

The CHAIRMAN. But they do not do it.

OVERFLOWING WITH GOOD IDEAS

Mr. LODGE. They do not do anything about it. Vietnam is overflowing with good ideas, and what it lacks is execution. We do not need to give them any more good ideas. What is needed is to take a few, two good ideas, and carry them out. Take land tenure and take political organization. Carry them out and do them. You do not need more ideas. They cannot possibly cope with the ideas that are there now.

I think before you came in I described that in June 1964 a paper was signed by all the U.S. agencies—the Embassy, the military, the USOM, USIA, and CIA—supporting this concept of a unified political effort, and that in turn was agreed to by the Government of Vietnam. Then came all these upheavals in Saigon, and they could not do anything until 4 months ago. For 4 months they have been working at it under General Taylor's direction, and very good work has been done, and 400 of these hamlets have had this treatment. The results are encouraging.

It is small. It is not a thing to make a big deal out of, but they have had elections. In 200 of these hamlets they have had elections for village chiefs and councils which presuppose a considerable degree of tranquility.

NEED TO TRAIN VIETNAMESE LEADERS

Senator MUNDT. We put all emphasis on the military, and I think we are all agreed that the military is purely a holding operation. They are not trying to obliterate Hanoi, but to hold until we can work something out.

Now, they bring in thousands of young military officers, army pilots, navy pilots, and they train them here, and they send them there. They have got no place to train them here in this political thing. This cannot be done entirely, Cabot, by Americans. You have got the idea. Some Russian guy probably trained Mao Tse-tung. He did the job.

Mr. LODGE. Mao Tse-tung did the job.

Senator MUNDT. Now we have got to train some Vietnamese. We can bring them here to Princeton to study French, but that is not going to——

Mr. LODGE. We have to do for the people in Vietnam what this Russian fellow did for Mao Tse-tung. Before you came in, I submitted that there are three different kinds of action. One is the action against the north which is purely military and undertaken by the United States. Two is the pitched battle in the south between battalion units of the Vietcong, which is United States and Vietnam together, and third is subversion-terrorism in which the military work has to be exclusively by the Vietnamese, with political guidance, economic support, and so on. That is how the thing divides up.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION

Senator SYMINGTON. There is one question I would like to ask, if I may, on or off the record, before this most constructive hearing is over. I have learned more in the last hour about this thing than in many meetings before.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much.

Senator SYMINGTON. And I mean it. It has been great.

What is the Russian position—I ask you this based on your long background—what do you think the Russian position is, regardless of what their formal position is? How do they really feel about what we are doing in South Vietnam, and what is their reaction to it? What is the position between the Red Chinese and the Russians incident to this situation and our effort in it?

It is a very involved question, not adequately presented, but I think you know what is in the back of my mind.

Mr. LODGE. It is a very important question and one I have thought about a lot, but we can only guess. I believe that Russian interests, regardless of whether they are ruled by czars or whether they are ruled by the Soviets, are opposed to those of China in Southeast Asia, and I believe the present generation of Russians think so. I think they are privately relieved that we are carrying this load.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Russians are.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, and I think that is what makes them feel free to attack us publicly and say how wonderful the Chinese are, because that is typical Communist technique. But I think they are very much opposed to Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

SOMETHING IS BEING DONE

The CHAIRMAN. Cabot, I think this has been extremely interesting. I hope you can influence our leaders down in the State Department and the White House.

Mr. LODGE. I find they receive my views——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean get this done.

Mr. LODGE [continuing]. In a very sympathetic way, and I think something is in the process of being done under high pressure, and they are going to use some of this money that Congress appropriated.

The CHAIRMAN. And on political organization.

Mr. LODGE. And on political organization; yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear that. I hope that is true.

Mr. LODGE. I think if I should be around in 6 months, I could tell you something quite good.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will be around. You look very healthy to me. I do not see any signs of deterioration.

Thank you very much. I think it has been very interesting.

Mr. LODGE. Very nice to be here again.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the briefing was concluded.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore, Lausche, Pell, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Senators Harris, Russell of South Carolina, Muskie, Hart, Kuchel, McGee, Bass, Morton, Prouty, Nelson, and Kennedy of Massachusetts.

Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Secretary of State is with us this morning to bring us up to date on the situation in the Dominican Republic. I have also invited interested Senators who are not members of the Foreign Relations Committee to attend, and particularly for their benefit I want to emphasize that this is an executive session, and that all Senators on or off the committee are under an obligation not to discuss in any detail certainly in any way what the Secretary says, because you never know when it may be embarrassing.

The Secretary is going to make a short statement and then we will ask questions. He has said he has to leave at 11:15.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He has to go find out what the latest change is in the Dominican situation.

All right, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I thought I might comment on three points before turning to your questions and discussion. First, the situation down there this morning as of now; second, the OAS relationship to this situation; and third, the question of partiality as between the two sides that has come up in a good deal of press discussion in the last 48 hours.

On the first point, it appears now there has been an agreement between the two sides to have a 24-hour cease-fire beginning at noon today to permit the Red Cross to come in and administer to the wounded and restock the hospitals.

I thought I might open with a comment on three aspects of this before we get to questions and discussion. One is the situation in the Dominican Republic as of 9 o'clock this morning; second, the

OAS relationship to this problem from the beginning; and third, the question of partiality or impartiality as between the opposing factions down there insofar as U.S. forces are concerned.

24-HOUR TRUCE

There has been overnight an agreement between the two sides to have a 24-hour truce in this area of the northern part of the city north of the line of communications occupied by the U.S. forces for the purpose of permitting the Red Cross to go in and administer to the wounded, to take care of the dead, and to restock hospitals. It is our hope that we can make arrangements between the two sides during that period to bring about a permanent cease-fire. That could be accomplished, for example, if the so-called rebel elements that are north of the line of communications were to move into the southern part of the city and make the line of communications a clear truce line between the two sides.

Now, the probability is that by noon today the so-called loyalist forces will have completed the occupation of that northern part of the city, so whether or not there is anything left to do in terms of a cease-fire by noon we don't know. Some of the threats by Imbert [1] to attack the central part of the city to the south of the line of communications should not be taken seriously. We would not permit them to come through the line of communication or the truce zone and we would not permit them to make sea landing pending a complete political solution.

We think it very important there not be a major bloodbath. There have been relatively few casualties in the north. Unfortunately, most of the casualties have been civilian, but there have been a large number of so-called prisoners taken by the loyalist forces.

A considerable number of them joined the loyalist forces in the fighting and turned their guns around in the other direction. It is a very mixed up situation in that northern part of the city.

MEDIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Last night the OAS dissolved its committee that had been functioning down there in order to name the Secretary General as the OAS representative on the spot. He, Mr. Mora,[2] has been in the Dominican Republic continuously since the 29th, and he has been an extremely helpful individual. He has the task of working on the cease-fire, plus the task of trying to mediate among the parties to find some peaceful settlements of the political problem.

There have been contacts among all political elements there, outside of the Trujillo groups and the Communist groups, trying to find some basis for a coalition provisional government that could accept responsibility for the country pending elections. That is, that seems to be the general view of the inter-American countries as well as ourselves as to the necessary target. It would not be, I think, appropriate to get into specific names, but we have been in touch with the moderate elements of the Juan Bosch forces, we

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[1] Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras.
[2] José Antonio Mora Otero.

have been in touch with President Balaguer, we have been in touch with the military leaders on both sides trying to find a civilian government which would have a broadly representative character which could maintain a provisional government pending elections. That could be accomplished within the next 48 hours, but we are not yet sure.

Those negotiations are going on. Mr. Mora is very much involved, in the middle of those. We would hope very much that some solution could be found.

ELEMENTS OF VIOLENCE AND TERROR

If one is not found promptly, I think it is probable that the fighting will be wound up today or perhaps tomorrow, and that there would be at least a stalemate and a period of peace pending further negotiations. It is not necessarily a bad thing, because tempers have run very high. The elements of violence and terror and fear and suspicion have been so much of an overwhelming part of the problem that the atmosphere itself has made such negotiations extremely difficult.

When you talk to these leaders down there, they usually start by saying the No. 1 problem for Dominicans these days is to stay alive, and their problem is that very few of them are willing to entrust themselves to the mercy of anybody else because of the backlog of bitterness and revenge, and that dominates that island.

We have about 23,000 troops there. There are at the present time, the present moment, about 450 Central American troops. The Brazilian Senate yesterday completed action on a Brazilian force. We expect a Brazilian force of perhaps 1,200 to begin to arrive very shortly. We expected the inter-American force to be commanded by a Brazilian general.

Our forces have been made available to that inter-American force. We would, therefore, expect the inter-American character of the force to build up fairly substantially, making it possible for us to reduce some of our own American commitments there.

ROLE OF THE OAS

Now, as far as the OAS is concerned, let me go back just a minute to outline what happened in the first stages of this problem, and explain to you how the OAS did and did not become involved in the problem at the very start.

When the revolt took place on April 24, as is customary in problems of this sort anywhere in the world, the first effort that was made to deal with the problem, get peace established and get the parties together, was made by the local diplomatic corps. Our Embassy, working with the dean of the corps, this very courageous and able Papal Nuncio, and the unanimous effort of the diplomatic corps to try to bring about a cease-fire and a peaceful solution occupied the first 3 days of the effort.

But the situation continued to deteriorate, so that on Tuesday, April 27, the United States asked for a meeting of the Inter-American Peace Committee in order to explore this situation fully. That peace committee is made up of Argentina, Nicaragua, Colombia, Dominican Republic, and the United States.

When the peace committee met, most of them felt that they had no jurisdiction over this particular type of problem, that their problem had to do with disputes between states, in circumstances where both parties to the dispute asked the Inter-American Peace Committee to function. So that although they had a full discussion of it and decided to keep an eye on it, they decided on that Tuesday that there was no particular action that they were called upon to take.

We then asked on the morning of the 28th for a meeting of the Council of the OAS, that is, the full membership meeting there at the Pan American Union. Again, there was full discussion, but no action was taken.

I will have to say that neither in the peace committee or in the OAS did we ourselves recommend that action be taken with respect to troops, putting forces ashore and things of that sort, because at that time we ourselves had not thought it necessary. Our Embassy was not asking for it. The situation on the island seemed not to require it, and so no action of that sort was taken on the morning of Wednesday, the 28th.

TELEGRAM FROM THE U.S. AMBASSADOR

By about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, we had before us a telegram from our Ambassador, a very cool, level-headed Foreign Service officer, who had had previous experience in the Dominican Republic. We had a telegram from him saying that the situation had been deteriorating rapidly, that there was no effective authority in the country, and that although he was not prepared to call in to ask that the Marines come ashore, he thought there ought to be at least contingency plans in order because they could be needed at any moment. He said several hundred Americans who had been collected at the Ambassador Hotel had been subjected to fire; there had been tommyguns running through the hotel; a number of the embassies there, including six Latin American embassies, had been attacked by mobs, apparently looking for those who had sought political asylum in those embassies. But even so, his recommendation as of 4 o'clock was that we not put men ashore.

But at 5:15 when the President, the Secretary of Defense, and I were meeting on another matter, we got what is called a critic message, that is the fastest message we know how to send, saying the situation had completely deteriorated, that the police and military authorities had told him they could not take responsibility for the safety of American or foreign lives, and that foreign troops would be necessary for that purpose.

CONTINGENCY EVALUATION PLANS

We had in connection with our normal type of evacuation plans, which we have on a contingency basis with practically every country in the world—we had some ships offshore to assist in evacuation if that should become necessary. They had been moving some people out by helicopter, but it became clear that the President had to face the decision to either put Marines ashore or face the prospect of losing very large numbers of lives because the Americans in the Ambassador Hotel, as well as on the polo field, were at that moment under fire.

After about 30 minutes of careful consideration of the factors, factors that we had been thinking about before that particular moment, he decided to act. He issued three instructions: one, inform the troops; two, inform the Congress; and; three, inform the OAS. But about 7 o'clock that evening the troops began to arrive. You will remember there was a leadership meeting of the Congress at about the same time, and we were at that point already in contact with the Ambassadors of the OAS informing them and asking for a meeting of the council early the next morning.

Now, I want to emphasize that in retrospect one doesn't have a chance to see what the alternative might have turned out to be. The local diplomatic corps down there is almost literally unanimous in the belief that the landing of the American Armed Forces there averted a complete disaster. They have reported that, including the Ambassadors of countries who have taken a rather cool view to our action in public—I mean people like the [deleted] Ambassador, for example; he should not be quoted or he would lose his job.

The French Embassy asked us for protection. We had requests for protection from about a dozen embassies right at that particular moment, and we were the only ones who had a chance to move.

ORGAN OF CONSULTATION

In any event, the OAS met on the morning of Thursday, the 29th, and I think it is illustrative of our continuing problem that the Council of the OAS did not consider that they themselves had the authority to act with respect to this situation that it was necessary to convene the organ of consultation of the inter-American system, that the necessity for getting instructions from their governments would require time and, therefore, the council called for a meeting of the organ of consultation to meet 48 hours later. They did at that moment, however, call for a cease-fire and arrange for the Secretary General to go on down to the Dominican Republic to do what he could meanwhile.

We did succeed in shortening the time, 48 hours, to 24 hours, in order to get a committee established, in order to get a cease-fire called to provide for the establishment of an international safety zone, and to get the OAS more involved and in touch with the situation.

Then when the organ of consultation fully met it provided for the constitution of an inter-American force. That has been somewhat slowed because in most of the Latin American countries it requires action by their congress to send their troops outside of their country, and this has been the cause of the delay, for example, in Brazil. Certain ones, such as in Central America, could take such action without legislative authorization and approval.

So, the OAS was drawn into the matter—well, first, the governments of the hemisphere were drawn into the matter, first, through their ambassadors on the spot in Santo Domingo from the very beginning; second, through discussion of the peace committee on the day before the troops were put ashore; third, in discussion in the Council of the Organization of American States on the morning before the troops were put ashore; fourth, through notification

to all the ambassadors of the OAS on the evening of the 28th, the day that the troops were put ashore, and then a formal invocation of the inter-American machinery on the early morning after the troops were put ashore.

Now, we would like to see the OAS take just as much responsibility as it is willing and able to take. But, gentlemen, I have to say that that situation is still unsatisfactory, because the OAS machinery which now exists is not geared to this type of situation. The machinery was devised for more leisurely days and more leisurely circumstances as far as the hemisphere was concerned.

A STANDBY INTER-AMERICAN FORCE

We have been talking with the other governments, particularly countries like Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, about continuing standby machinery with a standby inter-American force equipped with political machinery that would be able to make decisions as rapidly as events unfold.

The Foreign Ministers of the hemisphere will be coming to the OAS here in Washington on the 27th, and this will be one of the key subjects of discussion for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at that time, because this illustrates the point that multilateral machinery can't operate unless it is prepared to operate with a speed required by the events themselves. In this situation—there have been other situations in the past where someone had to bear the responsibility for taking the action while the international machinery moved to take control of the situation and try to find a final answer.

There have been some differences of view in the hemisphere, as you can imagine, about some aspects of this. We ourselves tried at one point to give [Betancourt] of Venezuela, who has had great experience in dealing with, actually running a government and dealing with the Communist problem, helped by [Luis] Muñoz-Marin of Puerto Rico and [José] Figueres of Costa Rica. That did not work because many of the other members of the hemisphere were not willing to put the kind of power in the hands of these three men that they insisted upon as a condition for their carrying out this role.

Mr. Figueres, for example, felt the inter-American system ought to establish a trusteeship over the Dominican Republic. Well, the Dominicans won't do this and the inter-American system won't do that, so that particular proposal did not come to anything.

The Venezuelan Government was not willing to have Betancourt take on this responsibility. In other words, his own government wouldn't support this idea.

But we had some difficulty in keeping the committee of the OAS actually in the Dominican Republic. It is not a very pleasant place to be at this point and it isn't easy to see how an answer can be found. They got frustrated. They had not expected to take on this sort of duty, and we have some problems on that side.

We do think, however, with Mr. Mora having been given now the responsibility for acting for the OAS with respect to the several resolutions that have been passed, plus the job of mediation among

the parties, that the OAS can move into this matter somewhat more effectively.

RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES AND DOMINICAN FACTIONS

I would like then to turn to the relationship between U.S. forces and the two factions, the forces on the two sides.

Our primary responsibility there is for the international safety zone and its associated communications running eastward across the Asoma River to the airport to the east of the city and westward to the Port of Haina about 9 miles west of the city. This is a rather extensive responsibility. We do permit unarmed individuals to move freely across those areas in either direction. We do furnish food and medicines to both sides from within that zone, moving food and other supplies in both directions. We do not permit the armed forces of either side to come through that zone in either direction.

Now, there have been a good many press reports, and I think some of them have been really quite irresponsible, about the actions and attitudes of our own forces there. I think we ought to remind ourselves that when fellows are there under fire that it is easy to get answers from them that indicate a considerable amount of partiality; for example, if a reporter goes up to a Marine and says, "Who is the enemy?" the Marine is going to say, "Those fellows over there shooting at me," and from the rebel side have come over 460 violations of the cease-fire in the last 9 days, and 70 of them yesterday.

FALSE ALLEGATIONS

So, reporters can get any answer they want to, they seek and probe for from fellows on the spot. But in fact, let me just run over just a few allegations that have been made. Yesterday we were told that for the first time American paratroopers engaged in fierce fighting against the rebel forces in the vicinity of the Duarte Bridge. No such engagement took place. There was an attack by a so-called rebel group on the national palace, something less than a mile from the Duarte Bridge. For some reason which we can't explain, this group, in shooting at the national palace which was occupied by some of Imbert's men, this group took the LOC under fire, and our fellows in the LOC waited 6½ minutes before replying.

You should know in the line of communication the right to return fire is in the hands of the battalion commander. No one junior to the battalion commander is authorized to issue orders to return fire.

So, they waited under fire for 6½ minutes and then they returned the fire. It was in that fracas where there was firing both from the national palace, Imbert's men, and our men returning the fire that we couldn't get turned off, that two of these leaders were killed, one of them an intimate associate of President Bosch, a man we had rather hoped might be a part of a new government, but as well a well-known determined Communist terrorist who had been working with the elements there in the city.

Then we were told that an airborne officer remarked that his troops have orders to shoot at any rebels who try to pass through the safety corridor without surrendering their arms. Well, as I say, the standing orders are that we will not fire unless fired upon. These orders are understood by all officers, return fire has been reserved to the battalion commanders. All armed individuals crossing the checkpoints are disarmed before being permitted to cross, this applies to both sides, to the personnel of both sides.

A number of Dominican civilians, the allegation was, fleeing the battle zone, reported they had seen American soldiers working with the junta army. Well now, the source of that report was that we had established an army liaison detachment with walkie-talkies, an officer, and three enlisted men, to be sure that the loyalist forces don't get tangled up with U.S. forces. The liaison was for the purpose of protecting the U.S. forces from becoming involved in the engagements. We have had similar types of contact with the people on the other side.

NO SINGLE COMMAND AMONG THE REBELS

Such contact with the rebel side has been complicated by the fact there is no single command among the rebels. You have these different groups, some of them quite irresponsible groups, wandering around armed. That explains why we have had 462 cease-fire violations from the rebel side—it is not the responsibility, it is not the fault of the so-called rebel command—and practically none of those violations from the so-called loyalist side.

There was a violation involved when some loyalist planes took off and started bombing and strafing in connection with trying to seize the radio station there. They broke the cease-fire as far as the line of communication was concerned. Our fellows shot at them and one of the planes had to make a crash landing because our fellows had hit the plane. We ourselves are preventing the use of military aircraft by the loyalist forces for bombing in the city. We have got jeeps parked in front of them. We do permit the loyalist forces to use planes like C–47's to haul rice out to the countryside in connection with the general food supply problem.

Then, there was an allegation that large sections of the corridor were cleared of virtually all U.S. troops that were sent to the northeast. Well, this simply is not true. U.S. Armed Forces along the corridor remain in place, and on the day in which this allegation was made no units were even relieved by other units. They had been in position there. U.S. Marines, it was said, and paratroopers gave both direct and indirect help to the forces of Imbert yesterday. This was not true. It was alleged assistance was rendered by airborne forces and U.S. Marines. I did mention that liaison detail that was with them to try to keep them away from the American forces.

WHEN NEWSMEN WANDER AROUND

Then they talked about our forces were firing into rebel positions facing the junta forces north of the corridor and that the American forces moved a mile north along the corridor security territory wanted by the junta. Then they charged our forces had moved

south along the corridor into the main rebel stronghold. This is just not true. Our forces haven't changed their position since May 12. So that these allegations are just made up out of the whole cloth.

Now, the charge was made that we were stopping all trucks carrying food from entering the city. Again, not true. These trucks are searched for arms, but we have been sending food into the city all along. We do everyday, as well as food out into the countryside.

So, I think what happens is that when newsmen wander around the city—they have these huge signs on their cars, "Prensa" or "Press"—they are given very special treatment by anyone who can get hold of them. They are filled full of all sorts of charges that they themselves either have no opportunity for or time to check carefully before they report. We have tried to do something about that in terms of local information down there.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Now, there are those who say that the actual establishment of a line of communications was partial. Well, that depends on who was stronger and who could have done what to whom. We don't know. We don't know. That was a very uncertain situation, and we had very heavy responsibility in the safety zone there, and we had to have safe contact with the airfield which we ourselves were using.

I suppose that when two dogs are snarling at each other and a peacemaker comes in and pulls them apart, the question of which dog you are favoring depends on what these dogs are going to be able to do to each other.

But the LOC, the line of communications, and the safety zone were established under the authority of the OAS. We stayed in it. Once in a while a Marine will take a wrong turn in a jeep or something, and get lost and get shot at, but that will happen to any of us going home tonight if we are not careful. So, you get minor incidents but the policy is there of impartiality between the two sides, to try to work toward a cease-fire as best we can, to get these groups in between the two extremes into political contact with each other, to build a provisional coalition government that can hold elections, and find out what kind of a government the people of the Dominican Republic themselves actually want to have.

I have perhaps taken too much time, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted to make those comments as an opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

ARMED FORCES ACTING INDEPENDENTLY

Are we to understand that these reports, some of which appear this morning—Mr. Kurzman, who has been writing for many years in this area, says it may be that the Armed Forces are acting independently of our policy and orders.

Is there any evidence of this?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Vance was asked yesterday, as well as the day before, to make his own detailed investigation of this point, and we can't swear with 23,000 men there that every private soldier has acted with complete impartiality. These things are very hard to control when you have people scattered around this way.

But we can't find significant violations of the instructions on impartiality.

One thing that will happen that perhaps a newspaperman will pick up and say, "Look, he is attacking the rebels," if along the line of communications or the border of the safety zone our fellows are under continuous sniper fire from an apartment house a block and a half over there, our fellows will take that fire for a considerable time. Then they will shoot some warning shots, and if the sniper fire still doesn't stop, they may send a sortie out to clear out that apartment house and then come on back to their own lines. If an American newspaperman happens to be around at the time and sees that sort of thing, he will say, "Oh, the Americans are attacking the rebels."

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a specific allegation.

It says, "A message to his troops on the front line of an official newsletter"—this is by General Palmer—"says that the present struggle is between Communists and the Dominican Government," which this man interprets, Mr. Kurzman, as meaning that the so-called loyalists—that Imbert is the government, then everybody else is a Communist.

Is that true? Was there such a newsletter?

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure about the newsletter, but there is not——

The CHAIRMAN. By the General, I mean, not be the newspeople.

Secretary RUSK. I will have to look it up.

The CHAIRMAN. He makes that allegation in this morning's paper.

Secretary RUSK. Oh, that, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that very early in this affair it became clear that the issue here was not just between the Juan Bosch forces and the other elements in the country, but that the extremists had moved in very quickly to seize control of the situation in the downtown area.

THREAT OF ANOTHER CUBA

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, while you are doing that, I will read you Marquis Childs this morning.

These people, we all know who they are, they are certainly fallible. He said, "From the first"—he is talking about the Director of the CIA—"From the first, he insisted with deeply emotional conviction that the rebellion was Communist dominated and that another Cuba was imminent."

Is this an accurate description of his attitude?

Secretary RUSK. I wouldn't want to speak for Admiral Raborn.[3]

The CHAIRMAN. He has been involved in all these meetings.

Secretary RUSK. But we had a lot of information from not only his organization but also from our own people on the ground about known Communist leaders who were seen in charge of these armed bands in the downtown area. So that these were identifiable people.

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[3] CIA Director William F. Raborn, Jr.

On the 28th, for example, Molina,[4] who was, you know, sworn in as provisional president at one time, went into asylum in an embassy. He came out later, but he went into asylum on the 28th saying that the movement had been taken over by these extremists.

The acting dean of the diplomatic corps of Colombia said at that moment the issue quickly turned into a Communist versus non-Communist elements. The secretary general of Juan Bosch's own party came in on the 28th and said that his party no longer was connected with the struggle. If the rebels win, it will be an extreme left victory.

Senator GORE. Was this before or after——

Secretary RUSK. This was said—we did not have that in front of us at the time the decision was made to put in the troops. I can say to you gentlemen that although we had had reports about some of these extremists moving in, that the decision to send in the troops on the 28th was 99 percent the problem of protecting American and foreign nationals. I mean we weren't—at the time when that critic message came in, we were not at that time involved in all of these other possible ramifications.

The problem was there were several hundred people there in the Ambassador Hotel and on the polo grounds awaiting evacuation, they were under fire, the police and military authority said they could not accept responsibility for their safety. The Ambassador said, "You are going to have to come and get them."

This is the fact we had to face, and when the Marines landed they found these civilians under fire. The diplomatic corps there unanimously said that the arrival of our forces averted a real disaster, and the President had a very warm message from the Papal Nuncio expressing great appreciation for the action taken by the United States for saving these people.

We evacuated over 4,000 people from almost 40 different countries, and that was a service that most governments, with one or two interesting exceptions, have extended very warm thanks for.

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED MOVEMENT

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you, wasn't that list of 48 or 52 Communists that was published in the Washington papers an official State Department release? Is that something that the——

Secretary RUSK. That was based on Government information.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And we consider very reliable information.

Senator MUNDT. As I recall the President's $700 million White House briefing and your previous discussion before the table, for a long time what we were being told is about exactly what this newsletter told the troops. There was a Communist-dominated movement. It is hard for me to forget all these facts.

Secretary RUSK. The reason I commented at this point, Mr. Chairman, was that this point made in the newsletter is also a

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[4] Dr. José Raphael Molina Urena.

point that has been made to us repeatedly by Juan Bosch's own representatives on the ground in Santo Domingo, and Juan Bosch's people have told us they could not control the situation inside the city there. Otherwise we wouldn't have had these 462 violations of the cease-fire from that side of the line during this period.

We have been working with Juan Bosch's moderate leader. But you have got the left wing of the 14th of June Party, which is a Castro party, and you have two Communist parties there, and those fellows came out very fast to take advantage of the Juan Bosch effort to change the government and then took advantage in a very professional way of the anarchy and the complete collapse of any authority that developed there.

CHANGING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS

Senator MUNDT. In other words, they were there in strength for a long time. You are not changing your original analysis or your original definition of what the trouble was in Santo Domingo?

Secretary RUSK. I think after we got ashore——

Senator MUNDT. Or are you?

Secretary RUSK. After we got ashore and became much more involved in the situation with our own people as between the two sides, we became increasingly aware of the role that was being played by these hardcore extreme left people.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those Communists still there, now that you are there in force and know more about it? Is this a struggle still——

Secretary RUSK. Some of them are.

Well, one of them was killed in this attack on the national palace yesterday, one of the leading hardcore Communists. But we have had some reports that some of these leaders are now beginning to go underground trying to get away.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider it now a struggle against communism?

Secretary RUSK. I think that the military phase of what they can do is pretty well over. But I think that the problem now is to try to develop a provisional government that excludes these fellows, excludes the butchers of the Trujillo period, and you build a provisional government on the more moderate elements of the different political groupings.

Mr. Bosch——

[Discussion off the record.]

BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, who has to leave, wants to ask some questions.

Senator GORE. First, Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question about your statement concerning the situation there today.

You told us, on the one hand, that a cease-fire for a 24-hour period was in effect.

Secretary RUSK. Will begin, I think, at noon today or 1 o'clock today.

Senator GORE. This may explain your other statements, because I thought there might be a conflict. You said also that the so-called

loyalist forces would complete their occupation of the northern sector today.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I said they might do it before the cease-fire goes into effect. You see, they run across very little resistance there.

Senator GORE. This I did not understand, so that clarifies that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator GORE. Now, going back to the decision that was made, you say it was 99 percent protection of U.S. citizens.

Secretary RUSK. On the Wednesday afternoon of the 28th, yes, that was almost a totality of a basis for which we put the troops in at the time the first Marines went in.

POOR COMMUNICATIONS

Senator GORE. Did you or the President have any knowledge that the wire from the Ambassador would be dispatched before you received it?

Secretary RUSK. We had had an earlier wire from him earlier in the afternoon saying the situation was deteriorating. He was not prepared to ask that American forces come in, but that it would be well to sharpen up the contingency plans in case it became necessary. That was——

Senator GORE. Was that a telephone communication at the time?

Secretary RUSK. Communications were very poor there during that period. The telephone services were interrupted. We had some radio communication. One of the things that complicated it was that open communications, monitored by all elements there, could have caused some problems. Incidentally, gentlemen, in terms of how you deal with these things in terms of getting international organizations into them in advance, had we asked the OAS at 5:15 for permission, in the first place they couldn't have made the decision because they would have to get instructions from their governments, but this would have made public the fact that the Marines might be coming in and they might have been forced to make a combat landing in a situation where American and foreign nationals were being—would then be under severe attack and might even be seized as hostages, so that from a military point of view you would have completely lost any elements of surprise and lost a chance to do it peacefully as it was done peacefully.

Senator GORE. I am not trying to be critical, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. I understand, that is all right.

Senator GORE. I am trying to establish the validity of the telegram and the action.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

PREPOSITIONING OF SHIPS OFFSHORE

Senator GORE. I dare say one may engage in a rather ludicrous hypothesis, if I were in the place the President was in with this kind of wire before me and the evidence upon which he had to act before him, no other course would have appeared possible but to protect American lives and American interests. I wasn't sure, and I am not yet sure, the extent to which there was an understanding,

if any, prior to the dispatch of the wire by the Ambassador and the receipt of it by the President.

Secretary RUSK. About putting troops ashore?

Senator GORE. Yes.

About the dispatch of such wire, was this action entirely upon his part?

Secretary RUSK. I think it was on Sunday before this that we had moved certain ships into the area offshore, as we would in any situation in which there might be Americans requiring evacuation.

In your evacuation plans, you do have standby evacuation plans for many, many countries, and they involve a prepositioning of ships or aircraft for the movement out of people, presumably under peaceful conditions. I mean these evacuation plans don't turn on putting people ashore. So, we had some vessels move over from Puerto Rico into the area in connection with a standard evacuation program, and indeed they had picked up some of these people by helicopter with the permission of such local authorities as we could find.

But it was not until it became clear that there was no authority that was able to be effective, and such authority as there was, the police chief and the heads of the armed forces, came to us on that Wednesday afternoon and said, "We can no longer take any responsibility for the safety of anybody here and it is up to you, you have got to do it yourselves," that the decision was made.

The Ambassador on the basis of that sent a message saying we have got to take care of our people, we have to get these people ashore.

Senator GORE. One other question and then I will desist.

REACTION IN LATIN AMERICA

What is your assessment of the reaction in Latin America now to this action?

Secretary RUSK. I think that, first, you have to distinguish between what is said publicly and what is said privately. You would expect a number of these countries to make very strong public statements on the subject of intervention, not only because of the history of the last hundred years, but also because certain ones of them, like Uruguay, are nervous about the possibilities that they might be subject to intervention by some of their own big neighbors.

In case of Mexico, they have a known standing attitude on any sort of action in the hemisphere. They opposed everything that has been done in Cuba, for example, by the rest of the hemisphere; Chile very sensitive on this point. But we have had majorities in the OAS from 14 to 18 on the resolutions that have been passed here, and one of the key resolutions which was voted by 18 to 0 with 1 abstention, was abstained on by Chile, on the ground that it gave full authority to and blessing for the action taken by the United States.

Well, we would have been glad to have their vote but we didn't object to the ground on which they abstained, because this was in fact the OAS picking up the necessity of the action and moving on from there to try to find an answer.

Senator GORE. Would it be reasonable to conclude then that there is sharp division of opinion within Latin America or there is a considerable body of opinion both within and without the governments that support the U.S. action?

Secretary RUSK. Well, you have mixed editorials in the hemisphere. You have some papers in Mexico supporting the action taken by the United States. You have some papers in Brazil, where the government has given us full support, being critical of the action. But I have no doubt myself, Senator, that when it became clear down there locally to the diplomatic corps and to the Nuncio and to—when Juan Bosch's people came out of the downtown area and told these people that the extremists had taken over, I have no doubt that the basic view of the hemisphere was there must not be another Castro in this hemisphere.

THE FIGHTING WILL STOP

Senator GORE. Do you have a reasonable expectation that within a matter of weeks a government will be formed there and that the bloodbath will cease?

Secretary RUSK. I think the bloodbath almost certainly will stop. A man in my chair doesn't like to make predictions too hard, but I think the fighting will almost certainly stop within the next 24 to 48 hours. I think there is a fair chance that a provisional government can be formed in the next, say, 3 or 4 days. In other words, we are not looking toward a situation going on over a period of months.

Now, it may be necessary for some elements of the inter-American force to remain behind for some time until they get a police force reconstituted, that has been decimated in the fighting, and get the situation under the control of the new government pending elections.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

WILL NOT PERMIT ANOTHER CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any change in the administration's position that will not suffer the establishment of another Communist base in the Western Hemisphere?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I would say, however, Senator, that we should not generalize too quickly about the Dominican Republic situation and apply it to every other country as far as means and techniques are concerned. The fact we put some people in the Dominican Republic doesn't mean we will put 1 million people in Brazil. What the hemisphere and what each country does with this problem will vary greatly. In Chile they handle it at the polls; in Brazil, in another way; in British Guiana it was handled in another way.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me put it this way then.

Is there any change in the administration's position that it will not permit the Dominican Republic to become another Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; no change whatever.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that an important element prompting the presence of our troops in the Dominican Republic?

Secretary RUSK. It was not the basis for the original reason for the troops.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand, not when we went in.

Secretary RUSK. But we want to be sure when the inter-American forces, including our own, will withdraw, we want to be sure there is a government there not under control of Castro elements.

A COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, what is going to be the approach of the State Department with regard to the establishment of a coalition government and making certain that Communists will not become a part of it, and that those friends of Bosch who were noted for their Communistic activities 3 years ago will not become a part of it?

Secretary RUSK. We are working with the political leaders of the Dominican Republic that we are in touch with, to identify and exclude these people. We are working it on a basis of names, and the names of the people who would be a part of a negotiated coalition government will be very carefully studied, not only by us but the Dominican leaders themselves and by the OAS. You can't get the OAS to approve and recognize a government that is going to look like Castro. You just can't do it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

How many Communist groups are there? There is the Castro group, as you said, and two others?

Secretary RUSK. There is a left wing of the 14th of June movement, which was very closely tied into Castro and participated in that effort made in, when was it, 1959 or so by Castro to send some armed elements into the Dominican Republic. Then there are two specific Communist parties in addition to that. So, there are three groups that you have to watch very carefully in this situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. It will be the purpose of the State Department to keep representatives of those groups out of any coalition government that will be formed?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, and also to see that certain of these individuals leave the country.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON REPORTING

Now, then, is consideration being given to the sad experience that we had with Castro when newspapermen were being quoted in this room as establishing Castro as the hero and the Robin Hood of Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. I think that will become apparent in the makeup of the new government there. I think it is true that some of the reporting that we have seen is strongly influenced by political commitments of one sort or another, but that is not anything that we are taking into account in working with the Dominicans in setting up a new government.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is a factor we have got to approach with caution, because I know they induced this committee to have Castro come before it, with his bearded jaw.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not. The State Department requested us to have him here because they didn't want him. They asked me would we receive him because they didn't know what to do about him. It was not as a result of a newspaper request at all. The newspaper association invited him to speak downtown. When he came here, the State Department asked me to ask him here, to relieve them of the embarrassment.

Here is—Senator Morton knows about that. Is that not true, Senator Morton?

Senator MORTON. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. I didn't say he was requested.

The CHAIRMAN. You said we were invited by the newspapermen——

Senator LAUSCHE. Matthews'[6] stories that he was a Robin Hood helping the poor, fooled this committee, caused the State Department to disregard the reports which they had about Castro being a Communist, and accepting him in that favorable light.

Now, the only point I am wanting to make is I am not going to be dominated by what the newspapers say in this matter. I hope that our State Department likewise will not be dominated by what they are saying.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to comment on this, Senator Morton? He was in the State Department.

Senator MORTON. I wasn't in it. I left the State Department before Castro even grew a beard. I would like to comment on this.

TELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

I think that what the Secretary has pointed out here and in which he analyzed some of these news reports and gave an account—I wish, Mr. Secretary, that you would go on, I don't know, television or what, but I wish we could get out to the American people—you covered a few sensitive points here, but when you were dealing with these quotations from these reporters from the press, I think you handled it, to my mind, well and gave a good explanation.

If you are getting shot at, you can take it for a little while but then you are going to shoot back, and if the rebels or the leftists are the ones who are doing the shooting, naturally we shoot at them more than the others.

I wish we could get this thing in perspective a little bit, because I found in my mail and my conversations with my people in my State pretty well altogether back of our going in there when we did, and now I am getting more people hollering about this, that, and the other. The reason they are is just these kind of stories that you quoted.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have two problems on that. It was to meet one of them that Mr. Vance gave a press conference on the spot yesterday. If we say these things here, the reporters say, "Ah,

[6] New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews.

but you fellows in Washington don't know what you are talking about. We have a man down there who tells us that he saw these men do X, Y, and Z." So, we have to have these things hit on the spot down there.

Second, some of these things—I quoted to you two of Juan Bosch's close associates in talking about the takeover of the movement by the Communists. It is extremely important, gentlemen, you understand, those people are still in the city and they could lose their lives if this got quoted, so we have got that problem. We can't call in some of our best witnesses, because they could get shot for their pains, you see.

Senator CASE. I think it is true, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. I want, Senator Case, everybody on the committee——

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one question and I am through.

NO PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL

What will happen if we pull out?

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on when?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, we will have a bloodbath if we pull out.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean immediately?

Secretary RUSK. Immediately. Let me say again I want to go back to the views of the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo, who unanimously, I think, without exception—I don't know of an exception—have reported to their government and their governments have so informed us that what we did there averted a major disaster, and that if we were to pull out precipitately you would still have a major disaster there.

Senator KUCHEL. That would include [deleted]?

Secretary RUSK. I don't want to emphasize the [deleted] Ambassador because he would get fired if he would be quoted on that, but he has told us that locally.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case has a question.

Senator CASE. It isn't so much a question as it is a general backup of what Senator Morton said.

In the first place, I assume that what Frank Lausche has been putting to the Secretary is not going to go into my public record.

The CHAIRMAN. This is entirely off the record, all of this. Everybody understands this is an executive meeting.

FROM EVACUATION TO OCCUPATION

Senator CASE. The worst kind of thing, it seems to me, for support of this country's policies in Latin America is to have that kind of thing apparently American official policy.

Second, I do think that insofar as the Secretary can and the Defense Department can, so far as we can, we ought to make clear what the facts are on these matters because they are very disturbing. You get perfectly, very decent people like this man you quoted, Marquis Childs, and the rest of them, it can't help but disturb a great section of American opinion, the most articulate people we have in this country which ought to be behind the administration in any proper action there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think what you say is exactly right.

In the beginning everyone approved, I think, of an evacuation operation. When did it cease to be evacuation and then occupation? Is there any point?

Secretary RUSK. There is no single——

The CHAIRMAN. Is it now an occupation operation?

Secretary RUSK. No, we occupy——

The CHAIRMAN. You have got out all the people you need to get out.

Secretary RUSK. We occupy only the safety zone and the line of communication for that zone established by the OAS. That is the only place where we have military forces present.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not the policy to occupy the country indefinitely.

Secretary RUSK. No one has asked us to, no one has authorized us to, and we have not made such a decision. Now, we are sending people by helicopter and by truck and by aircraft around the country with food and medicine. We are trying to help in the logistics of keeping 3 million in the countryside alive during this period, but there is no military occupation, no use of force except to maintain the area in which the OAS has asked us to be present.

The CHAIRMAN. And you intend to turn it over to OAS command as soon as you reasonably can?

Secretary RUSK. I think I indicated earlier we expect during the day today the Brazilian commander of the inter-American force will be announced.

The CHAIRMAN. And he will become the commander of the operation?

Secretary RUSK. Including the American forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to find out.

Senator Mundt.

EVALUATION OF GENERAL IMBERT

Senator MUNDT. We are talking a little about this man Imbert, if I pronounce his name correctly.

How did he get in charge? He is the man who is in charge of loyalists.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to do that providing we emphasize, when talking about a personality, the executive character of this session.

Our information was when the revolt first started Imbert offered to take command of the rebel side provided they would give him the military command. They refused that, and so he went the other way. He kept himself reasonably aloof from the so-called loyalist forces at the beginning. Wessin was in charge at the very beginning. He himself, Imbert, holed up in the national palace with about 400 men which is now still in the middle of rebel territory or well inside rebel territory. But then——

Senator MUNDT. Surrounded by rebels.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. But when the so-called loyalist forces began to disintegrate, Imbert then moved out to take charge

of those. He pulled them together and formed a so-called civilian-military junta of five people, two military men and three nonpolitical civilians, to take charge in the so-called loyalist held area and to give some sort of cohesion to the countryside where the administration of government was breaking down.

Now, Imbert is one of the assassins of Trujillo. He feels he has got to stay in the Dominican Republic. If he goes outside of the Dominican Republic, Ramfis Trujillo would kill him. He is sure of that, and we can't disagree with him on that. He is not a man who ought to run that country.

One of the troubles here is that during the Trujillo period there developed on both sides a military type at the top that you wouldn't want running any country. We have arranged for a number of these fellows to leave the country, and I can say very privately to you gentlemen that this man Caamano is to leave the country. There are some other types of that sort, some of these extreme leftists are scheduled to leave the country in connection with the formation of a government.

But nevertheless, Imbert at the moment is a force to be reckoned with, because some negotiation with him is necessary if a solution is to be found without violence, and naturally everybody would like to see a solution without violence. But some of these top people who have been through all these experiences of the last 30 years, are not very attractive people from anybody's point of view, anybody's point of view.

OPPORTUNISTS

Senator MORTON. He is the damnedest opportunist there ever was.

Secretary RUSK. So is Caamano. He will work for anybody who pays him.

Senator MUNDT. Let's move over to Wessin.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we could delete from the record this discussion. Wessin is out. If he weren't out on his own, his own military would see to that. Once things got tough, he disappeared into his bedroom at San Isidro and hasn't been out of his bedroom since.

Senator NELSON. What is his past association with Bosch's people, if any—Caamano?

Secretary RUSK. Caamano tried at one time to get rid of Bosch. You see principles are very flexible in a situation like this.

Senator NELSON. He was never an associate of Juan Bosch.

Secretary RUSK. Not at the time when Bosch was President, not an intimate of Bosch at the time Bosch was President.

Senator CASE. Who is the man who is supposed to be 42 percent popular over there, living in Paris?

Secretary RUSK. We took a private poll about 6 weeks ago before all this started. We don't rely on it too heavily, but this poll indicated if an election were held at that time that Balaguer, who was the transitional president from the Trujillo regime to the Bosch regime, would get about 46 percent of the vote; that Bosch would get about 24 percent of the votes; that Reid Cabral, the fellow who was thrown out on April 24, would get about 6 percent. I mean he

was the President of the day when the poll was taken. He would get about 6 percent of the votes, and then other individuals trickled down from there.

Senator HARRIS. Is Balaguer still in New York?

Secretary RUSK. He has been in New York but as I indicated earlier, he and Juan Bosch have been in close touch trying to build some moderate center government here.

Senator HARRIS. Where is he physicially?

Secretary RUSK. If he is not in New York, he is in Puerto Rico.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kuchel, do you have a contribution to make?

OAS RESOLUTION

Senator KUCHEL. No, not very much, but I will tell you, I think what is difficult for the people in my State to understand is to read some of these articles by newspapermen who say they have been misinformed and misled by American military commanders. That is too bad.

But just in a sentence or two, Mr. Secretary, what was the effect of that OAS resolution that got 14 votes? Do we assume that that authorizes any country to send peacekeeping military personnel there to serve under this Brazilian commander, and is the charter of the OAS today, with all its, God knows, faults, sufficiently cohesive to permit OAS peacekeeping personnel to stay there during the interim and indefinite period of time while the so-called caretaker provisional government is being formed?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is no question about that, sir. I would—this resolution was aimed specifically at the Dominican Republic and would not itself cover certain other situations that might develop in some other country, but I think there is no doubt that the resolution would permit the inter-American force to remain for a period if outside force was required.

PUNTA DEL ESTE RESOLUTION

Senator KUCHEL. I want to say, like these others, there is no question in my mind that the President did exactly what he should have done, some of the niceties of the situation to the contrary notwithstanding.

Is it the position of the governments down there that are raising Cain with us that we broke the OAS treaty and came in in spite of our commitment against sending troops anyplace?

Secretary RUSK. There are certain other countries that have been in the minority on this type of issue since Castro came to power. I think Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Morse are not here, but they will remember at Punta del Este in 1962, it is the same minority all the way through here, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay, and for different reasons, but they are different internal reasons in Mexico and Uruguay, and Chile has the nervousness about the possible intervention of Argentina and Brazil, you see, a similar type of situation.

But the general attitude of the hemisphere on the Communist penetration of the hemisphere has been well established now for about 3 years, since the Punta del Este conference of January 1962.

There is the hemispheric doctrine, spelled out there in resolution 2 of that conference. Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Morse will remember that there was a high degree of solidarity among the majority but with these three or four countries standing aside because of their internal political problems.

The Chilean Foreign Minister told me on that resolution, he said, "If you fail to get this resolution, you can go back and the Senate will bat your ears in, but I will go back and get shot, so you can understand my problem in voting for a resolution of this sort."

Secretary KUCHEL. That is Punta del Este?

Secretary RUSK. That is the Punta del Este resolution.

JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING TROOPS

Senator KUCHEL. Would you assume that you gave the President—because I am thinking of some of the letters I receive with respect to the legality of the President's action—would you say that the Punta del Este resolution is the basis on which our action may be justified legally?

Secretary RUSK. No, that has a bearing on, if you would like, the legislative history of the problem, but the specific basis for our sending the men in initially was a request by such authority as this was in a situation of near anarchy, the police chief and the heads of the armed forces asking us to take responsibility for the safety of our own people. It is somewhat analogous to the Stanleyville situation when Belgian paratroopers carried by American planes dropped into a situation of anarchy, with the authority of what government as there was over in Leopoldville, to move into a situation where there wasn't any law to do what had to be done for the safety of people.

So, that is the elementary legal basis, and then what has been done since then has been done on the basis of specific OAS resolutions: The establishment of the safety zone, requested by the OAS; the establishment of the line of communication, requested by the OAS; protection of the foreign embassies, requested by the foreign embassies.

I mention the French Embassy—despite the grumblings out of Paris, the French Embassy asked us to use Marines to move the safety zone two blocks east to protect the French Embassy. We haven't had a word of thanks from President de Gaulle.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie, do you have any questions?

GET THE STORY OUT

Senator MUSKIE. No. I think this has been a very helpful discussion. I would like to underline the desirability of doing what Senator Morton said; that is, getting as much of this story as you can out to the country. I mean there are disturbed people who fully supported the official action, who wonder now whether we are indeed partial and whether we are in back of a military dictatorship. What you tell me this morning is most comforting to me, if you could find a way to get it to the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kennedy.

ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION

Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Have you been completely satisfied that the information that was available to the President, certainly during the period from the 24th to 27th, was all that you would want it to be as to the degree of accuracy and the amount of information that was available?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the principal failure of precise information had to do with the timing of the first rebellion. We had had a good deal of information that something like that was brewing. It was a rather general understanding that the target date was about June 1. On the 23rd we asked our Ambassador to come up here to talk about the sense of the situation. It may well have been that the departure of the American Ambassador was the thing that pushed the button to do it that night rather than wait for a later period.

I think that in general, we have had good information in the first 3 days because people like the Papal Nuncio were moving freely among all elements there, trying to work out a cease-fire, giving us full information as he saw it, but we were out of contact for a period. This is one of the reasons why we got—that is on the so-called rebel side—this is one of the reasons we got John Bartlow Martin back. He had been our Ambassador when Bosch was President and he had a good many personal contacts with people on that side. Since they were in opposition or out of the country when Mr. Bennett was Ambassador, he had not had those same contacts so we sent Mr. Martin down as a private citizen to help us establish contact with those fellows and try to find out what they were doing, what was on their minds. I can say to you that Mr. Martin has no doubt whatever in his own mind after fully exploring the situation on the spot with his old friends in the Bosch group, he has no doubt whatever that the Communists have become the dominant factor in the downtown area of Santo Domingo.

The CHAIRMAN. As still of the present?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Quite frankly he had doubts about the wisdom of putting troops ashore on the day they were put ashore. But he is utterly and completely convinced, as were the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo.

FIRST MOVE IN THE REBELLION

The CHAIRMAN. Who initiated the first move in the rebellion?

Secretary RUSK. Apparently the PRD party, Juan Bosch's party. But almost instantaneously.

The CHAIRMAN. Led by whom at that point?

Secretary RUSK. Led by Molina, led by some of the elements of the army, some of the younger men in the army. Then it sort of developed into a very curious combination of elements. But I would say that, well, the secretary general—his name is, I have his name here—of the Juan Bosch party was very active in the beginning. But we think the Communists undoubtedly were privy to the plans of the PRD and they moved in very quickly as soon as it started. They were the ones who got the civilians armed, got the arms turned over by the army to the civilian groups before the PRD moderates came out and told us what was going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Prouty, do you have a question?

SCHEDULE FOR WITHDRAWING TROOPS

Senator PROUTY. Mr. Secretary, if a provisional government should be established, how long would you guess before we can start withdrawing American forces?

Secretary RUSK. If the—I can't make a flat commitment in the absence of a Presidential decision.

Senator PROUTY. No.

Secretary RUSK. But we think we might start withdrawing them fairly soon. The Brazilians have just completed action which may bring 1,200 Brazilians there within the next few days. If they do that, we would be able to pull out some of our forces now.

But we think it may be necessary to retain a contingent of inter-American forces in there until a government is in position that can tell us that we are now sufficiently equipped with a reliable police force and army to be able to take care of this ourselves.

Senator PROUTY. And these forces will be under the command of a Brazilian?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. There will be an American deputy commander and Brazilian commander.

STATE OF SIEGE IN COLOMBIA

Senator PROUTY. As I was on my way to work I heard over the radio that a state of siege was underway in Colombia.

Secretary RUSK. This is a student-led, Communist group of students in Bogota. I think it is correct to say—and this throws some light on what is involved in the Dominican Republic—that Communists in the hemisphere have tried to stir up as much reaction as possible to this situation.

Today it is in Colombia. Last few days it has been in Bolivia, but that seems to be somewhat quieter now. We got a reaction on the other side. The Argentine Armed Forces are apparently rather furious at their own government for not sending troops to the Dominican Republic, and you get rumors that the armed forces may——

The CHAIRMAN. Rebel down there?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Rebel down there for exactly the opposite reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart has a question.

IF A COMMUNIST WAS ELECTED

Senator HART. To your comment that it was the administration policy or our Government's policy that there would not be a Communist government in this hemisphere, what if some good bona fide Communist turned up elected someplace, how broad is your statement?

Secretary RUSK. That would be such a difficult question, Senator, that I feel we ought to do everything we can to evade that contingency. I don't myself believe that the people in this hemisphere are going to elect a Communist freely at the polls. There is too much tradition utterly opposed to it.

Senator HART. This is really what I wanted to get at. Let's assume the assumption is wrong. Do we undertake to count ballots? I mean just how far does that statement go?

Secretary RUSK. The whole purpose of this country for some years, beginning with the social trust fund established at the recommendation of President Eisenhower and the Alliance for Progress that was given major impetus by President Kennedy, the whole purpose here was to establish constitutional regimes in this hemisphere that can begin to meet the needs of their own people, as the better and democratic answer alternative to the kind of Castro thing that happened in Cuba. You see, one of the great problems about the prevention of Castro was Batista, and so we would prefer to have neither a Batista nor a Castro but try to find a moderate constitutional structure of government that can get on with the job with the people of these countries and do it in a democratic fashion.

Senator HART. Sir, I quite agree and we are all for that, but is there an answer to the question in the event that all our efforts and good answers and textbooks notwithstanding, somebody turns up elected.

Secretary RUSK. I wouldn't want to try to answer that one in advance, Senator. That would be a very, very touchy question for everybody concerned, but I don't believe it could happen that way. I mean Chileans demonstrated pretty well that this is not——

Senator LAUSCHE. That is about 2 months ago, 3 months ago.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, 2 months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee, do you have a question?

A TELEVISION APPEARANCE WITH THE CHAIRMAN

Senator MCGEE. Is there any reason, Mr. Secretary, why you, for example, couldn't go on TV, let's say, with the chairman of the committee, let him put——

The CHAIRMAN. For Heaven's sake.

Senator MCGEE. I am trying to think of a format here, because I am concerned more than I am afraid you may be about the backwash of this aftermath of the incidents down there. Let him put to you exactly the charges that have been put here, that you are free to talk about and shoot them down there in a give and take. I am afraid if you bury this in a release somewhere, you are not going to get the impact that the charges have already attained, and I think it is that important because we are all caught up in this right now.

Secretary RUSK. I gather that there are some fellows outside now, and the chairman can say what he wants to and I can—I am sure I will have some questions of that sort to respond to when I leave here, but I am not sure that the chairman will want to be in the position of an inquisitor before TV, I don't know.

Senator MCGEE. You set the format. You pros ought to know best how to do this, but I just think this has to be gotten across on a more massive scale than, let's say, the limited dismissal here from this meeting or a press statement. I think this has to be worked at, because in some ways the more difficult part of this is still ahead of us rather than behind us. It is easy to go and make the action we did with the Marines. It is more difficult now to act on the

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minds of people, and I am afraid we are going to lose that if somebody doesn't go to work on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell came in late, a member of the committee. Did you have a questions

Senator PELL. I have no questions. Does anyone else?

Senator Harris, do you have any questions,

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator HARRIS. I will say first to you, Mr. Chairman, I think your inviting us here is very thoughtful and helpful. I appreciate it. .

The CHAIRMAN. You can see how difficult it is.

Senator HARRIS. I want to ask the Secretary one question.

Where are we now with the U.N. and Security Council there?

Secretary RUSK. We feel very strongly that the regional organization should be given first crack at a problem of this sort in the Western Hemisphere. There is some resistance to that idea in the U.N., partly because some of them—for example, Jordan—don't like the idea of the Arab League dealing wtih them on the basis of the theory of a regional organization. The British are nervous about what the Organization of African Unity would deal with Southern Rhodesia on a regional basis, sort of outside the reach of the Security Council. The Russians would like to have the Security Council involved in this as much as possible. So, we have got a little bit of a constitutional tension here between the OAS and Security Council as of the moment.

My own view is that when the fighting stops, as I think it will in the course of the next 24 to 48 hours, and the political medication processes are known to be continuing, that that problem will recede into the background.

Senator HARRIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson.

REACTION OF DIPLOMATS IN SANTO DOMINGO

Senator NELSON. Just for understanding, did I understand you to say that the representatives at the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo from every country represented there were agreed that it was necessary, to avoid a bloodbath, for our troops to come in?

Secretary RUSK. I wouldn't want to commit them by saying that publicly. I said I did not know myself of any exception to that statement, and we have been——

Senator NELSON. Whether it was South American or European?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else?

Has everyone had an opportunity?

Senator KUCHEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

UNTRAINED PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. If we may switch for just a minute to Vietnam, I had brought to my attention late last night in a phone call from one of the most prominent citizens in our State the fact that his

wife's sister's husband, one Leo Wagner, Jr., was one of the boys in Vietnam who was killed in this airplane disaster, when all these planes blew up. He called to my attention something that I didn't know, which you ought to know.

He said that Walter Cronkite, I think the night before last, had a soldier's wife on his television program reading letters that this soldier had written his wife in which he said that he personally had protested as much as 5 months ago against the fact that we were using untrained Vietnamese handling explosives in these airports. He is furious, naturally, because his wife's brother-in-law got killed in that connection, and a collateral fact that when they sent the wire to his wife, who happened to be living in Fairfield, UT at the time, 3 minutes after she got the death notice the press was there inquiring about her husband and their reaction.

I have got to give him some kind of an answer, and I would rather get it from you and talk about it right here.

Secretary RUSK. On the point about whether untrained personnel handle bombs, I think you ought to get that from the Pentagon. We are looking into that because we saw that story.

Senator MUNDT. It was a story?

Secretary RUSK. It was a printed story as well.

They are looking into it, and I don't know what the facts are. I would say so far as it is humanly possible to tell, we are convinced this was an accident and not sabotage. These matters were being handled solely by Americans, and we just don't see any possibility of sabotage. There are some technical explanations that seem plausible about how this matter occurred, but we are not able to find any elements of sabotage at all.

Senator MUNDT. I wasn't thinking in terms of sabotage as much as using untrained Vietnamese.

Secretary RUSK. Not Vietnamese. My understanding was we have been using for some time only Americans, and I think some of those might have been untrained. The man who made the complaint on that was himself a highly trained demolition expert and apparently he was nervous at the way some of these fellows were handling these bombs.

Senator MUNDT. This fellow said this was predicted 5 months ago and he was notified and it had happened and "it has happened to me."

Secretary RUSK. It is a major point.

PROTECTION OF NEXT OF KIN

Senator MUNDT. The other collateral question, what kind of security is there to protect the identities of these people who get killed. I think it is pretty bad to have the press have the information at the same time the widow gets it, because they are knocking on the door right after the Western Union.

Secretary RUSK. I am afraid I don't know what the practice is. My understanding is they would withhold any announcements until they have notified the next of kin, but I just don't know what happened.

Senator MUNDT. Will you check into it? A 3-minute withholding wouldn't be very long.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 24, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

The Chairman stated the order of business was the markup of the bill (S. 1368), to amend the Peace Corps Act.

On motion to report the bill favorably, as amended, the following members answered to their names:

YEAS:

Senator Sparkman;
Senator Mansfield (proxy);
Senator Gore (proxy);
Senator Lausche;
Senator Church (proxy);
Senator Symington;
Senator Dodd (proxy);
Senator Clark;
Senator Pell;
Senator McCarthy;
Senator Aiken;
Senator Williams;
Senator Fulbright.

Senator Aiken later voted Senator Carlson in the affirmative.

A poll of the absentees was ordered.

So the bill was reported, 14 to 0.

The committee approved routine nomination lists dated April 13 and May 10.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Symington, McCarthy, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Riddleberger of the committee staff.

[On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nomination of Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to be United States Alternate Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund.

[On motion by Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee also approved for report the nominations of John M. Leddy, to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Marshall Green, to be Ambassador to Indonesia; Ridgway B. Knight, to be Ambassador to Belgium; Patricia Roberts Harris, to be Ambassador to Luxembourg; and Joseph J. Jova, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Honduras.

[On motion by Senator Sparkman, and seconded by Senator Symington, the committee voted to report the Protocol for the Extension of the International Wheat Agreement of 1962 (Ex. B, 89th Congress, 1st Session).

[The Hague Protocol, to amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Agreement), (Ex. H, 86th Congress, 1st Session), was passed over for future consideration.]

The CHAIRMAN. What about hearings on the Dominican Republic?

I happened to look by chance at the television program on the Dominican Republic by CBS, and it really was something about pictures—they are taking films which indicate, at least the way they presented them, that what we have been told about the situation is just not so. Of course, the administration is upset as the devil about these rumors.

Senator CARLSON. I am a great reader of the Christian Science Monitor, and they have had some articles from their own correspondents.

The CHAIRMAN. He was one of them.

Senator CARLSON. I did not see that.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that Bert Giles; didn't he monitor it?

Mr. MARCY. I did not see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Reference was made about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was very much impressed with the way Eric Sevareid defended the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Sevareid defended the policy. He did not defend the truthfulness of what has been said about our impartiality.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think he did explain it was very difficult to have a Cadillac available for the correspondents to ride right along with the Marines, have a cup of coffee, and all at the same time.

The CHAIRMAN. Several members who are not here today, particularly the younger members, last asked me if we could not bring it up—I do not know why they are not here, they are as busy as everybody else—and have some hearings for the information of the committee, presumably executive hearings, and try to get some feeling about this. It is a very controversial matter as to the facts. I do not think there is so much controversy about something that had to be done, but as to what actually happened and what you think about it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it would be a good thing myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you all come? I would like to have at least one or two or three.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate your not having it on June 8 or 9.

Senator CARLSON. I will not be here June 8 or 9.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other suggestions about that, not on June 8 or 9?

Is it the opinion, then, of the committee to have the staff get in touch with the Department and try to arrange some hearings?

TESTIMONY FROM AMBASSADOR BENNETT

What about this suggestion: Would you like to have Ambassador Bennett?

Senator CARLSON. He certainly has been under criticism. I do not know the man.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not either, but since he is the person from where it originated, it seems to be logical with me to start with Bennett. What do you think?

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it would be good to have Bennett. We had him here just before he went down there, don't you remember, just about the time it broke out. I think it would be good to have him.

In fact, personally, I would have thought that we were pursuing the right policy down there. It was a very difficult position to take, but nevertheless it was one that was made necessary by the circumstances.

Now, if we are going to have a lot of this stuff told to us all the time that that is not correct, why, I think we ought to bring it out right here.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that it would hopefully clear the air a bit. The committee could have any consensus of what happened.

EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF TROOPS

Senator CARLSON. I have not been critical of what they did. I felt the number of Marines was far in excess of what we needed in there, but that is another matter.

Senator SYMINGTON. On the other hand, if you are going to go into a place, for goodness sakes, go in with enough people. I had a son in the Marines in World War II. I do not want to see 150 Marines go into Santo Domingo and get knocked off. If we go in at all, we ought to go in with enough people. I would like to know what those critics would have said about our going into Santo Domingo and have had 400 or 500 shot if there had been chaos in that country. I think a lot of these superduper liberals would have been exploded.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me explain. We asked, on the one had, Bennett and Martin, and assuming we could get them, Mann and Bundy, and this is the administration's side. Shouldn't we have someone who will try to balance it out, to balance out their judgment? We have not had a practice of having reporters. This is an executive hearing, and we could have.

Senator CARLSON. Let us do that later.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just exploring what you maybe all have in mind, so I can put some feelers out.

Senator SPARKMAN. How about those urging that we have this kind of proceeding, do they have people whom they might suggest who would be helpful?

Senator CARLSON. I am not urging this today.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not talking about you.

SCREEN THE WITNESSES

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it depends on who the people are. I personally have been reading—I do not know whether you read this book—the last book of [Anthony] Eden and the degree of appeasement just prior to this situation that developed in World War II, which was pretty fantastic, and I would hope if we have somebody up here that we do not have somebody with a gripe, I mean, on the other side. I would like to get the State Department's position, Mr. Chairman.

But when it comes to picking some of these people who make a living out of criticizing anybody who does anything about this steadily developing totalitarian aggression around the world—I just read a paper by this genius Seymour Melman of Columbia, which he voluntarily sent to me without my request, and some of the stuff to me is pretty hard to understand. I would hope that any witnesses who come up here designed to attack the administration's position, if they would be screened a little bit before they come——

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly I would not want any irresponsible ones, but the question is, Do we want to try to find anybody—you mentioned the Christian Science Monitor, I do not know who the man is.

Senator CARLSON. I do not know, either. I just read him.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Monitor is a very reputable paper, and if they had anybody, just as an example, would you think it proper and useful to have someone there to tell his story as to what he thinks happened?

Senator CARLSON. He was actually there or somebody who has been there.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know who he was.

Senator CARLSON. I do not know either.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think, Brother McCarthy?

SECONDGUESSING

Senator MCCARTHY. I think it becomes a question of what the function of the committee is, Mr. Chairman, whether you are going to rubberstamp an action that occurs or secondguess when it is over or whether you should be concerned about it in between.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have an opportunity before it occurs.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right; and after that, it is just secondguessing.

I think if the committee wants to be responsible along the way, I think we ought to be asking some questions. It does not mean you are against the action or for the action necessarily, but there are conflicting reports which pose the question of whether we are supporting the junta or whether we are neutral. Maybe we ought to be supporting it. The administration says that we are not and the corridor is neutral territory. I do not think this is a bad policy, but I think the committee ought to try to ask these questions along the way, and maybe the next time there is such action, maybe we are in a better position to understand it or to defend it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree with that.

Senator MCCARTHY. But to take an absolute neutral position while an action of this kind is going on, which may last for 10 years, I think is for the committee to deny that it has any responsibility. In a way it is a tough question because I think under the Constitution we have got foreign policy responsibility, but there is no effective way by which we can exercise it at the present time. Maybe something of this kind, Bill, if nothing else, just as a kind of experiment, is something we should entertain.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just hope we would be careful about the witnesses. I completely agree with what you say.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

SET THE HEARINGS IN A BROADER CONTEXT

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about setting it in a broader context and not just the Dominican Republic, but in view of the fact that it has been stated that 8 or 10 other places could blow up in Latin America?

Senator MCCARTHY. I think the examination of the whole OAS has got to come.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the possibility of things happening in Africa. If we state the hearings to be on a broader basis, of which this is an incident, the impact of nationalism or what is the nature of this; is our policy going to be to intervene in other cases or is this just a special case? What do you think about that?

I am just trying to explore your minds as to how we ought to proceed. There are a number of people, members of this committee, specifically Pell and Clark, who both mentioned it to me, and someone else, that we ought to be informed and look into this matter. I was just exploring as to whether we should have it.

Fred Dutton wrote me quite a long letter. You will remember, he used to be in the State Department. He was urging—I will just read the first paragraph:

> I want to urge you that you give early consideration to having the Foreign Relations Committee hold an exploratory series of public hearings on the direction of U.S foreign policy

Then he goes on for 2 pages, which you can read if you like, but it is too long to read here.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I make an observation here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

JUSTIFIABLY NERVOUS ABOUT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator SYMINGTON. If you go into it on a very broad basis, then you attenuate, to at least some extent dilute, the Santo Domingo situation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. As far as I am concerned, I feel I am informed enough on South Vietnam to know what my position is on South Vietnam.

So far as Santo Domingo is concerned, I agree with Gene. I just do not understand the details of it. I watched the program last night, and anybody who did could be justifiably nervous about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. With that premise, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we might get into the Santo Domingo situation first, and then expand it as the members of the committee thought advisable after that.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else?

Senator MCCARTHY. I think we could start with the Dominican thing. We get rumors about Guatemala and Venezuela, and those things come up, but I think we ought to ask some questions about OAS. They have a free run on us; they do not put up anything.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you got into Santo Domingo, you would get into OAS.

Senator MCCARTHY. They play with Monopoly money, and they can bet like hell with that.

Senator CARLSON. We told the treasury in Santo Domingo that it is our money, but to go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. It looks like we have assumed $200 or $300 million a year now. We have undertaken to pay all of the civil service, all of their expenses.

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

Senator McCarthy. It is like that hoof and mouth disease control in Mexico. Whenever we tried to take it away, every time we tried to take it away, they came up with another case. [Laughter.]

SMOTHERED IN FEATHERS

Senator Symington. I just have a feeling that if you open it up you will get smothered in feathers, as Roosevelt used to say. If you go into Santo Domingo, you get into a lot of things, the question of money and OAS and all of these questions come up, and it would have to be defended on Santo Domingo operation per se. As a member of this committee, I have to make a commencement address at my State University next week, and I am not just informed about Santo Domingo to a point where I could discuss it properly.

The Chairman. I thought the same way. I have not discussed it because I did not know what to say.

Senator Carlson. I made a speech or two out in Kansas, and I supported the administration on it. I did have some question, as I said, on the numbers. As I said, I thought 3,000 to 5,000 would have been sufficient, that is just my personal opinion—20,000 troops in that little country are a lot of troops.

WITNESSES OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION

The Chairman. You think it ought to start with just some executive hearings on the Dominican affair rather than a broader hearing. There is no limitation, of course. We can ask them anything. I think the critical question is, Should we have witnesses outside of the administration, I mean people who are in the administration?

Senator Carlson. Let us determine that later.

Senator McCarthy. I think we ought to.

The Chairman. I would like to determine it.

Senator Symington. Yes, I think we should. We ought to pick the witnesses.

The Chairman. I have no idea who they are right now, but I just wondered. You think we should have others? What do you think, John?

Senator Sparkman. I think so. I think we ought to try to get the real facts, whatever they are.

Senator Symington. Yes.

Senator McCarthy. No matter what you bring Rusk up on, he always winds up blaming all the African republics and ministers, no matter what you want to get out of him.

The Chairman. You think we ought to try to find some other people?

Senator McCarthy. We ought to bring in some other guys. Bring in the agricultural guys and ask, "Why did you cut down the Dominican sugar quota this year? Who told you to? Did anybody warn you about trouble? Didn't somebody tell you about their $230 per capita income?"

The CHAIRMAN. Any of you who have any ideas in the next few days could think about it a little, and maybe you know someone who could be of assistance. I think it is about time we ought to at least try to get some information.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL AID FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In an address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, President Johnson declared the United States ready to enter "unconditional discussions" toward peace in Vietnam and proposed a massive economic development program for Southeast Asia. Although the North Vietnamese rejected Johnson's offer as "bait" and insisted that only a cessation of bombing would promote peace talks, Johnson moved ahead with his economic proposals. On June 1, the President asked Congress for $89 million in supplemental funds for economic programs in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

The Foreign Relations Committee approved the request by a vote of 13 to 4 on June 7. That same day, the Senate voted 42 to 26 to add the supplemental funds as an amendment to the foreign aid bill. Senator Fulbright sponsored the amendment, while Senator Wayne Morse led the opposition, arguing that, "We should not conduct a war under the guise of the foreign aid program." On June 12, the Senate voted 68 to 20 for the foreign aid bill containing the supplemental funds.]

THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

[The chairman laid before the committee the resolution (H. Con. Res. 426), expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the viewing of the USIA film "Years of Lightning, Day of Drums," at the 25th class reunion of the Harvard Class of 1940, in Cambridge, MA, which passed the House May 27, 1965. On motion by Senator Clark, and without objection, the resolution was ordered favorably reported to the Senate.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please. This is an executive session.

I wonder, simply in order to give a little more time for other members to appear, because there are several who are planning to be here, we could proceed.

Mr. Secretary and Mr. Bell, who is accompanying him on the proposal of the President for some additional aid in Southeast Asia, this is, I take it, a followup on the proposal in Baltimore some weeks ago by the President.

Mr. Secretary, will you lead off.

STATEMENT, OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RUTHERFORD M. POATS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR FAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I would ask, Mr. Chairman, whether you feel it would be appropriate rather than to take the committee's time to read my statement, I might file it for the record and make some brief informal comments and then have questions before Mr. Bell takes up the details of the actual $89 million proposal itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. We need a complete statement for the record, but then I think we might, in the interest of time, proceed as you suggest, so we will receive the entire statement for the record, and you summarize it very briefly, and then we will have questions.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add, if I may, to the statement comments on three aspects of the South Vietnam situation for the information of the committee. One, the political processes by which attempts have been made to achieve peace in the area; second, comment briefly on the present cabinet issue that has arisen in Saigon, on which we may have further information before this meeting of the committee is finished; and, third, a brief comment on the military situation. These three together make up an important part of the background against which this proposal is made and should be considered.

DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS

I think that it is important for the committee to know that the variety of the efforts that have been made in the past 4 years to explore fully the possibilities of peace in Southeast Asia are many. It is almost exactly 4 years ago that President Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna. At that time, and since, there have been continuing bilateral discussions with Moscow, a few with Peiping, and with other governments in contact with Hanoi. I myself have discussed this matter many times with Mr. Gromyko, with the Soviet Ambassador, and those discussions with Moscow and Peiping have continued up to the most recent dates.

We have never been able to find a basis for agreement on South Vietnam. We did, as you know, in 1961, achieve some common understanding between ourselves and Moscow on Laos. That resulted in the conference on Laos and an agreement on Laos. That agreement failed to achieve its purpose because Hanoi never brought itself into compliance with the agreement.

In addition to these intensive bilateral contacts, we have supported the effort of the cochairmen, particularly the British cochairman, to make full use of the machinery that was established at the time of the 1954 and the 1962 agreements. We have been as responsive as possible to the cochairmen. We have on occasion been encouraged to think that the Soviet Government might assume a more active and responsible role as cochairman working with the British, but thus far that effort has not moved forward.

We have attempted to discover whether the United Nations might be able to play an effective role. As you know, Hanoi was invited to the Security Council at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. The Soviet representative moved to invite Hanoi, and we supported it. Hanoi rejected the invitation.

Since that time, Hanoi and Peiping have refused to accept a visit by U Thant, the Secretary General. Almost at the same time, they refused to accept a visit by Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker as a representative of the British cochairman.

The possibility of the Cambodian conference arose, and we supported that. Prince Sihanouk, apparently under influence of Peiping on this point, seems to be pulling away from the very conference which he himself has proposed.

NO RESPONSE FROM THE OTHER SIDE

We have supported talks among the three factions in Laos. We think the Soviets have supported those talks, but it has become clear in the last few weeks that the Pathet Lao have pulled away from those talks, and there is evidence that they did so under the influence of Hanoi and Peiping.

The President, in Baltimore, offered unconditional discussions. We have had no response from the other side on that except rejection.

President [Sarvepalli] Radhakrishnan of India made what seemed to us to be some interesting proposals about a cease-fire and supervision by outside forces. We tried to give that suggestion some encouragement as a basis for discussion. Hanoi and Peiping have rejected those proposals.

There was a period of several days in which, for a combination of reasons, there was no bombing in North Vietnam. The other side was aware of the fact that there was no bombing at that time. There was no indication that they would come forward with any suggestions during that period. Indeed, their reaction to it was very harsh.

Contacts do continue in a variety of ways, but I think, in summary, I would have to report that there is no present indication that the other side is seriously seeking a peaceful settlement except on the terms of a solution in South Vietnam in accordance with a program of the National Liberation Front. We shall not be discouraged in keeping channels open and holding open the possibilities of a peaceful settlement, but nevertheless, I regret that I am not able to bring to this committee a prospect of an early, or certainly not an immediate, development in that field.

STEPPED UP ACTIVITY BY THE VIETCONG

With regard to the military situation, we are encountering stepped up activity by the Vietcong. We apparently are at the beginnings of a major or a substantial effort which the Vietcong can be expected to make during the monsoon period when there is some limitation on air power in dealing with guerrilla operations.

One of our problems in reporting has been that information on losses to the South Vietnamese is available first for information on losses to the other side, and in the course of a day's operation, al-

though there may be a dozen such operations, it is usually the adverse operation that gets the major attention. But there has been a definite increase in the fighting, and we shall have to brace ourselves for increased Vietcong effort in the weeks ahead. It may well be that Hanoi and Peiping will pay or show no interest in political channels for peaceful settlement until they find out whether they can, in fact, win in South Vietnam by military means during the monsoon period.

At the present time, I think while we are meeting here, there is a meeting in the palace in Saigon among the top civilian and military leadership to try to find an answer to a certain impasse which developed with respect to changes in the cabinet.

MILITARY COUNCIL DISSOLVED

As you know, the military council was dissolved as a vote of confidence in the civilian government some weeks ago. Following that, the Prime Minister felt he should strengthen his cabinet by making certain changes, changing five members of the cabinet, to put it on a somewhat broader base politically and to increase somewhat the representation of the so-called southerners as compared with the northerners in the cabinet. Two of the cabinet members who were to be replaced refused to present their resignations.

This raised the issue as to the authority of the Prime Minister to make cabinet replacements. Unfortunately, this point was not specifically and clearly covered in the charter under which they are operating, and there developed an issue between the Prime Minister and the chief of state, Mr. Suu, as to authority.

There are dissident elements, a small group of Catholics who do not represent the hierarchy or the general Catholic movement, plus some political figures who had been left outside the government, who have been encouraging Mr. Suu to resist the effort of Prime Minister Quat to change the cabinet.

The bickering between Quat and Suu has led to uneasiness on the part of the military leadership, who have expressed themselves as being impatient with such bickering among the political figures. An effort is being made today to settle the problem by a joint meeting of the chief of state, Mr. Suu, the Prime Minister, the cabinet, and the national council, which is a political group, and the military leaders.

I hope we can have an answer shortly as to what the solution can be. Naturally, we ourselves hope very much that it will not lead to another one of those situations of changing governments and the kind of distraction and disunion that has so heavily impaired our effort there in South Vietnam.

DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I think the basis for the proposal which is before you, Mr. Chairman, is a desire to demonstrate as effectively as we can what could be accomplished in that part of the world if there could only be some peace. I myself have seen certain development activities in South Vietnam in high spot areas and have been very much impressed with the ability of that country and its people to make rapid advance if they could only have some peace.

We believe there is a basis for important regional cooperation, particularly among Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam in such projects as the Mekong River development project and the related development efforts that could go along with it. The proposal before you would make it possible to move faster on the Mekong River plan than would otherwise be possible, to get going with some of the dams that are an essential part of that proposal, and to undertake certain other development and economic support activities in the first instance in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. In accordance with plans which would include shortly similar construction projects in Cambodia, there is a possibility, if peace can be achieved, that even North Vietnam might be included in a regional effort.

We believe that this idea, which was suggested by the President in Baltimore, has stimulated a great deal of interest. It has caught on in the countries of Southeast Asia. Mr. Eugene Black [1] has had some very important talks on the matter and is convinced that this has lifted the morale of the people of that part of the world significantly.

There are many feasible and practical things that could be done, and this is clearly moving in the right direction. To the extent that hope and food and housing and the prospect of higher standards of living can be substituted for bullets, guns, and violence, so much the better.

We hope very much, Mr. Chairman, that the committee would give very sympathetic consideration to the addition of this amount to the AID program for the purposes indicated in the President's message. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the committee wish to ask the Secretary questions before we have Mr. Bell go into the details, or should we hear from Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. I would be very pleased to go into the details, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

MEKONG BASIN PLAN

Perhaps the simplest way to run down the major items that are in the $89 million request is to ask you to turn to page 6 of the Secretary's statement. There is on that page and several succeeding pages an itemization of the elements that make up the $89 million.

The first three elements which are indicated on page 6 are all related to the Mekong Basin. The Mekong Basin is shown on the map the Secretary is now looking at outlined in blue. The watershed is shown there, and the Mekong River itself runs down the middle of the map.

The significance of this, as you all know, I am sure, is that for the last several years there has been underway a cooperative effort under the sponsorship of the United Nations to exmaine the development possibilities of controlling the rivers of the Mekong Basin and make better use of them. Some work is underway, some has been completed.

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[1] President of the World Bank.

LAOTIAN DAM

The next project which has been examined and is in the final stages of review is the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos, which is a few miles above Vientiane. It is that red dot, just above the red dot, in Laos. That is the Nam Ngum damsite. It is just 50 miles from Vientiane. It would, when completed, provide power for Vientiane, and it would have a needed transmission line across the river into the northern part of northeastern Thailand.

Senator AIKEN. That would be very high-cost power; I notice $27 million for 20,000 kilowatts.

Mr. BELL. 20,000 kilowatts, Senator, is just the first element of the installation. As I recall, it will go to 60,000 kilowatts.

Senator AIKEN. 60,000 would be feasible—20,000 does not look feasible.

Mr. BELL. You are quite right.

Now, the United States has offered to provide half of the cost on a grant basis—since Laos has no opportunity, no possibility, of paying back a loan at the present stage of its development—if other countries will put up the other half on a grant basis. The $13.5 million for that share of the Nam Ngum Dam is the first element indicated here.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you envision now how the other countries might be?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Japan and Germany, I think, are probably the two outstanding possibilities; France and Canada and the United Kingdom also. They would be the advanced countries, particularly Japan, because they have a special interest in working cooperatively. The Japanese have responded very strongly and favorably to the President's initiative for this Southeast Asian development effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Would this be under the jurisdiction and management of the World Bank?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. The World Bank, Mr. Woods has agreed to take on the management of this project. This has been very reassuring to us because it will mean that the bank will use its own management and engineering staff to make sure that the project is executed properly and well, and all of us would get value received for our money. So, the funds we make available would go to the World Bank for their control and use.

A power transmission line across the river and down into Thailand is estimated to cost $500,000. That is related to the same project.

PA MONG DAM

Then the so-called Pa Mong Dam, which is the next major project being looked into, is just above Vientiane, on the Mekong main stream. It is the white dot just left.

The Pa Mong Dam would be a much larger project and would be on the main stem of the Mekong. It would be the first main stem dam. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has completed a preliminary assessment of this project and found it sufficiently promising so that they believe we should go ahead with a major engineering review. This would cost some $4.5 million and would continue over

the next approximately 3 years. This is not a short-run project, but it has very major possibilities for storage and for irrigation on down the river for a good distance.

This area, although it has a heavy rainfall, has a very seasonal rainfall. Therefore, as has been demonstrated in other parts of Southeast Asia, there can be very effective use of irrigation water in the off-season which permits you to double-crop rather than single-crop your land. This project will require a very careful, continuing investigation for some years yet, but it is at the stage now where the Bureau of Reclamation recommends—and the United Nations is strongly supporting—going ahead with this next phase of the investigation.

There is one other point. There are also two small feasibility studies on smaller rivers in northeast Thailand which require about $500,000 for acceleration of studies. These are the elements related directly to the Mekong River Basin, and they total $19 million of the $89 million.

IMPROVING HEALTH SERVICES

The second element of the President's request is an increase and an improvement in the health services which we are now helping to provide in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

In Thailand, we already have a substantial rural health effort, and we propose to enlarge it and strengthen it, particularly in the provision of equipment to provincial hospitals and health centers. The Thai Government is now proposing a substantial increase in their rural health program. This is very sensible, in our opinion, and we want to back it. Our estimate is that about $1 million of additional 1966 funds will be needed for that purpose.

In Laos, we are already contributing very substantially to the health services that are available in the rural areas. We are, for example, financing more than 100 Philippine doctors and nurses under Operation Brotherhood, who are now at work in Laos. We are proposing an additional $500,000 to supplement what is now being done, and to expand and better equip the rural dispensaries in that country.

In Vietnam, we have a major effort underway, including some dozen or so medical and surgical teams working now in a number of provincial towns in Vietnam. Some of these medical and surgical teams are American civilians, some are American military teams, and some are being provided by other countries—the New Zealanders have a team, the Taiwanese have a team, the Filipinos have two teams—these efforts have proven to be very important.

South Vietnam is extremely short of doctors, and we are proposing to better than double the medical and surgical teams that we have in the provincial portions of South Vietnam. As the President said in his statement on Tuesday, he has asked the American Medical Association—and they have agreed—to help in recruiting people to work in these provincial medical centers, especially surgical and other specialists who will go over for short-term voluntary tours of duty to add special talents.

The health program together adds up to a request of $7 million of the $89 million.

LOCAL ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC WORKS

The next element is the local engineering and public works agencies. We are not proposing any increase in Vietnam at this time. There is a strong effort underway there, but we are proposing to increase the effort in Thailand and Laos. We have been helping to equip and to train provincial public works staffs in the provinces in northeastern Thailand up along the river, up along the border with Laos, as part of the expanded rural development program in Thailand, which is intended to strengthen the forces of progress in that part of Thailand and to strengthen the resistance of the people of that part of Thailand against the North Vietnamese and Lao Communist infiltration which has begun from across the river in Laos.

We are proposing additional equipment and training. The initial steps we have taken look very good. We have had an evaluation of the work underway in the last year, and we want to expand it to additional provinces in northeastern Thailand. Also, a small part of this would be for two provinces in the very southernmost part of Thailand, which is an area where some of the Communist refugees from Malaya went to some years ago, after the Malayan insurrection was put down. We want to help the Thais strengthen the situation down there.

In Laos, we have been helping for some years to support the development of a roadbuilding capacity. We want to augment that plan, which will be managed, as the recent effort has been, by highway engineers who are provided under an arrangement we have with the Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Commerce.

These two efforts in Thailand and Laos total $6 million of the $89 million.

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION

A fourth element of the President's request is for $5 million to support establishment of three rural electrification co-ops. We have had a team of people recruited for us by Clyde Ellis and the National Rural Electric Co-op Association, who have been in Vietnam in recent months. They have picked three areas which look promising, one down in the delta southwest of Saigon and two northeast of Saigon, and are proposing to help establish the first three rural electric cooperatives in those areas. We believe this is a very promising and sensible course of action and propose to support it. We have asked for some $5 million in this $89 million total to do so.

We have asked for about $1 million for strengthening, expanding our agricultural effort in Laos. We have proposed $1.5 million for expanded and enlarged feasibility studies for industrial plants and related infrastructure in Vietnam, notably in such lines as fertilizer, cement, and kraft paper.

LOCAL POLICE FORCES

We have asked for about $4.5 million to step up our work with the police forces in Thailand and to reinitiate work with the police force in Laos.

The police force in Laos was "disbanded," I guess was the right word to say, it was taken over by the military about 1960, and there has been no civil police effort in Laos for the last several years. Now there is a possibility to reestablish a civilian-oriented and civilian-controlled police force in Laos. We believe this is a very sensible objective, and we propose to provide the same kind of training and help with equipment that we provide in other countries. This is a renewed element of our program in Laos.

IMPORTS INTO VIETNAM

Last, included in the $89 million total are about $45 million for imports into Vietnam. This is, in part, in substantial part, an additional requirement of the kind we have been providing to Vietnam for the last several years. We had $150 million in the regular 1966 program. It has been clear that the enlarged military force, which is now in course of recruitment and training in Vietnam, the enlarged police forces which are in the course of recruitment and training, and other additional governmental expenditures in Vietnam will increase the purchasing power and call for more imports, which we will need to help finance.

Furthermore, because of the interdiction, because of cutting off of the flow of rice from certain important areas, and because of the floods in northeastern Vietnam, which reduced the amount of rice production this year, Vietnam, unlike last year, will not have any rice to export. This means a loss of $30 to $35 million of what has been their foreign exchange earning.

For these reasons it is clear that we will need to provide additional funds for imports into Vietnam, and the rough estimate today is $45 million.

PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN VIETNAM

Now, these funds will support a good deal of investment by the private sector in Vietnam. We have been very pleased and impressed to see that there is a very substantial interest on the part of the private businessmen in Vietnam to continue to invest and expand their industrial activities. As of last week, the largest volume of requests pending for import licenses, some $30 million of the $50 million total pending request for import licenses, were for iron and steel, so that there is a very significant element of support for investment and development in this request for funds for——

Senator AIKEN. In what form is the iron and steel?

Mr. BELL. Reinforcing bars and shapes.

Senator AIKEN. Structural steel?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; structural steel. All sorts of——

Senator AIKEN. Do they have wheels on it?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. These are iron and steel structural forms, shapers, and bars.

REQUEST FOR $89 MILLION

These elements, Mr. Chairman, make up the $89 million total, which the President has requested.

Of the total, $80 million would be financed under our supporting assistance appropriation and $9 million under the technical cooperation and development grant appropriation. Therefore, our formal request to the Congress is to raise the authorization amounts for those two elements of our two categories of appropriations by those amounts: $80 million for supporting assistance and $9 million more for technical cooperation.

Now, is there anything I should add? Mr. Poats, who is our Assistant Administrator for the Far East, directly responsible for this program, is here.

Mr. POATS. No, unless there are questions.

MATCHING FUNDS

Senator AIKEN. What amount of the total would be matched by other countries, of the total $89 million?

Mr. POATS. There will be substantial contributions of budget funds from Thailand and Laos for these programs. Of course, Laos is so heavily dependent on the United States that it is an artificial description.

As far as the medical program is concerned, arrangements are going forward for the introduction of four additional medical-surgical teams from other countries which match our efforts to some extent in this field.

Senator AIKEN. Bilateral contributions?

Mr. POATS. Bilateral from each country.

COMMITMENTS FROM OTHER NATIONS

There is an increase in technical assistance to Thailand occurring now from countries that are members of the DAC, Development Assistance Committee, coordinating group. The Germans have a substantial program in Thailand and are interested, as Mr. Bell pointed out, in the Mekong Basin projects generally. The Mekong projects, as I believe the committee knows, have had the support of 21 countries and agencies, and we expect, and the U.N. Secretariat expects, that support will be expanded.

Our concept of the Southeast Asian scheme, for an expanded effort there, is based heavily on the effort to involve the commitment of other advanced nations to the economic and consequently, political integrity of that area. The planning work which Mr. Black is chairing now, and on which he is meeting today, involves a variety of means of drawing increased contributions by Western European countries and Japan, particularly, into this total effort. What we are proposing here to do is to get the ball rolling, demonstrate by concrete action that we are prepared to start, and call upon them both directly and through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to join in.

PAST ASSISTANCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How much over the last 11, 12 years have we put in just this kind of work in these countries, the total? Do you have figures there? It seems to me to be a very vast amount.

Mr. POATS. Total assistance to Southeast Asia by the United States in all forms, of course, is very large. The bulk of that assistance has been in basic economic support of Vietnam during the period of war and reconstruction after division of the country.

Mr. BELL. That alone has run around $2 billion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We understand that military operation. But we put a lot of money in Cambodia, into Thailand, and a lot of money into Laos. Is that exactly the same thing that we propose now, with some specific program, to increase by $89 million? I mean, haven't we been doing this for years?

Mr. BELL. There is a very important element of novelty, Senator, in the proposal that the President stated was involved here, and following up with Mr. Black's guidance. The request, the President's formal offer on behalf of the United States is if the Southeast Asian countries themselves increase their cooperative efforts and their cooperative planning and their own commitment to economic and social development, we will be prepared substantially to increase the kind of thing we have been doing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would be something about $1 billion.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; although he did not specify a period of time.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We have been thinking of it—if there were an effective response, presumably this could be well used along with appropriate contributions from other countries—over a 3- to 5-year period. The kind of things that would be done are in many cases—you are entirely right, Senator—the kinds of things that have been going on, development of highways, health services, and educational services, and so on. There would be regional efforts like these Mekong River projects which are under the general supervision of a joint four-country regional commission.

But the key element in the President's proposal, and the thing that has the chance of making a substantial difference in the way people in that part of the world think about their own future, is the opportunity to work together on economic and social progress for the people of their countries through individual activities in their own countries and through regional activities. In this sense it is really a significant and substantial new proposal that the President has put forward.

ATTEMPT TO AFFECT THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to ask the Secretary, coming back to his statement, isn't really the principal motive for this growing out of the situation that has developed with regard to the war? I mean, here the war has been progressing on an ever-increasing scale in North Vietnam, and it looks as if it has gotten to the point where it is either going to be considerably greater or we will have to find some means to deheat, so to speak, that effort in escalation. It has not brought the results hoped for.

But this is largely political, the timing of it. Why you are doing it at this moment is in the hope that this, combined with the military effort, will create a different attitude on the part of South

Vietnam, not only South Vietnam but of the whole region. This is a kind of downpayment on the pledge that we would like to spend money in improving the conditions there in hopes that this would affect even the attitude of the Vietcong, but certainly the Cambodians and the Laotians, that we mean it when we say that we do not really wish to destroy this area.

We are spending, I believe the President said, at the rate of $2 billion a year in this overall military effort in this area; is that about right, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The real motive here is just not another aid program, but certainly, as to the timing of it, the real reason is to try to affect the course of that war, that either it looks as if it is going to expand into a full-scale Korean effort or this, combined with the pressure, will create a different attitude; the response of these people which you describe as being wholly negative up to now, that this demonstrates enough good faith that there is hope, as you say, for a better life, and substituting hope and food for guns and bullets is what you are trying to accomplish here. In a sense, it is kind of a psychological warfare that you are mounting on this; isn't that the real reason?

It is just taking this as another aid program; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. There are very important political factors. You pointed out some of the most important yourself, Mr. Chairman.

I think this effort does give a fresh impetus to mobilization of contributions from other countries——

The CHAIRMAN. To get them involved.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. In a capacity to help.

I also think it is important to help meet the persistent Communist propaganda that world opinion is strongly against what we are doing in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

AID FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Secretary RUSK. The committee might wish to have inserted in the record at this point a very brief digest of the types of aid being furnished by more than 30 countries in South Vietnam today.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have it? If you do, we will put it in.

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad to submit it. I will file a brief summary.

[The document referred to follows:]

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

The main burden of outside support for the Government of South Vietnam has been and will continue to be borne by the United States in the foreseeable future. However, substantial contributions of military and civilian assistance have been provided by a number of other countries. In response to appeals made on July 15, 1964 by the Government of Vietnam for more international support, many current donors increased their assistance and several other countries pledged contributions. At the present time, 30 free world countries are providing, and 8 more have agreed to provide, assistance to South Vietnam. Prior to the July appeal only 10 nations, including the United States, were providing aid.

Significant contributions have been made by the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, France, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in the form of loans, grants, and commercial credits. For example, Germany has made available in loans and grants about $20 million. Australia has provided technical and economic assistance

totaling nearly $8 million. Assistance since 1955 from France has totaled more than $100 million, while Japan has provided about $75 million chiefly in the form of reparations.

Free world personnel, other than American, now being provided in Vietnam under governmental arrangements is expected to number over 5,000, the large majority of which will be military personnel. However, most of these military personnel are engaged in civic action programs, such as rural reconstruction and medical care. Among these are personnel from Korea, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, New Zealand, and Australia.

Two of the most recent contributions have been the Australian decision to provide an infrantry battalion, approximately 800 men, to support the Vietnamese army in combat operations, and an artillery battery from New Zealand.

One of the fields in which free world contributions are being made and is most appreciated is in health. Foreign military and civilian personnel are actively engaged in providing medical and surgical care in the provincial areas to the rural population. Teams of doctors, nurses, and administrative personnel, supplemented by donations of medicinals and other commodities, are significantly supplementing the relatively small number of Vietnamese doctors available to the civilian population. Countries other than the United States which are providing medical personnel include Australia, China, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Canada, France, Germany, and Italy. In addition, the Netherlands has agreed to provide a medical team and Denmark has agreed to train nurses.

Other free world aid is made available by grants for the construction of installations, such as powerplants and schools, and for study or training of Vietnamese overseas.

NONMILITARY AID

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question there in context? What are the amounts as compared to what we do?

Secretary RUSK. The amounts, of course, are not on the scale that we are supplying.

Senator SYMINGTON. Roughly what?

Mr. POATS. About $40 million.

Secretary RUSK. $40 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. As against what we do, you have 30 countries putting up $40 million. I am not asking in criticism, just to find out the facts.

Mr. POATS. In economic aid $280 million, including Public Law 480.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is exclusive of any military aid or offshore military expenditure.

Mr. POATS. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the Public Law 480 in the $280 million?

Mr. POATS. That is correct, sir—$220 milion AID funds and about $60 million Public Law 480.

Secretary RUSK. We do know certain countries are planning to contribute more.

Mr. Chairman, on the——

PRESS HARD FOR COOPERATIVE ASSISTANCE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at that point? I think one of the most important things that can be done with reference to this program is to get those other countries actively contributing and to give publicity to it. I think it strengthens our position with our own people, and I think with the world as a

whole immeasurably to have that brought in. I sometimes wonder if we do press hard enough to get cooperative assistance from other countries.

The CHAIRMAN. The World Bank has proved to be the most successful agency for enlisting the participation of other countries in the past, hasn't it?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Mr. BELL. It has been very successful, sir. There are other ways. We have done it in other ways, and we have done it through the DAC.

I smiled when Senator Sparkman made that statement. There may be other ways, but Mr. Poats and I are bloody and scarred from putting all the pressure we can into that effort.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not criticizing you, but I am just trying to emphasize what I feel to be an important impact.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OPINIONS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, there is one item I have not been able to state to this committee. I made a summary of the information, I checked our reports, on the attitude of the governments of the world on Vietnam, and I have looked broadly at what they both say publicly and privately. Some talk to us privately because for various reasons they do not wish to speak out publicly on it.

There are 70 governments that support what we are trying to do in South Vietnam. There are about 25 that are indifferent or neutral and about 25 that are opposed. In other words, I think we ought to be a little careful about supposing that world public opinion is set against the efforts being made to support the independence of South Vietnam and its safety in the situation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to test that for just a minute, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say world public opinion. Do you differentiate between leaders who talk back in the corner settee and say, "Go ahead, let's you and him fight," and then go out publicly and criticize us?

Secretary RUSK. No. In the case of a man who would say——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. World public opinion is a mass opinion.

Secretary RUSK. No, I am not suggesting that the Vietnam effort is broadly popular in the sense of the man-in-the-street. But I am saying those who are carrying the responsibility recognize what the consequences and the stakes are, and we have far more support than appears on the front pages of the newspapers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wish they would translate that into more overt action.

Secretary RUSK. I agree, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

SUPPORT FOR THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, there is one sharp delineation here. I was wondering if I hear correctly about the 70 governments that support our objectives, the restoration of peace and a better life for the people there. Would you say that those 70 governments, speak-

ing privately, supported the bombing of North Vietnam? There is a difference between objectives and how we attain them.

Secretary RUSK. I think there are some of those 70 that would not do so publicly.

Senator PELL. Or privately.

Secretary RUSK. But I would also say—may I go completely off the record on this?

[Discussion off the record.]

HEATING UP THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. If the program could be effective enough to enlist the enthusiasm of these people in Cambodia and Laos and South Vietnam, it might well have an effect upon their spirit with regard to the guerrillas, and so on. I still come back, I think the main excuse for it is its effect upon the course of the war.

What disturbed me most about it is that apparently the heating up of it—when they shoot down our planes, this heats up opinion here in this country, [illegible] you will soon get in this country a sentiment that it cannot [illegible] topped, if there is going to be an all-out effort, and it seems to me this does not lead anywhere. It seems to me the significance of this is to try to affect that.

This gives an alternative. It might even be said to give an excuse to the Vietcong and to others that, after all, it gets them nowhere to continue the fighting. If they can turn it around, they might begin to bring pressure upon Hanoi to at least have a truce, we will say, pending the development of this kind of activity. It gives an alternative to just continue the fight, and the fighting, I cannot believe, will ever lead anywhere, be very beneficial if it becomes an all-out effort as in Korea.

In Korea, after 2 or 3 years, what did we end up with? A truce, which is what you are asking for now. It will be much better if you can in some way induce the truce before you have to go through with an all-out war, and I think that is the principal significance.

MORALE OF THE VIETNAMESE

Does it have a real substantial, in your estimate, psychological effect upon the attitude of the people in this area?

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I believe Ambassador Lodge may have commented on this directly to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. He did.

Secretary RUSK. We have had a good many reports from Vietcong prisoners that morale on the Vietcong side is definitely affected by shortages of medical care, medicine, food, the ordinary conveniences of everyday life. The more that we can show that the difference between these two sides makes a difference on these daily needs, I think the more encouragement the South Vietnamese will find, and the more you will see the kind of thing that has happened where some 200,000 refugees have moved out of areas overrun by the Vietcong out to where they can be in contact with the government and be under government care and attention, and part of that is affected by the military situation itself. But I think we ought not to underestimate the importance of this sort of difference on the two sides there in South Vietman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

CUT BACK OTHER FOREIGN AID

Senator CARLSON. Just one question. I am sure Mr. Bell will appreciate this, but we are considering now the foreign aid authorization bill of $3 billion something, and this is really just an addition of $89 million. I do not know if the chairman expects to do this as part of the bill or a separate bill, but isn't there someplace we can cut back on the other sections of the foreign aid bill to take care of this $89 million?

Mr. BELL. The supporting assistance appropriation for fiscal year 1966 was an extremely tight one when we presented it to this committee. It is our judgment that the elements of that request, which were, totaled, about $370 million, as I remember it—the committee cut it slightly—should not be compressed. As you will recall, Senator, we have been reducing, we have been eliminating, supporting assistance in country after country, I think in accord with the wishes of the committee and our own wishes, to get out of the supporting assistance business wherever we can.

But the situation on Southeast Asia today is the kind of a situation where supporting assistance is properly used. The point I am making is that the request for that kind of funds was a tight one. It is a tight one as it stands before the Congress today. We believe that $80 million additional supporting assistance is required in addition to the previous amount asked for. In technical assistance, technical cooperation funds, we are asking for $9 million, which adds to a total of about $210 million, which is the amount in the authorization bill; here, again, we think that $210 million is a tight figure.

You are entirely correct. It is obviously feasible, if we wish to abandon or reduce activities elsewhere in the world, to shift funds.

However, as the committee knows, under the President's instructions we presented the minimum, what we regard as a minimum, program everywhere. Therefore, it seemed to us, and it seemed to the President, that the proper way to meet these requirements was not to reduce anything else, whether over in Nigeria or Brazil or somewhere else, but to ask for additional funds to take care of these additional requirements.

AN EMERGENCY SITUATION

Senator CARLSON. It occurs to me that this comes in as an emergency situation, an emergency measure. I, of course, am not in a position to say, "Let us eliminate some countries."

There are some countries that I am sure we ought to begin to cut back even more than you did last year, and I would be hopeful if we could. But this is just an addition of $89 million and, of course, as has been mentioned before, it is probably just the beginning of a very large program.

Mr. BELL. Could I add one other point, Mr. Chairman and Senator Carlson? You will recall that when the President sent his general foreign aid message to the Congress earlier this spring, he asked for a special authorization for such additional sums as might be needed for economic or military assistance in South Vietnam.

When the House of Representatives considered that provision, they included it in the bill. It was included in the bill which passed the House last week, but they enlarged it, so that it covers not only South Vietnam but also the rest of Southeast Asia, no other parts of the world but Southeast Asia. Under that arrangement, this amount would not need to be specifically authorized, but would be presented to the authorizing committee and then submitted as an appropriation request.

When this committee considered the President's request, it was decided that the committee did not wish to approve that arrangement. If that arrangement were in the bill, then we would be before the committee explaining fully the $89 million request. The formal action would be before the Appropriations Committee. When that was brought down, it was said then you could come up and ask for something specifically if you needed it.

OBJECTIONS TO OPEN ENDED APPROPRIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Now they are here asking for it instead of the open ended. We objected to the open ended provision.

Senator CARLSON. I think our committee took a very sound position. Our committee was opposed and I was opposed to an open ended appropriation. I am pleased we have to go through it this way.

Mr. BELL. Senator, this is not at all the end of the story. It does not cover military assistance at all, and there may well be additional economic requirements during fiscal year 1966.

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on the course of events. Supposing the war really gets enlarged in the nature of a Korean effort, of course, progress in this would be very limited. If this is successful in starting a different trend, you would much more than save this amount if you could decrease the military effort.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Far beyond that.

Mr. BELL. Many times over.

Senator CARLSON. The Senator from Kansas sincerely hopes it will be effective. Personally, I have great doubt in the situation militarily. That is the thing I really regret.

The CHAIRMAN. I regret it, too; I mean the amount we are spending now on military.

Senator Lausche.

GETTING HANOI TO NEGOTIATE

Senator LAUSCHE. To refresh my memory, Secretary Rusk, will you reidentify the efforts that have been made to procure a meeting with the North Vietnamese to bring about an end of firing? I know the President's initial speech saying that without condition he will sit down with Hanoi and discuss ways and means of settling this problem.

Now, briefly, each one. You already enumerated them, but I want them in compact form in the record.

Secretary RUSK. First, the bilateral contacts that led to the Laotian conference where Hanoi was present.

Senator LAUSCHE. That occurred when?

Secretary RUSK. That was in 1961 to 1962.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Second, discussions among the three factions in Laos trying to find a basis for reconvening of the Laotian conference to move back toward compliance with those agreements.

Third, efforts by the cochairmen to be in touch with all parties to find a basis for a meeting which could work toward a peaceful settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia.

Senator CLARK. Is this Laos or Vietnam cochairmen?

Secretary RUSK. This includes both. The cochairmen of 1954 and 1962 are the same, and they worked on both aspects of this.

Senator CLARK. Those are the British and the Russians?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Fourth?

Secretary RUSK. Fourth, contacts which other governments have had with Hanoi to explore with Hanoi the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

Senator CLARK. Can you name the other governments, Mr. Secretary, or not?

Secretary RUSK. I should not name them for the record, but I would off the record.

Fifth, contacts with Hanoi by the United Nations, such as the invitation to Hanoi to come to the Security Council at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Sixth, an attempt by the British cochairman to send a special envoy to Hanoi and Peiping to discuss the same issue.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that Walker?

Secretary RUSK. That is Patrick Gordon Walker.

Seventh, encouragement by us to President Radhakrishnan's proposal, which we know was communicated to Hanoi, and which they rejected.

Eighth, contacts through the International Control Commission which operates in Hanoi, Saigon, Cambodia, Vientiane.

Senator CLARK. Would you yield for a question?

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me complete my question and let him complete his tabulation.

Secretary RUSK. Ninth, their knowledge that there were a few days in which there was no bombing of North Vietnam, in which they had a chance to react to this in view of what they have been saying between, the connection between, negotiations on the bombing.

And, of course, tenth, the open ended statement made by the President with respect to unconditional discussion.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, now you go ahead.

EFFORT FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT

Secretary CLARK. Could you tell us, Mr. Secretary, to what extent, if at all, these efforts at conciliation followed the President's statement of his interest in unconditional discussions, and to what extent, as it seems to me, they preceded it? And also can you tell us whether you have ever said formally or informally that we would be willing to sit down for discussions with anybody that

Hanoi chose to bring to the conference table, which might well include representatives of the Vietcong?

Secretary RUSK. This effort to find an acceptable peaceful settlement of Southeast Asia has been continuous since almost exactly 4 years ago when President Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. There has never been any cessation of the effort. On every occasion I have met with him, I suppose a dozen times since then, on every occasion that I meet with——

Senator CLARK. By "him" you mean Gromyko?

Secretary RUSK. On every occasion I have met with him since 1961, I have talked to him about Southeast Asia, quite apart from what is said through normal diplomatic channels, to find a way back to full compliance with the Laotian accords, which has been continuous since 1962.

I think that since the President's Baltimore speech, you have had the cochairmen effort, you have had President's Radhakrishnan's proposals, you have had some talks among the three factions in Laos, you have had the brief period in which there was no bombing in North Vietnam, and you have had indirect contacts with capitals on the other side. So, this is a part of a continuum. There has never been a period when this was not fully being explored.

PRESIDENT ESCALATED THE PEACE EFFORT

Senator CLARK. Nevertheless, the President's statement that we would engage in unconditional discussions obviously, if you want to put it this way, escalated the peace effort. My concern is what response you have had from the Russians since then, and your own judgment as to whether our present continuation of the bombing in North Vietnam is forcing a reluctant Russia into Chinese arms or whether you feel that the Russians, in the long run, will be helpful in bringing an end to the fighting.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to go into that if I could off the record, because I think this is fairly important.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. I will yield to just one question. I want to have my thoughts in continuity.

NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, I am disturbed because in the list of the 10 points that you mentioned—and I am not sure it is being brought to the attention of the people higher up in the Government—an effort was made by North Vietnam to enter into negotiations with us 1 day prior to the resumption of bombing, and the precondition that they had previously set, withdrawal of American troops, they backtracked on and said that it would be acceptance of that in principle, that the troops would not have to get out. By the time the contact started to be firmed up, the bombing had resumed because it takes several weeks to have any effect. It would seem to me that that is one case that is not known, and I would be delighted off the record or any other way to affirm the fact. There must be other efforts made by the North Vietnamese.

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Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I indicated earlier that channels continue to be open and that contacts are available. But I cannot confirm that we have seen anything that looks like a negotiating approach from Hanoi.

Senator PELL. Are you aware of what I have been talking about?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I am, sir.

Senator PELL. Do you not consider that was a definite contact?

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe that that showed any slightest degree of change from any public position that they have taken, and is no indication that they were interested in a serious discussion of bringing this matter to a close.

Senator PELL. It did show they were willing to have our troops remain, just acceptance in principle, and it did show they wanted to get in touch with us.

Secretary RUSK. But there was nothing there that indicated what was going to happen to the military effort made by Hanoi in the south, and nothing to show there was any answer in the south that they would accept other than the program of the Liberation Front.

Senator PELL. But it does require a conversation to ascertain that fact.

Secretary RUSK. As I say, contacts—there are a number of governments and others in contact with Hanoi. We are not in direct contact with them.

Senator PELL. Excuse me for pressing this point, but what I am driving at is an effort on the part of North Vietnam to get in touch with us. It was terminated by our resumption of bombing.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry, Senator, I will have to check this point, but my understanding is that the contact you are referring to came after the resumption of bombing.

Senator PELL. Forgive me, sir, the original contact was 24 hours before. By the time the authorization—I think you can check that.

Secretary RUSK. I will check that, sir.

VIETCONG REPRESENTATION AT NEGOTIATIONS

Senator CLARK. I do not think you had answered my question, sir, as to whether we would be willing to allow Hanoi to bring to the bargaining table anybody they wanted to, which might include representatives of the Vietcong.

Secretary RUSK. I do not see any particular objection in Hanoi's having any delegation they want to.

Senator CLARK. But you say we do not talk with the Vietcong. Is this not——

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would ask for the regular order here, because this discussion seems to be a basic disagreement of a policy.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better proceed in order.

WILL HANOI NEGOTIATE WHILE BEING BOMBED

Senator LAUSCHE. You have enumerated 10 efforts to have understandings with Hanoi, and all of them have failed. You have also said that there have been efforts made by individual countries whom you have not identified.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many of those countries are there that have tried to intervene?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that there would be at least a half dozen that have had contacts at one time or another.

Senator LAUSCHE. Over what period of time?

Secretary RUSK. Over the past 2 years, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. The cessation of the bombing, was that done in response to arguments that were made by newspapermen of our country, and some public officials, about how you expect Hanoi to sit down when we are bombing them? Quit bombing them and they will come to the negotiation table with you; was that one of the reasons why we did it?

Secretary RUSK. There were several reasons involved there, Senator. Mr. Chairman, I regret to ask to go off the record so frequently but——

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

[Discussion off the record.]

UNANIMITY IN THE TOP ECHELONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Has there been any change of opinion in the top echelon of the administration concerning the absolute need of not allowing this area to fall into Communist domination?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And does that opinion run through the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the White House?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Chiefs of Staff?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, if you have not succeeded in getting them to sit down and try to talk out a solution of the problem, what are your alternatives at present?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that Hanoi is apparently under the impression that they will succeed in their operations in the south, and also are under the impression that a combination of international and domestic opinion may cause us to change our views with respect to our commitment in South Vietnam. It is my impression that they are going to make a substantial effort during this present monsoon season that is beginning. I doubt that they will be in a frame of mind to talk seriously until they and the rest of us see the outcome of that effort during the monsoon.

Senator LAUSCHE. You can avoid this difficulty in the next several months of the monsoon by pulling out.

Secretary RUSK. That is one way to avoid it, but you reap a harvest of other problems if you do that.

PUBLIC OPINION CONFUSED BY DISPUTES

Senator LAUSCHE. I observed in reading the book by Berding on John Foster Dulles,[2] that he has one paragraph where he said that no obstruction is of greater weight in achieving an objective for our country than when you have a public opinion that has been ren-

[2] Andrew H.T. Berding. "Dulles on Diplomacy," Princeton, 1965.

dered confused by disputes among the domestics. May I have your opinion on that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that a vigorous debate in this country is built into our system, and I think that it properly occurs. I do think that it is important that everyone understand that this country takes it commitments seriously and that, as far as we are concerned, we are prepared to live at peace with others just as quickly as they are prepared to live at peace with us.

USE OF THE U.N. AND SEATO

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one more question or two more: This is for my information. Why don't we go to the United Nations or SEATO?

Secretary RUSK. In the case of the United Nations, Hanoi and Peiping have made it very clear that they do not accept the United Nations as a proper forum for discussing these problems in Southeast Asia. They refuse to come to the Security Council; they refuse to accept a visit by U Thant, and you run immediately in the Security Council into the Soviet veto, so it does not appear that at the present time there is a United Nations' role in that problem. It might come later in connection with a peace settlement, but we see no prospect at the present time that the United Nations can bring about a peace here.

As far as SEATO is concerned, let me see, all but two of the members of SEATO are taking an active part in support of the South Vietnamese. The view of France is well-known, publicly known. They are now, for all practical purposes, an observer in SEATO.

Pakistan has not taken an active part in support of the South Vietnamese effort. The rest of them have been supporting it very strongly politically, and a number of them with resources. But as you know, there is a proposal before the Philippine Congress at the present time to send Philippine troops.

Australian troops are beginning to arrive now. New Zealand has committed an artillery unit in support of that Australian battalion.

The Thais are playing a very active part in Southeast Asia in carrying their share of the load there.

BRITISH TROOPS IN MALAYSIA

The British commitment is thus far limited because they are carrying the full load of the problem in Malaysia with full disposition of their forces.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand that they have 50,000 military men in Malaysia.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, and about one-quarter of their defense budget is committed in Southeast Asia at the present time.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have just a few questions I would like to ask you.

BOMBING TARGETS

On this bombing business, we stopped—and I feel that wise—and then we started. Why don't we bomb more than just bridges and ammunition dumps if we are going to bomb at all?

Secretary RUSK. We have been concentrating on what are basically military targets, bridges, chokepoints on highways, ammunition dumps, radar installations, an airfield in the southern part of North Vietnam, truck convoys, those things.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you call oil dumps——

Secretary RUSK. We have bombed a number of POL facilities in the southern part.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you bombed all that you know of?

Secretary RUSK. There are targets up in the north we have not bombed, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say "north," you mean north of Hanoi?

Secretary RUSK. In the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, what disturbs me is that this type and character of bombing has never been effective in any war, and you have about 60,000 people out there now.

Secretary RUSK. About 45,000 at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is more than that.

Secretary RUSK. I think if you include the personnel on the ships at sea——

Senator SYMINGTON. It is 100,000.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. It is more than that.

Senator SYMINGTON. 100,000.

Secretary RUSK. But 45,000 on the ground.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thought it was more than that. But in any case, it is a lot of people.

The horrors of the Pentagon during the days I was over there were to get tied down in a ground war in Asia. We seem to be getting pretty deep into a war that I do not see how we can possibly win unless we used nuclear weapons in a ground war. We do not seem to be doing anything except for show, you might say, instead of blow in the use of air power.

If we are going to do it at all, why don't we do it where we are the strongest and they are the weakest, instead of doing it where they are the strongest and we are the weakest?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, since this involves certain military operations I would like to answer off the record, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I want you to know, Mr. Secretary, it is very disturbing to me. I do not quite understand it. It seems to me in one sense—and I say this just in an executive hearing, I do not talk about it—it seems to me that we are not fishing or cutting bait, but playing around with this air bombing. I am afraid that people have a great deal more respect for it than they should have, based on the history of all bombing.

FOREIGN AID AND TRADE

One other group of questions: As I understand it, you want $89 million more for aid, and we do not even want to get that by paring aid anywhere else. For years I have worried about the amount of aid of other countries as expressed in U.S.-owned foreign currencies.

I note that as of now, for example, we ourselves own 18 percent of all of the Egyptian currency totaling over $250 million in value; and we own 13 percent of the Pakistan currency totaling nearly $250 million in value; that we own $500 million of Polish currency—it is not possible for us to ascertain the amount of that in percentage. We will leave out any South American countries, but in India we own over $1 billion in rupees; in Yugoslavia we own over $250 million of dinars, which is 14 percent.

Now, isn't there some way that we could work out some kind of a trade—I say this, my premise being, I get increasingly apprehensive about this problem of the balance of payments. We have got these experts who say because a leg of lamb is better than nothing, and nothing is better than heaven, a leg of lamb is much better than heaven and, therefore, it is really a good idea to lose our gold and increase our debts and credits.

I notice now our credits are up $1,172 billion in private debt now. We have also lost now over $1 billion this year, as you know, in gold due to the activities of France and Spain and so forth. Last year I think we lost only $125 million, and a great deal of that was for private commercial use, not in fiscal exchange. This thing, to me, is getting very serious.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE GREAT SOCIETY

I happen to agree with the thinking of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve about what is going on in this economy. If there is any extended further drop in security values, it can only mean the calling of loans, which, in turn, could create a problem that we would have to face.

Under all these circumstances, isn't there any way that we can make some form of trade with these countries? When we talk about what these other countries do, I remember here not too long ago Australia was doubling its contribution to South Vietnam. That is much better now, but when I asked Mr. Marcy of the staff, what the figures were, he said from 30 to 60 people. So, you get sort of a false impression that, I think, is sometimes dished out to the people. I do not say it is intentional. Perhaps it is wise to put your best foot forward, even if it does make you at times rise above the literal truth.

But isn't there some way we can take all these billions of dollars of aid that we put on a phony profit and loss statement as an asset—rather, on a phony balance sheet as a profit-and-loss asset—and put it in true picture. If we are going to do as the President said, namely, knock off any Communist aggression in this hemisphere—we have places now like Guatemala and Bolivia—and if we are going to go ahead in planning a war with a possibility of something worse in South Vietnam, and continue to maintain five divisions in Germany, which we have for over 20 years, and two

divisions in Korea, which we have for nearly 15 years, where are we going to get the treasure to handle policies on this basis? That is what worries me as much as any single aspect of our foreign problems today.

Senator CLARK. Would the Senator permit an interjection?

What happens to the Great Society?

Senator SYMINGTON. I am more interested in survival than in prosperity at the present time in my question. I imagine the Secretary does not have much to do with the Great Society. I see he wants to make it a little better in South Vietnam.

USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES

Secretary RUSK. Senator, as you know, we are very much involved in the gold flow problem and the foreign exchange problem, and we have been encouraged by some of the things which have been done in the past several months to affect that. I would like for Mr. Bell to comment in just a moment on the matter of better utilization of these funds, these foreign currencies we hold.

One of our problems has been that we do not have a great deal of flexibility in the use of those currencies, partly because we use them only on the basis of dollar appropriations here, typically, and second, there are economic problems in the countries concerned about the rate at which they can be used there without having a strong inflationary influence there.

Some interesting ideas are being worked on. For example, in the case of Indian holdings, exploring the possibility of creating a semi-public foundation-type corporation that would be able to use some of those in ways which they have not been made available thus far.

I would like Mr. Bell, who has given a lot of thought to this, to comment on it, if I may.

Mr. BELL. Let me just say two or three things quickly, Senator.

EXCESSES IN LOCAL CURRENCIES

First of all, we quite agree with you, we want every possible use made of foreign currencies ahead of dollars. Our flat rule throughout, not only throughout AID but throughout the executive branch of the Government, is if we can use a rupee or a baht or a peso that we own, it must be used first before the use of any dollars. This has been increasingly effective.

At the present time we do not have local currencies excess to our needs except in eight countries, so that in every other country of the world where we have local currencies, we are using them effectively, all that we have in sight. These are the Treasury's decisions and judgments, not just mine, and, therefore, the problem you speak of, of having local currency that we do not have uses in sight for, is limited to eight countries only.

One of these, incidentally, Poland, that you speak of, we do have arrangements, a firm commitment, with the Poles that over a period of 10 years those zlotys will be converted into dollars, so we can see those all being converted, although not in the short run.

Senator SYMINGTON. In context, why can't we decide what the $499 million in Polish currency is to the total of the Polish currency?

Mr. BELL. That is a good question. I was surprised when you commented on it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can you furnish an answer?

Mr. BELL. Yes, I would be glad to.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES HOLDINGS OF POLISH CURRENCY

United States holdings of Polish currency are equavalent to 3 percent of the currency in circulation in Poland. As of the end of 1963, total currency in circulation in Poland was 33.2 billion zlotys. U.S. holdings, all of which were reserved for U.S. uses, amounted to 12.0 billion zlotys, equivalent to $499.1 million dollars.

FROZEN ASSETS

Mr. BELL. Now, in cases where we do have substantial excesses, India, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia, Israel, and three or four more, we decided when we sold the surplus agricultural commodities we could not ask the country to pay in dollars either immediately or under a deferred basis, because of the balance-of-payments problem that the country had. Therefore, we said, "We are willing to take for our agricultural commodities local currencies which we will not convert except within narrow limits by mutual agreement."

Therefore, it is not possible for us to use those excess currencies to buy things in those countries which we then apply to our needs in other countries. That would be the same thing as going back on our original agreement, which was that we would accept local currencies and not ask for dollars.

Therefore, as the Secretary said, we have what amounts to frozen assets, and we need to find ways of using them within the countries where they exist. We are searching very hard for uses, and the India Foundation, which——

The CHAIRMAN. However, the House, Mr. Bow told me yesterday, turned it down. They said they did not see why you could not convert rupees into sterling. I could not convince him.

Mr. BELL. Who was that?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Frank Bow. I called him about it, and he rejected it, and he says you can.

Mr. BELL. Certainly not.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyway, they disapproved of that proposal.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have been trying to work out an arrangement with India; haven't you?

Mr. BELL. On the foundation? Yes, sir. The Indians agree. The question is whether we can—we are talking with the various key Members of Congress, notably of the Agriculture Committees, on this matter.

Secretary RUSK. This matter gets caught up in many different kinds of things. Some look on it as part of that indirect financing that is not always popular at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue, but there is a problem as to whether we can use these currencies before some of them just shrivel away over time through their own inflationary processes. If we could make some present use of these currencies by some more flexible machinery, it would be of great advantage to us in putting them to work.

REQUIRE THE MONEY TO BE SPENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BELL. For the last several years, as this committee knows very well, we have insisted that the dollars that are appropriated to us by the Congress for foreign aid should be spent, with small exceptions, in the United States, for American goods and services, typically over 80 percent now, which we ship abroad.

In 1964 our gross outflow was about $400 million out of the $2 billion total expenditures. These are actual expenditure figures, not just commitments. During calendar 1964 there was a receipt of $150 million from prior aid, loan repayments and interest, so that our net outflow of dollars, as distinct from goods and services in calendar 1964, was reduced to $250 million. That is the best figure yet.

It is continuing to decline, and it does show we have reduced sharply the impact of the aid program on the balance of payments. It is not zero and it cannot be zero, but it is now quite a low figure, and it is getting lower.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, just one more point. I did not mention Israel because it is one of the smaller ones, it is $50,200,000, as against, for example, United Arab Republic, which is $261,600,000, over five times as much.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

COMPARISON TO THE BRITISH

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to make one final observation. Everybody has a reason for improvement in his own position, but the money still rolls out, and the unfavorable balance is not balanced.

One of the latest arguments is that while the British had to do this when they were the leading country in the world in the 19th century, it is only too bad that we have to do it in the 20th century. My only comment is that the only thing the British asked for was a fair advantage. We know the standard of living they kept in India in order to have a raw material setup for buying their own manufactured products, et cetera, all over the world.

The way we operate, I would say is about 180 degrees opposite to the way that the British did in the 19th century, because they really were worried about protecting their economy. It seems to me that we are now, as we manipulate our foreign aid into these soft international windows, we are, if anything, being less careful about our economy despite these tremendous new expenses, including, of course, the Great Society which the Senator from Pennsylvania referred to, that part of it—we are, it seems to me, being less careful about our economy rather than more. That will, as I see it, bring up a very serious situation, because I do not see how anybody can win another war. We could certainly lose, and will we have an economic catastrophe in a year.

I do not have any further comments. Mr. Chairman, I am through. I would appreciate any comments you might wish to make.

AID PROGRAMS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

Mr. BELL. May I make a comment on that, Mr. Chairman? I think the evidence we have so far is quite clear that the effect of

the economic aid programs since the end of World War II has definitely been advantageous to the American economy, and not disadvantageous.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not talking about the past. I am not talking about the Marshall Plan, I am talking about the last 5 to 10 years.

Mr. BELL. Right. But even our most recent examples, for example, Taiwan, which is, as you know, a currently very successful economy, and where our aid is coming to an end, is a larger market for American exports and a better place for American private investment overseas than it has ever been before.

It will continue to be, as Japan and Western Europe have been, a strong economy with which the United States economic relations will be growing and beneficial to us as well as to them. So that I think the current cases, like the past ones, look promising.

Now, we are a long way from home. The Indian economy, the Southeast Asian economy, they are all very weak economies at this stage, but there is no reason why in time, if they act sensibly, and we help through our aid, and so do others, that they cannot also become stronger economies which will be beneficial to us in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, do you have a question?

Senator CASE. I would like to reserve my time, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DISTURBING TRENDS IN VIETNAM

Mr. Secretary, I would like to make a couple of observations which you may wish to comment on, and then that will lead up to some questions. I hope the chairman will cut me off if he thinks I have gone too long.

As I see it, the situation is getting more and more critical in South Vietnam since I came to talk to you about it privately perhaps now 6 weeks ago. At that time you expressed the view that we had plenty of wiggle room. It seems to me we have got less and less wiggle room all the time and that we are really in grave danger of throwing Russia into the arms of China and having World War III, or, in the alternative, a kind of Korean war thrust reluctantly upon us. I would think that the principal but not the only danger of that would be if we were to continue to escalate the bombing and, in particular, if we were to hit the industrial installations in Hanoi and in Haiphong and Russian missile sites which are being set up.

There is another factor that disturbs me very much which, I think, has occurred since you and I talked, and that is what I would call the fatigue factor. I say this with the greatest of good will toward you, Mr. Secretary, and your associates, but it seems to me that in these times when the chips are down and decisions have to be made pretty quickly on matters critical to the safety of the American people and, indeed, of the world, it is a catastrophe to have you and your immediate associates virtually on the point of exhaustion day after day and night after night.

Now, I appreciate that this is not within your control, that the demands which are made upon you by higher authority make this something to which you cannot say "No," but I have some information as to the number of consecutive hours that you and Mr. McNamara, probably Mr. Bundy, no doubt others, have had to spend on these matters in the last several weeks. If there ever was a time when we needed clear heads and rested minds, with as much absence from immediate tension as is feasibly possible, this is it.

I hope you will carry that message back, which may in the end result in your getting a little more rest yourself. I know there is not very much you can do about it, but we just cannot afford in this kind of time to have decisions made by men on the verge of exhaustion.

Now, having delivered myself of that diatribe, may I suggest that my very grave fear is that we are on a collision course, that further escalation on our part will make it worse and not better. I agree with Senator Symington we do not bring people to their knees by this kind of tactical military bombing, and my own view is that if we step up the bombing, and if we get to the point where the possibility of nuclear weapons is involved, we are inevitably in World War III, and our Western civilization and our opponents' civilization is going to go down the drain with them.

OPEN TALKS WITH THE VIETCONG

Now, for my questions: I thought you made a splendid statement on the efforts you had made, and others have made, to get into contact looking to unconditional discussions.

It occurs to me that one test of greatness is the ability to admit mistakes. I do not think we Americans ought to be bound by the Chinese conception of face. My own view is, we made a great mistake when we started this bombing and that the events since we did it have indicated it. I think we made a mistake when we said categorically we would not talk to the Vietcong.

What I would like to ask you, as my first question, is, Is it, in your judgment, feasible, and, if not, why not, to stop the bombing and to indicate to Hanoi, stop the bombing for more than 4 or 5 days, and then not start it up again just when possibly it was becoming an effective peace weapon, as Senator Pell has suggested, stop the bombing and indicate privately and possibly publicly that we will be glad to talk to anybody that Hanoi wants to bring to the conference table, which would be unquestionably some representatives of the Vietcong, and sit down and discuss unconditionally not only our own terms, but those of the National Liberation Front?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I appreciate your solicitude about possible exhaustion of the people who are carrying heavy responsibilities. I think those who are carrying the constitutional and statutory responsibilities in these matters feel that there is no more important matter on which they can concentrate than these great issues of war and peace which we have confronting us on the Pacific Ocean area.

I do not, myself, believe that it has reached a point where judgments are affected. But I will accept gladly the view that if ways

could be found in which all of us could get a little more time off——

Senator CLARK. Or even sleep.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. That would be helpful.

I must say a good deal of our time is taken up in trying to correct things that are not so.

Senator CLARK. And possibly a great deal of time is taken up straightening out misconceptions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

[There was discussion off the record.]

BROADCAST ON THE CIA

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield to me? I have dictated to our chairman a letter to have shown to this committee, the NBC broadcast on our Central Intelligence Agency. I have received so much condemnation of our Government and its tactics on account of that picture, that I think it is essential that this committee see the picture to determine whether or not it was fair to the United States. This deals with what you are talking about.

I have seen you on television time and again trying to tell what the facts are in opposition to what has been represented to be the facts by NBC and CBS and others. I call it to the attention of the members who are here that I have written this letter requesting that at one of our meetings that whole picture be shown.

Pardon me for interrupting.

Senator CLARK. Could I get back, Mr. Secretary——

A MIDDLE GROUND ON BOMBING

Secretary RUSK. On your question, Senator, about the bombings, I do not want to anticipate the future on this sort of thing, but I do want to be sure you understand that the other side has been given many opportunities to indicate what else would stop if the bombing stops. Now, to stop the bombing and simply say, "Well, now, maybe we can have some peace," and extend it and extend it and extend it to a point where the other side recaptures a sanctuary and feels that can step up their efforts in South Vietnam definitely without any consequence to themselves, is not a very appealing thought to me.

Senator CLARK. I would agree with that. But there is a middle ground.

Secretary RUSK. That middle ground has been explored many, many times; many, many times.

Now, so far as Hanoi having anybody they want on their delegation at an international meeting, no one is going to see who is sitting behind the delegate.

Senator CLARK. But we have said, have we not, that we will not negotiate with the Vietcong?

Secretary RUSK. We have, and I do not see why that should be surprising. I am quite sure that the French Government is not going to negotiate with the Communist Party of France about the reconstruction of the French Government.

Senator CLARK. I am just suggesting, Mr. Secretary, that there are several ways of skinning a cat.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, but we have not even gotten the cat into the yard yet.

UNILATERALLY STOP THE BOMBING

Senator CLARK. Have we given a real try to a suggestion in terms of getting going a negotiation by making it clear, and if we do not want to lose public face, let us do it privately, that we will, and perhaps unilaterally, stop the bombing for maybe 2, maybe 3 weeks, and we will sit down and talk with anybody Hanoi wants to bring to the negotiating table and see whether that won't work?

Secretary RUSK. Those possibilities have been, are fully on the table. The other side is fully aware that we are interested in a peaceful settlement. If there were any indication from the other side that that is a door through which peaceful settlement could be reached, then that would be a major change in the present situation.

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you to complete your answer to my earlier question, which was interrupted because I was out of order and asked Senator Lausche to yield to me and then proceeded further than I should have, what are your views as to the Russian intentions?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to go off the record on that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

[There was discussion off the record.]

REPORTS BY CYRUS EATON

Senator CLARK. Do you put any credence in the reports brought back by Mr. Eaton in his interviews with Kosygin and Mikoyan? [3]

Secretary RUSK. I think that the fuller publication of the notes taken by Mr. Eaton put that into somewhat better context then did the first press reports. But the committee should know that these were the views expressed by Mr. Eaton to our Ambassador when he first arrived in Moscow before he saw Mr. Kosygin.

Senator CLARK. That may cast some doubt on his reliability, but——

Secretary RUSK. I would think an interview under those circumstances and the questions put by Mr. Eaton, given his point of view, would be likely to encourage and induce the kind of answers he got.

I must say that the Soviet Union has full opportunity to communicate with us directly on things that they wish to say. We do not look on this as any special message which they sent to us through Mr. Eaton.

Senator CLARK. Do you take it as a fair summary of your answer than that in your judgment the Soviets are not close to a decision to go to war?

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[3] On May 24, U.S. businessman Cyrus Eaton reported on his meetings with Soviet Premier [Aleksei] Kosygin and President Anastas Mikoyan, in which Kosygin had warned that the Soviet Union would have "no alternative but to fight" American forces if the bombing of North Vietnam did not cease.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I would not want to say that, because we do not know enough about what is being said by those gentlemen in the Kremlin to each other. I think this is a highly dangerous situation. I would not want to leave any comfort behind on that point.

Senator CLARK. I think it is, too.

Secretary RUSK. It is a dangerous situation.

HO CHI MINH IN CONTROL

Senator CLARK. In your opinion is Ho Chi Minh still in control of the Hanoi government?

Secretary RUSK. We think so, sir. We think that his actual participation in day-to-day affairs has been somewhat reduced and he seems to be taking somewhat less of a role than he did at one point, but I think there is no doubt that he is the overwhelming figure in North Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. To the extent that he is less important than he was before, has he been replaced by pro-Peiping people?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that is probably the case; yes, sir.

UNDULY OPTIMISTIC MILITARY REPORTS

Senator CLARK. Turning to the military situation, I was concerned, and I know the chairman and others were, too, that we have been getting in this committee an unduly optimistic view of the military situation in South Vietnam, particularly, I felt, the last time we had Ambassador Taylor here. I wonder if you can give us any helpful prognosis as to what we can look forward to from a military point of view with respect to military operations during the monsoon. In particular, is there, in your judgment, a serious danger that we will find the American and South Vietnamese forces pretty well holed up in the larger cities by the sea and fairly close to being under a state of siege?

Secretary RUSK. I do not, myself, believe that the South Vietnamese forces or our own forces are likely to be enclosed in pockets. I think the Vietcong does not show indication of having that kind of strength. I rather suspect——

Senator CLARK. Except perhaps at night.

Secretary RUSK. No, not even at night. Not even at night, when you look at the countryside as a whole.

I think you may indeed find during the monsoon season that Vietcong units of a battalion, two battalions, will take the initiative in particular localities, usually where they are faced with inferior forces. We still have not yet seen the Vietcong attempt to sustain themselves in a position for any prolonged period of time. In this most recent episode in which severe casualties were inflicted on both sides from accounts, the government reinforcements have been unable to make contact with the Vietcong when they arrive on the scene. The Vietcong struck, struck hard, and then went back into the hills.

I do not believe, myself, the Vietcong are going to be in a position to maintain a major position from the military point of view in the weeks ahead.

NORTH VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT INTO THE SOUTH

Senator CLARK. Does your information indicate the regular North Vietnamese army is being moved down battalion by battalion, regiment by regiment, until in the course of a couple of months we will find most of the North Vietnamese army actually engaged in supporting the Vietcong in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. We have confirmed publicly that there are—we have identified at least one battalion of regular North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator CLARK. In the light of the present political situation, is there any valid reason why North Vietnam would not be prepared to send its regular army down into South Vietnam under cover of infiltration, a few here, a few there, until gradually in the course of a couple of months you find most of their effective military forces committed?

Secretary RUSK. That is possible but their main forces are still in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

Senator CLARK. Yes, buy my question is, Is there any political reason why they should not move south during the monsoon?

Secretary RUSK. I think that depends upon what they think people here think about South Vietnam and what you gentleman around this table seem to think about South Vietnam. If they are convinced we are determined, sending their entire forces into South Vietnam will cause them very serious problems indeed.

Senator CLARK. Is there any discernible group within the South Vietnamese Government which might be called pressing for peace, disengagement, and a removal of the American influence?

Secretary RUSK. We do not know of groups other than the Vietcong themselves.

[Discussion off the record.]

SPENDING THE MONEY

Senator CLARK. I have one more question, and this is directed to Mr. Bell: In view of the military situation in Southeast Asia, do you think we can get this $89 million spent? In other words, can we get to the area where we need to spend it, in view of the military situation?

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes. All of these proposals that are before you that add up to this $89 million are specific actual opportunities that now exist. We have no difficulty reaching any of these areas.

Senator CLARK. Even in the Mekong Delta?

Mr. BELL. In the Mekong Delta in South Vietnam there is substantial movement, there are substantial areas which we can reach. One of these rural electric co-ops is planned for the area outside of the town of Long Xuyen in the southeast part of the delta. That was picked in part, Senator Clark, because it is an area in which the Vietcong are not active or have not been successfully active.

Senator CLARK. You are not concerned that if you set up an electrical installation, it will be destroyed overnight.

Mr. BELL. We do not expect that.

Senator CLARK. I am all through.

MR. EATON'S STATEMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, will you supply for the record a tabulation of the documentary evidence that you have that Mr. Eaton made his statement even before he saw Kosygin?

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry, I might have been mistaken on that. I did not say he made a statement before he saw Kosygin. I said the views he reflected were those he discussed with our Ambassador before he saw Mr. Kosygin.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see. That was a person-to-person talk.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is what your Ambassador reports to you.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have any further questions?

Senator PELL. I have a couple if I may.

DIFFICULTY IN GAINING A FREE ELECTION

Mr. Secretary, in comment on your point that the majority of nations support both our objectives in Vietnam and our role there, I must report that I came back as the U.S. representative on the Political Committee of NATO, and everybody supported our objectives in Vietnam; except for the Conservative Party representatives in Britain and the Dutch, I found myself defending our bombing in Vietnam. But this is my own experience I had there.

Would you say also that we would accept the results of elections, that it would be safe from the propaganda viewpoint to accept the results in South Vietnam or South and North Vietnam? It is my understanding that is the case.

Secretary RUSK. It is certainly true in South Vietnam. I do not see much prospect that you can get free elections in North Vietnam.

Senator PELL. Can you use it as a gambit?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; as a matter of fact, I might insert for the record here a brief summary of the recent local elections that have been held throughout South Vietnam within the last 10 days in those areas that are accessible to the government. There were many candidates. There was a good deal of public interest. The elections went in an orderly way. We did not see evidence—and we had a good many people around the countryside—we did not see evidence of malpractice at the polling booths and things of that sort. We were very much encouraged by the response to these local elections in the many provinces and the interest taken by the people in them.

But I will be glad to report on that. No, we have no concern about the effect of an election in South Vietnam.

[The information referred to follows:]

RECENT LOCAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Local elections were carried out successfully in South Vietnam on May 30 despite some opposition from the Communist Vietcong. Complete figures show that 3.4 million persons voted out of a total of 4.7 million who had registered. The total electorate, all Vietnamese men and women over the age of 18, is estimated at just under 7

million. This includes persons in areas under Vietcong control who were unable to register.

Throughout the country, 1,001 candidates contested the 471 seats on the municipal and provincial councils. All professions were represented among the winners. The polling went smoothly in nearly all cases, and there was no evidence of pressure or coercion upon the voters by the authorities. Local issues dominated the campaigning. The elected council members will supervise local administration with authority to investigate and make recommendations on the implementation of government program, the disbursing of funds, and the quality of services rendered to the people by local officials.

NEGOTIATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENTS

Senator PELL. Another point made—I hope I was correct in speaking without knowledge but from assumption—that we would accept at negotiations, as you pointed out and suggested to Senator Clark, the presence of Vietcong or anyone else who were there as part of a general group.

Secretary RUSK. Let me be clear on that, Senator. We believe that if there is a reconvening, say, of the Geneva conferences, this would be a reconvening of the governments who were participants in those Geneva conferences. Who sits with the various delegations is up to them. We are not going to inspect the credentials or pass judgment on credentials of people who sit behind particular chairs, but we believe negotiations have to be among governments.

Senator CLARK. Or in particular chairs.

AN ADDITION TO THE PRESENT BILL

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask before anyone leaves, is it your recommendation that this be added onto this bill which is supposed to come up tomorrow, be laid down? Do you recommend this be added to that as an amendment?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would say on that that the President hopes very much that this would be added to the present bill rather than do it in separate legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the reason I asked. I wondered if the committee would be willing to vote on it, because the bill is to come up tomorrow, be laid down tomorrow.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would object to action on this thing. It is a new situation, it is a new proposition. It was announced yesterday, and it has facets that I am not familiar with fully. There are geographic difficulties here. To embark on a program of this kind in a time of chaos down there, I have not satisfied myself that there are not other approaches in consideration of the emergency that exists down there, that it might not be better—I do not mind spending more money in Thailand, maybe some encouragement in Laos. We cannot get into Cambodia; they have kicked us out.

I mean there are just so many complications there, I think we ought to think about it just a little. In other words, I do not like for the administration to send a program of this kind over overnight and send word over, "Pass it out and pass it tomorrow." I just do not like it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not imperative we act today. This bill undoubtedly will be before the Senate for some days. We could act next week. I just wanted to see what the attitude of the committee

was. We will have an opportunity to pass upon it as a committee before that bill is disposed of, but I wanted to see what the attitude of the committee is.

Senator LAUSCHE. Someone said it will take a week before you get through with the foreign aid bill. You will have several days.

The CHAIRMAN. I was asking if this is what the attitude of the committee is. If they do not wish to vote today, there has been very little time to vote.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am prepared to vote.

Senator CLARK. I am prepared to vote.

Senator PELL. I am prepared to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to see what the feeling was before we left, what the feeling was.

ABDICATING THE SENATE'S RESPONSIBILITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you want to consider it, offer it as an amendment to the bill, I still am not willing to abdicate the responsibility of the Senate and subject myself to the overnight orders of the administration or any administration.

Secretary RUSK. Would it be possible for the committee to excuse me at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. We can act on it next Tuesday if we are disposed to do it. Think it over during the weekend. It is not absolutely necessary today in order to get it as an amendment.

Senator LAUSCHE. By that statement that I am willing to vote, I am not rejecting Hickenlooper's position that he may be justified in wanting a bit more time, but I think we will have a week.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the chances are probably more than 50 percent I will support it when I understand it and understand the pattern of the thing.

The CHAIRMAN. It is understandable.

Senator CASE. He thinks there is something more than a quantification.

Secretary RUSK. Did I use it?

Senator CASE. I do not know who used it, but you have it in your statement.

MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go, I want to make one observation. If you think now the monsoon is upon us, they are mounting a major effort, if this major effort is successful—of course, that is another matter—but you believe, and I am sure you do from what you said, it will not be successful in a major way. After this session is over and they fail, with the combination of this kind of a proposal in the background it might be persuasive upon them to be more reasonable and to agree to some kind of a truce or whatever you want to call it. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. I think it is very important to try to get everybody in Southeast Asia including, if I may say so, the people in North Vietnam to understand that there are things that are more important than the issues over which they are now fighting from their point of view, and if they would just let some

peace come to that part of the world, it may make a great deal of difference to the people in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. This is kind of a downpayment of our genuine interest in pursuing this proposal. It was not in your words.

Secretary RUSK. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I think it is true even today; in spite of the large military assistance we are putting in South Vietnam, our economic and social assistance is still larger in dollar amounts than military assistance, and this is not generally understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions before he has to leave? [No response.]

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone want to ask Mr. Bell more before he leaves? Go ahead, Senator Case.

BUILDING UP THE RESOURCES OF THE PEOPLE

Senator CASE. Along the line of comments and discussions we had when you were here on the regular authorization bill, I am a little confused. This seems so largely a matter of dumping in current aid rather than building up the resources and ability of the people in these areas to help themselves; that is, we are giving consumption goods in this $45 million in large part, and that is more than half of what we are putting. In addition to this, there are a lot of other things.

Mr. BELL. I think you may not have entered the room at the time I was describing the $45 million of imports, because I made the point very strongly that a large share of those imports are, in fact, investment imports and not consumption imports.

Senator CASE. That was the impression of your statement given.

Mr. BELL. I cited the fact that of the pending applications for import licenses in Saigon last week, the latest figures we had which total something in the fifties, $51 or $52 million, $30 million of that was for iron and steel, reinforcing bars, structural steel, this sort of thing, investment goods and not consumption goods. There is a very substantial effort, private effort, in Vietnam today that these goods will help to support to build industrial facilities, commercial facilities, transport facilities, and so on.

I do not wish to mislead you. A very substantial part of the imports we are putting into South Vietnam are, in fact, consumption goods, and there is no alternative to that as part of the support for the general military and nonmilitary effort that is being made there.

Senator CASE. I do not object to it, but it would seem to me we are not putting enough emphasis on the other side.

Mr. BELL. We are putting all the efforts we can think of, sir, and each of these sections of this proposal—the water development on the Mekong River and the tributaries, the health effort, the public works effort, the rural electrification effort, the agricultural effort, the feasibility studies for more transport and industrial facilities—all of these are designed to do exactly what you are talking about, to help the people of these areas increase their own confidence and ability to meet the problems that they themselves confront. The overall thrust of this, as we said earlier, is to not only help them to

do this in a direct sense but also to help them build toward a regional cooperative arrangement which would have political significance obviously, as well as economic and social significance.

So that our thrust is very strongly in exactly the direction that you are asking for.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NO FUNDS INTENDED FOR CAMBODIA

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, may I add also that, in reference to a point Senator Hickenlooper made a couple of minutes ago, none of the funds that are here involved are intended for Cambodia. However——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How are you going to operate in the Mekong Valley without Cambodia in cooperation?

Mr. BELL. Excuse me, sir. None of the funds that are here are for Cambodia, but it is quite true we are looking forward to further work in the Mekong basin, including work in Cambodia. So that problem does loom ahead of us, and it is our assumption that at an appropriate stage, if projects are proved out, and the Mekong regional organization moves in that direction, backed by the United Nations, and they have either the World Bank or the new Asian Development Bank, if that is their agent, we might put money up for some of the projects in Cambodia.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, Mr. Bell, I was told Mr. Eugene Black's representative went out there and made a very favorable impression, that Cambodia invited him to make Phnom Penh the headquarters of this whole development; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. They did, sir, and that is not a change of venue that we would look forward to. We do not think that is going to happen.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, though, as an indication of the attitude toward the bank of this development, as opposed to ours.

Mr. BELL. That is right. Cambodians have continued to participate in a forthright and sensible and appropriate manner in the existing Mekong River coordinating committee, which is a four-power group—Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos—in spite of the political difficulties between Laos and Thailand on the one hand and Cambodia on the other. This four-power committee on the Mekong River has continued to function and its functioning today quite effectively, just as you said.

JUST A DROP IN THE BUCKET

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I hope we can go into this in a little more detail, but it is late I can see. I am not particularly hostile, and I was not particularly hostile to the President's proposal that maybe we might eventually devote $1 billion down there if we could get some kind of a peaceful situation or climate. That is not the point. We have these vast river systems, the Mekong. We spent a lot of time on the Indus River and Jordan. But here we are embarking on a program of which $89 million in my judgment is just a drop in the bucket of what it is going to cost down there. It is a fantastic river. It is a fantastic river system there. And while I hope it is not, it smacks a little of political groping hysteria here at this moment, to send this over in one night and hope it is voted out

the next day, and we go on our merry way without knowing what we are doing or being prepared.

If I would support this, I would like to be prepared in my own mind to go ahead and support the further development of this thing at a future date. If it is just $89 million, it looks to me it is throwing it down the rathole unless there is some followup on this thing and we know what reasonably to expect and what over the long run we are going to have to do.

Mr. BELL. Could I say a word in response to that, sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. BELL. I entirely agree. It is our expectation that the following things will be happening: First, at this recent meeting of the Mekong River committee it was agreed, and this was a suggestion that we made, that the Mekong committee would expand its interest beyond simply works on the river itself. It would think some about the transport, education, and other aspects of regional development so that we look to the possibility that the Mekong committee, which has been effective, gradually becomes a stronger instrument for regional economic and social development.

THE ASIAN HIGHWAY

Second, there is, or there has been for some time, an effort under the U.N. to encourage construction of what they have called the Asian Highway, which is an international highway system that runs from Saigon and Kuala Lumpur, I guess, at the southeast end, all the way around through India and to Iran. They are thinking of undertaking more intensive effort to develop regional transportation projects of many sorts—rail, river, ocean, ports, roads, and so on. This is another step which we would anticipate happening in the future.

We have put money and are putting money into the improvement of the highways in this region. We have been fitting our individual projects generally to this overall concept of an overall international highway system, and we think that effort will be strengthened.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Third, and perhaps in some senses most important, there has been a series of moves in the last year or so looking toward the establishment of an Asian development bank. They had a committee of experts work on this, which has made a report. It has been given a preliminary examination within this government. It has been discussed at length with Gene Black, and it looks promising.

There will be a meeting in Bangkok in late June in which Mr. Black will be representing the United States. He is meeting today here in Washington, and they are going over the details of this, what kind of an organization for the bank would make sense so that the United States would not run the risk of putting money into an institution that would not be strongly managed, in which we might be seriously outvoted on some issues which we would regard as being of major principle, and so on.

Assuming the particulars of the bank looked proper and correct from our point of view, then that meeting in late June will prob-

ably take a long step toward specific agreement on the establishment of such a bank, which would not be limited, obviously, to Southeast Asia, but would be intended from the beginning as an instrument through which special funds and special activities in Southeast Asia might well be carried forward.

Now, in each of these ways, through the Mekong committee, the possibility of an Asian transportation committee, the probability of an Asian development bank, we are seeking to help establish regional organizations and institutions which will lead toward a stronger emphasis on economic and social progress and the political connotations of that along the lines that the chairman has stressed two or three times here this morning, as evidence of what we want to do in this part of the world.

So this, Senator Hickenlooper, is a partial response to your very legitimate and proper questions as to what lies beyond this particular request that is before us today.

BAIT TO STOP THE WAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no problem about realizing the force of the argument about these things, matters of this kind, in a reasonable, peaceful climate or atmosphere. But I do have some question in my mind about the real benefits of this specific thing that we are trying to do here, which is evidently put out as bait to try to stop the ruckus in South Vietnam.

I do not think it will do it. I do not think it will have a nickel's worth of effect, but may start something out there, I do not know. But anyway, I would like to know what we are going to do.

Mr. BELL. It has a significance, sir, not only in relation to South Vietnam but also Thailand and Laos. In Laos, of course, there is a divided country now, and in Thailand there is plainly the beginning of the kind of infiltration and subversion which years ago began in South Vietnam. This proposal that is here before you, and this general effort in that area, is also highly promising as one means of emphasizing this is the kind of progressive work, peaceful work, that we are interested in, and of providing a strong rallying point against the destructive activities of the people who are infiltrating.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I would hate to be fixing things up there for the Communists to take over.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I would like to have a little more peace.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the dilemma. I agree with you. If there was no war going on, it would be quite a different approach. But I do not agree that this could have no effect upon their attitude. If there is any hope whatever of reaching a truce of some kind, I mean you have only one chance, a rather rapid escalation which looks, if something is not done, it looks like it will lead to a war. I cannot help thinking of the Korean war, after long and bloody fighting we had a truce anyway, probably a truce we could have achieved in the beginning if we tried to.

WORTH TAKING A CHANCE

I do not know. The cost of this, even the whole thing compared to what you are spending in the military, is relatively small. I think if it has any value as of this time, its possible effect—no one can prove this—upon the course of the war is if it can turn the attention away from the rapid escalation that seems to me to be going on.

I was very disturbed by the fact that they are now able to shoot down our planes as they did two of them yesterday, and this country itself, if that continues, is going to demand, I suppose, as countries usually do, an all-out effort. They are not going to do that to us, and it seems to me it is worth taking a chance to try to avoid it. I do not know whether it will work or not. I do not know the final answers to any of these problems.

Mr. POATS. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary alluded to the notion that this Southeast Asia concept, as presently outlined by the President, is designed to set the framework for a more secure peace in that area. We are trying to describe to the people of the area and the underdeveloped countries the possibility of regional cooperation to which we commit the political and economic interests of countries outside the area, and to broaden the base of regional cooperation so that it involves countries of various political beliefs in an association that is useful to them all, to create a future there which will be more likely to assure the integrity of this area and survival against Chinese Communist pressure than is not foreseeable by the process of continuing to maintain excessive military forces in these small countries that cannot afford them.

We think the savings by that kind of regional scheme in the reduction of military forces alone could largely finance this billion dollars. We cannot say that with any confidence and absolute insurance. We do not know what history is going to unfold, but that is a possible assumption.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a possible one.

AN ALL-OUT WAR

If it does not have any effects and you have an all-out war, all these, perhaps, are out anyway. You are not going to spend a billion. If you have an all-out war, everything goes down the drain but pending that, it seems to me it is worth the effort to try to influence the course of action.

Mr. POATS. And even short of an all-out war if this kind of hostility continues in the area, obviously there is little that can be done beyond fringe things in secure areas. Major expenditures will have to be prolonged over a long period, not 2 years but 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have done so many of these things in these countries down there, I do not know how much more proof we have got to give.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very regretful we are involved in it at all, if you want to come down to it basically. I am sorry we ever had any thing to do with it, but that is all past. What do we do under these circumstances? It looks to me as we are headed for a war unless we turn the emphasis around and give hope to some other solution re-

gardless of how mistaken or right we have been in the past. That is what we are confronted with today.

Senator Pell.

MEDICAL AND SURGICAL TERMS

Senator PELL. I support this line of thought in this program. There are a couple of a very specific questions, to ask you. You are talking about medical and surgical teams. How much is the cost of each one of them roughly?

Mr. POATS. It depends on the team sir. For example, we have a military medical team. The AID cost would be simply the cost of the consumable drugs that they use and any repairs and improvements that have to be made on the permanent Vietnamese hospitals in which they operate. This varies from hospital to hospital depending on what is needed.

Senator PELL. A village united medical team, what would be a rough estimate per annum

Mr. POATS. I would simply have to give you an arithmetic divisions as a rough figure.

Mr. BELL. We can supply something better for the record if you would like.

Senator PELL. Would it be more than $100,000 per annum?

Mr. BELL. For medical and surgical teams that are in these provincial hospitals, yes, sir. But in these village teams certainly not that, much less, certainly a few thousand dollars. The village health center with a partially trained village person——

Senator PELL. No, no, I do not think I am communicating correctly. I am talking about the medical team where we have a doctor and couple of nurses to spend a year to try to change the public health habits of an area. Would that be 50 or——

Mr. POATS. The cost is $250,000 per team per year for the full-scale surgical teams and $50,000 for the medical teams which are comparable to the CARE-MEDICO teams.

Senator PELL. Here is the proposal I wanted to advance to you, and I do not know whether you considered it. I used to work with MEDICO Health, and the cost we used to estimate was $50,000 a unit. I have been struck by the fact MEDICO has been knocking at the doors of AID for 7 years and has never been able somehow to get through, yet the cost to the taxpayer would be a great deal less because they have in their files lists of doctors, sometimes retired, and nurses of a certain age who are willing to go abroad for $200 or $300 a month. They have done it.

EXAMPLE OF DR. DOOLEY

I remember in Laos the effect of Dr. Thomas Dooley had there. Originally we sent a unit in, and the Ambassador objected prior to election. Six months later he wanted a few more units, and we could not raise the money. Here the Government spends two or three times the money. Why can you not contract it out to MEDICO?

Mr. POATS. Senator, the last proposal we had from MEDICO a year ago, they proposed to recruit doctors who would be available for 30-day service.

Senator PELL. This is because——

Mr. POATS [continuing]. To be rotated out. We pay transportation out and back. They would be working there for 30 days and come back. We said that was excessively expensive because in addition to transportation costs, we have to provide all the medical——

Senator PELL. This is nothing along the lines of Dr. Dooley's organization concept. The organizational concept.

Mr. BELL. That we supported.

Senator PELL. Supported, but never gave money. Why cannot this organizational concept be revived, saving the taxpayers a lot of money?

Mr. BELL. There is a group now in Vietnam, Operation Concern. Dr. Turpin, who was in my office recently—you may know him—is doing something like this, and we are backing him as strongly as we can. We have arrangements now, which are—our attitude has changed, Senator, with respect to volunteers. We are not prepared to send them out for 30 days, but for 90 days it looks like it might pay, and a year or more, yes indeed.

MEETING WITH MEDICO

Senator PELL. Could I take the liberty of sending down to you somebody from MEDICO to talk to you, because they have had a rough reception from you.

Mr. POATS. We had a meeting day before yesterday with all interested volunteer groups in the medical field, and I believe MEDICO was represented. You may have seen references to AMA's volunteering to recruit, but actually it was broader by all these groups to attempt to recruit medical service people.

Senator PELL. Can I send him to Mr. Poats? Maybe they will get a happier reception. I was one of them who knocked.

Mr. POATS. Dr. Humphrey, the new chief of our medical services in Vietnam, will be here today and tomorrow and could see him while he is here.

AID PERSONNEL IN THE PROVINCES

Senator PELL. The second question I wanted to ask you—and maybe you can submit it for the record—that is, the percentage of your people who are based in the capital, as opposed to provincial provinces, in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. I checked that this morning. AID has some 750, roughly, persons in Vietnam now. Most of them either direct hire or on arrangements from other Government agencies, but perhaps 200 of them there on contract. Of the 750, about 370 are either—well, let me build it up. About 160 of them are stationed full time outside of Saigon, living in provincial and district towns, and 200 more spend more than one-half of their time outside of Saigon, which makes about 360 or very close to one-half of the total who spend more than one-half of their time outside of Saigon.

Now, I meant to say something about this earlier when Senator Clark implied that it would be very difficult to move in the countryside. It depends on the area. These men live all over South Vietnam. Generally speaking, we can base people in any of the 44 provincial capitals, and typically we have 2 or 3 people in each of the

provincial capitals. The extent to which they can move out into the countryside or the districts, towns, and the villages w vary, but all of them are active all the time in villages and hamlets in the countryside.

Senator PELL. Thank you. My hope was that the percentage in the provinces might become even larger.

CONSULTATION WITH OTHER NATIONS

The third question I had, and last one, you have been in consultation with other nations on the technical assistance program of the U.N.?

Mr. POATS. We are in touch with their representatives. We have been dealing with them on several ideas. They have a very slow budgeting procedure which makes it difficult to be quickly responsive to a situation like this. We talk to them now about a project and they may consider putting it in their budget next January to be considered for the following year.

Senator PELL. But the liaison group, when we were there, some of your people did not even know the names. Are they in touch, in communication?

Mr. POATS. The U.N. only established a permanent technical assistance representative there in the past 2 months——

Senator PELL. Several years ago they had one.

Mr. POATS. Not in Saigon; based in Cambodia.

Senator PELL. Maybe he was based in Cambodia.

LIKELIHOOD OF ADDITIONAL REQUESTS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bell. It has been a very instructive meeting. I personally—I do not know how the committee feels about it—feel some emphasis in this direction could possibly affect them if, as the Secretary says, they do not succeed in their current drive. I do not know whether it will or not, but I do not think you are risking too much in the effort anyway. It would not be entirely wasted.

Mr. BELL. We feel that way, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is because of our involvements—we would feel impelled to do this in any case. It might be an extra dividend in influencing their attitude. I think it is very appropriate at this time.

Thank you very much.

You have already stated you prefer this to be offered as an amendment to the current bill. There is an alternative if for any reason the committee does not wish to act in time for it, in conference. Since the open end is in conference, we could propose in conference that in place of the open end, since we do not have it, that this be substituted in its place and that might be acceptable to the House. Would it be acceptable to you?

Mr. BELL. We would hope that would not be the outcome, Mr. Chairman, because, as was indicated earlier, we do not—we do anticipate the possibility, almost the likelihood, of additional requirements during the coming fiscal year on the military side and the real possibility on the economic side.

The CHAIRMAN. On the military surely the $700 million you have ought to go a long ways toward meeting that.

Mr. BELL. None of that is for military aid. All of that is for the direct budget of the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. That is becoming a major part of the activities, is it not, in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Yes, it is; certainly it will provide, for example, for the construction of a lot of facilities in South Vietnam. My point is our case for a standby authorization is not disposed of by action on this particular request.

The CHAIRMAN. Plus the $700 million.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It should go some degree toward satisfying that, I would think.

Mr. BELL. It is a step, yes, sir; this is one of the things that——

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a minor step, is it?

Mr. BELL. No, indeed, I agree, this is one of the reasons that lay behind the initial proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Mr. BELL. If the committee is willing.

The CHAIRMAN. I will offer it as an amendment, but I was just anticipating that maybe they would feel it is too quick and has not had consideration. There would still be that possibility. Of course, I could offer it on my own, but it would be much better if the committee offers it as an amendment by the committee to the bill. We will try to do that. I am confident the bill will not be enacted before next Tuesday or Wednesday, so we will have time to consider it further, and it may be necessary for other members to have some further hearings, but I think it has been a good hearing.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee recessed.]

PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL AID FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA (MARKUP)

MONDAY, JUNE 7, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long of Louisiana, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The last meeting we had under consideration the proposal of the President's for $89 million in the Mekong Valley, primarily. I guess that is the way you would identify it. We agreed to let it go over until today and take some action on it. What is the will of the committee?

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I move approval of the request of the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion.

NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Senator, I don't think we have enough information on this whole thing. I don't know what this whole program is going to cost.

The Mekong Valley is a vast climatic area over there, and we probably will help them, but I certainly would like to know what kind of obligation we are assuming here—$89 million doesn't seem to be a great deal of money these days, and we are spending a lot more than that every few days in Southeast Asia now. So, it isn't a question of money, but I don't know what kind of a burden we are assuming here for the enlargement of this Mekong Valley.

I think it took us a year or so before we got into the support of the Indus Valley situation and the River Jordan Valley situation. We sent special delegations over there. We did this, that, and the other thing; we had plans and knew what it was going to cost. I don't know what we are getting into here overnight.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that Mr. Bell and Secretary Rusk made pretty clear exactly what this money was to go for. I have here the factsheet which was prepared by our staff in

connection with this. It is largely for the building of dams, electrical cooperatives, the increase in medical services, training for small-scale village projects, plus a substantial amount of commodity imports and agricultural developments and industrial expansion. I know those of us who were here that day asked some fairly searching questions about what the money was to be spent for.

I was particularly interested to know whether these projects could be taken on in light of the military situation. Mr. Bell was very clear they were. Most of them are in Laos and Thailand, although some of it is in South Vietnam, in areas where they said we weren't in a position to control the land. I thought that they made a good case.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS

The CHAIRMAN. I think it was clear from the statement that it isn't a question what we are taking on. We already are taking on the whole country, we are spending about $2 billion a year there presently. The main purpose of this, I think, is psychological, aside from the actual benefits; that is, some of this is now being done. The medical services are underway, and there would be an enlargement of it. The electric co-ops in South Vietnam is a new project, but it has been surveyed by the representatives of the national cooperative organization here in the United States, and they have recommended this. It is a well-known type of activity. I think it is fair to say that this move is to try to change the emphasis in the operation in Vietnam from one of purely military activities to more peaceful and constructive activities. It is part of the psychological warfare going on there to hopefully induce the South Vietnamese to be more sympathetic to our purposes and hopefully to have more of them to defect and to support the Government of South Vietnam.

It seems to me we are in a dilemma. Either we have to go further into all-out warfare or find some other alternative. It is somewhere between pulling out and going all out. This is the approach of it, and that is the purpose of it. This is a terrible situation and a very dangerous one, and I would like to see them change the emphasis in this direction, that it could possibly influence the outcome of the war there, possibly lead to some kind of peaceful settlement other than an all-out war. I think it is very clear what the objective is.

Whether or not it progresses and you get into a full-scale economic activity depends a lot on the war. If we get into an all-out war, of course, this is going down the drain, I think, but if we don't you have got to do something in this direction. We will reconstruct it; we spent a lot more than this annually in South Korea since the war, not to say anything about what we spent in the war itself.

CONTINGENT ON ENDING THE WAR

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, to carry out your suggestion, wouldn't it be proper to make this authorization contingent on the cessation of the war in North Vietnam? You can't pass them and buy them all the same day. That is what we are appearing to do.

You can't lick them, then offer to buy them. Isn't that the purpose of this?

The CHAIRMAN. In effect, it is to try to make the people in that area, particularly South Vietnam, but also in Cambodia and Laos and Thailand, feel that there is an alternative to an all-out war and that we are interested in the constructive side of these activities, and that if we could get a cessation of the hostilities, if we could even get a truce, then we could move more vigorously in this direction. Hopefully then they would settle down under a truce, if you could get it, to reconstruction, and the Vietcong would gradually evaporate.

I was impressed by one of the testimonies the other day by Mr. Lodge. He said he thought there wouldn't be any negotiation, someday the Vietcong would simply get tired of their continual fighting and quit fighting. This would be helpful, I think, in inducing them to get tired of fighting, and if we feel there is no hope open in that direction and don't think it is for anybody concerned——

Senator MANSFIELD. I think Mr. Lodge is a wishful thinker.

Senator AIKEN. I remember Mr. Lodge coming in 2 years ago and saying success was just around the corner and everything was lovely.

SIMILARITY TO THE PHILIPPINES

Senator SPARKMAN. In the Philippines there is some similarity between this proposed program and what Magsaysay put on in the Philippines to induce the Huks to quit fighting. A great many of them did quit fighting, and we did it to such an extent that it really disappeared.

The CHAIRMAN. This is really the course that the Philippine trouble settled? They did resettle them, land resettlement and technical assistance?

Senator SPARKMAN. Not exactly on all fours but similar.

The CHAIRMAN. Similar?

ESTIMATE $1 BILLION PROGRAM

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, the staff has three interesting questions on paying two of these staff members. I wonder if the answers to those are in the record, or have been made. The questions are very pertinent; I would like to have the answers.

The CHAIRMAN. I can supply part of it. I mean the Mekong Valley has been under study for, I think, 5 or 6 years. There is a committee on the Mekong Valley. They view it somewhat similar to TVA, and we are to pay a part of that. This has been in the future. This would be a downpayment in regard to that definitely—it is a big program.

Then——

Senator MUNDT. Payment on how much total payment?

The CHAIRMAN. The estimate, I forget, was it $1 billion? I think these estimates are purely estimates at this stage.

Senator CLARK. Yes, he said $1 billion about a month ago, the President did.

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't visualizing that we would pay all of it. It would be a consortium. The same way, the bank they are talking

about—Mr. Black came to see me last Friday. He is going out the end of this month, the 24th of this month to start a bank; that is, to negotiate on the way on which we are to take, he expects—this is purely off the record at this stage, because they are in the negotiating stage—20 percent. He believes he can get the Japanese, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Germans, and the British to make the rest of the contribution. There would be in the bank, somewhat like the Inter-American Development Bank, small contributions by the countries involved. That is something from Thailand. It is purely kind of a ceremonial contribution from the very poor ones, because we are already supplying such a large part of their funds, but they will make a small one, very much like the Inter-American Bank. It is a very small contribution by the Latin Americans, and we put up most of it.

In this bank, however, he says he is recommending that we put up no more than 20 percent, in contrast to about 90 or 95 percent in the Latin American Bank. He is going to attempt this. He feels that he can do it.

MOSTLY FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. I was interested, primarily, Mr. Chairman, in question No. 2, where the implication is that about half of this $89 million would be commodity imports and the other half is economic and social development.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. What I wanted to find out was whether these commodity imports are for the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese or just the South Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony was just the South Vietnamese.

Senator MUNDT. I think if we start feeding the North Vietnamese, to use a State Department phrase, it would be counterproductive; it would be discouraging rather than encouraging.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony is clear.

Senator LAUSCHE. The identification of the project puts them all in South Vietnam. I am certain of that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. Is the Mekong Valley all in South Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. The commodities.

Senator LAUSCHE. Partly in Thailand, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of the projects are in Laos and Thailand. The training for small-scale village projects, for example, is in Laos and Thailand.

Senator AIKEN. Electric generating equipment would be between Laos and Thailand, and the line there—motor vehicles would probably go to South Vietnam as they have been going for the last few years.

The CHAIRMAN. And the dam would be on the river in between.

LARGER AID PROGRAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, we had recently a request for $700 million for additional military.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was passed promptly, without any substantial argument at all or questioning. The President announced 2 months ago that he was going to propose this economic program for Southeast Asia, hopefully that there might be negotiations that would look forward to a peaceful settlement in which the entire peninsula, the whole of Southeast Asia, could be included. I believe he said at that time that that would call for about $1 billion and that under his plan other nations would be requested to join in. Isn't Gene Black organizing the group?

The CHAIRMAN. The Asian Bank?

Senator SPARKMAN. The Asian Bank, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That capital is contemplated to be $1 billion, of which we would not contribute more than $200 million.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would this $89 million be a part of this $200 million?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. But there is a starter of the general program that would be envisioned.

The CHAIRMAN. It is part of this, the Mekong Valley Dam is a part of the program which the bank will contend with.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is a big thing in this particular program.

The CHAIRMAN. The bank is a separate institution from this.

COMPARING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. The point I am making, though, is that we are asked here to make available $89 million to get this general program started, get the basis laid for it, as I see it. I don't see why we should have any more hesitancy over trying to develop something this way for $89 million than we had in making available to him almost immediately for military purposes $700 million.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I don't see there is any comparison there at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think there is.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, we are comparing dollars. It isn't a matter of dollars with me in this program at all—$89 million, that wouldn't bother me in the least. What I am concerned with is what kind of a burden we are taking on down here in this Mekong Valley business, and what kind of a camel is getting its head under the tent. I simply don't think we have enough finalized information on this thing. Now, $89 million doesn't bother me in the least. We vote 10 times that, as you say, without batting an eye, but we know what the limitations are—not the limitations, but we know what it is for.

For instance, you have $19 million for electric cooperatives in South Vietnam. I am very much for the REA. It has done a great deal for our State, but of all the places to put an REA, down in those swamps and sloughs in South Vietnam—I don't know how they could operate it. I think it would be much better to put REA's in Thailand where they have some kind of an organized society and rural area to benefit, but this is going to put $19 million in electrical cooperatives and if we are not careful it will sink in that mud.

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That muck, you know, goes about 140 feet deep down there in Saigon and Mekong Delta and so on.

Senator SPARKMAN. There are a great many organized towns and villages in South Vietnam that are solidly built. There is a lot of swampland down there that you could sink them in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you not willing to vote?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have a majority here.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to vote?

Senator MORSE. There is a lot of discussion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not for voting it out now.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman——

REDUCTION OF MILITARY AID

Senator MORSE. I am not going to forgo my remarks. I will say any time I want to say, at whatever length I want to say, the Senator from Ohio, and everybody else on the committee. I have a series of motions I want to make on this. I am going to move first that the military aid bill, the military aid item of the present bill, be reduced by $89 million—reduce it by whatever they want to, by $89 million, and transfer $89 million to the economic aid bill.

Senator CLARK. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MORSE. Sure, I'll yield.

Senator CLARK. Why don't you move to move the military aid program to where it was last year.

Senator MORSE. I am going to do that on the floor of the Senate. I tried to do it in committee, but you all voted me down.

Senator CLARK. We won the first time 10 to 8, and then the decision was reversed when about 6 proxies were brought in.

PARLIAMENTARY STRATEGY

Senator MORSE. It seems to me I am blocked in this parliamentary situation now. We have the foreign aid bill through this committee. I don't think it would be very proper for me to use parliamentary strategy that would amount to formal reconsideration on the amount you sent to the floor of the Senate, but it is quite proper for me—on the basis of the amount that you sent to the floor of the Senate, I will do everything I can to cut it further there—to suggest that not $89 million be added to this bill but that $89 million be taken off of the amount of military aid that you have recommended in the bill that you have got up there.

Senator CLARK. Would you yield further?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Don't you think as a matter of parliamentary strategy, and I am in accord with you that we would get further if we didn't try to tie the $89 million and cut back the military but make a separate motion——

Senator MORSE. I will vote for whatever I can vote for that will certainly not increase this amount by $89 million. But you see, I just don't see how you can look at this bill and escape the fact that you have got many times $89 million of shocking military waste in this bill. Pakistan, India, Turkey, what in the world you are pouring that amount of money——

Senator CHURCH. How can they fight the war if they don't get it from both sides?

Senator MORSE. Of course, they can't fight their war if we don't give it to them. You are quite right. I would cut the whole thing if I were doing it, but I only want to take out $89 million. I am going to leave it up to the defense establishments, the administration to decide whether or not they want to, where they want to cut the $89 million in military aid. But my motion, Mr. Chairman, is that we not add to this bill $89 million, but that we cut military aid by $89 million.

NOT KNOWING HOW THE MONEY WILL BE USED

The CHAIRMAN. I may say to the Senator from Oregon we had that fight here. On that occasion I voted with you; we carried the vote. It was purely an idle gesture. I was in favor of keeping it to last year—it was over $89 million—but we didn't have the votes.

You can make the motion on the floor. I don't know which motion you will make, but if it is comparable to the one you had here in the committee, I expect to support it, the one we carried at one stage. The Senator remembers what happened. What good does it do to do it here?

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, that amendment, that was mine, you will remember, and I had thought when the appropriate time came on the floor I would renew it.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember what happened on it.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, I remember very well what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be better kept at that level now in view of what happened subsequently than what we had then. But anyway that was done and voted. I think now the only orderly procedure is to vote this up or down.

Actually, you think this purpose is largely psychological, to try to get out of a very difficult situation which looks as if it is going to go into an all-out war. They said you appropriated $700 million for the military, and they said you know what you are going to do with it. I don't know what they are going to do with it. I don't know whether they are going to bomb Peking or not. They might.

Senator CLARK. They don't know either.

The CHAIRMAN. They just gave them the money. They don't say this was to be used for a specific military purpose. The military can do what they like.

They argue about REA's in a swamp. We have them all done in areas which used to be swamps in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. This area is no longer swampy, but it was at one time just as swampy as the Mekong Valley. It is nonsense to say you can't build an REA there. Those are some of the most profitable areas in the country in the deltas of the Mississippi, they are all over there. That is no argument. The REA has been out and recommended this can be done in these areas, the REA itself, that is our REA, they made the recommendations for it. Clyde Ellis and his colleagues went out.

LEAVE THE DECISION TO THE PRESIDENT

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid this is just another effort for the administration who got us in a mess over there to play it up before the whole world that the U.S. Senate is solidly behind anything the President wants to do. That being the case, I would like to revert to the proposal which I made once before, before this committee, when we restored the $115 million to the military. I suggested then that we put to the President's fund for him to use for either peace or war and leave the decision to him. I think that is what we should do now, to transfer this $89 million to the President's fund to be used for either bashing them or buying them, which is what he wants to do. If he can't do one, do the other. But I don't think—this committee didn't get the United States in the mess it is in over there, and I think the responsibility should be left where it belongs.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, if you do that you lose most of the psychological effect.

Senator AIKEN. I think it is time this committee did exert its authority and not just tag along all the time and do whatever they ask us to do when we know some of the time they are dead wrong.

Senator CHURCH. But, George, we don't assert our authority by putting it in the contingency fund, where the President can do anything he wants.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is you want to turn the emphasis on the nonmilitary activity, that is what this says much more than anything. You have said the $700 million and everything we have done indicates that we think the military solution is the only thing that can get us out of there.

Senator AIKEN. May I ask—while they are planning to spend $90 million to start and $1 billion eventually in Southeast Asia, they are cutting off the school lunch programs for Mexico, which is a country which really tries to be friendly to us.

Senator MORSE. I want to speak very, very briefly. I want to get a vote.

Senator AIKEN. I can't vote for this.

THE PRESIDENT CREATED THIS SITUATION

Senator MORSE. I want to speak very briefly about the parliamentary situation.

I do not agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that our choice here this morning is to vote this up or down. The President has created this situation in this committee. He is asking for $89 million more for a foreign aid bill over and above what we have already acted on and sent to the floor of the Senate. He has drawn the issue. I think we have a duty now to decide whether or not we want to give him $89 million more or whether we want to take back $89 million somewhere else in the bill, like proposed military aid, and substitute this $89 million in economic aid. That is my motion.

It keeps the figure the same. It authorizes him to spend it for economic aid, but is says to him, "At the same time, you have to save $89 million on military aid somewhere else in the world." That is a pretty clear issue, that is voting it up or down, and that is my motion.

THE SITUATION IS CRITICAL

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I think this would be a most inappropriate time to follow the course that is being suggested here. The situation is critical. The world will look upon what we do as reflective of our firmness and our conviction that we cannot again weaken our position in Southeast Asia.

I think the Communists in Hanoi would look with pleasure upon this proposal that we reduce the military appropriation. We would be doing exactly what they hoped we should do, let the world know that we are not supporting the alleged correctness of our position in Southeast Asia, and I am not willing to join in such a proclamation being made. That is what the effect of it would be, proclaiming to the world that we believe the administration is wrong. When I say that, I want to emphasize that I have disagreed with the administration probably more often than three quarters of the Senators on the floor, and for that reason, I will not support this motion. I will vote for the granting of the $89 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready for the Senator from Oregon's motion?

RUSSIAN PLANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator MORSE. One more comment, Mr. Chairman. I want the record to show what my opinion is as to what is bothering the President. I think you can see it in his speeches all weekend between the lines. I think the President knows Russia is leaving him. I think the President knows Russia is going to take him on in Asia, and I think this is a psychological move. I think the President is greatly disturbed as to what is happening to his policy in Asia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where does the Senator have his information that Russia is going to depart from him?

Senator MORSE. What our intelligence reports are already giving us, that Russia is already moving into North Vietnam. She is not going to move stuff into North Vietnam to have it blown up. She is going to move it in to defend it, take us on.

Senator LAUSCHE. Cyrus Eaton made that statement.

Senator MORSE. That isn't the basis of my statement. And I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that we had better save the President from himself and start doing it. My position will be one of the starts. I am going to ask for a rollcall vote on my motion.

NOT A BLANKET APPROVAL

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, if this request is favorably considered by this committee, can we put it in our report that it is not to be taken as blanket approval of whatever the President wants to do over there in any way?

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is all right.

Senator AIKEN. And not be taken as a commitment, because I know they will interpret it as they please.

Can't we write it into the report in such a way that it cannot be played up around the world as a blanket endorsement of everything?

The CHAIRMAN. Of everything?

TO MAKE DEMOCRACY A BETTER DEAL

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me if we are going to vote this, we ought to vote that we approve of what the President proposes to do with this money. I don't see why we should reduce, if we are going to vote that way, I don't see why we should reduce the effect of it by going quibbling and finding fault with something else.

I know some people don't agree with what the President is doing in Vietnam, but I do say he has got a tough situation on his hands over there, and every time we indicate that we perhaps are not with him all the way and we are not backing him, it makes it just a lot tougher on him. It is played up and written up in all these Communist capitals, and they tend to use that as an indication if they can just keep the pressure on us we will collapse after a while. It seems to me if we are going to vote it, if we have any doubt what they plan to do with it, we ought to investigate it more closely. Frankly, as far as I am concerned, it is clear on the face of it the kind of thing he has in mind here, and I am prepared to vote for it.

I may vote for some cuts on foreign aid, but this is not tied up with this request. The President says he wants to try to make democracy a better deal or at least the form of government they have out there is better backing than what they have.

But I think this ought to stand on its own merits and vote it up or down.

Senator AIKEN. Will this be added to the foreign aid bill if approved?

SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT IN VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. I merely want to say I agree with what Russell said. I strongly favored the proposal on the Mekong Delta that the President first made in his Johns Hopkins address. I wouldn't want a vote of mine here on this issue to be interpreted as a failure to support him in that aspect of his program in Vietnam. I do intend, when the matter comes to the floor, to reintroduce my amendment cutting military assistance because I know that can be done without affecting Vietnam in anyway at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. I don't approve of building up the military organizations of Pakistan, India, and Turkey and Greece to help them fight wars with each other. I don't approve of it. I don't think it makes any sense for the United States of America. And if anyone wants to say that is failure to support the President in Vietnam, they are misinterpreting the facts totally, so I am going to press my amendment on the floor but I am going to vote for this proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we carry on?

TAKE FUNDS FROM FOREIGN AID BILL

Senator SYMINGTON. As I mentioned to you, I don't want to be in a position of undercutting the President's position in South Vietnam with Americans fighting out there, I agree with the Senator from Louisiana. I could vote if there was some problem and to

some extent following the theories of the Senator from Idaho, I would like to vote that it is the sense of the committee if it could that this $89 million come out of the aid program setup, to do it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Stuart, that can be done on the floor in the way that Frank says, but I think it spoils or it lessens the psychological impact if we vote it up or down.

Senator SYMINGTON. As the chairman knows, I am worried about the balance-of-payments problem and have been for some time.

The CHAIRMAN. The problem is on the floor.

Senator AIKEN. What is the need of this committee taking any action whatsoever on this? Why can't it be offered as an amendment on the floor unless the President intends to use it as proving blanket endorsement of this committee for whatever he sees fit to do. Why do we have to act on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Judging from what has been said here, it isn't blanket. I don't expect it to be unanimous. I expect it to be divided, and that will show it is.

Senator AIKEN. What is the motion?

The CHAIRMAN. The motion at present is the Senator from Oregon's, to take this out of the military appropriation.

Senator LAUSCHE. $89 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we veto it?

ECONOMIC AID ONLY

Senator MORSE. I say this, Mr. Chairman, most respectfully in reply to Russell and Frank. My motion approves of this economic aid to Vietnam. My motion doesn't take a dime away from the President as far as his military operations are concerned in Vietnam. What my motion says is we are opposed to adding another $89 million to the President's foreign aid bill that has already gone to the floor of the Senate.

This doesn't indicate any lack of confidence in the President. You already have given your vote of confidence to the President in Vietnam, and I have given him my vote showing a complete lack of confidence in him in Vietnam, but they are separate and distinct. I ask for a rollcall vote on my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. George, don't leave. Why can't we vote on this one way or the other?

Mr. Clerk, call the roll.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I have been trying to get the floor for 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from South Dakota.

Senator MUNDT. If we are going to vote this out——

Senator AIKEN. What are we voting on?

The CHAIRMAN. The vote now is on the Senator from Oregon's motion.

WE ARE NOT TRAINING THE PEOPLE

Senator MUNDT. I know if we are going to vote out the amendment, I certainly don't want to vote it out with this implication in our staff memorandum that we are going to limit the aid to small villages, to the areas where we are not fighting a war, instead of

putting it mostly where we are fighting a war, as Cabot Lodge says we are losing it because we are not training the people in the vital elements of civil government. Training small villages in Laos and Thailand, we should be training them primarily in South Vietnam, that is where we are weak and where the difficulty is, and I don't want to be voting for something which seems to indicate we don't even know where the war is being fought.

I would like to see something in the report specifically stating that primarily it should go to South Vietnam so far as the training of villagers are concerned. This is why Cabot Lodge says we are losing it. There is where the difficulty is. The basis of information before us is they are not even included.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, even if Wayne Morse's amendment carries, there is nothing to stop you or some other member of the committee offering the $89 million on the floor as an administration amendment. I just wonder what we are voting on.

DEFEAT OF SENATOR MORSE'S MOTION

The CHAIRMAN. We are voting by the action of the committee, it is approved by the committee. This is what we vote on always. It is not necessarily unanimous. You don't have to vote for it. Can we vote on it?

Senator MORSE. I am ready to vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Call the roll.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator SPARKMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mansfield.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Morse.
Senator MORSE. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Long.
Senator LONG. No
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Gore. Mr. Lausche.
Senator LAUSCHE. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Church.
Senator CLARK. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Dodd.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Clark.
Senator CLARK. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Pell.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. McCarthy.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Hickenlooper. Mr. Aiken.
Senator AIKEN. Present.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Carlson. Mr. Williams.
Senator WILLIAMS. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mundt.
Senator MUNDT. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. The vote on this is 11 nays and 3 ayes.

POSTPONE COMMITTEE ACTION

Senator MORSE. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am about to make another motion. In view of the facts that the foreign aid bill is already before the Senate, it seems to me that the appropriate place for any amendments to that bill is not from this committee but to the floor of the Senate. If the administration wants to add money to that bill, then let the spokesman or the spokesmen on the floor of the Senate support such an amendment and, therefore, I move that this matter as far as this committee is concerned be indefinitely postponed.
The CHAIRMAN. Clerk, call the roll.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator SPARKMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mansfield.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Morse.
Senator MORSE. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Long.
Senator LONG. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Gore.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Lausche.
Senator LAUSCHE. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Church.
Senator CLARK. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Dodd.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Clark.
Senator CLARK. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Pell.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. McCarthy.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Hickenlooper. Mr. Aiken.
Senator AIKEN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Carlson. Mr. Williams.
Senator WILLIAMS. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mundt.
Senator MUNDT. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Case.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Case would want to vote no. I have his proxy which indicates that he favors granting the President's request for $89 million.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. The vote on this motion is 13 nays and 4 ayes.

The CHAIRMAN. It reverts to the Clark motion.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mansfield.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Morse.
Senator MORSE. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Long.
Senator LONG. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Gore.
The CHAIRMAN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Lausche.
Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Church.
Senator CLARK. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Dodd.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Clark.
Senator CLARK. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Pell.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. McCarthy.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Hickenlooper. Mr. Aiken.
Senator AIKEN. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Carlson. Mr. Williams.
Senator WILLIAMS. No.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mundt.
Senator MUNDT. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Vote on the motion——
Senator AIKEN. Case wants to vote aye on that one.
I still don't see——
The CHAIRMAN. What is the vote.
Mr. ST. CLAIRE. 13 yeas, 4 nays. The motion is carried.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Hickenlooper is against it, but I don't know whether he wants to be recorded or not.
Senator SPARKMAN. He said he wasn't sure.
Senator MORSE. I think you ought to call him.
Senator MUNDT. I think he would have voted to postpone it.

[The chairman laid before the committee the bill (S. 1760), to authorize the acceptance of a settlement of certain indebtedness of Greece to the United States, and to authorize the use of the payments resulting from the settlement for a cultural and educational exchange program. Senator Sparkman moved the bill be reported, and the clerk called the roll. The members responded as follows:

Yeas	Nays
Senator Sparkman	Senator Morse

Senator Mansfield (proxy)
Senator Long
Senator Gore (proxy)
Senator Lausche
Senator Church (proxy)
Senator Symington
Senator Dodd (proxy)
Senator Clark
Senator Pell (proxy)
Senator McCarthy (proxy)
Senator Aiken
Senator Mundt
The Chairman

[So the motion was agreed to, 14 to 1. Senator Williams passed.

[The chairman laid before the committee the bill (S. 1742), to authorize the U.S. Government to agree to amendments to the articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation.

[The clerk called the roll, and the members responded as follows:

Yeas	Nays
Senator Sparkman	
Senator Mansfield (proxy)	
Senator Morse	
Senator Long	
Senator Gore (proxy)	
Senator Lausche	
Senator Church (proxy)	
Senator Symington	
Senator Dodd (proxy)	
Senator Clark	
Senator Pell (proxy)	
Senator McCarthy (proxy)	
Senator Aiken	
Senator Williams	
Senator Mundt	
Senator Case (proxy)	
The Chairman	

[So the motion was agreed to, 17 yeas, 0 nays.]

LATIN AMERICAN HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further to come before the committee, Mr. Clerk? Do we have a meeting tomorrow?

Mr. MARCY. We have no meeting scheduled tomorrow. None have been scheduled unless we get into the Dominican problem.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff is negotiating with representatives of the Department to set up some hearings on the Dominican Republic.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, I want to say as chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee that I strongly endorse the suggestion I understand that was made in my absence the other day that this committee proceed with some hearings on American policy in Latin America. If the committee doesn't want to do it, then I am going to ask permission that my subcommittee

conduct such hearings, because there is growing up in this country and there is more intense criticism of this committee if we don't proceed to make a record, as we did in the Bay of Pigs matter, an executive record and put in the safe. But I certainly think—I understand that you have sent a letter down and have raised some of these problems and that the committee has not as yet decided to go ahead with a hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee did decide to have hearings. They have already requested the Department to make arrangements to have certain people we have named and some others.

Senator MORSE. You have decided to have hearings. I thought that was in limbo.

Senator CLARK. Executive hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Executive hearings. I wanted to—we can start off with Bennett, with Martin and Mann and Vaughn and Bundy and so on. We don't confine it to that.

Senator MORSE. I am all for that, and I prefer to have full hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. We have already sent the letter down on June 2.

Senator MORSE. Let the record show I think it should be executive to begin with, but I may move to open them up.

The CHAIRMAN. We can determine that at the will of the committee.

Senator MORSE. I think if you are going to have hearings and if you really dig into it, you will be shocked at the record the United States has made in Latin America; just shocked by it.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was adjourned.]

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The instability of the civilian government in South Vietnam was further highlighted on June 12 by the collapse of the fourth government since the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. Premier Phan Huy Quat resigned and was replaced—to the dismay of American officials—by the flamboyant Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu assumed the post of commander in chief. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy later described the Ky-Thieu leadership as "absolutely the bottom of the barrel."]

FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, jointly with the Committee on Armed Services, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present from the Committee on Foreign Relations: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, and Case; from the Committee on Armed Services: Senators Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, Young, McIntyre, Saltonstall, and Thurmond.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the committee come to order? It is 9 o'clock. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have our Ambassador to South Vietnam.

I wonder, Mr. Ambassador—I understand your time is a little short. Could you make a brief initial statement and allow the members to have opportunities for a few questions?

I suggest we each limit ourselves to 5 minutes on the first round. If there is time left, we will go a second round.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator STENNIS. We appreciate being here, too—the Armed Services Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have the Armed Services Committee. The General's time is short, and I understand that it would be impossible to go to both.

Senator STENNIS. We are delighted with the invitation. We are here with pleasure.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am very happy to have a chance to appear before you this morning. I also appreciate the courtesy of the two committees meeting at the same time. I thought it might help if I summarized the high points of events

that have taken place in the last 2 months. It is almost exactly 2 months ago that I appeared before you gentlemen.

Dividing the comments into two general areas, the political and the military situation, in spite of the fact that the two are so intertwined they are virtually inseparable, I will lead off first with some comments on the political situation.

ADVANTAGES OF THE QUAT GOVERNMENT

When I was here in April, the Quat government had been in power for about 2 weeks. I summarized then what seemed to be the advantages and the favorable auguries which appeared at the time of the entrance of Quat into power. He had several clear advantages.

First, he had the advantage of the early bloom of the so-called Rolling Thunder bombing program against the north, which had had a very favorable impact in South Vietnam. While obviously he didn't get the credit for it, he necessarily gained some benefits from it.

He was clearly the beneficiary of the coup, attempted coup, which had taken place on February 19, in that it ended in the expulsion of General Khanh, who had been the great troublemaker among the generals.

Third, he came in with a clear blessing of the Buddhists, who had been the principal opponents of the previous Huong administration, and the demonstration of the Buddhist Institute had been largely instrumental in bringing down that government. Quat also had good intentions. He was saying the right things. He obviously intended to do many things which were entirely consistent with and favorable to American policy.

Of course he had certain disadvantages which did not immediately appear, although they could be deduced from the initial situation. Since we came in with the clear blessing of the Buddhists, necessarily he was watched with great suspicion by the Catholics and particularly by the refugee northern Catholics, who are violently anti-Communist but also are equally fanatical in the defense of their religion and in their fears and apprehensions of Buddhism.

He still had the problem of his generals, in spite of the departure of Khanh. The generals had been in politics virtually since the overthrow of the Diem regime in November 1963. So, he had the problem of getting them back to their military knitting and moving more and more toward a true civil government.

Finally, he had the so-called southerners, the sudistes. As you know, regionalism is extremely strong in South Vietnam. A man is clearly identified as being a northerner, a centrist, or a southerner. A northerner, of course, comes from North Vietnam, from the old Tonkin area. The center is the Hue-Da Nang area, which is the old Annamite area. The south is the Saigon delta, the old Cochin China of the French administration.

Quat is a northerner. Hence, he was watched very closely in particular to see whether he was going to favor his own regional brethren or whether he would steer an impartial course.

NEED TO OVERHAUL THE GOVERNMENT

With those advantages and disadvantages, Quat started his government and did quite well for the first 2 months. In fact, he was doing quite well until about 4 weeks ago. He discovered very early, however, that he had weak ministers. This was because of the fact he had tried to assign the ministries in terms of representation of regions and religions—necessarily he got some qualified only by their origin but without ability to be ministers. Hence, he decided after about 2 months that he needed to overhaul his government in order to improve its efficiency and also to give better representation to the southerners who were already complaining.

It was that action of trying to eliminate some of his ministers and fill some vacancies which caused the so-called constitutional issue which has arisen and is still unresolved. This constitutional issue is really an issue between Quat, the Prime Minister, and Mr. [Phan Khac] Suu, who is the Chief of State.

The government is based upon a very poorly drafted document, the so-called charter, which is vague in language in some respects and also omits many important provisions. One omission, or lack of clarity, affects the right of the Prime Minister to change his ministers. We would say, I think, most reasonable people would, that it is implicit in the responsibility of being Prime Minister that one can hire and fire his immediate colleagues upon whose performance the success of his Prime Ministership depends.

OPPOSITION TO QUAT

Quat made this assumption and soon found that it was violently challenged by Suu, who refused to sign the necessary papers for the change of the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Economy. Simultaneously, those elements who had been dissatisfied with Quat at the outset and whose dissatisfaction had been growing, but rather silently, without a vocal expression, came out and aligned themselves behind Suu, taking his side on the constitutional issue. So that we have today Suu backed by the northern Catholics, to some extent by the southern Catholics, and to a large extent by the southern politicians, opposing Quat, the Prime Minister, on this issue, who is supported generally by his military people and certainly by the Buddhists, particularly the strong element of the Buddhist Institute.

When I left Saigon last Sunday, I thought this was on the track. We had reached a verbal agreement, in the presence of witnesses, with Mr. Suu, which would have resulted in an amicable and a fair way of settling the issue. By the time I got to Washington, I found Suu had disavowed it and is still holding his line that the procedure he insists upon must be followed.

Meanwhile, the attitude of the generals has been very important and I would say very encouraging. They have resisted being drawn back into the political arena. They have quoted the things they had been told by Quat, and, of course, by many of us Americans who also have urged them to keep out of politics and stay with the military. They have quoted what we have said to them about the need for keeping the military out of politics. Hence, although they supported Quat, they said, "We will not come out publicly for you or

intervene unless requested." Quat initially declined to do that, because he didn't want to undo the good work he had done in putting the generals in their proper place.

QUAT'S APPEAL TO THE MILITARY

Now, faced with this last refusal of Suu to compromise, I gather from the cables since I left, Quat has appealed to the military to come in and mediate. Just what mediating is going to mean, we don't know. It can mean anything from throwing the entire government out and taking over as a military dictatorship, which would be the extreme on one side, to the least possible action which might be effective, which would simply be to tell Mr. Suu that the generals are tired of this nonsense and he better mend his ways quickly or something will happen. Suu is a timid man and I suspect an action such as the latter would probably succeed.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS

Meanwhile, in spite of this turmoil, a very important event took place a week ago Sunday, elections were held throughout all of South Vietnam where the writ of the government runs. In many areas where we would have suspected that the Vietcong were strong enough to prevent the elections—these were local elections for the so-called municipal councils and for provincial councils—yet the result of the election numberwise I thought was very encouraging.

It was estimated that roughly 7 million voters would qualify. The only real qualification was to be 18 years or older. Of those 7 million estimated eligible to vote, something like two-thirds registered.

Now, to register takes courage. That means to indicate that one is loyal to the government and intends to participate in the election. Two-thirds of the eligible voters in the country registered. We would have expected about one-half, based on previous statistics. Of those who registered, 72 percent voted, which is a pretty good voting record, especially in a country where female suffrage has virtually been unknown, but they were eligible to vote in these elections.

The elections went off quickly, efficiently, and, as I say, with a better turnout than most of us expected.

So much for the political situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if we could ask some questions now.

THE MILITARY FRONT

General TAYLOR. I suspect by questions you will get into the military situation very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would like to.

General TAYLOR. May I make a statement on the military situation?

The CHAIRMAN. You may make a short one. I know the members would like to ask questions.

Go ahead.

General TAYLOR. On the military front, most of the 2 months which have just transpired were very quiet. The VC, since the so-

called Tet Holiday, were lying low, obviously preparing for the monsoon offensive. Intelligence gave us indications of movements of VC units, but as always the intelligence was very general in nature. Nonetheless we expected an offensive and we got an offensive.

The first battle, I would say, was the Quang Ngai battle, now about 2 weeks old. We have had a number of ambushes, a number of surprise attacks since. This is a pattern which has been followed in previous years. However, I should suspect this year it is going to be a maximum effort, assisted by the reinforcements which have been brought in from North Vietnam.

On our side, we have increased our forces in South Vietnam during this last period. When I was here before, there were only two battalions of Marines which had been landed. At the present time, there are seven battalions of Marines in the Da Nang area. There are two airborne battalions and a total military strength in South Vietnam of a little over 50,000.

Plans are now in process of completion for introducing a force including four additional battalions with an additional strength of around 18,000, which will include not only the four battalions, but also certain logistic elements, so that our strength will be approaching something over 70,000. The role and mission of these forces, as you know—this has been a subject of press debate, I understand, the last 2 days—the White House statement, I think, is everything that I could say on the subject of the general mission.

EXPANSION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

The forces of South Vietnam have been expanding during the last 2 months, according to the plan which I explained to this committee. However, the expansion has not been as rapid as I had hoped. While recruitment has been up and volunteering has been up, desertions since Tet have remained high. The rate still runs in the regular forces around 13 per 1,000. We are working hard at bringing desertion under control.

Losses are heavy. These have been hard battles which have been fought and the losses have been very high on both sides. The VC has taken a beating; so have the forces of South Vietnam.

So, the problem of adequate military manpower which I commented on is very much still with us and will be throughout the rest of this calendar year.

In summary, I would say that the battle is joined now for the monsoon offensive, and the monsoon weather runs from now until about October. It will be restrictive on military operations, but will not stop them. It will be restrictive particularly in the delta area, from Saigon south, and also in the highlands area, running from Saigon north paralleling the Cambodian frontier. In these areas it will rain hard once or twice a day. There will be breaks, however, in the rain. Air operations will be slowed, but they will not be stopped.

So, I would say simply that the monsoon season is going to be an important one. There is going to be heavy fighting. However, the air will not be neutralized to the extent suggested by the comments in the press.

Mr. Chairman, I think those are the highlights I wanted to report to you. I would be very happy to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

For the benefit of those who came in late, we agreed to limit our first round to 5 minutes of questions, so that as many as possible can have an opportunity to ask at least one or two questions. If there is any time left, we will go around a second time.

NEED FOR ADDITIONAL TRIPS

General, I understand according to the press and other reports that you are here to review our policies there. It is suggested that 300,000 troops are anticipated to be necessary to control the situation. Could you tell us about our plans in that connection?

General TAYLOR. First, I would say that there has been no more of a policy review this time than on any other occasion. Every time I come back we go over the entire front of our political and military activities. So, I would not underline the importance of this period.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you say whether or not it is a policy now to expand the forces of whatever are deemed necessary to an all-out effort?

General TAYLOR. The only forces that are approved beyond those present are the ones I indicated. Four battalions and a total numerical addition of about 18,000.

The CHAIRMAN. No decision or request has been made for an additional 150,000?

General TAYLOR. Has a request been made?

That is one of the figures which has been considered. Among a number of packages talked about.

AN ALL-OUT POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. I am not so interested in precise numbers as whether the policy is now to go all out to save the situation militarily?

General TAYLOR. I would certainly expect us to do whatever is necesary, but what is necessary at this time has been defined only as the addition of 4 battalions and 18,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Would this include bombing of Hanoi and Peking?

General TAYLOR. That is not planned at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. At the present time. But it is not excluded as a possibility?

General TAYLOR. I would never eliminate anything as a possibility. It certainly is not a part of our plans.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at is the decision in your mind is that we are there to do whatever is necessary to stay there, to win the military victory?

General TAYLOR. I would describe in more specific terms what we are doing as keeping pressure on the north by means of the bombing program and, at the same time, reversing the downward trend in the military operations in the south.

I personally am convinced we will never get Hanoi in the frame of mind to terminate this aggression against South Vietnam unless

we are successful both in hurting in the north and at the same time eliminating any hope on the part of the Hanoi authorities that they can take over in the south.

GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S COMMAND

The CHAIRMAN. Is General Westmoreland now in charge of the military operations?

General TAYLOR. He is the senior commander; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the whole operation?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir—air and ground.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean combined forces of South Vietnam and our own.

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not. What is the controlling body of the total effort? Is he just a member of a joint chiefs?

General TAYLOR. It is the Government of South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that government—does it really function?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Not as well as I would like but it is very much in business, and also very much makes the decisions which are the broad policy decisions of the conduct of the war.

EVERYTHING ENDS IN NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. It wouldn't be fair to say, then, this is our war?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, we are very much in it, but it is not our war.

The CHAIRMAN. When does it become our war?

General TAYLOR. When we take command.

The CHAIRMAN. What I was trying to get in a minute or two is what you foresee as what I call the overall policy, aside from the details, if we are now determined to go all out, even to the point of a land war with China—if this is necessary to win.

General TAYLOR. I would not be qualified to say that is our policy, because I don't know that it is. All I know is that we are now putting in a force in order to fend off the monsoon offensive, at least to stalemate it, so that by the end of this period Hanoi will not have won any decisive victories in the south, and meanwhile we will continue to hurt Hanoi in the north.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you foresee as the ultimate outcome, assuming we achieve that purpose? How do we finally end up in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. We will have to negotiate. We will have to have a negotiation. Everything always ends in a negotiation of some sort, but a negotiation under favorable terms, I would hope.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

SOUTH VIETNAM'S WAR

Senator STENNIS. General, you speak of the 70,000 and then the 150,000 as being at least kicked about even now, and you speak of the idea of taking over command. Isn't the only thing left to do, if we are going to be effective, is just to go on in and take over command?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I don't think so, Senator. I think it is so important that this be South Vietnam's war, as it is today. When they win in the end——

Senator STENNIS. But is there a chance to win through them?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. You think so?

General TAYLOR. I think so.

Senator STENNIS. You say there is an inadequacy there of manpower, adequate manpower is lacking—the Vietnamese troops. You mean there is inadequate manpower just to hold their own?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, to swing the pendulum back. It is the old question of the need for very substantial superiority in guerrilla warfare, because one battalion of theirs has mobility of action, has the initiative, can move from A to B and strike B where we have only one battalion, yet we could have 10 other battalions someplace out of the range, away from the battlefield, which would be useless.

MUST BE SUCCESSFUL TO NEGOTIATE

Senator STENNIS. It just looks to me from this end that in spite of the fine effort on your part, our military, and everyone else, that this thing has been losing and there is nothing left to do except to take over, even though I realize that is a loss itself, to lose the symbol, at least, of going through this other government.

General TAYLOR. We have never yet, Senator, felt that any military action was not being taken by the Vietnamese which we thought should be. In other words, our advice and counsel, in effect, have accomplished what we want.

Senator STENNIS. I know. But to be effective—I don't see how—now, you have got to be successful to a degree before you can negotiate effectively; isn't that so?

General TAYLOR. That is right, to be a success in the north and a success in the south, I would think, before these tough leaders we are dealing with will come to the table in a frame of mind favorable to a settlement which we would take.

Senator STENNIS. I would just rather see, as I see it, to just go on and take over. The American people are asking more and more questions, the uncertainty of things. We mustn't weaken here, and I believe we will weaken here if we don't come out and take this over.

AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE FORCES

General TAYLOR. I would just point out, to show the relative effort, American versus Vietnamese, in terms of people, there are 582—at the present time there are 510,000 armed soldiers—soldiers and paramilitary under arms fighting today. We will have 70,000, of whom about 18,000 are combat types.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that include the naval forces?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, this is regular forces—255,000, regional forces 105,000, popular forces 150,000, a total of about 510,000.

Senator STENNIS. The 70,000 does not include our naval forces?.

General TAYLOR. These are Vietnamese figures only for the regular and paramilitary forces. That is against our figure of 70,000 I have been talking about.

Senator STENNIS. Does that 70,000 on our side—is that our men?.

General TAYLOR. It includes the Navy actually assigned in South Vietnam. The Seventh Fleet, of course, is giving support up and down the coast. I don't count those.

Senator STENNIS. My time is up. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long.

EFFICIENCY OF REGIONAL FORCES

Senator LONG. Would you repeat those figures, the force that the Vietnamese have in there?

General TAYLOR. May 15—255,000 for regular army forces; 105,000, the so-called regional forces which are really forces that operate at a provincial level; 150,000 popular forces, the local guards at the hamlet and village level. A total of 510,000.

Senator LONG. What sort of efficiency do you rate to those regional and popular forces?

General TAYLOR. They are the ones that really take the casualties. They are the ones that are closest to the enemy. They are not as well trained, not as well equipped as the regular forces. They get about 5 weeks of training. The regional forces are trained on a company basis, the popular forces on a platoon basis. Necessarily their effectiveness is in the order I indicated regular forces, regional, and popular forces.

I must say some of the popular forces in the defense of their own villages many times put up very good fights. On the other hand, they are the source of most lost weapons. They are the ones that get jumped and overwhelmed. So that many of the times you read about defeats, the people that have been defeated have been only the popular forces in the villages.

FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE

Senator LONG. An article in this morning's Post states to the effect that the Vietcong prisoners just don't understand why the government forces don't take more offensive actions, particularly after an ambush operation or something of that sort. The general tenor of the article was that Vietcong prisoners, on interrogation, can't understand why the government forces don't take more offensive action against them after they make an ambush or strike and go back to regroup. They say sometimes it is as much as 4 months between the time that they strike someplace and the time they go back and strike again and that the government gives them sanctuary at night and doesn't seem to take the offensive after they strike in an ambush.

General TAYLOR. I think you would be impressed—I am sorry I don't have figures—how many government-initiated offensive actions take place per week or per month. There are literally hundreds per week and thousands per month.

The trouble is intelligence. There has always been a serious problem in finding out where the enemy is and striking him in time. They are very clever in the use of terrain, concealment. And it is

still very difficult to get the peasants to give information in those areas under VC control.

The question was why not more offensive operations on the part of the government. I would say the government forces are very offensive in the sense they are moving out constantly, trying to find the VC. Unfortunately, they will make contact once out of, say, 10 times.

The real failure is intelligence—intelligence is hard to come by, because the enemy is very skillful. They know how to use the terrain, how to use night movement. And, most of all, the peasants are still afraid to give information in those areas where Vietcong forces are strong, because they lose their lives if they do. It is as simple as that.

CROP DESTRUCTION

Senator LONG. This article also says that about one-third of the Vietcong is employed in raising rice and producing food to support their operation in South Vietnam. It raises a question to me—why don't we just put weed killer on it, so it won't produce food for them?

General TAYLOR. There is a certain amount of crop destruction in those areas which are clearly Vietcong controlled. On the other hand, the delta, for example, is such a rich country, it is just one vast rice paddy. It is virtually impossible to control food as was done, for example, in Malaya.

In the mountains, where the rice is not grown, they still have tapioca, which grows wild and makes a very good dish. It has not a good taste, but it is thoroughly nutritious. So that food control has been almost impossible in this particular setting.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General—thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONSTANT CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT

General, just two questions. One of the great weaknesses it seems to me—is there a real will to win by the South Vietnamese Government?

General TAYLOR. I would say definitely yes, Senator. More than the government, there is on the part of the people. They have been willing to carry a war for 10 years and are still willing to carry it. There is not the élan that you would like to find, but there is the patient endurance of a people that have suffered long and are prepared to suffer even longer.

Senator SALTONSTALL. If that is true, and I hope it is, why do they put up with this constant change of civilian government? It seems to me every time we read—it depresses me, I know, to see this row in the civilian government. They cannot get leadership.

General TAYLOR. It worries me, too, sir. I assure you I have more headaches in the political field than I do in the military. This is not a fault of the people in the country who really bear the brunt of the war. I thought that was your reference.

In the cities, in Saigon primarily, there are the political-minded citizens. If one of them would explain to you, he would probably say—he is a middle-aged man—that he had never had a chance to

engage in public life, to contribute anything to the political development of his country until November 1, 1963. Up to that time, he was under foreign control or he was under the very strong domination of the Diem regime. When that regime was overthrown, the lid was taken off, and every citizen who had any political ambitions immediately became a politician in his own right.

FRAGMENTATION AND LOCALISM

That has explained to some degree the turbulence in Saigon, which has been aided and abetted by the localism which I mentioned before, which leads these politicians to form into many small fragments, cells, representing sometimes religions, sometimes races, sometimes, more frequently, regions of the country. So, instead of falling naturally into a team, as we would hope, in time of war, we have fragmentation and localism.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And it is going to keep on?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid this is something that only experience and maturity will eventually eliminate. We are fortunate in having Quat, a good man, and several good ministers. We are fortunate now in getting the army behind Quat. So that as long as that combination remains, I would not expect Quat to be overthrown. On the other hand, we will continue to have the sniping at the government, the internal feuding which certainly makes for ineffectiveness.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, one more question, if I have time.

NOT SEEKING TO WIDEN THE WAR

General, you said keep it a South Vietnamese war.

I think that the great criticism—one great criticism—if we are in this thing, why shouldn't we bomb Hanoi, to put it accurately, why should we allow these Russian planes to get in and why should we allow the Russians to put up the antimissile, antiaircraft weapons? Can we keep it a South Vietnamese war and win?

General TAYLOR. I think we certainly should exhaust all possibilities before we shift into an entirely different gear. Obviously, it is highly desirable that we settle this as North Vietnam versus South Vietnam. No one I know of in his right mind wants to widen this war deliberately. Nobody is proposing anything deliberately to that end.

The present hope is that the leaders in Hanoi, not wishing to become puppets of the Chinese, bitterly disliking the Chinese, unable to get much practical help from the Soviets, will some day decide that their national interest is on the side of a reasonable settlement. Our task is to create the situation which will bring about that frame of mind, and everything we are doing is directed to that purpose.

I don't see how anyone can argue with the intention. You may be skeptical about our ability to do so, but as a principle, I don't see how it can be attacked.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Ambassador, your last remark about the hope that they will seek a reasonable settlement—what does your information show they consider as a reasonable settlement? Do they consider that South Vietnam is going to invade North Vietnam and conquer them? Or what is their purpose? They have been let alone.

General TAYLOR. Of course, their present intent, which they have not changed, is to absorb South Vietnam into North Vietnam in a single Communist state. That is what Ho Chi Minh decided was his objective in 1954. He hasn't changed it a bit.

We would like to change the picture to convince him he cannot do this without paying a price way beyond anything it might be worth and that he has a greater national advantage in retaining North Vietnam as a Communist state, if he wants it that way, but as a reasonably good citizen of Southeast Asia, an area which could then move forward in prosperity and with reasonable political stability.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as the Communist philosophy is concerned, stability is not the prime purpose, is it? It is the prevalence of international communism.

General TAYLOR. That is true.

A TITO ANALOGY

However, we don't think that the North Vietnamese—of course, we have many North Vietnamese in South Vietnam who should be able to interpret their psychology reasonably well—we would doubt that Ho Chi Minh would see any merit in the communization of all Southeast Asia because it would be necessarily a Chinese communization. He very clearly does not want to be a part of a Chinese bloc controlled by Peking. So, I think we have more of a Tito analogy in the Ho Chi Minh situation than the case of a local satellite being willing to be absorbed into the Chinese controlled Communist state.

RECIPROCAL GUERRILLA WARFARE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The rumors, of course, are perhaps not as thick in this country as they were in South Vietnam, but they are still quite numerous as to the reason why the South Vietnamese are not as vigorous in defending their own country, or let's say as adept as defending their own area, as the North Vietnamese are vigorous in attacking them. In other words, I am merely asking the question: Why can't the South Vietnamese give the North Vietnamese just as much trouble in the jungle as the North Vietnamese give the South? That is on their own dunghill.

General TAYLOR. You mean a reciprocal kind of guerrilla warfare? That has been tried, but tried too late. The Communist apparatus in South Vietnam, the Vietcong apparatus, was laid in 1954 and very cleverly developed for years, without ever being surfaced, without anyone being really aware of what was taking place. By the time South Vietnam realized that it was under subversive attack and thought of trying to do the reverse in North Vietnam, a police state had been established. We made these efforts, but I must say they have not paid off particularly well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is one of the mysteries to me, this attitude of—the vigor of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong as against the lack of success of the South Vietnamese. They have had their successes, yes. But the fact is that the Vietcong are still operating, perhaps not at will, but they are operating with great facility in South Vietnam. They have been able to concentrate their troops recently, apparently, and they keep hammering away down there. I don't know what would happen if the South Vietnamese alone attempted to subvert the North Vietnamese.

General TAYLOR. Well, by the nature——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They would not get very far?

General TAYLOR [continuing]. By the nature of a guerrilla war, the guerrillas have the initiative. I suppose you would say the criminals seem to be more energetic than the police. They are the ones that have the initiative of action. So, I would not agree in principle the North Vietnamese are more energetic or better fighters than the South Vietnamese.

THE MANPOWER RATIO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the criminal usually assumes the initiative. We have certain situations in this country now where the initiative has been assumed by certain people. But just like here, we find a lack of vigor in stopping this monkey business in this country. And I don't know what the situation is there, but I think the history of the situation is—I hate to revive old history, which has its bad side—but I think in the Philippines, at the time we had our troubles down there, we didn't start to get anyplace until we really went after them.

General TAYLOR. I can assure you they are really going after them, Senator, in South Vietnam. The question is finding them.

Also, I would point out the manpower ratio. The present combat advantage, numerical advantage of the government forces over the Vietcong is only around 4 to 1. I don't know of any guerrilla campaign where the government has undertaken to fight successfully without 10 to 1. Fortunately, we are giving mobility to our forces in South Vietnam, by helicopters and by aviation, which allows us to do many things which haven't been done before.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One more question.

I think my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, one more.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just one more question.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY AFTER DIEM'S ASSASSINATION

You mentioned the fact that after Diem was eliminated down there, which I personally think was one of the biggest catastrophes that ever happened in South Vietnam—but it didn't seem to bother us too much—anyway, after his elimination, a lot of people became politically minded.

Was it politically minded or that certain leaders wanted to get their hands on the boodle bag?

General TAYLOR. I would say the fact that restraints were removed and people were encouraged and allowed to engage in politi-

cal activity which had been strongly suppressed or restrained under the Diem regime.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

All I can do is—the information I have, I guess, is rumor, but it has been rumored, of course, immediately the attraction of loot in South Vietnam became very important with a lot of these people, to see who could get the most the quickest down there after the Diem regime went down the drain.

General TAYLOR. I would not——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it was personal ambition on the part of these people.

General TAYLOR. I could not confirm that, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize, Senator Mansfield. I didn't see you.

Senator MANSFIELD. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson.

STRENGTH OF THE VIETCONG

Senator JACKSON. General, I wonder if you could give us the relative strength. You mentioned the Vietnamese forces. I think it would be well if you would follow through and indicate what has happed with the VC's and to what extent the North Vietnamese regular forces, which are alleged to have come into the south, are in the picture.

General TAYLOR. It is very hard to have too great confidence in our relative figures, just because we are never quite sure what the strength of the VC is. There is always a wide range of possible error. But we know that the relative strength of government forces to Vietnamese forces has gone down in an unfavorable sense since about January 1964. The figures then, our estimate then of our advantage was a little over 5 to 1. Now we would say it is a little under 4 to 1.

Now, that is based on intelligence of infiltration which is always late. In other words, we verify that a unit is in the country and we find it entered 6 months or a year before.

Senator JACKSON. Is there that much of a lag?

General TAYLOR. There can be.

Senator JACKSON. That can be pretty dangerous.

General TAYLOR. It is just inherent in the business. But in the last 6 to 8 months we have had very clear indications of a very large number of North Vietnamese individuals coming down. They come down in large units, a hundred or more, from the north. They are men who have had military service in the north, have never been in the south before. Sometimes they come directly out of North Vietnamese units. Sometimes they have done their military service and are recalled for the purpose.

LACED WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE

But the prisoners we take in the first and second corps, a very high percentage of these are mingled in the units which originally were South Vietnamese but now are very heavily laced with these North Vietnamese, to the point that many times they are the majority.

In addition to that, we have finally become convinced that tactical units, formed tactical units, have come into the north of South Vietnam. We actually have a hard case of only one battalion that we could prove before you distinguished lawyers of the committee. However, I have a very strong feeling that about a division is now in North Vietnam, of which this battalion is one unit.

Senator JACKSON. In South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. In South Vietnam, excuse me.

There are further indications which are very tenuous—and I would not have any strong feeling of probability—that another division is in Laos, moving slowly down into this area. We just don't know for sure.

Senator JACKSON. What size division?

General TAYLOR. Three regiments of three battalions. Their battalions are running around 600 men.

Senator CLARK. Regiments or battalions?

General TAYLOR. A battalion is running around 600 men. Three battalions in a regiment, three regiments in a division.

Senator LONG. You say a division is on its way down?

General TAYLOR. I would say that we know a battalion of a division is in South Vietnam. We have strong collateral indication that the other two regiments are also present. Hence, we would say a divison is probably in South Vietnam.

Senator LONG. A division of ours is somewhere between 15,000 and 18,000.

How many is their division?

General TAYLOR. When we think in terms of battalions, 1,800 per regiment, and 3 regiments—5,400—and some overhead. Around 7,000 something of that order.

FILLING THE GAP

Senator JACKSON. Now, at what point do we fill the gap here? In other words, I take it that you cannot afford to permit the ratio which is now 4 to 1 to go much below that and still be able to do the job. Is that a fair statement?

General TAYLOR. That is a fair statement; yes.

Senator JACKSON. So if the Vietnamese are not able to recruit and to increase their forces, we will have to fill the gap until they can?

General TAYLOR. Of course, we are working very hard at raising additional Vietnamese forces. Recruitment and induction are good. What we are concentrating on now is controlling desertion. So that I would hope that in the coming months we can do better. The curve of increased strength will turn upward.

However, you are quite right in suggesting that the reason, the justification for American forces in South Vietnam is to a large degree closing this kind of gap. We close it by taking over and defending certain key places where their troops are now disposed and, to a greater extent, controlling areas peripheral thereto.

THE MONTAGNARD SITUATION

Senator JACKSON. Is the Montagnard situation improving any?

General TAYLOR. It is about static.

Senator JACKSON. Do they still have their hostility toward the South Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. Yes, this is centuries old. The Quat government, again, is showing enlightenment in its dealing with the Montagnards, but because of its political problems has not been very effective in carrying out the program.

GETTING THE FULL STORY IN THE PRESS

Senator JACKSON. There is one thing that impresses me, General. We read in the press about the catastrophes over here, but somehow or another we don't get the full story of the actions that are taking place throughout Vietnam. It is these single incidents, I think, that tends to distort.

General TAYLOR. I agree with you.

Senator JACKSON. I don't know what the answer is.

General TAYLOR. We certainly make every effort in releasing information to our press—we have a very large and very aggressive press in South Vietnam—to lay everything out, the victories and the defeats, and to make available transportation to the battlefields when necessary.

Senator JACKSON. The Australians have a battalion, or will have.

General TAYLOR. They will have.

Senator JACKSON. Where will they be? And will they be in active areas?

General TAYLOR. They will be brigaded initially at least with the airborne brigade, which has only two battalions, one in the Bien Hoa Airfield, alongside of it, and the other at Vung Tau. I think the Australian battalion, the last word I had was it will go into the Bien Hoa area, brigaded with the airborne brigade.

Senator JACKSON. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

RATIO BETWEEN FORCES OF VIETCONG AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator GORE. Mr. Ambassador, I would like you to repeat, if you would, the ratio, or rather, the accuracy or inaccuracy of my understanding. I understood you to say that as of January—what date did you use?

General TAYLOR. January 1964.

Senator GORE. January 1964—the ratio of South Vietnamese forces over the Vietcong was more than 4 to 1.

General TAYLOR. A little more than 5 to 1, and it has dropped by May 1965, last month, to a little less than 4 to 1.

Senator GORE. Would you break that down and tell us whether that is a result of an increase in the Vietcong or a decrease in the South Vietnamese, or both.

General TAYLOR. The first. The Vietnamese forces have increased throughout this period, but the verified infiltrated units and individuals, plus local recruiting, accounts for the increase in Vietcong strength.

Senator CLARK. Vietcong strength?

General TAYLOR. Vietcong strength; yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Would you give us the Vietcong strength in January 1964?

General TAYLOR. I don't have it, I don't believe. I would be able to get it for you. I simply have the ratios here.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE STRENGTH

Senator GORE. Would you give me the South Vietnamese strength as of January 1964?

General TAYLOR. I only have the figures of today, of 510,000, which I gave at the outset.

Senator GORE. Would you know whether that is lesser or greater?

General TAYLOR. If I had a sliderule, I could, of course, tell you what the Vietcong relative strength is.

Generally speaking, the Vietcong strength today is in the mainline units, that is, in the hard core units. The last agreed figure was about 42,000, and that is a couple of months old. It is something over that now—say 45,000, someplace in that area. In addition to that, they have the guerrilla forces which really correspond to the regional forces and popular forces of South Vietnam. The strength there runs from 80,000 to 100,000. No one really knows how much it is. So that the total strength at most, then, would be 145,000, something in that area.

Now, in addition to that, they are able to recruit porters on a short-time basis, irregulars of various types can be brought in, are frequently used in engagements—sometimes the inhabitants of a nearby village are just impressed into service to carry ammunition, let's say, bring up food and water, and then they dissipate. So, there is a wide range for variation in any accurate head count.

Senator GORE. Well, ratios, like percentages, can be very misleading.

General TAYLOR. That is true. I would not put too much stress on this ratio I have been using. But it is suggestive.

Senator GORE. What I was trying to get at is whether—No. 1, whether the South Vietnamese forces had been reduced.

General TAYLOR. No, sir, that is easily answered. The South Vietnamese forces have constantly gone up. On the other hand, the VC have also gone up and, relatively speaking, at a greater rate.

Senator GORE. That gets to the point that I wanted to get at.

EFFECT OF THE AIR BOMBARDMENT

What effect do you think the air bombardment of North Vietnam has had?

General TAYLOR. I think it has had the effect which was intended, as I understood the intent. There were three purposes, in my mind at least, and I believe generally in the mind of those who supported the program.

The first was to restrain or limit infiltration. No one that I have ever spoken to suggests that this would stop infiltration, but at least it would make it more difficult. As one looks at the effect of the air bombardment on the communications, railroads, bridges, highways, and so forth, in South Vietnam also over in Laos as well——

Senator CLARK. You meant North Vietnam, didn't you?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I am sorry—North Vietnam—certainly one is convinced that this has had an effect. Now, you can argue whether this has reduced it 50 or 20 or 70 percent. I just don't know. But it has had an effect on infiltration, as it was intended to.

Second, it was to have an effect on morale. The South Vietnamese were discouraged because they were suffering and the enemy was not receiving licks in return. Hence, the morale effect, positive in the south, negative in the north, was a strong argument in favor. And I would say that that also has been accomplished.

Senator GORE. You mean it has had an effect on the north?

General TAYLOR. A very clear effect in the south. We have indirect indications that it has negative effect, if you want to put it that way, in the north. Obviously, it would, since the pattern of life in half the country has changed drastically

THE WILL OF THE LEADERS

The third area is one which was highly important in my judgment, but one which you cannot weigh, the effect of all this on the will of the leaders in Hanoi—the fact that they would see a progressive loss in their own country, the suggestion of worse to come as the bombing pattern expanded slowly but inexorably toward the north, would at some point convince these people that it is to their interest to change the pattern of their behavior. That change has not taken place yet, but obviously it is inevitable that this bombing has had an effect in that direction.

So, I would say on all three points, in my judgment, this has been a very worthwhile thing. I personally feel it has done as much as could be expected in the time available.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, your time is up.

Senator Aiken.

NO NEED TO DECLARE WAR

Senator AIKEN. General, assuming that it becomes necessary or desirable for the United States to assume command in South Vietnam, would it then be possible to maintain the strength of the Vietnamese armed forces or such morale as may exist among the people?

General TAYLOR. I would see no benefit in our taking command. The government itself must raise and support forces, just as our Government raises and supports forces. We cannot do it for them.

Senator AIKEN. That is right. So, in that event it would be out of order for us to declare war on anyone?

General TAYLOR. I certainly see no reason or advantage.

Senator AIKEN. Assuming that we should take over command—and I suppose it is possible that we might some day—what would our objectives be then?

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't know, Senator, because I am against taking over command. It seems to me it is a step backward.

Senator AIKEN. That is all right.

THE ARMY CONTROLS THE GOVERNMENT

I suppose you have given thought to the possibility, with the frequent changes in the Vietnames government, that we might some-

time get a government which would soften its position towards the Vietcong—possibly even go so far as to say, "We are sick of all this, and we think we better get together."

Have you thought of such a contingency? Is there even a remote possibility that that could happen?

General TAYLOR. It is conceivable, but I cannot view it as a possibility for the simple reason that the army is completely committed to destroy the Vietcong, and the army in the long run controls the country, controls the government. Any government that showed any tendency toward neutralism or willingness to compromise directly with the Vietcong would be thrown out.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, do we really work under their command and put our forces at their disposal?

General TAYLOR. The relationship of General Westmoreland to the high command is purely one of advice. Now, that is true all the way down the line, all the advisors we have down to the battalion. But certainly at the top, a man like Westmoreland is highly respected, and anything he has suggested of substance has always been done. The same is true of a corps advisor, who would be an experienced colonel. If he is the picked man and we see that he is, he very quickly establishes a very strong bond between himself and the corps commander.

Senator AIKEN. You referred to the effect of the bombing on North Vietnam. I think Cabot Lodge was here a couple of weeks ago, or somebody, and said that the infiltration had increased in the last few months from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. I cannot verify that. First, we don't have a meter on infiltration and we frequently don't know when it occurs.

Senator AIKEN. I expect it is difficult to tell them apart, too.

General TAYLOR. It would be for me.

COMPARSION TO CUBA

Senator AIKEN. Here is my last question: What is the difference between conditions that prevail in Hanoi today and conditions that prevail in Havana and Cuba? What is the real difference?

General TAYLOR. I don't know the situation in Havana well enough to make a comparison.

Senator AIKEN. You have heard about it.

General TAYLOR. I have been too far from that situation for almost a year now.

AIR RAIDS ON HANOI

But, Hanoi, as described by, say, the Canadian ICC representative, is a beleaguered city; it is a city at war. All the air raid precautions of cities during World War II—control of lights, a great deal of air raid shelter construction going on, very little economic activity. In broad terms that is the picture that is being brought back to us.

Senator AIKEN. Conditions would be about the same—they have the same type of Russian aircraft, the same antiaircraft protections, the same schools for training infiltrators and saboteurs to make trouble for other non-Communist countries.

I think that is all the questions that I have at this time. I realize that you have a very, very difficult position.

General TAYLOR. You are referring to my position here in this chair or in Saigon?

Senator AIKEN. I refer to our national position and possibly your position, too. I wouldn't know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

I got confused here on both committees, and I overlooked you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

General Taylor, this bombing I would like to pursue. Nobody knows better than you that this is political and psychological bombing and not effective military bombing in the true military sense. I base that on the experiences in Europe where, along with some other members of this committee, I saw a good deal of bombing, and the reports by Mr. Alexander of the Strategic Survey.

Now, I would like to ask this question: If you want to get Hanoi to agree to a negotiation, why don't we bomb oil dumps more, and electrical apparatus? We don't necessarily have to bomb Hanoi and kill women and children, but why don't we go after the basic economy of the country instead of just hitting bridges and railroad trains and buses and warehouses?

In other words, I have checked this with the military, and I find we do not go after targets that could be considered targets that would destroy—inasmuch as they have given no evidence of wanting to respond to our abeyance of bombing, why don't we hit this situation all the way, except for hitting the houses and the homes?

General TAYLOR. Well, as the first target system, the emphasis was placed, I think, properly, on communications. Anything related to infiltration was struck.

In my judgment that should remain the basic pattern. But I would agree with your suggestion, we ought to be moving around now and undertaking at least sporadically attacks of different kinds. I think you will find that two electric plants have been struck in the course of the last month, at least.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESS

Senator SYMINGTON. When you and I were in Saigon several years ago I said, "I think we ought to fish or cut bait." I still feel that way about it—we ought to move in and win this war or get out of it.

I want to congratulate you on the magnificent job you have done out there. Although you read a lot of things in the paper, I am convinced an overwhelming majority in the Senate are 100 percent for your operation.

Yesterday one of the Members of this body criticized the press severely as only giving one side of the war to the American people and implied that was the reason that there was a lot of criticism—the criticism of not all the reasons, but one of the reasons why there was a lot of the operation out there. He also said the press was getting along very poorly with the USIA.

Would you comment on that, as to whether you think the press is giving a true picture of what is going on out there to the American people, No. 1, and—this is an off-the-record hearing, and naturally we are all interested that—and, No. 2, if there is any difference between the USIA and the press why is it, and what can be done to correct it?

General TAYLOR. The problem of the press is an old story. I have seen some of that over the years.

I would say that the press—the relation between the press and the authorities, both the American authorities and the Vietnamese authorities, is considerably better now than it was 2 years ago. I think the representation, the quality of the individual, is a considerably higher, because of the importance of the situation—our press is sending out some of their best men, and I think some of their reporting is excellent. I have no complaint myself against the way the press is performing at the present time.

They have problems; we have problems. The ineffectiveness, inefficiency of the Vietnamese Government public relations makes us inevitably take their place to a large degree as the spokesman of the situation. We are always criticizing ourselves, and sometimes being criticized, for speaking when the Vietnamese Government should speak. All I can say is we are trying to reverse that, trying to get the government to be its own spokesman.

If there is a ground for complaint, it is the selectivity of publication back here. I would suspect that—as we mentioned before—the emphasis on defeats rather than victories is a selective process in publications in the United States and I don't believe can be charged against our local reporters.

Senator SYMINGTON. One more observation and question, Mr. Chairman.

A PROGRESSIVE EXPANSION OF BOMBING TARGETS

I asked yesterday how this could continue this way unless it was the attitude of the publishers, who were slanting the news when it came back home. One of our more prominent newspaper people, yesterday, I believe it was, talked about the reaction in Europe, for example, growing apprehension about American foreign policy. He said one of the chief reasons was that, being well up on effective bombing, they would be greatly surprised if we would think this type and character of bombing would have any effect on the North Vietnamese, from the standpoint of the history of Korea and World War II.

If there is any change in the decision—of course, I am talking about conventional weapons—on what is to be bombed after the meetings that you hold here this time, if you would be good enough to have somebody let this committee know——

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I know of no plan of changing the general pattern of bombing at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. No plan for hitting the oil dumps, for example?

General TAYLOR. I would say that the idea of a progressive expansion of the target system is very much in the cards. I know of

no one, however, for example, talking now about bombing Hanoi as a target.

I think we have to bear in mind, gentlemen—the press frequently makes statements which show a lack of comprehension the difference between bombing in World War II and here. When we bombed Germany and Japan, we were trying to destroy everything there—men, women, children, buildings, everything.

In North Vietnam, we don't want to do that. We are deliberately not doing that. We have a hostage in Hanoi, in the high command. We want to keep the hostage alive, but we want to make the hostage very unhappy. That is the objective of the program, and I think that is what it is doing.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

VIETCONG ORGANIZATION

Senator LAUSCHE. You made the statement, General Taylor, that the Vietcong were building their organization in South Vietnam since 1954 secretly, that it was not known that it was being done, and suddenly you find it well organized and difficult to contend with.

My question is, Isn't that the normal technique of the Communists?

General TAYLOR. First, may I just modify slightly what I stated? I would not suggest that suddenly this appeared and we suddenly realized it, but the extent of the seriousness of the organization was certainly not appreciated in earlier years. I don't think it was appreciated in the United States until about 1961.

Senator LAUSCHE. But isn't that the technique? We ought to have the experience that we had in South Vietnam in mind with regard to the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and all other places in this hemisphere.

General TAYLOR. I would agree with you certainly in this sense, Senator Lausche. We now know that this is a favored technique for the expansion of communism worldwide, and while it will be varied undoubtedly in different countries, this idea of subversive insurgency as a cheap and easy way to expand communism has been announced by Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi. We should be warned.

VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. You are familiar with the 1962 pact made with regard to Laos generally?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Hanoi was a party to that treaty, or protocol, whatever you call it; is that correct?

General TAYLOR. I will have to check the record. I don't think so.

Senator LAUSCHE. It was. Hanoi was in on it, and Hanoi agreed to withdraw its troops out of Laos. Did it do so?

General TAYLOR. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did it do so?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. It is still putting new Vietnamese in from time to time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the Vietcong forces causing trouble to you through their use of the Laotian border in going into Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. We certainly think that many of them come that way; yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now, it is argued that we should negotiate, and we have made efforts to negotiate.

General TAYLOR. I don't believe so, Senator. I don't think so. I think we have showed a willingness to discuss, which is quite different.

Senator LAUSCHE. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to place in the record the questions which I put to Secretary Rusk, in which he enumerated 10 efforts that were made to procure a meeting with Hanoi on the problem which we have. Each of those 10 efforts were rebuffed by Hanoi. I would like to read them, but time will not permit.

[The document referred to follows:]

For inclusion in the secret transcript of June 11 with General Taylor. These are excerpted from the transcript of June 3, 1965.

"Secretary RUSK. First, the bilateral contacts that led to the Laotian conference where Hanoi was present. * * *

"Second, discussions among the three factions in Laos trying to find a basis for reconvening of the Laotian conference to move back toward compliance with those agreements. * * *

"Third, efforts by the cochairmen to be in touch with all parties to find a basis for a meeting which could work toward a peaceful settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia. * * *

"Fourth, contacts which other governments have had with Hanoi to explore with Hanoi the possibility of a peaceful settlement. * * *

"Fifth, contacts with Hanoi by the United Nations, such as the invitation to Hanoi to come to the Security Council at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. * * *

"Sixth, an attempt by the British cochairman to send a special envoy to Hanoi and Peiping to discuss the same issue. * * *

"Seventh, encouragement to President Radhakrishnan's of India proposal, encouragement by us, to President Radhakrishnan's proposal, which we know was communicated to Hanoi, and which they rejected. * * *

"Eighth, contacts through the International Control Commission which operates in Hanoi, Saigon, Cambodia, Vientiane. * * *

"And ninth, their knowledge that there were a few days in which there was no bombing of North Vietnam, in which they had a chance to react to this in view of what they have been saying between, the connection between, negotiations on the bombing.

"And, of course, tenth, the open-ended statement made by the President with respect to unconditional discussion."

Senator LAUSCHE. I have an important call coming in. May I reserve my questions for a later time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Senator Thurmond.

WHAT IS OUR GOAL?

Senator THURMOND. General Taylor, I was going to ask the question Senator Lausche asked about North Vietnam laying these plans in 1954. Is there any question that they were laying plans to take over South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. We certainly have every reason to believe that this plan, which we are now seeing in execution, dates—the concept dates from about 1954, the time of partition.

Senator THURMOND. I am highly in favor of what President Johnson did in going and taking steps to get this over there.

The thing I am interested in now, that I want to get your opinion on is this: What is our goal now since we have intervened there?

General TAYLOR. Our goal has been announced, Senator, several times, as being the restoration of peace and the restoration of a viable independent South Vietnam, free from the menace of Communist aggression from North Vietnam.

FIGHT A DEFENSIVE ACTION

Senator THURMOND. The North Vietnamese can come down and do come down at will, when they feel it is necessary, to fight. The South Vietnamese, though, are not going north, are they?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Do they plan to?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. You mean in the sense of a reunification drive?

Senator THURMOND. Yes. The North Vietnamese are trying to come down and destroy the South Vietnamese. I am wondering if the South Vietnamese are going to plan to go north and destroy the North Vietnamese.

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, are they going to just fight a defensive action like we did in Korea, or are we going to try to push the war over there and gain victory so the matter will be ended?

General TAYLOR. I would say that the offensive aspects of the action are being limited to air action and to some lesser degree to naval action and that the bombing program is the offensive arm of the campaign against the Vietcong.

A TEMPORARY PEACE

Senator THURMOND. Do you think that if some agreement is reached, if that policy is followed, that we would have peace very long? Would that not be a temporary peace?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, not necessarily.

Senator THURMOND. I am sure you agree with me that the Communists are at what they call war all the time. Sometimes it is a hot war, sometimes an economic war, sometimes it is a political war, sometimes it is a diplomatic war. There are various facets and phases.

So, if some agreement should be reached between the South Vietnamese and the Communists, do you think that would ensure peace?

NO PLAN TO WIN THE WAR

I was talking to a young fellow yesterday afternoon, for instance, and I asked him, "Are you going to go into the war in Vietnam, are you going to the Army soon?"

He said, "I hope not."

I said, "Why? That is where the fighting is going on. Don't you want to be there?"

He said, "No, because people are just being slaughtered over there, and we have no purpose over there. We don't have any plan to win over there."

Now, this came from a young man that is about to go in the service.

Do we have a plan to win over there, or are we just going to have a stalemate and be subject to keeping troops over there as we have done in Korea, indefinitely?

General TAYLOR. First, the young man you are talking to, I am sure, doesn't represent most young men, or many young men. I have just had a problem. My own son has been storming the Pentagon to get assigned to Vietnam and has just succeeded in getting his orders there. Our people on the ground have no doubt as to what they are doing there, what their purpose is.

Going back to the basic question, what constitutes a satisfactory termination, I would say two things have to be accomplished. One is Hanoi has to desist, has to lay off aiding and abetting and assisting the Vietcong. Second, we have to break up the military apparatus represented by the Vietcong in South Vietnam so that it ceases to be a military threat, and although I am quite sure there will be banditry and police aspects of this guerrilla operation for many years to come, we will no longer have VC battalions and regiments, armed and equipped, moving about the country. When we get those two points satisfactorily adjusted, I would say the chances of peace in South Vietnam are as good as in any country with a Communist neighbor.

Senator THURMOND. Of course, you know as I do that an agreement with the Communists is worth nothing. It is not worth the paper it is written on.

General TAYLOR. Unless self-interest is involved on both sides. I think history shows most agreements that last have to have self-interest on both sides.

Senator THURMOND. If they reach an agreement, it is a temporary affair until they can——

General TAYLOR. Unless the power balance is such that they have to respect it. That, I think, is the clinching factor which must be present.

ARE WE GOING TO WIN?

Senator THURMOND. What I am trying to get at is, are we going to win over there or not?

General TAYLOR. Would you define what you mean by winning?

Senator THURMOND. Gain victory.

General TAYLOR. I am sorry, Senator. I still cannot answer it.

Senator THURMOND. To gain victory, to gain military victory over the Communists, so that that would be the termination of the matter and we will not have to keep troops over there and will not be concerned about the Communists——

General TAYLOR. I would define "victory" in a different way. I would define it as changing the will of Hanoi, so that Hanoi and the leaders thereof recognize South Vietnam cannot be taken over and, hence, will give up a losing game.

CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM

Senator THURMOND. Are the Chinese backing North Vietnam and the Vietcong in this matter?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, backing North Vietnam, certainly, as the Soviet Union is, also.

Senator THURMOND. Then the will of China would be involved here, too, would it not?

General TAYLOR. To some extent. But I would feel reasonably sure that Hanoi is pretty much the master of its destiny.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Lausche, you have 2 minutes more.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. General, I just saw that Communist China has warned if we put any more troops in active combat, she is going to put her troops in. Do you know anything about that?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, but I have heard so many threats from the Soviet Union and China over the years that if I heard it, it would make no difference.

Senator WILLIAMS. You would still go ahead with your plans?

General TAYLOR. I think we are on the right course of action.

Senator WILLIAMS. What would be our reaction if China did move?

General TAYLOR. I am not able to answer that. I think only the President can answer that.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do you consider that would be open war?

General TAYLOR. It would depend on the contacts made.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECT OF BOMBING ON INFILTRATION

General, since we have carried on our bombing activities in North Vietnam, you have indicated that apparently the flow of personnel has stepped up to South Vietnam. I am wondering about materiel and supplies. Has this had any appreciable effect?

General TAYLOR. I would make this point, Senator. I could not prove, I don't think anyone could prove, that infiltration has stepped up since we started our bombing. We started bombing February 7, and most of the evidence we have—I know of no evidence of infiltration after that point in time. I suspect there has been.

But most of the units I have been talking about, or people I have been talking about, came in well before February 7.

Senator CANNON. And we only learned of them fairly recently?

General TAYLOR. That is right—there is often a 6-month lag.

Senator CANNON. Getting back to specifically the materiel and supply, is there any indication that this has had any appreciable effect on materiel and supplies they have been able to——

General TAYLOR. I could not prove it one way or another.

Senator CANNON. I see.

In further reference to Senator Williams' question, there has been, as you know, a lot of discussion about our supposed confusion in United States policy the last few days, and there has been a lot of talk out of Red China, Hanoi, and other places. I am wondering,

has this had any appreciable effect on the activities in South Vietnam as far as you can ascertain?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

VIETCONG SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Senator CANNON. Are the Vietcong at the present time, by reason of our stepped up activities in South Vietnam, having any appreciable supply problem, as far as you can tell?

General TAYLOR. They always have a supply problem, a very serious one. However, the logistics system is very good, but it represents a tremendous amount of labor and effort in order to position their supplies for a given attack.

The Vietcong are good, but they are not 10 feet tall. They have definite limitations as to the rate at which they can operate. They have to allow a great deal of time to concentrate supplies, move their troops, make their plans, and execute their attack. They have to attack quickly and disperse quickly. Otherwise, they will be struck by air and take heavy losses.

So, I would say they are good at the kind of actions they fight, but the rate at which they can operate is controlled by these factors.

AMERICANS KILLED AND MISSING

Senator CANNON. In the last 2 days we have seen one rather unfortunate contact with them, where they overran the village, and we now, apparently, have taken it back. Do you have any information on this activity other than what we read in the press?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I don't, except that the original number of Americans killed was apparently very much exaggerated. The last report I saw was one killed and six missing.

Senator CANNON. Was this the one where supposedly 14—I think the first report said 14—were killed?

General TAYLOR. I think it said 21. I really don't have the details.

Senator CANNON. You don't have, generally, any further information on that activity than what we have seen in the press?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. Unfortunately that is the pattern of the attack. There is a camp. It is well within[1] the Cambodian border, in an area surrounded by hills and jungle, where it is very easy to concentrate a regiment without anyone knowing it. And then a surprise attack—this is the pattern over and over again. It is very hard to anticipate. It is becoming easier to punish now because of our mobility. This VC outfit was punished badly that made the attack. But, unfortunately, we suffered losses also.

Senator CANNON. Thank you.

LAOTIAN DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, let me have 5 seconds of my time while all are here.

North Vietnam was a signatory to the Declaration of Neutrality for Laos in 1962. So was South Vietnam. All nations lived up to it except Hanoi in North Vietnam.

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[1] General Taylor corrected "well within" to "near".

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

DRIFTING INTO A LAND WAR

Senator CLARK. General, there are some of us who have been concerned that we were drifting reluctantly step by step into a land war that none of us want. But it is very difficult to figure out how to avoid it.

I would like to read you an excerpt from a column this morning in the New York Times by James Reston, and then ask you to comment on it.

> Officials do not like to admit it in public, but in private they concede that both the level of bombardment must be greatly increased in the north and the commitment of American troops must be increased to around 300,000 to have a chance to win on the ground.
>
> The effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army is far more disappointing than any official here has dared admit in public, and there are responsible officials at the Pentagon who concede that even an army of 300,000 Americans could not be sure of winning the war on that terrain.
>
> Adjusting the objectives to the American power now committed to the battle is also painful, for it would mean going back to the original American position that the war had to be won by the South Vietnamese, with our advice and military aid, and this in the present circumstances is tantamount to accepting defeat.

Would you comment on that, sir?

General TAYLOR. I known of no responsible official with whom I have been in contact who is suggesting 300,000 American ground forces going into South Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. What is the alternative?

MANPOWER PROBLEM IN GROUND FORCES

General TAYLOR. The alternative is doing what we are doing.

What has really happened, Senator, is we started off with a clear and proper concept that we would limit our assistance to an advisory role in South Vietnam. Progressively the problem became greater as the aid from Hanoi continued to roll in. So that the indigenous resources have turned out, in point of fact, to be ineffective in many areas.

First we go into the air area, to utilize our available strength there to supplement what they do not have in South Vietnam. Now we are seeing the manpower problem in the ground forces and we feel we have to again supplement what they have, at least over this period during which time indigenous strength is being increased. But insofar as taking over the war, moving in 300,000 troops, duplicating Korea, I know of no one talking in those terms at the present time.

Senator CLARK. You don't think it will be necessary?

General TAYLOR. I do not.

Senator CLARK. One more question, Mr. Chairman.

Last time you were here, General, it is my recollection that you were reasonably optimistic about our being able to maintain our position in South Vietnam through the rest of this calendar year. Have you had any occasion to change your mind at all?

MODEST PROGRESS

General TAYLOR. No, I don't know whether I like to be called optimistic or pessimistic. I tried to have a balanced judgment on this.

I would say that things became considerably better in the first month and one-half, since I last visited here. For example, pacification, which we haven't talked about, according to our records—I reported last time that about 47 percent of the population was clearly under government control, 23 percent clearly under Vietcong control, and the balance disputed.

Senator CLARK. Yes, but you also, I think, admitted that most of that 47 percent was confined to the larger cities.

General TAYLOR. No, I just say the cities are included in that. Today the comparable figures are a little bit better: 52 percent clearly under government control, 21 percent clearly under Red control, 27 percent in dispute. So, I would say there has been modest progress.

Senator CLARK. Is that based on pretty hard intelligence?

General TAYLOR. The best figures we can get, as in all matters of statistics. There are plenty of soft spots in it.

Senator CLARK. I think you indicated earlier today, and it certainly made sense to me, that intelligence is almost necessarily one of your weakest links over there.

General TAYLOR. It is, no doubt about it.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Young.

NOT EXPECT QUAT TO BE OVERTHROWN

Senator YOUNG. General, you have stated that Quat has appealed to the military to bolster his regime.

General TAYLOR. He has asked the military to mediate, which was one of the functions they were conceded to have.

Senator YOUNG. Is there a distinction between that and bolstering his regime?

General TAYLOR. Perhaps not, it all depends. That is a term, because it is based on a legal question.

Senator YOUNG. You have also spoken of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the South Vietnamese Government, but you have said that you do not expect Quat to be overthrown.

I have a question——

General TAYLOR. I would say that Quat will not be overthrown if he retains the strength and support of the army which he has now.

Senator YOUNG. Twelve regimes in Saigon were overthrown in a period of 13 months some time back.

General TAYLOR. I would not entirely agree with that. You can count them different ways.

Really there have been four governments. That is still not good.

Senator YOUNG. I heard those figures from the Secretary of Defense.

But, regardless of that, if it happens that the current regime of Quat were overthrown, and then very unexpectedly the new regime proclaimed that they wanted peace there and issued a proclamation for Americans to withdraw their armed forces—if that should happen, what is your view as to the position we should take?

General TAYLOR. I would say it won't happen that way, because the army won't let it happen. The army is completely anti-Communist, they are completely anti-VC, they have no sympathy with

neutralism or discussions with Vietcong. Any government that undertook to do that would be tossed out.

Senator YOUNG. You don't look for that possibility?

General TAYLOR. No.

Senator YOUNG. Has that possibility been anticipated at all?

General TAYLOR. Well, we always have it on the list of things that could happen.

Senator YOUNG. That would place us in a very unenviable position.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator YOUNG. I just have one other question.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Have you any information or figures as to the numbers of civilians, that is men, women, and children, in South Vietnam, who, unfortunately, have been killed by our napalm and other bombings?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I don't have a figure. I have been in many, many hospitals throughout the country, and always there are civilian casualties. Whether the bullet that struck them was a government or Vietcong bullet, obviously we don't know.

Senator YOUNG. Have you observed civilians, men, women and children, in the hospitals suffering from napalm bombs?

General TAYLOR. Very, very rare, but a few. Usually bullet wounds.

Senator YOUNG. You have no idea of the numbers of civilians?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. It is not a large number.

Senator YOUNG. Would it be several hundred?

General TAYLOR. I have seen probably half a dozen cases myself.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Dodd called me and asked me to express to you his regrets for not being able to be here. He is delivering an address to the War College.

General TAYLOR. Please give the Senator my regards.

Senator LAUSCHE. He says he hopes to see you before you go back.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

FISH OR CUT BAIT

Senator PELL. I am reminded of Tennyson's poem, "Cannons to the right; cannons to the left."

In this question of fishing or cutting bait, if we really fish it can lead, to my mind, to a general war, nuclear war. If we cut bait, we also lose our credibility all over the world. As I understand our course now, it is to keep the pressures on, and neither fish nor cut bait.

Is that correct?

General TAYLOR. I would not agree that this is an indecisive course of action. I would say that the purpose of all war, throughout all history, has been to change the mind of the opponent. That is exactly what we are trying to do right now.

Senator PELL. Isn't it sometimes better to keep the pressures on, but not go all out, or withdraw? Isn't that what we are doing? And it is correct, in my mind.

General TAYLOR. No, sir. We are keeping the pressure on in an offensive sense by use of our air power. We are showing them, I hope, by our conduct in South Vietnam, they cannot take over that part of the country, there is no profit in this thing, hence he better change his ways.

Senator PELL. I was very impressed with your statements that agreements are valid, and I think history would show the Communists or any other nation have honored or violated them in accordance with their national self-interest. But as the power balance changes, you mentioned, the solidity with which agreements are kept can change, too.

As we look ahead into the future, obviously the power balance is going to change in that part of the world. I think President Kennedy pointed this out—as they acquire nuclear capability in the north, as they get more industrialized.

10 YEARS IN THE FUTURE

How do you see this thing projecting 10 or 15 years from now?

General TAYLOR. I would certainly expect progress in South Vietnam, a free South Vietnam, without the terrible handicaps of the Vietcong insurgency within its borders. I would expect South Vietnam to move much more rapidly in terms of economic and political development than the north, so that the strength trend in that sense should be favorable. Certainly the power of the United States in this part of the world will continue to be the dominant force in the background but if indeed we can develop an autonomous South Vietnam, we should be able to reduce our physical presence.

Senator PELL. You don't think the old principle of the lever, with the Communist China being rather large and close, can have, as time goes on and decades go by, a negating effect?

General TAYLOR. It is probably the most important strategic problem we are faced with. I cannot give you an easy quick answer.

BOMBING HAS UNITED THE COMMUNISTS

Senator PELL. As I see it, our bombing has brought these Communist nations perhaps a bit together—there being no real effect on the infiltration one way or the other—I am wondering what you see as the end result gain, because our European friends always found that bombing increased national spirit, not broke it.

General TAYLOR. I made the point indirectly in the previous discussion. The purpose of this kind of bombing is quite different from what it was in Europe—where the Germans had no solution other than to fight and resist because unconditional surrender was the objective, and the bombing attack had the objective of total destruction.

Here this is not the case. Hence, to the peasants, through our leaflet drops, through all our propaganda, we try to convey the thought that the great inconvenience, the hardships imposed by the bombing results from the actions of the Hanoi government, which will contribute not at all to the improving of the way of life of the North Vietnamese peasants. So that we are hoping not to drive them together, but rather to separate the people from the

government because the government is responsible for the hardships to which they are exposed.

Senator PELL. A final question, sir.

DANGER OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

In connection with the support of the people of South Vietnam, I was struck by the fact that it had gone up from 47 to 52 percent.

What would be the land area that we control?

General TAYLOR. I don't have the figure and that is a very misleading one, because sometimes it is stated that the Vietcong control two-thirds of the country. I don't know whether that is true or not, because no one is interested in controlling the vast jungle, the mountains, and so on, and usually that is credited to the Vietcong.

Senator PELL. The reaction of one of my constituents, the young men stationed out there, say because we have white skins and are rather burly, they are not too popular, and the people would just as soon we got out of there.

General TAYLOR. I would say that certainly I see no signs of unpopularity. One can find, especially in the villages where our small detachments live, a captain and a couple of sergeants are in the village, assisting in civic action and all that kind of thing; there is the evidence of great popularity in circumstances like that.

We are very much aware that an increase in the American presence exposes us to the dangers of anti-Americanism developing, especially in crowded communities, such as around Da Nang. We are watching this very closely, and thus far we have not detected such indication.

Senator PELL. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre.

Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Chairman, should I not yield to the Senator from South Dakota here?

Senator MUNDT. Go ahead.

A MORE IMPORTANT PERIOD

Senator MCINTYRE. General, from the answers I have heard here today, I take it that you are somewhat encouraged as opposed to the position we were in when we were last together.

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I don't—I cannot distinguish a particular difference between the periods. I would say this is a more important period now than 2 months ago, primarily because of the monsoon offensive. It is something we have to blunt and beat back. I think we have the resources to do it.

Senator MCINTYRE. I think you told us part of the strategy of the monsoon offensive might be for the Vietcong to bring about some sort of a military disaster for us or the South Vietnamese.

General TAYLOR. I have never been among those who talk about another Bien Dien Phu. I think I mentioned the possibility, which still exists, that the Vietcong will gang up on one or more of the important towns in the highlands, because there you have the highland plain and then the mountains, the Cambodian border close behind, a beautiful area to form secretly and launch the surprise attack I have described. That is about the extent of what I think the Vietcong are capable of doing.

SOVIETS AND CHINESE VYING OVER NORTH VIETNAM

Senator McINTYRE. General, could you just comment briefly—I have been somewhat intrigued by the overall strategy. I think either the last time you were here, or somewhere along the line, I heard it said about 2 months ago that it was true that never before had the Soviet and the Communist Chinese been so far apart. Now, as the portent of this thing begins to look like more American troops and perhaps a larger war, this has a tendency to perhaps bring these Communist buddies together.

What do you feel or know about it?

General TAYLOR. It is a very, very important question. It is very hard to be sure how to answer it. My own impression is that they are no closer together, but they are both vying in showing their willingness to fight and die and give all for North Vietnam. In other words, they are competing one with the other for the leadership of the Communist world. I don't think that necessarily indicates they are closer together. But for the time being, at least, they both have a common desire to show their willingness to help the North Vietnamese and actually to do certain concrete acts to prove they are sincere.

Senator McINTYRE. If these communications I have heard this morning indicate that the first probable movement of land forces would be the Communist Chinese——

General TAYLOR. The Soviets are so far away. I don't think anyone was thinking in terms of Soviet land forces.

ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES IN HANOI

Senator McINTYRE. What is the latest information on the antiaircraft missile locations in the vicinity of Hanoi?

General TAYLOR. There is at least one there. They may be working on others. I have not seen the very latest developments.

Senator McINTYRE. Still working on the site?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

U.S. INTEREST TO KEEP QUAT IN OFFICE

Senator McINTYRE. Are you still satisfied that Quat offers a great deal of stability?

General TAYLOR. I would qualify that. I would say that Quat is a good man. It is in our interest to keep him in there. Whether he can weather this storm—I think perhaps the chances are greater he may get disgusted with the whole thing and say, "Thank you," and let somebody else take over, than that he will be forcibly ejected from power.

Senator McINTYRE. Have we taken such steps as we can within the delicate framework to try to keep Quat in?

General TAYLOR. Within the delicate framework.

Senator McINTYRE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

NO SINGLE COHERENT PLAN OF BATTLE

Senator MUNDT. General, you made a rather clear case of what we are trying to do, bombing in the north. You made a pretty clear

presentation of what the Communists are doing in South Vietnam. You haven't had very much to say about what, if any, battle plans we have on our side, the Vietnamese and the Americans, for a forward-moving operation on the ground in South Vietnam. When I hear you talk, it sounds like we are just sort of striking back where they strike us and trying to patch up a breakthrough here and there.

Do we have any forward-moving battle plan that is going to clean that thing out eventually in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. By the nature of this kind of war, it is never possible to have a single coherent plan as you would to break the Hindenburg Line, let's say. Every corps commander has his own responsibility for his corps area. He has many, many plans which he carries out, which are really local in effect because the war is local. It is dependent largely on intelligence.

It is almost a question of an ad hoc type of campaign, where you try to find VC and destroy them. Having destroyed them, then the apparatus of government should move in quickly behind and starts to build up and retain that territory. By the nature of the war, in other words, you cannot simultaneously take the offensive over a wide area on the same day and the same hour as you might in a conventional war.

SLOW AND UNDRAMATIC PROGRESS

Senator MUNDT. What I have in mind is this: This is a pretty small geographical area we are trying to handle with 510,000 Vietnamese troops, 70,000 Americans. You start out. You have someplace there where you have a contiguous area. Maybe it is 10 miles square, maybe it is larger. We hold it, this is ours. Now, I was interested if we would start pushing out the periphery of these lines and gradually develop the contiguous area we hold.

General TAYLOR. That is being done and has been in progress for over a year around Saigon, where there has been slow and undramatic progress. Unhappily, this procedure demands a lot of troops and that has been one of the limitations—the lack of ability to saturate an area completely.

Senator MUNDT. Could you give us any measurement in our degree of progress in terms of miles or acres?

General TAYLOR. No, I could give it more in terms of population, where the population control around the Saigon donut has gone up several hundred thousand.

Senator MUNDT. That can come from people moving into Saigon from out in the hinterlands.

General TAYLOR. It could.

Senator MUNDT. If you could give it to us in terms of geography.

General TAYLOR. Geography doesn't mean anything. There has been no significant move of population into Saigon in this period of time. This has been a clearing operation.

Senator MUNDT. Pushing out?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

MILITARY DECISIONS MADE IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Senator MUNDT. Out my way there is pretty general agreement with the program that you are undertaking, or were undertaking. But I wonder if you read an Alsop column, I think it was within the week—apparently he is out there, because he is writing with a Saigon dateline. This was a pretty devastating attack and has created a lot of uneasiness in my mail about the fact that he says categorically that the military decision on the day-to-day strikes are being made in the Pentagon or in the White House, and never in the history of America have we been able to win a war with the command center that far away from the fighting. He says it without any equivocation or anything, and he predicts defeat on that basis.

I think if his premise is correct, we are going to lose. I don't think anybody is smart enough to sit down in Washington and determine how we fight that war.

General TAYLOR. The Alsop statement is not true, Senator, insofar as the in-country war is concerned. That is directed almost entirely by military decisions made either by CINCPAC in Honolulu or General Westmoreland. Now, it is true, however, about the bombing program in the north, and by the very nature of the thing it should be pretty well controlled.

Senator MUNDT. You think he is talking only about the bombing?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

INSTALLMENT OF RUSSIAN PLANES

Senator MUNDT. You say that you are not much concerned about rumors about Red China. I am sure we cannot be bluffed out, but we have something else going in there, in unanswered newspaper stories. Since you were here last, the Russians are in there with x number of new kinds of planes. There they sit; we know they are there. What do you think is the political significance and the military impact of that?

General TAYLOR. I don't think the military impact is serious at all. I think this is a psychological, political gambit that is being played to prove that indeed the Soviets are doing what they say; namely, they are defending their Communist brothers.

Senator MUNDT. You don't think this is an installment of a lot more to come which could have a great military impact?

General TAYLOR. They could, of course, put in more of the same kind of thing, but I do not see how it would make any difference.

Senator MUNDT. Aren't the planes of military importance?

General TAYLOR. They haven't affected our program in the north thus far.

Senator MUNDT. Not yet, but if this is the first installment——

General TAYLOR. Any time the Mig's want to come out and get in a fight, they can. Of course, they have elected not to.

Senator MUNDT. You are not concerned about that?

General TAYLOR. Not particularly, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Just on that point there, General—none of these Mig's are manned by Russians?

General TAYLOR. Not in our knowledge.

NATIONAL LOYALTY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

Senator CASE. Senator Hickenlooper some time ago raised a question as to strength of the national loyalty of the North Vietnamese. Is it more strongly felt, that feeling of nationality, in North Vietnam than in the South?

General TAYLOR. Of course, I have never been there, but I would suspect so in the sense that it is more homogeneous racially. Also, it has had a Communist apparatus in power, and they certainly have an ability to make a monolithic bloc out of a population and suppress opposition.

Senator CASE. Is there any such feeling in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. There really is very little national spirit, for the reason that South Vietnam is a federation, one might say—a confederacy of many races, of many religions, and they have not yet been welded into a single bloc. Time will do this. But, unfortunately, that is not the case now.

WHO ARE THE ARMY?

Senator CASE. Speaking of the army, citing this and citing that—who are the army?

General TAYLOR. That is a good question.

Well, the army are the generals. They are the generals that command troops. They were the ones who formed the old armed forces council which was disbanded at Quat's recommendation.

Whenever Quat wants to talk to the army he calls in General Thieu, who is minister of defense, and is the senior man in uniform there. However, he, in turn, if this is an important policy matter, he will call in his principal field commanders, and they will have a council of war.

Senator CASE. Is this an entity that exists and breeds and draws new blood into it, or is it a bunch of tired old people?

General TAYLOR. No, these are all young fellows. And they, in turn, have their groupings between the conservatives and the so-called young Turks. They have been rather divided in their attitude on public questions. Right now I would say they are pretty well pulled together in support of Quat.

Senator CASE. Does their existence as a power force depend upon the individual controlling the actual forces?

General TAYLOR. Yes. When the cards are down, in a show of strength, it is the man who has forces that will obey that gets results. If his control slips in any way, word gets around.

Senator CASE. What is it that holds the Vietnamese soldiers together?

General TAYLOR. Leadership of the commanders. They react just about like American soldiders, I would say.

Senator CASE. What is the morale of the army on the whole?

General TAYLOR. The majority of this army are volunteers.

Senator CASE. And on this score, the control of the leadership of the army is likely to be fairly—something we can look forward to?

General TAYLOR. If you are referring to the solid anti-Communist orientation, I would say yes.

A MATTER OF JUDGMENT

Senator CASE. Earlier Senator Pell raised a question as to whether we were not putting too much pressure on. Senator Mundt talked about the Alsop complaints. Alsop recently said in recent weeks we have let up and we have almost lost all of the advantage that we had in the initial stages. Have you any comments?

General TAYLOR. No, I would just disagree to that. It is a matter of judgment.

Senator THURMOND. Who said that? I can't hear you.

Senator CASE. Stewart Alsop.

Last, sir, if you will—you are a civilian now.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

THE DILEMMA THAT WE FEEL

Senator CASE. You are a citizen. I wish, if you have any comment in capsule, you would give it—on the dilemma that we find ourselves in in considering and determining the question of declaring war. What would you do if you were a Member of Congress in regard to this responsibility?

General TAYLOR. I would continue to support the administration policy.

Senator CASE. Yes. But—I am not trying to embarrass you at all. I am trying to present to you in a sense the dilemma that we feel, which causes a good deal of unrest and uneasiness around this table and in the Congress beyond us, as to whether we are doing our job and whether we are not avoiding or evidencing something that we ought to be doing.

Maybe you want to start a little further back.

General TAYLOR. Of course, the Congress, last August in its joint declaration, gave pretty broad approval for anything that needs to be taken or that has been taken.

You gentlemen know the rules better than I do. Presumably you could always change and modify that declaration if you wanted to, at any time.

I would personally think that perhaps more intimate discussions of this situation, and of future plans, between this committee and our leaders in the State Department and in the Pentagon certainly might be indicated. I hope this is the useful kind of discussion we are having today. No one in Congress should be surprised by Executive actions, in other words. If Congress has been surprised by one of these actions, I think personally that is unfortunate, but I don't know why it is not possible, by the kind of exchange we are having today, to avoid any question of anything taking place that really surprises the Congress.

A GENERAL UNHAPPINESS

Senator CASE. I don't think the question, General, is so much whether we are surprised.

Secretary McNamara came back for some time with reports about how well things were going, followed by disaster after disaster. I do not feel we are being conned or given a snow job, but the position we have in the country is not a very good one. We are not

in control of this situation. The President presumably is, but we are the fellows supposed to declare war.

We are supposed to make policy. We haven't done it. We did pass a resolution in circumstances last summer when we could do nothing else, except, it seems to me, destroy the prestige of the President completely. We passed an appropriation of $700 million here a little while back in the same circumstances. I personally regarded that as a vote of approval of what was going on.

I don't believe—I must say—that you don't have any better idea than we do as to how to act in the modern world in the light—I mean act with regard to our constitutional responsibilities under modern conditions. I have nothing more to express than a general kind of unhappiness with the position we are in, and yet I have general agreement with what you are doing.

NO DESIRE FOR A COLONY

The CHAIRMAN. Following that thought, the thing that is most elusive to me is just what is our purpose. You said a moment ago at one stage that all wars are directed toward changing the minds of your opponents. I believe you said all wars in history have been to change the minds of opponents. Then you seemed to make an exception right after that in saying in Germany it wasn't that, it was unconditional surrender.

What puzzles me most of all is the ultimate outcome of a policy of increased activity, even to all-out war. Naturally our most recent experience being Korea—I think of that as well as the most likely outcome of it if we continue to escalate the war. I am not at all clear as to what is the real purpose. We don't wish to have a colony there and permanently occupy, do we?

General TAYLOR. We certainly do not; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you clarify a little for us what our real purpose is?

General TAYLOR. I will have to repeat myself somewhat in doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you can do it a different way to clarify it. This is to me the central core of what he is asking about. What is the objective here, and is it a feasible one that may be achieved? Total victory—I don't quite know what this is, either. You said in answer to Senator Thurmond, "I am not quite sure I agree with you as to what that is."

General TAYLOR. I would answer this—and I am speaking for myself—I don't know that I have ever seen this written on a piece of paper or given approval by higher authority, but to me it is clear enough. We are trying to defend the principle of self-determination there, a principle for which we have stood for many decades—allowing South Vietnam to have the kind of government, live under the kind of society it wants, which clearly is not a Communist government or Communist society.

The CHAIRMAN. How do we know that? You said this is not a nation, it is a collection of tribes or local people. Is there any possibility of any kind of consensus among these people in the sense we have one in our system?

General TAYLOR. There is on that particular score, Senator. I think the failure of the South Vietnamese—first, they have had a chance to go north and be Communists in 1954. They didn't want to.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The CHAIRMAN. This is one thing constantly thrown up at us. Diem didn't allow the election which would have been a clearcut, we assume, decision. He avoided it. Whether or not that is correct, whether they could have done it—but they did provide for an election, and it was not held. Has there been anything we can say is a clear determination, self-determination?

The military—under Diem it was a dictatorship, and you have already said several times the military is in complete control of this country. Now, do you mean that just the military will determine it, and they don't want to be Communists, or do you mean the mass of the people?

General TAYLOR. I would just go back to the record again saying that these people all had a chance to be Communists if they wanted to. Millions gave up everything they owned in the north to come south, rather than be Communists. They have shown a patience and a resistance to communism and the Vietcong aggression which is amazing. I think the record is one that is almost unique in history—willingness to suffer heavy losses, to incur hardships of an unbelievable nature at times, rather than become Communists.

We have never found a case where there was not clear evidence of jubilation when the Vietcong was driven away. We have seen an indication in recent months—over 200,000 came out of the hills at the threat of being under communisim, and became refugees on the coast—a serious social problem for us, but a dramatic indication that these people do not want to be Communists. The army is anti-Communist because the army reflects the people. A half million young men are under arms. They were not forced to be soldiers. Between 75 and 80 percent volunteered to be soldiers.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I say something on your point, as to our objectives? I don't think it is credible to say that we are in this to defend the right to self-determination—at least, we cannot do this all over the world, obviously, and we should not try to. This gives Walter Lippmann and all the rest of them a complete answer to that.

Aren't we here to contain the expansion of China—not even of communism, but of China? Maybe the administration cannot say this.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to get at.

THE THREAT OF CHINA

Senator CASE. But we can say it. It seems to me that this is a right and good reason for us to be here. Unless we do this, China will expand indefinitely and make our position in the world and the position of freedom, too——

General TAYLOR. I don't argue that at all. I would say that is collateral.

Senator CASE. The other doesn't seem to me to be defensible.

General TAYLOR. I am not standing on that alone. I would say there are several reasons, of which the first is the most appealing to me.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which is the first?

General TAYLOR. That this is self-determination. This little country should be allowed to choose its own government and not become Communists, when it is resisting and fighting and dying over the years to keep this aggression from being successful.

Now, in addition to that, we have other reasons. We have the threat, which always hangs over this area, of Red China and its expansive tendency. We have also the clear requirement to defeat this war of liberation, which has been announced to be the future tactic of expanding communism worldwide. If it succeeds here, it is encouraged elsewhere.

You can find three or four very strong reasons. You can pick them as you like.

A SPECIAL SPOT

The CHAIRMAN. It makes a difference from our point of view of getting the best one. I think what the Senator from New Jersey is trying to develop, and I am, too, is what is the most persuasive reason we can give as to why we are in there. This puzzles us. You say self-determination. It is a little vague. There are other countries that we allege are under dictatorships of a different kind. Obviously they are not self-determining their fate. Yet we do not intervene.

It seems to me there must be something special here. The answer I am seeking is why is it so vital to the United States that we apparently see fit to risk going into an all-out war that might involve—I don't know—100,000, 500,000 deaths of American people for this particular spot in the world. This is hard to answer.

General TAYLOR. It is a special spot, Senator; it is a spot——

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it special to us that we pick this place out?

General TAYLOR. We have to look at it in the Laotian context. We know that expanding communism has taken Southeast Asia as its objective and will take over Southeast Asia if we don't do something about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I can understand why if they took over Germany, this would be a real threat to us. I don't think there is any question but that we would resist, and I think that is without any real question, because if the Russians got Western Europe it would immediately present a real threat to the U.S. security. I think it would. I do not know if everybody does.

But it is a little hard to translate that into this God-forsaken part of the world. Suppose they did take it. How would this threaten the security of the United States, and why are we justified in bearing practicaily the whole burden, both militarily and monetarily and every other way, over this area as distinguished—the extreme case would be if they took over Western Europe. This is a little hard to explain.

NOT THE END, BUT THE BEGINNING

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I think you omit from your assumed facts a very important aspect.

I would say give up South Vietnam if that would be the end. You assume it will be the end. I declare firmly my conviction that it would only be the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether it would or not, but I don't think that South Vietnam is comparable in the power it would align with the Communists that Western Europe would. I mean the power of having the security of the United States—if you joined that economic and industrial power with the Russians—to me it is quite clear we would really be faced with a danger.

Senator LAUSCHE. You say to give up this little place, what does it mean to us?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the General's answer. I will argue with you at Burning Tree or anywhere else, but I want to hear what the General is going to say today.

What do you say to this point?

General TAYLOR. I will concede, I believe, Senator, if we give up South Vietnam we are going to lose all of Southeast Asia.

COMPARISON TO EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. We gave up Czechoslovakia, and we didn't lose all of Europe.

General TAYLOR. Because we immediately established NATO and put 250,000 troops in there. If we were willing to do that——

The CHAIRMAN. But we had a very strong Western Europe to deal with, too. It was not an amorphous group of people who could not run their own affairs. We had something to deal with.

What is discouraging to me is I don't see how you can ever make anything out of this place—from your own description of the chaos after all these years, of the local people. What do you deal with? And are we capable of creating a viable regime there? This is a great question as to the feasibility I am talking about, no matter what the desirability may be. Do you really think you can do this?

There is a great question whether it is possible for the Americans to do this. We could do it in Europe, we proved we could do it, and I think there are good reasons to distinguish it from this case.

General TAYLOR. I remember there were just about as many doubts when NATO was founded, as to whether we were going to save Western Europe or not. At every critical point in our history we have had a tough question in front of us. Had we followed the same line of reasoning in NATO, had we listened to the theories advanced by many, many of our senior people at that time and not tried the NATO gambit, Western Europe would be under the Soviets today. I do not feel the problem is really basically any more difficult today in Southeast Asia than it was at the time of the fall of Czechoslovakia.

WITH WHOM CAN WE NEGOTIATE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask in that regard a question I do not think has been answered here today?

The President has said that he would negotiate with anyone. Many of our letters—and we get masses of letters, mostly critical—say to negotiate. All right. Following up what these gentlemen have said, with whom today can we negotiate successfully out there to end this situation? Must it be only Hanoi, or must it include the Chinese Communists and possibly Russia? With whom can we negotiate? I have never heard that question answered.

General TAYLOR. I don't think we have gotten to the point of negotiating. We are talking about discussing. The first thing we would discuss would be how to negotiate. But the easy answer is we would like to have this negotiation, at the proper time, between North and South Vietnam. How we would be involved, whether simply our good offices would be involved or a more direct contact, I don't know.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is not going to stop the situation. If North and South Vietnam today negotiate and work out a peaceful settlement, in your opinion is that going to stop the situation in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. You are suggesting the Chinese would not let them?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

General TAYLOR. I think they would because—no one has anything to gain by a generalized war at this time. The Chinese don't, the Soviets don't, Hanoi doesn't, we certainly don't. In a situation where no one would win by expanding this war, I think the Chinese would not be happy but willing to let this thing go.

SAFE AS ANY PERIPHERAL STATE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Following up what the chairman has said, as opposed to World War II, can we be satisfied that our security is enhanced if the North Vietnam and the South Vietnam get together, without any influence from or without any statements of any kind from Communist China?

General TAYLOR. I think it could be as safe as any peripheral state can be close to Red China or close to Russia.

NEED TO OCCUPY SOME TERRITORY

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, that leads back to a question I have, the answer to which is the most disappointing and discouraging part of this thing as far as I am concerned.

I agree all wars have as their purpose breaking down the will of the other fellow to keep on fighting. Now, one way you do that in all wars is not just by bombing. Certainly if bombing alone would break down the will, Hitler would have quit a long time before D-Day. There was a lot of bombing.

We have got to get some occupied territory. We have got to consolidate an area. To me it is tremendously discouraging that it has been almost a year since your last report, and you say that we cannot tell that we have got any more acres or miles that have been consolidated on the free side than last time.

General TAYLOR. I could. I just don't have the figures here. But I still say that mileage does not mean anything in a country where

you have tens of thousands of square miles unpopulated that no one wants to live in.

I can get you——

Senator MUNDT. Someplace you have to occupy some territory. As I see the picture, we have certain bastions of freedom we are holding, the Communists have certain lowlands or valleys or mountains that they are hiding in. So, they come out and strike at us, kill a bunch of our boys, and we rush back and try to clean out that area. Eventually, in a small area like this, with the manpower we have got outnumbering them 4 to 1, I would think we could have a mopup operation and gradually push them down the peninsula and throw them into the sea.

PROVINCIAL PACIFICATION PLANS

General TAYLOR. Each province has its pacification plan based upon the terrain in that province. All the forces in that province are constantly doing what you are talking about, moving back, clearing, holding, clearing, holding—sometimes losing ground.

Senator MUNDT. Are there definite moves of a provincial bastion in one place to take a contiguous area and hold it?

General TAYLOR. Every province has its pacification program which has been related in general to the allocation of forces throughout the country.

Senator MUNDT. It would be very encouraging if you could come here and show us a map of South Vietnam and show us where we were a year ago and where we are now. I don't think that bombing, chasing them back into the jungle, is ever going to end this thing.

General TAYLOR. You are saying what I say, Senator. Bombing is not the full answer. It is corollary and ancillary to the action in the south. We must do better in the south.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis has a question.

Senator STENNIS. I will be quite brief, Mr. Chairman.

PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN VIETNAM

Mr. Ambassador, I just want to say this: With your knowledge there, you are well-versed and qualified to speak on it. But in the comparison between the present situation over there in Southeast Asia and Western Europe, I think your statement denies the differences in the people and in the basic economy and the capacity. I just say that in passing. I don't want to argue it now.

General TAYLOR. I agree with you entirely.

Senator STENNIS. Do they have a parliamentary system in South Vietnam? Do they elect their officials? Do they have a legislative body?

General TAYLOR. They have a legislative committee which was appointed at the time of the foundation of the Quat government. The next step is to have general elections next October, which will be——

Senator STENNIS. They told me in Thailand, our people did, that they do not have a parliamentary system there, "and please don't bring it up."

General TAYLOR. In Thailand?

Senator STENNIS. That is right, in Thailand. They have had it and abandoned it. I was there about 1959.

NO PROBLEMS WITH SUPPLIES

Now, the military situation. What about the logistics, the supply lines and everything? Are our men having what they need over there?

General TAYLOR. Oh, yes—no problem.

Senator STENNIS. Of course, you have a very crowded situation in those airfields, as illustrated by the explosion.

General TAYLOR. That's right. However, we are building a new one, and a second one beyond that has been approved.

Senator STENNIS. Do you have enough money for all of those things?

General TAYLOR. As far as I know; yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. You don't have any undercurrent of complaint or anything, official or otherwise?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, not from the American side.

Senator STENNIS. Of course, we are creating a problem back here in supplying our divisions—but you are entitled to be supplied.

General TAYLOR. The whole area is favored by every department in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

DESTROY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't it a fact that the Vietcong in South Vietnam are trying, by their tactics, to destroy the will of the people to resist the movement of the Vietcong?

General TAYLOR. Yes, I would say that it is to win over the people and get control of the people.

Senator LAUSCHE. Surely.

Now, we can allow them to do that and finally take hold of South Vietnam—my question is, if that happens, will that be the end of our troubles in Southeast Asia?

General TAYLOR. If the Vietcong succeed in taking it over?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

General TAYLOR. I would say it would be the start of our troubles.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now, then, the alternative—if we say let them get together, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Communists, and they do get together, and we pull out, will that be the end of our troubles?

General TAYLOR. I would say, first, they already had gotten together—that the Vietcong are directly supported from North Vietnam and without North Vietnam would soon wither on the vine.

THE EQUIVALENT TO DEFEAT

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's assume our friends join with the Vietcong and the Communists of the north and they say, "We will live together peacefully." Will that be the end of our troubles?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I would say that is equivalent to defeat.

Senator LAUSCHE. In your opinion, where would be the next focal point where you would have your problem over there?

General TAYLOR. Certainly Laos would go very quickly. It is in a very fragile state of balance at the present time. Thailand is under threat and, of course, Cambodia has declared neutrality already.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then the argument that Vietnam means nothing assumes that that is all that we have at stake, Vietnam, and that Thailand and Indonesia and Malaysia and Laos and Cambodia are of no consequence to us; is that a fact?

General TAYLOR. I have never known, frankly, what the people mean when they say "Vietnam is of no consequence." I strongly disagree with that statement.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, they talk about entering into a peaceful understanding with the North Vietnamese Communists, the South Vietnamese, and our friends in South Vietnam. Isn't that exactly what we tried to do in Laos in 1962 by calling together all of the contending parties and saying, "Enter into an understanding that will bring peace in Laos"?

General TAYLOR. I think there certainly is an analogy there.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY

We first asked Laos to issue a declaration of the neutrality of Laos, and it responded and said, "We will be neutral, we will not help either the West or the Communists." On July 23, 1962, Laos issued its declaration. Following that declaration, the nations involved in the pact of 1954 sat down and signed the protocol to the declaration of neutrality of Laos. I want to read that.

Article 2. All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations, and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn.

That was a peaceful objective. Hanoi signed it.

In the third section it was declared that departure points shall be established where the departure will be observed to see whether the troops are pulled out.

Article 4. The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations, and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

Article 6. The introduction into Laos of armament and war materiel generally, except such quantities of conventional armament as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary, is prohibited.

That which is being advocated now by some was sought to be done in Laos. Hanoi signed it, pledged its honor that peace would prevail in Laos. My question is, Did Hanoi conform with this agreement?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I think the record shows it did not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, you are going to have a new agreement with them. We are going to pull out of South Vietnam and peace will come to that area.

General TAYLOR. I don't know who is proposing this, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not saying that you are.

General TAYLOR. I know of no one in responsible places in Government.

Senator LAUSCHE. The formulators of the foreign policy of our country, newspaper reports, are advocating it.

General TAYLOR. Happily, I don't know about it in official circles.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have any questions?

LOSS OF BOMBERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wanted to ask General Taylor about this loss of the bombers on the airfield in Bien Hoa, 16 or 18 of them blown up. Do you have anything you can tell us about that, as to the cause of that?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I think the Pentagon now has the final report. I, of course, was very much interested. I went over immediately after it occurred. I think the report will show, still, uncertainty as to whether it was a defective fuse, as originally suspected, or some other cause unidentified. I would suggest you ask the Pentagon for the report.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the domino effect of bomber after bomber being destroyed——

The CHAIRMAN. How many did go?

General TAYLOR. I believe it was a total of 10, and then there were 1 or 2 more planes, not bombers.

Senator STENNIS. Senator, if you would yield to me just a moment—we have had a hearing on that over in the Preparedness Committee. They talked to us about it and gave us some leads on it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. While General Taylor is a military man, I know he is our ambassador over there. I don't know whether he had anything to tell us about it.

Senator STENNIS. I was interested in your question, too, but since he said he did not have any knowledge, I will give you what we have.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't believe I have any more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. There were 10 B–58's?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they worth $10 million each?

Senator STENNIS. No. The B–57 is what we lost. They are about $1½ million apiece.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

ALL COUNTRIES ARE NOW ADJACENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I want to make a statement and then I would like to ask one question.

When I used the term "fish or cut bait" with Mr. Rostow, we were not doing anything particularly. Now I do think they are fishing. I mention that because my colleague did not understand.

This business of spheres of influence, Dr. [Hans] Morgenthau's thought about China being the logical dominator of the Far East and so forth, I don't think these people understand the tremendous change in the military picture in the last 10 years. Every country military timewise is in the adjacent country.

I made a talk in Missouri this week. Actually in military time Red China is closer to St. Louis today by air than Kansas City was to St. Louis by air at the end of World War II.

I remember General Bradley saying to me—he was born in Clark, MO, 12 miles from Moberly. We dedicated the airport in his name. He said, "It took me longer to go those 12 miles when I was a kid than it takes a man today to go around the world." That is just as important for political as it is for military recognition, if Clausewitz was right in his concept of what war was.

CLEAR EVIDENCE OF SINCERITY

I would like to ask this question: Suppose that in a true Machiavellian style, Ho Chi Minh said, we have what looks like an ostensible victory, the pressures were what we hope, we feel they can be, and he gives in, you might say, and then we get out. But suppose that his agreement was a typical Communist agreement and he had no intention of keeping it. Then, after a few months, or a period of time, he would work his way back into the Saigon government, due to the obvious problems that they have in keeping a political position down there stable.

What would we do in a case like that? Do we have to go back in, try to retake the airfield, get into military operations? What would we do?

General TAYLOR. First, I would assume we would be very, very reluctant to move too fast in this business, until we had clear evidence of sincerity of intent on the part of the other person. The hardest question of how to end this, of course, is not the action of Hanoi and the assisting which they can do. This we could verify pretty well. It is what to do with the hundred thousand-plus Vietcong who have got guns in their hands and are still within the country. How are you going to get rid of them?

I would not think we would depart until that was solved in some way, such as a general amnesty, with their coming forward and turning in their weapons and going north—having a second partition in a sense, something like that. Once that had been done, I would think then with the airfields available and with our proved mobility, both seaborne and airborne, that we could indeed cut back and reduce our forces to something like the kind of training missions we had when we started. In other words, they would have to perform up to a certain point before we would take out substantial forces, but then we would have in-country a series of bases ready for reoccupation and retaking if necessary.

Senator SYMINGTON. No matter what our riches are, our treasure and our people are limited. Ever since World War II, wherever we go in, we stay in: Korea, the Formosa Strait defense, and above all in West Berlin.

HOW LONG CAN U.S. ACT UNILATERALLY

How long can we be almost unilateral, or at least the vast majority of the power, the force, to contain communism and at the same time—I know your knowledge goes far beyond the military—be able to carry that from the standpoint of our economy? Just what you say there—our watching the bases. Are we going to end up with, say, three divisions? We have had five divisions in Germany for over 20 years. We have had two divisions in Korea for 15 years, this summer.

Is this going to be another place where a great segment of the American economy and treasure and people has got to be shored up? And if this is true, how long can we do that as one nation?

General TAYLOR. Those, of course, are very good questions, Senator. Unfortunately, I do not think anyone can answer them, except to say I see no reason why there should be any large permanent deployment in a place like South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a very good question. This is getting to what I was trying to get at a while ago. It seems to me this is essential to a determination of what our policy is.

SHRINKING OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS

Senator SYMINGTON. Just one more point.

Mr. Menzies [2] was here. Some of us had lunch with him. There was a tremendous business about Australia doubling its contingent in South Vietnam.

Senator JACKSON. Doubling its total military forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. We found it was from 30 to 60 men. That has been changed. They are going to put in a battalion. But the idea of what we do and the other countries do is getting sort of silly. It is just how long, regardless of how right we are, can we swing it from an economic standpoint.

General TAYLOR. I think there is an interesting question I would like to ask your judgment on, Senator. If, indeed, we pulled our forces out of Europe, let's say, would we demobilize them? If we pulled our forces out of Korea, would we demobilize those divisions? Is it possible to shrink our military establishment in view of our worldwide responsibility? And do overseas commitments per se add materially to the drain you refer to?

Senator SYMINGTON. The answer to that is yes, very definitely so. For example, in my opinion our chief economic problem today is balance of payments. We have nearly a million people in Europe today, counting dependents—937,000.

General TAYLOR. On the gold flow side, there is no question about it, but on the budget side, does it cost more to maintain a division in Europe than a division in the United States?

Senator SYMINGTON. The point I want to make is—and I would hope this is seriously discussed at the Security Council level—how long can America be a world policeman against communism to the extent it is doing now, and specifically in the South Vietnam picture, do we see any chance of not being forced to police that country over a long period of years unless we are going to trust the decision made in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. It is a very important point.

A TREMENDOUS DRAIN

The CHAIRMAN.I think it is the crucial one. If we keep accumulating Korean situations, which has been a tremendous drain, at some point it seems to me we have got to clearly go broke.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the Russian program.

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[2] Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Gordon Menzies.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we are not playing their program by expanding our commitments in fashion. What I meant a moment ago is, is it feasible, is there any hope of the kind of success that would enable us to withdraw? I don't see it. We have not withdrawn from Europe, but at least the Germans are able to offset our expenditures to some extent by their purchases. I don't know how long they can do that. They will be covered up with arms after a while. But these poor people cannot do anything.

General TAYLOR. We have not had World War III, either. Furthermore, we are talking less and less about the Soviet menace. So, I would say our policy has been pretty good.

Senator JACKSON. I would like to take off on that point that you just made.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would explain it.

Senator JACKSON. No, I am not explaining anything. I want to ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, by your questions. Go ahead.

DETERRING WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me the point here is that we have demonstrated that we can deter general war. We have not had it, so we have deterred it.

Haven't we demonstrated that we can deter limited war? We did in Korea; did we not?

General TAYLOR. Yes, but I would say the possibility of limited war elsewhere——

Senator JACKSON. Yes, but I say we have demonstrated. It seems to me that the real crucial question is, whether we can deter that which the enemy has said will be the preferred course of aggression, namely, wars of national liberation. This is the thing that interests me. It is not just Vietnam. I think the importance in Vietnam is what you mention plus—that is, to live up to our commitment, preserve the integrity of the country—we have the threat of Red China as it relates to Southeast Asia, which is Australia, New Zealand, and the whole area.

But the intriguing question which I think we ought to concentrate on is how do you deter wars of national liberation? If your enemy tells you precisely what he is going to do, you are not apt to believe him. Candor can be an extremely excellent form of deception.

Now, they have said they are going to do this. And people say this is civil war. The truth is that the Russians, the Communists came to power through civil war. Mao came to power through civil war. The Greek aggression was civil war. That sort of thing you can deal with on the continent of Europe, because it gets to a classical war situation and your job is a lot easier.

But I want to know is what the answer is. I am not expecting to find it right now, but what is the answer to a situation such as Vietnam, such as can rise in Africa, where there is no national consciousness, where they have never known statehood, and still provide the means of protecting their territorial integrity, and yet help them become a nation? Isn't this our problem out there?

Vietnam has never existed as a nation. I think part of our problem is that our people do not understand Vietnam. They do not understand that historically the Vietnamese have always hated the Chinese, that the Chinese use them as slaves, and they were taken as indentured workers, the Tonkinese are spread all the way across the Pacific.

I just get worked up about these things once in a while.

AGGRESSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY

It seems to me that the real issue here is how we proceed to deal with this total threat of military, economic, political psychology?

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly the issue I was groping for. Can we do this sort of thing, no matter how worthy the purpose is? Can this be done?

Senator JACKSON. This is the thing I think we must realize. They have told us this is what they are going to do. They have made clear that t' s their preferred form of aggression—civil war—as you mentio aggressive counterinsurgency, or insurgency.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator will yield. Ambassador Lodge told us that the South Vietnamese had five things that they were terrified of: fire, plague, floods, robbery, and a central government.

General TAYLOR. No one is ever for the government over there. Traditionally you are bound to be against it.

I agree will all that you say, Senator. I think our Government is aware of this. At least for the last 2 years the whole training program of the Armed Forces, a great deal of attention in the State Department has been directed toward the problem of subversive insurgency.

Certainly we are aware of the fact that to deal with this kind of business we have to anticipate it. Anticipation comes first, a friendly government comes second——

Senator JACKSON. Don't we have to make this kind of aggression unprofitable? This is to me the crucial thing. It is not just Vietnam. We have got this problem in South America lurking, we have got it in Africa. This is the crucial issue. This is what we ought to concentrate our debate on more and more, all of us on either side of an issue, to come up with some constructive answers.

HOW CAN WE BE SPREAD ALL OVER THE WORLD?

The CHAIRMAN. Recalling Lodge's statement, he seemed to emphasize that there had to be much greater emphasis on political and economic development if you were ever to make progress. He did not mean to withdraw the military. It has to be there as a kind of basic protector. But I would say—I don't think I am misquoting at least the spirit of what he said—while you hold it with the military, you have got to do much more in a political and economic sense if you are ever to meet what Senator Jackson was talking about on the other side of it, to create through economic and political means some viable organization. It cannot result just from military action.

Senator JACKSON. I would agree with the chairman, but I want to say one other thing.

How can we be spread all over the world? I would like someone to do a little research job and observe what happened to the British in the 19th century. In the 19th century they were all over the world. It was a responsibility they did not want, but they had to take it in order to maintain their base of power in islands. And I think—sure it has been accelerated—but I think there is a lesson here. We are in the same boat, for better or for worse.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is one major difference. In the British days, they could destroy any country in the world if they had to, without being destroyed themselves. That we cannot do.

THREE CHOICES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I am merely making an inquiry here, because I don't know what the solution to this situation is.

There are various alternatives, but it seems to me that we are facing one of three choices, broadly speaking. Either pull out, which is defeat, completely—I mean loss of face all over the world and loss of our position. The other is to negotiate; that is, discussions leading up to negotiation, and then negotiate ourselves out of this thing one way or another, which I would have no particular faith in, because we never have won a negotiation with the Russians yet, or the Communists, that I know of. The other is to destroy all reasonable vestiges of troublemaking in North Vietnam. That would require, of course, a greatly stepped up military action, probably the destruction of Hanoi, probably the destruction of major ports along the seacoast, and their industrial complexes—but just physically bring them completely to their knees, to where they would not have the capacity to at least renew their subversive activities for a long period of time. Of course, this latter would involve the possibility of Red China getting into this thing, or somebody else. There are lots of potentials, but it seems to me that we have got in the main two lines of conduct.

If we pull out, it is complete defeat in my judgment. I mean the American prestige, American leadership is gone for God knows how long if we pull out of there. And I believe if we pull out, the whole kit and caboodle will go Communist—India and Pakistan and Thailand and Burma and Indonesia, and the isolation of Australia—I am quite committed to the domino theory if we pull out of there.

Now, negotiations have never proved satisfactory. We have been talking—first in Geneva and now in Warsaw—to the Reds for how many years, ever since Korea, very shortly after that. We have gotten noplace. We have never gotten anyplace with the Russians or the Communists because it is not their method of operation—procrastination, delay, time is on their side. They are winning as long as time goes on.

TAKE THE HAZARD OF CHINESE INTERVENTION

I kind of wonder if our only ultimate out here with any security at all is to take the hazard—I am not necessarily advocating this, I am just thinking out loud—but to take the hazard of Chinese intervention and plaster them from the 17th parallel to the Chinese

border, virtually shooting anything that moves up there. To just destroy them practically, from the standpoint of any viable economy or any viable military operation, is the only avenue that can give us any reasonable guarantee of stability in that area in a prolonged period when that subversion from North Vietnam can be stopped.

It has, of course, monumental hazards, tremendous hazards, which are beyond my ability to assess. I don't know, but I don't see there is any end to it. I don't see any conclusion. I don't believe that the policy we are following now of piecemeal and selective bombing—they probably can predict, can guess we will hit tonight on one of two places up there and tomorrow night we will hit one of two other places. The selective bombing—it is not nitpicking, I don't mean that, it hurts them. There was a story in the paper yesterday that said they are rapidly throwing wooden girders across these bridges to restore the spans temporarily so they can get the goods across them. They found ways and means to get around our destruction of facilities. We can destroy a radar station and they can put in another one very shortly.

But we have not, and maybe we shouldn't—I don't know, I am just at a loss here to know—but we have not hit at the heart of this infection, which is the basic center—for instance, Hanoi, their ports, and the whole economic complex of North Vietnam. I seriously question that we will ever get anyplace over there with any reliability and be able to get down to the work of organizing a reliable economy in South Vietnam until North Vietnam is brought, probably completely, to its knees. And I don't know whether that is worth it or not.

AN INTERMEDIATE APPROACH

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know, either, but I certainly don't subscribe to total destruction. We can't possibly avoid getting in China. Then you would come to the question of why don't we do it to China.

We are never going to be rid of troubles. The idea that if you had a complete military victory, there would be no trouble in the world—we are going to have them anyway. Time goes on and the troubles change. We more or less thought that about Germany, that we would liberate them and it would be the end of our troubles, but it only created more trouble of a different kind.

I can't take that at all.

The intermediate approach is the only one I can even contemplate. It is somewhere between getting out and destroying it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Negotiation would be very desirable if you could rely on it.

The CHAIRMAN. You say no negotiations have ever been made that have succeeded. Austria, however, is a clear example. What do you think about it?

General TAYLOR. I would not go so far as the Senator does. I think we are on a course of action which may not succeed, but it is well worth giving it a good try.

COOPERATION NEEDED FROM HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think total destruction is contemplated there?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I would say total destruction works against what we are trying to do now. We need a certain degree of cooperation out of Hanoi. We don't need corpses and destroyed cities. We need leaders who are forced to change their policy in self-interest.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Maybe that is true, but I see no sign of any success along that line.

General TAYLOR. I think it is far too early for that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the Army has won wars for us, but the politicians have lost the peace every time.

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I am due at the Security Council at 12 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I hope we are not contemplating all-out Third World War.

General TAYLOR. Not I, sir.

Senator JACKSON. I just want to make an observation. It seems to me—of course, there are many questions involved in all this. One is our staying power. I do think we have to find a way in which we can bring this type of insurgency under control faster than we have in the past. This is what all the debate is about.

General TAYLOR. We started too late.

Senator JACKSON. This is what causes the frustration and the difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the session was concluded.]

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MINUTES

FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:30 p.m., in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman) and Senators McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, and Case.

Thomas Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Robert Sayre, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, discussed the trouble spots in Latin America.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1965

U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

The first item on the agenda was the Protocol Amending the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, dated at The Hague, September 28, 1955 (Ex. H., 86th Congress, 1st Sess.)

On the question of reporting the protocol to the Senate for ratification, the chairman directed the clerk to call the roll, and the members responded to their names, as follows:

Yeas:
Senator Sparkman;
Senator Mansfield (proxy);
Senator Morse (proxy);
Senator Long (proxy);
Senator Lausche (proxy);
Senator Symington (proxy);
Senator Dodd (proxy);
Senator Clark;
Senator Pell (proxy);
Senator McCarthy;
Senator Hickenlooper;
Senator Aiken;
Senator Carlson;
Senator Williams;
Senator Case;
Senator Fulbright (proxy).
Nays:
Senator Gore.
Senator Church abstained.

So the Protocol was ordered reported by a vote of 16 yeas to one nay.

The next order of business was the nominations of 760 USIA officers to become officers in the Foreign Service. William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, testified on the nominations.

On the question to report favorably the nominations to the Senate, the Chairman directed the clerk to call the roll, and the members responded to their names, as follows:

Yeas:
Senator Sparkman;
Senator Mansfield (proxy);
Senator Morse (proxy);
Senator Long (proxy);
Senator Gore (proxy);
Senator Church;
Senator Dodd (proxy);
Senator Clark;
Senator McCarthy;
Senator Aiken;
Senator Carlson;
Senator Mundt (proxy);
Senator Case;
Senator Fulbright (proxy).

Nays:
Senator Lausche;
Senator Hickenlooper;
Senator Williams.

So the nominations were reported, 14 to 3.

The resolution (S. Con. Res. 36), expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations, was next in order. On motion by Senator Case, the resolution was ordered reported without objection and on a voice vote.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

HEARINGS ON VIETNAM AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman), presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Church, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Carlson, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. We might as well come to order.

Senator Dodd is here. He wrote us a letter on June 10 which you all have copies of before you.

[The letter referred to follows:]

JUNE 10, 1965.

Hon. J.W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: What I saw in Vietnam convinced me that the fundamental realities of the situation cannot be gleaned from a reading of the press.

In the speech which I am making this morning, I set forth instance after instance where the truth has been distorted by twisted or misplaced emphasis, or where important truths are not known because the story has not been told at all or not been told widely enough.

I am convinced that to a very large degree the opposition to administration policy stems from lack of information or misinformation.

If the national debate on Vietnam policy is to be conducted in a rational manner, it is essential that the facts be established and the nonfacts be laid to rest—as expeditiously as possible, but also as thoroughly and scrupulously as possible.

Because of this, I wish to propose that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee appoint a bipartisan factfinding mission to make an on-the-spot study of the situation in Vietnam and to report back.

I hope that this proposal meets with your approval.

I am taking the liberty of sending copies of this letter to the other members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. DODD.

Senator DODD. Do you want me to proceed, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Everybody has had a chance to read it.

Senator DODD. I haven't got much to add. The letter really says everything.

A POLITICAL WARFARE EFFORT

My own conviction is that there is a lot we can learn by having some members of this committee right there. The military situation, the political situation, the AID rural program which I was much impressed by, I don't think we really know much about—I didn't anyway. I would say this is a political warfare effort. I don't know how you can handle it with the attitude of the other three Far Eastern countries, things of that kind anyway. I think that says it. That is about all I can say about it. I think there is a lot of information available.

I was urged, by the way, by Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland to try to get others to come over and take a look. That was their attitude in April, I don't know what it is now. They didn't mention this committee specifically but just Members of the Senate and particularly newspaper people, I remember that particularly.

I was asked if I had any influence with some of them to try to get people like Walter Lippmann to take a trip over, and I didn't think I was the one to handle that, but that is really what was behind my idea, Mr. Chairman. I know it is difficult, maybe it can't be done now because of the pressure of work on us.

Mike Mansfield made a trip there at least twice or four times.

Senator MANSFIELD. Eight times.

Senator DODD. Eight times.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an authority. Then you tell us what your views are on this.

Senator MANSFIELD. I agree with what Tom said on the last. We have an awful lot of business to do here.

Senator DODD. I thought you were going to agree.

Senator MANSFIELD. We need the votes here. We have awfully important legislation coming up and, frankly, I don't know that we can find out anything that the administration doesn't know.

Senator DODD. Maybe after the session, Mr. Chairman.

A DIFFERENT PICTURE

For example, here is what I didn't know. You may all say that was just my own fault or ignorance. I had no idea that the Vietnamese had a substantial air force. I truly thought we were carrying the whole weight of the air fight. I was tremendously surprised to learn that they have about 800 crack pilots, that they are flying as many sorties as we do, that their maintenance record is just as good as ours. I don't know, maybe somebody knew it, I didn't know as they told me that 70, 75 percent of the Vietnamese force is voluntary. This gives quite a different picture to me of what the situation is, that sort of thing, so much more. More experienced men could find out what I didn't find out. I am sure of that.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think, Tom, Taylor and Westmoreland are doing the best they can under the circumstances.

Senator DODD. I do, too.

Senator MANSFIELD. But to be pragmatic about it and to point out the fact that the committees are just beginning to roll on the legislation is not to downgrade or lessen the importance of Vietnam, because that really has been the No. 1 priority. You have

Medicare coming up, you have the silver coinage, you have the military construction, you have the appropriation. What I would like to do would be to get this program on the way and, if possible, quit by Labor Day.

Senator DODD. Maybe then, Mr. Chairman, somebody could go over. I am not seeking to go, believe me. I don't think I should. I have been there.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think Tom's idea later has merit, but——

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

HEARINGS ON VIETNAM AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator DODD. I read in the paper—I didn't have a chance to ask you, are you planning on opening some hearings on Vietnam and the Dominican Republic? Maybe this would be a way at getting at it.

The CHAIRMAN. We weren't planning open hearings but closed hearings. That is later on the agenda, to talk about the hearings on the Dominican Republic. There is no reason why we can't have one on Vietnam. We had a number of Vietnam——

Senator CARLSON. I thought the discussion was on the Dominican Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. We have already instigated an inquiry about setting it up. I expect to discuss that just a little later this morning.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I won't press it. I don't want to be a nuisance.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how anyone could go. I couldn't go now. I have too many things to be done here.

Senator DODD. Maybe after the recess. Could it be considered as being held in abeyance until the adjournment?

The CHAIRMAN. You might do that.

Senator CHURCH. I should think after the session a visit by members of this committee might be very useful.

The CHAIRMAN. I think if everybody went now they would be under such pressure to get back that they would just be there for a day or two, have a drink at the bar, and be briefed by the Ambassador and then come home.

Senator CARLSON. I would just like to say this: I have been in Saigon and Vietnam once, but I was very happy I went there years ago because at least I know about how the country looks. I know nothing about the operation but I did drive from Saigon up toward Laos, that way, and I know how the country looks. It is helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. We will pass over that and defer it until near the end of the session, when it might be revived.

[The committee then discussed the proposal to have members present at the forthcoming celebration of the 20th anniversary of the United Nations in San Francisco.

[Senator Church, from his ad hoc subcommittee, reported to the full committee the bill (S. 1903), to amend the United Nations Participation Act, as amended. On his motion, seconded by Senator Dodd, the committee voted favorably, and without objection, to report the bill to the Senate.

[Senator Church then reported from his ad hoc subcommittee to the full committee the resolution (S.J. Res. 71), to amend the joint resolution of January 28, 1948, providing for membership and participation by the United States in the South Pacific Commission. The resolution was ordered favorably reported to the Senate, without objection, upon the statement of the question by the Chair.

[The next order of business was stated as the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union (Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.). After discussion, the chairman stated it was the consensus to have one executive hearing on the convention, and then to decide if a public hearing would be held thereon.]

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave, what about the Dominican Republic? What is the procedure?

Mr. MARCY. Pat has talked with them on this, and there might be a couple of points to make.

Mr. HOLT. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that following the discussion in the committee on June 1, you wrote to the Secretary of State saying the committee would like to explore the situation in the Dominican Republic in some detail in a series of strictly executive sessions, and suggesting that it would be helpful——

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want to do about this?

Senator CARLSON. I thought we agreed we were going to do it and you would work out a schedule.

Senator DODD. I will take the same view. I will leave it with the chairman.

DOCUMENTATION ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

Mr. HOLT. You suggested a number of executive branch officials the committee would want to hear. You also said it would be helpful if the Department could make available to the committee in advance the executive branch's documentation bearing upon the development of United States policy in the Dominican Republic.

The Secretary replied on June 11, welcoming this opportunity and designating Mr. Vaughn, the Assistant Secretary, as the coordinator for the arrangements. I spent Saturday morning at the Department with Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Mann discussing this in detail, at some length. They are in the process of compiling a fairly voluminous documentation bearing upon the question of Communists and the Communist activities in the Dominican Republic.

I told them in addition to the Communist question, there were various others that I felt the committee would want to go into, and asked for national intelligence estimates, for the telegraphic traffic between the Embassy in Santo Domingo and the Department, and for various memorandums of conversations and biographic data on some of the principals as to character. They said they would clear it with the White House but anticipated no great difficulty about it.

With respect to the witnesses, it seemed to us the logical way to proceed would be for Mr. Ball to lead off, to set the background, and then follow through more or less in chronological order as things have developed in the Dominican Republic, and end up with

a consideration of the future of the Dominican Republic and placing this problem in the context of overall Latin American policy and problems.

Besides Ball, they are prepared to produce Mr. Mann, Mr. Vance, Ambassador Bennett, former Ambassador Martin, and Admiral Raborn. The chairman had also said the committee wanted to meet with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and I gather that Mr. McGeorge Bundy is reluctant to appear. I said that before he finally declined, he should consider whether or not he wants to be put in the position where he gives background conferences to newspapermen and refused to talk to Senators, and they said they would present that aspect of it to him.

I guess that is all.

NONOFFICIAL AMERICAN WITNESSES

I also told them that in view of the conference on foreign aid, I did not think that the committee would be in a position to begin this until after July 4. I guess that is about it.

In the chairman's letter to the Secretary he said, "I should also tell you that the committee intends to invite nonofficial American citizens with knowledge of the Dominican situation to appear before it, also in closed session." It is very difficult to find nonofficial Americans who have knowledge of that situation and who also have a reputation for objectivity. It occurred to me that we might look at the group that was evacuated, some of whom were residents there and presumably would have known something about it.

There are some Puerto Ricans who might be helpful. Governor Luis Muñoz Marin has not himself been in the Dominican Republic, but he is reasonably well acquainted with conditions in that area. Jaime Benitez, who is the chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, has been in the Dominican Republic. I think he is there now, as a matter of fact. He might be able to shed some light on the situation. Those names were mentioned.

We left this that the Department is going to call me by the middle of this week with the results of their discussions with the White House. I guess that is about it.

PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVITY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any suggestions, Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we ought to find out what we can about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this procedure agreeable?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Any suggestions?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I suggest with reference to Pat's comment that it is difficult to find American citizens who are unofficial who can approach it with complete objectivity, I think we are just as handicapped in that line as we are with American officials. I think they can't speak with objectivity. They are running the show and whatever bobbles they make, I don't think they are necessarily fully objective in this situation.

Mr. HOLT. I didn't intend to imply that they were.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we could get some—I think there are probably, as you suggested, out of these people who came out of there, I think there are probably perfectly honest, honorable people who do their best to try to be objective and try to be honest with this committee. Now, manifestly there are some who are highly prejudiced, and we get letters which indicate complete devotion to their own slant from the Department of State people.

PATTERNS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is inevitable. The way I thought we would have these witnesses is they would tell their story and the staff and the committee working together could see if there is any pattern in it at all of agreement or disagreement and then after a study, we would pursue it with whomever may be suggested. Very often what happens as we go along a hearing with those who mention incidents and those who would give us a lead as to where we might find some further leads to develop further——

Mr. HOLT. I think the opportunity to go through this documentation that you asked for will probably save a lot of time, because this will enable us to pinpoint precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. I think these witnesses you mention will be highly cumulative. I can't imagine that Mann's testimony and some of the others won't be very much the same, Mann and Raborn have discussed it and gone over it, unless it appears there is disagreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not criticizing them for it, but I think any of these officials are bound to present the established line of procedure, designation made on their policy. I think they all probably will follow the same thing unless it gets into some specialized hearings on Javits' bill, and I thought it might be well to create a subcommittee for that. There is also another bill by Senator McGovern in which he wants to get additional, what is it, $500 million for creating centers in this country to help train people to be better able to understand the aid program.

The CHAIRMAN. $500 million?

Mr. HOLT. He has two different bills. One of them is training in this country, which I think is less than $500 million. He has another one, which is school lunches, and it starts out $500 million the first year and it escalates at the rate of $500 million a year through 1970.

Mr. MARCY. We said we would wait until we work out a draft.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take them when we get ready. OK.

ANNUAL NATO MILITARY TOUR

Mr. MARCY. One other thing just mentioned, Senator, here is a letter from Wayne Hays reminding the committee that from August 23 to September 4 they have their annual NATO military tour in Europe. For that period of a little bit over a week they would like to have four Senators designated.

The CHAIRMAN. Mike informed us he is hopeful we will get through by Labor Day. He doesn't want us to go off and I don't want to go off in the last few days of Congress, and I think it would be very difficult to get people.

Mr. MARCY. I doubt if we could get people to go. I think we could answer it by saying—this started out——

The CHAIRMAN. We have never done this before, have we?

Mr. MARCY. I don't think anyone from the Senate has, but the House people seem to like it very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we ought to make a commitment until we see how the Senate is going to wind up and when. I don't think we should go. Why not tell him that we can't make it; we discussed it and we can't make a commitment until we see when the Senate adjourns? If it does go until September 1, this will be the last week practically, and I wouldn't think many would want to be away. He is probably optimistic that we will be out Labor Day.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the purpose of this NATO business?

The CHAIRMAN. Education of the Members is the only purpose I can think of.

Mr. MARCY. Senator, I think the more crass explanation is most members of the NATO parliamentary groups don't have very much to do, and they like to come to the United States and be guests of the U.S. military and the Air Force and visit Cape Kennedy and Omaha.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a reciprocal arrangement?

Mr. MARCY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If we go, they come?

Mr. MARCY. We have had it. They have come twice, and the military puts on a big show for two or three planeloads of them. Every other year they do the same thing in Europe, but for the most part the people who go on these trips in Europe are the Europeans themselves. Usually the U.S. contingent is rather small.

The CHAIRMAN. I am in favor of deferring action on this.

Do you have any feeling about it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is deferred until we see what happens.

The committee is adjourned unless there are some further suggestions.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JULY 12, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session, at 10:05 a.m., in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

The Chairman announced the meeting had been called to discuss the terms of the Consular Convention with the U.S.S.R. (Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.) Those appearing on the Convention were Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and Richard Davis, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Also present: Robert W. Adams, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Mann; Leonard C. Meeker, the Legal Adviser, Department of State; Colonel Ralph E. Vandervort, Jr., Deputy Director, Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense; Alexander Schnee, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State; and Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

The Committee on Foreign Relations begins this morning a series of hearings on the situation in the Dominican Republic. I want to make it clear at the outset that at least so far as I am concerned we begin these hearings without prejudging the conclusion that may be reached. This is neither a witch hunt nor a whitewash. We are simply trying to understand how the situation in the Dominican Republic developed and particularly how U.S. policy developed. We are also interested, of course, in how the Dominican Republic fits into the context of our overall hemispheric relations and policies.

We have not yet seen the end of the Dominican story, and delicate negotiations are even now in progress. It is, therefore, of more than ordinary importance that the executive nature of these hearings be respected, especially in view of the unusual interest on the part of the press. The record of the hearings will not be published until after a sufficient number of years to make it only of historical interest, if then, and only then on order of the committee.

This morning we will hear from Mr. Thomas C. Mann, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who has requested that Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, also be present. They are prepared to return tomorrow morning in case they do not complete their testimony today. I suggest that we will probably run until about 1 o'clock, if it is agreeable with the committee.

We have arranged for Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, to be here Friday morning, and on Monday next, we will have Admiral Raborn, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. We can then decide if any additional witnesses are desired. We want all witnesses to have as much staff assistance

as they feel is necessary, but I hope it will be limited to that which is necessary and it will not include auditors from other agencies of the Government.

Finally, before we hear from Mr. Mann, I want to express the committee's appreciation to the Department of State for its cooperation with the committee staff and the committee in preparing for these hearings.

Mr. Vance has supplied a prepared statement on military movements and so on which will be inserted in full in the record, and, of course, on which he will be questioned about in the course of the hearings.

Mr. Mann, I believe you will lead off with a statement you have.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS C. MANN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; AND HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, the revolt against the government of Reid Cabral commenced at noon Saturday, April 24. A group of——

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, before you start, I left off one item. If there is no objection, I suggest in view of anticipating quite a number of members, that we proceed under the 10-minute rule so that everyone will have at least an opportunity. Then, after that, it will be open without objection.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I certainly have no objection. I have to leave at 11:15 to cut a transcription, but I will be back before 12. I have one or two things before the session concludes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to, certainly some of us will yield to you.

Senator CARLSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We want everybody to have a chance to begin, and then with the usual procedure of ten minutes.

Senator CARLSON. I will be back by 12.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MANN. The revolt against the government of Reid Cabral commenced at noon Saturday, April 24. A group of dissident military, totalling no more than an estimated 1,000 officers and men, seized control of an army post and, that same night, began distributing arms to civilian mobs.

On Sunday, April 25, a U.S. Naval Task Force was directed to move in the direction of the Dominican Republic, to stay out of sight of the Dominican shore, and to be prepared to evacuate Americans should this prove to be necessary.

On April 26, a number of U.S. citizens, principally tourists, requested evacuation in view of the continued deterioration in public order and the indiscriminate shooting that was taking place. On the evening of April 26, the Embassy recommended that Americans be evacuated through the Port of Haina about 7 miles west of Santo Domingo.

By Tuesday, April 27, several hundred Americans had gathered at the Ambassador Hotel on the western edge of the city. While they were being processed for evacuation, an armed gang engaged in indiscriminate firing both in the hotel itself and in the premises around it. Late in the same day the American Embassy, both chan-

cery and residence, came under sniper fire. The evacuation of more than 1,000 people was nevertheless successfully carried out through the Port of Haina on the same day.

DETERIORATION IN PUBLIC ORDER

On Wednesday, April 28, there was a further deterioration in public order. Molina Urena, who had shortly before been installed as provisional president and leader of the rebel movement, had taken asylum during the night of April 27. There was no one who even claimed to have control over the rebel movement or of the mobs in the street. Violence and looting were unrestrained. Reports of atrocities mounted. Policemen were being shot on sight and were seen shedding their uniforms in full flight.

The anti-rebel forces, under the command of General Wessin, and based about 10 miles east of the city at San Isidro, were ineffective. A small Wessin force entered the city but turned back on meeting resistance. At the same time, a column of about 1,000 officers and men approaching Santo Domingo from the west under General Montas entered the city but divided itself into small groups which temporarily succeeded in gaining possession of some parts of the city. They were quickly surrounded and isolated from each other and from General Wessin's forces.

Meanwhile, several hundred more civilians had gathered at the Ambassador Hotel area, expecting to be evacuated through the Port of Haina.

I have here by the way, Mr. Chairman, a map which I think will make some of these locations much clearer for the committee.

However, the anti-rebel forces informed the Embassy that their safe passage from the Ambassador Hotel to the Port of Haina could no longer be guaranteed.

U.S. FORCES LANDED TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES

Late in the afternoon of April 28 the Embassy Country Team unanimously recommended that U.S. forces be landed. A decision was promptly taken in the early evening of the 28th to land some 450 Marines for the purpose of securing an area near the Ambassador Hotel suitable for use by helicopters. Fifty additional Marines were dispatched to reinforce the Marine Guard at the Embassy, some distance from the Hotel.

The purpose of this landing was to protect American lives and specifically to bring about the speedy and orderly evacuation of civilians gathered at the hotel, mostly Americans and principally women and children.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if somebody could use a pointer and point out the spots that Secretary Mann is talking about.

Mr. MANN. When I finish this I might give you a rundown, Senator, if you like.

Mr. VANCE. I can show you where most of those are if you would like.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you mention a town or spot, if you could point out to us so we can get a perspective as to the locations——

Mr. VANCE. The hotel is out in this area right here.

Senator WILLIAMS. What number is that?

Mr. VANCE. This does not correspond with that which you have before you.

AIRLIFT BY HELICOPTERS

Mr. MANN. If I may, to give the committee a general idea, this is the river which separates the city itself, located in this area here; this is the main part of the city right here, up against the river and up against the sea. The San Isidro military base, where General Wessin's forces were at all times, was 10 miles east of this river. It is off the map. The Ambassador Hotel is in this area here on the edge, on the western edge of the city and near the sea.

The Port of Haina is not shown on this map, but it is about 7 miles to the west of the Ambassador Hotel in this direction. So that the first evacuation on Tuesday the 27th was through the Port of Haina where there were docks and facilities available. The actual landing took place in this area for the purpose of securing the polo field so that once this road was closed down to the coast, to Haina, so that several hundred Americans—in the end I think it turned out to be over a thousand Americans and foreigners, mostly women and children—were lifted by helicopters from an area secured by the Marines here directly onto the aircraft carrier standing offshore.

Senator CARLSON. Where would the airport be located that was built by Trujillo?

Mr. MANN. The airport is at San Isidro.

Mr. VANCE. The other one is down here, the commercial airport.

Mr. MANN. The other airport, not shown on the map but some distance from the city of——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What are those two strips ahead of there, just above that pencil?

Mr. VANCE. This one here is an old abandoned airfield which is now a housing development.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Senator AIKEN. Where did our Marines come from that first night?

Mr. VANCE. Where did our Marines come from? They came from offshore. They were deployed to stand offshore on the 25th. They were standing offshore, moved into shore, then went into shore by helicopter.

INTERNATIONAL SAFETY ZONE

Mr. MANN. I might, even before finishing my statement, give you a general idea of what these lines mean.

These lines here, including this little jut here, is the international safety zone. This is the perimeter which was held under OAS authority by Marines. This line that you see here is referred to as the LOC or line of communication between the troops stationed in the international zone here and the paratroopers over at the San Isidro base. Without this line of communication, it would have been impossible to communicate between the forces in this part of town and those of the base except by helicopter.

The rebel zone is this area in here, what is called the new city, but actually it is the old part of the city, the place where the banks and places of business are. This is a demilitarized zone around the national palace.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the rebel zone held by it completely?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Where is our Embassy located roughly?

Mr. MANN. Our Embassy is located right about here.

Senator CARLSON. Thank you.

Mr. MANN. Most of the Embassies, in fact, Senator, are located in this perimeter. The reason the perimeter was extended, originally at the request of some eight or ten Embassies under sniper fire for their own protection, it was done to bring within the international zone most, if not all, of the Embassies in the area.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the proportionate population in the rebel zone compared with the balance of that area?

Mr. MANN. I don't have the exact figures. I would guess, sir, maybe a third of the total in the city. This is a heavily populated area up here. It is a poor area. This is sort of the Wall Street area, the downtown business area. This is a rather higher class area in here. This is a factory area in here. All of the factories, Senator, are in this area, and there are people living on both sides. This map doesn't show it, but it is rather heavily populated on both sides north of this line here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the significance of the black line on the right side of the river running parallel?

Mr. VANCE. The significance of this line is it is the original line which was established by the 82nd Airborne when it came in to secure this side of the river.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right.

ROLE OF COMMUNIST FORCES

Mr. MANN. This does not mean that the U.S. Government was unaware of the Communist force within the rebel movement. We had been concerned about the three Communist parties in the Dominican Republic long before the revolution began. Our concern grew with news that the dissident military had passed out arms to civilians. It grew even more with the news that well-known Communists were identified as being active in the early hours of the revolution, not only in seizing control of propaganda media but also in passing out arms.

But it was not clear on the evening of April 28 that the Dominicans themselves would not be able to solve their own problems. The army, navy, and air force under the command of General Wessin were intact and apparently united. They had the preponderant military force. Only after it became apparent that the armed forces, especially the army, were unwilling or unable to act effectively was it clear that the Communist-controlled elements within the rebel movement constituted a clear and present danger to Dominican independence and, based on our experience in the October 1962 missile crisis, to our own security. Here again, our concern with the Communist facet of the problem was to grow with

each passing day bringing additional reports of Communist activities.

REINFORCE THE MARINES

On the afternoon of April 29, the continued deterioration in the Dominican situation, the need to protect several thousand Americans residing in the Dominican Republic, the growing bloodshed, and the weakness and disunity of the non-Communist elements on both the rebel and anti-rebel sides combined to cause us, again on the recommendation of the Embassy, to reinforce the Marines holding a small safety perimeter around the Ambassador Hotel and to land the first airborne troops at the San Isidro airbase in the early morning hours of April 30.

The small perimeter around the Ambassador Hotel was extended at the request of various embassies which had also come under sniper fire. This extension of the perimeter was subsequently approved as an international safety zone by the Organization of American States.

A line of communication between the international safety zone and the airborne troops at San Isidro was established on the night of May 2 for the purpose of securing an overland means of communication between the international safety zone and the San Isidro Airbase. This had the effect of interposing U.S. forces between the bulk of the rebel forces and the anti-rebel forces. In spite of the atrocities committed by both sides, and in spite of the repeated violations of the cease-fire which subsequently occurred, this act of interposition prevented killings on a much larger scale. It also had the effect of containing the bulk of the rebel forces within the principal business district of Santo Domingo, of helping to stabilize the interior of the country, and of reducing the risk that Communist elements in the rebel forces would be able, in the political vacuum which then existed, to seize control of the entire Dominican Republic by force.

EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A CEASE-FIRE

From the beginning the effects of the United States have been directed toward obtaining a cease-fire and the restoration of order, to helping non-Communist Dominican elements on both sides to reach agreement on a provisional government that could guide the country to elections, and to the achievement of effective OAS collective action at the earliest possible time.

The Ambassadors to the Organization of American States were informed as promptly as they could be found and reached when the decision was taken on the evening of April 28 to evacuate Americans by helicopter. A meeting of the council was called that same night and was held on the morning of Thursday, April 29. Previously, on the morning of April 28, the council had been fully briefed on the Dominican situation by the Ambassador from the Dominican Republic and on the day previous, April 27, the Inter-American Peace Committee had been briefed.

By May 1 a special meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs had been convened in Washington. From that time forward the Organization of American States had been deeply involved. On May 6, the

Inter-American Peace Force was created. American troops came under the command of the distinguished Brazilian General, Panasco Alvim.

In spite of the early efforts of the United States and later the continuing efforts of the OAS, acting through committees and through its Secretary General, it has not yet been possible to get both sides of the Dominican crisis to agree on a provisional government which could lead the country to elections and a return to economic and political normalcy. The need for a provisional government was, and remains, urgent.

The principal issues which have divided the two sides in the Dominican dispute were, and remain: the issue of control of the provisional government during the pre-electoral period and during elections; the issue of control of the military; the issue of what to do about Communist leaders; and the issue of protecting both sides against vengeance by the other.

I shall be glad to discuss more in detail these and other issues which the committee wishes to raise.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

For the benefit of those who came in late, the committee decided we would proceed in the early stages, at least, on the 10-minute rule so that everyone would have an opportunity to question, because otherwise some members might not have an opportunity to ask questions. So, I will start.

EVALUATION OF THE REID CABRAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. Secretary, by way of background, I wonder if you could tell us what the policy toward the Dominican Republic prior to the uprising against the Reid Cabral government on April 24 was and what we had done to carry out that policy?

How did we evaluate the Reid Cabral government?

Mr. MANN. The government of Mr. Bosch, which preceded the triumvirate, was in turn succeeded by Reid Cabral, had left the country in what can accurately be described as an economic mess. The Dominican economy is a sugar economy. It depends for its foreign exchange on exports of sugar.

Nearly all of the, about half, the Dominican sugar was raised in the old days by Trujillo and his family. His estates were expropriated about 3 years ago in his death, and the title to these properties came to be in the government itself.

Under Bosch the cost of producing sugar went to about 11 cents a pound. Shortly thereafter the world price of sugar dropped to about 2 cents a pound. This meant that the economy was not viable. The Dominican currency was overvalued, there was underemployment and unemployment. I would say that our main efforts in those days were to get an economic base which was viable in the hope that building on that base we could help the country to go to elections and——

The CHAIRMAN. Was this under Bosch?

Mr. MANN [continuing]. To needed social reforms.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about——

Mr. MANN. No. I thought the question was what was our policy toward the Reid regime?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I got lost there. I thought you were talking about Bosch. But under Reid Cabral we were favorable to his government; did we support it?

Mr. MANN. We supported the Reid Cabral government in the same sense that we support all governments with which we have relations—not in the sense of intervening, as far as I know, Senator, in their internal affairs.

AN HONEST PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Did we think it was a good government, and did we try to help them?

Mr. MANN. We thought Reid Cabral was the first honest President that the Dominican Government had in a long time. We realized he had no broad political base. He was not an effective orator but we thought he was trying to do a good job, a very effective job in restoring order out of economic chaos, and we supported his regime with limited amounts of aid.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we give him aid?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We approved of him and gave him aid.

Did we do anything about the sugar quota?

Mr. MANN. The sugar quota is ruled by the Act of Congress and we did nothing specifically on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that because you couldn't do anything under the law?

Mr. MANN. We never gave it much thought, Senator, since it is legally impossible to do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. We gave him some economic aid, didn't we?

Mr. MANN. We gave him limited amounts of economic aid.

The CHAIRMAN. How much, do you remember?

Mr. MANN. I have some figures here, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, approximately.

Mr. MANN. A total of about $61 million, counting Treasury standbys, social progress trust funds, bank loans, P.L. 480 and what might be called aid; the total of about $61 million between January 1964 and April 24, 1965.

The CHAIRMAN. Really what I was trying to establish is we were trying to work with Reid, we thought he was a good government, is that correct? I mean the best that they had had.

Mr. MANN. We thought at that period in Dominican history he was doing the best job that could have been expected at time.

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Did we supply him with any intelligence services?

Mr. MANN. I think, Senator, I am not sure about this, but it is standard practice for us to exchange information about Communist activities—not about the activities of non-Communists—about Communist activities, with all governments in the hemisphere with which we have relations. I think to that extent there was an exchange of intelligence information.

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

Mr. MANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]
Mr. MANN. [Deleted.]

MILITARY AID

The CHAIRMAN. Did we give him any military assistance through the air attachés? Did they advise him and did we give him funds or equipment?

Mr. VANCE. Mr. Chairman, it is my recollection that we did give military aid. I cannot give you the exact figure but my recollection is that it was less than $500,000 per year.

The CHAIRMAN. And training.

Do you know how large their police force was?

Mr. MANN. Their police force was between 8,000 and 9,000, according to my best recollection, and their armed forces totalled approximately 14,000, as I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. The main point I was trying to make is, it was my understanding that we did approve of and tried to support the Reid government in many ways; I mean economic and through assistance in their intelligence.

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, Senator.

ANTICIPATING THE COUP

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us, how well did the United States anticipate this anti-Reid coup of April 24?

Mr. MANN. We had continuing intelligence. I might tell the committee first that under Trujillo we had practically no intelligence in the Dominican Republic. All sources during the Trujillo regime were identified and liquidated by the Trujillo government. [Deleted.]

May I ask one question here before going into detail? In the event this is published in later years, will there be an opportunity to delete certain things?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. It won't be published unless the committee authorizes it. I don't anticipate it will ever be published, but under the rules of the committee it can't be published without the direction and approval of the full committee and I am sure if there is any reason for it to be, it would be, as they call it, sanitized.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why can't he give the answer without having it go on the record?

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive record, and if it is to be useful——

Mr. MANN. It is perfectly all right, so long as we have a chance to delete certain sensitive things.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. We don't anticipate it will be published at all.

Mr. MANN. [Deleted.] We were aware of the fact that Mr. Bosch was plotting to overthrow the Reid government. These plots were endemic. A plot would exist to move on a certain date and when nothing happened that date would be moved up for 1 month or 2 months. This was an endemic, perpetual thing.

[Deleted.] What we did not know and what Reid did not know was the extent of the defection within the military itself.

As I stated earlier, about a thousand officers and men defected and took over an army post, without which all of this plotting would have been fruitless.

SHORT-TERM POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. According to one of the chronological statements supplied to the committee, which reads as follows:

Assistant Secretary Vaughn met with officials from the State Department and CIA to discuss the worsening situation in the Dominican Republic. After review of the critical position of the Reid government, Mr. Vaughn decided to order Ambassador Bennett to return to Washington the following week to join the State Department and other officials in an examination of our short and intermediate term policy toward the Dominican Republic.

That meeting, I think, was on April 14.

What was the short and intermediate term policy which was to be examined and what was Assistant Secretary Vaughn thinking about it at that time?

Mr. MANN. I think that question might better be put to Mr. Vaughn, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are not aware of it, it is quite all right.

Mr. MANN. Insofar as I am aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I would presume that the immediate problem was how to maintain the viability of the economy, how to keep people employed and how to reduce expenditures in the government monopolies, how to——

CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything on April 14 that made it critical?

Mr. MANN. I might tell you about some of the reforms that Reid tried to institute with our support. This, together with the drop in the price of sugar, I think, directly contributed to the success of the revolution.

The old Trujillo military were very corrupt. There were generals, a number of generals, and the police chief himself was very corrupt. They had the duty-free import privileges and were actually selling on a large scale things that had been imported duty-free for their personal profit.

A move was underway to try to eliminate corruption within the government, especially within the armed forces, to collect taxes from those having the ability to pay. It was in many respects an austerity program on which the weight fell on all classes of society. I suppose that in addition to the falling price of sugar, these reform measures contributed to as much dissatisfaction as any other one single thing to the Reid regime.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what made it critical at that time.

Mr. MANN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Lausche, are you ready?

EDITING OF CBS BROADCAST

Senator LAUSCHE. I wanted to direct my questions to a broadcast made by CBS. I saw it and I thought that it placed our Government

in a light that was beyond repair as far as belief in good morals is concerned.

Now, first of all, are you able to tell whether or not that broadcast dealing with the Dominican Republic was spliced together by taking parts of statements made by different governmental officials, or was the production one showing a complete sequence of events as it was portrayed to be on the air?

Who can answer that question?

Mr. VANCE. I can answer that question, Senator.

That program was put together by taking various shots and splicing them together. For example, I can give you a specific item which relates to myself. If you will bear with me a second, I will get a factsheet which deals specifically with this question.

In that film it portrayed a question apparently being posed to me with respect to the question of whether or not troops of the GNR forces were being permitted to cross the line of communciations. The fact was that that was an opening statement which I made at the outset of a press conference which I held then and there and not a question. They truncated——

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, the issue was whether our forces were impartial after the passing of a bit of time, and the charge was made that the military forces and the State Department were lying about what actually took place.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you will first of all—segments were spliced together and made to appear as an actual sequence of events, and that was not true, that it was an actual sequence of events?

Mr. VANCE. That is correct. It was not an actual sequence of events.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

OMISSIONS FROM THE BROADCAST

Dealing with yourself and revealing what took place in your statement, and what part of it was carried by CBS and what part was omitted which made that part 1 which was carried a falsehood——

Mr. VANCE. Right, if I might continue.

I opened that press conference by saying, and I quote:

> The first allegation is that the United States is permitting armed Government of National Reconstruction forces to cross or enter the line of communications. This charge is incorrect. No armed military forces of either side have been permitted to cross or enter the line of communication. Unarmed individuals from both sides have been permitted to cross but no units have been permitted to cross.

I went on to state:

> Armed members of the national police have been permitted to enter the line of communications for the purpose of maintaining law and order. Some of these police forces have been wearing army uniforms and this may have led to confusion. You will recall that shortly after the arrival of U.S. troops it was pointed out to the press that some of the national police were wearing the uniform of the Dominican armed forces. Efforts are being made at this time to get all national police forces back into the police uniforms so that they may be easily identified.

They left out that whole statement with respect to the police and the fact that the police were wearing army uniforms and that confusion might follow.

Senator LAUSCHE. You just read four paragraphs. Based on your last statement, the first two paragraphs were carried which gave some support to the claim of CBS but the last two paragraphs were omitted which explained the true facts.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct.

NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE TRUTH

Senator LAUSCHE. Was there any further aspect of that presentation that was not in accord with the truth as you men understand it?

Mr. VANCE. Immediately after showing my statement, they portrayed a question being put to General Palmer and to me by a reporter at the press conference asking us with respect to a specific incident. General Palmer replied that he had no knowledge of this incident. I also said that there might be isolated cases of which General Palmer and I were not aware.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, now, I have the exact quote.

General Palmer was then shown at the press conference responding, "I cannot confirm or deny that. If it happened it was against standing instructions."

Then the camera was turned on you, Mr. Vance, and you answered:

There may be isolated incidents of which we are not aware, and I would be foolish to say anything else, but the orders are very clear and the orders are understood by the officers commanding our troops along the line of communication.

DOZENS OF TRUCKS

Now, we get to [Charles] Kuralt, who was the moderator. Kuralt then, to prove that you were not telling the truth and that Palmer was not telling the truth, made this statement:

"The very next day"—this is Kuralt speaking—"we watched dozens of trucks loaded with armed junta troops and policemen, both of them in battle against the rebels, roll through the American checkpoints without even slowing down." To substantiate—that is the end of the quote. To substantiate this broad statement, one film clip was then shown of two partially loaded civilian type trucks passing through a checkpoint.

Will you deal with the truth or falsehood of that item?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, after the CBS program appeared, I asked for a copy of that portion of the film and sent it down to Santo Domingo and asked General Palmer to have the inspector general conduct an investigation. That he did. The results of the investigation show that those two trucks were police trucks and the people on the scene, including a Mr. Ruiz, who is the police adviser at the Embassy, identified the individuals in the truck as policemen.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was the general impression that Kuralt attempted to give, subsequent to these items which I have thus far discussed, an effort to prove his preconceived claim that you were allowing these troops to cross the lines?

Mr. VANCE. I have no idea whether it was or not, Senator, and in fairness to Mr. Kuralt, I must say that I submitted to CBS a fact paper on this situation, which has covered the facts we have discussed up to this point, as well as additional facts.

I have heard back from CBS that they regret the fact that they truncated the original part of my statement, that all the film they have is of the two trucks rather than the dozens of trucks.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, now stop at that point. They had two trucks crossing the line, but they say there were dozens of trucks crossing the line, is that right?

Mr. VANCE. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Now proceed. That is, they expressed regrets about that falsehood?

Mr. VANCE. Mr. Kuralt maintains, however, that although there are pictures of only two trucks, there were in fact dozens of trucks. There is a conflict between his statement and the conclusions of the inspector general reached in the investigation which was taking place.

The conclusion of that report, as expressed by General Palmer, said:

> Department of Defense can state without reservation that no armed GNR soldiers are known by any responsible individual on this island to have passed any checkpoint after the press conference on 20 May.

A POLICY OF IMPARTIALITY

Senator LAUSCHE. One last question: was there a dividing line in all of these operations after the revolt took place which created a difference in conditions as existing before we came in and after we came in?

Mr. VANCE. In the early days after we landed, the only government which existed outside of the rebel-held area of the city was the junta, and there was cooperation in those early days with the government troops. However, after the line of communications was established, the United States moved to a policy of impartiality and the orders on that were issued and, I felt, clearly understood.

As I said before, there may have been isolated cases. I believe that there are two cases where those orders were violated, one on May 5 and one on May 16.

Senator LAUSCHE. My time is up. My summary is I believe what you said was this program was indefensible because it falsely portrayed our country. But even though you did what they say you did in face of what has been testified of Bosch's involvement with the Communists of Peking and Russia, I would still give my strength to your defense.

Mr. VANCE. Senator, in fairness to Mr. Kuralt, might I say one more thing? He still maintains that there were dozens of trucks, and he asserts that he asked the soldiers in a truck passing through a checkpoint the next day whether he was Army or police, and the reply was Army. That is Mr. Kuralt's story.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper yields to Senator Carlson.

PAYING THE COST OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate this very much. I want to get to the current situation. Do I understand that this government at the present time is paying the administrative costs not only of the government operation but of feeding and so forth?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator CARLSON. How much is that a month or a week or a day?

Mr. MANN. I think we have invested something in the neighborhood of $45 million; $500,000 of this is in food and the bulk of the balance, $42 million, has been payment of wages, miscellaneous costs relating to emergency food, and medical relief, our contribution to the special OAS fund for emergency assistance, the carrying out of aid programs which were in progress at the time in the field of agrarian reform, water supply, relocation, and education.

Senator CARLSON. Are these funds through the regular aid appropriations or President's emergency fund or where are they from?

Mr. MANN. I think they are from one or both of these.

Senator CARLSON. Is the food that is distributed Public Law 480?

Mr. MANN. Yes. I think the answer to that is yes.

CONTROL OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS

Senator CARLSON. What control do we have over the distribution of these funds, do we send a check down there to some administrator in the Dominican Republic or do our own Government agencies handle it or how is it done?

Mr. MANN. We have had teams from Treasury, Senator, Assistant Secretary Solomon was down there, some of the Defense people were down there, and Commerce.

We were faced with a situation where business was brought to a complete standstill in the Dominican Republic, and where people had not worked or received any wages or food was scarce, and it was necessary for us in order to stabilize the island itself to bring about a distribution of food and to the extent possible resumption of normal transactions. We spent a great deal of time getting people to open up their factories.

We labored under a great deal of difficulty because the banks themselves, including the Central Bank, are in the rebel-held part of the city—I am not sure of the Central Bank, the commercial banks are. The question of getting credit, therefore, without access to books which the rebel forces were unable to grant, unwilling to agree to, has been a difficult one. In my opinion this poses the most serious threat to eventual collapse of our efforts there to restore law and order in the Dominican Republic.

REDUCTION IN CORRUPTION

Senator CARLSON. You mentioned under the Reid administration that the military was corrupt and the chief of police and the department were corrupt. Has that situation changed or is it better?

Mr. MANN. We ourselves, in cooperation in the early days, arranged for the deportation of eight generals believed by us to have been the most corrupt. Reid himself had removed previously the chief of police who was alleged to be corrupt.

I would not know. I spoke with the four commanders of the armed forces when I was down there, and I must say that they, to visual appearances, Senator, appear to be young men, dedicated men. They asserted they had no money and that their concern was to prevent a Communist takeover in the island.

Now, I think to that I should add that all of the military forces in the Dominican Republic, army, navy, and air, were never in the past a professional army in the sense that we know it in Mexico or Brazil or Chile. It was more the personal army of Mr. Trujillo, and Mr. Trujillo governed by corruption and by intimidation and fear. Everybody in the island, including Mr. Bosch, everybody who lived there, was a part of that general society, and the most difficult problem we had was to bring about a total transformation in the way of thinking and habits and moral standards of those people.

DISSIPATION OF U.S. FUNDS

Senator CARLSON. The reason I bring this up, within the last month or 6 weeks I have had two visits with a man that you may know. He is Secretary of State in Puerto Rico, Dr. Carlos Lastra. He tells me he has been in Washington. He tells me he has conferred with some people in the State Department.

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. Do you know him?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Last week he visited with me and discussed this situation in the Dominican Republic and mentioned that our funds which we send down there are greatly dissipated. In fact, he mentioned—I do not know the man's name, but he said, for instance, and I am giving you his words now, that the chief of police collects checks for about 300 deputies, of which he has no deputies, and he pockets the money himself.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I would be less than candid if we were not concerned about possibilities of this kind from the beginning.

During the shooting it was very difficult to even get access to public rolls. We paid public employees according to the rolls as they existed. There was no opportunity, no chance, of revising those rolls during the confusion that existed—to make sure who was fictitious and who was actually on the rolls—and I would say to you that we all understood that there would be some leakage, and we did the best we could to prevent it. I have no doubt that when this is all over—and we will know more about it as soon as we can get access to facts—that we will find instances of this kind. I do not know whether this particular instance is true or not.

Senator CARLSON. I merely mention it because it was called to my attention by a man who I think was fairly responsible. In fact, he had been in the Government of Puerto Rico for many years; he is not a stranger down there and he has a responsible post. My thought was if this situation prevails when the thing is over within a year or two, whenever it is over, when this is exposed, it will be very damaging in my opinion, and I would hope every effort would be made somehow to get this thing under control because it concerns me greatly.

This is one case, he said we would be shocked—I am using his words now—if we knew how our money was being dissipated. That concerned me greatly. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I want to bring this up.

Mr. MANN. I share the Senator's concern. I would only say to that I think our only other choice was to watch this thing go down

the drain, which would have meant occupation by U.S. military of every town, village, and hamlet in the country—I think even more expensive than the course that we chose.

Senator CARLSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. I will pass for the time being, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

BOSCH IN PUERTO RICO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Secretary Mann, why did we allow Bosch to stay in Puerto Rico and export his revolution and all that sort of stuff by way of radio and otherwise, keep this agitation going? Perhaps the question should not be why did we permit him to remain in Puerto Rico, but why did we permit him to remain there and do this.

Mr. MANN. As long as he was a professor in the University of Puerto Rico, sponsored by Chancellor Benitez and by the Government of Puerto Rico, it would have been extremely difficult under our laws to restrict his activities——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Don't we have a law——

Mr. MANN [continuing]. While he was in the United States.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Don't we have a law——

Mr. MANN. The choice as we saw it was whether to deport him or whether to permit him to stay on and exercise what some of my friends would call the privileges of free speech.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It isn't, as I understand it, really quite that. Don't we have a law prohibiting aliens from using the territory of the United States to exploit revolutionary agitation in other countries and things of that kind?

Mr. MANN. We have the legal adviser here. My memory is that it is limited, the law, an old law on the books, to the mounting of revolutions from U.S. territory designed to overthrow a government with which we have relations.

REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do we call the propaganda that Bosch is putting out over the radio constantly into Venezuela?

Mr. MANN. From the technical standpoint, he was not mounting an armed expedition or revolution from U.S. territory. He was, in effect, broadcasting statements to the Dominican people inside the Dominican Republic.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But he was agitating revolution.

Mr. MANN. He was agitating revolution by Dominicans inside the Dominican Republic.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is the fact that a man is a professor, does that create some kind of halo around his head that removes him from the pains and penalties of ordinary mortals?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think you have raised a good question. I would hope the Congress some day would give consideration to passing a law which prohibits, in this modern age of radio and television, using a safe haven or asylum, political asylum in the United States for the purpose of agitating for revolution in other countries. But such a law does not exist on our books.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Haven't we been clamping down a little on Cuban expatriates from using radio and other things of that kind, aside from the collection of arms?

Mr. MANN. Not to my knowledge, Senator. To my knowledge we have never interfered with freedom of speech of people who have been granted political asylum in the United States, regardless of which side of the fence they are.

BEYOND FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It goes beyond the question of freedom of speech. It is my understanding he was permitted to use the Puerto Rican radio, I do not know whether daily, but periodically with substantial frequency, to agitate these things to foment revolt.

Mr. MANN. I think it is bad that we permit this to be done. I think this illustrates the damage that can be done by a demagog, an effective political demagog, broadcasting from the States. I am not clear, Senator, I have a note here, whether he actually bought time on the Puerto Rican radio. I expect there was some of that. But the greatest damage done, I am told, was taping speeches and then flying those in by air and playing them on the radios inside the Dominican Republic. I think it was both things, and perhaps the taping process was a bigger factor than the direct broadcasts, if any, from Puerto Rico.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In a broad sense does it make much difference whether a fellow exports a rifle to Santo Domingo from American territory or he exports an inflammatory tape?

Mr. MANN. I think this is a legitimate question. As I said, I would like to see the Congress consider whether we should not require all political exiles to refrain from political activity as long as they are inside the United States. I think it is damaging.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not familiar with it.

Mr. MANN. I do not think it has been our tradition. We have never done that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my understanding we do have a statute that prohibits that.

Senator CLARK. Why don't we ask Mr. Meeker? He is right here.

Mr. MEEKER. Mr. Chairman, if I may just comment on that question, there is a statute which makes it an offense to mount from this country an armed expedition designed to overthrow the government of any other country, but that statute is limited in its scope to the mounting of armed expeditions. It does not cover propaganda which might come from people in this country directed abroad. There is, therefore, in the statute a distinction between the rifle that you referred to and the taped broadcast.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I understand there can be a technicality there. That may be one statute. Do we have one statute or any other statutes that are prohibitory against agitation, verbal agitation over the radio or otherwise directed toward revolts and revolutions and subversive activities in other countries?

Mr. MEEKER. No, we have no such statute.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right.

FOOD SUPPLIES TO THE REBELS

Secretary Mann, in treating with the rebels, how are they getting their food down there?

Mr. MANN. We have been feeding people inside the rebel zone including, I suppose, some of the armed contingents. There are a great many civilians. The civilians who live in the rebel zone greatly outnumber the people who are combatants, and it was felt by them, by the civilians, that if they ever abandoned their houses and moved out of the rebel zone that everything they had would be destroyed. So that an enormous number of people have stayed on in the rebel zone in spite of the difficulties.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then we are putting food into the rebel zone theoretically for the feeding of non-combatants, but isn't it rather naive to assume that the rebel forces are not seizing a part of that food, at least for their own use?

Mr. MANN. Yes, it would be naive, Senator. I am sure we have fed the rebel forces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So, in effect, are they getting food from the sea, I mean from the seaward side?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. Not that I am aware of.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have a blockade against the admission of ships into the new city?

Mr. MANN. The Dominican Navy has up to this time prohibited, except for one ship carrying oil, coming into, using the river and using the old port. I believe there has been no traffic in and out of the principal port.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me we are actually feeding the rebels so they can keep on fighting through indirection, that is, in theory.

Mr. VANCE. Senator, I might speak to that because the military forces have been participating in the distribution of food. It is a fact that we have been distributing food to both sides without discrimination as between civilians and military.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But we cannot have a good war without both sides being fairly fed, and are we sort of feeding them so they can fight tomorrow?

Mr. VANCE. We have been trying to be impartial, Senator, and to that end we have been distributing food and medicine impartially.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is impartial. I guess my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy.

RECOGNITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, Bosch was overthrown in September of 1963, and shortly after Muñoz Marin and others recommended that we not recognize it immediately. The United States recognized it within what, 2 months, December, after that overthrow.

Mr. MANN. Recognized the triumvirate which preceded Reid Cabral?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. MANN. This happened before my time, Senator, and I do not know whether it was——

Senator McCarthy. I wonder if we could have the record show the order in which the new government was recognized by the other countries.

Mr. Mann. We can do that.

Senator McCarthy. North and South America.

Mr. Mann. We have it here in the record. We recognized on December 14.

Senator McCarthy. We were about the first country other than the dictatorships in Latin America to recognize them.

Mr. Mann. Bosch fell in September, if I remember correctly. We recognized in November——

Senator McCarthy. In December.

Mr. Mann. December 14. I do not know from memory how many countries had recognized before. Our usual practice, Senator, is to go along about the middle, to be neither the first nor the last. I would imagine this is what happened in this case.

Senator McCarthy. Could we get the record on that so we could take a look at it to see what the order of recognition was?

Mr. Mann. We can do that.

JUDGMENT ON OAS RESPONSE

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Secretary, what is your judgment as to the way in which the OAS responded in this case? Do you think their failure was because of the structure of OAS or do you think the structure was all right? It just did not function. Is it a question of operation or is it a question of structure?

Mr. Mann. It is because of basically their problem, although they did take meaningful action, not perhaps as much as we would have liked, but by a bare two-thirds majority they did establish the inter-American force and take other action which was very helpful to us.

Senator McCarthy. This came really after all the propaganda damage to the United States was done, since we have moved and we were established and we kind of brought them along the way we had gone, they moving along the same way, but we brought them along and they supported us.

Mr. Mann. That is correct. I can explain the timing of it, Senator, if you are speaking of that.

Senator McCarthy. My question is inherent really in the way this thing operates, that this is always going to be the case in a political disturbance of this kind, that you cannot expect it——

Mr. Mann. It is partly structural. The charter of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty considered together, which are the two basic charters, give the council of the organization, which is the only body that is in session, no authority whatever to deal with situations of this kind. We are required to convoke a meeting of Foreign Ministers. The ministers may either meet in person or delegate their authority to members of the council, as actually happened in this case.

Nevertheless, the procedure is that you must first call a meeting of the council, which has no power. The council then must take the necessary time to consult with their governments about whether there will be a convocation of the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

After the meeting of Foreign Ministers convenes, countries must then present proposals which, in turn, must be referred back to governments for decision. So that the procedure itself is cumbersome. But beyond that, Senator, there are very great differences of opinion about a matter of this kind.

POSITION AGAINST POPULAR FRONTS

We have differences, for example, on the meaning of absolute non-intervention and self-determination, which conflicts in many respects with other charter principles. We have a difference of opinion at the grassroots level, for example, on whether a so-called popular front or wars of liberation or revolutions are good or bad. Some countries think they are very good. We take a position that any popular front which gives respectability to Communists by making them a part of alliance is per se a dangerous thing.

Senator McCARTHY. That is, we do, but most of the OAS states do not.

Mr. MANN. We do, yes, sir. But we do not get too excited about it, Senator, if, as in the case of Mexico, let's say, where Lombardo Toledano's PPS is for all practical purposes a part of the PRI party in Mexico, where the relative strength of the Communist component of the popular front is much, much less than the relative strength of non-communist components.

Senator McCARTHY. This is the United States position you are describing.

Mr. MANN. That is our position. You find in Latin America, though, very doctrinaire positions on things of this kind and therefore an unwillingness to take any action at any time involving the use of force against any movement which calls itself democratic.

Senator CLARK. Will you yield for one question? I have to go.

Senator McCARTHY. Yes.

NON-INTERVENTION TRADITIONS

Senator CLARK. Mr. Mann, what is your opinion as to why a number of the Latin American governments which appear to be free and reasonably democratic, such as Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and Mexico, were unwilling to join in the OAS force in the Dominican Republic?

Was this due to the fact, whether correctly or not—and I pass no judgment on that—they were of the view that we were intervening to either protect or restore a military dictatorship.

Mr. MANN. There are a variety of reasons depending on the country. Mexico has a long tradition of intervention.

Senator CLARK. Non-intervention.

Mr. MANN. Of intervention. They were intervened by Maximilian. They were——

Senator CLARK. Being intervened?

Mr. MANN. In Wilson's time.

Senator CLARK. People intervening into them and not their intervening in others.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, and they lost a third of their territory to the United States, so there is deeply ingrained in the Mexican political mind the idea that the most important rule in international law is

the principle of absolute non-intervention, collective or individual. They are opposed to collective intervention just as they are opposed to individual intervention.

Senator CLARK. Actually, their own revolution was in those days a pretty radical——

Mr. MANN. This comes out of their heritage. There are other reasons which motivate [Eduardo] Frei, for instance. Frei's Ambassador's argument is that a popular front is not necessarily dangerous, and they point to the time when the Chilean Cabinet had Communists during Gonzalez Videla's time and they passed through this without becoming Communist. They fail, in our opinion, by taking a very doctrinaire standpoint in trying to translate a Chilean experience into a situation such as the Dominican Republic, and there the debate becomes almost doctrinaire.

COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION

Then there is another element. Take the Christian Democratic movement in Venezuela. The A.D. party, the [Romulo] Betancourt party, has always been in favor of collective intervention, and indeed Betancourt himself told me in the two or three days after we had actually intervened, that this would open the way for collective action which he thought was very desirable, both against extremes of the left and extremes of the right.

Senator CLARK. How about [Raul] Leoni?

Mr. MANN. Leoni, I think, shared that view. The left wing of the Accion Democratica party did not share that view. They came under great pressure from Rafael Calderas of the Christian Democrats who is influenced greatly by the Frei approach, and it was this pressure that for domestic political reasons caused the government ultimately to criticize the action taken.

Senator CLARK. How about [Fernando] Belaunde?

Mr. MANN. Belaunde has, I think, still a different situation. His party has an extreme left wing which is very far left. He is concerned with maintaining the unity of his party. He is trying to attract left wing votes away from Haya de la Torre and "Aprismo."

Senator CLARK. However, there is an extreme left wing which is not in his party, is there not, Communist?

Mr. MANN. Yes, but he has worked with the Communists. His party, in coming to office, worked with the Communists, and specifically the Commercio family, a very influential family in Lima. Miro Quesada, who owns El Commercio, which is the only newspaper that supported Belaunde, only last week said in an editorial that while the Peruvian Government should oppose international Communists outside its frontiers that it should not necessarily oppose communism inside of Peru. So this is a very mixed bag, Senator. A lot of that depends, a lot of it stems from their own domestic political problems and getting elected to office.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Gene.

SETTING UP MACHINERY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

Senator MCCARTHY. Can we call it that they are against unilateral intervention? How about a security council which could be called

on for multinational intervention in cases like the Dominican Repubic?

Mr. MANN. We have this in mind. We hope in the future to set up collective machinery that would deal with this kind of a problem.

Senator MCCARTHY. Would this be discussed at the Brazil meeting do you expect?

Mr. MANN. If the Brazil meeting is held, we are not sure yet. It might be held on schedule.

Senator MCCARTHY. It might be good to postpone it.

Mr. MANN. It might be. We would not ask for postponement. We will follow Brazil's lead in this. Brazil has, in effect, our proxy. If they want to have the meeting, we will have it. They are the host government. If they prefer to postpone it, they decide to do that, we will not oppose postponement.

CONFIDENCE IN THE AMBASSADOR

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Secretary, it appears as though the advice of the Ambassador was counted upon very strongly as a basis for action. Is this a matter of policy or did it just happen you had an Ambassador in the Dominican Republic that you had great confidence in and acted accordingly?

Mr. MANN. We do have great confidence in the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic. Indeed, we have great confidence in all of our Ambassadors. I don't know of any other way, Senator, to get at the facts except as those facts are reported and analyzed by the Embassy. In a fast-moving situation of this kind, it wasn't just the Ambassador, I hasten to add, it was the unanimous judgment of the entire country team, which means the army, navy, and air force attachés, the agricultural attaché, the Peace Corps all the U.S. agencies represented there——

Senator MCCARTHY. [Deleted.]

Mr. MANN [continuing]. Were of the unanimous opinion that the situation required a landing. Most of the other Embassies there shared in this. I have here, I could read to you off the record a copy of a telegram [deleted] given to us in confidence. All with one or two exceptions thought that their lives were in danger and that a landing was necessary. All the people on the ground thought that.

THE RISK OF AMERICAN LIVES

Senator MCCARTHY. Why did no other country move if they felt that way? Why couldn't we have gotten someone to move so we would have looked a little better? The British could have moved a ship in there somewhere, couldn't they—they have got ships in the area—if they were worried about their nationals? I don't question the fact at all. I would say why didn't we say to them, "Move in," and get a ship in.

Mr. MANN. I think there were two considerations, Senator. If we hadn't had, if we were not in the process of evacuating Americans, if we hadn't had these approximately 1,000 people on the beaches, I don't think we would have gone in at the time that we did and in the manner that we did. We would have probably gone in two or three days later, after it became apparent that the Dominican

armed forces were not going to be able to move in an effective way, but we would not have moved so quickly. The judgment had to be made, and those people were on the beaches, when the road to the port was closed, either to leave them there for a period of several days and take a chance that something would not happen to them or to get them out. Had we asked for British forces which were not in this part of the world, or had we waited until the OAS machinery could have acted, we could have done this, but the risk would have been that American lives would have been lost. I think all of us felt unanimously here that under the circumstances we ought to have moved as quickly as we did.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLICE AND MILITARY

Senator MCCARTHY. I just wanted one more question.

Isn't it a fact that the police and military are practically indistinguishable down there, Mr. Secretary? The question of whether you had police uniforms or police trucks or whether they were armed members of the military armed services is kind of a questionable distinction, isn't it?

Mr. VANCE. We thought that there was a distinction as between the two inasmuch as one was a civilian force and the other a straight military force. We needed somebody to assist us in maintaining law and order in the international security zone and to agree along the line of communications, and that is why we drew a distinction between the police on the one hand and the military on the other.

Mr. MANN. They are, in effect, Senator, different services.

Senator MCCARTHY. I read the report we have here, it is the New York Times of 1963 in which it says, "General Imbert Barreras has gained almost complete control over the heavily armed 12,000 man police force."

This was the New York Times of 1963. It may not have been accurate, but it raises some question as to who controls the police forces. If the general controls the police force, he controls——

Mr. MANN. That is true in all Latin American countries that I know anything about. The police officers are assigned to sort of a national police force. But nevertheless, the services are different. One is civilian, one has the job of maintaining law and order and preventing crime, and the other one has the job, more of a military job. Their uniforms are different, their pay is different, and their budget is different.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

DIVISIONS BETWEEN LEFTIST FACTIONS

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, you noted among the political parties that there are three, that one is Castro-oriented, one Peking-oriented, one Moscow-oriented.

Mr. Mann. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Does that indicate a serious divergence of opinion or coordination among the leftist elements in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MANN. No, this is a phenomenon which occurs in nearly every Latin American country. They do squabble with each other, Senator, over doctrine, along the same lines, for example, as the Chinese and Russians are squabbling over issues such as violence now and let's infiltrate and take over later, which is more the Russian line.

But in moments of crisis where it is a matter of the so-called imperialist versus the war of liberation, they almost universally unite, and in fact did so in this case.

Senator AIKEN. You mean the one thing they agree on is the destruction of existing government is desirable from their point of view?

Mr. MANN. There is no difference between them on strategy. The difference is on tactics.

BOSCH'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE LEFT

Senator AIKEN. I believe you said that Bosch, in his desire to return to the presidency, was banking on the support of the Castro-oriented rather than the others.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. But that the others would join in there.

During the time that Bosch was the president, and is now labeled as leftist, what action did his government take which would warrant placing him so far to the left?

Mr. MANN. I don't think that Bosch himself is a Communist. He is a poet-professor type.

Senator AIKEN. A do-gooder.

Mr. MANN. A do-gooder. In common with many Latin American politicians, he would make an alliance with the devil himself if he thought it would get him into office. They usually argued——

Senator AIKEN. And a crusader.

Mr. MANN. A crusader, which is all right.

Senator AIKEN. We have quite a few of them.

Mr. MANN. We have quite a few of them, which is all right. But the problem, as I tried to say earlier, is whether in this kind of popular front or alliance with the Communists, the preponderance of strength is on the side of the non-Communists—whether, in fact, they can control the Communists or whether the Communists will end up by controlling them. This is as a practical matter what we have to look at.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, the situation there is orthodox. Bosch apparently demonstrated that he was not a competent administrator for a government, not nearly as competent as his predecessor Trujillo had been.

Mr. MANN. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. He was really competent.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

JOSÉ MAYOBRE

Senator AIKEN. Now, another thing, the OAS, the United Nations designated José Mayobre to go down there and look over the situation at least.

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. But I notice in the FBI report they call attention to the fact that José Mayobre had never formally renounced communism. Does that make sense in your book?

Mr. MANN. I have known Mayobre for many years. He was, I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, a member of the Communist party in his younger years. I would say that he has at least informally and in private conversations pronounced himself as being anti-Communist. I would put him closer to Raul Prebisch and that crowd which are essentially anti-American, pro-Latin, pro-socialist in terms of the economic structure of their thinking and one of those who would like to see Latin America unite along Latin lines.

Senator AIKEN. You wouldn't say pro-Castro?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I would not.

Senator AIKEN. He was instrumental in kicking the Castros out in Venezuela, as I recall it.

Mr. MANN. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. And he also told me plainly that although he had studied communism, it was not for them. He got along too well with the Standard Oil of New Jersey in order to be a bona fide Communist.

Didn't they work together in straightening out affairs in Venezuela?

Mr. MANN. I think I would say that in my judgment he was not a Communist. He was a member of the Communist party.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. I think that is correct.

SUGAR WORKERS ON STRIKE

By the way, I understand that the workers on the sugar plantation at La Romana are now on strike.

How are they living during the period that they are on strike? Do they have any unemployment compensation or what? What is happening?

Mr. MANN. I don't know. The La Romana workers are led by—Mr. Vance says he knows about this.

Mr. VANCE. I believe I am correct in stating that we have supplied food to La Romana. Whether we have supplied food in the last week or 10 days, I do not know, but we have in the past.

Senator AIKEN. Has the sugar crop been harvested there this time?

Mr. MANN. My recollection is that it is—was harvested.

Senator AIKEN. After we had the trouble with Cuba, after we broke with Cuba, I believe we did give the Dominican Republic an increased import allotment, didn't we? I think so, I am not sure; a substantial increase.

Mr. MANN. The Cuban sugar quota, which was a very large one, has in the process of time, over the last 5 or 6 years since Castro came in, been divided up into three parts. The beet sugar industry in this country has had its increases in their production allotments, if I remember correctly. Some of that has been given to Australia, the Philippines, and India, and the bulk of it has been divided

among, by Act of Congress, the Latin American republics, including the Dominican Republic.

CASTRO'S POPULARITY

Senator AIKEN. I have a communication from Latin America—of course, we get communications from everywhere—indicating that Castro is not admired as much in the Latin American countries as he was at one time, and giving to the Alliance for Progress a considerable amount of credit for the drop in his popularity.

Would you say there was any sound reasoning back of that?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I make a distinction, Senator, between what you might call the non-Communist left, the intellectuals in Latin America who before Castro's time looked on Marxist-Leninist doctrine as creating an ideal world in theory and they were shocked to find that in practice there was political repression, no elections, and that, above all, the standard of living of the people went down, bureaucracy was corrupt. In effect, this was an intellectual sort of phenomenon that did take place.

On the other hand, the number of disciplined members of Communist parties in Latin America is growing rapidly. Castro has trained and continues to train young people from all over Latin America and from Africa. We found that two Cubans were killed in the Congo, Cuban nationals.

In Latin America they continue to train these indigenous forces. They send them back, trained in guerrilla warfare, and we now have in Latin America—and this is quite dangerous for the long pull—forces in Guatemala, in Venezuela, in Colombia, and only last week one started up in Peru, which are, which have been operating for a year or longer except in the case of Peru, with the governments unable to stamp them out. And so guerrilla activities, wars of liberation that Marxism talks about, are being carried on in this hemisphere with even more vigor than 2 years ago. There was a meeting in Havana in November 1964, where the Russians, the Castro government, and representatives of Communist parties of all three branches from all over the hemisphere met and decided to work together to try to step up their revolutionary activity and their guerrilla activities.

SHARPLY DIVIDED OPINIONS ON INTERVENTION

Senator AIKEN. But I also understand that the resentment against our operations in the Dominican Republic is not as keen as some of the statements which are published would indicate.

Do you find there is not widespread disapproval of our operations in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MANN. Throughout the hemisphere?

Senator AIKEN. Throughout the hemisphere.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I would say the opinions in other Latin American countries are sharply divided. I talked with Pedro Beltran yesterday, who thought this was a very fine thing. You will find other people who for doctrinaire reasons think that the Alliance has been set back 20 years, that the way you combat communism is by doing good works. We believe in good works but we believe that you also must meet force with force whenever the Com-

munists start shooting. I wouldn't say there is broad agreement on this issue yet. I would hope we would get a broader agreement as we get better understanding of the real true nature of Communist violence and purpose of wars of liberation.

Senator AIKEN. I don't believe since we went into the Dominican Republic I have had 50 letters on both sides commenting on the situation, which probably indicates we don't know.

But it has been amazing——

Mr. MANN. Very hard to tell.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. When you compare that with the correspondence relative to Southeast Asia. Maybe it is because it is nearer home.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

REBUKE CBS FOR DISTORTIONS

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Vance, you were discussing with Senator Lausche the fact that CBS had distorted your statements and views.

Has the State Department issued any public rebuke to CBS for this program which you consider to be against our best interests?

Mr. VANCE. I believe that no rebuke has been issued by anybody. What we have been seeking to do is to ascertain the facts, to give CBS the opportunity to see what we believe the facts to be, and to express their views on the situation. I just received yesterday their response to the fact paper which I submitted to them, which I recounted in my testimony in response to questions from Senator Lausche.

Senator WILLIAMS. Will it be a rebuke to them so that they think twice before they do something like that again, if they find they were in error?

Mr. VANCE. I would be inclined to take this up with Mr. Stanton. That is the direction in which I am intending at this point to bring this question to issue.

Senator WILLIAMS. So far as the public is concerned, it would stand documented and undisputed.

Mr. VANCE. I have come to no conclusion yet on what should or should not be done on it.

Have you any ideas, Tom?

SLANTED REPORTING

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think our difficulty is the same as we always find ourselves in. Had we gone out in these early days, and even now when negotiations are still in a very delicate stage, and given our side of the story with facts, well-documented facts, this would have reflected on one of the sides, namely on the Bosch side, adversely. We would have then been attacked for having been partial in the business of interfering with the OAS in its negotiations.

I think my own view is that what we should do when this is all over, once we have a provisional government set up, is to put out some kind of an official paper, a white paper, giving the true facts. I think this ought to be done because I share the view that great damage was done not to the personal reputations of American officials by all of this slanted reporting—and I use the word advised-

ly—but what concerns me is that the image of the United States was greatly damaged throughout the hemisphere and throughout the world by assertions and insinuations that U.S. Government officials were lying about what the facts were. I was shocked during the Panama crisis where a segment of the press, television, and radio formed preconceived notions of what the facts were. They went down and looked for people who would give them an opinion or a fact which fitted into their preconceived theory. This was a campaign over a period of weeks which I am frank to say I think was damaging.

Senator WILLIAMS. I, too, am concerned and am fearful it is going to continue until you rebuke them. A white paper coming out months after is no good because no one ever reads it.

U.S. SUPPORT OF BOSCH GOVERNMENT

Did we support the Bosch government when he was in power?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did we contribute to the overthrow?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. Take part in it?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. We did everything we could—we do everything we can once we recognize any government, be it left, right, or center, to help that government solve its problems, to make progress in the social, economic, and political fields.

Senator WILLIAMS. In later negotiations since this revolution, is there any truth to the report that we paid Bosch about $1 million or so to withdraw from the field, and he took the money and then changed his mind.

Did we pay him anything?

Mr. MANN. Not that I know of, Senator. I don't think so. I would say not since January 1964, when I arrived on the scene. No money has been paid to Bosch.

ALERTING THE REID CABRAL GOVERNMENT

Senator WILLIAMS. Did we alert the Reid Cabral government to the possibility that it was going to be overthrown, that an attempted overthrow was going to occur?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. We passed on reports, three or four separate batches of reports that we had.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did we give him support to sustain his government?

Mr. MANN. We did in the form I suggested earlier; we gave him economic aid and a very limited amount of military aid.

Senator WILLIAMS. I mean in the early stages of the revolution, which side did we support?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I would divide this into three principal phases. I would say in terms of our own intentions inside the U.S. Government, the first objective was to evacuate Americans and protect American lives. At this stage we were not sure it would be necessary for us to take military action against Communists.

When it became apparent that the Communists were relatively strong within the rebel movement, that the anti-Communist elements in the anti-rebel movement and in the rebel movement were

weak and ineffective, then we became convinced that the Communists presented a clear and present danger, largely because of the political vacuum in which they were operating—you can't beat something with nothing. As Mr. Vance said, there was a period when we were working to stabilize the countryside, to contain them within the rebel zone, the bulk of their forces within the rebel zone, combatting their strategy of bringing about a general strike and collapse of the entire economy, and trying to keep—and supporting the provincial officials and the junta until they pulled themselves together.

Once we had done everything we could to prevent this from spreading, we then passed into a third phase which essentially was one of trying to bring about an effective cease-fire to eliminate Communists, get agreement on a provincial government which we would deport the Communists and which could lead the country to elections.

The difficulty, the confusion in the press—I think a lot of it is deliberate, in my opinion, on the part of some correspondents, some individuals—the confusion was caused by failing to take account of the various stages and transposing a statement by some official, including the President, which applied to one time period and making it appear that it was inconsistent with what we were doing in another time period. The record is clear. It is consistent. It is one that, speaking personally, I am proud of. I won't say we didn't make any mistakes. I don't even say we have a solution yet, but I think we had no alternative but to do what we did more or less in the way that we did it.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is an excellent answer to my question, but I am not sure I understand it.

CHANGING SIDES SINCE THE REVOLUTION

Have we changed sides since the initial revolution and overthrow of the government?

Mr. MANN. The problem we are faced with now was essentially the problem we were faced with, let's say, 10 days or 2 weeks after it started. We could have ourselves gone into the rebel zone—and we considered this in some detail—and cleaned out this area in what is known as the old city. We would have probably done that, in my opinion—this is a personal opinion—were it not for the fact that the Communists surround themselves with women and children. They set up their strong points in the heaviest populated civilian district. To go in and knock out a Communist-held stronghold or a rebel stronghold would have meant firing large-sized shells, cannon, and knocking out the nests, knocking down the whole building. This is the way this is done in wartime when you clean up a city.

We could not have done this except with a very high casualty rate on the part of innocent women and children and non-combatants. We therefore didn't move in and clean up, which would have solved the political problem, which is a dangerous one, still, mainly for that reason.

We opted instead to get the OAS in as much as we could, to put this on the basis of collective action and law and order, to work for

the creation of a provisional government which was not identified with either side, to reduce the amount of bloodletting to the extent that it was possible, in the hope that ultimately, this would lead to elections and a decent government.

Senator WILLIAMS. I supported the action. I am not quarreling with it. I am just trying for the record to get the information.

A MATTER OF SEMANTICS

I gather we have changed sides since it started. I am not quarreling with our position, but I am just trying to find out what we did. All of this explanation boils down to one thing, as I understand it. We have switched sides for various reasons, without enumerating those reasons, since this started.

Mr. MANN. I wouldn't want to say, Senator—I think this is a matter of semantics.

Senator WILLIAMS. I appreciate you don't want to say it, but I appreciate that is the fact.

Senator CASE. So I understand it, what side did we switch from to what?

Senator WILLIAMS. That is what I don't understand. I am trying to find out whether we supported the government in the initial stages or we supported the rebels in the initial stages.

Mr. MANN. I think this is a matter of defining what you mean by switching sides. We have been opposed to the Communist component in the rebel movement from the beginning and are still opposed to the ascendancy of that group as we ever were.

Senator WILLIAMS. I appreciate that and I supported it.

Mr. MANN. We did encourage [Gen. Barreras] Imbert and others—Imbert having been the only person willing to take on the job—to set up a provisional government as a provisional government for a transition period in order to pull together the anti-rebel forces and stabilize the balance of the city and the rest of the country, control it, and to prevent a Communist takeover.

We never intended—and the record shows this very clearly—that the Imbert role was anything more than a transition role. We had no intention at that time, nor do we have one now, of recognizing it. I won't say that we never will. This depends on what will happen. But we do think, I personally think, that Imbert played a role, a necessary role, in pulling together the anti-Communist forces at a very crucial time, and that if he had not done so we would have been obliged to occupy the whole country.

Now, from the beginning we hoped to set up a provisional government once the situation was stabilized, which would not belong totally to either side but which would be somewhere in the middle and which would lead to constitutional government, restoration of law and order.

Senator WILLIAMS. My time is up. I wasn't quarreling with what you did, but just trying to understand it. But my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Just a couple of questions. I am sorry I wasn't here at the beginning of your statement. I don't want to go over ground you must have covered already.

FAR FROM AGREEMENT ON A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

But just in summary, how close are we to the point where acceptance of the suggestions made by the OAS committee may be expected and hoped for?

Mr. MANN. I would be less than candid if I didn't say to this committee that in my opinion we are still an unknown distance away from agreement on a provisional government. Our role is, essentially the OAS role, is one of good offices and mediation.

We have not yet tried to impose a government by force, to do the cleanup job and to restore with our own forces or to permit the Imbert forces to do it, law and order by force. It may well become necessary to do this, because I don't think we can go forever with the problems that have been mentioned here, financial and otherwise, without some kind of a provisional government. Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker is due to arrive this week to make a report to the OAS, and we will have some hard decisions to make then unless we get a break very soon.

Senator CASE. How many people, including civilians, are there altogether in the rebel zone?

Mr. VANCE. I recall a figure between 50,000 and 60,000, but I am not at all sure that that is correct. A number of people have moved out of the zone and those remaining, as I recall, would be 50,000 to 60,000.

Senator CASE. These are not troops?

Mr. VANCE. This is everybody.

Senator CASE. Everybody?

COMMENTARY ON DECISIONMAKING

Just one other point. I do think I understand why you can't issue white papers or blue papers or red papers or anything else in the course of this, but I would like to think you ought to have a commentary on this Draper article of the 4th of May, particularly with respect to decisions that we felt were essential. I just would say, in that connection, I don't know Draper personally but I have a recollection of his handling things in the Cuban matter that predisposes me in his favor.

I met a couple of reporters and I have always been favorably impressed with them. I would like to have something that will help me.

Mr. MANN. I would be delighted. Would you like something for the record or would you like to ask questions now.

Senator CASE. No, put it in whatever form you can, put it as candidly as you can, and assume the secrecy of the committee would be inviolable. Give it to the committee and I will get it later here.

That is all, thank you.

ABSENCE OF KEY U.S. OFFICIALS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I was trying to develop a little bit of a chronology here.

As I understand it correctly from the documents supplied to the committee on the 14th of April, there is this statement that I read to you a moment ago that Secretary Vaughn met with the State Department, CIA to discuss the worsening situation of the Domini-

can Republic. It says after a review of the critical position of the Reid government, Mr. Vaughn decided to order Ambassador Bennett to return to Washington.

Now, 10 days later, on April 24, Ambassador Bennett was visiting his mother in Georgia en route to Washington and Assistant Secretary Vaughn was attending a conference in Mexico, and it has been reported that 13 of the 15 officers in the U.S. military mission were attending a regional conference in Panama and that the naval attaché was out hunting with General Imbert.

Do you know whether or not this is true?

Mr. MANN. I don't have the dates fixed in my mind, Senator, but I think it is true that Mr. Bennett was on his way to Washington. He stopped off in Georgia to visit with his parents a day or two about the time the revolution broke out.

The CHAIRMAN. On the day it broke out, the 24th.

Mr. MANN. On the day, yes, sir. And if my memory is right, Mr. Vaughn was in Mexico City at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been said in some of these documents that instead of expecting a coup on April 24, the United States expected the Reid government to take repressive action against its opponents that weekend, that this accounts for the absence of so many key U.S. officials.

Do you know whether this is true or not?

VARIOUS PLOTS

Mr. MANN. Senator, there were various plots, if I may clarify this in some more detail.

The CIA knew of four reported plots, some of them interrelated, being planned during March and April 1965. We did not know at that time exactly when, which of these plots was the most serious, nor did we have an exact kick-off date. We had made all of the information available as appropriate without, short of, revealing our sources to the Dominican Government. I think there was a considerable hope at that time that the Dominican armed forces would not split and would continue to support Reid for an additional period of time.

Obviously, if your point is, Senator, had we known on that Saturday noon that Bosch and his allies would move, that they would be successful in getting a thousand officers and men to take over an army camp and distribute arms and so forth, obviously Mr. Bennett would have been at his post and Mr. Vaughn would have been here in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Could it be that the explanation of the absence of so many of the officials was because they did expect Mr. Reid to take action to destroy the incipient coup?

Mr. MANN. I think if I could phrase that as saying that we did not anticipate that Mr. Reid would lose control at the precise time he did, I think that would be correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The theory of this statement would apparently be that you did not wish to be implicated in an action taken by Mr. Reid, that is why they were out of the country.

Mr. MANN. No, no, that is not correct as far as my knowledge goes, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, it is a fact that you did not anticipate the coup at that time?

Mr. MANN. At that particular time, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Although 10 days before there were very positive statements at a meeting by Mr. Vaughn that it was a very critical situation.

THOUSANDS OF REPORTS ABOUT PLOTS

Mr. MANN. Senator, the problem which the State Department continually faces with every country in the world is not a lack of information about plots. It is literally thousands of reports about plots that are going to take place, that are scheduled at some vague date in the next 2 or 3 months all over the world.

The great problem is to separate out of this mass of information those which have some chance of being successful. We are concerned today, for example, with a possible coup in Uruguay. I couldn't predict the exact hour this will take place, but certainly all of the indicators point in that direction. We are concerned about a deteriorating situation in Colombia which may well result in the fall of that government. We are consulting almost constantly with our Embassy there, but not within the framework that General X will move on midnight at such and such a day, and that this is going to happen. We don't have that kind of information.

We are concerned about Guatemala. We are concerned about Bolivia. We are deeply concerned about Ecuador. The government there could fall at any time, and this is only one continent we are talking about. We have similar problems around the world.

MUÑOZ MARIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that, as one CIA report has it, Muñoz Marin came to Washington prior to the coup to assure the U.S. Government that a Bosch regime would be pro-United States?

Do you know anything about that?

Mr. MANN. He did not assure me.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he come at all prior to the coup?

Mr. MANN. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know who he saw, if he saw anybody?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, that is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield for just a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

THE EVIDENCE WAS CLEAR

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the implication contained in this question in conflict with the information which you had about Bosch's associations with these Communist groups?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. I would have to piece together—to give you the exact timetable of this would be somewhat difficult. Sometimes our information comes in a week or 10 days after the event because the person who penetrates the party has to have a safe contact with somebody, and then this has to be reported through cutouts and the Embassy reports it up here.

But the evidence was clear. We knew Bosch was a continuous plotter. We knew he was in contact with not only leaders of his

own inside the Dominican Republic, but we now know—and I am not sure whether we knew at that particular moment—that he had been in contact with leaders in Puerto Rico of the June 14 movement. The pamphlets of the other two Communist parties, complete with the picture of Lenin and so forth, appeared on the streets weeks in advance of this, Senator, calling for a revolution in support of Bosch and explaining this was the first step toward the kind of a socialist revolution that the Communists wanted.

Now, we have those documents, those pamphlets, if you want to look at them. There was ample evidence that the situation was unstable, that the economic and social conditions were propitious for trouble, that some of the army was rumored to be pro-Bosch and in favor of the revolution. As I say, the difficulty is in picking out, out of thousands of reports of this kind, exactly what is going to happen on what hour. This has never been done with great precision, to my knowledge, by any government.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand your answer, you state that the CIA report, it may or may not be true, you simply don't know whether Muñoz came to Washington. You didn't see him. He may have come and not seen you.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, Senator. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to ask the CIA. That came from their report.

TIME FOR A CHANGE

Do you think when the coup began on the 24th that the United States could have done anything to support Reid and frustrate the coup, or to influence the direction which the coup took?

Mr. MANN. I do not. I think the evidence is very clear that the opinion was almost unanimous amongst all sides that it was time for a change. I think the division and the split came when Molina Urena was set up as a Bosch protegé and all the anti-Bosch people passed into what I call the anti-rebel camp. Everybody was apparently in favor of overthrowing Reid.

The CHAIRMAN. That was fairly unanimous.

Mr. MANN. That was fairly unanimous.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a question of who did it.

Mr. MANN. It was a question of who replaced him, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is where the differences occurred.

Mr. MANN. That is where the split occurred.

LEARNED OF COUP THROUGH RADIO BROADCAST

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that the Government, our Government, first learned of the coup through a Santo Domingo radio station's broadcasting announcement of the arrest of army officers?

Mr. MANN. Yes, for this reason Reid apparently went to an army camp—and you (turning to Mr. Adams) correct me on this—in an effort to personally order the arrest of officers that he thought were in rebellion. He failed in this. This was followed promptly by some people whom we identified as Communists taking over a radio station by force. I think they just went in shooting and took it over and announced that a revolution had taken place, when in

fact it had not, so that the first news that something was afoot came over the radio.

ORDER TO ARREST ARMY OFFICERS

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that Reid took the first move that precipitated this in an effort to arrest army officers?

Mr. MANN. I have heard this.

Mr. ADAMS. Reid personally didn't go, but it was tied in with coups and plots and so on, and he did order the arrest of some officers.

Mr. MANN. Reid did order the arrests of some officers. This was one of the things that kicked it off.

The CHAIRMAN. Kicked it off.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EMBASSY

Did the Embassy make any recommendations at that time, on the 24th, when it first heard of it?

Mr. MANN. I think the first reports were reports of this radio broadcast, of reports that the Embassy had of dissident army officers having taken over this one army camp. This particular radio station was later taken by the anti-rebel forces and then again by the rebels some days later and eventually taken over by Imbert. It has changed hands three or four times.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Embassy on April 24 of that afternoon make any recommendations as to our course of action?

Mr. MANN. I don't think they did.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first reaction in the State Department to the news of this coup?

Mr. MANN. I think our first reaction was one of anxiety about what the outcome of the revolution would be, disappointment we were entering into a period of violent change, and a hope that the United States wouldn't have to do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there——

Mr. MANN. Stay out of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was coming to. Was there any disposition to move in to support Reid, in other words, to prevent the coup?

Mr. MANN. Senator, Reid fell almost immediately. We never believed and still do not believe that there was ever any chance of getting any sizable segment of the military forces or the political parties in existence to support Reid. We wrote Reid off. He himself wrote himself off very early in the game, in the first hours of this thing.

APPEAL FROM REID

The CHAIRMAN. Did Reid make any effort to contact the Embassy or the Department at that time on the 24th?

Mr. MANN. I am reminded, Senator, that on the 25th, which was a Sunday, I believe——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN [continuing]. Reid did ask the Chargé d'Affaires whether the United States could find some way to keep him in

power to prevent the revolution taking place, and under the facts at that time, the Chargé correctly replied that we could not.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Chargé, do you remember?

Mr. MANN. Bill Connett.

Senator MCCARTHY. Can I ask a question?

REID LACKED A BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT

Does this mean in the State Department the book you had on Reid was such that you were certain if anything started there was no way to save him, or did this decision come on the basis of a report that you got on the 24th or 25th?

Do you have these things figured in advance and you say Reid is ready to fall and there is nothing we can do to save him, or does it happen that the revolution comes and your man on the spot says it is hopeless?

Mr. MANN. I think it was a combination of several things. It was a common knowledge that Reid did not have any broad base of popular support. He had no political party, for example, of his own. He emerged as the central figure in what had been a triumvirate. We knew that all of the organized—political parties, the Balaguer party, the Bosch party, the Communist parties, the Christian Democratic party, were all opposed.

Senator MCCARTHY. He was a creature of the military from the beginning.

Mr. MANN. We knew his power rested on the military. The minute we heard that the military were not disposed to help Reid, we knew there was nothing to build on and that Reid was through.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

A SUCCESSOR TO REID

The CHAIRMAN. At that point, since you knew Reid was through, were there any considerations given to measure yourself to support any of the rebel groups?

Was there anyone in there that you favored, any consideration given to this one?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. After this happened, after Reid fell, it is pretty clear from the reporting that, as I say, there was no support for Reid. The military and all of the anti-Bosch people met in the rebel zone and debated on what kind of a government should emerge to take over on a provisional basis.

The military argued for a military junta. The Bosch people, supported by the three Communist parties, urged that Molina Urena be installed as a "constitutional" government, and I put that word in quotes. The PRD crowd.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he the man that Bosch said, "Aye"?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I put a question?

How could they put him in under the facade of the constitutional government?

Mr. MANN. The theory is that since if Bosch had not been overthrown, his regime would have still been in power, and that therefore the Congress would have still been the legitimate authority.

Now, the Congress did meet later on—we never knew how many, whether they had a quorum, for example, or anything of that kind, this was all kept in secret. But the PRD crowd took the position that the mantle of Bosch had fallen on Molina Urena and he was therefore the constitutional president.

How you arrive at this, as a lawyer, is a little difficult, but the minute Molina Urena installed himself as president, all of the forces that believed—and I think many of them sincerely—that Bosch had an alliance with the Communists and that this would mean an eventual Communist takeover, they split away. The lines were drawn in about 36 hours, I think, after that Saturday noon, into anti-rebel and rebel lines.

CONTACTS WITH BOSCH

The CHAIRMAN. During this afternoon of the 24th and 25th was any effort made or any contacts made with Bosch by our government?

Mr. MANN. I had no personal contacts with Bosch, but Mr. Vance, on my right, did.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Mr. MANN. On the 24th, 25th, did you say?

The CHAIRMAN. The early days.

Mr. VANCE. No; the contact I had with Mr. Bosch was, as I recall it, on May 15 when Mr. Bundy and I went to Puerto Rico to meet with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Much later.

Mr. VANCE. Much later.

The CHAIRMAN. During the early stage, the coup took place about noon on the 24th, and that afternoon or the next day there was no contact with Bosch, to your knowledge, by our Government.

Mr. MANN. By Government officials.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I do recall, Senator, that Muñoz Marin, Romulo Betancourt, Figueres were in telephonic contact with Bosch, and some of them did report to me what Bosch's attitudes were.

The CHAIRMAN. So that during that period we did not take a position, that is, either to support Reid, which you have explained as to why, nor did we make any move to support any of the rebels or the military, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. We did not support any faction except to the extent that I have already stated. When we became convinced several days later that there was a substantial danger that the Communists would capture or had captured the rebel cause and would emerge, then we shifted for a period of days to support what later emerged as the Imbert group.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any one of these groups, personages, in the opposition, that is, supporting the coup—did any of them request support from you, from our Government?

In other words, did any of them approach the Embassy and ask for support in forming a new government?

Mr. MANN. I believe the answer is that the first, aside from the Reid Cabral approach that I have already testified to, the first ap-

proach made to a U.S. Government official was by Molina Urena after he was installed as provisional president.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember what day that was? Was that on the 25th?

Mr. MANN. The 27th.

TRYING TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE

The CHAIRMAN. On the 25th did anybody representing any of these factions of the opposition request our Government support?

Mr. MANN. Not to my knowledge, Senator. Our activity in those days—we were in contact through the Embassy with both sides trying to arrange a cease-fire. On through the day of April 25 and 26, in fact, I think four times, four separate times, the Embassy thought it had achieved a cease-fire.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in charge of the Embassy at that time?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Connett.

The CHAIRMAN. Connett. He did have contact with——

Mr. MANN. Both sides.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Both sides?

Mr. MANN. But not in the context of supporting either side; in the context of trying to arrange a cease-fire and to talk instead of shoot.

The CHAIRMAN. But he had no instructions to try to work with any particular one, only to get a cease-fire generally, is that the situation?

Mr. MANN. I think the answer to that is, yes. He had no such authority to support any side.

The CHAIRMAN. When were the first naval units ordered into waters adjacent to the Dominican Island?

RETURN OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR

Senator CARLSON. When did our Ambassador, Mr. Bennett, get back, in view of the fact Mr. Connett——

Mr. MANN. He got back on the 27th.

Senator CARLSON. We will get to that later.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the following Tuesday.

Mr. MANN. It would be the first Tuesday after it started on Saturday noon.

Senator CARLSON. The reason I was concerned about it is this fact, there were so many stories at that time—I don't know Mr. Bennett and never met him in my life—and that was his inept handling at one time and I wondered, in view of the dates of the chairman, when he came back.

Mr. VANCE. Senator, I can answer your question. On April 24 the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was ordered to stand off the Dominican coast.

Senator CARLSON. That was naval forces.

Mr. VANCE. Naval forces with Marines embarked.

Senator CARLSON. That was on the 24th?

Mr. VANCE. 24th.

Senator CARLSON. When was the 82nd Airborne first alerted?

Mr. VANCE. It was first alerted on the 26th, as I recall.

Senator CARLSON. That would be Monday?

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. Where were they at that time?

Mr. VANCE. Fort Bragg.

Senator CARLSON. If I understand it correctly, during this period, there was no contact made with Bosch himself.

Mr. MANN. Directly by a U.S. Government official?

Senator CARLSON. To your knowledge.

Mr. MANN. Not to my knowledge.

Senator CARLSON. If any were unofficial, it was private?

Senator MCCARTHY. Bill, can I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly. I yield.

THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED ELECTIONS

Senator MCCARTHY. The regular elections were scheduled for September of this year.

Is it the opinion of the State Department that the Reid government was highly unstable and could not be sustained unless it had support of the army? Had we done anything in anticipation of the elections of September or were we going to let the army more or less run it off and go along with Reid as President hopefully after the elections in September? Did we have some plans or commitments regarding the elections in September?

Mr. MANN. I believe it is accurate to say, Senator, that we often talked through the Embassy with Reid about elections. The issue was not really whether there should be elections but the timing of those elections, and because of the chaotic economic and social situation at the time——

Senator MCCARTHY. There was a possibility there would not have been any elections in September anyway.

Mr. MANN. I presume that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think later on, there was some evidence that either Muñoz or Mr. Abe Fortas contacted Bosch.

Did that come later, or do you know about that?

Mr. MANN. I don't know of my own personal knowlege about that; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know about that.

Mr. VANCE. I can add something to that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CONVERSATIONS WITH BOSCH

Mr. VANCE. I think at a later date, Mr. Fortas did have conversations with Bosch, and as a result of that at a later date, when it became clear that Bosch was a figure with some power in the equation in the Dominican Republic, was instrumental in bringing about a meeting with him which I attended with Mr. Bundy on May 15.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that he had some influence and power in the situation was evident even on the 24th or before, wasn't it?

Mr. VANCE. I think it was not clear how much power, influence he actually did have at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought his activities that we were talking about a moment ago of his agitation for and up to the coup had been going on for some time, hadn't it?

Mr. VANCE. I think it had, but I think it was still unclear at that point whether he was a dominant factor or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he had a following or not, you mean?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On that Saturday, if I get this correctly, and Sunday, Connett had contact with leaders of the PRD and maybe other factions in an attempt to get a truce, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he talk to any of the military officers?

Mr. MANN. I am sure he did.

The CHAIRMAN. This was all in an effort to try to bring about a truce, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

HARD AT WORK AT THE EMBASSY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what Connett was doing on the afternoon of April 24; was he in the Embassy on duty?

Mr. MANN. We received telegrams signed "Connett," from which I deduce that he was at his post hard at work.

The CHAIRMAN. On the 24th?

Mr. MANN. I don't have personal knowledge about where he was at that moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did Ambassador Bennett not return immediately and wait until the 27th?

Mr. MANN. Ambassador Bennett participated in consultations here in Washington on Monday and left, as I remember, on Monday night. The shooting by this time was so intense that he had to go to San Juan, and he had to be flown over to San Isidro, taken by a helicopter first to the aircraft carrier and then to the safety zone and then make his way on his own to his Embassy from the safety zone. It took some time.

MEETING AT THE EMBASSY

The CHAIRMAN. We have here one unofficial statement, that didn't come from the government, that on the 24th and primarily on Sunday, the 25th, a number of the PRD representatives went to the Embassy. The group included Antonio Guzman, who has been Bosch's secretary of agriculture, and Antonio Martinez, secretary general of the PRD, and a man named Lovaton Pitalugo, foreign minister in the rebel government, and a man named Enriquillo del Rosario, former Ambassador to the United States. This group was received by Arthur Breisky, a second secretary.

Do you know anything about that? Was there such a meeting?

Mr. MANN. I am trying to find out whether we have—I believe they did call to discuss the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. These were, I would gather from this, the principal leaders of the Bosch party, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. Was Molina Urena——

The CHAIRMAN. His name isn't in this group.

Mr. MANN. Then it is lacking the principal leader at that time. Certainly some of the names you mentioned—Guzman is Bosch's——

The CHAIRMAN. Martinez, it says he was secretary general of the PRD.

Mr. MANN. I am reading from notes here, sir, at 1:30 p.m. the secretary general——

The CHAIRMAN. On the 25th?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I think this is the 25th. The Bosch party secretary general Antonio Martinez told the Embassy he planned to go to Puerto Rico to get Bosch.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you mean get him?

Mr. MANN. To bring him back.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your report say what was the nature of the conversation Breisky had with this group?

Mr. MANN. I am sure we have it somewhere, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why didn't you go and get him?

CONCERN ABOUT THE VIOLENCE

Mr. MANN. Shortly before 6 p.m.—I am sure this is still the 25th—a Bosch party leader named Fernandez asked the Embassy to put pressure on the Dominican air force to stop strafing of the presidential palace. An Embassy officer unidentified in my notes said, "I would like to see shooting stop on both sides."

A PRD officer came to the Embassy at 6 p.m. to put pressure to stop the attacks. The Embassy officer receiving them expressed the Embassy's concern about the violence and a situation favorable to Communists. He suggested that the time had come for Dominicans of good will on both sides to act responsibly. The officer added if the PRD leaders, meaning the Bosch leaders, could persuade the rebel military to negotiate without preconditions with the military hierarchy he would try to get the Embassy to facilitate talks between the two sides. However, he made clear the Embassy would not intervene on behalf of the rebels.

BOSCH PREFERRED TO DEAL LONG-DISTANCE

Senator LAUSCHE. May I put that question, why didn't you go and get Bosch when they wanted him?

Mr. MANN. Senator, the opinion in the State Department is that Bosch never considered it physically safe to go back to the island, and——

The CHAIRMAN. At that time?

Mr. MANN. At any time since the shooting started. He preferred to deal by long distance telephone with his lieutenants.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you by that time know of his contacts with the three Communist parties?

Mr. MANN. We did. Bosch had always, when he was President, had contacts with the Communist parties. It was during his regime that the 14th of June movement passed into the control of the Communists. It was originally an anti-Trujillo movement. He made, we believe, according to our intelligence, an agreement with the 14th of June that he would not bother them if they did not attack him personally or his party. They were free to attack others, but there had to be a truce in terms of their activities insofar as he

was concerned. He has a record, a long record, of understanding the Communists.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask that there be supplied for the record a tabulation of the information that you had about Bosch's participation with the Communists. I think you stated what was done, but I would like to have you put it down in the form of one, two, three, four, whatever it is.

Mr. MANN. I would be glad to do that, Senator.

MEETING WITH BREISKY

The CHAIRMAN. This Breisky, I wonder why they met with Breisky rather than Connett.

Mr. MANN. It may have been, it often happens, that the Chargé is out talking with somebody else and somebody appears at the Embassy—this is a presumption on my part—and the senior officer available at the moment will receive them in that case.

The CHAIRMAN. This account states that the group that I mentioned was received by Arthur Breisky, a second secretary, who lectured them severely. He asked how they dared ask for help after stirring things up. Breisky told the group that if he had Wessin's power he would use it against them. Breisky accused them of being Communists and they denied it.

Do you have any knowledge of such statements?

Mr. MANN. Senator, as you know, the files on this thing are very voluminous. I have no recollection of any report in our files which would bear out what you are saying.

May I ask whether your source is from the rebel side or from the Embassy?

The CHAIRMAN. This is an unofficial source, according to this. This is a staff statement from an unofficial source.

Mr. MANN. I know of nothing which jibes with that.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. From the New York Times report, I believe.

Now——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Tad Szulc.

ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE REBEL CAMP

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming this could be correct for the moment for asking a hypothetical question, I suppose at that moment if this did take place, the policy of the government would have been not to respond to a request by this group for assistance.

Mr. MANN. Senator, assistance—defined as attempting to bring about a cease-fire and a situation where both sides would talk out their differences—was given to the rebel camp. As I said earlier, I think the Embassy believed or thought it had on four separate occasions on one of these days, I believe the 25th or 26th, achieved an effective cease-fire. We were working hard because the Embassy realized that the greater the confusion, the greater the anarchy and chaos, the more dangerous would be the Communist problem. And no doubt they did talk with—I wouldn't doubt this—with the rebel people they came in contact with about the danger of associating themselves with Communists and particularly of permitting Com-

munists to arm themselves and to take over strong points within the city.

EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the position and your belief that this group—and I say "we" assume did come and call on him—were or were not Communists at that time?

Mr. MANN. We knew that the PRD people themselves, the people closest to Bosch, were not members of any of the Communist parties. We did not consider them to be Communists, therefore. We also knew, however, that they were in an effective alliance with Communists from all three parties, and that they had secured arms and represented a significant portion of the military strength of the rebel cause.

FAILURE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. The question, of course, from this arises, since, in view of your view that Reid had no support, why advantage wasn't taken of this opportunity at that time to try to rally around this group who represented, I suppose, as near a non-Communist group as you could get and proceed to back them so they could form a government.

Why wasn't that done?

Mr. MANN. Excuse me, Senator. Would you repeat that?

The CHAIRMAN. Let's assume that this meeting of these representatives took place on the 25th. One of them, I notice, Guzman, we later did attempt to promote. He is alleged to have been a member of this group that came to our Embassy. I am not familiar with these people, but Guzman's name has been in the press. Antonio Martinez, Pitalugo—I have some difficulty with these names—and del Rosario, who was former Ambassador to the United States—I assume he was known to our people. I was just curious why advantage wasn't taken of this opportunity to try to establish a government in succession to Reid, because you had already given up any thought that Reid could be preserved. You had to have some successor government. I wondered why you didn't take advantage of that opportunity.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think you are assuming that this group did meet with the junior officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is true.

Mr. MANN. And you are assuming that the junior officer said certain things.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. MANN. This is not within my knowledge, but I would like permission to insert in the record the official version of what took place at this meeting, if indeed it did take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure, I would be glad to. This is the best information we have that this did take place.

Mr. MANN. All I can say is what I have already said in answer to that question, that the Embassy did try countless times to arrange a cease-fire, to get the rebels and the military talking together, so that they could agree on some kind of a provisional government which would have avoided the mess that actually occurred.

RESPONSE TO AIR FORCE ACTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. The staff has handed me another statement that apparently [deleted] ex-rebel officers held by Dominican police were dismayed by the early punitive action by the Dominican air force which halted all negotiations and incited all persons to fight back.

On the late afternoon of April 25, the day the bombing started, PRD leaders asked the Embassy to pressure the air force to stop the bombing. The Embassy suggested negotiations between the rebels and the military but were generally unresponsive.

And then——

Mr. MANN. Senator, I don't think in general they were unresponsive. I repeat that time after time we were in contact with both sides, urging both sides to get together—the non-Communist elements—and to agree on a provisional government to avoid the kind of confusion and chaos and anarchy that we slipped into.

Now, it is true, Senator, that we didn't come out in support of the rebels. But we are not in the business in the U.S. Government of deciding which side ought to win at this stage of affairs, when there is no clear and present Communist danger. We don't think this would be effective if we tried it. We think the only effective way you can work out of one of these things is to act as a mediator, offer our good offices in getting the two sides together to agree. After all, it is their country.

The CHAIRMAN. Then on the 25th you did not think there was any immediate danger of a Communist takeover, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. We did not think on that day that the danger was immediate, that is correct.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD MOLINA

The CHAIRMAN. On May 8, according to this report, an Embassy officer had a conversation with Molina in the Colombian Embassy. Molina admitted that the Communists were trying to exploit the situation but said they would have had little chance if it had not been for the repeated bombing of the city April 25 to 28. Molina said he yielded his post as president of the rebel government only in the face of United States disapproval and insistence on unconditional surrender.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. MANN. No, sir; that is incorrect.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean Molina did not say that?

Mr. MANN. There are many statements. I am addressing myself to the report he surrendered his authority only because the U.S. Government demanded unconditional surrender.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not correct?

Mr. MANN. That is not correct.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not feel you wished to support Molina at that time?

Mr. MANN. We didn't think that it was in our province at that time under those circumstances to intervene for or against either side as long as there was no clear and present danger of a Communist takeover.

The CHAIRMAN. If you wish to question, I hope you will intervene when you like, either one or anybody.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a question.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have a lot more cards. May I ask this: What are you trying to prove, Bill?

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to establish the chronological character of the crisis. These cards are prepared mostly from official documents supplied to the staff. They were prepared by the staff.

ANOTHER CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to ask this question: As you look back now and on the basis of what you now know what would be the situation in the Dominican Republic if you hadn't stepped in, in your opinion?

Mr. MANN. In my judgment, sir, if we hadn't stepped in, the Communist-led forces in the rebel movement would have been in effective control both of the Bosch adherents and of the country as a whole.

Senator LAUSCHE. And we would have had another Cuba at our shores.

Mr. MANN. That is my opinion.

Senator LAUSCHE. These tributes that are paid about the fight for freedom, that is what was said about Cuba, about Castro when he took over Cuba.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. VANCE. I would like to add, if I might, Senator, if we had not put our Marines ashore when we did, I personally am convinced that scores of Americans and other foreign nationals would have been killed and there would have been more bloodshed among the Dominicans than actually took place.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, and when Castro took over, he had circus trial and ordered to death 500, didn't he?

The CHAIRMAN. This comes later, I think, in the story. Here is a situation on the 25th, which is the day after this coup started, in which the PRD leaders came to the Embassy and at a time when, according to the testimony just given, there was no immediate danger of Communist takeover. They at least had an opportunity to support this group if they saw fit. I mean it was an opportunity; whether or not it was wise not to take it is another matter.

The intervention came after a number of other developmemts, several days later, did it not?

Mr. VANCE. That is correct.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. We are talking about the 25th, the day after the coup.

Frank, either one of you, go ahead. I am trying to establish the chronological developments.

Senator CARLSON. You are doing a good job.

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOSCH

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know anything about a man by the name of Virgilio Gell?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, it rings a bell.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is alleged he has been acting as an intermediary for Donald Reid to return to the Dominican Republic in exchange for PRD support for Reid as a presidential candidate. He is alleged to have said that Bosch has been getting excellent financial support from different quarters in order to consolidate PRD in his leadership. Included as financial supporters are Diego Bordas, $10,000, March 12, and $50,000 later. José Benitez, a Puerto Rican millionaire, is one of the other contributors, and Bobby Gene Baker, former secretary of the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, a good friend of Bordas and Benitez, who share business interests.

Do you know anything about that allegation and those contributions?

Mr. MANN. We know there is a CIA report to this effect, and we also know that Dominicans, well, a limited number of wealthy Dominicans were supporting financially the Bosch political activities.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How about an apparently wealthy American by the name of Bobby Gene Baker?

Mr. MANN. This I have no knowledge of.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any knowledge he was working in collaboration with Bordas and Benitez?

Mr. MANN. This information, I think, is included in a CIA report dated the 18th of March, 1965. I would suggest you might ask the Admiral when he appears here about this. This is one of his reports. I have no knowledge except what is contained in this report. I don't think anybody in the State Department has any knowledge.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. OK.

BOSCH'S POPULARITY QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. Really what puzzles me a bit is, in view of the fact you had no confidence that Reid had any widespread support, you anticipated for some time that he was likely to be replaced, unless you felt this group of leaders of the PRD were Communists and hopeless, why you didn't seek to rally around them in order to avoid the deterioration into chaos which did occur.

Mr. MANN. Senator, Mr. Bosch has a very good publicity office and the impression gained has been that he is the acknowledged first leader, the political leader of the Dominican Republic.

As a matter of fact, we took a poll, which is highly confidential, about one month before, the USIA did, done by professionals of public opinion in the Dominican Republic. If my memory is correct, Bosch polled about 26 percent of the votes. Balaguer polled about twice as many. The rest of the votes were distributed amongst various minor candidates such as the Christian Democrats, small fractions.

So, it has never been very clear on that scene that Bosch was the knight on the white horse who the Dominican people demanded return. We had never felt that way about it.

NOT LOOKING TO THE MILITARY

The CHAIRMAN. Where was Balaguer at this time?

The only point I am trying to make is, I am curious as to why we in effect stood by and allowed this—maybe we couldn't have stopped it—but allowed it to deteriorate into a chaotic situation. If

these people were not really Communists, I don't really understand why you didn't try to work with them. The opposition would be the military, the Wessin forces, operating out of San Isidro.

Did you think they were the more likely successor?

Mr. MANN. No, we never looked on the military.

The CHAIRMAN. If you didn't—and these were not at that time, you didn't regard them as Communists—certain things have happened subsequent to that which might persuade you of a different view. But all of these statements, both official and unofficial, would indicate that the approaches made on the 25th and I think some on the 26th, did not receive very responsive reaction in the Embassy.

Mr. MANN. I really don't think, Senator, that that is correct. I think the Embassy worked very hard bringing about a cease-fire in an impartial manner with the PRD leaders and the military leaders in those days you are talking about. I don't think they could have done any more.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they do anything to stop the bombing by the air force that was under Wessin at that time?

Mr. MANN. We didn't at that time. We had no capability of stopping the air force. The ability of the United States to control political developments in other countries is a very limited ability. We did stop the bombing later on, after the troops were in San Isidro, by placing trucks in front of the airplanes and forcibly restraining them. But the ability of the Embassy to influence and direct political movements in other countries is a very limited one.

EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR A MILITARY JUNTA

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that on the 26th, that is the Monday, that the Embassy proposed a strong diplomatic initiative for a military junta and September elections?

Mr. MANN. In December——

The CHAIRMAN. September elections.

Mr. MANN. When is the time?

The CHAIRMAN. On April 25, the Department instructed the Embassy to urge unity among the Dominican military and the formation of a provisional government. On April 26, the next day, that is Monday, the Embassy proposed a strong diplomatic initiative for a military junta and September elections.

The Embassy made that second proposal?

Mr. MANN. That is reasonable Senator, because we were not thinking in terms of an immediate election in a situation of that kind. One has to think first of who is going to restore law and order and permit an orderly election campaign and orderly elections to take place. Essentially we are trying now for a provisional government, and this is most unrealistic.

The OAS is trying for it. Unless it has the support of the junta, the military establishment, it won't last. So the reality is that the military have to support a government or it doesn't last, whether that government is popularly elected or whether it is not popularly elected.

The CHAIRMAN. So the reason for the proposal for a military junta was simply the practical one as the only one you thought could work.

Mr. MANN. Obviously, exactly, obviously as a transition, as you see pending elections.

SUPPORT FOR BALAGUER AS LEADER

The CHAIRMAN. When did the administrator first contact Balaguer, when you first stated he polled approximately 52 percent of your vote at the private poll?

Did you think of him at that time as a possible successor?

Mr. MANN. We, I believe, first contacted Balaguer, it was several days later—I would say it was shortly before May 15.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite a bit later.

Mr. MANN. Shortly before May 15 we were in contact with Balaguer.

The CHAIRMAN. But not on April 25th?

Mr. MANN. About the same time we were in contact with Bosch, May 14.

The CHAIRMAN. May 14.

This says that on April 25 the Dominican air force—I assume that is Wessin's?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Asked the U.S. air attaché about possible transportation of Balaguer to the Dominican Republic on humanitarian grounds to see his sick mother, is that correct?

Mr. MANN. I believe that is correct, Senator. I have no reason to doubt it. I don't know it of my own knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. It says the attaché was noncommittal. Apparently nothing was done about it. We did not furnish transportation.

Mr. MANN. Balaguer did go recently to the Dominican Republic to see his——

The CHAIRMAN. Long after this time.

Mr. MANN. Long after. So, I think it is possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is Balaguer acceptable to the military junta crowd as opposed to the revolutionary group?

Mr. MANN. We believe that he is probably as acceptable to the military as any political figure. He is not persona grata with Imbert. This is for personal reasons, but my impression is that the officer corps looks with as much favor—to the extent that there is a consensus—on Balaguer as they do on anybody.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If there is a reasonable ground to believe that Balaguer has the highest popularity, what would be the reason for not attempting some kind of a coercive movement in conjunction with the OAS or by the OAS to get Balaguer set up as the head of a provisional government there and then let them go ahead and enforce it?

Mr. MANN. Balaguer refuses to head up any government unless he is elected by the people.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

DIFFICULT TO FIND ANYONE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.] Balaguer is reported to have told Bosch he had the full backing of the United States to be the new provisional president. That Bosch refused to support. Do you know whether that is true or not?

Mr. MANN. That is not correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not correct?

Mr. MANN. It is not correct, he had the full support of the United States Government to be provisional president. We did sound him out and he made it very clear to us, as I have said earlier, that the only condition under which he would act in the government was if he was freely elected. In fact, the great difficulty we have had, Senator, in this whole thing is to get literally anybody to assume any responsibility, any Dominicans to assume any responsibility.

The only man, aside from the military, who has been willing to act—the only man of any stature is Imbert. That is why Imbert is in there.

REBEL SEIZURES OF ARMS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we discussed this a few days ago, but what about the dissipation of arms after they were seized throughout the Dominican Republic, caches of arms around over the country? I mean the report that literally scores of truckloads of arms and ammunition had been taken out of the arsenals and taken out into the country in the early days of this operation.

Mr. VANCE. Senator, I think I can speak of that.

We do not have a precise figure on the total arms that fell into the hands of the people in the so-called rebel movement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The allegation is 90 truckloads.

Mr. VANCE. The best estimate is some 9,000 to 10,000 actually fell into their hands. A substantial number of those arms are still in the downtown part of the city. We are also convinced, however, that a substantial number of these arms have been smuggled out from that part of the city to various places around the countryside in the Dominican Republic.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the state of law and order or law enforcement so far as the recapture or confiscation of those arms is concerned?

Mr. VANCE. This is going to be one of the most difficult problems that the provisional government will face. It is going to be extremely hard to try to recapture these arms and get them turned in. They will probably have to set up stations to receive these, offer bounties to people who will turn in arms, but I am convinced that even this will not get all the arms in, and there probably will be substantial caches of arms throughout the countryside which we will never get.

IMPOSING A GOVERNMENT BY FORCE

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, right on this point about these provisional governments, I have no doubt that the Department is making every effort to set up a provisional government. Is there much possibility of setting up a provisional government as long as we send great sums of money into all these various groups?

Aren't they satisfied with the present situation, and would be delighted for it to continue as long as we do this?

Mr. MANN. I don't think the money has much to do with this, Senator. The great difficulty is in the low caliber of the people. It is

incredibly low. The great difficulty is to get any Dominican of any stature and reputation to step forward and assume responsibility. The gut problem which faces us is whether we are going to have to ultimately impose a government by force or alternatively to permit the armed forces if they have the capability of imposing a government by force.

We have tried for nearly 3 months now every conceivable formula, every conceivable way. A five-man committee worked at it. Ambassador Bunker is down there now. He has worked the clock around for a month trying to get any kind of a decent anti-Communist base set up. Nobody wants to offend the Communists. Nobody wants to assume responsibility. Everybody is afraid that they will be either blamed for what may happen, for atrocities or things of this kind, and they all want nothing to do with politics.

They want to be left alone to work, and yet they want to govern themselves without having the capacity to do it. This is our real problem, and I think you will find few Dominicans who wouldn't say that they will be very happy to have the inter-American force out of there and the whole OAS was wrong because this is offensive to their feeling.

UNITED STATES AS MEDIATOR

Senator CARLSON. I fully appreciate your doing everything you can to try to set up a provisional government. I personally have had some questions of getting one set up as long as we furnish the funds for the operation of the government, the city. There are many individuals involved who were no doubt doing very well by it, and when some leader comes up they no doubt will ever agree on it. I am just fearful we are in a situation here where the Department, the administration is going to have to take some steps and say we are going to change this and maybe then we can get some movement forward.

I may be in error.

Mr. MANN. In effect, as long as you are acting as a mediator you have a veto of both sides. They are so concerned with these issues I have mentioned of who is going to control the military. The rebels want all of the top officers fired and their people put in. Who is going to control the government? What will the provisions of the constitution be? What disposition, what protection, or what action against the Communists are going to be taken? It is things of that kind that revolve around, in my opinion, naked political power that both sides are jockeying for. I don't doubt that on the fringes there are people who are lining their pockets, but I would say that the great majority of the people would be governed more by what happens to me after this is all over kind of question.

GETTING THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CARLSON. Do you really feel encouraged we can get out of there within 2 or 3 years?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, providing we can get a government set up that is effective. I think we can get out fairly soon and should get out I would think fairly soon. The question is how you break

through this crust, how you get a provisional government set up without using force.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, it is after 1 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to stop in just a minute. In that connection, I notice that on May 7, Bennett told a delegation of prominent Dominicans that we couldn't save them if they were not willing to try to save themselves.

Martin had reported on May 2 that the Dominican armed forces were waiting for the United States to do their job, which sounds very reasonable under the circumstances. They would like for us to take the heat of setting it up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is Martin still acting officially?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is devoting himself now to writing newspaper articles about what a great job he did down there, I guess.

FINDING SOMEONE TO UNITE THE COUNTRY

The CHAIRMAN. On May 8, the Embassy recommended that the Department should approach Balaguer to offer reassurance and to solicit his views. The Embassy expressed the opinion that Balaguer was the only popular leader other than Bosch who was available, that his return to the presidency through elections might be the only solution.

Is that the Department's view?

Mr. MANN. I would say—I can't speak for all of my colleagues—that given the fact, Senator, that the opposition to Bosch is so deep-seated in the military, unless we are prepared to abolish the military and take over the job ourselves, we have no alternative but to find somebody who can unite the country. Balaguer would certainly stand pretty high amongst the list of possible candidates. I don't myself see Bosch uniting the Dominican Republic except by blood and fire.

The CHAIRMAN. The question arises, of course, if this is your view, I don't understand why we don't get behind him and try to put him over and get him established along the lines the Senator from Kansas suggested. Somebody, if he is the best one—goodness knows I am not suggesting that he is, I am not making any suggestion—but if it arises, why can't we make up our mind as to whom to back and establish him for better or worse and try to influence the course of their events? If we don't take a hand in establishing somebody it just remains in a chaotic situation, it seems to me.

Mr. MANN. I am reminded that just a few days ago Ambassador Bunker in the ad hoc committee, three-man committee, approached Balaguer, who repeated what he told us in the early days, that he would take no part in any provisional government. I repeat, the problem is to find anybody except Imbert who is willing to act in a provisional government or the rebel side. If we can't find anybody, obviously we are going to be presented with some very difficult choices.

The CHAIRMAN. I should say we are.

WHAT IF WE SUPPORTED BOSCH

I think it is late and maybe we had better adjourn until tomorrow. I have a few more questions based upon this. All I am trying to do through these questions is establish really what happened, and hopefully we can get some guidance as to what the proper policy in the future must be. I must state it does seem to me on the 25th if these people then approached you, there might have been a possibility at that time of having them, the PRD crowd, a provisional government pending an election. They were willing. They were willing and able, I guess, to serve with our support.

Mr. MANN. Senator, the possibility of having the PRD crowd set up a provisional government on the 25th and 26th, 24, 27, is absolutely zero. This is precisely what caused the military and a large segment of Dominican opinion to split away from the rebel side, let's say the anti-Reid side. They split over the issue of Bosch.

Now, what would have happened had we not intervened or had we supported Bosch? It would have been an almost certain military triumph of the rebel side within, in my opinion, a relatively few days, with a very considerable danger that the Bosch element within the rebel alliance would not have been able to prevent the Communists from taking over.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you don't think he is a Communist, and he had 58 percent of the election.

Mr. MANN. Twenty-eight.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean when he was elected.

Mr. MANN. Excuse me, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the only election they had had in 30 or 40 years. We did support him. I mean you have already testified that we supported him.

BOSCH WAS AN INCOMPETENT ADMINISTRATOR

What happened between the time when we supported him and this time in April that changed the Department's view of him and said you could not support him?

Mr. MANN. By the time Bosch left office, he had alienated a great many people in the Dominican Republic. There is a great difference between Bosch's popularity at the beginning of his term and at the end of his term.

The CHAIRMAN. We have all seen that happen to everybody.

Mr. MANN. He was an incompetent administrator. He had convinced the military establishment—which has to be counted as a force, unless it can be eliminated by force—he had convinced them that the Bosch return would mean a certain return to communism. A great many Dominican people believed this very sincerely. So that we never looked on Bosch in 1965 as an element around which the Dominican people could rally.

ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. What it comes down to, it seems to me, is that there is no alternative to a military government. From what I gather you say, there isn't any alternative. Would you say that is true? It may be.

Mr. MANN. We hope that is not true, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. But you believe it is.

Mr. MANN. But it possibly may turn out to be true. I would like to reserve judgment until we talk to Mr. Bunker. I think some people are more optimistic than I am. They have been at times, first that the Guzman formula would work, that the Garcia Godoy formula would work. What we find is both sides want to negotiate out a long list of detailed issues which, in effect, spell out in their totality political and military power. Each side is insisting on a package which will give them the power, and there is just no give as between Imbert and the rebel side on this issue of power.

The CHAIRMAN. In honesty, I can't see any alternative. Reid Cabral everybody agrees was an honest man, a decent businessman. One of the principal reasons they threw him out was because he didn't pander as he should have to the military. I am told we have some other data here——

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The military are so accustomed to the usual corruption of particularly buying things in the United States and bringing them in without tariffs and selling them on the black market that if anybody like Reid, who is an honest man, or Bosch or anybody else tries to tangle with them, they throw him out; is that about what happens?

Mr. MANN. That is the history since Trujillo.

A HOPELESS LOOKING SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. That sure looks hopeless to me, except a military government. I hate for us to take the responsibility of us imposing another military government after having 30 years of it.

Mr. MANN. This is why we have been working for these nearly 3 months, Senator, to try to get another solution.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe the Communists are the only solution if you can't put a military in. I don't know.

Mr. MANN. We don't want another missile base. If the Dominican Republic goes, Haiti will go like a tinderbox, and you have a whole island, the island of Hispañola, and we will be sending over U-2's looking for missiles and a lot of things.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you fairly specific in your information as to the extent of the Communist influence in these groups? They are rather vague. They mention these—we have got a whole list of these, variously oriented. Are these large gatherings of people or are they a few straggling conspirators down there now?

POPULAR SENTIMENT AND MILITARY STRENGTH

Mr. MANN. Let's make a distinction now between popular sentiment, which is always hard to judge, and military strength. You have got no more than, and probably quite a bit less than, 1,000 dissident military people on the rebel side. They have some strength. You have a bunch of PRD politicians who have no demonstrable control over either the dissidents military or the Communist part of this rebel movement.

A situation has developed, Senator, where Caamano himself, the present titular head of the rebel cause, has told the OAS committee openly that there are certain sectors of his own rebel zone that

he is unable to go into for fear of his life. We have defections from the rebel side, including particularly a captain, as I remember at the moment, who made an estimate that 75 percent of the firepower in the rebel zone is under the direct immediate control of Communist leaders.

From the very beginning in these negotiations there is ample reason to believe that Guzman was never a free agent, that Bosch does not exercise effective control over the rebels. He exercises effective control over the PRD part of the rebel movement, and our strategy from the beginning has been to try to split off the non-Communist PRD elements, principally PRD and rebel military, these thousand men, away from the Communists, isolate the communists, and get them to cooperate with other decent elements to form a provisional government, either a broad based provisional government or non-political, apolitical provisional government in which everybody can have confidence that they would have a fair deal, there would be no vengeance, and so on, to get the provisional government to agree to deport the Communists. Once we have a provisional government, if we can get it, then we would still have, in my opinion, to go in and clean up some of these youngsters who are led, armed, controlled, and take their orders from the Communists, well-known Communists.

HARD EVIDENCE ON THE COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any, what you call, hard evidence about the nature and size, and who they are, of these Communist groups?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, a great deal.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they very numerous?

Mr. MANN. We can give you estimates on numbers that are fairly accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be very curious to see them if you will do that.

We will adjourn until 10 in the morning and we will finish it tomorrow.

Senator CARLSON. Very interesting.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vance follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Today I would like to explain the military operations undertaken in recent weeks in the Dominican Republic.

Santo Domingo, a city of 460,000 persons, is located on the west bank of the Ozama River. The palace, the traditional seat of the Dominican Government, is located downtown, and most of the embassies, including the U.S. Embassy, are about one mile west of the palace. American forces were used in the Dominican Republic primarily in the area for the port of Haina, 7 miles west of Santo Domingo, within the densely populated city of Santo Domingo itself, and eastward for about 8 miles to the San Isidro airfield. The map attached to my statement gives the general picture of the distribution of U.S. forces at the peak of their deployment on May 17, 1965.

The insurrection in Santo Domingo against the government of Donald Reid Cabral began on Saturday, April 24, with rioting and demonstrations in the streets of downtown Santo Domingo. On April 25, Donald Reid Cabral resigned, and Rafael

Molina Urena was named as provisional president by rebel leaders. Rioting continued throughout the day.

During the next few days, the situation became increasingly chaotic. On April 26, the regular forces bombed rebel-held territory in Santo Domingo. Molina took refuge in the Colombian Embassy. The situation continued to deteriorate rapidly. Other early leaders of the rebel movement began to seek refuge in foreign embassies. Extremist groups moved quickly to the ranks of the rebels. Communist agitation played an increasing role in the rebel movement and assisted in collecting arms, organizing forces, and setting up strong points in Santo Domingo. As the rebels gained control of more arms and ammunition, hundreds of civilians were given weapons.

Deployment of U.S. Forces

The deployment of U.S. Forces paralleled these events. On April 24, the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron, with its 1,830 Marines, was directed to move to and stand off the Dominican coast. On April 26, two Army battalions of the 82d Airborne Division were alerted. On April 27, the Marine amphibious squadron was ordered to begin the evacuation of United States and other foreign nationals. On that day 1,176 Americans and other foreign nationals were evacuated through the port of Haina. On April 28, the situation had so deteriorated that Ambassador Bennett requested the landing of Marines to protect the evacuation operations and reinforce the Embassy guard. In response, 500 Marines were sent ashore to protect the evacuation operation and reinforce the Embassy guard.

On April 29, the Ambassador requested that the remainder of the Marine units (1,500) and the two Army battalions (1,800) be moved into the Dominican Republic to protect American lives. On April 29, the 1,500 Marines landed and established positions around the Ambassador Hotel, which was the assembly point for evacuees, and secured the road to the port of Haina. On April 30, in the early morning, the 1,800 Army troops landed at the San Isidro Airfield.

A cease-fire agreement, sponsored by the committee of the Organization of American States, was signed at 5:30 p.m. on April 30, by representatives of the rebel forces and the forces of the three-man military junta. U.S. Ambassador Bennett, U.S. Army Major General York and the Papal Nuncio to the Dominican Republic, who helped bring about the cease-fire, also signed the agreement as an indication of their good offices. Despite the signing of the cease-fire agreement, sporadic but frequent sniping at U.S. troops continued from the rebel-held area. Within about 48 hours, 4 soldiers and Marines were killed and 41 wounded. A rebel shortwave transmitter broadcast instructions to shoot Americans on sight. Thus, the danger to American lives continued; and with the rebels in control of Radio Santo Domingo—the only effective communication with the rest of the island—the danger of chaos and anarchy throughout the island increased, with its accompanying danger to American and other lives and property.

Accordingly, 400 Army troops were landed late on May 1 at San Isidro, about 8 miles east of Santo Domingo. 1,600 more Army troops arrived early on May 2. They secured the San Isidro Airfield, the Duarte Bridge at the east entrance of Santo Domingo, and part of the east bank of the Ozama River on the eastern side of Santo Domingo.

Also, on May 1, an international safety zone was established within Santo Domingo, pursuant to a resolution of the Organization of American States, to protect anyone, including Dominicans, who wished such refuge. The international safety zone encompasses an area of about three square miles and is located in the southwestern portion of the city. It is bordered on the east by the downtown area held by the Caamano forces and on the south by the sea. It contains most of the embassies and the Ambassador Hotel. U.S. forces were given responsibility for establishing and maintaining the zone. By the end of May 3, about 1,700 more Army troops and 1,000 Marines were landed at San Isidro and Haina to reinforce and hold the international safety zone and to secure the Duarte Bridge and the road to the San Isidro Airfield.

Deployment of U.S. forces continued on May 3, 4, and 5, with supporting elements arriving until May 17. By May 17, there were approximately 21,900 U.S. Armed Forces personnel on the island: 6,000 Marines, 14,900 Army, and 1,000 Air Force. An additional force of 2,000 Marines was deployed offshore to meet unexpected contingencies.

THE NEED FOR SUCH FORCES

To appreciate the need for this sized force, two major factors must be considered: the missions of the force, and the geographical location and population density of the areas in which they were required to perform those missions. It should be borne in mind that the missions I am about to describe were carried out in the framework of the political objectives described to you by Secretary Mann.

The initial mission of the U.S. forces was to evacuate U.S. nationals whose lives were in danger. The mission was also immediately expanded to include the evacuation of other foreign nationals and the reinforcement of the U.S. Embassy guard which was under attack by rebel snipers. Marines were required to insure the safety of the evacuees from the assembly point at the Ambassador Hotel on the western edge of Santo Domingo to the port of Haina 7 miles away. The next mission assigned was the establishment of the international safety zone. Establishment and maintenance of this zone, together with the need to assure the safe movement of people and supplies over the 7 miles of road from Santo Domingo to the landing, supply, and evacuation point at the port of Haina, required approximately 6,000 Marines.

The missions of the Army troops were also to protect the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals and to help restore law and order. In addition, the Army was assigned the mission of establishing a safe corridor from the San Isidro Airfield to the international safety zone, thus protecting the vital lifeline of medicine, food, and other essential supplies from San Isidro to Santo Domingo. In addition, the corridor provided a safe route for evacuees from San Isidro Airfield.

4,416 Army troops were required to secure the eastern bank of the Ozama River, including the Duarte Bridge, and the 8-mile road from San Isidro Airfield to Santo Domingo on a 24-hour a day basis. Another 4,416 men were required to secure the airfield at San Isidro and to remain available to restore law and order, on behalf of the Organization of American States, throughout the remainder of the country in the event violence should spread outside the city. An additional 1,809 Army and Air Force personnel were required to support the intensive air operations at San Isidro Airfield and to provide the other services needed to maintain our forces in the Dominican Republic.

4,416 additional men were required to establish and maintain the 2-mile corridor from the Duarte Bridge to the international safety zone. This corridor, 4 blocks wide, ran through a densely populated section of the city. Eventually this corridor became (as it now is) the line separating the opposing rebel and regular forces, and the key to the maintenance of the cease-fire.

U.S. Army troops in this portion of the corridor not only performed the missions of protecting the lifeline from San Isidro and separating the opposing Dominican forces, but also searched all traffic crossing the corridor to prevent the passage of arms and ammunition from one side to the other. The corridor also serves as a route for the transport of food, supplies, and medicine to the international safety zone and the rest of Santo Domingo.

THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE

On May 8, the Council of the Organization of the American States authorized the establishment of an inter-American peace force for the Dominican Republic. Subsequently, the forces of Latin American countries joined U.S. forces in Santo Domingo. On May 13, Honduras ordered 250 men and Costa Rica 21 to the Dominican Republic. On May 14, Nicaragua ordered 159 men and on May 23, Brazil ordered 1,129. On that same date, an act formally establishing the Inter-American Peace Force was signed in Santo Domingo and General Hugo Panasco Alvim of the Brazilian Army was designated Commander, with Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer of the United States Army as Deputy Commander. On June 22, Paraguay ordered 180 men to the Dominican Republic. All of these Latin American units are now deployed in the Dominican Republic, along with the remaining United States units, as elements of the Inter-American Peace Force. Supporting naval and air forces are provided by, and under the control of, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.

Under the act signed on May 23, the mission of the Inter-American Peace Force is as follows: "This force, pursuant to the Resolution of May 6, will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions."

Latin American and U.S. relationships within the Inter-American Peace Force have been excellent throughout the execution of the combined operation.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES

With the arrival of the Inter-American Peace Force contingent from Brazil and the continued improvement of conditions in the Dominican Republic, it became possible to reduce the number of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic. Through the end of June, forces were withdrawn as shown below.

	Personnel ashore [1]		
	Withdrawn		Remaining
May 17			21,900
May 18–24	500	Army	21,400
May 25–31	1,500	Army	
	200	Air Force	
	100	Marines	19,600
June 1–6	600	Army	
	200	Air Force	
	5,800	Marines	13,000
June 7–24	400	Army	
	100	Air Force	
	100	Marines	12,400

[1] The 2,000 Marines afloat off the shore of the Dominican Republic were withdrawn on May 27.

On July 4, the President announced the planned withdrawal of an additional 1,400 Army forces. When these forces are withdrawn, we will have approximately 11,000 U.S. personnel in the Dominican Republic.

CONCLUSION

It is hard to conceive of more complex military tasks than those of our military men in the Dominican Republic. These tasks were carried out in a strange land, under fire, in the midst of heated and conflicting passions, and largely in a city where women and children resided and were trying to go ahead with the daily chores of living. I can state from personal observation that our forces have performed magnificently. In addition to the commendable restraint and valor which they exhibited under fire, I believe we should underscore certain special accomplishments:

1. Our forces safely evacuated several thousand persons from 46 countries without the loss of a single civilian life.
2. The action of our troops prevented the killing of hundreds of innocent Dominicans caught between the conflicting Dominican forces.
3. With the advice and assistance of other agencies, our forces distributed 1,781 tons of food and 45 tons of medicine and medical supplies to the Dominican people.
4. American military personnel have established and manned two hospitals which have to date treated some 43,000 patients.

Finally, the first Inter-American Peace Force has been established in which U.S. and other American troops were joined under a Brazilian commander to protect the lives and preserve the freedom of the people of a sister republic.

I shall be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very interesting. It is always vague to me, I mean the reports you read about Communist groups. I don't know whether they are talking about five or a dozen or 500.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Thursday, July 15, 1965.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

Also present: Robert W. Adams, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Mann; Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State; Colonel Ralph E. Vandervort, Jr., Deputy Director, Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense; Alexander Schnee, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State; Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I believe when we stopped yesterday we had just come up to about the 27th. I wonder if we could start, perhaps, by your telling us what happened on the 27th, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS C. MANN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; AND HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

I have some odds and ends that were asked yesterday, some information that we didn't have, and I am ready to supply it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, that will be fine.

EMBASSY TELEGRAM

Mr. MANN. In regard to the conversation between Fernandez and Secretary General Martinez with an Embassy officer, we do have a telegram dated April 25, which I will read to the committee. It contains our report about these two conversations, 6 p.m.:

PRD Manuel Fernandez, who was deeply involved in military insurrection, called Embassy officer to ask that Embassy pressure the air force to stop strafing the palaces. The Embassy officer replied that the Embassy was greatly preoccupied over violence and would equally like to see shooting stopped on both sides.

The Embassy officer suggested that Fernandez get the rebel military officers to talk sensibly instead of provoking worse confrontation. At 6:00 p.m., a delegation from the PRD consisting of Secretary General Martinez, District Committee Head Lovaton Pitalugo, and Antonio Guzman from Santiago, and former Ambassador in Washington del Rosario, came independently to the Embassy to express the same concern and to ask the Embassy to pressure for end of air attacks. Embassy officer again spoke directly and frankly to them expressing the Embassy's concern over the

violence and the resulting situation which was favorable to the Communists. He suggested that the time had come for Dominicans of good will on both sides of present dispute to act responsibly. He went on to suggest that if PRD leaders could persuade the rebel military to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions with the military hierarchy, he would undertake to persuade the Embassy authorities to do what they could to facilitate any effort by both sides to talk. It was made quite clear, however, that the Embassy could not intervene on their behalf and obtained an admission that as good Dominicans, the rebels did not want this. Call was then placed to Fernandez, who undertook to make effort with the rebel military. We are now awaiting results of this effort.

Senator CLARK. Was Bennett back by then?

Mr. MANN. No, this was sent by Connett on the 25th. Bennett was not there at that time.

Senator CLARK. The shooting——

The CHAIRMAN. On that word, the man we had the other day was Breisky, the man who received them.

Mr. MANN. This refers to an Embassy officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Breisky, I think.

Mr. MANN. And I am assuming, Mr. Chairman, that the Embassy officer was Breisky.

Senator CLARK. The air force shooting was coming from the military and not from the rebels, wasn't it?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It would come from the planes. They had five.

Senator CLARK. From San Isidro.

Mr. VANCE. Those planes came from San Isidro.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, they strafed the palace that day, didn't they?

Mr. VANCE. They did, sir.

RECOGNITION OF REBEL TRIUMVIRATE

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, someone asked yesterday about the date of our recognition of the triumvirate that overthrew Bosch. Mexico never did break relations. They resumed the transaction of normal business on October 1, 1964.

Senator CLARK. Give us the date of the revolution.

Mr. MANN. The date was in September of 1963.

The following countries recognized the triumvirate prior to October 17, 1963: China, Honduras, Portugal, Spain. France recognized on October 31, 1963. Germany recognized on October 31, 1963.

Senator CLARK. West Germany?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Italy on October 31, 1963. Japan about November 2, 1963. Uruguay about November 4, 1963. The United Kingdom about November 6, 1963. The Netherlands about November 13, 1963. Guatemala on December 5, 1963. Nicaragua on December 5, 1963. Argentina on December 11, 1963. Ecuador on December 14, 1963. El Salvador on December 14, 1963. The United States, December 14, 1963. Canada, December 15, 1963. Brazil, December 18, 1963. Chile, December 18, 1963. Vatican on February 27, 1964. Uruguay on March 1, 1964. Turkey on March 1, 1964. Bolivia on April 1, 1964. Colombia on May 30, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is enough. We don't need to recite all those dates.

Senator MORSE. What was our date?

Mr. MANN. December 14. We were asked for a list of the dates on which other countries recognized and where we came in the list, Mr. Chairman. We were well down the list of countries.

Senator CLARK. Three months after the revolution.

MURREY MARDER ARTICLE

The CHAIRMAN. Before we proceed on this 24, I want to see if I can clear up something. Is it correct, as reported by [Washington Post correspondent] Murrey Marder, that this matter was started when the Chief of Staff General Marcos Rivera Cuesta and a deputy drove to the 27th of February military camp outside of Santo Domingo? They intended to cancel the commissions of four officers for plotting against the Reid regime. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. MANN. We believe that is substantially accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me it has some significance in that this trouble was not touched off by either the rebels of any color, whether they be Communist or non-Communist. It was really touched off this particular day by an action taken by Reid, wasn't it?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered if that statement was correct.

Senator CLARK. Did you ask him, Bill, of his appraisal of the Marder article, which I read with great interest?

The CHAIRMAN. No. You may ask him. Have you read it, Murrey Marder's long article?

Senator CLARK. In Outlook.

Mr. MANN. I read it some time ago, rather hurriedly.

Senator CLARK. So you don't have any deliberate appraisal of it now. To me it was quite convincing. I wondered whether to you it was inaccurate.

Mr. MANN. I think it contains substantial inaccuracies, but I thought it contained also a lot of good factual material.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, do you have any views about it?

Mr. VANCE. I share Tom's view on that, Senator Clark. I think it does contain some inaccuracies, but there is a substantial amount of accuracy in it.

Senator CLARK. I think it would be helpful, Mr. Chairman, as we conduct this discussion if the gentlemen would point out where they believe it to be inaccurate. It is quite a full documentation by a very able reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you indicate where you think it is inaccurate?

Mr. MANN. I would be happy to do that. I don't have the article here.

Senator MORSE. I think he should file a memorandum so we would know it was a reasoned judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a long article. I have it here, as a matter of fact. There are many points in it, I think, that are well made if they are accurate; I mean they are significant if accurate. I have no way of judging it. It would be useful if you could——

Mr. MANN. I would be happy to do that.

Senator CLARK. I would like the record to note that to any personal knowledge he is an extremely able reporter. He could be wrong, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. He could be wrong, and on many of the points he states, there is a difference of opinion, of course, a matter of judgment as to what happened.

Senator CLARK. Right.

MILITARY AID TO REID GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Any other preliminaries?

Do you wish to ask anything before we proceed? We started to try to develop the things as they occurred.

Senator CLARK. We are going down day by day.

Senator MORSE. I deeply regret I couldn't be here yesterday, but as Joe Clark is, we are on the markup of this higher education bill. I got them to recess for the day so we could be here.

Mr. VANCE. There is one other piece of information which was requested yesterday and I did not have the answer.

You requested the amount of military aid given to the Reid government. I said yesterday, as I recalled it, it was about $500,000. I have checked the facts and they show that in 1964 military assistance to the Dominican Republic was $600,000, and it rose to a programmed amount of $1.7 million in the year 1965, of which about $1.3 million has been delivered.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Let's see, we start back then on the 27th. That was a Tuesday on which day Ambassador Bennett returned to Santo Domingo.

Do you remember about what time he returned? He left here that morning, got there about noon; is that about right?

Mr. MANN. It seems to me that relying on memory, Mr. Chairman, he either left Monday night or fairly early Tuesday morning. He went to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico. He went from there to the commercial airport 16 miles east of San Isidro. He was carried by helicopter from the airport to the aircraft carrier. He went from the aircraft carrier and made his way through the international safety zone arriving in the Embassy around noon. This is from memory.

The CHAIRMAN. And that day he was called upon by a delegation, was he not, offering or asking their intervention in negotiation, by the rebel leaders?

Mr. MANN. I believe that is correct.

REPORT ON THE MEETING

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any details about that meeting?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, we have a report on that meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would put that in the record.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I will give you a summary, I hope an accurate summary of the telegram dated April 28, 1965, which we received from the Embassy, which is the basis of our knowledge and belief about this particular interview.

The Embassy reported in a joint State-Defense message that Molina Urena appeared at the Embassy shortly before 4 in the

afternoon, accompanied by some 15 or 20 people whom he introduced as his principal political and military advisers.

The Prime Minister, Lovaton, had reportedly already taken refuge in a foreign embassy, and collapse of some of the other leading military have already been reported. Colonels Hernando Ramirez and Caamano Deno were with him.

Following security practice already instituted, I required all weapons to be checked at the entrance. Molina Urena was nervous and dejected, was trying hard to carry himself as a constitutional president and failing in doing so. All talked about democratic principles and some talked of fighting, but it was clear they realized that the forces against them were superior, and they said they were ready to negotiate a settlement.

In a meeting lasting almost one hour, various members of the group asserted that their people were still prepared to resist, but they felt that their action was necessary in the interest of preventing further bloodshed.

I made clear our emphatic view that the senseless shedding of blood should end at the same time, reminding them it was their action on Saturday which initiated the fratricide. I recalled to them that the United States had loyally supported Bosch to the end of his government and beyond, and had made clear its emphatic disapproval of his overthrow. That had happened, however, more than 18 months ago. The latest effort to restore Bosch was obviously unsuccessful and at some point one had to start anew.

I made clear to them that we were talking in similar terms to both sides and while meeting was going on, word was brought in that a navy air force bombardment had ceased. I suggested this was time for them to approach the other side for talks. Both in the full group and in private conversation with Molina and one or two civilians accompanying him, I underlined that there was no question that the Communists had taken advantage of their legitimate revolutionary movement having been tolerated and even encouraged by the PRD.

I noted that in spite of the fact that the PRD was a democratic party, they had in effect given the Communists free rein, especially through military distribution of arms to civilians in large numbers, their tolerance of widespread looting, and physical mistreatment of innocent people.

I said there was much talk of democracy on their part but this did not impress me as the way to get to democracy. At one point I told Molina Urena, with whom I have always had good personal relations, I was sorry for him as regards the way all of this had turned out but that I was also concerned about the serious Communist infiltration and influence in the recent events.

His answers and those of his colleagues were unconvincing, although I found little give in their position and no willingness to admit that such was the case. I recounted to him incidents over the local TV over the weekend of Castro-type bearded ones, barbudos, talking a pure Castro line. He said I was talking about details. I replied to him I wanted to make clear that this kind of detail was of considerable importance.

During the meeting a message came that danger possible to American citizens in La Romana through the actions of rebels handing out arms to the civilians. I called to the group's attention just what I was talking about. They indicated concern and offered to use helicopters to go to La Romana to stop it. As regards to their request that we persuade Wessin from crossing the bridge and get the air force to call off bombing, I reminded him that the Embassy had been successful four times yesterday in getting the air force to hold back, and I thought early this morning that a truce had been worked out. They had, in fact, tried to take advantage of each ceasefire.

Then I came down strongly on the incidents at the Ambassador Hotel where American lives were wantonly placed in peril this morning. I asked whether this was an example of democracy in action.

During the meeting Martinez Francisco called back asking to speak to Molina and saying he was going to make a strong effort with him to give up. They had a long talk by phone, contents of which were not discussed with us. I declined courteously a proposal made by Molina that I attend negotiations along with the dean of the diplomatic corps and representative of the Church. I said that I had no authority to participate in a meeting of this kind and that in our view an accord should be reached by Dominicans talking to Dominicans.

I said the U.S. looked forward to early elections, hoped they would be entirely free, and perhaps they could be supervised by OAS if Dominicans wanted it that way.

The meeting came to an end with Molina leaving accompanied by a small group and several others, principally the military, lingering as though they hesitated to go out into the world again. There was some evidence that the army/navy force group was ready to talk with them, and I urged them to get together. We have not yet heard the results.

Senator CLARK. What is the date of that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who sent that?

Mr. MANN. That was sent by Bennett and the date of it is April 28, sent about 9:30 p.m. April 27.

The CHAIRMAN. It refers to what took place on the afternoon of the 27th.

Mr. MANN. I just gave you, Mr. Chairman, a full account.

AMBASSADOR'S AUTHORITY TO MEDIATE

The CHAIRMAN. This seems to me a rather critical time there, if we try to judge the actions. It would appear that the rebels who came there thought their cause was hopeless and were practically in a position of wanting to surrender. They wanted to ask for his intercession, and he said he had no authority to intercede; is that true?

Mr. MANN. No authority to——

The CHAIRMAN. Mediate.

Mr. MANN [continuing]. Mediate. He thought this should be done by Dominicans working with Dominicans. But he also pointed out on the day previous, four times he thought he had arranged a ceasefire and each time it was the rebels who started shooting and broke it up.

The CHAIRMAN. He wasn't there the day before. He just got there. This is Tuesday, the 27th.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. But——

The CHAIRMAN. He couldn't have interceded. Let me go back.

Isn't it a fact that after this Reid effort to dismiss some officers, it was on Sunday, the next day, that the air force started bombarding the palace that caused, according to Marder's statement—and I don't know whether this is again correct, it sounds reasonable—during that frantic Sunday in Santo Domingo, there was uncertainty about who would line up on each side, especially about the position of the air force.

Then about 4:30 p.m. after warning to abandon the swearing-in of Molina Urena had been ignored, four of the air force's, five P-51's began rocket and machinegun fire at the palace; 5 p.m., Molina Urena was sworn in. The air attacks, which caused several casualties, produced public frenzy. The mobs began sacking stores and homes of Trujillo's and triumvirate supporters and so on. It describes that. This started that distribution of arms, which would bring me to what I think is a key point.

He recites there several times the evidence of Communist takeover. What evidence of a Communist takeover does he have and has he ever produced, because this description of what occurred would seem to be just a mob. They were excited and panicked by an air attack.

Senator CLARK. They were being shot at.

The CHAIRMAN. Being shot at, it sounds like a mob. I don't know what the facts are there, but he recites Communist takeover of

this, and he apparently on the 27th takes the view that the rebels are about to surrender and they should go surrender to the military; is that correct?

EMBASSY ARRANGED CEASE-FIRES

Mr. MANN. No, sir. I don't think the word "surrender" was ever used, Mr. Chairman. I think what I read was an accurate statement that the Embassy worked constantly from the very beginning, time after time, in contacting both sides in an effort to get both sides to agree, especially the military, the dissidents and regular military, to work out together as Dominicans a Dominican solution to a Dominican problem. They pointed out if they didn't act responsibly in this way that in view of the arms that had been passed out, obviously the Communists would benefit from the chaos and the confusion. They actually did arrange several cease-fires.

The CHAIRMAN. When?

Mr. MANN. This telegram stated four times the day before. That would be April 26, Monday, April 26.

Senator CLARK. Who did it, Mr. Mann, since Bennett wasn't there?

Mr. MANN. That was Connett on April 26. But the Embassy operates as a unit. All the decisions were taken unanimously. When an Ambassador comes and goes, his staff carries on the policy, and when he comes back he picks it up. It isn't a different policy. It is a continuation of the same efforts, the same policy.

Senator CLARK. May I ask one question, Bill?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

BENNETT'S REFUSAL TO MEDIATE

Senator CLARK. What was the apparent excuse for Bennett refusing to go with the constitutionalists, as I prefer to call them, to confer with the military to see whether an arrangement could not be worked out to stop the bombing, the raiding, and the firing?

It would seem to me—and I agree this is hindsight and it is a cinch to be critical after the event, I know that—that if he had been willing to go at that time to talk with the military, which at that point I guess was Wessin y Wessin, wasn't it?

Mr. MANN. Wessin y Wessin was in command on that day, yes.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. That something might have worked out to avoid all the subsequent disorder.

Now, I say again, this is a cinch on the basis of hindsight. But in retrospect, would it not have been wise for Bennett to go and mediate and do the papal nuncioing? He was asked to accompany the papal nuncioing and refused—do the nuncioing.

Mr. MANN. I don't think we have any information. The Nuncio was very active, Senator, just as we were, from the beginning. We were in close contact with the Nuncio.

Senator CLARK. My recollection is that he went back and forth a good many times.

Mr. MANN. He went back and forth a good many times and so did we, so did Connett when he was in charge and so did Bennett when he got back. He was flying in helicopters to San Isidro back

and forth on almost a 24-hour around the clock basis trying to get an end to the shooting from the very time it started.

THROWING UP HIS HANDS

Senator CLARK. But at this critical moment he refused to go and took what seems to me, on the basis of this statement—I don't mean to be unduly critical—and took what appears to be a pretty anti-constitutionalist position and indicated these gentlemen had really better go and surrender because the game was up.

Do you think this is an unfair inference from his telegram?

Mr. MANN. I think it is. I don't think he ever used the word "surrender." I don't think he ever used the term "surrender." He was thinking in terms of an accommodation.

Senator CLARK. He threw up his hands, didn't he?

Mr. MANN. I don't know that he threw up his hands, Senator. If we can take these questions one at a time, you asked why it was that the American Ambassador wouldn't want to meet in a room with both sides present at the same time as distinguished from meeting with each side separately and pushing them together. This is——

Senator CLARK. As apparently the Papal Nuncio was willing to do.

Mr. MANN. That is correct. I am not sure that the Papal Nuncio ever did meet in a room together with both sides. I doubt it. The reason for that is a long history that we have in Latin America of a distinction we make of trying to persuade both sides to get together and work something out, and summoning them to the Embassy as we used to do 40 years ago and, in effect, telling both sides what they had to do.

INTERVENING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

If Bennett had done this—and this was done many times in the past before the days of non-intervention—certainly he would have been accused by both sides of having intervened in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. You must understand that in these first days he was working in accordance with standard operating procedures not to intervene.

His concern was growing day by day at the strength of the Communist movement. He was fussing at the rebels for having armed the Communists. He was telling them that this was dangerous. He was urging them to get together with the regular military and the dissident military, and for the military to work out between themselves an arrangement to stop the fighting. He said that four times the day before, the Embassy had been in touch with both sides, that four times they thought they had achieved a cease-fire so they could get together and talk. He said he did not think he should sit with them together, but he willing to go to the regular army forces again to see what he could do to help.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Mr. MANN. I don't see, as a professional knowing something about Latin American policies and tactics, that there was anything unusual or wrong about this. In the light of subsequent developments, Senator, had we known that this situation would have con-

tinued to deteriorate, we would have probably—which we didn't know at this time and hoped would not be the case—we probably should have intervened earlier than we did, but the hope was through those early days that U.S. intervention, with all the liabilities that this brings, could have been avoided.

INTERVENTION OR MEDIATION

Senator CLARK. I don't think you ought to use the word "intervention." We are talking about mediation. We are talking about going to a meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. They did go later with the Papal Nuncio.

Mr. MANN. This is not military intervention. I do want to say that many times in situations comparable to this, in times of revolutions, both contending factions have been called into the American Embassy, summoned by the American Ambassador or something of that kind, where the American Ambassador is present. You will find in the history of nearly every Latin American country a deep resentment that internal political affairs were decided by the foreign Ambassador. The practice is to talk to each side separately. It is a difference between good offices and mediation and to try to get them together to find a national solution.

Senator CLARK. There is no suggestion here that he should bring them in the American Embassy. I have pursued it far enough.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I pursue a couple of points?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One is the point raised about the Communist takeover and what triggered this.

It seems to me with great frequency in the world, Communist overt activities are not necessarily started by Communists out in front with a Communist banner. As I understand from reading all of these things and listening, they have been organized for a long time down there to take advantage of opportunity when it presents itself. I think it is fair to assume that when the resignation or the cancellation of the commissions of these four officers was demanded by the President, that let the dissident elements say, "The chips are down, we had better get busy."

While it could be said to be triggered by that, it was not the explosive force. The explosive force was the subrosa or subversive activities of this highly trained cadre or cadres of dedicated Communists who are ready to take over at the first instance of an incident which they thought merited an all-out effort, and they took over almost immediately.

Now, I think we have all seen, we have a mob of 500 people or a 1,000 people, and five or ten knowledgeable and trained—that is, knowledgeable in tactics—are Communists, who are trained in subversion and revolution and things like that. They can get in there and immediately spring into the leadership because they know what to do, and the mob follows them. It seems to me that is probably what happened there. They actually took over the direction and leadership. They probably were responsible for distributing the

arms. That is a common Communist tactic, I think, in a lot of countries where they do get a temporary advantage. They took over that distribution—probably the distribution of arms over the country and all of those things.

ROLE OF THE AMBASSADOR

As far as the mediation is concerned, I hope I understand the position taken here. It might have been difficult if both sides had sent a supplication to the American Ambassador to please come and meet with both of them. That might have been considered to be non-intervention, but in response to a request from the various warring factions to come and meet with us at a round table. But I can readily see if the American Ambassador marched down the street with the rebels in an attempt to talk to the other side that the other side would say immediately, "Oh, oh, the United States is now on the side of the rebels, and we will look at this with a jaundiced eye." There is no indication here that the other side wanted the American Ambassador to come and meet with the rebels, was there?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. On the contrary, at this particular moment, I don't think the other side would have accepted if the Ambassador had gone with them, as you say. I don't think they would have accepted the Ambassador.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As far as the Nuncio is concerned, I think in any of those countries in Latin America, probably the Nuncio occupies a unique position.

Mr. MANN. He does.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He occupies the position of spiritual as well as the political mentor of some kind, which professional ambassadors don't occupy. He can approach it on the basis of religious or spiritual arguments and things of that kind, rather than political. But I have been quite convinced that while the Communists may not have been out in front in the inception of this trouble there, they were sitting right there just in the wings ready to come out and take the leadership. I think the evidence is pretty clear that they did.

EXTENT OF COMMUNIST PENETRATION

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, if you would like for me to state the facts as we understand them about the extent of Communist penetration—is that the question you put to me?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I think I can do this in about 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANN. This is, in our opinion, the third attempt of Castro to promote a revolution in the Dominican Republic. The first one occurred in 1959 in June, the 14th of June, when an expedition was launched from Cuba and liquidated by Trujillo.

The 14th of June movement takes its name from this Cuba-launched expedition in 1959. It takes its name from the date.

The second attempt was made in 1963 when a number of Dominicans who had been trained in Cuba in guerrilla warfare were financed and sent to the Dominican Republic by Castro and actually

formed a guerrilla movement in the mountains. This was in September, I believe—November 1963. After fighting for about a month, this group was also liquidated.

Senator CLARK. By whom?

Mr. MANN. By the military. I believe during the time of the triumvirate which followed Bosch. In fact, one of the principal causes of the military turning against Bosch was what they consider to be an equivocal attitude toward this particular expedition.

The CHAIRMAN. How many were in that, do you remember? Was it a large expedition?

Mr. MANN. We can file that with you, together with the names of the leaders who were killed.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I saw it was about 20, wasn't it, who were wiped out in the mountains? All of them were killed.

Mr. MANN. I don't recall the numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. It is referred to in one of these things.

Senator CLARK. That is my recollection, 20.

Mr. MANN. Of course, Castro started with 12. The tactics in all of these things is to get the peasants to rise and create what they call a revolution of national liberation. It didn't catch on with the peasants. The peasants were the ones who informed the military about the location of these people, and therefore it failed.

THREE COMMUNIST PARTIES

There are three Communist parties in the Dominican Republic. One of them is called the MPD, the Dominican Popular Movement. This has been illegal since 1963 and is therefore underground. It follows the Peiping party line. It has, according to our intelligence, about 500 hardcore members.

The second party is called the PSPD, the Dominican Popular Socialist Party. This is also illegal and underground. It is Moscow-oriented and financed, and it has about 700 to 1,000 members.

The third party is called the 14th of June movement. It is known by the initials PACJ. It started as a liberal movement and it was captured by the Communists in 1963. I want to make clear that this still contains some non-Communist elements in the ranks. Before 1963, I would say that they were probably predominant. Since 1963, our intelligence is that the leadership is now totally Communist, the control is Communist, and that they take their orders and receive financing from Castro.

The CHAIRMAN. How many do you estimate in that?

Mr. MANN. We estimate that they have between 3,000 and 5,000 members. They claim a larger membership, but our estimate is somewhere in that neighborhood.

This is openly pro-Castro.

Senator CLARK. Excuse me, Mr. Mann. There are about 3½ million people in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, yes.

I am just trying to develop in chronological order the facts which gave us concern and which caused us to conclude the Communist danger was very considerable.

COMMUNISTS IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

In the latter part of 1964 and in the early part of 1965, some 45, and possibly more, known Communists in leadership positions, most of them returning secretly and covertly, re-entered the Dominican Republic. All of these or nearly all of these, according to our information, had received training in guerrilla warfare and in subversion in the Communist countries, predominantly Cuba, but some of them were trained in Peiping and I think one or two in Russia, if I remember correctly.

Senator CLARK. Could you define a little more "leadership positions?"

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, I am coming to that.

Now, the 14th of June movement considered with Bosch in January of 1965 its participation in a popular front, according to our intelligence.

The left wing of the Social Christian Revolutionary Party—and I want to make a distinction between the left wing and the moderate wing, because the moderate wing has from the beginning claimed that this revolution was captured by the Communists early in the game—the left wing of the Social Christian Revolutionary Party made a pact——

Senator CLARK. Is that PRD?

Mr. MANN. No. sir. This is more closely akin to the Christian Democrats.

They made a pact with Bosch and his party, the PRD, to overthrow Reid Cabral and to reinstate Bosch in the presidency. It was decided at that time that it would be counterproductive for the 14th of June movement to openly participate in this pact, but it was understood between Bosch and the 14th of June leaders that their support would be welcomed.

Through the 14th of June movement the other two Communist parties, according to our intelligence, were also informed of the plot to overthrow Reid Cabral and were prepared when the revolt came to take advantage of the opportunities.

COMMUNISTS CHANGED POSITION ON BOSCH

I have in this connection a number of pamphlets, which I think are of more than passing interest, by all three of the Communist parties—issued prior to the commencement of the revolution—which shows that they changed their position, which had previously been in opposition to Bosch, to one of support of Bosch. They say frankly in here that this is not the end of the revolutionary movement but it is the first step toward the accomplishment of socialist aims.

One of them, for example—I would like to pass them around. It is the only copy I have. They are in Spanish; we can provide translations for the record. Some of them we have translated, but here, for example, the Moscow line party with a picture of Lenin and all the other insignia. This is dated on 16 March 1965.

I have another one here which is a PSP sheet dated March 9, 1965, talking about the pact between the left wing of the Social Democrats and the PRD and support of Bosch.

Another one which is undated but which was distributed at about the same time——

Senator CLARK. Do all three of those refer to Bosch in favorable terms?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

And this is significant, Senator, because up to this time they had opposed Bosch. This is the result of the significance of this pact that I was talking about that was made in January.

RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Senator CLARK. Is it your intelligence that these three Communist parties were friendly with each other?

Mr. MANN. Oh, yes, sir. Their strategy is throughout all of Latin America, and our experience is always the same. The only thing they debate about are tactics and timing, and the debate follows the general lines of the debate between the Chinese and the Russians.

Senator AIKEN. You mean if Bosch accepts so much Communist support then he would be obligated to virtually run a Communist government himself, just like we did after World War II?

Mr. MANN. Well—I am trying to develop here the facts, as I understand, as we believe them to have been.

Then I have some pamphlets here.

Senator AIKEN. I didn't mean that too seriously.

Mr. MANN. We have some pamphlets here from the Peiping line Communist party, and we have some recent ones from the 14th of June which I think are very revealing.

For example, here is an article which is published in Peiping propaganda, complete with pictures and all, and a translation into Spanish by the 14th of June movement. Both pictures and text are lifted textually from the Peiping publication.

We will have later on some tapes, if the committee is interested in the kind of propaganda that the 14th of June was putting out. You will find it much more violent than this straight Communist party line propaganda from the very first day of the revolution.

Senator CLARK. It is also pro-Bosch. That is the critical thing to my way of thinking.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir, it is pro-Bosch, and I might stop here. Senator, by saying that in our opinion in the State Department we worry about an alliance between the non-Communist left and the Communists, always for the reason that it gives the Communists a respectability which they don't have and don't deserve. This does not mean that in all cases we are deeply concerned about this.

Mexico, in fact, has a popular front or an alliance between the PRI and the PPS, the Lombardo Toledano party, the biggest Communist party in Moscow. We don't consider this as a matter of doctrine. We don't worry about Mexico in the immediate future simply because the strength of the center, the non-Communist left, and the right in the PRI party far outweigh the strength of the Communist left.

BOSCH'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS

Senator CLARK. But to get back to the Dominican Republic, you have established, I think, by the circulars that the strength of the three Communist parties—assuming the translation is as you say it is, and I have no doubt it was—had shifted from anti-Bosch to pro-Bosch. What is the evidence that Bosch accepted their tender of help?

Mr. MANN. The evidence are intelligence reports about members of the 14th of June, known Communist leaders, having gone to San José, Puerto Rico and participated in discussions on the pact, in the decisions not to come out openly as a member of the pact but to support the pact.

Senator CLARK. Bosch denies this, doesn't he?

Mr. MANN. And Bosch not only participated in this, but said he needed and would accept their support.

Senator CLARK. Has he admitted that publicly?

Mr. MANN. No, sir; this is our intelligence.

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Mr. MANN. [Deleted.]

U.S. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me where it leads us is that undoubtedly throughout these countries there will be some Communists participating and if we arrive at this conclusion, since they participate and since these countries have no democratic way of changing their leadership, it leaves us inevitably in the position of always supporting a military dictatorship in opposition to any effort to change the status quo.

Mr. MANN. That is what I was talking about Senator. I don't think this is really the fact. There are a number of governments in Latin America, and I use the example of Mexico, where there is an effective popular front, a de facto popular front where we have perfectly good relations and where we are not immediately and deeply concerned.

Where we do become concerned, Mr. Chairman, is where the element of strength—and I am coming to this in the Dominican situation—on the Communist side is in our opinion greater than the element of strength on the anti-Communist side. As Senator Hickenlooper says, the whole tactic, the whole theory of Marxist-Leninist doctrine about popular fronts is you infiltrate, you take over, and take control. I think we have to look at each case not from a doctrinaire, liberal versus conservative point of view but from the relative Communist strength of the Communist component of the alliance and the relative strength of the anti-Communist component. Then we have to reach a judgment as to whether this particular popular front will result in a democracy or a Communist dictatorship.

COMPARISON TO CASTRO

Now, many factors enter into that. The Castro regime, his movement, was not even predominantly Communist in the beginning. It took him a year before he was able to take over control of what was essentially a democratic movement.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think the trip to Washington was the turning point?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I don't. He himself has admitted he was a convinced Communist from his youth.

Senator CLARK. I happened to be with him at Princeton at that time and I thought then he could have been our S.O.B., to me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The newspaper people brought him up here. We had him over here on the Hill.

Senator CLARK. The President refused to see him.

Mr. MANN. If I may continue in a chronological way, the facts that caused us to be concerned about the Communists—and we will put these pamphlets in the record——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As a matter of fact, as an aside, Tom, I saw a statement in the paper the other day. I don't know how accurate it is, but I think this was an estimate out of Russia that there are only 10 million Communists in Russia out of 200 and some million people.

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator AIKEN. About a quarter in the Soviet are non-Communists, dominantly, technically.

COMMUNISTS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REVOLUTION

Mr. MANN. As a result of this pact our intelligence is that when the revolution broke out on that Saturday, April 24, the leaders of all three Communist parties were prepared to participate in it and to take advantage of it.

On the night, the very night, the Saturday night, the first day of the revolution, arms were passed out to the mobs in the streets. The Communists, identified Communist leaders, were seen participating in this; and shortly thereafter they began to control the distribution from trucks to the mobs of machineguns, mortars, and arms.

The CHAIRMAN. When did that happen?

Mr. MANN. It started on Saturday night, the 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. It didn't start——

Mr. MANN. The early morning hours of the 25th, Saturday night the 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. Before or after the air force strafed the palace?

Mr. MANN. Before. It is very important, Mr. Chairman—this thing was planned. It was a pact——

The CHAIRMAN. Who did actually do the distribution? Were they the officers, the disaffected officers, in the air force?

Senator CLARK. How did they get the arms?

The CHAIRMAN. They were in an arsenal there.

Mr. VANCE. I can answer that, Mr. Chairman.

Some of the arms—and I think the initial arms were distributed by Colonel Francisco Caamano, and they were taken from the 27th of February camp which has previously been referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, when?

Mr. VANCE. I believe those are the ones that Mr. Mann has referred to as having been distributed early on the morning of the 25th.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the strafing?

Mr. VANCE. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. How did they get the arms, Mr. Secretary? They raided a barracks, didn't they?

The CHAIRMAN. No, the military officers.

Mr. VANCE. They opened up the arsenal there at the 27th of February camp.

Senator CLARK. The people in control of it were Caamano people.

Mr. VANCE. That is right.

In addition they distributed arms downtown that day, and the names that I have [deleted] are as follows: Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel, Juan Ducoudray Mansfield, Jaime Duran Hernando, and Fidelio Despradel Roques. They were active in acquiring weapons and equipping their followers in both the PSPD and APCJ.

Senator CLARK. The PSPD is the Moscow party?

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. And which is the other one? APCJ is the 14th of June?

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I have here a summary of the evidence that we have of Communist activities between April 24 and May 5. This summary is not an official State Department document. It has not been approved at the highest levels, but it was carefully prepared by Mr. Adams on my staff who worked about a month going through bushels of reports, assisted by our own legal adviser and by a special assistant, who is a lawyer, to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator CLARK. Where did the raw material come from?

Mr. MANN. The raw material came largely from [deleted] the FBI.

Senator CLARK. The FBI wasn't there yet.

Mr. MANN [continuing]. And from the Embassy.

The FBI has information in this country. It is not complete on foreign activities. But Bosch is in this country, and they have information about Bosch.

Senator CLARK. But it wasn't until later that the President sent the FBI to the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, Senator.

But the FBI does have information about people in this country, and there are many Dominicans in this country whose activities here shed light on it. I have here several copies. I would suggest that we put this in the record. It is complete with, I hope objectively it states, the evidence that we think is relevant to these very early days in that period. It also has a résumé of Cuban involvement in Dominican revolutionary activity and it contains a list and the principal evidence that we have concerning [deleted] Communists who were identified [deleted] as having been early participants in passing out of arms, setting up of commando units, and forming paramilitary units and taking over newspapers, radios, and propaganda lines.

I will give this to you for the record, and here are some copies for those who would like to read this in detail. I won't burden the committee with names and details of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, is this an accurate statement:

> Presumably because they knew they would be opposing the bulk of the nation's military forces, the rebel officers at the 27th of February camp broke into the arsenal. Several army trucks rolled into the center of Santo Domingo with pistols, rifles, machineguns, and grenades which were distributed to civilians. Bottles were filled with gasoline from tank trucks for Molotov cocktails.

Is that an accurate statement, do you think, of what you were saying?

Mr. VANCE. That is the information I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANN. This paper that I just passed out deals with this in much greater detail, much greater detail.

COUP SPARKED BY REPORTS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you about some of these CIA reports. The CIA reported as of 5 p.m., April 24, that the coup appeared sparked by the PRD in cooperation with the military and police elements. APCJ leaders were believed giving their support.

Is that correct?

Mr. MANN. That is accurate, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It says that the night of April 24, the CIA reported that the PSP was going to try to take charge of the situation. Reid's speech that afternoon had alerted the PSP to the seriousness of the situation. That is the Moscow oriented crowd, isn't it?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the early afternoon of April 24, Radio Santo Domingo was calling on the people to cooperate with rebel authorities in maintaining public order, was exhorting the people to respect private property and not to burn or loot. In the early morning of April 26, the rebel radio was calling on the people to stay alert and defend the bridges.

Those are all according to your understanding?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

May I add to that that in the very early hours of the revolution during the time when Molina Urena was set up—and nobody contends that the Molina Urena or the leaders of the Bosch party are Communists—they did try to bring about with the military and orderly type leftist revolution. They called on people not to loot, to maintain order, and to fight. But shortly thereafter the Communists took over the radios and the newspapers, and they were exhorting people to shoot Americans on sight, to burn and loot, and to carry the revolution to the countryside.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't this take place after the strafing? I mean, according to these other reports, this did occur but after the air force strafed the city. What you are now saying?

Mr. MANN. I would have to look——

The CHAIRMAN. That was on Sunday.

Mr. MANN. I think from the very beginning there were inflammatory Communist pamphlets even before the strafing, Mr. Chairman. But I will have to look.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish this.

LOW MORALE OF COMMUNISTS

There are three more. It says on April 26 the CIA reported on the pessimism of Dominican Communists over their failure to take complete control of the revolution. That is the CIA's statement. It says on April 27 the CIA also reported a low morale in the PSPD. A similar report was made April 30.

On April 27 the CIA reported that Communists were criticizing the rebels for agreeing to the evacuation of U.S. citizens. The Communists thought the departure of U.S. citizens would permit the air force to bomb the city

On May 4 the CIA [deleted] said the PSP was reported to believe that Aristy was a CIA agent, which is a rather odd conclusion, isn't it?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, may I say——

The CHAIRMAN. This last one and then you can comment.

In a roundup of Communist evidence May 7, the Embassy said that 2 weeks before PRD labor Secretary Miguel Solto said that the Communists mainly from the MPD had six of nine positions on the directorate of the PRD labor arm. The Embassy felt it possible that the plot did not include Communists but noted their heavy participation was increasingly evident by the second day.

That is just a series of CIA reports.

THE JOB OF THE CIA

Mr. MANN. Let me say that the job of the CIA is not to evaluate information or to make policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. The CIA gathers reports [deleted] from all [deleted] sources, they report these, they give an evaluation about the reliability, their evaluation of the reliability of their source. It is not unusual to find sources of the CIA giving conflicting reports.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Mann, you would admit, wouldn't you, that the function of the CIA is to collect, evaluate, and disseminate, and evaluation is a terribly important part of the CIA's job?

I am sure you don't want the record to show they don't evaluate. They don't make policy. You said they didn't evaluate. I am sure you don't want to let that stand.

Mr. MANN. Let me define "evaluate".

What they do is to say in essence a source which is considered reliable or may be reliable or an untested source or a source which, "We believe is telling the truth"—they evaluate in that sense the reliability, as I said earlier, of the source. They do not make the final judgment, which is a policy matter, on whether the Communist elements—they make recommendations to the State Department. The State Department makes the final judgment on whether the Communist strength, let's say, in a popular front is to be taken seriously or whether it isn't.

Senator CLARK. I think we are talking at cross purposes, because I am sure we agree. It is clear that the CIA doesn't make policy. It is equally clear, is it not, that they evaluate, not only for the State Department but for the President, their best judgment as to the raw intelligence which comes to them?

Mr. MANN. I think I have said substantially that, Senator.

REBEL DELEGATION AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we could get back to April 27, and if this is a correct summary of what happened that day.

On Tuesday, April 27, Molina Urena, the provisional president, the constitutionalist, as they call it, of the rebel regime, and Caamano Deno sought a cease-fire through American mediation. A rebel delegation came to the United States Embassy at 3:00 p.m. and talked with first secretary Benjamin J. Ruyle. They asked for help in arranging a cease-fire. Thereafter Ruyle went to see Molina Urena at the palace and urged him to seek a cease-fire. Molina agreed.

Thereafter Molina and about 15 or 20 advisers, including Caamano Deno, went to the United States Embassy. At that time General Wessin's tanks seemed about to cross the Duarte Bridge into the city, and the rebel cause looked hopeless.

Is that an accurate statement? Is there anything wrong with that statement?

Mr. MANN. I think that is substantially correct.

EXAGGERATED ACCOUNT

The CHAIRMAN [reading].

There are conflicting views as to the nature of the discussion which took place between Molina Urena and Ambassador Bennett at the Embassy. According to Caamano Deno, Ambassador Bennett belabored the rebels for allowing Communists into their movement, laughed at them, and told them they were finished. Bennett is reported to have told the rebels he had no authority to seek a cease-fire.

Is that about a correct summary?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I just read the text of the telegram which gives our version of this, and it is the only evidence that I have. I believe it is an accurate report by the Embassy of what was said at that meeting.

Senator CLARK. I don't think it is inconsistent with anything you just read.

Mr. MANN. Their statements, Senator, about laughing and so forth, which I do not believe are true, I think this is an exaggerated, biased account of a conversation by the rebels, but I would say that on the main points in terms of fussing at them or turning over arms to Communists, it coincides in that and in many other respects.

EMBASSY STAFF THOUGHT REBELS DEFEATED

The CHAIRMAN. The last paragraph says:

Bennett and the Embassy's staff thought that the rebels were finished, as well they might have been if Wessin had not stopped his tanks at the Duarte Bridge. After the meeting with Bennett, Molina Urena took asylum in the Colombian Embassy and the revolution seemed over.

Is that about right? Did he report that it was over?

Mr. MANN. I think that is substantially correct, that at that moment the anti-rebel forces had overwhelming military superiority. They had the navy, they had the bulk of the army, and they had nearly all of the armor.

Senator CLARK. The air force?

Mr. MANN. They had the air force. And this really explains one of the great confusions in the press about our own motives and attitudes and statements. We did not believe at this time that the army would prove ineffective, incapable of restoring law and order

and, therefore, we went in on the basis first of saving lives and later decided that——

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why under those conditions it wasn't proper and wise for him to accept what appeared to be an offer of settlement and to reject it and say he had no authority to mediate or intercede in any way. It looks to me like an opportunity was missed there to settle the matter, with the feeling that the military were in control, because he had previous to that, and I think subsequently, recommended that a military junta was the only way out of it. In fact, yesterday we more or less concluded that was, didn't we?

Mr. MANN. I think we have just covered the ground in great detail. We can go over it.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I don't care to go back over it. I was trying to sum it up.

CONTACTS WITH BALAGUER

I wonder if we could go on then a bit if we can. When did the administration first contact former President Balaguer and with what results? Do you know about that? Was that on April 25?

Mr. MANN. May 14, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not ask the U.S. Air attaché about bringing Balaguer back to the Dominican Republic on the 25th of April?

Mr. MANN. We might have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. The U.S. Air attaché.

Mr. MANN. My memory fails me on this. I think there was some consideration about getting Balaguer back there to see his sick mother, but this was outside the mainstream of events, and I don't think there was any communication so far as I know with Balaguer at that time. There may well have been, Mr. Chairman, but I doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN [reading].

On April 26, the CIA reported the military junta which was established early on April 25 to take over the government temporarily and hold elections in September seemed powerless and is no longer being mentioned on radio or TV. One of its members, Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno, a former police official and anti-Communist, is reported to have sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy.

At that time they thought he was an anti-Communist.

Mr. MANN. We think that Caamano is not a Communist. We have never thought he was a Communist. He is a policeman and a kind of a bully fellow. He is not——

Senator MORSE. Who is that?

Senator CLARK. One side one day and the other side the next.

Mr. MANN. He shifted gears because he lost out in the job maneuvering within the police force and is not considered an intellectual or a politician but rather a cop.

Mr. VANCE. Actually he has served in every one of the military forces and in the police.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

AN OAS TRUSTEESHIP

The CHAIRMAN [reading].

On May 2, President Johnson said that he sought the wisdom and counsel of such Latin American liberals as Betancourt and Figueres. On May 10, Caamano wrote to the OAS asking for an investigation of the charge that his government was Communist by a committee of Betancourt, Figueres, and Muñoz.

What happened to that request? Did he make such a request, and what happened to it?

Mr. MANN. I don't know. I couldn't testify, Mr. Chairman, as to what the President did, but I know a great deal about the efforts in those days to bring in Betancourt and Figueres and Muñoz Marin.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance of that? Would you describe it?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Early in the game we thought in the State Department that if Betancourt, Figueres, and Muñoz Marin could go down—we talked about a trusteeship in the name of the OAS—and take over this thing, that this was perhaps the best way to have emerge the kind of a progressive liberal-minded government we wanted which was anti-Communist.

Senator CLARK. Wasn't Lleras in it?

Mr. MANN. Lleras was in Europe at this time. I was told by Betancourt of conversations over the telephone between Betancourt and Lleras. I personally didn't talk to Lleras. I did personally talk myself several times to Betancourt. At that time, before the Christian Democrats had come out in opposition, consistent with the Frei position, he thought that we had done the right thing. He was willing to go down with the other two, provided he could get plenipotentiary authority from the OAS to deal with things as he wished.

A FIVE-MAN COMMITTEE

He talked about setting up his office on a Venezuelan battleship offshore.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who is this?

Mr. MANN. Betancourt. He asked for, he said he thought it was essential that they be given, absolute power, including control over the military forces there. This was in principle acceptable to us. A five-man committee had already been formed and was on the ground, had been sent down by the OAS, with a Colombian, an Argentinian, a Guatemalan, and a Panamanian.

Senator CLARK. It wasn't a Venezuelan?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. It was a five-man committee.

The five-man committee, since we are off the record and speaking candidly——

[Off the record.]

Mr. MANN. I simply want to say for the record we lost 4 days, I think it was 4 day's in trying to work out within the OAS a two-thirds majority supporting either a parallel commission or a new commission replacing the five-man commission, and we came to the conclusion that we would never even get a simple majority if we stuck with this. So we abandoned this.

Senator CLARK. Can't you put the names on the record?

Mr. MANN. Yes, the names of the three-man committee would be Betancourt of Venezuela, Muñoz Marin of Puerto Rico, and Pepe Figueres of Costa Rica. There was also some talk about a possible fourth member, Lleras Camargo, who was at that time in Europe.

Senator CLARK. He is a Colombian?

Mr. MANN. He is a Colombian.

Mr. Chairman, in answer to your question, against this background, I believe the President personally saw, on an off-the-record basis, all three men. I think he talked with Betancourt. I think he talked with Figueres. I know he talked with them, and I am almost certain he talked with Muñoz Marin, and the conversations were around this general theme which I have just described to the committee, I believe. I was not present.

U.S. VIEWS OF BOSCH

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions on that day?

I wanted to move on. I wanted to review just a bit this question of Bosch. It is not clear to me why we changed our views about Bosch, having supported him.

Is it only because he is an ineffective administrator and not because he was a Communist?

Mr. MANN. No, sir. We have never considered Bosch a Communist. We have worried about him, both in the latter days of his 7-month presidency and especially since this pact was made with the 14th of June. We have worried about whether he had, as he always claimed to believe, the real power to control the Communists that he had put himself in alliance with. There was considerable doubt about the amount of his following in the Dominican Republic, the ground we covered yesterday; the polls we took showed he was running only about 26 percent as compared with twice that amount almost for Balaguer, according to the polls prior to the revolution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you want to try to distinguish between a Communist, as you refer to them, and one who is a Marxist, if there is a difference? That is a question of international communism and so on. It seems to me Bosch veered pretty close to being a Marxist.

Mr. MANN. There are all shades of opinion. When I use the word "Communist," I mean a member of, a disciplined member of, a political movement which is controlled by the Communists and financed either from Peiping, Moscow, or Cuba.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And supporting aggressive policies.

Mr. MANN. And supporting wars of liberation and violence and——

Senator CLARK. Dictatorship of the left.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, sir.

In Latin America, Bosch is basically a poet. Betancourt describes him as a poet who makes a good professor but who is unfit to govern.

That is Betancourt's opinion, and he said he tried to give him advice when he went in, and that Bosch called him when he was about to be thrown out. According to Betancourt's statements to me, Betancourt replied to him over the telephone and just before he was thrown out that, "You didn't listen to my advice for 7

months and you have gotten yourself in a hell of a mess, because you don't know anything about politics, and I don't think there is anybody who can help you now; it is too late," and he says he hung up.

Now that is what he told me. I think they are still friends. I think they belong to a school which is liberal and they feel they have something in common, and along with Haya de la Torre and some of the others. I don't think this implies that he doesn't like him personally but he doesn't meet with him or talk with him. I think it implies that he is very incompetent in political terms.

Senator AIKEN. Betancourt wrote prose and Bosch wrote poetry. I know Betancourt gave me a couple of books he had written, all in Spanish.

BOSCH'S CONTACTS WITH COMMUNISTS

Mr. MANN. I have a paper here, I have a summary here of Bosch's contacts with Communists. If you would like for me to read it in the record or insert it in the record, I will be glad to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is it?

Mr. MANN. It is two pages.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it ought to be read.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Mann, does it go back to the time when he was President with the Communists in the government?

The CHAIRMAN. Let him read it and we will see.

Mr. MANN. In January 1963, Manuel Tavarez, head of the APCJ (14th of June Movement) declared—this is all based on intelligence now. I don't guarantee every, the accuracy of every, bit of this. I think it is substantially true.

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir; that is correct—declared his movement would work closely with Bosch, who had just been elected President.

2. About 100 Communists leaders exiled by the Balaguer government and the Council of State were allowed by Bosch to return to the Dominican Republic early in 1963. That is a fact.

3. Following Bosch's overthrow by the military in September 1963, APCJ leader Tavarez sent representatives to Puerto Rico to inform Bosch of APCJ plans to begin guerrilla warfare against the successor triumvirate government. Bosch approved the plan, but said he would continue to say publicly that he wanted no bloodshed. It was agreed that Bosch would keep in close touch with the APCJ through his niece, Milagros Ortiz Bosch, and his representative, Rafael Molina Urena. We believe that is correct.

4. The APCJ, with participation by other Communists, particularly the MPD, undertook guerrilla warfare against the triumvirate government in late November-December 1963. About 25—and this is the answer to your question earlier, Senator—25 Communists trained in Cuba were returned to the Dominican Republic by the Cuban Intelligence Directorate, and the latter also mounted a special operation to supply the rebels with arms and ammunition. The guerrilla movement was put down by the Dominican Government in December 1963, and its leaders were arrested and later de-

ported. Tavarez was killed during the fighting and has become the hero-martyr of the 14th of June Movement.

5. In April and May 1964, there were reportedly several meetings in San Juan looking to the reorganization of the PRD and a possible, but concealed, affiliation between it and the APCJ. Representatives of the APCJ met in Puerto Rico with Bosch, who reportedly told them he needed and wanted APCJ support.

A COMMON FRONT

6. Late in 1964, Bosch negotiated with the left wing of the Dominican Christian Social Party (PRSC) for a "common front" to overthrow the Reid Cabral government and reinstate Bosch. During the course of these negotiations, APCJ leaders proposed to Bosch's PRD that the APCJ formally join the proposed "common front", but that no open alliance be made with the MPD and PSPD, the other two parts, the Communist parties, because this would be counterproductive. PRD members decided not to accept the APCJ's formal alliance, but Bosch agreed that once an agreement was signed between the PRD and PRSC, he was willing to accept the "adherence" of the APCJ and other parties.

That means, in my opinion, the other Communist parties.

7. The PRD-PRSC pact for a "common front", known as the "Rio Piedras Agreement", was signed in January 1965 by Bosch and Martinez Francisco for the PRD, and by Antonio Rosario and Caobano Javier Castillo for the PRSC.

Senator CLARK. Excuse me—go ahead. I made a mistake.

Mr. MANN. In May 1965, Javier Castillo, acting as an emissary for Caamano to Chile seeking diplomatic recognition, stated that the "Rio Piedras Agreement" included the APCJ.

8. The APCJ in February 1965 called on its members through the "1J4", its official organ, to support the "National Unity Front" to fight for Bosch and "constitutionalism". The APCJ, the link between the PRD-PRSC coalition and the Communist parties, obtained the support of the MPD and the PSPD for the "Rio Piedras Agreement". The MPD issued a manifesto on February 20, 1965 specifically endorsing the PRD-PRSC "common front" to overthrow the Reid government and restore Bosch. The PSPD issued its manifesto early in March 1965 calling for support of the PRD-PRSC agreement and for "mobilization of the masses" for "constitutionalism" and Bosch's return.

9. On April 9, 1965, Bosch met with Victoriano Felix, active member of the APCJ, and granted him an interview calling for a prompt return to "constitutionality" for use on an APCJ radio program broadcast some days later over "Radio Cristal", a station in Santo Domingo owned by a PRD member.

Now, what this shows, in our opinion, is a political alliance of convenience. I think we ought to give Bosch credit for thinking that he could use these three Communist parties and control them. The gut issue is whether having entered into this kind of an alliance, they controlled Bosch or Bosch controlled them.

IMBERT'S CONNECTION WITH COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any information about Imbert's connection with the Communists? Does he have any connection?

Mr. MANN. Imbert had some connection with the 14th of June prior to 1963, before it came under Communist domination. The bond between them was a hatred of Trujillo and, as you know, it was Imbert who turned his car around and went back and shot Trujillo personally in the head when he was standing there with the gun in his hand, wounded but not dead.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only connection you know of?

Mr. MANN. That is the only one that I know of personally.

Senator CLARK. Can I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. How strong is the PRSC in terms of membership?

Mr. MANN. It is a very small splinter group, it is a very small splinter group. All I have by memory to go by is the fact that they polled less than 5 percent, if I remember rightly, in this USIA poll taken about a month before the rebellion started.

A MODERATE WING

Senator CLARK. Could they be described as socialists but not Communists?

Mr. MANN. There is a moderate wing. They split over this issue. There is a moderate wing which opposed the rebels as Communist controlled, and the leftist wing which joined the rebels and which is still fighting with them.

Senator CLARK. But that doesn't necessarily make them Communists, does it?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. It does, however, if I may put a question, give strength to the efforts of the Communists to take over.

Mr. MANN. I have some estimates on the strength of the rebel side, Mr. Chairman, that you asked about yesterday. I could give you that, if you want me to at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Put it in the record.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you for the purpose of the record and for further enlightenment of myself identify in detail this June 14 movement?

Senator CLARK. He has done it before you came in.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will find it in the record. Never mind.

DEFECTIONS FROM THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. MANN. At the height of the strength of the rebel cause, this means in the first 2 or 3 days, there were an estimated 1,000 officers and men who defected from the armed forces. According to the latest estimates of our military on the ground, this total has been reduced by desertions, defections, and casualties to between 200 and 400 officers and men, regular army, inside the rebel zone today.

Senator CLARK. Does that include police?

Senator MUNDT. Is that the size of the resistance group now?

Mr. MANN. That is one element, sir, because these are dissidents, regular military, army, navy, and air force.

Senator CLARK. Not including police?

Mr. MANN. I don't think we had any information, did we, that police ever went over in any large numbers?

Mr. VANCE. There were some police who went over. We never have had any accurate estimate as to how many. Indeed, I would point out that 200 to 400 is an estimate and could be off either way.

—Mr. MANN. I want to say all of these figures I am going to give you now are estimates and we are not sure about their accuracy.

Senator CLARK. Like everything else in this picture?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask how big an area geographically have they got in the city?

Mr. MANN. Senator, we can show best on the map here. If you would like to come over.

Senator MUNDT. What scale is the map, how large?

Mr. MANN. You can see here a city block.

Senator MORSE. Dimensionwise, could you tell us how many blocks, how many square miles?

SQUANDERING A LOT OF MARINES

Senator MUNDT. While he is getting that, Tom, it is difficult for me to explain to the people back home writing in how come X number of thousands of Marines and infantrymen are being stuck out there to either protect the rebels or fight the others and the others fight the rebels. They feel, and I kind of share that feeling, if we wipe the rebels out we might be in better position to bring some kind of order. If they only have 400 people it seems like a lot of Marines to be squandering over there.

Mr. MANN. I haven't finished. I was just talking about the military components on the rebel side, if I may come back to it, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. MANN. These officers and men, let's say that there are between, around 400 men, I would guess—and it is a guess—are still to be operating as more or less a cohesive unit. And this, of course, is the unit commanded by Caamano and from which he gets his personal strength. They are not considered Communists. They are a substantial element of military strength in the rebel side.

I might add that they include the frogmen from the navy, who are the toughest, I think, element in the whole armed force. They have done some deeds that merit respect in terms of bravery.

ARMED CIVILIANS

At the height of the rebel strength there were, in addition to the military, a number of armed civilians in the rebel movement, variously estimated as between 2,500 and 5,500. We are giving you the lowest and the highest estimates of our sources.

Currently, according to the latest estimates of our military on the ground—and I repeat for Mr. Vance, estimate means estimate, we are not positive—between 1,000 and 3,000, armed civilians remain. These armed civilians consist of members of the three

Communist parties, and those who are not necessarily Communists under their direct command. The estimates of the intelligence community are that this group numbered about 1,500 in the very beginning. We do not have exact estimates of their current strength, but their numbers are believed to have declined considerably as a result of casualties, capture, and dispersal to other parts of the Dominican Republic.

In addition there were an estimated 1,000 to 4,000 armed civilians at the height of the rebel strength, consisting of teen-aged youngsters who enjoyed the thrill of the fight, hoodlums, street gangs, and members of the Social Christian Party and dedicated PRD members and their supporters.

DISCIPLINED AND UNDISCIPLINED GROUPS

Senator CLARK. How do you distinguish between the last two groups? You had 1,000 to 3,000 members of the three Communist parties and others who were followers although not members, and now 1,000 to 4,000—do they overlap?

Mr. MANN. I think on the civilian side of the civilian strength, let's say, the paramilitary groups controlled by Communists, they are disciplined, they wear 14th of June uniforms; whereas the others are more in the nature of undisciplined mobs who just roam around, loot, and shoot their personal political enemies.

Senator CLARK. The first is 1,000 to 3,000, and the second is 1,000 to 4,000.

Mr. MANN. Now, this group of armed civilians, while probably not directly under the Communist control and discipline, nevertheless are believed to have been dependent in varying degrees on the Communists for leadership and for their arms and ammunition.

In mid-June [deleted] reported that 65 percent of the rebel command posts, that means the strongpoints, the barricades, and so forth, were fully controlled by the 14th of June leaders and the remaining 35 percent infiltrated by Communists.

We have another estimate [deleted] that 75 percent of those who had arms in the rebel sector were under direct Communist command and control, and that only 25 percent were not. I would say that somewhere between 60 and 85 percent of the civilians, not counting the military, are effectively controlled by known communist stalwarts.

POLITICAL LEANINGS IN THE REBEL ZONE

Senator CLARK. So your view would be that the overwhelming majority of the people still within the rebel zone are Communist oriented?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, not necessarily Communist oriented. There are many motives in this thing. I am using the word "control" advisedly. Caamano himself, for example, stated to the OAS that it was no longer safe—they were fighting among themselves—it was no longer safe for himself to go into certain parts of the rebel-held city.

Senator CLARK. Wouldn't that tend to the conclusion that most of the people in the rebel-held zone are under Communist control?

Mr. MANN. We don't consider the military Communist controlled. We don't consider that the PRD civilians, the Bosch partisans, Communist controlled.

Senator CLARK. I must have misunderstood your figures then. It isn't important.

Go ahead. I got the impression from what you said----

The CHAIRMAN. You think it is fair to say that both Bosch and Imbert were opportunists and would take support wherever they could find it?

Mr. MANN. I think that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And these parties are shifting entities, all of them looking for some advantage politically, aren't they?

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator MUNDT. May I follow up on that question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

WHY NOT CRUSH THE REBELLION?

Senator MUNDT. Tom didn't actually get to the answer I would like to have to my correspondents, that is, the validity of the position. We have got a large corps of people and another thousand here and another thousand people here, but a pretty small group of Communist-controlled people in a comparatively small area fighting with each other, and they have pretty well neutralized a lot of Americans over here whose mothers back home figure if they don't go to Vietnam their sons are going to be drafted to go. They want an explanation of why we sit around and maintain this conflict in perpetuity instead of wiping it out and then starting it out with some kind of a government.

Mr. VANCE. Senator, I might speak to that from the military standpoint. There are a large number of women, children, and noncombatant civilians in the portion of the city held by the Caamano forces. Any military action to take over that part of the city would, in the judgment of our military commanders, result in a large loss of life in terms of these innocent women and children and noncombatants.

The downtown part of the city has narrow streets. The strong points are barricaded and heavily defended. It would be necessary to go in and blast them out of these strong points, probably using recoilless rifles, perhaps tanks, and even mortars. In the process, a lot of innocent people would be killed, and it has therefore been felt from the military standpoint that this should not be done.

What we should seek is a solution among the Dominicans to be worked out on a peaceful basis so that this blood would not have to be spilled.

A BLOCKADE TO STARVE THEM OUT

Senator MUNDT. That presumes, of course, a military attack, which I was not thinking of and neither were they, but they were talking in terms of blockading them and starving them out. It would not be a very big operation to starve out something like that.

Mr. VANCE. It is true you could shut off the water going into that part of the city. It is also true that you could shut off any food from

going into that part of the city. But by the same token, the innocent people would suffer during this process as well as the fighters who are left in the rebel zone.

Senator MUNDT. Do we have any illusion that the innocent people aren't suffering there and there is a tremendous amount of malnutrition on the part of women and children?

Mr. VANCE. I think they are suffering, Senator, but I think they would suffer more.

Senator MUNDT. What is the answer? We just stay there forever?

Mr. VANCE. I think we must strive in every way, as we have been, to try to bring about peaceful solution of the problem by the establishment of a provisional government and then move thereafter to elections and probably a constitutional referendum.

Senator CLARK. You are hopeful of accomplishing that in a reasonable near future?

Mr. VANCE. We are hopeful, Senator Clark. As to how this will come out, I don't think anybody can predict. There are certain fundamental issues which have been the nub of the question from the start, which still remain.

Senator CLARK. Mostly personalities, isn't it?

Mr. VANCE. One of the main issues is who controls the military, and this is fundamental both to the Caamano forces and to the GNR military forces. I have discussed this with both Caamano and with the GNR forces and with Imbert himself, and this is a very vital question to both of them.

OAS LIMITATIONS ON AMERICAN TROOPS

Mr. MANN. May I add to that, Mr. Chairman, and then if you wish to follow up—I am almost through with the evidence we have—I would like to give you the opinions of the other embassies on the ground about this issue, and say that one juridical reason, aside from the military and humanitarian reasons, is that our troops are now part of an inter-American force operating under certain rules and limitations which have been set out by the OAS. In my judgment it would be necessary to go back to the OAS if we moved either north or south of that LOC in order to clean out the Communists or to impose our will on the Dominican military. And I want to repeat what I said yesterday, that I am not personally too sanguine that this mediation, which is in effect what the OAS is doing, is necessarily going to be effective.

I don't think we can wait very long. I think a solution is urgent, simply because of the considerations raised yesterday, the amount of money involved—and I am sure this is not all being wisely spent, and yet we don't want to face the alternative of having a total collapse in the economy, which would play into the Communist hands. Our real problem is how we are going to force both sides to meet, to be reasonable, to meet on a common middle ground. I am not sure as long as both sides have a veto, which in effect they have, we are very close to an agreement.

I think we have got to be facing up to this issue very soon. Ambassador Bunker is coming this week and I think we will be talking to him about where we go from here.

IMPOSING A SOLUTION

Senator CLARK. Are you suggesting we may have to impose a solution?

Mr. MANN. I am suggesting that in the long run our present position is untenable, that the alternatives are to pull out or to impose a solution in one degree or another.

Senator CLARK. Which will probably be American and not OAS, wouldn't it?

Mr. MANN. No. We would hope it would be OAS. We have tried to stay within the OAS framework, even when it didn't seem to jibe always with our own opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. I don't want to interrupt other than to say I hope before Secretary Mann gets through here today, or with a subsequent hearing, he will take us through these negotiations by the Bunker group and bring us up to date. I assume we will have the Ambassador himself later, but I think we ought to be briefed step by step as to the ups and downs of the Bunker Commission, because I was advised just last week that the White House was exceedingly hopeful that they were just on the verge of a settlement and apparently had a very favorable report from Ambassador Bunker. Unless it happened while I wasn't here yesterday, I would like to have the record eventually show a detailed account of the negotiations by the Bunker Commission.

Mr. MANN. It might be interesting if I could go off the record to read the report from the British Chargé about his estimate of the situation in the early days.

OFF-THE-RECORD COMMENTS

Senator MORSE. Let me interrupt, Mr. Secretary, on the matter of procedure.

As the Chairman knows, I go along with off-the-record statements when it can be shown that they are absolutely essential, but I am at a loss to understand, if these are executive documents, why the comment of our Under Secretary in regard to what other embassies say about this matter should be off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is customary in quoting an official document from another government that we have done that quite often because of the possible embarrassment of the other government, not——

Senator MORSE. How can it be embarrassing if this is an executive record. When we get into executive session here 10 days from now and we get into an argument over what the Embassy did say or didn't say——

The CHAIRMAN. It is the British Embassy I am talking about now.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have done it in the past. I think the Senator will find where they don't wish to quote a foreign minister or foreign government, they have allowed the Secretary of State or whoever it was to go off the record, I believe they have.

A diplomatic courtesy is all it is. I think that has been the practice.

Mr. MANN. This is a copy.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Because they send it on a confidential basis.

[Off the record.]

DIPLOMATIC ESTIMATES

Mr. MANN. If I may read quick summaries of estimates given by other members of the diplomatic corps, the Papal Nuncio——

Senator CLARK. I wonder if these concur with the British Embassy, whether these are necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they all in accord with the British?

Mr. MANN. Yes, except the rest of them stress the Communist control even more than the British—including the Papal Nuncio.

Senator MORSE. I want to hear them.

The CHAIRMAN. Summarize them.

Mr. MANN. The Papal Nuncio, who was very sympathetic to the rebel cause at the very outset, by May 12, 1965 said he doubted the "democratic intentions"—in quotes—of the rebels. On May 16, he stated that Aristy was using Communist tactics. On May 29, he told Ambassador Bennett that only the U.S. intervention had saved the country from communism, and that the "worst elements" had taken over control of the rebel movement.

The French Ambassador on May 6 said that events in Santo Domingo were developing in a classic Communist pattern. He said he met with British, German, Italian, and other European Ambassadors on May 6 and all agreed the Caamano group was extremist and Communist directed.

The Israeli Ambassador reported that he had personally seen Peiping, Moscow, and hard line Communists who were known to him handing out arms to the mobs.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is that?

Mr. MANN. The Israeli.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is his name?

Mr. MANN. I don't know.

The Colombian Ambassador informed Ambassador Bennett he told PRD leaders their party had fallen under Communist domination. He said the issue was clearly between communism and noncommunism.

The special committee of five ambassadors that we referred to earlier filed a report here which I think is self-explanatory and which underlines the extremist influences within the rebel movement.

Senator CLARK. Can you tell us, Mr. Mann, if you are finished with that——

Mr. MANN. Sir?

Senator CLARK [continuing]. Are you finished with that?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

WESSIN'S SCRUPLES

Senator CLARK. Can you tell us what your view is as to why Wessin stopped when it looked as though he had the thing under control?

Mr. MANN. That is one of the most puzzling things in this whole business to us. He was either obviously unable or unwilling to move. I would myself venture a guess, which may not be a very good one. He is a very religious man and said to be one of the honest men in the military. Either he had scruples when he saw the sharp resistance from the 14th of June when he moved his tanks across the bridge and met with very sharp resistance—he claimed the tanks could not go in because they would be exposed to Molotov cocktails thrown from the buildings—I think this is nonsense. I think either he didn't have the stomach for it or he for some other reason didn't want to do it.

Senator CLARK. He is very anti-Communist, isn't he?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Haven't any of our people ever asked him why he stopped?

Mr. MANN. Yes, and his answer is a military one, that "They had Molotov cocktails and we were afraid to take our tanks into the city," which I think is nonsense. We have taken our tanks in without any such results.

Another possibility is they were so used to having Trujillo giving orders they had no one to give orders. You can rationalize that from the time Imbert appeared on the scene—probably the only strong man on the non-rebel side—they did pull themselves together and in 4 days cleaned out the city to LOC, which is a clear determination of the force and character of one man, Imbert.

Senator MUNDT. Not a particularly estimable character.

Mr. MANN. No, no.

Mr. VANCE. Senator Clark, for whatever validity it may have, the leaders of the GNR military stated that the reason he did not do this is because he did not have the stomach for it.

Senator CLARK. Yet he was thought to be a strong man.

Mr. VANCE. But not of great courage.

The CHAIRMAN. Wessin—Marder reports almost the same thing you say about him as to why he didn't do it.

INEFFECTIVE JUNTA

Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we can take a little different line. When was this Benoit—is that what you call it, junta—when was it formed and why, and what role did it play?

Mr. MANN. April 28.

The CHAIRMAN. What did it do?

Mr. MANN. It did nothing that was effective. It set back on San Isidro with all its military strength and never entered the city until some weeks later when Imbert came in and took over.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not the junta that requested our intervention?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. When did they do that?

Mr. MANN. In the early afternoon of the 28th, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say it was formed for that purpose, I mean to——

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it formed?

Mr. MANN. It was formed because there had to be some recognized authority pulling together the anti-rebel forces and the anti-rebel elements in the country, political elements in the country, and the formation of military juntas in times of shooting and anarchy is not unusual in Latin America.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. How many were in that Benoit junta?

Mr. MANN. I think there were three. He was the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a general?

Mr. MANN. A colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. And he did submit a written request for our intervention?

Mr. MANN. That is correct, sir.

GROUNDS FOR INTERVENTION

The CHAIRMAN. On what grounds did he base the intervention?

Mr. MANN. The first request was, I believe, oral. The first—may I read from our notes here?

At around 3 p.m. Colonel Benoit telephoned the Embassy to ask that we land 1,200 Marines to help restore peace to this country. The Ambassador did not believe the situation justified such action at that time. However, he emphasized the seriousness of the situation to Benoit.

The CHAIRMAN. Then did he submit a written request? He did, didn't he?

Mr. MANN. That came. I think he did submit a written request. He did indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that request—what basis was it on? Was it to prevent a Communist victory or protection of lives?

Mr. MANN. I think the military took the position from the very beginning that the rebel movement was Communist controlled and that the main issue was preventing a Communist takeover.

ANTI-COMMUNISM VERSUS PROTECTING LIVES

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that Bennett, in recommending the Marines be landed, said if Washington likes it can be done for the purpose of protecting the evacuation of foreigners?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, we did not set up the Benoit junta. We had nothing to do with the Benoit junta. It did approach us on its own initiative, first verbally and then in writing, officially requesting that we land, and basing its request principally on the Communist influence within the rebel movement.

We did instruct our Ambassador to go back to Benoit after it became apparent to us that we had to evacuate Americans, and in order to improve our juridical base asked him to specifically say that he could not protect the lives of American citizens. This he also did.

But this was subsequent to the other, and we didn't want at that moment—because we were not specifically, we were not yet, convinced that the anti-rebel forces could not control it—we did not want to base our first landing on the ground of anti-communism but rather on the ground of saving American lives because that is what our thinking was at the time.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

JURIDICAL BASE OF ENTERING

Senator LAUSCHE. You state you wanted to protect your juridical base of entering. The fact, however, is that the element of Communist takeover was there, and also the element of saving American lives?

Mr. MANN. That is correct, Senator. We were concerned from the very first minute, from the very time that we knew that the Communist leaders were handing out arms to the mobs and forming paramilitary units. We knew this was a danger.

I think there was no doubt in our minds that we would have been prepared at any time to go in once we were convinced that this was necessary. Whether it was necessary depended on the thing we were talking about a moment ago; whether Wessin with all this military superiority was going to do the job himself or whether, as it turned out, he would sit back for whatever reason, fear, uncertainty, lack of leadership, and let the situation, to use a Texas phrase, go to hell in a handbasket.

It was only after we became convinced that there was no other alternative that we expanded the number of paratroopers and Marines and established the corridor and dug in for the purpose of preventing the bulk of the rebel forces from moving out. We would have always been delighted to have seen the anti-Communist forces do this job for us.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the source of your proof that the Communists were in this weapons distribution operation?

Senator CLARK. We spent an hour on that earlier this morning.

Mr. MANN. We have this summarized, Senator, in a paper which is not official. We can get you a copy of it.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you will deliver a copy to me, please.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On the same morning, the 28th, did Bennett recommend that the United States furnish General de los Santos, the air force general resisting the rebels, 50 walkie-talkies from stocks in Puerto Rico?

Mr. VANCE. I believe that is correct. We did.

Senator CLARK. May I ask Secretary Vance a question?

STATEMENT BY A NAVAL CAPTAIN

Earlier in the day, Mr. Secretary, there was a report from the Washington and New York papers that an unidentified naval captain had made the first statement that we were going in there for the prime purpose of preventing the Communists from taking over the country. This pre-dated any statement from the State Department in this regard.

I, at the time, was rather annoyed about it and made a comment on the floor of the Senate as to when naval officers began making foreign policy.

Do you have any background on that that will be helpful to this committee?

Mr. VANCE. I have no firsthand information with respect to that incident. I have heard that a statement along those lines was made by a naval captain. He was not authorized to make such statement, and this was his own personal opinion.

Senator CLARK. This was at a time when our public posture was that we were going in merely to protect American lives.

A CHANGE OF MIND

I wonder if this would lead, Mr. Chairman, to a statement by Secretary Mann of the chronology as to when we changed our mind or whether we ever did change our mind as to the purpose of our intervention between saving American lives and putting down a Communist revolution.

The CHAIRMAN. He just stated that, I thought, very clearly. As I understood it, the first request from the Benoit junta was based on the danger of communism, and in order to, as he says, protect the juridical base they requested him also to state that it was to save American lives.

Senator CLARK. I didn't appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. He just said that.

Senator CLARK. The first time you went in it was really for anti-Communist purposes?

Mr. VANCE. No, sir.

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The request from Benoit was on the basis of preventing a Communist takeover.

Mr. MANN. One thing was the Benoit request. The other thing was what our decision was and the basis for it. They are quite distinct.

Senator CLARK. Exactly.

Mr. MANN. I——

Senator CLARK. It might have been both.

STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS WERE TRUE

Mr. MANN. It is accurate to say, Senator, if we, in my judgment—this is hypothetical—if those Americans had not been standing on the beaches, if they had not been shooting at our people, at our Embassy, if they had not been shooting around the Ambassador Hotel, if we had not been convinced they were in danger, we would not have gone in at that time and that place because we had not yet decided that it was necessary for the U.S. Government militarily to intervene in order to contain the Communist elements within the rebel cause.

This became clear to us only after the colossal failure of Wessin and the armed forces to move in an effective way. It came 2 or 3 days later, and in fact, the first paratroopers who were taken into San Isidro were taken in because there were still several thousand Americans and the anarchy and deterioration was getting worse by the hour.

Senator CLARK. So what was told to the people and the press is accurate?

Mr. MANN. Absolutely true, absolutely true.

INTERVIEW WITH TAD SZULC

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I need your advice, and I will follow it. I have here this confidential report that has been made to you by Mr. [Seth] Tillman of our staff, based on the interview that

he had with Tad Szulc. Of course, some of the statements of the report place, shall I say, a different evaluation on the events in the testimony of Secretary Mann and Defense Secretary Vance.

I want to know what your pleasure is in regard to this report? Do you want to let it go until executive session and then we discuss it among ourselves?

The CHAIRMAN. It is perfectly all right if you wish to use it as a basis for questions. This is simply for the convenience of the members. It is confidential, not to be published, I mean, but it is for your use. If you wish to base questions on it, it is perfectly proper.

Senator CLARK. If the Senator will yield, it would be quite useful, if the committee is trying to find out the basic facts here which are necessarily very complicated to secure, if the two Secretaries could be questioned about Mr. Szulc's view, which is so different—and he was on the spot—just as we have asked him about Mr. Marder's view, who made a pretty comprehensive survey later. I think that part of it has been useful.

Senator MORSE. I do not want to intervene at this time to do that, but I will deal with this later. I only wanted to be sure I met with the pleasure of the chairman.

I have had a little whispered conversation with Mr. Tillman, and I will assume responsibility for the conversation, but he has called my attention to question eight that is in this memorandum. It is a question of whether or not I should read the question and Szulc's answer to it, because it bears upon what the chairman has been asking Mr. Mann.

TWO SEPARATE COMMUNICATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you wish. I was dealing not with what they were thinking in the State Department at the moment, but the Benoit junta was formed and that they, I think, furnished the request, apparently, the formal request, for intervention, and what was the request based on. According to this information, based on that and other reports, the first request was on the danger of communism and the rebel victory, and in recommending that the Marines be landed, Bennett says if Washington likes, this can be done for the purpose of evacuation of foreigners.

The Secretary, I understood, very frankly and clearly said that he thought this basis of protecting the lives of Americans and other foreigners gave a better juridical case. That is the way I understood it, which is not at all inconsistent with that.

In other words, then, the junta added a paragraph specifying this as a reason for his request. That is the way I understand it. Is that not correct?

Mr. MANN. No, Mr. Chairman, it is not correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that was——

Mr. MANN. There were two separate communications furnished by Benoit. The first one was spontaneous on his part, first by telephone——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN [continuing]. And later confirmed in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. We have the text of that here.

Senator CLARK. Bennett to the Embassy?

Mr. MANN. To Bennett, to the American Ambassador. I will read it to you, sir.

Senator CLARK. Not to the military, but to the Embassy, because our military were not there.

TELEGRAM FROM THE EMBASSY

Mr. MANN. The following is the text of a request by the newly formed junta for military assistance. This is a telegram from the Embassy. They are giving the text of a message they received from Colonel Benoit:

> Military junta of government conscious that present revolutionary movement against democratic institutions junta represents is directed by Communists and is of authentic Communist stand as shown by excesses committed against the population, mass assassinations, sacking of private property, constant incitations to continue to fight broadcast by Radio Havana, and which movement, if victorious, will convert this country into another Cuba. We request with responsibility and in categoric manner that the United States Government lend us its unlimited and immediate military assistance so that such grave situation may definitely be controlled.

Senator CLARK. What is the date?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the 28th, is it not?

Mr. MANN. It is dated the 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. April 28.

Mr. MANN. Now, that is the day that the decision was taken later on in the day to land the Marines for the purpose of evacuating Americans.

THE COMMUNIST MENACE

I have tried to explain that we were not yet prepared to intervene on the ground that the Communist menace made this necessary. We were conscious. We were concerned. We reserved judgment. We knew that we would intervene later on if necessary, in my opinion, although this was not explicitly said in the councils, but our collective judgment was that the immediate problem was to evacuate about 1,000 Americans on the beach who were, in our opinion, in clear and immediate danger.

So we sent back an instruction to Bennett consistent with this thinking and said to our Ambassador, "See if Benoit would be willing to give us an additional message which places the request squarely on the need to save American lives."

The CHAIRMAN. Was that message——

Mr. MANN. This message was given to us orally, not in writing, and Benoit said, "I will be happy to make this as a second additional request."

We received an oral request, and this was reported to the Department. We considered this gave us a better basis more in conformity with our true intentions at that time.

Senator CLARK. This is still on the 28th?

Mr. MANN. The 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. That telegram you just read, was that from Bennett?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all of the telegram?

Mr. MANN. That is correct. I read you every word of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought there was another part to that telegram.

Mr. MANN. No, sir. The only confusion, Mr. Chairman, maybe in your mind, is that you thought this was an addition to a message. It was an additional message. It was oral and not written.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? I have not asked any.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

SHOCKED AT INTERVIEW WITH BOSCH

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask several questions, if I may. I am sorry I was not here yesterday, Mr. Secretary, but I had to go over and testify all morning in the House.

I have read the record of yesterday and, at the same time, listened as much as I could reading it today to you. I want to congratulate you on the detailed knowledge you have of what is going on down there.

Mr. MANN. Thank you, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Many times you have people come up here from the State Department, who are supposed to be in charge of things. It is my opinion that they know little or nothing about it, as against what they should, and certainly not as much as our staff does concerning those cases.

In reading this, I was very shocked at this CBS broadcast that has been referred to. I saw that. I was also quite shocked at an interview with Bosch which played him up as a great man who was being unfairly treated, and letting him say literally what he wanted to.

I notice in a discussion that you and Secretary Vance who, as usual, is on top of what he is supposed to do—I notice that you are talking here about a discussion with [Frank] Stanton of CBS.

In following some questions of Senator Hickenlooper, how can we let these people use the television indiscriminately to promote any particular idea of a certain newspaper or certain radical columnist or radical or conservative columnist, and have these people come over here and broadcast, you might say, revolution? How can we go on with that and have a coordinated foreign policy in a democracy on any basis? I just do not understand how we can do that. What would be your thoughts on that?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think I must say this: I personally was shocked first at Panama with the distortion of fact. There, I think AP and UP, mainly because they had Panamanian stringers writing the AP and UP stories, were slanted so that the facts were unrecognizable.

PROBLEM OF A FREE PRESS

I was shocked again not because of any domestic or personal political considerations, but because of the damage that this does to us, to our image, the country's image, abroad. These stories are read, they are believed as fact, the insinuations that high public officials in the U.S. Government—I don't think they accused me personally, I do not read them all—but they certainly accused people of misstating facts, which was published all over Europe. It consoli-

dated effectively a large body of foreign public opinion against what we were trying to do and distorted what we were trying to do.

I think, I suppose, this is a problem that in a free press we always have. I did talk to, not at my initiative, but at his, with Mr. [James] Reston of the New York Times, and I think the Washington Post and the New York Times were both concerned about losing credibility. This rumor—I have not had time really to run it down, but I understand they are making some changes in correspondents believed to be so emotionally involved in some of these issues that it is hard for them to be factual.

I think what happens is that a relatively small group became emotionally committed to Bosch, and I think they went down there looking for facts which would support their preconceptions. I do not indict the newspapers or the press in general for this, but I think it was the action of a small group of people. I also think it did us a great deal of harm, and I think, I hope, the newspapers themselves are aware of this.

EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you call it the same kind of emotional involvement that Mr. Matthews had with respect to Castro?

Mr. MANN. It is similar to that; yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would hate to think, a billion dollars that emotional involvement is going to cost us and, possibly, how many thousand American lives? But in any case, I was talking more about the television, because I think the television has a greater impact. In the programs I saw, I was just 100 percent in sympathy with many things that were said, and reading this I realize now that it was probably about 80 percent wrong from the standpoint of facts.

Doesn't the Government license television stations every 3 years, and radio stations; isn't that correct?

Mr. MANN. Senator, this may be. This is outside of my realm.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was just asking as a matter of information.

Mr. MANN. I do not really know, I do not know how to cope with this.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just answer the question from the standpoint of fact. Isn't it necessary for every television station and radio station to have its license renewed every 3 years?

Mr. MANN. I assume this is true, but I do not really know, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not saying it should be utilized, but my impression is that the television people in this case were far more damaging than anything I read in any newspaper, with these direct interviews they had with these people who broadcast their own position. If what you say in the record is true, and you certainly have all the sources of information, much of it, if not most of it, is just a plain grouping of lies.

PAYMENTS FOR FOOD AND SALARIES

Let me ask you this question. You say that we were paying for food and pay. I notice the food is a relatively small amount of what

we were putting up. Most of it is in pay. Is that continuing and will that continue indefinitely?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. Well, I do not think it can continue indefinitely. I think we must find a solution for this.

Our problem was that after about, I do not know whether it is 2 weeks or 3 weeks, there were a lot of laborers, employees of all kinds, both in the public sector and private sector, who had not received a cent in wages during this time, and they were without money. There was also a shortage of food. There were no tax collections, no goverment really worthy of the name running the economy, and our first effort was to stabilize the countryside and prevent just a general collapse of law and order, which would have required us to occupy every town, village, and hamlet in the country. We have sent a number of our best people down there on this aspect of the problem.

We have been paying salaries based on official rolls, government rolls, which may or may not be accurate. There has been some suggestion by one of the Senators yesterday that maybe some of the people are fictitious. This is not unknown in Latin America. We have no way of checking. About all I can say is that we are conscious of this, and we thought that we had a choice, because of the only alternative that we had. I think it is awfully urgent myself to get their economy going.

The banks, for example, the commercial banks are in the rebel zone, and the rebels refuse to allow access to those. We went to the Chase Bank and the First National City and asked them to open branches, but without access to their books they cannot make loans. They can only receive deposits and make loans against those deposits. We have had a succession of problems of that kind.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not criticizing it, necessarily; I am asking.

SOLVING PROBLEMS WITH MONEY

I would say this—I just have a couple more questions I would like to ask—that there does not seem to be any problem around the world that can be solved without putting up a great deal more money, and that has been the way it has been for about the last fifteen years. Every time anything comes up, if the United States puts up a great deal of money, and often people along with it, then the problem might be solved. There is no chance of solving it unless we do put up a great deal of money.

I notice, based on what you said already, there has been spent some $45 million.

Mr. MANN. I think $42 million is the exact amount.

Senator SYMINGTON. The record says $45 million in one place.

Mr. MANN. It is quite large.

ESTABLISHING A STABLE GOVERNMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. I notice a question here—and this is my next to last question—when you were asked about the problem, and you said:

> I don't think the money has much to do with this, sir, Senator. The great difficulty is in the low caliber of the people.

The gut problem which faces us is whether we are going to have to ultimately impose a government by force or alternatively to permit the armed forces if they have the capability of imposing a government by force.

You say:

We have tried for nearly 3 months now every conceivable formula, every conceivable way. A five-man committee worked at it. Ambassador Bunker is down there now. He has worked the clock around for a month trying to get any kind of a decent anti-Communist base set up. Nobody wants to offend the Communists. Nobody wants to assume responsibility. Everybody is afraid that they will be either blamed for what may happen, for atrocities or things of this kind, and they all want nothing to do with politics.

Doesn't that mean that if we are going to have a stable government down there we have to accept a military government or a Communist government?

Mr. MANN. We hope it does not come to that, but, as I said, we recognize that time is running out, and that this may be—we may have to face this in a few days.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am just asking, based on what you said about it and based on reading this record.

WARS OF LIBERATION

Now, finally, you mentioned four other countries in your testimony, Uruguay, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador. My impression is that, based on the hardcore developments emanating from Cuba and other places, and so forth, that you feel the same thing, in effect, or something comparable to what did happen in Cuba, and is happening or could happen in Santo Domingo, can also happen in these countries; is that correct?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I think this is a chapter or an episode in the Communist war of liberation technique, and that we face serious problems in this hemisphere and around the world, in Africa and in Asia, as well as Latin America, on these so-called wars of liberation.

I do not look upon this Dominican thing as an indigenous movement at all. Had it been purely indigenous we would not have ever been in there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PURPOSE OF THE BENOIT JUNTA

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to finish the point I was making, and it will only take a minute. I want to say I consider this Tillman memorandum to you an important memorandum, and I am sure in due course of time Secretary Mann will be given a full opportunity to comment on its contents. I think he is entitled to make them and we are entitled to have them.

The fact is that in the letter to you from Mr. Tillman it says that Tad Szulc is publishing a book in September entitled "The Dominican Diary" and that an abbreviated account on the Dominican crisis written by him will appear in the Saturday Evening Post late in July. My understanding of his document leads me to believe that it is going to cause at least considerable discussion, to put it mildly.

Question eight that Mr. Tillman put to Mr. Szulc was: "What were the circumstances surrounding the Benoit junta on April 28, the day that the United States Marines were landed in Santo Do-

mingo?" That is what you have been examining Secretary Mann on.

The answer is:

The junta was constituted for the express purpose of inviting United States intervention. I am not speculating on this. I have it on high authority. Benoit was designated to lead the junta, as Wessin was offensive to everybody. The junta was constituted on April 28 as it became clear that the rebels were not beaten after all. American officials therefore decided that it was essential to constitute a junta to ask for our intervention. There was some evidence that the U.S. Government was planning to recognize the anti-rebel forces. But as the rebels suddenly, unexpectedly reversed the tide on April 28 and started winning, and as anti-rebel forces began disintegrating, it became awkward for the United States to recognize the latter and it became all the more essential to have a junta formed which could ask for our intervention.

SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does Mr. Szulc give the source of his information?

Senator MORSE. I have read everything this has.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would disregard it utterly if he did not give his sources. I get fed up by newspapermen saying, "I have it on good authority."

Senator SYMINGTON. I couldn't agree more.

Senator MORSE. Nobody around the table has been victimized more than the senior Senator from Oregon by this. It can have its effect on public opinion, I can testify to that, too. I think it is only fair to the Secretary, whether the sources are cited or not cited, for him to make any comment that he wants to on what I read. That is the way I try a case.

Mr. MANN. I am perfectly prepared to comment.

NO EMBASSY CONNIVANCE

Senator, as far as my knowledge goes, we were not consulted about the formation of the Benoit junta and had nothing to do with its creation, and specifically we did not intend that it be formed for the purpose of requesting U.S. intervention. As far as my knowledge goes, there is not a scintilla of truth in any of that.

Now, if the question is what was in Wessin's mind when he consented or set up the Benoit junta—he was the Commander in Chief at that time. I think—I have no knowledge of that. I do not know. I have no knowledge of it. I cannot testify on it. I would be the most surprised man in the room if the American Embassy connived, if any official in the American Embassy connived, in any way, either, about this information requesting our intervention.

POSSIBLE CIA INVOLVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Will the Senator yield? Is it not possible, Mr. Secretary, in view of the way the CIA operates, that they might have done this without your knowing it?

Mr. MANN. Sir, I will say that in the past this may have been. I do not know. But since I arrived in January 1964, I have had an understanding, first with Mr. McCone and now with Admiral Raborn—and I am sure the Department has, even more importantly—that the policy is made here and that nothing is done without our consent. Again, I would be very surprised if since January 1964

any maneuver of this kind or demarche of this kind has been taken by the CIA without our consent.

Senator CLARK. That was the date on which Admiral Raborn took over? It was about that time.

Mr. VANCE. It was the day before.

Mr. MANN. He was baptized with the Dominican crisis.

Senator CLARK. So it might easily have been done without his knowledge.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator MORSE. Taking note of your comment on what is stated to be the misrepresentations of Mr. Szulc in the part of the interview with Mr. Tillman I read, it is my understanding, however, that you have already testified that after a written message was received from Benoit, the American Embassy was instructed by the State Department to seek a request from Benoit, which was given orally, that he needed intervention on the part of the United States for the protection of American lives. Is that an accurate statement of your testimony?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. It was really, Senator, not a new idea. He had already given us orally and in writing a request which, as far as my knowledge goes, was spontaneous on his part. All we requested was whether he would be willing to change the basis for this from one of fighting communism to one of protecting American lives. I think that is quite different from the thrust of the other statement.

WAS THE JUNTA AN EMBASSY PUPPET?

Senator MORSE. I am not saying that it is not, but I am pointing out to you that the Tad Szulcs and the others that do not share your evaluation of the chain of events in the Dominican Republic would make great capital of that statement in your testimony if they knew of it, that there was a very close relationship between the Embassy and Benoit, and that there was evidence of advice or instructions or suggestions, whatever phrase you want to use, to describe the relationship going between the Embassy and the head of this junta. I can see the conclusions that they will make that this junta was really a puppet of the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo.

Mr. MANN. I do not think that is true, Senator. I do not have any personal knowledge about anything in this except what is reported in the telegrams, but certainly our attitude in the very beginning of this thing was one of non-intervention, which is our standard policy.

We changed from that to a policy of evacuating Americans and protecting American lives. You were not here yesterday, but I said that only after we became convinced that there was nothing except U.S. force which could check the Communist strength inside the rebel movement did we make a decision to land on the basis of containing the Communists.

Senator MORSE. I read that, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MANN. As soon as we established the line of communications and in our opinion had stabilized the countryside, we did encourage Imbert to pull these people together, because I think this was nec-

essary. Once the countryside was stabilized and the rebels contained, the Communist component contained, we then passed into a period of genuine impartiality to the extent of physically blocking the airplanes from taking off with our trucks at the airfield. Our relations, the hatred, Mr. Vance and I can tell you from first hand, of the anti-rebel forces toward the United States, is probably exceeded only by the hatred of the Communists and the extremists on the rebel side.

Senator CLARK. We are not winning any popularity contests.

Mr. MANN. But the object is not to win a popularity contest. The facts, as I know them, have been stated.

EMBASSY CONCERNS

The CHAIRMAN. In this connection, one reason why I think the basis for this assumption is not just that of Mr. Szulc but in the Department's own summary of what went on, and this was prepared by the Department of State, I will read you just a few excerpts. This is page 8:

> The Department's telegram 633 of April 25 expressed concern over the appearance of extreme—this is the 25th, it is leading up to you—appearance of extreme leftist elements in demonstrations which had led to the overthrow of the Reid government. The telegram stated the Department assumed the Embassy was in contact with armed force leaders and was urging them to unite and form some type of provisional government capable of preventing a Communist take-over.

Now, on page 11—I won't read all of this, but this is the portion pertaining to this:

> The Embassy therefore urged diplomatic initiative designed to prevent the return of Bosch through the creation of a military junta which would schedule elections for September.

They were interested at that time in some kind of a junta.

Senator CLARK. And preventing the return of Bosch.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

On page 17:

> A Department telegram stated our primary objectives were restoration of law and order, prevention of a possible Communist takeover, and protection of American lives. It urged we contact the military leaders of the contending forces and suggest they establish a military junta to act as a provisional government.

Mr. MANN. That was the Imbert junta. The time sequence is all important in here, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. This last one that I read was April 27. We have not gotten to Imbert yet. I will come to Imbert in a moment.

INTERPRETATIONS OF EMBASSY ACTIONS

Senator MORSE. All I want to say, Mr. Chairman, is that if Szulc had got hold of that type of material they would take the jury away from the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record, this is page 22, and this is April 28:

> It was reported that Imbert had just succeeded in taking the national palace. It was also reported progress was being made on the formation of a junta. Wessin would not be a member, and the Embassy felt this was all for the best.

This could be interpreted, I guess, in various ways, but it leaves the impression that the Embassy was actively engaged in trying to

promote the formation of a junta, some junta, but I thought it was worth trying to clear it up. You talk about sources, this is your own summary.

Mr. MANN. May I reply to this, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. We are just trying to find out what this means.

Mr. MANN. There are many different distinctions that have to be made, and one of them is, were we concerned from the beginning of the Communist components in the popular front? The answser to that, as I have said many times, is we were concerned. This concern grew with the days that passed.

Were we concerned with the deterioration in law and order? I want to call the committee's attention to the fact that when Molina Urena resigned, I think this was on the night of the 27th, there was absolutely no government on the rebel side.

NO GOVERNMENT ANYWHERE

Senator CLARK. There was not any government anywhere, was there?

Mr. MANN. There was not any government anywhere, and it is quite one thing to say that we urge people to form some kind of a constitutional authority to maintain law and order which, I am sure, we did do to both sides, and another thing to say that we did this for the purpose of stimulating a request for U.S. military intervention as if it were some kind of a plot which, I think, is quite a different thing. The Szulc article attributes certain intentions to us which, I think, are not valid.

Now, I would like to read the entirety of a telegram that I drafted myself in these early days, as soon as we can get hold of it, which I will read to the committee. The record was made available to Pat Holt, and I personally offer any member of this committee who wants to read the official correspondence, it is open to you. I do not think you are going to find any sinister motives or facts.

NOT INSINUATING A CONSPIRACY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I stated yesterday you have been most cooperative. I do not think raising the matter is trying to insinuate a matter of conspiracy, but we are just trying to find out what happened. I do not for a moment suggest that it may not have been perfectly proper to form it, but we are just trying to clear up what the facts are.

Senator CLARK. I feel that way, too.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no insinuation of a conspiracy or any ill intent on your part at all. We are just trying to see what happened. It may well be that in a confused situation like this, you ought to have a junta formed for this purpose. I would not suggest that you ought not to.

My personal feeling now is that the real opportunity to do something was the 27th, when it got to this point. I think you were in a hell of a fix, and you had to do something, is, in common language, the situation when you got to that point. If it was a mistake, and I do not know whether it was, it seemed to me to have occurred on the 27th when they came in and almost were, well, ready to give

up, they thought the game was lost, they thought Wessin would come in with his tanks. It looked like Bennett might have taken advantage of this opportunity.

Maybe there are things, I am sure there are, that I do not understand. Each day the thing deteriorates and changes, so that a judgment of what might have been done on one day is quite out of the question the next day.

BENNETT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A MORE ACTIVE ROLE

Mr. MANN. I set out my personal views in a telegram which I just re-read the other day. Here is the telegram that gives, I think, the accurate tone and thrust of the instructions of our thinking, and gives one——

The CHAIRMAN. What day is this?

Mr. MANN. This is April 26—drafted by me and signed by me:

Please approach highest authorities in Santo Domingo and leading military officers on both sides and inform them that USG has received request from Americans in Dominican Republic for immediate evacuation in view of the current disorders. USG therefore requests immediate cease-fire and cooperation on both sides in permitting orderly and safe evacuation of those Americans desiring to leave by sea and by air. Ships are standing offshore. We would be willing to evacuate civilians of other nations desiring to leave. Please also inform both sides at highest possible level that United States holds them strictly responsible for protection of American lives. Strictly for your information we hope to build on a cease-fire to obtain some kind of provisional government which presumably would be committed to fair and impartial elections at the earliest practicable date.

That is the full text of a telegram on April 26.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of that, it only strengthens my view that on the 27th Bennett should have taken a more active role in trying to bring about a formal truce or cease-fire, if this account is true here, that he rejected it and said he had no authority. It seems to me that telegram gives him authority insofar as you can give it to him, and I assume you can.

Senator CLARK. Of course, this is all hindsight, which is what makes it so difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. We have to deal with hindsight.

Senator MORSE. There is no other way for us to deal with it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only way we can deal with it.

LET WITNESSES MAKE THEIR CASE

Senator MORSE. May I ask a procedural question of the Secretary? Both Secretaries have been very patient. It is now 5 minutes after 1:00. Some of us have already postponed some conference luncheons. What is your pleasure time-wise?

The CHAIRMAN. I had one or two other things to ask here about the Imbert thing, but in a few minutes we will adjourn. Tomorrow we have Bennett scheduled, and I am a little uncertain about it because of Mr. Stevenson's service.[1]

Mr. MANN. May I read you some more telegrams which I think give you the thrust here?

Senator MORSE. What do you want to do with Secretary Mann? I will just give you my personal view.

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[1] A memorial service at Washington National Cathedral for Adlai Stevenson, who died on July 14, 1965.

So far as I am concerned, he and Mr. Vance are the two most important witnesses to tell the story of the State Department policy. Bennett is important, I grant, but I think we owe it to these two witnesses to let them make their case in chief. We certainly have not finished it today.

Senator CLARK. I think our trouble is that because of the intense complications and difficulties of this thing, after two days of testimony we are still only about the middle of May. I think it is awfully important to move into where we stand now and where we can go.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very difficult to anticipate how this could go. I mean, I assumed that the Secretaries would still be available later, would later be around, that we wanted to get a first look, and then the staff and committee can clarify some of their ideas.

Senator MORSE. I want to be sure of all the information Secretary Mann is going to give to the committee before we have Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Bennett.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Senator MORSE. I will start over. I would like to feel that I have all of the information Secretary Mann and Secretary Vance are going to give the committee for background. They sit in a key post, and we should have their testimony before we hear Bennett and Bunker and the others.

The CHAIRMAN. That is sort of hard to do.

Senator MORSE. I know it is hard to do.

REDUCE TO MOST SIGNIFICANT POINTS

The CHAIRMAN. Why would it not be useful—I have learned a great deal, I did not know much about these details—after we get what we can, we can go over it, and I will at least be able to take a lot of the chaff out of it and have a few key points that I can reduce to what I believe are very significant points.

Senator MORSE. I will follow whatever procedure you want. I guess it is a matter of mental habit. I like to hear a presentation of one segment of a case.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not anticipate this would take so long.

Senator MORSE. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this first approach.

Senator CLARK. A lot of us talk a great deal.

RELEVANT TO U.S. MOTIVES

Mr. MANN. May I read two telegrams of instructions, one on the 27th and one on the 28th? I think this is relevant to our motive, Senator, that is involved in the question. I am reading the full text in all cases.

Senator CLARK. From whom to whom?

Mr. MANN. This is an instruction from the Department to the Embassy.

Senator CLARK. And the date?

Mr. MANN. The first one is the 27th, and the second is the 28th.

Your 5:45 p.m. report indicates tide has now turned strongly in favor of Wessin, de los Santos, and forces friendly to them. Assume you will take the earliest opportunity to get in touch with these military leaders and urge on them a policy of moderation and no reprisals in dealing with the rebels. Would be most unfortunate if

victorious Wessin forces would engage in same type atrocities you report have been committed by rebel forces. Believe you should stress with Wessin objectives of unity of Dominicans and prompt measures to restore the damage and get on with the very difficult job of economic stabilization and progress.

The next day—this is a U.S. instruction, and the United States has not yet intervened in the Dominican situation. This shows——

Senator SYMINGTON. Who wrote this, could I ask?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Sayre wrote this, Mr. Sayre who is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary for American Republics Affairs.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wrote it from where?

Mr. MANN. Instruction from Washington:

United States has not yet intervened in Dominican situation except to urge unity and restoration of law and order.

That was our understanding and, I believe, the facts down there will show it.

We want to maintain this position unless outcome is in doubt.

By that we meant we would move to prevent a Communist take-over. That is what that means.

We understand from your reports alliance forces (de los Santos, Wessin, and so forth) are winning and only a matter of time until they dominate the situation. We are taking steps, have walkie-talkies delivered to carriers so they will be available if critical to outcome.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the date of that?

Mr. MANN. The 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record I wonder if you could confirm or otherwise the statement, "On Wednesday," that is the 28th, "Ambassador Bennett was sending a flurry of cables to Washington. One received about 4 p.m. advised against intervention, according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk."

Mr. MANN. This is on the 28th?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Is that a correct statement?

RECOMMENDATION TO LAND TROOPS

Mr. MANN. We received a cable at 3-something in the afternoon, I think 3:16, recommending that it was not necessary to land troops. Three hours later, somewhere around 6:16, we received a unanimous country team recommendation that it was necessary to land troops to protect American lives, and that is the cable on which we acted.

The CHAIRMAN. On which you acted. Why is it that when they did intervene, did not the Marines take steps to control San Isidro Airbase? That has been asked several times.

Mr. MANN. The map shows, Mr. Chairman, that this was physically impossible. The Marines were over here. The San Isidro Airbase was 10 miles over here in this direction, 10 miles from the river. It is almost 15 miles from where the Marines were. The only way you can control the airplanes and Isidro Airbase is to be at the airbase.

Mr. VANCE. Mr. Chairman, I might add to that we first put ashore 400 Marines that first day. We subsequently put the balance of the Marine force, which was standing offshore, on the beach, and that brought it up to about 1,000 to 1,900. They were all locat-

ed over in the area which Mr. Mann has pointed out, and none of them in the San Isidro area.

TAKING THE SAN ISIDRO AIRBASE

The CHAIRMAN. If you would care to, if you thought it wise, you could have taken the San Isidro base if you wanted to, couldn't you?

Mr. VANCE. We would have had to have split our forces at that point to do it. We subsequently did, when we brought our airborne troops in, take over the San Isidro base.

The CHAIRMAN. You did?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir. Yes, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. When did that happen?

Mr. VANCE. We first landed our airborne troops on the 29th, I believe, but let me check it. I think it was about 2 o'clock in the morning. They came in about 2 o'clock in the morning on the 30th.

The CHAIRMAN. On the 30th?

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did take it?

Mr. VANCE. They subsequently took the base over and later blocked the San Isidro air force from taking off, by putting trucks in the way.

Now, there is an exception to that. The air force was permitted to fly cargo type aircraft back into the interior, and they were also permitted, as I recall it, to fly an unarmed reconnaissance plane, but they were not permitted to fly any armed aircraft. They did breach this on one occasion, however, when they came in and fired both on our Embassy and at Radio Santo Domingo, and we shot down a plane.

The CHAIRMAN. You did?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command when this occurred?

Mr. VANCE. Of our forces?

The CHAIRMAN. No, of theirs.

Mr. VANCE. General de los Santos.

The CHAIRMAN. He was?

Mr. VANCE. We shot down one of his planes. As a matter of fact, I saw the man who was the pilot in one of our field hospitals.

The CHAIRMAN. What date was that?

Mr. VANCE. That plane was shot down?

The CHAIRMAN. That you shot it down.

Mr. VANCE. Let me check, sir.

Mr. HOLT. May 13.

The CHAIRMAN. It was considerably later.

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Is that after Imbert was in control?

Mr. VANCE. That was after Imbert was in control.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all that is necessary for the record.

Mr. VANCE. I think May 13 is the correct date.

WHY THE OAS WAS NOT CONSULTED

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two other questions. I think the record ought to show why the OAS was not consulted, why the matter was not laid before them on the night of the 28th.

What is the reason for that?

Mr. MANN. It was laid before them in the sense that they were informed as soon as they could be pulled out of dinner parties and located and found, the very night on which it was decided to land the Marines for the purpose of evacuating the Americans. The council meeting was not held until the next morning at 10 o'clock. There had been a council meeting on the morning of Wednesday, the 28th, on which they had a full report of the Dominican situation.

The CHAIRMAN. They had a report?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. There was a brief meeting on the 27th of the Inter-American Peace Committee, in which the Peace Committee received a report on the Dominican situation.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time you had not made up your mind?

Mr. MANN. That is correct. We had not made up our mind Wednesday morning when they were in session. This happened around 7 or 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. It was laid before the OAS on the 29th, then?

Mr. MANN. Ten o'clock the next morning, decision taken around 7 or 8, if I remember correctly, That evening, on the 28th. They met at 10 o'clock the next morning. That meeting was called the same night for 10 o'clock the next morning.

USE OF THE RIO TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it not laid before them as a fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the Americas under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty?

Mr. MANN. Mainly because under the Rio Treaty you need a two-thirds absolute majority, and under a parallel or similar article in the charter you need only two-thirds of a majority of the states present.

May I say this, Mr. Chairman, that we moved that night, I repeat again, because nearly 1,000 people were on the beaches and we did not think we could wait 4 days to evacuate them. We knew that it would take the OAS a minimum of 4 days, even if a decision was favorable, to evacuate them. We made a deliberate decision that we could not wait 4 days, we could not afford to wait 4 days, to take the Americans off the beach.

FORMATION OF THE IMBERT JUNTA

The CHAIRMAN. Could you very briefly describe the formation of the Imbert junta and when and why, if you have it there available?

Mr. MANN. I do not have a piece of paper on this. I can say that former Ambassador Martin was sent down in an effort to bring about a cease-fire and, insofar as possible, some kind of a provisional government. He was unable to get anywhere with the rebels, and I think it was Ambassador Martin who principally worked out a renovation of the Benoit junta for the purpose of stabilizing the countryside and on a provisional basis. We never intended to recog-

nize it, and did not recognize it. But we thought, and still think, we needed some kind of an effective authority outside of the rebel zone.

By this time, about this time, the Caamano regime was formed. The reason Imbert was selected was because he was literally the only man they could find who would agree to head it up.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on May 7, I believe, the Imbert junta was created?

Mr. MANN. About that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Embassy in the Dominican Republic then recommend he be given diplomatic recognition?

Mr. MANN. I think Mr. Martin and Mr. Bennett may have assumed that he would be recognized, and we sent two cables down, if I remember, saying that was not all our intention.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? Why don't you recognize them? I am just curious as to why you do not.

Mr. MANN. For the reason we have stated here many times, Mr. Chairman, that our goal and the OAS goal has been from the beginning to get a middle-of-the-road progressive government set up, around which all Dominicans, both anti-rebels and rebels, could rally, so that the country could be led back to normalcy and to elections.

IMBERT'S FAILURE TO FULFILL HIS AGREEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Has Imbert lived up to his agreement? This one report says that Martin told Imbert on May 8 he could not put his stooges in the armed forces and play favorites, and Imbert agreed. Did he live up to that?

Mr. MANN. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. VANCE. He has not lived up to all of his agreement. He made an agreement with Dr. Mora, when I was present, to turn over Radio Santo Domingo to the OAS, and he welched on it.

The CHAIRMAN. He welched on it?

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Szulc reported that Imbert kept $750,000 given him by the United States to pay government employees. Is there any truth to that?

Mr. MANN. Imbert kept $750,000?

The CHAIRMAN. It is reported by Szulc that Imbert kept $750,000 given him by the United States to pay government employees.

Mr. MANN. I can only repeat what was said, I think it was yesterday, on this subject, that we paid the salaries of government employees and public works employees according to the official rolls in the vaults of the Ministry of Finance or the central bank, I do not know which it was.

Mr. VANCE. In the central bank. And I might add to that, that anybody who was paid directly through a paymaster had an OAS paymaster there. The checks which were issued were redeemed at OAS windows. So, the maximum effort was made to insure that what was done was being done honestly. Nobody can vouch, however, for the validity of the existing roll against which the checks were drawn.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Imbert have access to $750,000 that he might have kept, so far as you know?

Mr. MANN. He did not have direct access, but he was in a position, I suppose, of sufficient power that he could have collected checks, forged endorsements, and pocketed the money. This is not impossible.

FEAR OF LOOTING THE CENTRAL BANK

Mr. VANCE. I might add something here. We were fearful that there might be an attempt to loot the central bank, and to that end OAS troops were placed around the central bank and a man was placed inside the bank to insure that no funds were withdrawn from the bank.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that bank in the rebel zone?

Mr. VANCE. No, sir. It is in the international security zone, very close to the U.S. Embassy.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is about time to adjourn these hearings, which are far more complicated than I anticipated, far more than anticipated by the members. I am not sure that we have made a very good record. Maybe we can get it back on the track a little better. In anticipation of further articles on it, it may be a very good thing to clear up some statements, so we will do the best we can.

Thank you very much.

We will recess until tomorrow afternoon at 2:30.

[Whereupon, the committee recessed at 1:20 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., on Friday, July 16, 1965.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1965

U.S. CONGRESS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session, at 9 a.m., in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (chairman of the subcommittee) and Senator Williams.

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State, testified on matters relating to the situation in Indonesia.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:30 p.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Robert W. Adams, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Mann; Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State; Alexander Schnee, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State; Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The purpose of the meeting, as we all know, is to continue our checking into and getting as much helpful information as we can regarding the Dominican situation.

Ambassador Bennett, who went through all of those trials and tribulations, is here. We are glad to have you, Mr. Ambassador, and we will be glad to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TAPLEY BENNETT, JR., AMBASSADOR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Ambassador BENNETT. Senator, I have a statement which I would like to read if it is all right with you.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

Ambassador BENNETT. Year after year the Dominican Republic continues to be a country of crisis. In a situation perhaps unique in our foreign relations, it will be recalled that we have withdrawn our Ambassador, AID, and military assistance programs twice within recent years, in 1959 and again in 1963. I don't know of another country, actually, where that has happened.

Many current Dominican problems derive from the Trujillo——

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you wait just a minute? Would you read that statement again to me? Two dates, 1959 and 1963.

Ambassador BENNETT. In 1959, due to the hemisphere resolution in the closing years of the Trujillo regime, we withdrew leaving only a consul in charge. We broke diplomatic relations, actually.

Senator SPARKMAN. And again in 1963?

Ambassador BENNETT. In 1963, after the Bosch overthrow.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. Many current Dominican problems derive from the Trujillo legacy; others are endemic in the local scene and

have been characteristic throughout the Republic's independent history.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY PROBLEMS

During the past 15 months the country's massive political, economic, and military problems intensified. Politically, there was a government which had come to power after a coup d'etat and which was very narrowly based. Although in the military establishment efforts were made against graft and corruption, the military budget was cut for 1965, and a considerable number of the more unsavory military officers were retired, shelved, or assigned abroad, the armed forces continued to be an oppressive weight on the country and the source of popular discontent. Similar considerations applied to the national police force.

In the economic field the precipitate fall in the world price of sugar from something over 11 cents—I believe the futures got up to 13 cents—down to 2 cents a pound was a well nigh mortal blow to a country, more than 50 percent of whose foreign exchange earnings come from sugar and whose government-owned sugar industry—former Trujillo property—accounts for more than 60 percent of the total production. Cacao prices also were at unusually low levels; there was overproduction of coffee and trouble over the assigned quota, and the banana industry has been sick for a number of years.

The most severe drought in years affected the tobacco crop, as well as other products. The United States shipping strike in January and February of this year heavily depressed the government's income through the lack of receipt of customs duties for imports and the lack of ships to carry away sugar and other products for export earnings. In sum, the situation of a country already in deep economic trouble was made worse by almost every form of natural and manmade trouble.

BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Ambassador, the chairman is here now and while he comes to the seat, let me ask you, you said the two dates that we had broken diplomatic relations were 1959 and 1963. Is 1959 a correct date, or was it 1960?

Ambassador BENNETT. I thought it was 1959, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Our very proficient Latin American expert back here told me it was 1960, August 26, 1960.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what our book shows.

Ambassador BENNETT. Right, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. OK.

A FRAGILE AND FRAGMENTED SOCIETY

Ambassador BENNETT. An economic austerity program was adopted in mid-1964 under international guidance and, despite the limitations of a weak, untrained, and often resistant bureaucracy, was adhered to with some conviction. However, as in the case of much needed reforms in the government sugar industry, trimming and paring released more people onto an economy in which unem-

ployment was already one of the most serious problems. Payment of government accounts was behind schedule, and day laborers on public works and road projects were in many cases months behind in receiving their wages. These developments intensified the strains in a fragile and fragmented society whose memories of the Trujillo era, with its brutalities, are too recent to be forgotten and in which there is a strong desire for social change, particularly among the population of the cities and towns.

The U.S. assistance program under the Alliance for Progress was soundly conceived. In view of the 1963 withdrawal, however, an entirely new staff had to be assembled and the programs reinstituted in mid-1964. Ten months' time was not long enough to show results commensurate with the demands of the situation.

From the late fall of 1964, it was apparent that the situation was declining from an atmosphere already marked with plotting and coup attempts. In November, the Embassy reported the first indication of a possible later resumption of guerrilla activities; in early December, the Embassy warned of possible trouble after the Christmas lull and spoke of the situation as "a real house of cards, the pulling of any one of which could bring the structure down."

COMMUNIST POLITICAL ACTIVITY

After January 1 of this year, the pace of political activity among the 11 non-Communist parties and the three Communist-dominated groups quickened perceptibility—some of it open and aboveboard and some of it clearly subversive. In early January, a prominent member of the PRD—that is the Bosch party—told the Embassy that his party was resolved on "violence and disorder" for the spring months. The penchant of Dominican politicians to try to involve the military in their schemes was being given full play. Political broadcasts over the multitudinous Dominican radio stations grew more and more violent in tone, far surpassing in slander and vituperation anything that would be permitted in countries such as the United States or Great Britain.

A noticeable stepup in the activity of the extreme left was reported. Known Communists were returning, often by clandestine means, from training in Iron Curtain countries, Cuba, and Red China. The effects of their return in more sophisticated and better organized tactics were beginning to be seen. Indicative of increased funds, Communist publishing activities were expanding.

By late February, the combination of political and economic pressures was making the situation "almost unmanageable," as reported by the Embassy. In early March, the Embassy foresaw increasing turbulence ahead; the deteriorating situation and the possibility of a precipitate decline continued to be stressed in reporting in March and April.

THE APRIL REVOLT

The April 24 revolt began with a variety of participants for a variety of motives. There were some army officers who shared PRD views and were cooperating with the civilian leadership of the party. Other officers working with them looked forward to having a tidy coup and a resultant military junta, which had for some

time been the goal of certain elements of the armed forces. Others were opportunists who saw personal advantage in a change. Some pro-Balaguer officers quickly withdrew when, on Sunday, they came to realize the PRD involvement.

The Communists were quick to take advantage of the situation. They, particularly the Castro-supported June 14 movement and the Soviet-oriented PSPD, at that point immediately organized street demonstrations; assisted the rebel military in distribution of arms to civilians and soon largely took over this distribution; seized newspaper plants and exerted heavy influence on rebel propaganda over radio and TV—the TV on Sunday April 25 featured performance with Castro-type caps and beards and offered straight Havana-style programs; organized paramilitary units and established arms collection and distribution points. Their leaders actively participated in the discussions in the national palace on April 25 which led to the establishment of the provisional government under Molina Urena.

The deteriorating situation on April 26 to 27 was rapidly producing anarchy. Strafing and bombing runs over the city by air force planes stirred public indignation, and radio broadcasts whipped this feeling into frenzy. There was a blood fever in the streets, and there will probably never be a fully reliable count of the casualties. Sacking and looting were being encouraged over the radio, with addresses of specific houses being given.

ROLE OF THE EMBASSY

From the outbreak of the revolt the Embassy was in constant touch with the various elements, and its efforts were consistently directed toward stopping the bloodshed by getting a cease-fire. Several times on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday the Embassy was successful in getting the air force and navy to hold off firing with a view to promoting a truce between the two sides. These efforts were unfortunately not to produce success, and at one point the Embassy reported that it seemed obvious that neither side was interested in stopping the shooting.

The legitimate civilian leadership of the PRD began to go into asylum. Some, including the provisional Foreign Minister, took asylum on April 26 or on the morning of April 27 and others, headed by the provisional president, went into Embassies later on April 27. Colonel Caamano himself had actually taken asylum in the Salvadoran Embassy as early as Sunday night, April 25, but was to emerge again. Admissions were made to the Papal Nuncio and other Ambassadors by many of the asylees that their movement had come under the domination of extremist elements and that they were pushed aside. Some were to change or deny these statements later as they went in and out of asylum in a welter of changing convictions in line with what seemed to be the military situation at the moment.

AMERICAN CITIZENS REQUEST EVACUATION

American citizens had begun to request evacuation as early as April 26. The Embassy proceeded to make arrangements with both sides to enable an orderly assemblage at the Hotel Embajador on

the westerly edge of the city and a safe transit to the port of Haina 7 miles away. Several hundred Americans assembled at the Hotel Embajador early on the morning of April 27 and were shortly subjected to more than an hour of danger and terror by the arrival on the hotel grounds of a band of irregulars of rebel sympathies who began firing weapons indiscriminately, both in and outside the hotel.

Evacuation was finally effected safely later in the day. The evacuation program was eventually to take away from the Dominican Republic between 4,000 and 5,000 persons, citizens of 46 nations who went voluntarily and on their own estimate of the dangers of the Dominican Republic situation.

The Embassy, both Chancery and Residence, had been under fire throughout the night of April 27 and there had been sniper fire also in the Hotel Embajador area. This condition continued on the morning of the 28th and the situation grew increasingly ominous during the afternoon.

The police had dissolved as a force, and several Embassies had been violated. The police chief and the head of the military junta informed the Embassy that American lives were in danger and that it had become impossible to provide adequate protection. Our responsibilities were clear, and in the evening of April 28 a small force of Marines came ashore to reinforce the guard at the Embassy and to provide protection for the evacuation site.

Even then it was still to be hoped that the police and military authorities would be able to reestablish order sufficient to contain the anarchy spreading from the downtown sections of the city. However, the regular Dominican forces advancing on the city from the west were separated into small units and proved ineffective. The forces at San Isidro on the other side of the river, of the town, were at that point in a state of demoralization and unable or unwilling to take action.

It became necessary in view of the situation to land more U.S. troops on the following day. There was no doubt at the time in the minds of Americans and the great majority of the diplomatic corps that countless lives had been saved through this action and that an extremist takeover, directly or indirectly, had been averted.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to start, Senator?

Senator SPARKMAN. No; you ask him your questions first.

AGITATION AGAINST REID CABRAL

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, that I was late, but I had two funerals to attend today and it delayed the whole effort. There are one or two questions growing out of your statement I want to start with.

You have described in the earlier part the great activity toward a coup prior to this time, beginning last year, as a matter of fact. To what do you ascribe this? Reid Cabral was the Governor or the President?

Ambassador BENNETT. He was the President.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood we thought he was very good. Why was there such agitation against him?

Ambassador BENNETT. Part of that, Senator, is endemic in the scene, I suppose. Except during the time of Trujillo, there has been no period when there hasn't been very active plotting on an almost continual basis. Since the assassination of Trujillo in May 1961, there have been 7 or 13 changes of government, depending on how you want to count them. This is just, I am afraid, a part of the Dominican scene, intensified, of course, in this case by real economic problems and a general political malaise in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can—I don't wish to misstate anything and if I do misstate it, I hope you will correct it—I only am trying to get the picture in the record.

After the Bosch election, it is my understanding—and he won by about 58 percent, I believe.

Ambassador BENNETT. A little higher.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Our Government took the position they would support him; is that not correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. And we did.

The CHAIRMAN. And didn't we try to do everything we could to discourage those who were plotting against him?

Ambassador BENNETT. We did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe Ambassador Martin was there at that time?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But we have been told that we did everything we could to support him while he was in.

Ambassador BENNETT. We certainly gave him every support we could.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH REID CABRAL

The CHAIRMAN. In spite of that, we changed. Then I understand, after it was changed, without our connivance——

Ambassador BENNETT. Against our very strong opposition.

The CHAIRMAN. We, however, recognized it, but I find no evidence that we did anything after Bosch was removed to really help Reid Cabral, although everyone says now he is an honest man and was doing his best and a relatively good man.

Did we do anything?

Ambassador BENNETT. We recognized the triumvirate government, of which he was not then a part, in mid-December 1963. He joined the triumvirate on December 30 and soon became the dominant member.

I arrived there on March 21, 1964, and shortly thereafter we resumed economic assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that substantial?

Ambassador BENNETT. I do have some figures, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want all the details. Was it an adequate aid program?

Ambassador BENNETT. It was a good program. As I say, since we had dismantled the entire program after the Bosch regime, it took some time to get it going again, and the 10 months of program were not long enough to produce the kind of results that one wants to have. That is a problem from having to start over and build a whole staff and get everything going again.

NOT AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I am just wondering what we did, because the price of sugar in the meantime had gone down. I wonder if we really took preventive action to try to support this fellow whom everybody seemed to believe was a good man.

Ambassador BENNETT. Senator, I think we always labored under a handicap with Reid, in that his was not an elected government, and that was always in the background affecting our relations. He was doing as good a job as I think you are going to get in the Dominican government; his was the first government since Trujillo to try to do anything effectively about the military problem and to try to clean up the economic mess, neither of which did him any good locally because the economic——

The CHAIRMAN. I was just wondering whether or not we really took the action that we should have taken as a preventive matter to support him and did we give him adequate aid, all that was reasonably called for under the circumstances.

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe we had a good program.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we did?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, sir; in fact, we were accused locally of supporting him too much. But that is part of the game.

THINGS CHANGED QUICKLY

The CHAIRMAN. On the bottom of page 3, you say their leaders actively participated in discussions at the national palace on April 25.

You weren't there then. Was it Breisky that did go to the palace and have discussions?

Ambassador BENNETT. Connett was at the palace on April 25, and various other members of the staff.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time it looked very dim for the rebels and they were seeking a truce?

Ambassador BENNETT. Not at that time, sir. On that day they were still riding pretty high and they were forming——

The CHAIRMAN. It was on April 27 it looked that way?

Ambassador BENNETT. Things changed quickly. One side was up and down and then the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. Until Wessin failed to cross the bridge with his tanks it looked good for the loyalists, the army. When he failed, then it began to turn the other way; isn't that right?

Ambassador BENNETT. It went back and forth several times.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. In fact, the military didn't make up their mind which side they were going to support.

The CHAIRMAN. You say their leaders; that is the Communist leaders?

Can you tell us who they were at the national palace on April 24?

Ambassador BENNETT. We have a number of names of people who were in the palace on that day and taking part.

THE COMMUNIST LEADERS

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the Communist leaders? This refers to the Communist leaders.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were they?

Ambassador BENNETT. This is in the report, I believe, which was entered in the record. Among those conferring with Molina Urena was Facundo Gomez, a PSPD member; he had taken part in the attempted landing of arms from Cuba in November 1963. Others in the meeting were Luis Gomez Perez, who is a member of the PSPD central committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. What does that mean?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is the Partido Socialista Popular, which is the Soviet-oriented Communist party.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of Puerto Rico?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, of the Dominican Republic.

Senator SYMINGTON. I mean of the Dominican Republic.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes. This is the Soviet-oriented Communist party. Others were José Israel Hernandez, who received Communist bloc training in 1964; Rafael Evangelista Alejo, who is a member of the PSPD; Antonio Isa Conde, a member or the PSPD who had received subversive training in Cuba in 1963, and his brother Narciso; and Moises Blanco Genao, who is a June 14 member.

The CHAIRMAN. They all participated in that conference?

Ambassador BENNETT. They were in these meetings. Other Communists who participated in the meetings were PSPD members Ariosto Sosa Valerino, Silvano Lora Vincente, Diomedes Mercedes Batista, Miguel Angel Santamaria Demorizi—all June 14 members—Amin Abel Hasbun, Ema Tavarez Justo, and Daniel Ozuna Hernandez.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were along with the others, Caamano and the Bosch party?

Ambassador BENNETT. Of the Molina Urena group.

MEETING OF CIVILIANS AND MILITARY

Senator MCCARTHY. How large a meeting was there? How many people were involved in this meeting, or did these people come and go?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think it was a very chaotic atmosphere where people were coming and going. I would have to look it up.

Senator MCCARTHY. You don't mean to say these people were all there at the same time?

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't mean they were all sitting around the table like this, but people coming in and out as I understand it.

Senator MCCARTHY. How many people came in and out of the palace that day, do you have any indication? It was wide open.

Ambassador BENNETT. It could have been several hundred easily.

Senator MCCARTHY. Or more?

Ambassador BENNETT. Or more.

Senator MCCARTHY. It could have been thousands?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am sorry to say I don't know how many there were.

Senator McCarthy. Somebody must have been watching. Was it a meeting or did they just check them in or check them out? The question I was concerned about is what kind of a meeting it was.

Ambassador Bennett. This was a meeting between the civilians and the military in, I would assume, a room. I wouldn't think all these hundreds——

The Chairman. Wasn't Connett there? I thought this was a meeting with Connett.

Ambassador Bennett. He didn't sit in on this meeting; no, sir.

The Chairman. He had a meeting with them, didn't he, on April 15?

Ambassador Bennett. We were in touch with him, one member of the staff or the other during that day, yes. There was a meeting later in the day with Breisky, and Connett was in the palace that morning, and——

The Chairman. I thought that was the meeting you were talking about.

Ambassador Bennett. No, sir; I don't think he was sitting in on this meeting.

The Chairman. What you mean here is that there were conferences apparently going on in the national palace during the day and these people came and went?

Ambassador Bennett. This comes from a CIA report.

The Chairman. Yes.

Ambassador Bennett [continuing]. From people who were there; we were not involved in this meeting. There is another member who was there I should mention, Alejandro Lajara Gonzalez, who is a member of June 14, and he was one of those who was active distributing arms to civilians and was later appointed by Molina Urena to the position of deputy director of the security service in the provisional government.

The Chairman. With regard to this incident in the hotel?

Ambassador Bennett. Yes, sir.

SPLIT IN THE MILITARY

The Chairman. I read this from one of the reports, when Reid agreed to resign on April 25 he first wanted to name a successor junta himself but then agreed that the military should select it. The PRD insisted that it should also participate, and the officer corps split three ways in supporters of Balaguer, Bosch, and Reid.

Shortly, however, the first junta which included Colonel Caamano appeared. It was unacceptable to portions of the military; is that a correct statement?

Ambassador Bennett. The last part, Colonel Caamano what?

The Chairman. It says shortly, however, the first junta which included Colonel Caamano appeared. It was unacceptable to portions of the military.

Ambassador Bennett. I believe that is true, sir. I know the military did split as to that.

The Chairman. With regard to this incident you referred to at the bottom of page 4 about the Hotel Ambassador and so on——

Ambassador Bennett. Yes.

WARNING TO AMERICANS

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. It was reported in one of our reports here that the irregulars who invaded the hotel explicitly warned the Americans to stay out of the line of fire, told them to lie down and so on, get out of the way because they were looking for a specific individual named Rafael Bonilla Aybar, I think; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. They did come there looking for Aybar and Fernando Muniz, who actually is an American citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. And told the Americans to get out of the way, did they?

Ambassador BENNETT. A Colonel Fernandez at one time tried to give some assistance to the Americans and tried to calm the general scene. I do not believe that on their arrival they said, "Get out of the way," because they began shooting almost as they arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. They didn't shoot at any Americans, did they?

Ambassador BENNETT. Sir, they were shooting all through the crowd. I have a tape recording by a Marine sergeant which I would be very glad to furnish to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they shoot a single American?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, it is miraculous that no American was wounded, but there was——

The CHAIRMAN. All I know is one of the reports said that when they first approached, there were some on the lawn and told them to lie down on the grass. They went into the hotel and told them all to get out of the way and went through the hotel looking for this man reported Rafael Bonilla Aybar, who, incidentally, wasn't there. He is in Puerto Rico.

Ambassador BENNETT. No, he was not.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is what the report said.

Ambassador BENNETT. At the time, I believe he was still in the country. I have a group of 13 eye witness reports here which I would be glad to submit for the record—by various members of our own personnel who were there with their families.

SHOOTING INTO THE HOTEL

The CHAIRMAN. Did they shoot anybody, either Americans or otherwise, in the hotel?

Ambassador BENNETT. They shot into the hotel and shot around. I don't believe anyone was killed in this instance.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr.Chairman, I think it would be a good idea to have it in the record, the statements of people in the hotel who were there.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Ambassador BENNETT. I also have actual pictures of the event, of the Americans, if you want them, showing them under tables and behind chairs while the men with the guns——

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understood—they told them to get out of the way or get under the bed or wherever they were, they were looking for somebody.

Ambassador BENNETT. But people were exposed to peril and danger regardless of the mission of this group because they just came in and started shooting.

The CHAIRMAN. Who took these pictures?

Ambassador BENNETT. They were taken by an Episcopal rector who takes pictures as a sideline. He happened to be present. Reverend Morgan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How come he didn't get shot at?

Ambassador BENNETT. Well, as I say, we were fortunate that no one was shot.

NO AMERICANS SHOT

The CHAIRMAN. Someone ventured the view here the other day that in all the numerous Latin American revolutions, including the Dominican Republic, there were no American civilians—I am not including Marines who are out there fighting—but in these uprisings, they never shoot Americans.

Do you know anything about that?

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't know about that statistic.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know any who have been shot?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am happy to state it didn't happen in this one.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know where it happened?

Ambassador BENNETT. I wouldn't pose as an authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of anywhere they have been shot?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. They had one in Bogotá, for example, when Marshall was there. There was a great deal of violence, but they didn't shoot any Americans, did they?

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't know of anyone who was shot there.

The CHAIRMAN. Someone—I wasn't the authority but the other day when this was being discussed, they said traditionally they don't shoot Americans because they don't want to induce an intervention.

INABILITY TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES

We had a point yesterday, before I forget it, with Secretary Mann that I would like to develop for a moment. When you recommended the Marines be landed, did you do it on the basis of a written request from the Benoit junta?

Ambassador BENNETT. I had had two oral reports, one from the chief of police and one from Benoit. Benoit put his request in writing. I do not believe that the written request had arrived at the time that we had to take action, but it had already been requested and we had been warned by both him and the chief of police that they could no longer furnish protection.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the written request from Benoit mention the junta's inability to protect Americans?

Ambassador BENNETT. It did, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The first one you received?

Ambassador BENNETT. I have two from him. The first one did not; we did not reply to that. We did not take action on that.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not mention the inability to protect Americans, the first one?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, I don't believe it did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the subsequent mentioning of inability to protect Americans, was that inserted at your request?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, sir; I don't think that——

The CHAIRMAN. You did not suggest to Benoit that they insert in their written request mentioning of inability to protect American lives?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, sir; there are two entirely different requests. In the intervening time we had had the call from the chief of police, because, of course, protection is primarily a police function.

EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS TO BENOIT

The CHAIRMAN. The main point I am trying to make is you are saying you did not suggest to Benoit that he include in his written request for intervention the point that lives of citizens of the United States were in danger and that this was the reason for it?

Did you request that he insert this——

Ambassador BENNETT. Senator, I am not trying to be evasive, but frankly I am not sure whether we went back to him and said this or not. Communications were almost completely out at that time and I would have to collect our material.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not send any message by helicopter or otherwise to Benoit that he should include in his request——

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, I believe the air attaché went out to see him.

The CHAIRMAN. He wouldn't do that without your instructions, would he?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, he would not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you instruct him to go out and see him and tell him to put in his request the point that American citizens' lives were in danger?

Ambassador BENNETT. By that time, as I say, I had had the call from the chief of police and so we were going back to him. He had told us he could not protect Americans and so we asked for it in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. That did not come from Washington?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, sir; not——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The suggestion that you put it on the basis of protecting lives?

Ambassador BENNETT. I suppose—I am sorry, I will just have to check the record on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You can't recall?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am sorry, I will be glad to check it.

THE KEY ACTION

The CHAIRMAN. The main action of this rather urgent request that they land troops, this was the key action taken.

Ambassador BENNETT. It was.

The CHAIRMAN. You can't remember about that?

Ambassador BENNETT. It was a day of great confusion. We had people going back and forth trying to keep up with the thing. We were more concerned by the hour about the problem. As to wheth-

er I did that on instruction or on my own, I would just have to check the record, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair will yield, as I understand it, he told you orally he could not protect American citizens any longer and you asked him to confirm that in writing?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You can't remember whether that request was made to you by Washington; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. If it were made to you by Washington, whether he had told you orally wouldn't be the point, would it?

Ambassador BENNETT. Right.

Mr. Adams recalls that we had had the two oral requests and that Washington—I had reported that—and that Washington then instructed us to get it in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't the point I am asking you, whether it was in writing. I asked you whether you suggested that the basis for the intervention be on the ground that American lives were endangered.

Ambassador BENNETT. He came to me on that, sir, first. I didn't go to him first and say, "Let's find American lives in danger," no.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not.

Ambassador BENNETT. I would say, "No."

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't suggest to Benoit that he put in writing in the request that he cannot protect the Americans and that it should be on that basis that we intervene. I just want to make it clear. I know it was in writing and I know it was a verbal one.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But you didn't do that?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am sorry to say I would have to check the files on that.

MEETING WITH REBEL LEADERS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a meeting with some of the leaders of the rebellion on the 27th?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you describe that meeting? There has been some difference of opinion as to what took place.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your memory clear on that?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe it is, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you make it as precise as you can, please, sir?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe that my cable on the meeting has been put into the record previously. There had been various contacts during the day with the——

The CHAIRMAN. This is the 27th?

Ambassador BENNETT. The 27th, yes, sir—with the provisional government. Some of our people had been at the palace earlier. We had thought that morning we had a truce meeting set up with both sides to meet on one of the ships of the Dominican Navy; that had

been an arrangement with the two military sides. Molina Urena had declined to attend that.

Later on, Mr. Ruyle or our staff had gone to see him in the palace and at that time there was some discussion of a further meeting. I had called to ask to come to see him and at four o'clock he appeared at the Embassy. He came into my office, accompanied by between 15 and 20 of what he described as his political and military advisers. They were both civilians and miiitary officers.

STOP THE SENSELESS BLOODSHED

They said they had come to try to see if we could work out some way to stop this thing. I said I welcomed that because our whole purpose was to get this senseless bloodshed stopped.

We reviewed the situation and I urged them to get in touch and talk with the other side, as we had been doing steadily from the beginning. I recalled the background of the previous Bosch administration, that we had supported Bosch throughout his government and to the end and beyond; we had shown our disapproval of his overthrow most emphatically.

That had happened, however, 18 months ago, and we had to start from where we were. They complained of the barbarities of aerial bombardment and I agreed that that was a bad thing, but I reminded them that they had started the strife in the streets and that that had inevitably brought a counterreaction from the other side.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who were you talking to at this time?

Ambassador BENNETT. This is Molina Urena and his principal advisers.

SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE

The CHAIRMAN. Earlier that day, on Tuesday, the 27th, at 3 o'clock, did Ruyle go to the palace to talk to these people—no, they came to the Embassy at 3 o'clock and talked to Ruyle; is that right?

Ambassador BENNETT. A group came to see him, and he went from there to see Molina Urena.

The CHAIRMAN. And they asked for help in arranging a cease-fire; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And thereafter, that is right, Ruyle went to see Molina Urena at the palace and urged him to seek a cease-fire; is the correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. At the time Molina Urena had been resistant and continued to be, but following his meeting with Ruyle he apparently did change his mind and he came, as I say, with his advisers to the Embassy.

The CHAIRMAN. And, therefore, Molina and about 15 of is advisers, including Caamano Deno, went to the U.S. Embassy to meet with you?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right, sir. I had asked to see him at the palace and he came there instead.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time General Wessin's tanks seemed to cross the Duarte Bridge into the city and the rebels' cause looked hopeless; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. They were approaching the bridge?

Ambassador BENNETT. There were some reports that they were across the bridge.

AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a conflict that I thought you might clear up. There is a difference in reports as to what happened there. According to Caamano, you belabored the rebels for allowing Communists into their movement; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. I wouldn't say——

The CHAIRMAN. Lectured them?

Ambassador BENNETT. I wouldn't say I belabored them or lectured them. I spoke of the fact there had been undeniable Communist infiltration.

A DECISION FOR THE DOMINICANS

The CHAIRMAN. That is reasonable. The key point I would like to ask, it is reported that you told the rebels you had no authority to seek a cease-fire; did you tell them that?

Ambassador BENNETT. I wouldn't put it that way. They asked me to go to attend a meeting, assuming one were arranged, with the Papal Nuncio, with another representative of the church, and with me to be the third party. I said I did not have authority to take part in that kind of meeting, that we thought this was a thing to be described for Dominicans talking to Dominicans and that we were talking in identical terms to the other side. I urged them to get together.

I reminded them that four times on the previous day the Embassy had arranged for a postponement of military action to enable talks, and that each of those four times they had not come to the talks as had been agreed on. That morning it has seemed there was a very real conference set up for a cease-fire talk, and they had not appeared at the meeting. It was high time that they get together with the other side.

We had indications from the navy and the air force they were ready and willing to talk, and we were working on both sides as hard as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it is very difficult for me sitting here to say that was the turning point, but if it is true that at that moment it looked very favorable for Wessin and his group, and they were seeking a cease-fire, it would look like a psychological moment to move in and get one. I just wondered why you didn't do it. You didn't feel you didn't have authority to do it. You didn't think it wise to do it; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. We were very anxious to get a cease-fire; but we did not feel it was up to us to compel the two sides to do so, nor indeed do I think they would have agreed at that time because there was such feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. The feeling got lots worse after that.

Ambassador BENNETT. It did, sir, and we still have it.
The CHAIRMAN. It was much better then than afterward.
Ambassador BENNETT. We still have it.

NEGOTIATE A VICTORY?

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered why you felt on the 27th that you couldn't mediate, if you like, between them when these were the rebels seeking relief, I guess, because it looked very black for them, I gather from this report, at that moment.

Ambassador BENNETT. In other words, they wanted us to negotiate for them a victory which they hadn't won.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they ask you to negotiate a victory?

Ambassador BENNETT. Those are my words.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think they were asking you to negotiate a victory?

Ambassador BENNETT. Those are my words.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you stand by them or do you mean you misspoke; which do you mean?

Ambassador BENNETT. I do stand by them, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were asking you to negotiate a victory for them when things looked as black——

Ambassador BENNETT. That may be loose language, but they were asking me to take their side, and I didn't feel that we should take sides.

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite different. The report we have didn't indicate they were asking you to take sides. The report indicated, on the contrary, they thought they were just about to be overrun and they were seeking a truce because they thought they were going to be overrun.

Ambassador BENNETT. They would not, you see, go to San Isidro.

The CHAIRMAN. They were afraid to go?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe they would have been. And that would have been my responsibility if some of them had gone out there and been shot. That would have put the United States in a poor position. Molina Urena was insisting on their coming to the palace, which was quite unrealistic for the other side to do.

The CHAIRMAN. There wasn't any neutral territory?

Ambassador BENNETT. We had arranged that in the morning and it didn't work out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Chair yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I will.

UNDERSTANDING THE AMBASSADOR

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to understand what the Ambassador is saying, that he felt at this particular time, and the staff felt, that Wessin looked in pretty good shape. They came to you and asked you to negotiate, and the reason you slid the word out "victory" was at that time it looked like they were going down and you didn't want to take the responsibility, for the various reasons you have mentioned explicitly, of being the mediator. You felt that if you were the mediator you were taking on too much, but in any case if you had mediated for them you would have, in effect, prevented them from being defeated; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, I wouldn't put it that way.

Senator SYMINGTON. How would you put it? I am just trying to understand you and I am sympathetic with your problem.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. How can you say you prevented them from having a victory, and I am just trying to shade the word for you, that there would be a victory and not being defeated, which was what you thought would happen to them if they weren't successful in the cease-fire?

Ambassador BENNETT. As I said earlier, things there are very volatile, things go up and down, this was their down period; a day or two later they were very much up again.

Senator SYMINGTON. My point is what did you mean? You say, they are your words—I am intrigued, what did you mean by saying you felt you were negotiating? I am trying to interpret it; if I am wrong in interpretation, I want to ask a direct question. What do you mean "negotiate a victory" for them?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think they wanted us to negotiate them into the palace, and that was not our position.

Senator SYMINGTON. But would that have been a victory for them in your opinion?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think it would have been.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I wanted to find out. That is what you mean by victory, getting them into the palace.

Ambassador BENNETT. For a long time they wanted us to put them into the palace and it wasn't our power to do. What we were trying to do, primarily trying to do, was to get the shooting stopped.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you wanted the shooting stopped and they wanted the shooting stopped and they asked you to help stop the shooting, how would you be giving them a victory if you helped them stop the shooting?

Ambassador BENNETT. Well, we tried very hard to get them to talk to the other side and the other side to talk to them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador BENNETT. They left my office. I had the impression they were going to talk, except for Caamano, who said he was not. He said he would continue fighting. The others gave the impression they were going and we had had word about that time that the other side was ready to talk, and we thought we had accomplished this.

REASONS FOR PRESS HOSTILITY

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask one more question. I can't stay much longer.

Why do you think the press was so hostile in their reports back to the United States, especially the large city press representatives and the television representatives?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think, frankly, that a good many people came there already emotionally committed or decided as to which side they favored. We have had that; several of them have said so on their arrival. There were violent partisans on both sides. The Embassy has been, and I myself have been, shot at by both sides

verbally, and so I take that to mean we were trying to go down the middle of the road.

Senator SYMINGTON. Some of the newspaper people told you they had made up their minds as soon as they got there; is that what you are saying?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe some of them had their minds made up before they came there on April 29.

Senator SYMINGTON. On both sides?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, both sides.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can you give us the names of two who made up their minds to support Caamano and the other side?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think Tad Szulc was clear in this mind what he favored.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was that?

Ambassador BENNETT. Tad Szulc of the New York Times.

Senator SYMINGTON. What side did he favor?

Ambassador BENNETT. He was very much on the side of the Bosch, PRD group.

Senator SYMINGTON. As soon as he landed he give you that impression?

Ambassador BENNETT. He did, sir. He had already been in Puerto Rico and talking to Bosch there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he tell anybody else?

How did you get that impression?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe he did say that to an individual there in the country.

Senator SYMINGTON. As a result of being that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might say that is par for the course of Tad Szulc.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then if he said he did feel that way, it is your impression that he made statements of fact in his article?

Ambassador BENNETT. I feel so; yes, sir.

I think another one would be Dan Kurzman of the Washington Post, who certainly was very clear as to which side he favored. He certainly made some real distortions of some of my own statements, I may say, of the meeting which we are describing.

PRESS CONCERNS ABOUT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE

On the other side, I would say there was Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune and Hal Hendricks of Scripps-Howard.

Senator SYMINGTON. You felt they had made up their minds before——

Ambassador BENNETT. I think they were quite firm. They felt from the beginning there was a very strong Communist influence in this thing; they had had something to do with the previous Bosch period there and they felt it had gone much too far to the left and, therefore, opposed the thought of Bosch coming back.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did they distort any of your statements?

Ambassador BENNETT. I have not seen much of their writing and I did not have any particular contact with them, actually. I have had some with Hal Hendricks; he has come into the Embassy. Jules Dubois never came into the Embassy so far as I remember; he never came to see me at any rate.

OBJECTIVE REPORTING

The CHAIRMAN. What about Geyelin of the Wall Street Journal, was he prejudiced or biased?

Ambassador BENNETT. It seemed to me he was trying to get the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he was an objective observer?

Ambassador BENNETT. It seemed so to me from my one or two talks to him. I haven't read all of his articles. I can't comment on them.

The CHAIRMAN. He wrote one on June 25—have you seen that, "Dominican Flashback"—as kind of a résumé by Philip Geyelin.

Ambassador BENNETT. I have seen some, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that was accurate?

Ambassador BENNETT. I wouldn't want to comment on it without looking it over, because I saw it very hurriedly when it first came out. I think he got his facts right. I wouldn't agree with some of his conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN. But he is as near being objective as any you can think of at the moment?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think Roland Evans was trying to be objective. I think Eric Sevareid was there to get facts. He didn't write as much as some of the others.

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. Looking back on this April 27 meeting, would you say in view of what has happened maybe we missed an opportunity there to have affected the course of events?

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't believe so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think so?

Ambassador BENNETT. I have thought of it a good deal, sir, in view of all the comments that meeting has aroused. I don't see why it is always our fault when other people don't act responsibly. In this case we gave them every opportunity and every urging.

The CHAIRMAN. On the day of the 27th had you concluded at that time the Communists were in control of the Bosch movement?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, there was a very strong influence and we were very concerned about it. My own feeling is that the full takeover occurred that night or the next day. But there was always from the beginning—in fact, the secretary general of the PRD movement, Martinez Francisco, even on Saturday evening expressed concern to one of our officers about the extent of Communist activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that your concern about these people who came to you on the 27th, your concern that they were Communists was——

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't say the people who came to see me were Communists, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Or Communist-controlled, what would you say?

Ambassador BENNETT. Communist-influenced, with a heavy influence.

The CHAIRMAN. Communist-influenced.

That was the dominant reason why you were unwilling to mediate?

Ambassador BENNETT. I didn't think it was appropriate for us to try to tell the two sides whom they should choose or how they should get together.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly are doing that now to the best of our ability, aren't we?

Ambassador BENNETT. We now have an OAS committee trying to find a provisional government; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it looks as if anything is to be found, we have got to find it, haven't we?

Ambassador BENNETT. It is hard going.

NOT A SINGLE EVENT

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered what the difference—why on that day when it looked to me, as an outsider who knows very little about it, as if there was an opportunity, why we didn't take advantage of it.

Ambassador BENNETT. I think we are discussing that meeting out of context and looking at it was a single event. It came after there had been 3 days of these kind of efforts, and each time—I want to put it on the record—this group had not come forward after arrangements had been made for talks and for an effort to compose the situation. Each time it was this group, and we thought, quite frankly, that was under the urgings of some of their extremist supporters because it is a classic Communist technique to talk while you get ready for the next move. Four times on Monday that had happened and on Tuesday morning, when there was an excellent opportunity to sit down and compose the thing, they had not shown up for the meeting; Molina Urena had not.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you feel as early as Monday the Communist technique was in control.

Ambassador BENNETT. I think as early, if I may go back, as the late hours of Saturday night and early Sunday there was strong Communist influence. I believe the paper that was put in the record yesterday shows that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless someone wants to pursue that, I am going to take a little different tack.

AMBASSADOR'S RETURN FOR CONSULTATION

When you came to Washington for consultation, what was your assessment of the situation at that time? This was on the——

Ambassador BENNETT. A very serious and declining situation, and it was urgent that we talk here and consider what our next moves were going to be. When the Department asked me to come for consultation, I said I will be delighted to come because I think this is about the last safe time that I can come up there.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it your view then that Reid could hold on until the elections in September?

Ambassador BENNETT. It was uncertain. That is one reason that both Washington and I thought that we needed to talk.

The almost continual disorders from January 1 on just made it clear that the place was heading for——

The CHAIRMAN. During that period from January until April, did the Embassy have any contact with the opposition groups?

Ambassador BENNETT. Constantly.

The CHAIRMAN. With whom in the opposition did you have contact? Did you have contacts?

Ambassador BENNETT. With all parties. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you talked to Urena?

Ambassador BENNETT. With Urena, yes, I have talked with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Guzman?

Ambassador BENNETT. Guzman, no, because he lived in Santiago, but Mainardi. He was secretary of labor in the Caamano government.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, do you talk Spanish?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, I do.

AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. When you returned on the 27th, what instructions did you take back with you at that time?

Ambassador BENNETT. When I returned on the 27th?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. To make every effort to stop the bloodshed.

The CHAIRMAN. Then this would certainly give you authority; the report you didn't have authority to intervene was not true. It was a matter of judgment that you didn't choose to; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. We had instruction on the record that we should not take part in the naming of any people to serve in this junta or grouping that we hoped would emerge from these talks, and, therefore, I didn't see what my sitting in the room would contribute in talks which we were not supposed to try to guide.

The CHAIRMAN. All I am asking is it wasn't a question that the instructions didn't give you authority. You felt it was unwise to do it.

Ambassador BENNETT. All right, sir, I will take that.

Senator MUNDT. You just got through saying you had instructions in writing not to do certain things.

Ambassador BENNETT. Not to guide the formation of the government and, therefore, it seemed to me that I would serve no purpose by sitting in the room.

Senator MUNDT. Wouldn't that be considered instructions in writing not to intervene?

Ambassador BENNETT. It seemed that way to me.

Senator MUNDT. It would seem so to me.

AVOIDING INTERVENTION AND STOPPING THE BLOODSHED

The CHAIRMAN. How does that reconcile with instructions to do everything you can to stop bloodshed? That is what I am trying to develop.

Senator MUNDT. That is talking about a truce, but this is talking about a new government.

Ambassador BENNETT. I suppose they didn't want to get involved in saying this is our group or this is our government or putting our blessing on them in advance.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought this group was asking for a truce and cease-fire and wanted you to arrange it; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. We had the other side's agreement to talk, and I urged them to talk with them.

The CHAIRMAN. From what you said——

Ambassador BENNETT. They had been the ones who had not talked up until that time. If they had wished to take my advice, the other side was waiting to talk with them.

URGING A MILITARY JUNTA

The CHAIRMAN. I have just had called to my attention in the Department's own résumé of this affair, it said the department's telegram of April 25 expressed concern over the appearance of extreme leftist elements in demonstrations which had led to the overthrow of the Reid government. The telegram stated that the Department assumed the Embassy was in contact with the armed force leaders and was urging them to unite and form some type of provisional government capable of preventing a Communist takeover; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is true, sir, yes, and there were talks between the two military sides in which they were both involved.

The CHAIRMAN. That would seem to indicate they were urging you to get the military to unite and form a military junta, wasn't it?

Ambassador BENNETT. To form something that could hold the country together. You have to deal with what authority there is.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. It says the armed force leaders and urging them to unite and form some type of provisional government capable of preventing a Communist takeover.

Ambassador BENNETT. And that instruction was carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the 25th.

There are three more very much like it.

On the 26th the Embassy, therefore, urged diplomatic initiatives designed to prevent the return of Bosch through the creation of a military junta which would schedule elections for September. You were aware of that, I am sure?

Ambassador BENNETT. I was not there at the time, but I am aware of it and that instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. It came shortly thereafter.

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And again on the 27th, it urged we contact the military leaders of the contending forces and suggest they establish a military junta to act as a provisional government.

Ambassador BENNETT. That was an idea of falling back on what authority there was which could hold the country together and let the people choose, because this was not just a Bosch revolution.

When the thing broke out in some towns, people went into the streets demonstrating for Balaguer. So, how did you know what the choice of the people really was?

The CHAIRMAN. On the 28th there as another; this is another instance from April 28. It was reported that Imbert had just succeeded in taking the national palace. It was also reported progress was being made on the formation of a junta. Wessin would not be a member and the Embassy felt this was all for the best.

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right, sir.

A MILITARY JUNTA WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. All of that would seem to indicate that you were under instructions to try to get the military to unite to form a military junta provisional government, looking later to elections or whatever; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right.

On Sunday, it was with the military on both sides. On Monday after the bombings, in point of fact if one tried to get them together, the cleavage and the hatred were so deep then, I don't believe you could have gotten both sides together, and that is what is still the essential problem today.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fair to conclude on the basis of those instructions and your own view that the Communist influence was very strong as early as Saturday or Sunday, that there was no hope whatever with the rebel movement, and the only way out of this mess was to have a military junta; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am sorry, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Taking these telegrams of instructions here from the State Department's summary of what went on, and that is from their point of view, and your own conclusion, as you have just stated, you thought the Communist influence was very strong.

Ambassador BENNETT. Right.

ESTABLISHING ORDER AND AUTHORITY

The CHAIRMAN. As early as Saturday, which was the day it broke out, and on Sunday, and progressively stronger, if I understand you, it was quite clear that there was no hope for salvaging any kind of even non-Communist rebel government; that is, that was hopeless. The only hope would be to create a military junta of the loyalists, these words get mixed up, of the Wessin group, as the only way to really salvage law and order; is that a correct statement?

Ambassador BENNETT. Certainly you had to fall back on what there was that could establish order and authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that——

Ambassador BENNETT. That would be the military authorities as I say, working with both sides through Sunday to try to get them to agree among themselves. After the bombings, I myself don't think that was very feasible. But I would like to make clear throughout here that what we were doing was exerting and extending good offices. We were not authorized to mediate between the two or try to find a solution for them.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think, in view of your attitude, I wouldn't want to mediate to preserve the rebel's cause because they had evidenced strong Communist influence already, just in accordance with what you said, isn't it?

Why would you want to do it?

Ambassador BENNETT. At that stage our effort was to get the military, both the rebel military and the others, to unite to hold the place together, to stop the spreading anarchy that was killing so many people.

EVIDENCE OF THE COMMUNISTS' ROLE

The CHAIRMAN. What evidence is there that Communists or pro-Communist groups played a primary or decisive role in the distribution of arms to the populace or incitement of the people?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe there is a great amount of evidence that they took part in the distribution of the arms and more or less took over the distribution.

I believe that is in the memorandum which is in the record.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, any time. I am not trying to monopolize this. Ask it any time you want to.

Senator MUNDT. I personally am more interested in where we go from here than how we got to where we are. I am wondering in your report as to your suggestions as to what happens now, because I get a lot of complaints from my home folks who supported consistently the policy of the Government in Santo Domingo, but there has been switching in the contacts I have had from home since we apparently have stopped in this little enclave of rebel forces in what they construe to be a few city blocks of part of the city of Santo Domingo pinning down a sizable American force and neutralizing them. It looks to them from what they read and hear that the American force is to keep the central government, whether it was loyal or disloyal, I don't know, the military forces from the cleanup job which to them looks to be essential before you can ever establish law and order. They wonder what we are doing in there just protecting the rebels and keeping the others out, and I am having a devil of the time trying to justify it myself.

Can you shed any light on it?

Ambassador BENNETT. This is another part of the problem of being in the middle of the road, because at one time we were accused of protecting the Wessin people from the other side, and now that the rebel group is holed up downtown we are accused of protecting them against the larger forces outside.

The hope is to get a provisional government headed by a good man who can put together a cabinet of some distinction, that what is left of the legitimate PRD group in the group downtown would disassociate itself. That has been the trouble from the very outset of this whole thing, that the good PRD people would not admit to the Communist influence or, after they had admitted to it, would not disassociate themselves from it. Caamano himself has said, "Yes, I have got Communists but I need them, I have to work with them." That has been one of our problems in trying to find a middle way solution.

MUCH WORSE SITUATION

Senator MUNDT. But you said, Mr. Ambassador, in response to a question by Chairman Fulbright, if I understood the answer right, you concluded way back there on some weekend a long time ago in April that there were no hopes of getting the Communists and the military group in charge to get together and form a peace. The only way law and order was to be established was to pitch in with the military junta, make it as good as we could but work with what you called the existing authorities, thereby establishing law and

order and from then on trying to use our influence to make it as tolerant and as moderate a government as we can get.

I presume that still is true, as it was true in April, and it is still true. It is not going to get the hardcore Communists holed up in the rebel centers to ever agree to any kind of leadership which they can neither control nor infiltrate. So, we face precisely the same condition now we did back there in April, but we are doing it at great expense.

The CHAIRMAN. Much worse.

Senator MUNDT. Much worse.

Tying down a tremendous amount of military equipment and manpower that we need desperately in Vietnam or to replace the people who have gone to Vietnam, and there we sit. We have got to make up our mind.

If we made up our mind and if we are still right, and I think we are probably right, the military force in being are the only ones who can establish law and order. It seems to me we should get on with the job of stabilizing the situation by cleaning out the rebel forces and from then on, through our carrot-and-stick policy of military aid and whatnot, try to get them like we tried to get Nasser to modify his policies.

We are told that the President has been pretty successful in modifying Nasser. I don't know. The Senate——

The CHAIRMAN. Temporarily, I think, until the next agreement.

THE LOGIC OF U.S. TROOPS REMAINING

Senator MUNDT. Until he fixes it up to give them a chance, we fix you up to give you a chance with these other guys. But I just can't understand the logic of keeping our army there and perpetuating a situation which increasingly is getting worse.

Ambassador BENNETT. There is possibly a point to be made that, if we had cleaned up at the beginning, we wouldn't have been criticized any more than we have been and we would have cleaned it up. But the problem is that in cleaning up no one wants to go into the kind of house-to-house cleanup in a crowded city which ends up with the killing of innocent women and children—that sort of thing. That certainly has been a factor in American and OAS policy.

The other reason for the talks, and this goes back to the Bundy mission and comes on to the present, is the sincere effort to try to work with the good democrats and the legitimate PRD people who are in the movement downtown, to try to draw them out and work them into a provisional government along with other elements in the structure there.

Senator MUNDT. They have become weaker now because of the forces of attrition, and some of them have fled over into our side and sought asylum and whatnot. So, we face up to the ugly fact either sometime by military force or by a blockade—if there ever was an easy place to blockade, this would be the easiest place in the world to shut off all supplies except medical supplies, thereby forcing other people to seek refuge and asylum and, it would seem to me, bringing these other fellows to a point of desperation without bloodshed. I am sure there is some bloodshed going on down

there night after night, weekend after weekend. They are raiding each other, and it is a tough spot.

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't say we will go on accepting this situation continuously, I mean on and on in time, because it is very frustrating to everybody involved.

AT ARM'S LENGTH

Senator MUNDT. I have no quarrel and no criticism of mistakes which have or have not been made up to now. I think we have done about as well as we can, up until we finally decided that our mission there was just to hold them at arm's length and keep them in that position into perpetuity. I think it is an utterly unrealistic position.

Ambassador BENNETT. The OAS has been trying to negotiate and trying to bring these two sides together so we can stop this arm's length basis, but we have not had success up to this time.

Senator MUNDT. They have failed?

Ambassador BENNETT. They have not had success.

Senator MUNDT. And there are certain built-in concepts which I think are going to continue to keep them to fail, short of appeasement on our part, which would be worse than failure because then we would have wasted our own people.

Ambassador BENNETT. I can give you a very frank opinion—if we withdrew the inter-American peace force today, the killing would begin again without any doubt. We had incidents last weekend, two rather serious ones, where a mob of people set upon the local police. There is just a great deal of hatred in that whole scene now.

Now, the Inter-American Peace Force, their mandate is from the organ of consultation of the OAS, that this force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, maintaining the stability of the inhabitants and inviolability of human rights, and permitting the function of democratic institutions. They have not felt that gave them the power to go in and clean up, as you say.

Senator MUNDT. I understand that has been taking place. But I can't understand the thing which goes on after the point of failure has been passed.

COMMAND OF THE MILITARY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who has command of the military forces, air and army, in opposition to the rebels who are holed up in the main part of Santo Domingo?

Ambassador BENNETT. You mean on the Imbert side?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know. Wessin and Wessin or what?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, Wessin y Wessin has been somewhat at a discount for some time. We talk of him because he has become a symbol, but actually the secretary of state for armed forces under Imbert is Rivera Caminero, who is a naval commandant, former chief of staff of the navy, De los Santos is chief of staff of the air force. I would say they are the two principal officers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they working together or are they in a rivalry?

Ambassador BENNETT. They have been united over these 2 or 3 months—the three chiefs of staff. Wessin sometimes comes to the meetings and sometimes doesn't. As I say, he has been very much at a discount.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does he still have control over the forces?

Ambassador BENNETT. He still has the training center, which is the camp where the tank corps is.

INTER-AMERICAN FORCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the military forces, that is, all of them, navy and so on, if they decided, for instance, today they were going in and clean up the rebel nests in Santo Domingo, what would the OAS position be, if it has a position?

Ambassador BENNETT. They have been told again and again they would be stopped by the inter-American force.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So, the inter-American force would just continue the status quo.

Ambassador BENNETT. I beg your pardon, sir. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say the effect of that would be that the inter-American force would——

Ambassador BENNETT. It is holding, it separates the two forces at the present time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know how we are going to resolve the stalemate with that kind of stuff going on.

Ambassador BENNETT. Ambassador Bunker is here. In fact, I am due to go with him to a meeting at the White House at 5 o'clock, and I would imagine some of these things would be talked about there because he has come up on consultation.

I don't think it is correct to say the OAS mission has failed. They have not reached success yet, but they have given a great deal of diligent effort and painstaking negotiation to this problem and they have made some progress. They have found a good man to head the provisional government; he has two, three very important questions to work out between the two sides: One, this disposition of the military involved, and, two, the facing up to the Communist problem, which the people downtown have been very difficult about wanting to admit, first, and then to face.

CONFIDENCE IN A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Senator MUNDT. Would you have any confidence at all in the success of that kind of provisional government no matter how good this man—who is the man by the way?

Ambassador BENNETT. This is Hector Garcia Godoy. This is the man who has been mentioned. He is an outstanding citizen, one of the few, I may say, who is willing to step forward.

Senator MUNDT. Has he any chance of bringing in a coalition with Communists?

Ambassador BENNETT. There will be no Communist ministers, not if our Government is going to have anything to say about it.

Senator MUNDT. Some of these rebels are going to negotiate with him?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think on that side, it would have to be acceptable to the other side; it would be from the PRD legitimate elements, not from their Communist allies.

PRINCIPAL REASON FOR INTERVENTION

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back to one other question, I didn't finish, when on recommending intervention on the 28th, what was the principal reason that you recommended, was it the saving of American lives or the danger of a Communist takeover?

Ambassador BENNETT. It was the saving of American lives, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give a very brief opinion——

Ambassador BENNETT. I think this thing took several stages, if I may say so. The first was protecting the evacuation, saving lives. The landings later, the buildup, was definitely more allied with the Communist danger because, as of the night of the 28th, one still had the right to hope that the antirebel forces would unite themselves sufficiently to stop the anarchy from spreading. It was already clear 24 hours later they were not capable of doing that or were unwilling—they were quite demoralized at that stage—and, therefore, it did become necessary to bring in more troops. That time the Communist problem was uppermost.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There would have been the same problem of killing women and children at that time as there is now, had the forces gone in there to clean up the rebels?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, had they gone all the way downtown, yes.

In fact, I would say it would be much easier to go down now because there has been a gradual attrition in this thing.

POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE REBELLION

The CHAIRMAN. What is your estimte of the state of popular feeling in the Dominican Republic, outside of Santo Domingo, with regard to this struggle?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think throughout the country, there is a great desire for social change. The simple people are interested in work and food and the more sophisticated people talk about economic development. I have traveled very widely in the country—I have been in 23 of the 26 provinces—and I spend my time out with development committees and meeting with students and labor groups and cooperatives and that sort of thing. There is a desire in every town that I have visited to improve their economic status.

In the small places they are quite ready to do something for themselves. They need help, they need advice, they often need just a little bit of money that primes the pump. It is really quite inspiring to go and meet with these people who want to do for themselves, who don't know what to do or how to do it. The level of education has been so low there that that's one of the prime needs in the country.

I don't think that that desire for social change necessarily unites itself to any one person. Bosch certainly captivated it in the elec-

tion of 1962, but since he kept very few of his promises, when he was overthrown in 1963 there was no popular outcry at all when he was forced out. His name in the beginning of this revolution came up again and attached itself to this desire. Now, you seldom hear his name mentioned. They moved over to using the slogan "constitution."

SUPPORT FOR BALAGUER

Balaguer certainly has a strong and united following throughout the country. He is associated in the popular mind with the order of the Trujillo period, because things were orderly during that time, without being associated with its brutalities and cruelties. He was the administrator. Therefore, we would have to admit there is a nostalgia for a time when they didn't have all these kind of troubles and constant disturbances in the towns and in the countryside. Those are the two names, Bosch and Balaguer, and they have been the names ever since I have been in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think Caamano has any following as such?

Ambassador BENNETT. I don't, sir, not really.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any popular support for Imbert?

Ambassador BENNETT. A little bit, but not very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Or for Wessin?

Ambassador BENNETT. None whatever, I would say.

Senator CASE. The man you mentioned——

Ambassador BENNETT. Hector Garcia Godoy.

Senator CASE. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. Whoever becomes provisional President disqualifies himself.

Senator CASE. He is not a popular figure?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, he is a well-known figure but not a popular political type.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Do you have any questions?

Senator CASE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We would welcome a little of your wisdom.

Senator CASE. You are most kind, but I found it much more profitable in trying to soak it up.

POOR HISTORY OF LEADERSHIP

Ambassador BENNETT. That is one of the problems in the country, that there are very few people who want to come forward. It has been a problem in finding a provisional government, and this is one of the things in my opening statement I was referring to, characteristics that seem to be endemic. This runs down through Dominican history from the beginning, that they don't work together well, they find fault with one another, they cut at one another as much as any country I have ever been in, and it makes it very hard for anyone to govern the country.

Senator CASE. How did Trujillo get there in the first place?

Ambassador BENNETT. He came up, he was a sergeant in the guardia and became lieutenant.

Senator CASE. Just a man, a common man, he wants one——

Ambassador BENNETT. His father had been a petty official in one of the provincial towns.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he ever trained by the American forces?

Ambassador BENNETT. Did he what?

The CHAIRMAN. Was he ever a member of the American occupation?

Ambassador BENNETT. When the Marines were there, he had some training under the Marines.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, he learned the skill and control from the Marines.

Ambassador BENNETT. He got some training there, and he was a very clever intelligent, and ruthless man.

NOSTALGIA FOR TRUJILLO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any sentiment cropping up to the effect that they wished they had Trujillo back?

Ambassador BENNETT. There is a nostalgia, as I say, for the order of that period, as the brutalities fade away and people forget the low wages they had in those days. At least food prices were more in balance then than they seem to be now. You get a certain nostalgia and I think that, as I say, reacts in Balaguer's favor.

I think it is interesting, if we go back to the Bosch victory, there is no doubt that he had an undeniable appeal for the masses but he also got all the Trujillo vote, the Trujillistas, and the army family vote. The reason for that was that the civic union candidates who ran against Bosch—the civic union people were the moderate conservatives who had done most of the fighting against Trujillo, had led the efforts to resist him—had a campaign of considerable vengeance—"We will settle accounts". Both the people who profited under Trujillo and the army people thought that this meant that they would be worked on, and, therefore they actually voted for Bosch. He carried the poor districts, but he also carried the areas around the best residences. He would not get those votes today.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aren't there now a lot of accounts to be settled at a later date?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am afraid there are, sir. That is the tragedy of the situation. When I first went there, Dominican after Dominican would say, "We don't know how we got out of the Trujillo period without a bloodbath." Now they have had one, but it was interrupted in the midpassage.

A FANCY PROTECTORATE

Senator MUNDT. Are we all out of the area where you set up something like that, some kind of a fancy protectorate, getting someone to take over and starting afresh again under the aegis of the U.N., which obviously is not going to do it, or the OAS?

Ambassador BENNETT. In all logic, if you could take the country with an international, or whatever kind of group you want, and run it for 3 or 5 years—the country has resources and it needs the kind of training and it needs the stability that that could give. You never are going to take the country anywhere if you are going to change the government every 3 months.

Senator CASE. How about a trusteeship?

Ambassador BENNETT. Well, the minute that was raised——

THE OAS PROPOSAL

The CHAIRMAN. What is the situation at the moment? You say they are proposing a provisional government with this fellow Godoy as the provisional president, is that what our proposal is?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is the OAS proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we supporting it?

Ambassador BENNETT. We are supporting it. Ambassador Bunker is a member of that committee.

The CHAIRMAN. What does it take to get that done?

Ambassador BENNETT. It takes agreement of both sides down there.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't we control Imbert? We put him in, didn't we?

Ambassador BENNETT. I am not concerned over Imbert.

The CHAIRMAN. We are concerned about Caamano?

Ambassador BENNETT. No. They both have more or less agreed to the name, on the name, but there are other things which have to be worked out.

The CHAIRMAN. What haven't they agreed on?

Ambassador BENNETT. Presently they are talking about the institutional act which would be the document under which the government would operate.

THE 1963 CONSTITUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Are they opposed to the old constitution?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is a great bone of contention as to whether the 1963 constitution which was the Bosch constitution should be used, or whether to use some more simple document, which is what the committee has proposed.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it, in your opinion, faulty, the 1963 constitution?

Ambassador BENNETT. It is more detailed than necessary, and it has some problems for investment. Of course, the church is rather opposed to it because it abolished the Concordat, but, on the whole——

The CHAIRMAN. Because of what?

Ambassador BENNETT. Abolished the Concordat.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Ambassador BENNETT. That was the agreement with the Vatican which many countries have, a sort of a treaty for church rights. It abolished that.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the church own a great deal of property there?

Ambassador BENNETT. Not a great deal. It also, the church, has a problem. It allows divorce which, of course, the church is opposed to, but it is not——

Senator MCCARTHY. There is nothing in the Concordat on divorce, is there? It is just that the 1963 constitution allows it.

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right. The Concordat, of course, upheld the traditional church position on divorce.

Senator McCARTHY. The United States is not concerned about reserving that Concordat, I hope.

Ambassador BENNETT. No, we don't find any great problem with the constitution.

Senator MUNDT. Do you find any problems with the simple substitute that they are trying to propose?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, we think that is much better.

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been drawn up?

Ambassador BENNETT. It has been. It is under discussion on the two sides.

There are two other problems that are really more fundamental than the institutional act, in my view, and Mr. Bunker's view as well; that is the disposition of the military officers, because both sides have taken very intransigent positions on what they think should be the military arrangement, and, second, the handling of communism and Communists. Those are the two issues.

ROLE OF THE POLICE

Senator McCARTHY. What about the police force? It is involved, the control of the police force?

Ambassador BENNETT. The police are cordially disliked, and that is perhaps a generous term, all around the country.

Senator McCARTHY. Who controls them?

Ambassador BENNETT. But curiously, General Despradel, the head of the police, has not been mentioned by either side throughout this, as one who has sparked any indignation.

Senator McCARTHY. Is the police force neutral enough?

Ambassador BENNETT. It was pretty neutral in the revolution; yes, sir. It comes under the secretary of state for armed forces in a move which was made in January of this year or early in February.

Senator McCARTHY. Didn't Imbert once control—it seems to me we have something in the report of ours which goes back a year or two to a New York Times article which said that the 12,000 man police force was controlled by General Imbert.

Ambassador BENNETT. He has had rather strong influence with the police force, yes.

Senator McCARTHY. Does it continue or does he operate——

Ambassador BENNETT. I would say it is not as strong as it was at one time, but he still has influence there, and I think the head of the police force is fairly close to him.

Senator McCARTHY. Yet the police force, as a force, has not been thrown into the scales in an effort to work out the problem?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, they do not seem to be. This is primarily a military matter.

NEUTRALITY OF THE POLICE

Senator McCARTHY. What is the difference in the role of the police force and the army? Does the police force deal with internal revolutions or insurrections? How are the police forces kept out or how have they stayed out?

Ambassador BENNETT. They stayed neutral throughout this. Their statement for not going into the streets and cleaning up the

situation was that they did not have the kind of heavy weapons that, by that time, the rebels had gotten out of the arsenals.

Senator McCarthy. Is that true?

Ambassador Bennett. To a degree I think it was.

Senator McCarthy. What kind of weapons did the arsenal carry that the police do not have available, machineguns?

Ambassador Bennett. Heavy machineguns, 50 caliber, and mortars and things of that sort.

Senator Hickenlooper. Tanks?

Ambassador Bennett. I wouldn't call tanks a factor in this.

Senator McCarthy. They were not distributing mortars and the like to the civilian population, were they?

Ambassador Bennett. But the——

Senator McCarthy. Most of them didn't know how to shoot them.

Ambassador Bennett. But the rebel forces have got hold of some; yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. The rebels?

Ambassador Bennett. Yes, sir; because they had the two army arsenals, you see, the two army camps.

REBEL DEMANDS FOR CHANGES IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Senator Case. Is the controversy about the armed forces based upon who shall be in control of the armed forces or the composition and size of them?

Ambassador Bennett. It is more. The rebels say all the present military leadership has to go, and the present leadership says they will not take any of the rebel office's back in.

Senator Case. Does that mean the whole officer corps, or how far does it go?

Ambassador Bennett. You mean the rebel command?

Senator Case. Yes.

Ambassador Bennett. That is primarily three or four of the chiefs of staff.

Senator Case. I see. Not the——

Ambassador Bennett. In other words, Wessin, De los Santos, and——

Senator Mundt. Imbert?

Ambassador Bennett. Imbert would go. He has the title of general, but that is an honorary title given him after the Trujillo assassination. He has never controlled troops.

CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS

Senator Mundt. Tell me what consideration are we expected to give to the Communists. You keep saying that is a third element. What consideration do we have to give to the Communists, what will happen to the Communists? It would seem pretty obvious from all your reports that our policy is based on the idea that the Communists were the hardcore center of the revolution, and I do not see why we should make any concessions to them.

Ambassador Bennett. We do not intend to, sir. But on the rebel side they have not been willing to agree——

Senator Mundt. What do the rebels want to do?

Ambassador BENNETT. They have not been willing to agree, and this was true with the Bundy mission with Guzman, to take effective measures, in our view, to control the Communist problem and to get out of strategic positions such Communists as are in the governmental structure. The question of whether they should be deported or not is one which is a subject of discussion.

Senator MUNDT. There must be a lot of indigenous Communists, no place to deport them to.

Ambassador BENNETT. That is one of the problems.

Senator MUNDT. You cannot deport them to Cuba or someplace else.

Ambassador BENNETT. They sent 32, largely of June 14 group, out in May 1964, and Reid Cabral said he did not think, if he had to do it over, he would have done it, because they merely went on to postgraduate courses in Prague and Cuba.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. However, in a country as fragile and weak as this one, to leave them in the structure is dangerous, too. I mean, this is a real dilemma in a country like this, because they are not strong enough of their own to control them, and everybody is related to everyone else.

Senator MUNDT. Numerically, how many people are you talking about?

Ambassador BENNETT. The exteme Chinese-oriented party, 500 members, that is the MPD; the PSPD, 750 to 1,000; and the June 14, 3,000 to 5,000 perhaps. They claim a good bit more.

COMMUNIST MYSTIQUE

They have a certain mystique about them. They started out, you see, like a patriotic youth movement. It is a little like the French Resistance. They were against Trujillo, and gradually the leadership was taken over by the Communists, and it is pretty solidly Communist-dominated today.

That does not mean that all the members are. Many of them are young men, frustrated, who do not know what they are, but it is an effectively used Communist apparatus. But it has that popular base that the two outside Communist parties do not have. It is indigenous rather than international.

The CHAIRMAN. Indigenous, you say?

Ambassador BENNETT. The June 14 is a native organization which grew up within the country rather than being a foreign Communist party in the sense that the others have those ties.

EFFECT OF DOMINICAN CRISIS ON U.S. IMAGE

The CHAIRMAN. You served in other parts of Latin America, have you not?

Ambassador BENNETT. I served in the Dominican Republic 20-odd years ago. I started my career there.

I was in Panama.

The CHAIRMAN. Panama.

Could you give us any idea of what effect the Dominican crisis has had on our position in Latin America generally? Has it strengthened it or weakened it?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think it depends on the country really, and I think it also—as you know, Latin Americans a lot of time will approve what you do but they won't say it publicly.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that? Why do they approve it and won't say it publicly?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is part of being Latin, I suppose.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it is the nature of Latins to talk one way and act another?

Ambassador BENNETT. Latin Americans will often approve what you do, and yet they ask you, "Don't ask me to say it publicly."

I think the question on this would have been: What would have been the reaction in Latin America if we had not taken the action and the place had gone completely bad and we had allowed another Cuba or incipient Cuba to develop there? I am sure we would have been more heavily criticized than we have been.

REVOLUTION WOULD HAVE GONE COMMUNIST

The CHAIRMAN. That is the key question, whether or not it would have. It is a matter of judgment.

Ambassador BENNETT. It is, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is your judgment it would have gone Communist?

Ambassador BENNETT. It is mine, and I think almost every single observer on the scene, the Papal Nuncio, the British Embassy, most of the Latin American Embassies, the Colombian, the Peruvian, the Guatemalan, the Brazilian.

The CHAIRMAN. The Mexicans?

Ambassador BENNETT. The Mexicans, of course, have, as you know, a very different attitude on these things. I think their attitude has to be a little separated from the rest because they have their very strong nonintervention policy which is, perhaps, basic in their approach.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Down underneath they have a very strong anti-American feeling, don't they, too?

U.S. SUPPORT OF IMBERT FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. There is one incident—if no one wants to follow that—I do not know whether it is too important, but it came up in the papers here.

Between May 15 and May 20, the Imbert forces mopped up the rebels north of the U.S. corridor. To what extent, if any, did we support that attack?

Ambassador BENNETT. We did not support it in any way, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been a matter of controversy, not with me.

Ambassador BENNETT. Part of it, I think, arose from the fact that we had for several days liaison teams who were there strictly for the purpose of ensuring that the Imbert people did not fire against the American troops. That got confused in the press.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we allow them to cross the international line?

Ambassador BENNETT. We did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we allow them——

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe there were two or three instances. One day, in relieving the palace, which was still inside, is still inside, the LOC, but was held by Imbert forces, they brought an English-speaking man along with them and talked their way through the checkpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. No helicopters—we did not supply any helicopters?

Ambassador BENNETT. No, not at all.

BIAS OF NEW YORK TIMES

The CHAIRMAN. This Geyelin article which you recommended, I do not quite understand——

Ambassador BENNETT. I recommended him as an objective observer; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. You say the New York Times, you feel Szulc and Kurzman are not objective. Why aren't they objective? What is the reason why the New York Times and the Washington Post would be biased and prejudiced on this matter? I do not know enough about it to have a view. I have never been to the Dominican Republic.

Ambassador BENNETT. The New York Times, you remember its policy on Cuba was a most reluctant acceptance of Castro as a Communist, and it seems to color Mr. Herbert Matthews' writing even today.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not the one doing it.

Ambassador BENNETT. But he does the editorials, I believe, still.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is my understanding, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know.

Ambassador BENNETT. I do not really know, but it is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to use him as a basis for questions is all.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the other New York Times reporters, one named Juan de Onis, and Paul Kennedy, covering Latin America, are they of the same view?

Ambassador BENNETT. I find Kennedy a much more objective reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. Paul Kennedy, has he been down there?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Juan de Onis?

Ambassador BENNETT. Murray Schumach did, I think, the best articles for the Times since this has started. They have had four or five reporters there during all this time.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not the Times' policy generally, but just Szulc?

Ambassador BENNETT. I think Szulc has had a very biased approach.

NO COMPARISON TO CUBA

Senator MCCARTHY. You keep saying we do not want a Castro-like takeover. There is no real comparison between the kind of

Communist takeover you would have had in this takeover in the Dominican Republic, that had occurred in the Castro takeover in Cuba. I do not think the comparison can be made to stand up. The Castro takeover was different. He controlled the government. We helped put him over there in the government. He controlled the machinery of the government and then made the Communist switch.

In this case, you have an altogether different situation. I think you can talk about the possibility of a Communist takeover, but you ought not talk about a Castro-like takeover, because I see no similarity.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Except Castro has admitted he was a Communist since his youth.

Senator MCCARTHY. If you had said a Castro-dominated takeover, that is another thing.

Ambassador BENNETT. I think one of the criticisms of us was that we did not help these people into power.

Senator MCCARTHY. Which people?

Ambassador BENNETT. The rebel group.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not heard such a criticism.

Ambassador BENNETT. Some of the press has talked about it.

GEYELIN'S ARTICLE

The CHAIRMAN. This is the point of this Geyelin article. I know him slightly. The Wall Street Journal is considered a conservative, at least, as a conservative or middle-of-the-road paper. It is not a leftist organization, and I assume you know Geyelin better than I do.

Ambassador BENNETT. No. I had never met him before he came down.

The CHAIRMAN. Here are a few things he said that I wanted to base some questions on. He has studied it and reduced it to an article which was published on June 25.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes, sir; I have it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Here are a few items. He said:

By Sunday, April 25,

that is the day after the revolution started, and I quote from him,

just 1 day after the uprising got underway, while Washington remained openly confused and noncommittal, the Santo Domingo Embassy had clearly cast its lot with the loyalist military cabal and against the rebels' original aim.

Is that a true statement?

Ambassador BENNETT. I do not believe that is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. By Sunday. I thought it was consistent with what you said about your estimate of the Communist influence with the rebels.

Ambassador BENNETT. Well, the Communist influence was plainly there.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the real justification, which I assume you wish to establish, and you ought to do it as best you can, is that this basis for the intervention in a large way was justified and it really turns on this point, doesn't it, largely?

Ambassador BENNETT. Of course, landing of the Marines was, I repeat, for the purpose of saving lives.

The CHAIRMAN. I will come to that a little later.

Ambassador BENNETT. The later landings were clearly because of the other issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. But we thought——

The CHAIRMAN. You do not accept that, then, as accurate, but partially accurate?

Ambassador BENNETT. No. We were still working with both sides at that stage, and continued to do so.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉS

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I won't read it all, it is fairly long:

The Embassy nonetheless, Washington was advised the Embassy military attachés had given loyalist leaders a go-ahead to do everything possible to prevent what was described as the danger of a Communist takeover.

That is all under the item of Sunday.

Did the military leaders, attachés, do anything like that?

Ambassador BENNETT. I do not believe that is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you weren't there, but you would know.

Ambassador BENNETT. No, but I would know because we have a most harmonious country team.

The CHAIRMAN. Later on, the second or third one:

By midafternoon that same

this is skipping to Wednesday, the 27th, I believe,

By midafternoon that same decisive day, the Embassy officials were still against a troop landing.

This is mid-afternoon on Wednesday.

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

SENDING A HELICOPTER FOR BENOIT

The CHAIRMAN [reading].

Despite a formal request from the military junta chief, Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, for "unlimited" U.S. assistance, including the immediate landing of 1,200 U.S. Marines. That request, which said the revolt was of "authentic Communist stamp" and warned quite specifically of "another Cuba" was turned down. Curiously, U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., reportedly on Washington's instructions, sent a U.S. helicopter 16 miles that evening to fetch from Col. Benoit a slimmed down version of his original request. The new version talked only of preserving order and saving lives and was carefully stripped of any political motive or characterization of the rebels which might have invited controversy.

Is that a correct statement?

Ambassador BENNETT. That was still on the 28th, sir. Our concern was, as I have said, with saving lives. It was still to be hoped that the regular forces could contain the anarchy, and it became apparent the next day they were not able to, and then we did recommend a further landing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that you did send a helicopter 16 miles to fetch from Colonel Benoit a new version?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is true, sir. Maybe I ought to explain the situation there were respect to communications, which plagued us, I must say, for several weeks. There was no way to cross the downtown.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Ambassador BENNETT. I mean, in other words, there was no telephone service. The only way to communicate was to send an officer——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Ambassador BENNETT. Right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was out at the base?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes.

A NEW REQUEST IN WRITING

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite clear. The point about it is that he made this request, formal request, for 1,200 Marines, and he put as his basis an authentic Communist stamp and warned quite specifically of another Cuba. You did not agree with that, and you requested that he submit a new one, and you sent a helicopter to get that in writing; is that correct?

Ambassador BENNETT. That is right, sir, because he had——

The CHAIRMAN. And this was based on——

Ambassador BENNETT. Because we had had it by message from him earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. That was based on——

Ambassador BENNETT. I would hope any good diplomat would get it in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. You submitted that request in an urgent telegram on the evening of the 28th, was it, that is Wednesday, the 28th?

Ambassador BENNETT. I believe that is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. About 6 o'clock.

Ambassador BENNETT. With his message, you mean, for the Marines?

The CHAIRMAN. Asking for immediate intervention.

A TORTUOUS PATH WHOSE END WE CANNOT SEE

Ambassador BENNETT. No, sir. I would like to read this, because this was April 29, when it came in to the State Department at 3:54 in the morning, so it left me about 2 or 3 o'clock there. This is to distinguish the difference between the landing on the 28th, which was to save American lives. This was in connection with the possibility that Admiral Masterson would be arriving, and I thought it would be a mistake for him to come at that time. I said:

> The landing of Marines has had the restricted purpose of providing security for American citizens and arranging their evacuation. We have not, repeat not, taken a decision to intervene. I do not, repeat not, want to recommend intervention for any reason. It will take us down a tortuous path whose end we cannot see. However, I am quite prepared to recommend we intervene if a canvass of the situation later this morning shows the situation continuing to deteriorate.

It did continue to deteriorate, and I did so recommend later on the 29th, and I think those two landings are very different and distinct operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Then commenting on the reaction in Washington of your request on the 29th, he says:

> Aides insist he could not have done otherwise,

that is, the President,

once the Bennett cable was received. It works both ways, says one official. If you can argue that it provided the President with a handy excuse, you can also argue it left him no alternative.

And then over to the next, skipping a couple of paragraphs, it says:

A President can ignore such counsel but only at his political peril. For if a plea for help to save U.S. lives can be said to force a President's hand, so can an official judgment, from authorities on the spot, that a Communist takeover impends. The authorities may well be overly alarmed or simply wrong, but their opinion on the record makes it practically imperative for a U.S. President to assess the risk in a somewhat different way, on the chance that the warning may be right. This Cuban reflex, as strong in the President's office as it was in Santo Domingo, probably did more to shape official thinking in the prelanding date, in the opinion of many officials in a position to judge, than the advice of the more hardliners of his close counselors.

Do you have any comment on that statement?

UNANIMOUS JUDGMENT OF THE COUNTRY TEAM

Ambassador BENNETT. I would only say that it was the unanimous judgment of the country team and myself and, I believe, concurred in by nearly every diplomatic authority there, that intervention had become necessary, and I stand behind the recommendation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he says a little later, this is Geyelin, not me, saying it:

But a look at the chronology still leaves open the question of whether well before the landing the rebel movement might not have emerged on top free of a serious Communist taint, especially if it had received timely U.S. support.

I take it you would not agree with that.

Ambassador BENNETT. No, I would not. Senator, I would—timely support would have been intervention in the most flagrant way, it seems to me. Who are we to choose among them as to which one was the chosen force?

The CHAIRMAN. But in view of what you have already said——

Ambassador BENNETT. The only way to let them make up their mind is to give them a chance to vote, it seems to me. It is not up to us to set up one government or another.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not say it is. I am reporting what Mr. Geyelin said.

Ambassador BENNETT. I agree.

PLANS FOR AN ELECTION

Senator MCCARTHY. On that question of the voting, there was an election scheduled for September. Were there any plans in the Embassy with reference to that election?

Ambassador BENNETT. No plans.

Senator MCCARTHY. Did you anticipate it would have been held?

Ambassador BENNETT. I never heard of any indication that it would not be. There were many rumors.

Senator MCCARTHY. No American policy indications that they were not interested in having an election.

Ambassador BENNETT. We were in favor of elections, yes. In fact, I helped to get the date established.

The CHAIRMAN. It was planned. The Reid thing is what interfered with that.

Ambassador BENNETT. There were doubts about that, but there certainly were no plans to suggest a postponement.

Senator MUNDT. Let me follow up on that.

Ambassador BENNETT. I mean you can have a doubt as to whether it is a good thing.

Senator MCCARTHY. If you are going to have elections in September in the Dominician Republic, the Embassy would have plans——

Ambassador BENNETT. Sir, we were waiting until June.

Senator MCCARTHY. All right.

Ambassador BENNETT. It was to be a 3-month campaign. As Reid said when they hit him on it, he said, the British have elections in 4 weeks and the Americans take 3 months.

FREE OF COMMUNIST CONTROL

Senator MUNDT. I think you missed the point of the last statement the chairman made. He said this reporter said had we jumped in at that time on the side of the rebels, was that it, Bill—I think you read it on the side of the rebels.

Senator MCCARTHY. Timely support.

The CHAIRMAN. It says they might have emerged on top, free of serious Communist taint, especially if they had received timely U.S. support.

Senator MUNDT. If you agree with that, you negate everything you said up to now. You said from the beginning you were convinced that the Communists were in.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not agree with that.

Ambassador BENNETT. I did not agree.

Senator MUNDT. You were talking about elections. I want to know what you think about their being free of Communist control if we had let the rebels get in, because we have been led to believe from the beginning that the rebels were infiltrated with Communist influence, which increased as the moment continued.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is not saying that. That is the newspaper story.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, but he answered the question about the elections. I want to get his reaction, if we intervened we would have had an election free of Communist influence.

Ambassador BENNETT. I do not believe that myself.

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Bennett said he would have liked to have it worked out by voting instead of by timely intervention. At this time I asked what plans did we have about the voting, about the time during which elections would take place.

SOMETHING DRASTIC WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE

The CHAIRMAN. This is the last item:

> Unofficially the Embassy's attitude seemed to consist of a hope that the Wessin forces would prevail and a conviction if they did not, something drastic would have to be done.

Do you agree with that?

Ambassador BENNETT. This is from the outset?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador BENNETT. I do not agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. By Monday, I think it is.

Ambassador BENNETT. We had already, as you know, by Monday been trying, and on Sunday——

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. In this article he talks about local U.S. sympathies by that time being plainly with the military junta, and the forces under General Wessin's command which were beginning to shell and strafe rebel strong points, including the national palace. He said:

> U.S. policy officially was promotion of the cease-fire. Unofficially the Embassy's attitude seemed to consist of a hope that the Wessin forces would prevail, and the conviction if they did not something drastic would have to be done.

Ambassador BENNETT. We were still under instructions trying to get the two military sides together.

The CHAIRMAN. The Ambassador has an appointment at the White House in 10 minutes, which just gives him time to get there.

CUTTING THE DOMINICAN SUGAR QUOTA

Senator MCCARTHY. In your statement you made a point of the economic deterioration which was very clear earlier this year, and yet at the same time the State Department and the Department of Agriculture were cutting down by a formula they worked out the Dominican sugar quota to the United States by roughly 75,000 tons. Did they consult with you on that or did you make any representations to them that the loss of 75,000 tons of sugar in the American market would have serious effects on the economy, if not on the political situation in the Dominican Republic?

Ambassador BENNETT. Yes. I made various representations for as large as quota as possible for the Dominican Republic on the ground that it is the country most dependent on sugar, with just over 50 percent of its foreign exchange coming from it.

Senator MCCARTHY. Instead of using a 5-year average, which they could have used, or anything else, they developed a formula as a result of which the Dominicans received roughly 75,000 tons short of what they had hoped for.

Ambassador BENNETT. I was going to say I would not have felt they got less, they did not get as much as they wanted, but sugar, as you know, is a most complicated problem.

Senator MCCARTHY. They went to South Africa to buy it, and we do not really have a problem of supporting the Government of South Africa.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

[Whereupon, the committee adjourned at 4:55 p.m., to reconvene at 10 a.m., Monday, July 19, 1965.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MONDAY, JULY 19, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased to have Admiral Raborn this morning, Director of Central Intelligence. He is accompanied by Desmond FitzGerald, Deputy Director for Plans, E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., Office of Current Intelligence, and Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

Do you have a prepared statement?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to start with it?

Admiral RABORN. Thank you, sir.

It is a pleasure to appear before your committee, sir. I would like to read a short statement on the Dominican crisis.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM F. RABORN, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY DESMOND FITZGERALD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR., OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, AND LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL

Admiral RABORN. The coup which touched off the Dominican crisis stemmed from a build-up of unrest which had been carefully noted by the intelligence community for a period of months previously. The plot that erupted was but one of several and the exact timing of the outbreak was not fixed in the minds of the plotters and therefore, of course, was not precisely forecast by us. For example, as recently as April 12, the existence of a plot was reported [deleted] although the precise date when a coup would take place could not be pinpointed.

In any event, after further checking, the appropriate authorities were advised on April 17 that plans for an imminent coup were being made by elements of the military. As you know, the plotters actually made their move on Saturday, April 24. They probably acted on the spur of the moment when the Reid government issued

orders for the arrest of certain military officers plotting against the regime.

The very ugly turn which the coup took in its earliest hours could not have been accurately foreseen. The large-scale fighting, the collapse of public order, and the very rapid loss of control of the movement by those who started it—all these things were made possible when on Sunday and Monday, April 25 and 26, the military leaders of the coup threw open the government arsenals and began distributing arms in the street. This action was precipitated by their fear that the main elements of the armed forces of the Dominican Republic were about to move decisively against them.

U.S. APPREHENSION

This was the point at which all concerned in the U.S. Government became deeply apprehensive about the possible course of the coup. Now it could, and did, turn from a coup into a rebellion. At its worst point, the situation in Santo Domingo was anarchy. The public was being armed, mob action was uncontrolled, looting began, and there was indiscriminate firing in the streets.

The Agency had been following the activities of the Dominican Republic's three extremist parties with great care ever since wholesale expulsions of leftists of various descriptions had taken place in late 1962 and early 1963. Scores of these expellees had gone to Cuba, to China, and to various other bloc countries.

RETURN OF COMMUNIST LEADERS

For example, APCJ leaders Fidelio Despradel and Norge Botello received guerrilla training in Cuba in 1964. The APCJ is the 14th of June movement, which is the largest of the extremist parties and contains non-Communists as well as Communists. Luis Gomez Perez, a member of the PSPD central committee—the PSPD is the Moscow-line party—received training in Czechoslovakia in 1963. Another PSPD member, Antonio Isa Conde, attended a Communist indoctrination course in Moscow in 1964. PSPD leader Feliz Ducoudray has traveled to Communist China on two occasions, once in 1960 and again in 1964. APCJ member Rodrigo Lozada went to Communist China in late 1964, where he received a guerrilla training course. They had in many cases received training in subversion and other techniques, such as guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and communications.

Well before the coup occurred, we had already assembled dossiers on these individuals. In addition to those named above, the travels and activities of several dozen more of these leftists were documented. More importantly we were able to keep tabs on most of these people as they began returning to the Dominican Republic in late 1964 and early this year. Incidentally, all but a handful of these individuals so identified were later to be active in the rebellion. Most of those who were not were already in confinement.

President Reid Cabral was kept fully informed by the Ambassador and his country team on the return of these extremists and of their organizing activities after re-entering.

Now, I think the return of these people—and most of them came back to Santo Domingo where the principal political life of the

country is—constitutes another key element to understanding the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic.

A NEW BREED OF MEN

We knew that the leadership of the three extremist parties on the island—two of the parties confessedly Communist, and the other Communist-led and Cuban-inspired although containing many non-Communists—was now in the hands of a new breed of men, men trained in terrorist tactics in the bloc and Cuba. We knew that these Dominicans trained in Communist countries, even those who had not been particularly high in their parties before, would very quickly rise to the top. For most Latin Americans any degree of training in organized terrorist tactics automatically equips them to seize leadership of the mob should the occasion arise.

The situation, then, at the moment when the arms were handed out was one which lent itself to exploitation by the Communists, a classic opportunity. As we feared, they took full advantage of this chance. Communists succeeded in obtaining large quantities of the weapons distributed by the military plotters, set up their own distribution points, and controlled the issuance of their stocks. By no means were all of the several thousands of the people under arms in the rebel area Communists, but the party leaders saw to it that all the right people had guns. They rapidly made themselves indispensable by organizing the crowds who had joined the military members of the rebellion.

While the fighting was in progress—and there was much looting and destruction and settling of "old scores" in addition to fighting—Communist leaders were active on the political scene. As early as April 25, several leaders of two of the Communist parties were observed participating in the meetings at the national palace at which the first provisional rebel government was established. This government was by and large composed of members of the Bosch party, the PRD, the Dominican Revolutionary Party. But even then, one member of the APCJ, the largest of the three extremist parties and in Communist control, was appointed Deputy Director of Investigation—the Dominican security service. This was Alejandro Lajara Gonzalez, who had supplied arms to Communists during the revolt and had a record of arson.

COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE REBEL MOVEMENT

The vigor of the Communists' penetration of the rebel movement grew over the next 48 hours. By April 27 the PRD leaders began to leave the rebel area, many to take sanctuary in foreign embassies. These include the provisional president, Molina Urena, Jose Pena Gomez, and Antonio Martinez Francisco. Several of the original military coup leaders also quit at this time, including the leading military officer, Colonel Miguel Angel Hernando Ramirez, as well as Colonel Pedro August Alvarez Holquin and Captain Quiroz Diaz. Some of these defectors, notably Martinez Francisco, privately admitted their disgust with the growth of Communist influence in the movement and the loss of control by more moderate elements.

By April 28, the day the first Marine contingent landed, the rebel military leaders apparently only controlled a fraction of the total number of people in revolt. For the most part these remaining military officers had nothing to lose by staying with the rebels. Their careers were already jeopardized or their futures compromised. But, as I have said, even they did not control the crowds or mobs which were by then the main force of the rebellion. The principal inspiration and guidance the crowds received was coming from the bloc-trained leaders of the Dominican Communist parties.

SMALL NUMBER OF COMMUNISTS IDENTIFIED

There has been some criticism, particularly in the press, about the relatively small number of Communists identified as having taken part in the Dominican rebellion. Let me say now that I think any attempt to judge the seriousness of a revolutionary situation by adding up the number of Communists identified in it misses the point of the Communist threat in such situations. By skilled manipulation of propaganda, by assertion of leadership at critical points in the street fighting, by aggressive political activity, the Communists succeeded in discouraging the less extreme leaders of the revolt. The PRD leaders came to feel that their rebellion was now being converted into something not of their design and not of their liking.

A few score skilled people can do this in the proper circumstances, and there were the proper circumstances. Power over Santo Domingo was certainly well within the Communists' grasp. It is also well to remember that power in Santo Domingo has traditionally meant power over the whole country.

COMMUNISTS WENT UNDERGROUND

Where are the Communists now? Many of them are underground, many are still in the rebel held sector of the city. The current Caamano rebel cabinet has no members who are identified as Communists. The reasons for this are two-fold: One, after the U.S. troops landed, the situation stabilized somewhat and many of the PRD, Bosch's party, leaders returned to the rebel zone; two, the rebels themselves, who were anxious to gain recognition by other countries, adopted a "clean hands" non-Communist post. Thus Communists are not prominent in public political positions, but they do still control a great majority of the commandos into which the rebel military is organized. They are also active politically behind the scenes bringing their influence to bear on Caamano and company.

Difficulties with Communists in the Dominican Republic are not over. Many remain in the rebel area and many others who have gone underground have infiltrated into interior cities with their arms, where they will probably await new opportunities to exploit disorders and to join other dissident elements to make trouble for the government.

WEAK GOVERNMENTS INVITE UNREST

The great danger in Latin America is the weakness of governments, which invites unrest, dissidence, and potentially the col-

lapse of law and order, leading to chaos. Communists, by relying on their superior organizational skills, work for and take advantage of these conditions. The U.S. opposes this by striving in every way for the orderly transition to more democratic and liberal forms of government which will destroy the breeding ground of communism.

I have brought with me some documents which will indicate to you gentlemen the manner in which we attempt to keep ourselves alert to other dangers, and the manner in which we advise the senior officials of our government of possible trouble spots. There is little doubt that, in the right combination of circumstances, the tragic developments that occurred in the Dominican Republic could transpire in a number of other Latin American countries.

Mr. Chairman, if it please the Chair, this draft was made for me to bring to this meeting. It is not, sir, to be released because it has not yet been sanitized, although it is not stamped "classified".

The CHAIRMAN. We won't release it unless you want to release it yourself.

Admiral RABORN. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This whole record is executive and the committee understands this.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And not to be released, so far as I am concerned, in the foreseeable future at all.

Admiral RABORN. We would like the privilege of sanitizing it.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is by any chance, if anything develops and you want to do it, you certainly will have that opportunity. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Since we have such a good attendance perhaps we had better proceed under the 10-minute rule until everybody has a chance. Then it will be opened in the usual fashion.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES DURING TRUJILLO ERA

I have just a few to start with and then I will return to it later, Admiral, [deleted].

How would you compare the scale of Communist activities and inactivities in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo that is, pre-1961?

Admiral RABORN. There was very little in pre-1961, sir, because of the ruthless methods which he took to keep opposition down. When he wanted to rig an election, he did invite back a party, and I can briefly run through that if you would like.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral RABORN. Late in 1946, exile Communist leaders returned to the Dominican Republic at the invitation of General Trujillo, who was preparing what he called an "election" which would permit him once again to become chief executive. The Communists supposedly were to be allowed freedom of operation while Trujillo's government could take credit for furthering democracy by allowing opposition groups to take part in the life of the nation. The Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD, currently active in the rebellion, was legally established as the official Communist party at that time in the country and began holding public campaign meetings. This recognition scheme, which was to become a favorite Tru-

jillo maneuver, was short-lived. The PSPD was suppressed shortly before the 1947 elections and its principal leaders were put in jail and then exiled.

The CHAIRMAN. Under Balaguer was there any increase in the Communist activity?

Admiral RABORN. They began to drift back into the Dominican Republic under Balaguer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In Balaguer's council of state were there any Communists that you know of?

Admiral RABORN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That council included both Imbert and Reid, did it not, under Balaguer?

Admiral RABORN. Yes.

INCREASE IN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Under Bosch in 1962 and 1963—I believe, 1963, Bosch was in—was there any noticeable increase in the Communists?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, there were.

The CHAIRMAN. And under Reid?

Admiral RABORN. A slight extent. It was a slight extent, but importantly I think we should mention under Reid Cabral that some of those well-trained Communists had infiltrated, came back from abroad.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. No questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

LOCATING ARMS CACHES IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a report, how true it is, I don't know—I say a report, there is a rumor, I think that is probably the better description, that some 90 truckloads of arms and ammunition left Santo Domingo in the early days of the revolution, and went out into the country.

Now, the 90, there is no magic about that particularly but that was the figure that was given to me that approximately 90 trucks were observed going out with ammunition, and that they disappeared into the countryside. I am just wondering what we know about that.

[Deleted.]

MOBILITY OF THE JUNTA FORCES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have the so-called junta forces or those opposed to this revolutionary group which is infiltrated with Communists, do they have access to travel? Are they going out around and about the country, outside the so-called neutral zone, the zone of occupation?

Admiral RABORN. Oh, yes, sir, the interior of the country north of the neutral zone is nominally under control of the junta and the police, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have they seized any of these arms that left the arsenals and went out into the country?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, they have.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have they seized them in any significant quantities, that is, so that one might believe that they were locating and taking charge of a lot of this armament that might feed another revolution someplace?

Admiral RABORN. They are quite sensitive to the fact that these present a menace to their operations [deleted].

There have been, for instance, as high as 20 rifles have been recovered, small arms, similar amounts of small arms. This is relatively small, we believe, in amount to have been recovered.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have they smuggled out of Santo Domingo or out of the arsenals any heavy weapons such as 50-caliber machineguns and bazookas and any field pieces of any kind?

Admiral RABORN. Fifty-caliber machineguns, sir. We think maybe a few recoilless rifles. We know of nothing heavier than that.

COORDINATION OF THE REBEL GROUPS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there evidence at this time of the coordination of the rebel groups outside the Dominican Republic, that is, any concentrations or anything of that kind in areas outside of the so-called occupied zone in the city of Santo Domingo, further out in the country?

Admiral RABORN. You mean in the Dominican Republic?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the Dominican Republic, yes.

Admiral RABORN. The coordination is sporadic. There are those hotheads, so-called hotheads, and people who could easily be aroused, who are stirring up trouble from time to time with minor attacks on local police posts which have been unilaterally successful in repulsing these attacks.

There have been some few killings as a result of this, but by and large the populace has been fairly restrained in their actions because of the fact that they are being fed fairly well and being paid fairly well. Only in one or two cases, such as La Romana, the sugar mill there, have the Communists inspired a labor strike, continued, and become troublesome to any great extent.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, with regard to travel back and forth between the Dominican Republic and certain other countries, it seems I saw the paper yesterday some—this is a news story, I don't think it is an entirely official stamp—that Venezuelans are becoming a little less concerned for some reason, that is, they are not quite so militant against subversive activities. In other words, they are softening down just a little bit in Venezuela. There seems to be a tendency to veer away, to some extent anyway, to the enthusiastic attitude of support for the United States.

I put that rather crudely. That wasn't exactly what the story said.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. I have the gist of your question, sir, and our information indicates that they are now swinging back into more favorable support of the United States.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does there seem to be any support, active support, coming for the rebel movement from other countries than Cuba, perhaps; that is, Colombia, Central American countries such as Honduras?

Admiral RABORN. No active support, sir.

TROUBLE IN HAITI

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was also a story about Haiti asking for assistance from us or somebody alleging a Communist coup is on the way there. Anything in Haiti wouldn't surprise me. But what can you tell me about the foment in Haiti, if there is any?

Admiral RABORN. There is continual foment there because the dictator of the country, Duvalier, has a very tight clamp on the populace, and there are some dissident elements, including some known Communists. The situation is such that almost anything can happen there at any time. There are many exiles from Haiti who are in the Dominican Republic who took part in the first rebellion. They left Haiti.

A recent report of assistance which you mentioned, sir, was just one of the many which Duvalier had felt his situation to be so tenuous that he is nervous about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. These expatriates or those who have been exiled from Haiti in general, I suppose there are all kinds of people, but in general, are they Communist-inspired, inclined, or are they what one might call genuine patriots against the dictatorship?

Admiral RABORN. I think there are all kinds, sir, but the large majority are not Communists from our point of view. There are one or two that we know of that are hardline Communists, one Frenchman. But it has been said, and I think rather accurately, that a force of 100 well-trained Communists, terrorist type and well-armed, could put the country under control in 24 hours.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there has been proof that can be done in many places.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

AN ALLIANCE OF LEFT-WING PARTIES

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Raborn, do you have information showing whether or not an understanding was reached among the several left-wing parties and Bosch about a course of conduct to be followed in the Dominican Republic? I now speak of an alliance that was planned and agreed upon. If you have any such information, will you give us the details of it?

Admiral RABORN. Thank you, Senator. I will be pleased to, sir. May I say in the beginning this is a complex subject.

Obviously the Bosch forces and the Communists have been able to sort of establish a de facto alliance since the beginning of the insurrection. However, the question of whether there was a formal

alliance or a pact agreed on before the insurrection began is one on which there is conflicting evidence.

Last January, Bosch's PRD did sign a formal pact with the extremist faction of the Revolutionary Social Christian Party, PRSC, the Pact of Rio Piedras, signed in Puerto Rico.

The extremist wing of the Social Christians is almost as far left as the Communist parties. This pact, as it was published, did not include any other group but the two parties mentioned. In the pact the two parties agreed to form a united front to secure the reestablishment of a constitutional government in the Dominican Republic.

CREATION OF THE PACT

However, we do know from [deleted] that the 14th of June group, APCJ, was discussed at the meetings that led to the pact. The PRSC leaders present—or at least one of them, Caonabo Javier Castillo—pressed for the formal inclusion of the APCJ in the past. Bosch, however, according to our best information, resisted having the APCJ formally included in the alliance. He is known to feel, however, that many non-Communists are members of the APCJ and seems to overlook the fact that the APCJ has fallen under Communist domination.

During the discussions with the PRSC leaders in Puerto Rico, Bosch [deleted] stated that he would have no objection if members of the APCJ joined the PRD or if the party supported the PRD. He is said to have stated that it would have to be a unilateral arrangement and the PRD would come to no formal understanding with the APCJ.

Whether or not there was at any time an informal agreement between the signatories of the Pact of Rio Piedras and the APCJ is still a matter of contention. Javier Castillo stated in May 1965 that the APCJ was a member of the pact. This may or may not be true, but we have no further supporting evidence.

There is no hard evidence that the other Communist parties, the Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD, and the Dominican Popular Movement, MPD, were brought into the pact at any time. We do know, however, that both these Communist groups saw, for their own purposes, a good opportunity to exploit the political situation in the Dominican Republic by allying themselves with the non-Communist revolutionaries, the PRD and the PRSC.

Regardless of the existence of a formal pact, the Dominican political community is such that plots and counter-plots are pretty well known to most of the principal political leaders. Moreover, given Bosch's numerous contracts on the left, there were plenty of means available to him to keep channels open to any or all of the Communist parties if he so wished.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do I understand you to say that Bosch was urged to accept this June 14th group but he declined except that he took the position that they could participate?

Admiral RABORN. Not formally, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. There was no formal acceptance.

Admiral RABORN. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the Peking-oriented party?

Admiral RABORN. He had no discussions with them, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. What about the Moscow-oriented group?
Admiral RABORN. He had no discussions with them.
Senator LAUSCHE. That is as far as you know?
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. At this pact meeting.
Senator LAUSCHE. At this pact meeting?
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. What occurred subsequently, if anything, to bring the April 14 Moscow and the Peking oriented movements into the operation?
Admiral RABORN. I think principally that the leaders of these three principal Communist organizations, sir, knowing each other and knowing of their common aims, joined because they were stronger together than working separately.
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPONS

Now, in the distribution of the weapons, were they distributed to individuals, one weapon to an individual, or were they distributed in bulk to different units?
Admiral RABORN. They did both. But those in charge of distribution, sir—and we can give you names and places and times, if you wish—saw to it that the ones that they could trust got their weapons first, we will say.
Senator LAUSCHE. Does your proof contain names and places and times of where the weapons were distributed?
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. By whom distributed?
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. And to whom?
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. What does that proof show with regard to special efforts being made to distribute the weapons to the Communists?
Admiral RABORN. Eyewitnesses at the scene at the time.
Senator LAUSCHE. And you do have that proof and that is your conclusion that the objective was to see that the weapons got into the hands of the Communists?
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. You have been pointing out to him, does he have the specific proof on that? How lengthy are your tables, they are available, quite lengthy, but they are available to show who was in charge of distributing, to whom they were given, where, and in what quantities?
Were they given in automobile loads or truckloads or——
Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. They were at times, because they threw open the arsenals of one of the army posts and started to distribute them.

WEAPONS ENTERING HAITI

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have any proof indicating that some of these weapons may now have entered Haiti or are available in the Dominican Republic to be used in Haiti?

Admiral RABORN. It is quite possible that there are some cached away in the mountains which could later be used in Haiti.

Senator LAUSCHE. I read somewhere they were moved toward the Haitian border.

Admiral RABORN. They were moved, we know of one or two instances that they were moved to the interior of the Dominican Republic which, of course, borders on Haiti, but the access from over the mountains that separates the two countries is very tenuous and very tortuous and very difficult, and we have no record or any information of any of these arms reaching Haiti itself.

TRAINED COMMUNISTS IN THE MOLINA GOVERNMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. In your paper you identified a number of individuals who either went to Cuba or to Moscow or to Peking to receive training in Communist activities.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you able to say whether they went to these places for training to be exercised in the Dominican Republic or in other countries?

Admiral RABORN. We believe in both cases. Primarily, however, these were those who had been expelled and exiled from the Dominican Republic, and we expected that their principal reasons for going and getting the training was to return to the Dominican Republic, which they did.

Senator LAUSCHE. And they did return?

Admiral RABORN. They did, yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, after the revolt, the junta and then the revolt, was there one of these trained men placed into the post of investigation? I think you said in your paper that one of them was given the important post of investigation.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, I did, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Which one was that?

Admiral RABORN. Luis Homera Lajara Burges. The government formed by Molina included Luis Homera Lajara Burges, reported to be an underground member or associate of the PSPD.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was that a significant post or not?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. He was the Director of the National Department of Investigations, the security service.

Senator LAUSCHE. And do you know what the functions would have been—just let me finish this thought—what would his functions have been, investigating what?

Admiral RABORN. Security services are similar to the FBI, sir, and CIA combined.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

COMMUNISTS IN CONFINEMENT

Senator AIKEN. Admiral Raborn, on page 4 you referred to the Communists who had been trained outside the country returning to the Dominican Republic in late 1964 and early 1965. Then you say, "Incidentally, all but a handful so identified were later to be active in the rebellion. Most of those who were not were already in confinement."

Are there any Communists in confinement in the Dominican Republic now?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. In whose custody? Who is confining them?

Admiral RABORN. Principally in the junta's side, sir.

Senator AIKEN. On the junta side. Who is operating the jails throughout the Dominican Republic today?

Admiral RABORN. The police under, supported by, the military on the junta side.

On the rebel side, sir, the jails are operated by the Caamano government, but there is a shadow government behind him which is the real power, and those are headed by the hardcore Communist leaders of the three Communist parties.

Senator AIKEN. You mean they are running the jails, too?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Why do they keep Communists in confinement in jails?

Admiral RABORN. Excuse me, sir, they are running the jails, I didn't intend to imply there were Communists in the jails, but people they wished to jail.

Senator AIKEN. But there still are some Communists in confinement?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, on the junta side.

Senator AIKEN. And they are outside of the rebel territory?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

HERNANDO RAMIREZ

Senator AIKEN. I notice you refer to the original military coup leaders who quite apparently got disgusted. You mentioned one Miguel Angel Hernando Ramirez. Does he have any connection with General Ramirez who, I believe, was in the Dominican Congress and also became a member of the Reid cabinet?

Admiral RABORN. We don't know, sir. We can supply that for the record. I don't have it here.[1]

CONTROL OF SMALL ARMS MANUFACTURING

Senator AIKEN. The other thing is, who controls the small arms manufacturing plant of the government now?

Admiral RABORN. It is in the junta area.

Senator AIKEN. Is it still operating? If so, for whom?

Admiral RABORN. We have no information that it is actually turning out new arms, sir.

Senator AIKEN. However, it has turned out virtually all the small arms which the Dominican Republic has required now for many years since Trujillo's day.

Admiral RABORN. I believe so, sir.

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[1] The CIA later reported that a thorough search of its biographical files revealed no evidence of any relationship between Colonel Miguel Angel Hernando Ramirez and General Miguel Angel Ramirez Alcantara, although it was possible that some distant relationship existed. "If so, it would be on Colonel Hernando's maternal side since General Ramirez is not related to the Hernando family."

WILLIAM WIELAND RETURNED TO DUTY

Senator AIKEN. I noticed that in the paper this morning a member of the State Department, William Wieland, has been returned to full duty and with full honors. He used to have the Caribbean area under his jurisdiction.

Was the CIA consulted in reference to his being restored to full duty with full honors?

Admiral RABORN. They were consulted, I believe, sir, during the investigative procedures that preceded that.

Senator AIKEN. I won't go into that any further.

COMMUNISTS' ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS

One more question, you say at the bottom of page 11, "Communists, by relying on their superior organization skills, would take advantage of these conditions."

How come the Communists have such superior organizational skills? Aren't we competent to meet them in that field or what is the reason they are so much superior to us in organization?

Admiral RABORN. We did not mean to imply, here, sir, that they are superior to us in doing this.

As a matter of fact, I can say to you, sir, that this country has been quite successful in certain parts of the world in doing the same thing.

Senator AIKEN. They have been pretty good organizers, though.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, and we have trained indigenous troops in various parts of the world to fight the Communists very much like the Vietcong.

Senator AIKEN. You are taking that phase of the war into full consideration, that we need organizational skills, too. And superior, as you say here, superior organizational skills.

I won't use any more of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator AIKEN. It would be interesting to know what is happening to the arsenal, the manufacturing plant.[2]

SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the sensitivity of this information being given this morning. I would hope that not only the members of the committee—I know they will—but also the staff realize just how sensitive this information is. I say that based on the most unfortunate occurrence with respect to this agency back in 1954.

I would hope that the information that has been given here is not passed on in any way to people who are writing about it and

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[2]The CIA later supplied the following information: "The San Cristobal Arms and Ammunition Factory, which is just outside of Santo Domingo, was established by Trujillo and is presently under the control of General Imbert's government. As of February 1965, the factory was reportedly in operation and producing .38-caliber revolvers and an undetermined amount of ammunition. The rebel leaders of July 15, charged that it was being dismantled and that the three colonels in charge were selling its machinery at scandalous prices for personal gain. The broadcast said that all work at the armory had been suspended and all workers fired. At the present time the Central Intelligence Agency has no information that the above accusations are true."

talking about it on television. I say that after the rather astonishing testimony given by Ambassador Bennett in this connection.

Admiral, we welcome you back to the Government. Nobody ever did a finer job than you did on this Polaris so every American can sleep more comfortably and for which you were responsible. In taking this job you have two strikes against you, and especially because you left the Polaris job because of health. First, you represent a military man, and second, you represent an agency that can't defend itself. Therefore, you can be attacked. However, you had ten strikes against you on the Polaris, so you can start this one with two strikes against you.

IDENTIFYING THE COMMUNISTS

You mentioned the question of identifying these Communists. That is in your statement, which I have read. How are you able to identify them so quickly and sort them out in these parties?

Admiral RABORN. First, sir, these names are not news to us. I have a list here of some 51; all but about six or seven of these actually have been seen [deleted], participating in the rebellion. We have been following very closely.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many of the 51 actually seen?

Admiral RABORN. All but about six or seven.

We have been following very closely the activities of the Communists in the Dominican Republic ever since the assassination of Trujillo in 1961. We observed and reported the identities of the Communists and associated extremists who came into the open and operated fairly freely during the seven months Bosch was in power.

After Bosch was overthrown in September 1963, many of these people went underground, only to appear again in the abortive guerrilla uprising in November and December of that year. At least 50 of the Communists and allied extremists were then deported, mostly to Western Europe.

[Deleted.]

Beginning last autumn we noted that some of these people were beginning to clandestinely reenter the Dominican Republic. They returned in ever greater numbers. Some were caught, but many were not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is this in October?

Admiral RABORN. Last autumn, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

WARNING TO THE REID GOVERNMENT

Admiral RABORN. Our warnings to the Reid government were not sufficient, apparently, for him to get the situation under control and to at least control the influx of these extremists. We have some, as I said before, some 51 here. We have actually identified over, I think it is [deleted]-plus that have come to light over the long term, but we have dossiers or complete dossiers or relatively complete dossiers on these as well as other Communists throughout the world. We are making an effort, Senator, to improve and increase our information on Communists, hardcore Communists, because we recognize this as a continuing responsibility, one of our continuing responsibilities [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, do I have any more time?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask this question: in listening to Secretary Mann and Ambassador Bennett, and also Secretary Vance to a lesser extent, the whole question seemed to be so sympathetic with Bosch, people felt that the situation was not as serious as it had been developed. The defense is made to the American people as a result of the attacks in these newspapers and television. Ambassador Bennett volunteered that some of the criticism—he mentioned several correspondents—had been that we hadn't done it soon enough, so I was just wondering when you made your report.

By the way, to whom do you report personally?

Admiral RABORN. I report personally to the President of the United States, I myself, as an individual.

Senator SYMINGTON. Your don't make policy in any sense, do you?

Admiral RABORN. No, sir, I certainly don't.

Senator SYMINGTON. Give information that you get to the best of your ability and grade that from the standpoint of hard and soft?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, inasmuch as very possibly the mood of Ambassador Bennett or the suggestions which were accepted here by Secretary Mann, and, of course, then put into action by the President, was the result of information which had been furnished by your agents, would you expand a little bit how you felt. You have done a good job in your statement on that, I thought, but is there any additional information as to why you felt the situation was falling apart and falling into the hands of the Communists that you would like to develop for the record?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. I will be pleased to, sir.

May I mention that I have here a secret document which is titled "Communism in the Dominican Republic" which sketches the history of that in general terms, yet informatively. It goes into the three Communist-dominated parties, giving names and so forth as to their—what they do.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that prepared?

Admiral RABORN. This was prepared, sir, for my information.

The CHAIRMAN. For this meeting?

Admiral RABORN. I think—yes, although we have had the basic documents. I just hadn't put it together in one sheet. We have a continuing history of the Communist movements in every country, and I had this put in one document.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why don't you file that for the record, and I would just like to ask one other question.

COMMUNIST TERRORISM IN SOUTH AMERICA

We might get, as I get your testimony and that of the previous witnesses, we might as well get used to this type and character of

occurrence being possible, and perhaps even probable, in the future in Central and South America, based on the testimony of Secretary Mann in that the same type and character of the situation is also characteristic of, I think, at least four countries that were mentioned by the Secretary where the same type and character of Communist terrorism could develop in Central and South America.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral RABORN. I certainly do. The agency prepared under date of May 20, 1965 a classified secret document labeled "The Instability of Latin America." It is most informative. I asked them to group the countries into two different listings, one group of which the possibility that a coup could come quickly and with little or no prior warning, and there were 12 countries in that category. We grouped the remainder then, which were more firmly controlled by conservative elements or, in the case of Cuba and Paraguay, were subject to totalitarian controls.

If you would be interested I will be pleased to read briefly the names of those two groups.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Can he file it for the committee record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

POSSIBILITIES OF COUPS ELSEWHERE

Senator MORSE. It is a very important document.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him read it.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask unanimous consent, I thought the distinguished Senator from Oregon stated to incorporate it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Admiral, and read the countries you started to read.

Admiral RABORN. [Deleted.]

It is in the first column, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

COMMUNIST TRAINING IN CUBA

Senator MUNDT. On page 3 where you talk about these various leaders from the Dominican Republic who had been trained in Cuba, what can you tell the committee about what the CIA knows about the kind of training that they get in Cuba, where they get it, how it is provided, and where it takes place, the nature of the training?

[Deleted.]

Admiral RABORN. I can provide that detail for the record, sir. We have information on the nature and type of training they receive, and in some cases the places, the training camps. All I can say at the moment, sir, is that we have on the list of 51 Communists here, we have an abbreviated record of their activities. We have here in these boxes more complete dossiers on the individuals concerned.

We are familiar with the rather standardized type of guerrilla training given to terrorists or would-be terrorists, and these involve, of course, mob organizational methods, preparation and distribution of inflammatory leaflets, the use of weapons of various kinds depending on the degree of sophistication with which you

wish to train the person, the knowledge of how to make and to teach other people to make Molotov type cocktails. It involves house to house street training of rooftop fighting. It involves stealth, striking by surprise. It involves collaborative training of how to obtain the collaboration of the indigenous people in some cases. It is very complex depending upon the nature of the country in which they are to operate.

We have learned, for instance, a great deal about the nature of the training given the Vietcong in South Vietnam. We have overrun some of their training camps, got their literature, and it follows a classic pattern, but particularly adapted to the country in which it is to be used.

[Deleted.]

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I was wondering if you could give us a real detailed report so we could have it in mind, so we could study and become familiar with it as to just what does take place over there, where it takes place, how long it is, the various points of emphasis they make, because I gather from your earlier statements in your report they do something besides training them in terrorist tactics. They train some pretty sophisticated guys who know a lot more than just how to bomb an Embassy or how to shoot from a tree and stuff like that. They have a pretty sophisticated program, I believe.

Admiral RABORN. That is correct, sir. They have various degrees of training to suit the mentality of the person concerned. But those who are leaders or could be developed into leaders, they do give them organizational facilities——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean they establish an Amidon plan of education?

Admiral RABORN. We will be pleased to file with the committee a typical training course, if you wish, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I wish you would.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted].

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator MUNDT. You told Senator Symington that you do not make recommendations based on your findings. Instead, your work is to make a report as to what you see and evaluate it as to its probable accuracy.

Now, do you go beyond that at least to the point of making recommendations? Obviously you don't make the policy, but as the people in the field do you recommend to the President, or to whomever you report, that you think, "You ought to have a little change in your sugar buying program because of the economic situation. We ought to have a couple of battleships close by to see the strength of the U.S." Do you make any of these recommendations or do you say, "Here are the conditions, take them and do what you will."

Admiral RABORN. As a general rule, sir, we do not make recommendations that border on policy. We do recommend specific programs to carry out our intelligence services and responsibilities of the intelligence services, such as types and kinds of surveillance equipment which have to be placed in various parts of the world,

programs to infiltrate other unfriendly countries, programs to protect indigenous natives in various parts of the world who are threatened by Communist aggression, realizing at the same time these are the same kind of guerrilla tactics which have been so successful. We have those kinds of programs which are prepared and recommended to the President for his approval and which——

SPONSORING COUNTERMEASURES

Senator MUNDT. Apparently, it seems to me, stiffening your muscle and making you more effective in your assigned mission which is to infiltrate, get all the intelligence you can, and bring it in and do a more effective job. I take it when you train Americans, infiltrators, they operate under a pretty stiff set of wraps as compared to Communist infiltrators. Ours is to get information rather than to start a revolution or get command of a revolutionary movement, to be the head of a dissident group; am I right in that?

Admiral RABORN. I think basically you are correct, sir. Although if the situation would indicate that other actions were required we certainly, with the approval of the President, the State Department, and so on, have taken actions to resist the encroachments of communism or Communists into various movements, labor movement, for instance, and things of that kind, and we sponsor and help countermeasures in the local people concerned. This is a very good way to accomplish a very desirable end with a minimum effort.

Senator MUNDT. Right.

U.S. TRAINING CAMPS

But you do not make—let me just put a mild challenge to one statement you made. "The United States opposes this by striving in every way," this I deny because I don't believe we have set up these training camps and training facilities for our friends in foreign countries that they have here. Aiken talks about the Karl Mundt school, but the general concept of the Freedom Academy that a couple of dozen Senators are trying to promote—I was just asking whether we could get recommendations in the name of Admiral Raborn to make recommendations along this line. It seems to me this is a big weakness in our operations. We have no place here where we give the kind of training to our guys that they give—sometimes our guys that we infiltrate—but primarily to their guys. I think when you say "in every way" there ought to be an asterisk, footnote: except in the most important one of political warfare.

Admiral RABORN. Let me say, sir, categorically, this is not the case. We have these training camps.

Senator MUNDT. Will you tell us about them?

Admiral RABORN. They are very sensitive operations, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I know they are, they are so sensitive we can't find out about them. If they are going on they are not only sensitive but very elusive, but we have been trying to find out from the Pentagon, the State Department, and now from the CIA.

May I inquire in which appropriation do they come? I belong to the committee, I think maybe I can find out there.

Admiral RABORN. May I say, sir, we have very adequate and well-established and very successful training facilities for this kind of work.

Senator MUNDT. What kind of work?

Admiral RABORN. The kind that you are referring to, sir, guerrilla activities.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I know we have guerrilla activities. I am talking aobut political warfare.

Admiral RABORN. Political action?

Senator MUNDT. That is correct.

Admiral RABORN. This is an element of a school which we operate.

Senator AIKEN. You don't publish the names of your graduates, however.

Admiral RABORN. No, sir. We don't hold commencement exercises either.

Senator MUNDT. This will help, this will be my final question.

Admiral RABORN. But I will say, I am not meaning to imply, sir, that it would meet your standards of size or scope.

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

Senator MUNDT. I certainly don't want to condemn something I can't find and I can't learn about, but is there a place, Admiral Raborn, where a young Korean who was in my office a year ago asking where he could go to learn how to make democracy work effectively could call you and you could say, "Send him into my camp. I can't tell you where it is, Senator, but I have a camp." I will call you, and you will send him there. Is there such a place?

Admiral RABORN. There is such a place which depending on the type of effort he wishes to make for it to make the world safe for democracy.

Senator MUNDT. He wants to work in his government as a peaceful civil servant, not a guerrilla.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then he is not a subversive himself.

Senator MUNDT. He wants to make the world more effective.

Admiral RABORN. I would recommend he try the Peace Corps. They are very effective.

Senator MUNDT. The what?

Admiral RABORN. The Peace Corps.

Senator MUNDT. He came to me because they weren't doing the job. He wanted something better.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

CHANNELS OF INTELLIGENCE

Senator CLARK. Admiral, when did you take over as the head of the CIA?

Admiral RABORN. Wednesday, 28th of May, 1965.

Senator CLARK. 28th of May?

Admiral RABORN. 28th of April.

Senator CLARK. That was right in the middle of this mess, wasn't it?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. When you took over, what were the channels which you found through which intelligence information came to you? How did the raw intelligence get to you administratively from the Dominican Republic?

Admiral RABORN. It came on the cables and radio directly to our Agency.

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. There was and is.

DOMINICAN TASK FORCE

We have a Dominican task force set up, consisting of personnel who are skilled in working in Latin American affairs, and particularly in the Dominican Republic that over a period of years, and they analyze the news that comes in, the reports that come in, and render their judgment as to the validity of the news and give their opinions as to what the significance of it was.

Senator CLARK. In other words, they evaluate it?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. And that evaluation comes to you personally?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Does the raw intelligence also come to you or do you get the evaluated form?

Admiral RABORN. I get it both ways.

Senator CLARK. I assume you would want on occasion to see the raw intelligence?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, I get the original cables as well as the evaluation, sir.

Senator CLARK. And it is part of your job to read them personally?

Admiral RABORN. I do where I feel——

Senator CLARK. Where you think it is desirable?

Admiral RABORN. Think it is desirable, yes.

Senator CLARK. Would it be fair to say you get this evaluated summary of this intelligence, and then if you have any questions in your mind ask for the actual cable?

Admiral RABORN. As a general rule, but not in cases of great urgency as the Dominican Republic. I read both. We summarize it at the end of the day in various report forms, as you know, sir, and during the day in the Dominican Republic situation in the early days of it we rendered evaluated hourly reports to the President and other members of his administration.

AGENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CLARK. [Deleted.]

You also get for your evaluating Dominican Republic team the messages sent by the Ambassador, do you not?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. And you also get separate messages prepared and sent by the military, Naval and Air attachés, or are they all consolidated at the Embassy before they come to you?

Admiral RABORN. In the Dominican Republic situation the military messages were sent by separate communication channels, but I receive them also.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE

Senator CLARK. So that in terms of evaluating for your reports to the President, the intelligence which comes to you from the Dominican Republic, would it be correct to say that you get, [deleted]; two, reports from the Ambassador and his political assistant; three, reports from the military attaché; and four, from the Naval attaché; five, from the Air Force attaché, and that these are the principal sources on which you base your evaluation of intelligence.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. But they all come out—other than the separate military forces which were in the area, and which had their own obvious channels of communications, [deleted] of the country team, and that includes the Ambassador, the military attachés, [deleted] those all came to me under the heading from the Ambassador.

Senator CLARK. But not separately evaluated by him.

Admiral RABORN. I don't know about the separate evaluations. I assume, I am sure that he saw them. Obviously in a situation which resembles in a way a tactical situation on a battlefield, there could be some messages which responsible people in the Embassy would send without the prior clearance or approval of the Ambassador. Here I am just conjecturing, but I do know that the messages that we did get from the Embassy were sent by responsible people.

CONFLICT OF OPINION

Senator CLARK. The reason I ask, Admiral, is because as a result of this inquiry to date, there is some confusion as to who thought what down there. Certainly before the Ambassador got back and possibly after he returned, there was some conflict or opinion as to whether we were supporting the junta, whether we were neutral. Presumably the individuals who were the military, Naval and Air attachés down there would have a slightly different point of view, or might have a slightly different point of view, from the civilians in the Embassy. That is why I am trying to develop, how you get this.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Your time is up.

Senator McCarthy?

INDIFFERENCE OF THE MILITARY

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I read Admiral Raborn's testimony. They seem surprised that the regular military people didn't respond. Was there any reason to expect that they should have responded differently? Evidently the junta wasn't very well organized, and you said then it got into the streets and regular military people—one of the reasons you said that the people handling the coup began to pass out guns was that they were afraid the regular military were going to take action.

Shouldn't they have anticipated that the regular military would take action against them? What was the inside of that? Why were the regular military so indifferent all the way through? And did the people in the coup suddenly, it seems, begin to fear that the

regular military would become active? It seems to me they would have anticipated that in the beginning.

Admiral RABORN. It was anticipated, I believe, on the part of the rebels, that the military would become active. As a matter of fact, we have a report [deleted] which showed and clearly indicates that the speed with which arms were passed out was to arm the mobs in order to obtain opposing force to the military, and to move before the so-called service chiefs could act in concert to put down the rebellion.

Also, we know that when the military started to move—Wessin y Wessin, for instance, he started to move his tanks from the San Isidro area across the Duarte Bridge—that many of those in rebellion became extremely discouraged and sought asylum, figuring that their cause was lost. When General Wessin stopped at the western end of the Duarte Bridge because, it has been reliably reported, he has no guts, those in charge of the rebellion again took heart and renewed their fighting with renewed hope. Some came out of asylum to again join the rebellion, the rebels.

ANTICIPATING A MILITARY MOVE

Senator MCCARTHY. I think it was a question of timing here and the distribution of arms. It seemed to me that the men who led the coup would have anticipated that the regular military would have moved massively against them. As I read this, it sounds as though this action was precipitated by the fear that the main elements of the armed forces were about to move decisively against them, so this was kind of an afterthought to them. They didn't expect the main body was going to act, and then something happened that they were afraid the main body was going to act. There is a question of what set them off in the second place where they weren't set off in the first place.

Admiral RABORN. There is an element of timing here and if I can—the coup sprung into action a little bit ahead of the planned time, precipitated by the attempted arrest of several of the military leaders. The younger rebel officers participating in the coup, recognizing that perhaps this was triggered off a bit earlier than they had expected, decided they had to move with great speed to prevent their movement from being crushed at an early stage. So, they took this precipitous action of throwing open the arsenals of one of the forts that they had captured and taken over, and proceeded on that basis.

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

Senator MCCARTHY. What were the number of casualties, do you have a count on that, of Americans and Dominicans in the whole operation? How many people were killed?

Admiral RABORN. I can supply that for the record, if I may, Senator McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question?

Senator MCCARTHY. I asked how many people were killed in the whole operation to date.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any Americans killed?

Admiral RABORN. No, sir.

Senator McCarthy. None killed?
Admiral Raborn. Except in the armed forces, unfortunately.
Senator McCarthy. In the armed forces?
Admiral Raborn. Yes, sir. Some 22 in the armed forces.[3]
Senator McCarthy. In the armed forces, I knew that.
Admiral Raborn. Some 22 were killed, unfortunately.
Senator McCarthy. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Senator Mansfield?

NUMBER OF COMMUNISTS INVOLVED

Senator Mansfield. Admiral, you will recall that at the time of the intervention in Santo Domingo there was a meeting called at the White House which you attended. Do you recall that meeting? It was a Sunday afternoon. I believe either that day or the day before you had assumed your present office.

Admiral Raborn. I assumed my office on Wednesday, the 28th of April, sir.

Senator Mansfield. When was that meeting——

The Chairman. That was the meeting, it was a Wednesday.

Senator Mansfield. Do you recall being at that meeting?

Admiral Raborn. Yes, sir.

Senator Mansfield. It was probably your first meeting of that nature.

Admiral Raborn. Yes, sir.

Senator Mansfield. The information given to us at the time was the fact that the President had, an hour and a half previously, ordered the Marines in on the basis of information from Ambassador Bennett, who said if they were not sent in there would be bloodshed and scores if not hundreds of people of various nationalities would be killed.

Admiral Raborn. Yes, sir.

Senator Mansfield. The main reason for going in then was to save the lives of 5,000 American and other non-Dominican nationals who were considered to be in extreme danger at that moment because of the chaotic situation which had developed.

Toward the end of that meeting Mr. Ford, I believe, raised a question about the number of Communists involved.

Senator Symington. Mr. who?

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Ford, Gerald Ford. I am not certain it was Gerald, but I think it was, and the President turned to you and said, "Admiral, can you give us some information on that?"

As I recall your answer, at that time you stated that you did have information that there were two or three Communists identified in the area, and I believe they were tied up with the Caamano group.

Is that approximately a correct statement?

Admiral Raborn. That is a correct description of what happened, sir, of my statement at that time.

Senator Mansfield. That is right.

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[3] The CIA later reported that the actual number of U.S. military casualties were 25 killed and 160 wounded. As to the number of Dominicans killed, it provided "an educated guess" of between 1,000 and 1,800.

TERRORIST COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS

Admiral RABORN. I meant to imply that there were two well-known hard-line Communists who were high in the rebel leadership at that time. Of course, we had had reports of, before that, several days before, of participating by names of the terrorists, guerrilla types that were out in the streets.

Senator MANSFIELD. The terrorist guerrilla types or the terrorist Communist guerrilla types?

Admiral RABORN. Terrorist Communist guerrilla types.

Senator MANSFIELD. But that information was not given to the leadership and to the others in the Congress who were present at that meeting.

Admiral RABORN. I don't know. I don't believe so, sir. We have reconstructed the history of communism, which includes the rebellion in the Dominican Republic, and I had just come on board that afternoon.

My first contact with the full impact of the rebellion was in the stream of cables that were coming out and messages coming out of our Embassy in the Dominican Republic. One of those contained the report that they had personally seen and identified two or three well-known Communists, hard-line Communists who were high in the leadership of the rebels.

Senator MANSFIELD. I understand your position, Admiral. You were—this was thrown at you cold. You had just come on the job that day.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am not trying to find any fault but just trying to set the record straight. I believe that I am privileged to discuss information of that nature in a meeting of that kind, in an executive committee meeting of this kind.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

PUBLISHED LIST OF COMMUNISTS

Senator MANSFIELD. Later, of course, there was a list published of 53 to 58 or 59 Communists, and names were given. Some of them, of course, were subject to question because they had either left the country or were in prison or were too young.[4]

Senator SYMINGTON. Were too what?

Senator MANSFIELD. Too young. One was supposed to be 10 or 15 years old. Whether that is a statement of fact or not, I don't know,

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[4] The CIA later replied that Senator Mansfield's comments on the list of Communists in the rebel camp, including one who was 15 years old, appeared to be the result of a Washington Post story by Dan Kurzman, published on 9 May 1965. "The article stated that Alejandro LAJARA, who it was stated had been described by unnamed U.S. officials as a questionable appointee by the rebel government of Molina Urena, was actually only 15 years old and was not holding any position in any government. The full name of the man referred to is Alejandro LAJARA Gonzales. He was indeed appointed early on 27 April as subdirector of intelligence in the short-lived rebel government of Molina Urena. Alejandro LAJARA was described as having been a 'fanatical member' of the pro-Castro 14 June Political Group (APCJ) for more than two years. Information in the Central Intelligence Agency's files indicates that Alejandro LAJARA Gonzalez was born in 1943; this makes him 22 years of age this year. The error in The Washington Post story could stem from the fact that Alejandro has a brother named Luis Angel Homero LAJARA who was born in 1949 and, therefore, is 15 years of age. The father of Alejandro and Luis is Luis LAJARA Burgos, who is reliably reported to have been appointed director of intelligence in the rebel government of Molina Urena. The elder LAJARA then evidently appointed his son Alejandro as his deputy."

but at least the explanation was given and the point came out afterward.

But the point I am making is this: The reason we went in initially was to protect the 5,000 American and other non-Dominican nationals who were considered to be in grave danger. I believe the President, a month or so after the intervention, either in the course of a speech or stated, and I believe I can quote his figure correctly, that 88½ percent of the reasons for the intervention was to save these 5,000 lives.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral RABORN. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to comment?

Admiral RABORN. I would like to ask the indulgence of the Chair to repair to the men's room.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, we will take a recess.

[Short recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

WERE THE COMMUNISTS DOMINANT?

Admiral, I want to make just a short statement and have your comment on it to see if this is the correct interpretation of what has been developed.

I think likely the CIA established there was a significant Communist movement among the rebels. You have documented it this morning. The question that interests me very much is not whether the Communists were influential, which I think you have made clear, but whether they were dominant and, more importantly whether we tried to exert a countervailing moderate influence on the rebel leadership.

Do you think we did?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, we did. I might say that we kept the existing Dominican Republic government most adequately informed of the infiltration back into the country of the known Communists. This included the government——

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't quite what I am talking about. I know you kept them informed. In your opinion, were they dominant in these rebel causes or were they merely influential?

Admiral RABORN. It depended on what party, at what time.

The CHAIRMAN. The rebel leadership between the 24th, say, and the 28th; were they dominant then?

Admiral RABORN. In the rebel movement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in the rebel movement.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir, they were rapidly becoming dominant. It was not until the evening of the 27th, I believe, that the non-Communists and principal leaders of the rebellion became convinced that the Communists were going to take over. Some of them at that time started to take asylum and to leave, throwing up their hands in disgust over the way, the turn that the rebellion had taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought their despair arose from the possibility of the military—that Wessin was coming in with his tanks.

Admiral RABORN. That was another moment of despair, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But at what point do you think they became despaired that the Communists had taken over the rebellion?

Admiral RABORN. That was the evening of the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; the 27th.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

BRINGING ABOUT AN ORDERLY TRANSITION

The CHAIRMAN. You state on page 11 and 12—and Senator Aiken touched on this but I wanted to develop it a little more—that "the Communists have superior organizational skills" and that "the U.S. strives in every way," for orderly transition into democratic governments.

During this period when, at one point at least, before the 27th, this non-Communist led rebellion at that point, that is, dominated rebellion, might have brought about an orderly transition if we had helped them but we did not, did we?

Admiral RABORN. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a request made on the 26th, I believe, wasn't there, for assistance, when they thought Wessin was about to take over by his tanks, according to Ambassador Bennett. They approached him for assistance in arranging a truce. You are familiar with that?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think we should have done it then or did the CIA have any position at that time?

Admiral RABORN. The CIA had no position.

The CHAIRMAN. Had no position.

Looking back on it, do you think we might have assisted them in taking over with a non-Communist leadership?

Admiral RABORN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that because at that time we already thought the Communist element was already dominant?

Admiral RABORN. Not primarily.

First, it is not our privilege to get into policy matters in the first place. In the second place, sir, the policy, as I understand it, that the United States follows is hands off in cases of internal efforts to change governments. In the third place, and I can only speak now of my private opinion, knowing about the heavy infiltration which exists, which was existent, that to back the rebels' cause would have been to inevitably place the Communists in power.

THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE

The CHAIRMAN. If they were dominant. I thought there was a period when they weren't dominant and they became dominant in the course of activities.

Admiral RABORN. They became, they surfaced, they were there, they were the power behind the throne at all times, we believe, and they came to the surface and took active leadership at the later stages commencing about the 26th or 27th, night of the 27th.

HANDS OFF POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. You say our policy is hands off in efforts to change the internal government?

Admiral RABORN. That is my understanding, sir, of the United States Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we follow that policy?

Admiral RABORN. I am afraid I am not competent to speak on that.

The CHAIRMAN. In the Dominican affairs, do you think we did not influence the effort to change the government there?

Admiral RABORN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think the Embassy in its dealings with the rebels and the military had no influence on the course of events?

Admiral RABORN. Again, I am afraid I must plead that I am not competent to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it quite probable that in any effort to change the government by a coup or whatever you want to call it, rebellion, the Communists will be involved to a more or less extent in all the countries you mentioned a moment ago that are likely to have a coup?

Admiral RABORN. To a degree, sir. But only to a degree.

For instance, in Ecuador today there is considerable unrest, and yet the Communist movement is insignificant.

The CHAIRMAN. As of the moment they are, but there are Communists in Ecuador, aren't there?

Admiral RABORN. Very small number.

The CHAIRMAN. Aren't there some in all the Latin Amerian countries you mentioned?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

COMMUNISTS WILL CAPITALIZE ON DISORDER

The CHAIRMAN. Does it not follow from our experience here if a move is made to change the government by force, and there is a rebellion, and it is initiated by the non-Communist left, if you like, that inevitably the Communists will join, won't they?

Admiral RABORN. The Communists will invariably capitalize on disorder and will try to aggravate it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, and they will join it and they will try to take control. They will try to become influential, will they not?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. That is their standing pattern.

The CHAIRMAN. So that any reformist movement outside of certainly an ordinary election, anything short of that is likely to attract Communist support, isn't that true?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We were told in Panama, for example, that after that difficulty started, Communists joined in and became active, is that correct?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that the effect of this is that we would then be in a position of opposing any movement that the Communists support and that this would narrow the choice for all of Latin America, practically, to either one of Communists or a military junta. Isn't that where we would come out in the way things are developing?

Admiral RABORN. Unfortunately, as the Senator knows better than I, the Latin American countries have very few what we would term "democratic" governments.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the trouble; yes, sir.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

CHOICE BETWEEN COMMUNISM OR A JUNTA

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think this is what we are faced with in all those countries, that they will have the choice of either communism or a junta; that we will inevitably arrive at the conclusion that this reform group or whatever you want to call them, rebels, will be joined by the Communists, and then for fear that the Communists will dominate it we will have to throw our influence to the other side, which is usually a junta? Is that about what we come out with?

I am just trying to get the picture of these countries. You mentioned, I forget the number, 8 or 12 that are likely to have a coup at any time, without notice.

CASE OF VENEZUELA

Admiral RABORN. In some cases, for instance, in Venezuela the A.D. party fought with the Communists. They participated with the Communists but were strong enough to turn around and eliminate them later.

I think, sir, that the history of our own country shows there have been occasions when the forces of the United States joined with dissident elements in order to be stronger against a common enemy. I mean bring no disrepute to the fair State of Louisiana, but I am reminded that in the Battle of New Orleans, Jean LaFitte, a notorious pirate, came in and assisted us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a long time ago.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the case of Venezuela did we help Betancourt, for example, to establish his dominance and oust the Communists?

Admiral RABORN. We were not involved.

The CHAIRMAN. That was my impression, we were not involved and we took no part in it.

And we allowed him a free hand to get rid of the Communists, didn't we?

Admiral RABORN. That is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder—we should have learned from that—if we should have allowed these people to get rid of the Communists without taking a hand with the junta. I am just discussing that.

AN EITHER/OR CHOICE

Senator CLARK. Will the Senator yield for a minute before the Admiral replies?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. I think in fairness to the Admiral, we don't want him on this record—I don't think he wants to go on this record as indicating an either/or choice.

The CHAIRMAN. He doesn't have to.

Senator CLARK. I know he doesn't. But I just want to point out to him we have a situation in Chile, in Peru.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see why he can't answer this. He doesn't have to answer it if he doesn't wish to.

Senator CLARK. I just wanted to give him a chance, that there are other alternatives.

The CHAIRMAN. He has put on the record that there are a number of countries which are faced with a situation of a coup without notice. There are others you think are not so critical but that could happen.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In practically every country it could happen, I suppose it could, except Canada. He didn't mention Canada.

But to pursue your statement, it would seem to me we might possibly be faced with a further Dominican situation in at least 8 to 10 countries. Do you think that we will end up by intervention, as we did in the Dominican Republic, in all of them?

Admiral RABORN. Mr. Chairman, I, of course, am not really competent to speak to this except to say that in each of these countries in Latin America, the political strengths vary markedly, as you know. In some countries a Dominican type Communist-sponsored coup could take place more readily than others. We would have to consider each country and the current political stability, the factors that are causing unrest, and the ways and means to diminish the unrest in order to render a judgment.

THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE U.S.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we followed the thinking of the chairman, we will have expected that Castro would have rid Cuba of the Communists and thus we would have been spared this thorn that is now in our side.

Are we to allow a Communist takeover in these different nations and if we do so, will it be in the interest of the security of our own country?

My answer to those questions is in the negative, just as the chairman argues that we should stay out. There are others who think that when Communists take hold, we can't stand by in face of what now confronts us in Cuba.

Senator CLARK. I guess the Admiral concludes the committee is not a monolithic one. [Laughter.]

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND CUBA

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you think that the Dominican Republic, being so close to Cuba and having had this experience in Cuba, that this may have been a determining factor in our intervention there?

Admiral RABORN. I wouldn't be prepared, I am not prepared to answer that, sir. I can say, however, from intelligence sources that there was unusual attention given to the making in the Dominican Republic by Cuba—on several other attempts they have tried to stir up trouble, once sending an expeditionary force against the Do-

minican Republic; again, on another occasion sending them armed——

The CHAIRMAN. When was that so-called expeditionary force that you speak of?

Admiral RABORN. 1959.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that under Trujillo's regime?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Then there is the case of the *Scarlet Lady,* the name of a sailing vessel that was loaded to the gunwales with arms from Cuba that had tried to land that was intercepted.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral RABORN. 1963, sir.

Then during the current rebellion in the Dominican Republic, Cuba has beamed special radio broadcasts to the rebels exhorting them, encouraging them, giving them advice, and so forth.

So, there has been special attention given to this particular movement.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering if it wasn't possible to distinguish the Dominican Republic, because of the sensitiveness of this country to Cuba, from these other countries. You might be more relaxed if it is a case in Colombia, Ecuador with regard to to the question of whether or not the Communists dominate the possible rebellion.

Do you think that is logical?

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted you to say that. I hope you will distinguish in each country. I was trying to find a little comfort in this.

If it stands as it is, it seems to me to be perfectly consistently logical you would be called upon to intervene in every one of these countries that you mentioned in case there was a rebellion in which the Communists play an important part. I wonder if we couldn't distinguish the Dominican Republic from any of these others that you mentioned and we won't be called upon if we are to follow this policy of intervening by force in case of a rebellion. I think that it would be very helpful to these countries in Latin America for them not to believe that we are going to intervene in case any effort is made to change the status quo.

Admiral RABORN. I would be pleased, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. You came in late. You are entitled to your own questions.

SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WILL INTERVENE

Senator CASE. I don't want to take any particular time except to make this point—and I am sure it has been made before and I agree with your position and I think it is a fine distinction——

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what my position is. I am trying to develop it.

Senator CASE [continuing]. That we deal with these things variously, depending upon the needs and possibilities of a particular situation.

But also is it is not true we do not have a doctrinaire position against intervention? I hope you will say yes, for God's sake, and say it openly.

Admiral RABORN. I am not privileged to speak for the State Department, but it is my understanding, sir, that we certainly don't look with favor upon intervention and try to work through the association——

Senator CASE. Those are noble sentiments and I approve of them and I think they are fine, but there are situations in which we will intervene, isn't that true?

Admiral RABORN. I am sorry, sir, I am not competent to answer that.

Senator CASE. For God's sake.

Senator CLARK. The Admiral says he doesn't make policy. He is on sound ground.

Senator CASE. This is off the record. I think one of our problems is that we keep dancing and fencing here. I think it would be much better if we didn't. I don't want to keep pretending we never intervene when we do intervene.

I think the strength of our position as a great power requires us to intervene, and that all these ideas that you never intervene and if you do you mustn't say so are fine. Of course, then we get to the question of what the CIA does in a situation, and you only speak to God and Senator Saltonstall and Senator Mansfield and he doesn't want to hear you, Senator Saltonstall never wants to listen, so I wonder if you ever talk to anybody.[5] That is all.

Admiral RABORN. May I respond to that?

Senator CASE. You are a human being and you recognize concerns that we do have.

STABILITY IN MEXICO

Admiral RABORN. I appreciate the Senator's position, Senator. I am here as Director of Central Intelligence and, of course, must keep my private feelings, whatever they may be, out of it and speak as the Director.

I can also say that we have a very stable country immediately adjacent to us, Mexico, which is closer than the Dominican Republic, that has a long period of political stability and yet it has a recognized Communist movement in it. This is a case in point of what I was trying to bring out, that there was a time when we did intervene in Mexico. I was a small youngster at that time and watched openmouthed as General Pershing and his troops rode by on trains.

Senator CASE. It was under President Wilson.

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[5] The CIA later responded that "Senator Case made a statement indicating that the Central Intelligence Agency does not keep Congress informed. For the record, the Agency has appeared before combined sessions of the CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Appropriations nine times and once before Senate Armed Services and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations. Senator Saltonstall attended nine of these sessions. Further, the Agency has appeared seven times before the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services, once before the full House Armed Services Committee, nine times before the CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations, and once before the Defense Subcommittee of House Appropriations. All of these appearances have been since January of this year. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency appears from time to time before a number of other committees of the Congress for briefings on special subjects of interest to those committees."

Admiral RABORN. I might say that the stability of the Mexican Government, as we have set forth in our intelligence memorandum on instability in Latin America, gives one comfort that we need not have to think about intervention in every country.

Senator CASE. We agree. We don't intervene in every country.

Does that mean we don't intervene ever?

Admiral RABORN. I am sorry, sir, that is something for the President to speak to.

Senator CASE. And yet you don't hesitate to say we don't intervene in every country.

Why don't you hesitate to say that?

INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

Admiral RABORN. Previously we have brought to the attention of the chairman and the committee, sir, a bulletin which we put out under date of May 20, 1965, which is based on intelligence of instability in Latin America. In it we intend to give our opinions, based on intelligence, of the relative stability or instability of the countries concerned, and I would recommend this to your attention. It is classified "secret" and it gives an idea of the perhaps future trouble spots. We have gone out on a limb so far as to name 12 countries that we feel that a coup could come rather quickly and without warning. There are others as of this date of this pamphlet where they are less subject to such abrupt change in government.

I think perhaps this might be helpful.

Senator CASE. I appreciate it very much. I take it maybe here in the committee rooms we can examine it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. I would hope, even if I am entitled to it, not in my own office.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the pamphlet, I will say to the Senator, that aroused my question. I was wondering if we are going to follow the procedure in each of the 12 countries, because I think inevitably whatever Communists are in there are going to join in any movement to join any rebellion or coup. They are likely to join them unless it is purely a military junta type coup, in which case they, of course, would not.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

A SPECIAL SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Senator MUNDT [continuing]. Because it was based on this, because we might have 12 more Dominican Republic situations if this policy is followed consistently. My own feeling is that because it is so close to Cuba and because of the effect of the Cuban situation this might well be a special situation.

Senator——

Senator CASE. May I just say this: I don't disagree at all, and I think it is a fine idea to be discriminating here. I also think it is not desirable to have the country get the idea, the people of the country—and that includes such eminent spokesmen of the hard line as our friends from Ohio and others, and I admire this position that we never do because the reactions against the soft policy, a

completely wishy-washy policy of never intervening or at least saying we never do, is going to lead us to the other extreme. We are not going to be permitted to maintain such a policy. It has got to be the one which you indicated, and I would like to see somebody in authority say that we will intervene under certain circumstances, frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask a question, following up Senator Case's question, Admiral?

OPERATIONS BETTER DONE IN A COVERT WAY

Am I in error in my feeling that part of the prevailing job of your CIA in Latin America is to do what it legitimately can do to prevent the overthrow of governments friendly to the United States by a Communist regime? I thought that was part of the standard operating procedure.

Admiral RABORN. There are certain operations which can be better done, as the Senator knows, in a covert way, which are extensions of the United States' normal operations. These, having been carefully considered by the President and his appropriate cabinet members, do sponsor these actions which the agency carries out.

Senator MUNDT. Isn't one of those agreed upon national policies part of the prevailing job, the standard operating procedure of your CIA, to exercise its influence, usually in a covert manner, or however it can, to prevent the overthrow of governments in Latin America friendly to the United States by Communist regimes?

Admiral RABORN. In those instances where such action appears necessary, and in each case approved by the President, appropriate action by the Agency is taken.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, and that is per se intervention. Intervention doesn't have to be emblazoned to the world.

Senator CASE. Admiral, why couldn't you say that in answer to me?

Admiral RABORN. I misinterpreted your——

Senator CASE. That is all I was trying to get, some kind of assurance that we can say to our constituents privately, "For God's sake, we are not going to sit like a sitting duck."

Admiral RABORN. Intervention to me is military.

Senator CASE. You were just talking to an ignorant Senator.

Admiral RABORN. I am sorry, I did not get the import of your question.

Senator CASE. It is not a hostile question. It is a friendly question.

Admiral RABORN. I understand. I think the good offices of the United States all the way from the Peace Corps, all the way up and down, including such things——

Senator MUNDT. AID, and everything else. It is part of our national policy. Certainly CIA is not exempt from doing what it can to help implement the national policy.

Admiral RABORN. That is correct, sir.

TWO SITUATIONS EXIST

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator allow me, I do not know whether Senator Case was present last week when Mr. Mann testified. He said there were two situations in existence: one, the takeover by the Communists; two, the involvement of American lives. He said the juridical basis of going into the Dominican Republic was the protection of American lives.

Now, we had to have a juridical or international legal basis for going in, and I think what he said at least implies that we cannot afford to have another Castro or another Cuba at our shores, and we will not allow another one to come into existence.

Senator CLARK. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

PREVENT MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS

Senator CLARK. In connection with what Senator Lausche and Senator Mundt have just said, also Senator Case's comment, don't we have an almost equal obligation to prevent the overthrow of an existing democratically based Latin American country by a military dictatorship of Trujillo or Batista type, or is it your view it is only against Communist dictatorships that we would intervene?

Admiral RABORN. Senator, I would prefer not to speculate on that. I think that is a policy question and one which I am not particularly involved in.

Senator CLARK. I think it is, too, but you were fairly candid in responding to Senator Case's and Senator Lausche's questions, and I thought perhaps you would like to give a little balance to your position.

Admiral RABORN. I appreciate your indulgence, sir, and what I am trying to say is that in the case where it is national policy that certain actions be taken, and we can contribute, we certainly shall to whatever extent we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, on that question, carry it a little further.

HELPING THE PRESIDENT DECIDE

You say we intervene only on order of the President. But the President cannot make this decision in a vacuum. It will depend primarily on what he is recommended to do. For example, in the Dominican case, when he received the kind of wires he did on the afternoon of the 28th, I do not consider that he had any choice. Whether or not the wires were correct depends on the judgment of the Ambassador and his colleagues, but the Ambassador takes the final responsibility. I do not think any President has any choice, having received that kind of advice from the field.

Now, the fact that they used American lives as a kind of cover, as the Senator from Ohio has already pointed out, as a juridical base, was the testimony of Mr. Mann. The basic reason was the fear of a Communist takeover. Don't you think that is correct? And there is information coming from your people and the others, the FBI, in the field, isn't that the way it really works?

Admiral RABORN. In my opinion, sir, the thing that disturbed me most was the chaos and near anarchy that was existent and the undeniable danger to American lives, innocent people.

NO PROBLEM ABOUT SHOOTING AMERICANS

The CHAIRMAN. I accept that as the juridical base and so on, but the fact is that in these revolutions that take place very often in Latin America, no American citizens have been killed because whoever is involved knows that if they start killing them we are going to get in. In this case here, the evidence that has already been testified to is they did not try to shoot any Americans in the Ambassador Hotel. They told them to get out of the way, they were looking for another fellow. They shot over their heads. No effort was made—they could easily have killed Americans, they were all about the place, if they wanted to, couldn't they? There was no problem about killing Americans. But they have tried and did avoid in this case, and I am informed by other witnesses they have never in any of these revolutions sought out Americans to kill them, and haven't killed them, and they did not kill them in this case.

But the real guts of this is that we did not want a Communist takeover as in Cuba, which is certainly a very proper objective. I do not want another Communist takeover either, but what is important for the future, if we can learn anything out of this, is to be, as Senator Case said, very discriminative in the application of our force. If we are going to take the position of intervention on any change in which even a small Communist influence is present, I am afraid the final analysis would be to increase the Communist influence all over Latin America, and I do not think we want to do that. I know you do not want to do that. I wonder if the Admiral could comment on this.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if he could comment on this.

Isn't that what is involved if we are trying to evaluate the significance of this for the future?

Admiral RABORN. I am sure, sir, this is an element of consideration in what we can learn. I can only say that my own knowledge is, that the reports that came to my personal attention, and all of them did, commencing on the 28th, clearly indicated that law and order had broken down to such as extent that American lives, as well as the lives of many other people, such as the foreigners, were in danger, and that there were reports coming in from the mobs being incited against Americans by name, that is, by types. One of the persons in the Ambassador Hotel was of Dominican descent, but an American citizen, and they were particularly looking for them.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean Aybar, the man they were looking for? He turned out not to be there, but they were looking for him.

Admiral RABORN. Muñoz was his name.

THE RETURN OF BOSCH

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that an examination of the whole situation in the Dominican Republic will indicate that we initially believed that this was a military coup in which there was a conjunction of forces also that wanted the return of Bosch.

During the early days that happened we were going to stand by, content, and allow it to develop through the coup. But then we

found ourselves suddenly confronted with Communists taking over, the Castroite forces, the Peking forces, and Moscow forces had in their headquarters—they were building Molotov cocktails, they were distributing ammunition, and had, in fact, taken over.

So, you cannot construe the facts down there to mean that in every instance of a revolt we are going to step in. An examination of this document that you prepared will disclose that there came a turning point, and when that turning point came the President became concerned that it was going to be definitely a Communist takeover.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. I want to turn to another subject. Perhaps you want to follow what you have been asking.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

EFFECT OF INTERVENTION ON PUBLIC OPINION

Senator CLARK. Admiral, as a collector and evaluator of information all over Latin America, what is your conclusion or what are your conclusions as to the effect on governmental and public opinion in other Latin American countries of our intervention in the Dominican Republic? In short, have we hurt ourselves in terms of our prestige, of our ability to deal on friendly terms with other Latin American governments, or haven't we helped ourselves as a result of moving in the way we did in the Dominican Republic?

Admiral RABORN. Senator, if I may, I would like to speak to this. From an information point of view, the intelligence which we have gathered to the effect of the intervention within the Dominican Republic evoked widespread official criticism in Latin America, as you know. But this moderated considerably following the U.S. explanation of the action and approval on May 5 by a majority of the OAS members of the Inter-American Peace Force and subsequent decline of interest in the subject by many Latin American citizens. Mexico, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay opposed the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force——

Senator CLARK. And refused to participate in it.

Admiral RABORN [continuing]. While Venezuela abstained.

Our position to intervention did not generally stem from any appreciable disbelief in the U.S. revelations of Communist infiltration into the rebel camp. Most Latin American officials privately tended to recognize the danger of an extreme leftist takeover in the Dominican Republic.

AFFINITY FOR POPULAR LEFTIST MOVEMENTS

The Latin American governments, except Chile and Venezuela, which have a strong affinity for popular leftist democratic movements, have shown little sympathy for Caamano's rebel group. Only Chile came close to extending diplomatic recognition, but did not act when it saw that no other nations would follow suit.

Most criticism in opposition to the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force arose from a traditional legalistic doctrine of nonintervention, combined with such domestic factors as nationalist political pressures, fear of establishing a precedent for military intervention by neighboring Latin American countries.

This fear has been expressed, for example, in Chile and Uruguay. It was also evidenced during the late May domestic crisis in Bolivia when there was some Chilean and other outside suspicion of potential Argentine military intervention in Bolivia.

The five countries, Brazil, primarily, and Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, backed up their revolt creating the IAPF by sending military contingents, while El Salvador furnished a mere token contribution of three officers, and Panama sent some nurses. The other OAS members indicated they would have contributed forces, but for serious threats to their own stability or for political considerations.

Almost all of the Latin American military leaders supported intervention and favored the provision of their forces to the IAPF. Some nations with a substantial military establishment, however, did not send military forces for various reasons. In Argentina, the military leaders were sharply critical of their government inaction, although enthusiasm waned somewhat after the Brazilian became the commander of the IAPF. The President's inaction stemmed from the negative attitude of the majority of the political party leaders.

NO LASTING ADVERSE EFFECT

The Dominican events apparently have not had a lasting adverse effect on U.S. relations with Latin American states, we believe. Among the six states which opposed or abstained from voting for the creation of the IAPF, only Chile and, to a lesser extent, Uruguay and Venezuela may be listed as cases involving some possible deterioration of relations with the United States.

Senator CLARK. Not Peru?

Admiral RABORN. Not Peru.

Senator CLARK. And not Mexico?

Admiral RABORN. Not Mexico.

The Christian Democratic movement of Chile is seeking to develop a leadership in Latin America and has been sharply critical of the United States and OAS intervention, and called for an end to U.S. hegemony in Latin America and a basic reorganization of the OAS to expand its economic functions and to de-emphasize its military security role. Chilean leaders have also been among the foremost spokesmen for an "independent third force" nationalism which challenges U.S. leaderhip in the hemisphere and evidences it in vociferous opposition to the U.S. role in the Dominican Republic.

Although U.S. relations with Venezuela and Uruguay have been strained during the Dominican events, the effects there seem only temporary in both countries. The criticism of U.S. action grows largely from longstanding opposition to the military regimes in Latin Ameica, and in Uruguay from the fear of creating a precedent for intervention by its neighbors to stabilize a worsening political and economic situation within Uruguay itself.

The Mexican leaders have privately endorsed the U.S. action and provided some material support, but they publicly felt obliged to favor some limited criticism because of Mexico's traditional adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention.

Peru's negative vote on the IAPF represented in part a desire to align Peruvian with Chilean policy, while Ecuador's negative vote reflected an extreme legalistic view of its Foreign Minister regarding the OAS Charter.

I must say that it sobered many Latin American regimes to see what happened so quickly in the Dominican Republic, because they now recognize that the existence of subversives in their own countries can provide a real threat to their own government.

THREATS OF MILITARY COUPS

Senator CLARK. One further question—thank you, sir—you spoke of a number of countries in that memorandum where you were concerned at the possibility of a Communist takeover. Is it not true that in many of those countries and perhaps some others, there is an imminent threat of military takeover?

Admiral RABORN. I believe that——

Senator CLARK. I mean a military dictatorship.

Admiral RABORN. We are concerned with a coup, and we address ourselves to that. In our intelligence memorandum of May 20, we tried to describe the type of coup that might likely come about, whether it be military or other.

Senator CLARK. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I thought you were speaking only of an imminent or a possible and foreseeable Communist takeover. You meant a coup of any kind.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir; instability in general.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

NO ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, just for the record, one question. You said the coup was triggered ahead of the planned time by this movement of some officers under Reid Cabral's orders. Do you know what the planned time was that this triggered this ahead of time?

Admiral RABORN. We do not. We could not pinpoint it because it was not exactly pinpointed in the minds of the plotters themselves, but it was, we believe, a few days later.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, they had no specific time?

Admiral RABORN. They did not; no, sir.

SITUATION IN HAITI

The CHAIRMAN. Applying this principle, if I can, to Haiti, we know that is a very difficult situation. Duvalier has had—I do not know him myself, but from what I read he is not a very high-class president of a government; is that correct?

Admiral RABORN. We believe that there are better.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is a rebellion there and he alleges they are Communists, and it is right next to the Dominican Republic, do you think we would intervene to prevent it?

Admiral RABORN. I believe, sir, that I am not competent to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. If we are consistent with our policy in the Dominican Republic, if they are, we would, wouldn't we, if we are consistent?

Admiral RABORN. I believe, sir, each one of these will have to be taken on its own merits by the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if we could speculate a bit, if Duvalier alleges, and there is a coup, and he says that these are Communists and he submits good testimony and your agents report there are Communists in it, the President would then have to make up his mind whether to support Duvalier or the Communists to allow them to take over.

Admiral RABORN. I suppose he would.

The CHAIRMAN. In fact, any regime threatened with difficulties would allege they are Communists in order to gain our support; isn't that a logical conclusion?

Admiral RABORN. You have to examine each one of these on its own merits, that is for sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Each one on its own merits.

Admiral RABORN. I think that is correct, that is, we have to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. There will always be a difference of opinion as to how strong the Communist influence is and whether or not we should intervene.

CIA USE OF THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL EDUCATION

There is one question that was developed a moment ago by Senator Mundt that suggests this line of questioning, because this is based on common knowledge and it is not any secret. I had a question here that invovles this: Did the CIA help the Reid government prior to April 24?

Admiral RABORN. There is real reason to believe that some of the activities which the agency carries on can be much more effective in overt action.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think so.

Admiral RABORN [continuing]. And also provide great stability to truly democratic efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. You were talking about their superior organization. If there is any way short of force, I would think this is the way to compete with the Communists.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the way they do it. You would have to do the same thing better, isn't that true?

Admiral RABORN. This is part and parcel of our operations.

LATIN AMERICAN TOLERANCE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

This is not such a big secret. I think this is a good thing. If you would do it effectively, it is better than to intervene with the military on every occasion whenever it may arise. The prospect of intervening in these other countries as we did in the Dominican Republic is not a very good one from my point of view. I first approve of your discriminating, that is, you do not adopt this as a policy.

One thing that disturbed, I think, Latin Americans more than anything else was what they thought was the new Johnson policy that seemed to open up the prospect of intervention on every occasion, at every time, there was a rebellion influenced by communism. I think that did more harm probably than the actual intervention itself, and I think we ought to correct that if we can.

Is it characteristic of conservative governments in Latin America to tolerate or even encourage a certain amount of Communist activity in order to get our help and support?

Admiral RABORN. I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Is it characteristic of conservative governments in Latin America to tolerate or even encourage a certain amount of Communist activity in order to get help and support from the United States?

Admiral RABORN. I would think in some cases this could be, although I would be hard pressed to name a specific country.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned Trujillo. In spite of his well known characteristics, he tolerated and used Communists. I think, didn't you tell us, when he was threatened by Communists he asked our support of him; wasn't it?

Admiral RABORN. I might say if they do use this tactic it is usually in the case where they think they are quite well in the saddle in the government, and, of course, the efforts of intelligence are to help determine the nature and the size of the threat.

EXAMPLE OF BRAZIL

Senator CLARK. Wouldn't Brazil be a good example?

The CHAIRMAN. It would make us much more enthusiastic if they alleged a lot of Communists were around about to pounce on them.

Senator CLARK. Goulart was thrown out because he was a Communist. For all I am concerned, he may have been, but the military dictatorship in Brazil was influenced by the fact that we got much more enthusiastic about it when it was suggested they were going to put down a lot of Communists.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. Are you finished with that type of thought?

The CHAIRMAN. I am just going forward. If you have something, go ahead.

Admiral RABORN. May I, Senator, make a general comment?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, indeed.

FERRET OUT DEVIOUSNESS

Admiral RABORN. I think, sir, I would just like to say, following your line of questioning, that I made a comment to the effect that this is one of the services which the Central Intelligence Agency gives the Government, is to help ferret out such deviousness on the part of governments that would raise the bogeyman of Communism in order to obtain our assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. You are just about the only hope in doing this properly, aren't you, because how can anybody else evaluate it if you cannot?

Admiral RABORN. This is one of our primary jobs.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it one of the most important jobs you have, in just such a situation, because it is very difficult for ordinary civilian operators to know about this.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. In Brazil proper, I just want to say, sir, that the Communist movement there has been in great disarray since the present regime came into power in April of 1964. We speak to that in this pamphlet, "Instability in Latin America."

Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

RELEASE OF THE ADMIRAL'S STATEMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, first I would hope, even though it was not necessarily under the Admiral's name, that this statement made today, which was clear and concise, would be released to the people. There has been so much information, inaccurate and untrue information, peddled around of what has been said about the people in the Dominican Republic, you can put in A and B instead of giving the Spanish names. I hope that can get out to the people.

The CHAIRMAN. The Admiral can give out any statement he wants to. He stated he did not wish it released.

Senator SYMINGTON. I hope it is picked up, because you have no classification. I can walk off with it to my office and release it, based on my understanding of what is given to the Senate committees.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you wouldn't do that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I certainly won't.

The CHAIRMAN. When he gave it, he said he hoped this would not be released.

Senator SYMINGTON. But there is no classification on it.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. Before you came in——

Senator SYMINGTON. I was here all the time.

Admiral RABORN. We would like to clear this with, although we believe the information in there is unclassified, there is such a thing as timing, as you well know, and we want to clear this with the appropriate people.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

Admiral RABORN. We might clear it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to make a very brief statement. I have just been writing some notes, thinking about a lot of things.

NEED FOR THE CIA

We won World War II, and then we badly misjudged the Communists. If anyone has any doubt about it, I suggest they read the latest volume of Anthony Eden, the two chapters, "The Poles in Moscow" and "Stalin, the Negotiator," which I think would be interesting reading. I can remember talking with Ambassador Winant in February of 1941, in London, and then here later, in 1945. I think probably one of the reasons why he killed himself was the results that happened afterward.

Then we ran into Iran and so forth, and then, since then, I think primarily because of the realization of what a nuclear war would mean, we have made very great efforts in this country to promote

world understanding, with which I could not agree more. The sincere and patriotic people have recommended many programs, some of which, in my opinion, represented unilateral disarmament. I say that as one who signed and believed in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, so I am not referring to that.

Now, it is clear to me we are escalating into what, at least what I would call in the Pentagon, is the greatest danger we could perhaps get into militarily, namely, a real ground war in Asia. This will be just a big ground war in Asia. We are emphasizing, therefore, our hostilities on the basis of where we are weak as against where we are relatively strong, where we are relatively weak as against where we are relatively strong, namely, on the sea and in the air.

There are those of us who opposed the land war, oppose any sea escalation, oppose any air escalation, and a lot of the same people oppose intervention in Santo Domingo. The facts, as I have watched them develop, watched this development, they oppose any practical expression of real American strength. Those are a few premises that I have just been thinking about here today, listening to the discussions.

Now, my question would be, under these developments is there any real chance for the ultimate survival of the United States if we recognize the Stalin-Mao Tse-tung Communist theories in general of operations of wars of liberation and so forth, unless we have an agency like the Central Intelligence Agency, subject to the direction of the President, do you feel that we could continue the way the world is unless we had an agency comparable to the CIA?

Admiral RABORN. I certainly do not, Senator, and I could not be more emphatic. I can say categorically, in my opinion, that it is one of the most comforting things to me as an American citizen to see a democracy, which is a true democracy, which we have in this country, able to support an agency such as the Central Intelligence Agency, that can do the many things which our Government could not do openly and get in the back alley at times and fight the Communists on their own terms.

UTILIZE OUR STRENGTH

Senator SYMINGTON. Because if we do not want to utilize our strength, which we do not—and I am not criticizing that—and then at the same time we do not want to enter the subversion field, which many people feel we should not—and a lot of these left-wing writers emphasize in their articles that it is an attempt to paint a false picture, it is more difficult to paint it in the State Department where you have many different opinions than it is in the CIA where you have no opinion because of the nature of your agency—but if we do not do either, then really what we are doing is planned isolationism back behind the oceans which no longer give us any true protection; isn't that logical?

Admiral RABORN. It would seem logical, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. As someone said, every country now is in the next county. So, if we do not play either game, that of enforcing our position due to our relative strength—and I am not saying we should—but then if at the same time we do not get into this

type and character of operation as a result of the coaching we get from all these volunteers in the press—we get paid for their coaching by somebody, at times I wonder just who it is—then ultimately the question of our survival is up for real serious consideration, is it not?

Admiral RABORN. I think so, sir.

FORCES OF GOOD AGAINST EVIL

Senator SYMINGTON. What we discuss so far as your operation is concerned, as much as you have, and properly so, no responsibility or authority with respect to policy, is simply the efficiency or inefficiency of your Agency in presenting to the President, based on his instructions, to whom you report directly, what your best analysis is of the situation; is that a fair statement?

Admiral RABORN. That is correct, sir; and in cases where it seems desirable, we do bring to the attention counteractions which the Agency might take in a covert way to strengthen and stabilize the forces of good against the forces of evil. Inasmuch as the interest takes many, many forms, I am very happy to say that the President has on two occasions said to me directly, and with emphasis, that he wants no effort spared to make this Central Intelligence Agency the best in the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. You talk about the forces of good and evil, and, of course, you can have a good many arguments about that as to what are the forces of good and what are the forces of evil. I noticed Secretary Mann said, because of the educational, lack of it in these various countries, that in all probability the only permanent governments could either be Communist governments, like Castro, or military governments a la Trujillo, which we hope would be better. But there is no chance of developing the true democratic form of government, at least as it is conceived of and executed in the United States.

My point is that the definition of good and evil, the words that you used, it is not your definition, from the standpoint of responsibility. The President decides, based on the information you give him, what the policy of the United States should be, in this case and all other cases where the Central Intelligence Agency operates; is that correct?

Admiral RABORN. That is correct.

CIA COOPERATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. I also understand the Central Intelligence Agency now operates on the basis of full understanding with the State Department.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, in all cases, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. In all cases?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is no independent operation which I have found in the field and which in past years and which always breeds a certain amount of inefficiency or diversion of opinion or whatever it is.

Admiral RABORN. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me say I am not entirely sure in my own mind that is a good idea because the State Department is the greatest sieve of misinformation to support hard working as well as not hard working newspapermen that I have found since I have been in this town. The CIA, to the best of my knowledge has been very good about not passing out information to people who want to use it for their own uses against that of the best interests of the country, so I am not sure in my mind that is right, although I recommended when I got back from a trip in 1961 that they either ought to get together or there would be further difficulties.

But fundamentally what you are doing is a job. It is not a policy job in any way, it is an effort to carry out the instructions on an operating basis with our agencies in various countries. Those instructions come to you as a result of the Intelligence Board of the National Security Council, the National Security Council discussions, but fundamentally they come to you from the President of the United States.

Admiral RABORN. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, do you have any questions?

DISSATISFACTION WITH THE STATUS QUO

Senator CASE. I do not think so. I am very glad that I was able to be here for a little time. I have read your statement, Admiral. I got what I was trying to get out of it. Senator Symington and Senator Mundt and Senator Lausche and others, I heard their contributions.

I feel very strongly that in any sense this Government is not able to act as a great power, that is fatal in the maintenance of any shred of democracy with respect to our foreign relations. I am very glad to have this thing on the basis of a discriminating approach, as the chairman so properly emphasized earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I appreciate your attitude. It seems to me, as a practical matter, if we are not really discriminating we are going to end up encouraging more Communists than otherwise there would be. There are many people who are dissatisfied with the status quo in these countries, and I think there are a lot of people who ought to be dissatisfied in most of them, and they are seeking ways to change it. If we take too hard an attitude and make a mistake in judgment, or too many mistakes in judgment, they are going to conclude that there is no hope except to become Communists, even if they are not now, because that is the only way they can make a change.

If we align ourselves in too many cases with the status quo, we ought to encourage changes within a non-Communist context. In this case, Admiral, the point that started this thinking in my case was, I think it was the 27th, when the non-Communist rebels, I believe, approached the Ambassador and said,

> We are in bad shape. We would like for you to help us join and meet with the junta and arrange a truce and see if we could not stop the fighting.

And he said he did not have authority. I believe we had two or three different reports, but one of them was that he did not have authority to intervene, to arrange a truce, and that he would not

make any move. The evidence will indicate he thought that their cause was hopeless.

I wonder if at that point, unless you were convinced that they were already completely gone, under the domination of Communists, it would not have been wise to intervene there before it got any worse and at least allow, say, an election in 6 months or 3 months and preserve the—that was before our intervention, and we could have guided it.

This question immediately arises. This, of course, goes by the board if you are convinced they are already dominated by the Communists. This is a very delicate matter of judgment, I mean, and your judgment, the CIA's judgment, as to the situation, that is a critical question. As you say, you do not make policy but your evaluation of what the situation is is the most important thing that is in the mind of those who do make policy. I do not know how we distinguish that. I think your evaluation of the situation as it was, your activity, is probably the most important element in whatever policy decision is made.

BEYOND THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Chair would yield, this seems to me, in the statement for the record, the record is either right or wrong, it is a question of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. On this particular point, the matter of degree is involved. It is not quite as simple as being black and white; at least the other evidence we had, the other testimony, is not so clear that as of a given moment on Monday or Tuesday, it was beyond the possibility of negotiation and control. Subsequently it did become that, I think.

Senator CASE. I have never seen a situation in my experience in which I have seen such a discrepancy between our Government representatives—and this seems to be unanimous on their part—and the press.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not too surprised. I think evaluating in a very chaotic situation just who was in control and the degree of their influence is extremely difficult. I am not a bit—well, a bit—I can easily see why there would be a difference of opinion of different people looking at this situation, and it came up sort of unexpectedly. I am very sympathetic to people having a little different view of what the situation was at a given time.

But the thing that has fascinated me most in this was the fact that the Ambassador refused to have anything to do with them in response to this offer of the rebels asking for intervention to bring about a truce. I think that was the 27th, was it not?

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he declined. Of course, as the Senator from New Jersey says about our intervention policy, this has gone by the boards partly as a response to the Communist activities in intervening themselves.

I think before that activity, we tried to live up to it, but once they undertook it, why then, we had to respond to it, at least give our response. We still mouth the old formulas, but we do not follow them.

That is the question I raise, that in the future, it seems to me, you have a very critical role to play as to the judgment of whether or not a future rebellion can be guided toward a non-Communist change without being too doctrinaire that anything except a military junta is likely to be Communist. I just offer that as an observation after hearing a good deal of this testimony.

Admiral RABORN. I certainly appreciate the significance of your remarks, Mr. Chairman.

SERVICE IN BOLIVIA

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that there is any hard and fast way. It always comes down to a matter of personal judgment.

[Deleted.]

There is no way for us or anyone else to exercise second-guess judgment. In a critical matter, it is the judgment of the people on the ground more so than you people up here as to just what is the situation. You have to depend on what they report to you. If they have good judgment to evaluate it properly and they report it properly, it all goes right. If there is bad judgment in the field, there is not much you can do about it except in the course of time discover whether they are bad or not. But as of a given moment, it is hard to do.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think later events bore out the correctness of what he was reporting.

The CHAIRMAN. You think so?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope so.

We are very much in your hands, the CIA. There is nothing we can do about it. We just have to trust you and hope we can help you if we can.

DEDICATION OF CIA STAFF

Admiral RABORN. I can say, Mr. Chairman, that although I have been with the Agency but a short time, and certainly have not had the opportunity to meet but a fraction of the people that populate the agency, I am, with the experience I have had in serving my country, proud to say that the people with whom I have come in contact in the Central Intelligence Agency are, in my opinion, some of the highest in their dedication and genuine desire to serve their country that I have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt about that

Admiral RABORN. They are superb, superbly trained. As a matter of fact, I have had come to my ears from several sources, and not gratuitously from the point of view of currying favor, that our intelligence service is looked up to and respected around the world. We have just one rival, one real rival, and that is the KGB, and this is quite a tug of war.

The CHAIRMAN. We wish you well. These things are really very difficult, very ominous. We have to try to use our best judgment and not to defeat our own purposes. If we make mistakes, I am afraid it will help bring about the very thing we are trying to avoid. I hope we can learn from this experience to find a better way than intervention, I mean intervention in the military sense.

This other kind of intervention, the covert intervention to influence the course of events, I am all for it if you do it properly.

Admiral RABORN. Yes, sir. It has its place.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else you wish to say?

These statements, I do not wish for the committee to release them. Of course, you can always make any statement you like if you want to. We have not released anybody else's, and I think it would be bad judgment on our part to have anything to do with it. Your original understanding that it is not to be released——

Admiral RABORN. Yes. I have no intentions to ever make a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. We will pick this up and you won't take that with you. We will have leave it here. We won't take it away.

Thank you very much.

Admiral RABORN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 12:10 p.m. in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

On motion by Senator Church, the committee voted to report favorably en bloc the nominations of Edward Clark, to be Ambassador to Australia; Leonard Marks, to be Director of the USIA; Livington T. Merchant, to be U.S. Executive Director for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Albert H. Moseman, to be Assistant Administrator for Technical Cooperation and Research, Agency for International Development; John D. Jernegan, to be Ambassador to Algeria; David D. Newsom, to be Ambassador to Libya; David M. Bane, to be Ambassador to Gabon; Parker T. Hart, to be Ambassador to Turkey; George J. Feldman, to be Ambassador to Malta; and Hugh H. Smythe, to be Ambassador to Syria.

The committee next considered the bill (S. 2031) (H.R. 8862), raising the ceiling on U.S. contributions to the International Council of Scientific Unions, reported to the committee by the ad hoc subcommittee chaired by Senator Church. On motion by Senator Church, the committee voted favorably to report H.R. 8862.

Senator Church also reported from the ad hoc subcommittee to the committee the bill (S. 2072), to authorize an annual appropriation of not to exceed $75,000 a year as a contribution toward the expenses of the International Committee of the Red Cross. On consideration, the bill was passed over without prejudice.

The committee informally discussed the proposed Consular Convention with the Soviet Union.

The committee agreed to the calling of Luis Muñoz on the Dominican Republic situation.

For a record of the proceedings, see the offical transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:55 p.m.]

DISCUSSION OF HEARINGS ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VIETNAM

FRIDAY, JULY 23, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 11:35 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Church, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, and Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

[On motion of Senator Aiken, seconded by Senator Church, the committee approved for report the nomination of Arthur J. Goldberg to be United States Ambassador to the United Nations.]

FORTHCOMING SESSIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the information of the committee, we have a meeting this afternoon, in case you have not received notice, with the former Governor of Puerto Rico, who is reputed to be knowledgeable about the Dominican Republic. He will come in executive session at 2:30 in the room in the Capitol, Muñoz Marin.

And it is planned that new Ambassador Lodge will be up for confirmation. If I had known it was going to be so short this morning, we might have had it today, but he is not in town today. I told him it would be Tuesday.

On Tuesday, it is Secretary Mann and Mr. Vaughn as well. The reason for that is we thought there had been several questions discussed in the course of the hearings, and we would be there to try to clarify any questions left in the committee's mind.

Are there any suggestions about any further witnesses in those hearings? Does anyone feel the need of any further witnesses?

Senator CHURCH. The Dominican Republic?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

BALANCE THE TESTIMONY

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the other day that you felt that we ought to balance the testimony by seeking some people outside the orbit of the Department, who are, of course, primarily concerned with justifying the action that they have taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is what Mr. Muñoz Marin is intending to do.

Senator CHURCH. I am very much in favor of bringing Mr. Muñoz in. But I think the committee might give some consideration to hearing some witnesses aside from Mr. Muñoz as the lone outsider.

The CHAIRMAN. We did give consideration, and the staff and I, but we could not think of either.

Senator CHURCH. What I was going to suggest is that there are or were some American newspapermen who were there and have been there and have considerable knowledge of the situation, and since they are American citizens, it would not violate the custom of this committee as to calling upon foreigners to make observations or to give testimony.

Senator SYMINGTON. Specifically?

Senator CHURCH. I have several names I would like to suggest, but I do not have them on the tip of my tongue.

But I know there are some that I think might shed considerable light. I know that some of the best information that we have gotten out of Vietnam which later events have tended to bear out has been information that came from newspapermen which was in conflict with offical policy. I think they are men of integrity by and large. And they have access to people that many of our State Department representatives do not contact as a matter of policy or as a matter of practice.

CONFLICTING NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS

The CHAIRMAN. I can only say we have discussed that with Mr. Holt, I did, at considerable length, and we concluded that the ones that we knew of, particularly Mr. Martin, Kurzman and Mr. Szulc, had written, we thought, all that they knew. And it is in conflict in some respects. It is available; in fact, I read a good deal of it. And we concluded that there was not much reason to call them.

That is the reason I raised it this morning. I wonder what the committee thought about it. We have not made a practice of it, but there is no prohibition against doing this. We wondered what they could add to what we already have in the way of their own reports. If the committee wishes to have any of them, I have no strong objection. It was only a question of whether it would serve any purpose.

Senator CHURCH. My thought was that possibly—and I am not personally aware of these men——

The CHAIRMAN. I have read three of them, at least.

Senator CHURCH. My thought was that newspapermen who may have been stationed there who had seen this thing all the way through, and who had some background knowledge of the situation by virtue of their being in the Dominican Republic throughout the period, or even prior to the outbreak, that if we have the right people to call this might give us added perspective.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I remember the testimony of Ambassador Bennett, he named two newspapermen as having been in a position of writing their stories from the standpoint of supporting the rebels before they came to the island.

Senator CASE. And a couple of the other side too, didn't they?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, I was going to mention that. He named a Szulc of the New York Times and somebody named Kurzman or something like that of the Washington Post.

The CHAIRMAN. Kurzman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Kurzman. And he also named Hendricks of the Miami Herald, or a wire service—I know him, he used to be with the Kansas City Star—and Dubois of the Chicago Tribune, as being equally determined in their position before they came to the island on the side of the right.

I believe someone asked him how he felt about Geyelin's article in the Wall Street Journal, and he said he thought it was fair. Then somebody asked him if he thought there was anybody else, and he said he thought Rowland Evans was fair. And there was one other person whose name I forget.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not remember Evans. The others, I recall.

Senator SYMINGTON. You will find it in the testimony.

In addition to which, Szulc has written an article in the Saturday Evening Post, which my wife just by coincidence pointed out to me last night, that makes the Ambassador look like sort of an ass and has some other stringent comments about it. I just glanced through it, I did not read it carefully.

The only problem is, as I see it, I think there is a great deal in Senator Church's thought. But if you got into this, I think you would have to hear all sides of it, and then there would be a question of the press.

OBJECTIVE OBSERVERS OR QUARRELING FACTIONALISTS

The CHAIRMAN. That was another angle, Mr. Holt thought. He said, "Where do you draw the line?" There are so many of them that have written about it they would feel discriminated against if they were not called.

The only one that I can recall that the Ambassador has said he thought—maybe there was another one, but he did say Geyelin was, he thought, an objective observer and writer. I remember that. There maybe have been other ones.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know there was Evans, and I am confident there was a third.

Mr. HOLT. I believe he mentioned Eric Sevareid.

Senator SYMINGTON. He mentioned Geyelin, Sevareid, and Evans being objective. He mentioned Szulc and the Washington Post man, Kurzman, or whatever his name was, as being totally unobjective, and Lee and Dubois and Hendricks as being totally unobjective on the right.

Senator CASE. Is this a hopeless thing, Mr. Chairman, to try and get some advice from people who will be above what looks like a bunch of quarreling factionalists? I do not know that we have to have this formally. I would like to have it just as a matter of personal guidance here, because it does seem to me that we get in this area more than any other area of the world just a kind of in-fighting factionalism and intrigue in the communications area that is a pain in the neck.

INVITATION TO MUÑOZ MARIN

Senator SYMINGTON. That was your idea about Muñoz Marin as this afternoon, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Pat is our expert in this area, and we talked about all of them we could. We had a hard time finding him. He happened to be on his vacation with his grandchildren in this country. We called and called and finally found him in New Jersey.

Senator CASE. Sensible fellow.

What is he doing in New Jersey?

Senator AIKEN. Let's get Luis Muñoz and then decide.

The CHAIRMAN. So, Pat thought, and I did, that here is a man that is no longer in active politics; that is, he is retired, I thought most gratefully, and he is a man with long experience, a most successful administrator himself. We thought he was the best we could think of. He is as thoroughly familiar with them, I think, as a man can be in that area and still not be connected directly with anybody in the quarrel. That is the reason we settled on him as at least the first one.

Senator CHURCH. I certainly agree——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to whitewash anything or bring it to a close. If there is someone you know of that the committee would like to call, I am willing to do it. But we considered these newspapermen, and we had some problem of whom to choose. It could go on indefinitely. But that is not final, the committee can always do what it chooses.

OBJECTIVE OR CRITICAL WRITING

Senator CHURCH. I just raised this question, and I see there are difficulties. It might be well if we are going to hear any, we should hear them all. I do not think we should just hear these endorsed by the American Ambassador. Of course, his view of who is objective is bound to be colored by policies he followed and what he thought was right. We have heard from the Ambassador and at length. If we are going to call newspapermen, we do not want to call on those which are pedigreed by——

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't think Geyelin's article was colored at all. I thought it was objective, and it is in a newspaper well known for being objective in this matter.

Senator CHURCH. What is his paper?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the Wall Street Journal. If it had any bias it would tend to be on the conservative side. But his article, I thought, was pretty good down the line. And it was not an endorsement by any means.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will say it was not, it was quite critical.

The CHAIRMAN. There was much that was critical. And yet, he said it was objective. That is what he said about it.

Senator CLARK. Could I make a suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A ONE-SIDED STORY

Senator CLARK. I think we are getting a one-sided story on this, despite the fact that we all ask a lot of questions. Of course, it is perfectly obvious that the membership of the committee is not in

accord at all as to whether what we did was right or good or wise, and this perhaps is not such a shame at all.

I do think Frank is right, that we ought to have some reputable newspaper people who were on the spot to come in and tell us what they think about it. But after all, we are all big business; we do not have to have every damned reporter who wants to come in and shoot off his face before the committee.

My suggestion would be that you and Hick sit down and see if you agree on one or two, or maybe only one, who out of your wisdom and experience you both agree are pretty objective, but would give us the slant of people who are on the scene and who are in official positions where they now have to justify a policy whether they believe in it or not in the first place. I would be fairly confident that you and Hick could agree on them.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would not buy that. I would say that if you have the Ambassador from the United States come up here and say there are three groups, that one group was very decided before they hit the island, and the other group on the right was very decided, and there were also some people in the middle, that either you put all three in, or you agree to take a person like Geyelin or Eric Sevareid and talk with them only, because they were in the middle according to the Government. I just do not feel that this committee can function at its best if it is just going to be a place that people that want to whine against American policy one way or the other could come up here and express their thoughts. What I would like to do is get information. You can say Muñoz Marin is a good friend of Bosch or is sympathetic with Bosch, and has some relationship with Betancourt, and so forth. I know he is a very close to Betancourt, but I think he is a big enough man to give us an important opinion.

I would hope that the committee, especially since I think a great deal of the press has been responsible for some of the gravest problems we have in foreign affairs, would be awful careful in who they pick to come up here, because it leaks out as to who we are talking to, and so forth.

Senator CLARK. I do not disagree with anything you say. I agree with it. All I say is, let the guy in the middle be picked by the ranking Republican and the chairman.

Senator WILLIAMS. I do not care who you pick. If we are going to have it, why not pick one on both sides and find out what the controversy is, and hear the one that they disagree the most with on each side?

The CHAIRMAN. First, I do not know whether we will have any at all.

Senator WILLIAMS. I mean if you did.

THE AMBASSADOR'S RECOMMENDATION

The CHAIRMAN. If we had any, it would appear that it would be logical to have the one whomever we would apparently agree is objective. We do not have enough time to just pursue all these people. I do not want to spend the rest of the summer on these things. We have the reports available, and I have read a lot of them. As you said, they are available to the committee; we can put them in the

record if you like or we can read them. A newspaperman is going to write all he knows anyway, he is under no inhibitions. You can see what Szulc said and what we have. I do not see how they can say any more than that, do you Pat?

Mr. HOLT. I would be surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. Muñoz has not written anything as far as I know. We do not really know. I have no idea what he is going to say.

If they want anyone at all, I would think they would be safe in having the man that the Ambassador who was on the spot says was an objective observer, but I am not recommending you have him. But if you have any, it seems to me that—I do not think we ought to have over one. Certainly, it is just because of time. I do not care whether you have one. I am not recommending that you have one. But if you have any, I think we should consider what the Ambassador, the man who does represent the Government says. I do not recommend it, but if you want it, I do not oppose it.

Senator CLARK. The trouble is that the Ambassador is on the spot, and anybody he thinks is objective is not necessarily going to be objective.

The CHAIRMAN. But with this assurance, that we are not getting one that is biased against him. He would feel hurt if we did and did not have another one, whereas if he gets one he says was all right——

Senator SYMINGTON. I was astounded after reading the article that he would say it was objective, because I thought it was rather critical.

Senator CLARK. He is a very able young fellow, and a nice guy too.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say if you are going to have anybody you ought to have him, but I do not recommend that you have any newspaperman. It is up to the committee to decide.

What do you think, Senator Hickenlooper?

THE MOST UNSATISFACTORY QUESTIONING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think we ought to get into this newspaper business. It is the most unsatisfactory questioning of all. They make, sometimes, some radical statements. They refuse to tell who they talked to or what the source of information is, and the Congress does not have the guts to make them do it. It is a most unsatisfactory thing.

You recall this fellow that teed off on South Vietnam in the Washington News—what was his name, Mr. Marcy, Colegrove?

The CHAIRMAN. [Albert] Colegrove.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He made some violent charges and so on.

Senator SYMINGTON. Ken Lucas was in on that, too.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will tell you something else about that. We went down there on an investigation stimulated by these violent charges. I could not find—Carl was down there—I could not find a single thing to justify what that fellow had said. We traced down his two sources. One of them was a broker down there, and the other was a skinner who got kicked out of the Philippines and was ever trying to make——

Senator CASE. What is a "skinner"?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Someone who is out to skin everybody he could get.

The other fellow was a discredited, so-called broker, he called himself a broker. He was always trying to get some kunshaw out of the people. He tried it in the Philippines and they kicked him out of there. He went over to Vietnam, and the Government of Vietnam and our people refused to have anything to do with him. His reputation was bad. He was the fellow that boiled up all this stuff and charged everybody with being crooks and so on.

Now, some of these newspapermen—I was going to tell Stu about Lucas. He was down there at the same time. Carl Marcy and I had breakfast with Lucas one morning down there. We went down there to investigate this thing, this charge. Lucas showed us the carbon copy of the story he had sent to his own newspaper saying that this fellow was off base, and that he could find no real foundation for the charges that he had made so bombastically and violently about Diem and all that sort of stuff down in South Vietnam.

I mean, you get into all kinds of applications with these newspapermen who want to make a name for themselves.

Senator SYMINGTON. With the testimony we had here in the hearings on lobbying, there were quite a few of them that were getting extra pay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Some of them were, yes.

If the committee wants to do it, I am not going to yell and scream about it. But I would not be in favor of getting into this newspaper business unless we really went into it with a lot of newspapers.

JULES DUBOIS AS LATIN AMERICA REPORTER

I do not know what Pat Holt thinks about it, but I think the most knowledgeable man on Latin America, although he may have developed a bias—I do not know—is Jules Dubois. He spent 35 years down in that country. He lives down there now, and that is where he has been. He was the fellow that was quite favorable to Castro at first, you know; he wrote a book about him.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Jules Dubois. He wrote a favorable article on Castro at first. Then he found out about the thing, he was off base, and he had the intestinal fortitude to back up and say what he is and that he was mistaken about him at first, and so on. I think Jules Dubois, who of course has over the years developed some pretty positive ideas about Latin America and the various countries down there, I presume that you can say that he has developed a bias of one kind or another; he has developed a line of thought about that whole line of operations in Latin America.

Now, Szulc is on the other side. Szulc is certainly biased if anybody is. I have seen him in several operations in Latin America and he is always like that.

Senator SYMINGTON. He gets paid by [Herbert] Matthews.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know he does. It is the Matthews school of thought.

Senator CASE. What do you mean?

Senator SYMINGTON. He works for the New York Times.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By the same token, if he gets into that you are going to get some personal opinions. I just do not like to get into that ball of wax.

JUSTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION

The CHAIRMAN. What we were looking for was not a newspaper man, but a private citizen, American citizen who knew about this. The one we came up with was Muñoz. Now, if there is another one comparable that knows about it, we would welcome him. Pat and I just did not come up with another name of this kind. We talked about the newspapermen, and we concluded that this was a fruitless thing, and mainly because those who were knowledgeable had written everything they knew and had published it, and it was available.

Senator CLARK. The only thing that bothers me is that as we close the record with Muñoz—and I think it was a stroke of genius to get Muñoz—he is the only witness that we have had heard who is not completely biased in support of the administration's position. We have had nothing but officials, every one of whom has the duty and the obligation to justify the administration's position.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. It is very difficult to get witnesses away from the administration.

Senator CASE. But this is the dilemma. I think it is good to talk about it. It is the first experience that I have had since I was on the committee. If we are to do anything, I think we ought to try to go beyond the official. It is a hard thing, and I can understand that.

BEYOND OFFICIAL SOURCES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think many of our hearings would be helped if we could go beyond the official sources of one kind or another, that is very true. But where are the people other than the special pleaders of one kind or another? When you get into that field, it is so broad. I certainly would not want to just have, myself, just two—let's say one picked because we think he is on one side and one picked because we think he is on the other—I think if we went into it, we would have to go into it with some reasonable thoroughness. We have gone into this. We have had Mann over here, and we have had the Ambassador here. We have had other State Department people here, and we have had the CIA people here. We have not limited our inquiry on the Government side to just one side.

Senator CASE. Are there people in academic life who are possibly useful here, or are they merely just reflectors of what they read, and so forth?

The CHAIRMAN. The ones here would only reflect their judgment of what they have read. As far as I can see, they would. Really, this is a very difficult problem, because it comes down eventually to a question of judgment of the conditions that existed there at the time, and people have different judgments. We have to draw our own conclusions just from the overall as to which one was more correct in his judgment of these developments.

Senator CLARK. Do you contemplate making a report?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not. If the committee wishes to, I would guess that the committee has many different views, and it would be very difficult for them as a committee to agree upon a report.

EDUCATIONAL HEARINGS

Senator CLARK. What is the purpose of holding an executive hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. There are several purposes. In the first place, it is highly educational to the members. Then, I think it is very healthy to bring in these people who can participate and let them know we are interested, and if this occurs again in Colombia or someplace else, they are very likely again to be brought in. We are watching what they do, and we hope it will make them educate them.

Senator CLARK. I agree with all that. If that is the only purpose of the hearings, then we do not need to have anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see any other purpose, unless the committee itself is willing and could get together on a report on the substance. I just think it would be impossible to do that. Now, each member has always, of course, has the right to go on the floor and give his estimate of what happened, and there is no restraint upon you or anyone else making his own report. I have done that in other hearings. We have had one on the Aswan Dam, and the committee had quite different views, and I make my own report and my estimate of whatever it was worth.

USE OF EXECUTIVE SESSION INFORMATION

Senator CLARK. How about in executive session, were you going to turn this testimony loose at some point?

The CHAIRMAN. It would not be turned loose except under two conditions: If the committee would vote to do that, as it rarely does—and even then, it would have to be sanitized and most of the interesting parts taken out, for security reasons—it is very bad policy to publish reports dealing with names as we did, and it would prejudice our relations to no end. So, I do not think that is—I think these hearings are what I call educational in nature, for our information.

Senator CLARK. You talk about our being able to make our own comments on the floor or elsewhere. I ask this in ignorance as a new member of the committee, as I have never been in a situation before where we have so much in executive session on my other committees. To what extent are we inhibited in giving our own report by the fact that what we have heard is taken in executive session and to that extent classified?

The CHAIRMAN. You are not allowed to use that record as such. Because it is executive session, that would violate the rules of the committee. But this is a matter of good judgment. There is nothing—for example, you can make a generalized statement that in this case you believe, assuming that you do believe, that the Ambassador was quite justified, that there was clear evidence of Communist takeover, and so on, and you could make it in those general terms. I do not think you should cite the record and say everything

the CIA memtioned and name names; this would be very bad and in violation, in my view, of the rules of the Senate and the committee.

Or take the other, if you say there was not sufficient evidence to justify the wire of the Ambassador, I think you are free to make that conclusion on your own, judging from what you heard in the committee. But you should not go into any details.

Senator CLARK. The thing probably to do would be to prepare what you want to say and then send it over to Carl or Pat and say, "Is this all right?"

Senator CASE. That would be putting an awful burden on them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the only purpose of that would be, that they would be of assistance in case you did attempt inadvertently to use specific statements of the CIA. Whatever one may think of the CIA, we are not at liberty to reveal what they think is right or wrong in specifics, because it would prejudice their operation. We cannot take that responsibility. But you could make your own conclusions as to whether this thing was done properly, and you could say the Ambassador acted improvidently, or wisely, whatever you may think.

Senator CLARK. I am not at all sure I want to.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to. But you can make your own statement about it. We do very often.

Senator CASE. I have enjoyed this discussion, Mr. Chairman. It has been helpful to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Holt and I wished we had found another man of comparable reputation and stature to Munõz, but we were unable to think of one.

IS THE COMMITTEE OVERLY INHIBITED

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, it may not be wise—and I recognize the problems that are involved in bringing the press in one way or another—but I do feel sometimes that we are overly inhibited in this committee. We are constantly getting most of our information from the one source that is defending official policy. We hold executive sessions, and these are not afterward open to the press. The impact of our inquiry is extremely limited on the Executive Department.

Hick says that there is a problem of special pleaders, and there is. But this is a problem that does not inhibit other committees that are constantly hearing testimony of special pleaders in their activities and making an assessment on the basis of that testimony.

I just think our action is so circumscribed and so limited that our influence is dwindling away. I do not know the answer to this, but I hate to feel like a kept woman and in the Executive Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you could find an answer to it.

You take these reporters. I think I know what Dubois thinks. He thinks that they made not altogether bad judgment, but he certainly thinks they made a bad judgment. It happens to be the one I think is so important. Geyelin and he agree on that one, too. But they do not agree on many things.

EVALUATION OF THE AMBASSADOR'S ACTIONS

The particular one is whether the Ambassador missed an opportunity on the 27th of accepting the role of a mediator. I think they agree on that. I find pretty general agreement on it. I do not remember what Dubois said about that. But this is a matter of judgment, whether or not he was right in his refusal to enter into the negotiations at that stage before the intervention. This, you can get out of reading what they said. When I think about it, I do not know what he could say very different from what he wrote on some of these key subjects.

Some of these other things, whether or not they allowed troops to pass through or not, are peripheral questions, and it is not important whether they did or did not. To me the thing that committed the President and the country was that judgment of the Ambassador that Americans were about to be slaughtered on the one hand, and the other one, his refusal to accept the offer when Molina came and asked them to mediate; he said, "There is no authority to mediate."

These are two key things where a matter of judgment is involved. There was more agreement than you think among reporters who have diverse views about the overall situation.

If this was so important to go all the way into it, and you were willing to hear all these reporters, I think maybe it would be all right. But I do not think the thing in the present state warrants that kind of a thing.

Senate CASE. Thank God it is downgraded.

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. This is not really so important as Vietnam. There is nothing like the danger inherent in Vietnam. If we want to try to get into something real deep, that is important enough to warrant it, it would be Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. But you see, we have declined to do that.

Senator CASE. That is because it is hot.

Senator CHURCH. That is because it is too hot.

Senator CASE. Not in the sense that—you cannot——

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think we ought to do about Vietnam?

Senator CHURCH. I think as a committee, there are a lot of things that we probably ought to be doing, but we have not done.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

Senator CHURCH. I think for one thing, we have never had any public hearings on the policy questions involved in Vietnam in which we called a lot of very knowledgeable and gifted people to give us some balanced judgment as to the correctness of the course we are pursuing. There have been many opportunities through the years as this thing has worsened, and as the tragedy has been compounded by just putting more of the same in, the same policy—every time it fails we do more of it. We have never undertaken to use this committee as a public forum in which to focus and register the protests and the dissent as well as the support for the official policy.

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The CHAIRMAN. We are right at a critical time, apparently. Do you think we ought to? I do not wish to try to block any proper role of the committee. Why don't you bring this up at the next meeting?

Senator CHURCH. I would be glad to. But I think our disposition all along—and it may be our continuing disposition—is not to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. We have Mr. Lodge coming on Tuesday. You give some thought to it, and you bring it to the committee, they will entertain it. We are dealing with very different things. I am not at all sure I am right in what I do or do not do in this myself, I mean aside from the committee, but I am inhibited in this far beyond what I would like for fear that I will make the thing worse.

Senator CASE. We have been talking about this for 4 or 5 years.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a hell of situation there, and I really do not know what to do. I feel that my hands are bound behind my back. I would like to do something, but I do not know what to do, Frank.

Senator CHURCH. I know. But the Senate has played a very real role in the past on matters of equal importance when no one could be certain what was right. If we proceed upon the assumption——

PAST EXAMPLES

The CHAIRMAN. Give me an example that is analogous to this. I would be interested.

Senator CHURCH. I can give you an example of the action of the Senate after the First World War in taking direct issue with the President on a matter of fundamental importance. The Senate may have been wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean on the League of Nations?

Senator CHURCH. On the League of Nations and the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, and the whole course of American policy was affected——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that is analogous. We were not in a war here that was a very dangerous one. That was after the war was over. That is a matter which I don't think is comparable. I would like to have a precedent for open hearings in a situation like this if you have one.

Senator CHURCH. I do not.

Senator CASE. What about the conduct in the Civil War?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have been thinking about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that is a very good precedent, do you, for having open hearings?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He says it is the worst kind of an operation.

Senator CASE. It is not. But I know Frank's frustration.

The CHAIRMAN. I feel frustrated too, Frank, but I do not know how to overcome it.

Senator CHURCH. Maybe there is not a way. But I think we ought to give more thought to possible ways than we have.

ACCEPTING OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. I think that we well might have more executive hearings. I have no objection to that. And I think maybe we have been too easy on McNamara and some of those in the years gone by, in accepting their optimistic statement. When I look back on it, and he told us by next April, he thought we could start taking them out, I frankly did not know enough to start questioning him.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought it was this fall they were going to start taking them out.

The CHAIRMAN. It was long after that. It was April, was it not?

Senator CASE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know enough to say, "Why, you are a bloody fool, this is absolute nonsense." I just did not know enough. He said it, and he has been out there. It was long after the fact that it began to be apparent that they had utterly misjudged the seriousness and the character of the whole thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have got a lot of things that you simply cannot get the answers to.

The CHAIRMAN. I just did not know enough.

BROADER EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For instance, I have never had answers responsive—in fact, we have not bored in very much with it—on the elimination of Diem. That is a very mysterious operation of some kind or another.

Senator CASE. When you use the word "operation," I think you put your finger on it. This is what we cannot do. We can criticize afterward, and I think we should.

Senator CHURCH. What I had in mind was that we cannot operate a direct policy. Perhaps in this war situation there is nothing that we can do in the way of public hearings that would not merely complicate everything for everyone, but I do think that we should begin to address ourselves in a public way in a much broader and deeper examination of our general thrust in foreign policy and the thinking behind it that has gotten us into this tragic quagmire in Vietnam. This sort of thing has to be done in a public way, and we have to go beyond the resources of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. If we do it in the course of the war, it affects the war.

THE COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

Senator CHURCH. I am not talking about Vietnam, I am talking about the whole present philosophical argument as it affects American foreign policy generally, which has led us into Vietnam, and the counsel on the one hand that believes that the assertion of American military power on a global scale is the effective way to resist communism, and those who take issue with this and argue for a different scale of priorities in the commitment of American military power. This is a very important, critical, basic question that underlies the thinking, colors the thinking, and leads us into these situations in the world. This is a role that I think the committee could take.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should have started that about 1958.

Senator CHURCH. I think we should have, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Or 1959. I just did not think of it. I just did not realize that this thing was as serious as it is.

Senator CHURCH. I recognize that it is a special situation that we have got to cope with in Vietnam, but the very process of thinking, the prevailing viewpoint in this country, and the orthodox view in this country which places the stamp of approval upon this sort of commitment in American power ought to be questioned. There will be other Vietnams. If anybody thinks that this war is the end of guerrilla wars, or is going to have any final effect upon guerrilla wars, or is going to contain or sanitize the world from Communist ideology, this in my opinion is profoundly wrong. If this committee could play a part in the opening the dialog for the future——

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should have done it in 1958 or 1959. But the truth is I was not conscious that this was a real problem. We were preoccupied with Berlin and other things. This was a very side issue to me.

A ROLE FOR THE COMMITTEE TO PLAY

Senator CASE. Is there any place that the committee might have in this thing comparable to what these teach-ins were, as a forum to which from time to time people may come and the Government may defend its policies? It seemed to me that these teach-ins ended up in general agreement that we were doing about the best we could, with a few exceptions. I do not know whether the committee ought to do this or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Frank, you bring it up on Tuesday, if you want to. If you find that precedent, I would be glad to have it.

Senator CASE. I will look into it. I have not any settled view as to what we should do with respect to Vietnam and the situation there, but I do think there is a role this committee must play, begin to play in looking ahead beyond Vietnam.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Frank, there is one thing I want to disagree a little bit with you on. I think it is a matter of semantics. You said this feeling of general approval of the situation. I do not think it is approval in many cases, I think it is support. I do not approve of everything that has gone on, but I feel in the public interest that I have got to support the mess we are in at the moment to try to find some solution for it and get out of it.

Senator CASE. I do, too.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So, I think it is more a question of being forced into a position of support.

Senator CHURCH. I do not disagree with you there. I am in the same position you are there, but I think we have got to look beyond Vietnam to an assessment of the whole situation.

Senator CASE. What does it mean to be a great power, its responsibilities?

Senator CHURCH. That is right. And what should its policy be? And what should the guidelines be, and so on? I think we could get lots of reflective testimony on this that could be useful.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have got one thing that is bothersome. We no longer move across the ocean on steamships that burn coal. The world moves awfully fast. We have got this terrible com-

plication of the necessity for speed in decisions if we get anyplace, and——

The CHAIRMAN. I am going out and talk to the press.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FRIDAY, JULY 23, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:30 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Morse, Church, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better come to order, gentlemen.

Gentlemen, we come to order. The Committee on Foreign Relations this afternoon continues its executive hearings on the situation in the Dominican Republic with the Honorable Luis Muñoz Marin, the distinguished former Governor of Puerto Rico. Governor Muñoz is a long-time and perceptive observer of the Caribbean area and has done more than anyone else to transform Puerto Rico from a poverty-ridden dependency to a growing prosperous and thriving commonwealth. He has kindly consented to give us the benefit of his experience and knowledge of the Dominican Republic and the impact of that on Latin America generally.

I want the Governor to be perfectly frank and candid, and I therefore emphasize the executive nature of this hearing, the record of which is not to be published. You will not be confronted by the daily press as to what you say here.

Governor, we are very pleased to have you. I think a proper way to start may be for you to give us just in your own words a little background of your experience there—many of us know it—and your association with the Santo Dominicans.

STATEMENT OF HON. LUIS MUÑOZ MARIN

Mr. MUÑOZ. My experience in regard to the Dominican Republic has been chiefly through the exiles in Puerto Rico of which Juan Bosch, the President that was overthrown by the military coup 2 years ago, was perhaps the principal one. My visits to the Dominican Republic have been few. During the Trujillo regime I was not a welcome guest. I did go through it once very rapidly from Haiti in 1942 when we were studying a possible almost overland route from the United States to Puerto Rico because of the submarine warfare that was going on at the time in the Caribbean. I went through very fast, so my only experience was that I was received by the Foreign Minister—I was then President of the Senate of Puerto Rico—and by members of the cabinet. They gave me a luncheon at

the country club and in many ways gave me the opportunities of praising the dictator Trujillo, which I persistently avoided.

At the beginning they said that Trujillo was very anxious to see me and to show his regard for the people of Puerto Rico, through me. But after I had been given several chances of praising him, speeches, after dinner speeches and this kind of thing—I stayed 3 or 4 days, I stayed at the American Embassy—and had refused to take them, the word came that the President had had to go into the country, that he would forgo the pleasure of seeing me. I understand this was the standard procedure over there until finally people weakened and said, "You are a great President," and then he would publish that in all the papers.

BOSCH'S INAUGURATION

That was my only experience during the Trujillo regime. I said I was not welcome there then. And I was there when Juan Bosch was inaugurated. I had the opportunity of——

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the occasion when President Johnson was also there?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes. When President Johnson, as Vice President, attended the inauguration representing the President, the then-President of the United States.

Then I revisited Santo Domingo about 3 months later, in June of 1963; in Puerto Rico we were all very enthusiastic about the fact that democracy had come to Santo Domingo after all the years of a very bloody and corrupt dictatorship. So, we decided to pay a tribute to freedom in Santo Domingo by sending the Casals orchestra to play the Beethoven Fifth Symphony in honor of freedom in Santo Domingo. Afterward, I heard, as we all saw in the papers later, that around that time the conspiracy that actually overturned the government in September was about to happen. So, the political power, the preventive political power of Beethoven, only prolonged the democracy in Santo Domingo for about 3 more months.

Then, of course, when Bosch was overthrown by a military coup and exiled, I was Governor of Puerto Rico and I gave instructions, no doubt violating protocol, that he be received with 21 guns. So, my attitude is not toward Bosch personally—I am his friend, I like him, he is an honest man, he is a very decent man, he is devoted to the good of his people—but I don't think he had the experience to withstand such a difficult situation as that which existed in Santo Domingo with the Trujilloist army in full bloom. Even though he did win the election—and it was a fair election which was observed by the OAS—by about a 62 percent majority, the Trujilloist army was too much. They have no respect for the electorate. They have no reason for having it. They have no tradition for having respect for the electorate as the basic decisionmaking body of a democracy. The decisionmaking body there is the army, unfortunately.

TRUJILLO'S ARMY

Senator MUNDT. May I ask, was the army still the same army that Trujillo had?

Mr. MUÑOZ. My understanding was it was pretty much the same, it is still the same.

Senator MUNDT. Officers and all?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Pardon.

Senator MUNDT. Officers and all?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

INEXPERIENCE OF BOSCH

Now, I do think that if Santo Domingo—we in Puerto Rico are accustomed to calling the whole republic Santo Domingo; its official name is Dominican Republic—had had in that situation a man of the shrewdness and the strength and the political know-how and the statesmanship of Mr. Betancourt of Venezuela, he might—I am not sure he would have—but he certainly would have had a much better chance of dealing with that situation than a good inexperienced man like Mr. Bosch had. However, Santo Domingo did not have that good luck.

That is my experience, my direct experience in Santo Domingo. I knew Bosch when he was an exile in Puerto Rico many years ago. Then he was in Mexico, he was in Cuba, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. He had had experience with Latin American democratic governments, some of them democratic and honest, like the Government of Costa Rica where he was in exile for some years, and some of them democratic and corrupt like the government of Prio in Cuba, where he was also in exile during several years. So, he had a good experience, a good background on the general theory but he did not have, as I see it, a way of applying it to his own Dominican people with whom he had not lived for over 24 years.

That was the situation then.

U.S. INTERVENTION JUSTIFIED

When the unfortunate present situation occurred—I think, of course, it is very unfortunate that it had to occur, I mean the landing of United States forces in Santo Domingo. However, I feel that the administration, on the basis of the information it had, was justified, first, as a matter of protecting the lives of Americans and foreigners in the Dominican Republic; and in the matter of preventing a Communist takeover, evidently the administration must have had the information that justified them in taking that measure. I cannot pass judgment on that and say, whether there really was a danger of a Communist takeover or not. I don't know. I would not be in a position to know. I suppose this committee would have means of being in a position to know much more about that than I would.

However, I will say that, as all you gentlemen surely realize, there won't be any revolution or political move of violence in Latin America, either for democratic forces to depose a military dictatorship or for nondemocratic forces to impose one, in which the Communists will not be present. There will be some Communists present. This is their mission, this is their profession, this is their training. You cannot judge the possibility of a Communist takeover by the fact that there are active Communists, because there are going to be active Communists everywhere.

REVOLUTION RELATED TO POLITICAL MATURITY

Does their activity threaten a Communist takeover which, of course, the United States and, as a matter of fact, the free world, cannot tolerate in the Caribbean? What the likelihood is, it is difficult for me to judge. But I would say that you have to judge that in relation to the political maturity of the country in which the situation occurs.

For instance, a number of Communists, much larger than there could have been in Santo Domingo, were active in Venezuela under the Betancourt presidency; they gave him a lot of trouble, but there was never any chance of any takeover by them. A smaller number of Communists, perhaps even not as well trained, in an immature political society, like the society of the Dominican Republic had to be after the 31 years of the Trujillo dictatorship, is a more likely event.

So, I would say that the President was, in my view, justified. I don't know how good his information was, but by the information he must have had before him he was justified in taking the action he did.

CALL FOR A REFERENDUM

What I think is of greater interest is not reviewing the past but seeing what can be done in the future. My own view on this Dominican situation has been--I don't think it can be put into effect any more, I think perhaps it could have been at the beginning—that the constitution of 1963 should be recognized provided only that the people of Santo Domingo, of the Dominican Republic—Santo Domingo is the capital—be given the opportunity in a referendum to say whether they accepted that or not, within, say, 30 or 60 days. Then if they accepted it, as I feel confident they would by a large marjority, then put the constitution to functioning again—under an arrangement, of course, in which proper measures would be taken to prevent harmful or dangerous Communist activity, which may have been to exile the Communists or maybe not to exile them, because if you try to exile them out you only exile them under and that might be worse under the Dominican situation—and take steps to sterilize the army of its political capabilities.

These two things, and then a good economic development and aid plan by the Alliance for Progress, a vigorous one, with the armed forces being reduced from their political function, and the Communists being held at bay—perhaps "at bay" is a bad word because it is a war kind of a word, but I mean being under proper surveillance, under proper control in whichever way this would be possible.

Good economic aid, good technical assistance, and democracy functioning—then we would have done something to prevent a recurrence of the same cycle in the future. The cycle in the past has worked as follows: Democratic elections are held, somebody gets elected. Either he begins to act in the way the army wants him to act, in which case he does not reform the Dominican system and the revolution, the deep revolution will be always latent, because there will always be a latent revolution under the system until the

economic system, the social system is under democratic institutions, thoroughly reformed; or else he doesn't do what the army wants him to do, and then, whoever might be the president, we shoud have the pleasure of having him again as our guest in Puerto Rico.

A SPLENDID SYMBOL FOR THE PEOPLE

Reviving the 1963 constitution would have been a symbol. Besides a viable, a basically viable action, it would have been a symbol of what was put down by force, put back up again by votes; it would have been a splendid symbol for the Dominican people, for the United States insofar as the United States had undertaken some responsibilities.

As I see by the papers, at least, I think that is no longer a viable solution. I think even the constitutionalists have admitted that they will consider something else than reviving the constitution. So, as we say in Spanish, "we can't be more popist than the Pope."

But still I would try by whatever means would be at hand, or legitimately available, I would try to so manage that when civilian government was reestablished in Santo Domingo, by whatever agreement and in whichever way, measures could be taken to eliminate the Trujillo elements from the armed forces and to reduce those forces to the proper size and function, and, of course, to control whatever Communist menace there might be. There is no doubt some Communist menace is practically in every country, excepting in Puerto Rico. I think it would be possible to even establish in good faith and in terms of good will technical assistance in the way of detecting communism by the proper agencies of the United States and the proper agencies of the stabilized Dominican Government.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say, technical assistance to detect Communists?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes, so that we can know, so we can pass a fair judgment on when there is a Communist danger and when there isn't.

COMMUNISTS IN PUERTO RICO

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any in Puerto Rico?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Twenty-four.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four Communists?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know exactly?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes, just exactly. Some may have died since I left, a natural death, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they? Are they free?

Mr. MUÑOZ. They are in Puerto Rico and they are free.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it happen you have these 24? You cultivate them just up to that point?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they doing, anything?

Mr. MUÑOZ. They picket once in awhile.

Senator CASE. They have a soccer game?

Mr. MUÑOZ. They picket once in awhile. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you allow any more than that?

Mr. MUÑOZ. By law we have to allow as many as they want to be, but by good democratic practice and by good economic development the limit has been 24.

Senator CHURCH. Don't let the number rise, Governor.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Pardon?

Senator CHURCH. Don't let the number rise to 54.

Senator CLARK. Or 58.

Mr. MUÑOZ. No, I say 24. My remembrance is, I have not been Governor for now 6 months, but this was the number the police gave me the last time, with their names. The police, of course, are in close cooperation with the FBI. The FBI gives them technical assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Well, Governor, that is a very interesting statement. I particularly like your suggestion as to what might be done in the future.

In view of our rather goodly attendance this afternoon, I will just ask a few questions and we will try to abide by the 10-minute rule so that everyone may have an opportunity in the first round for a few questions.

SHOULD THE U.S. SUPPORT BOSCH

You have already made, I think, statements about Juan Bosch. You know him well. Would you mind saying anything further about your opinion of him? If I understand it correctly, he is a very good man, but lacking in political experience, which he couldn't have had, of course, being in exile.

Mr. MUÑOZ. He couldn't have had it in Santo Domingo. He has had some, at least a chance of political observation, in other countries as an exile.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You didn't say whether or not you thought the United States should support him to return to power. It was the constitution rather than Bosch that you thought was important.

Mr. MUÑOZ. If the Dominican people has insisted on that, I suppose democratically it should have been done. But I don't think Bosch himself wanted to be President of Santo Domingo again.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Mr. MUÑOZ. He was interested in the constitution as a matter of principle, that somebody should be elected by the Congress that had been deposed who would be the legitimate successor under the constitution, because the other two in the succession line were out of the country. Such man would take up the presidency and complete the term for which Bosch had been duly elected.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, have you been consulted by the administration regarding the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No, I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. You played no part in any negotiations?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I have not. I did ask to see the President and gave him my views on it, but that is about the only thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that before or after the coup?

Mr. MUÑOZ. After the coup.

The CHAIRMAN. Afterward.

CIVILIAN AGITATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Did you know about or anticipate that the coup on April 24 would take place?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not. It came as a surprise?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a rumor that——

Mr. MUÑOZ. There has been a pretty strong civilian agitation in the Dominican Republic for the past 4 or 5 months before the intervention, to bring Bosch back. It was the middle-class. The newspapers published, not only in the capital but in many of the provinces, long lists of middle-class and professional people, I mean 3,000, 4,000 or 5,000 signatures in this province, in the next province, in the other province, claiming that Bosch should return and complete his term, the restoration of the constitution. I had seen that. But I hadn't followed it, I hadn't followed the results of it. Then I was up here in the States doing something else. Since I stopped being Governor of Puerto Rico I have a tendency to hide in the woods, preferably of New Jersey——

Senator CASE. Tell me where you go.

The CHAIRMAN. It is secret.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Around Pompton Lakes.

Senator CASE. I hope you always come there. The Ramapo?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. I told Senator Case you must have gotten lost.

Senator CASE. I know where he stays. I know the guy he stays with now, a great friend of mine.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

So, I just lost the thread between those thousands of signatures of doctors and lawyers and merchants and what developed on April 24.

PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST ROLE

The CHAIRMAN. I would gather from what you have said that you do not feel you are in a position to give a personal assessment of the Communist role in the rebel movement, you have no information.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I couldn't. I do not have any.

I would have less correct information than government agencies and also—possibly I have less incorrect information than government agencies.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you call that de minimis in its total impact?

Senator CASE. That is a scintilla. [Laughter.]

A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Here is an interesting quote. Mr. Bosch is quoted as saying the following, I wonder if you would care to comment on it.

He says:

> In April 1965, a second Cuba could not have been in the making in Santo Domingo. What erupted was—and is—a democratic and nationalistic revolution. No Latin American nation today can accept a democracy which does not also offer social

equality and economic justice. It was a costly political blunder to look on it as a revolution which was in danger of drifting toward communism.

Would you venture an opinion about that?

Mr. MUÑOZ. That is, in my opinion, the kind of revolution it was.

However, whether it was in danger from Communists or not, I couldn't say, because I wouldn't have the elements of judgment for it. But I do know that is the kind of revolution it was, and all the movement of people I have described in the provinces was the buildup, the ideologically democratic, and emotional buildup of the movement.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you agree it was that kind of a revolution; what you do not have information about is whether or not after it started the Communists were capable or about to take it over?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I couldn't be able to pass judgment on it. There were Communists there and there will be in every Latin American revolution, but how strong in relation to the maturity of the Dominican people I don't know. I do know that they would not have to be so strong to be dangerous in a democratically immature country like Santo Domingo than they would have to be in a much more mature country like Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay.

THE USE OF FORCE WILL PRODUCE MORE COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. He says:

I am certain that the use of force by the United States in the Dominican Republic will produce more Communists in Santo Domingo and in Latin America than all the propaganda of Russia, China, and Cuba combined.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. MUÑOZ. That, unfortunately, may be true. I could make a psychological estimate of that and say there is that danger and the United States, therefore, in that respect finds itself between the devil and the deep blue sea.

If you don't try to restrain the Communists and they turn out to be really dangerous, you run the danger of a takeover. If you do restrain them, whether with good or insufficient motivation, you run the danger of conveying the sense that the United States is preventing democratic development. This is one of the punishments that the United States has to pay for its sin of not having remained in the 19th century.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a difficult dilemma.

Do you think the United States was pursuing a realistic aim in seeking to constitute a broadbased junta as an alternative government which would siphon off the democratic Bosch supporters from the rebel side, leaving the Communists isolated?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Once the situation was created there, as I have indicated, my view of the best thing that can be done so far as the Dominican people, as well as for the hemisphere and for the good name of the United States, would be to use in whichever proper way would be possible the influence of the United States directly or through the OAS to make a return to stable, peaceful conditions, not aimed only at this immediate return, but at developing under those peaceful conditions a situation regarding communism and regarding militarism that would tend not to facilitate the recurrence

of the same undemocratic actions by the military or by Communists in Santo Domingo.

POPULAR FEELING OUTSIDE OF SANTO DOMINGO

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an opinion as to what the state of popular feeling in the Dominican Republic is today, particularly outside of the city of Santo Domingo?

Mr. MUÑOZ. This is very difficult for me, but from observers there and from my sense of how a Caribbean people would react to things, which I don't claim to be 100-percent trustworthy, but it is the best I can do on the question, I would judge that the constitutionalist issue was a very strong one. It was the un-Trujillo issue, it was the anti-Trujillo issue. Besides, it had the democratic content to it: the restoration of the constitution that had been overthrown by the military.

If the constitution had defects probably they could have been cured later by its own amending process; but there was the symbol and it was such a good symbol, such a deeply searching symbol into the dormant but strong aspirations for democracy that every Latin American people have. If they haven't gotten democracy it is not because they don't aspire to it but because they were not historically trained to establish it and keep it. I think that if the constitution had been put to a vote—shall be bring it back or not—the country would have responded by 70, 80 percent, by a large majority, in the affirmative. Some of them might never wish Bosch to come back, some of them might, but the constitution, yes. We should help to prevent those 31 Trujillo years from starting again.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MUÑOZ. And I am afraid of these generals, Wessin y Wessin and other Trujillista generals and Imbert, although he could not be called a true Trujillista since he was one of those who shot Trujillo.

Senator SYMINGTON. Had not been what?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Adverse to Trujillo in former times.

The CHAIRMAN. It is reported that he killed his brother.

Mr. MUÑOZ. This report I have seen, but I know nothing beyond that.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Morse.

WHAT THE OAS SHOULD DO

Senator MORSE. Governor, in your opinion what can and should the OAS do to try to help bring about stability and peace in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MUÑOZ. They are now trying something. It is not what I would have preferred. I would have preferred just the straight constitutional issue, restoration with, of course, a referendum supporting it, but I haven't kept track of the situation recently.

I hope that they haven't lost sight of the necessity for not just reestablishing the absence of war, but of creating conditions in regard to communism and the military that would tend to give democratic procedures more ample elbow room in which to develop.

Senator MORSE. If the group representing the Organization of American States goes ahead with trying to implement a plan that

to a considerable degree sanctions the restoration of a compromise government with the military junta a part of it, will that not create some serious problems throughout Latin America in those areas that are very antagonistic to juntas?

Mr. MUÑOZ. It would depend on what kind of arrangement was reached. I do believe that the United States, acting principally through fraternal diplomacy in the OAS, could create a solution through some other means similar to the one I was describing when I spoke of the restoration of the 1963 constitution.

OAS PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Senator MORSE. What possibilities do you think there are that you can get substantial support within the OAS for the establishment of an OAS peacekeeping force?

Mr. MUÑOZ. The OAS with United States funds is paying the military as well as the civilian service of the Dominican junta government. This is done, of course, obviously with a view of having some kind of a government for housekeeping purposes in the republic at large.

Somebody has got to be there to arrest a thief who steals a chicken. Somebody has got to be there to regulate traffic. Somebody has got to be there to do the elemental peacekeeping duties, peacekeeping among individual citizens, to keep the court system going and so on. This in practice has been a necessity since the OAS couldn't establish a military service all over the Republic of Santo Domingo. However, the OAS controls the national bank. The OAS pays these soldiers and generals, so at any moment in which the OAS decided not to pay them something would have to give. I should think that even just by saying, "I can't pay for eight battalions, I can only pay for six," you would start something.

But don't let the soldiers, the rank and file, join the ranks of the unemployed which are tremendous already. Just create through economic aid some kind of a civilian construction corps where the enlisted men and petty officers can continue to earn their living.

DID THE UNITED STATES BECOME INVOLVED IN THE REVOLUTION?

Senator MORSE. Do you think there is considerable feeling in many parts of Latin America that the United States went beyond its right to intervene to the extent of evacuating nationals, Americans and others, and it has become involved interventionwise in the revolution itself?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes, I think there is important feeling, certainly there was very much in the beginning, in Latin America against that. To have such feeling they wouldn't have to go into the reasons, the motivations, the compulsions, the information on which the administration acted. Just the fact that it happened after so many years in which it hadn't happened would produce that feeling. That is one of the reasons why I feel that the United States should try as hard as possible—and I have no reason to suppose the administration is not trying—to solve the Dominican situation on a more permanent basis than just a somewhat more prolonged cease-fire.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that the part the United States played in the Dominican scene over and above the use of troops to evacuate nationals has weakened our prestige among democratic groups and forces in a considerable number of Latin American countries?

Mr. MUÑOZ. It probably, has done harm to it. But as I say, this very unfortunate situation—I don't mean the actions of the United States, but the events that gave rise to the sense that those actions were needed—could be turned into a blessing in disguise if, as a result of it, stabilizing forces, not merely what I have been calling a more prolonged cease-fire, could be not in movement—forces tending against militarism, communism, economic underdevelopment. If you could work at those three points and in bringing about elections in 6 or 9 months, if you can work it that way, the United States, I think, will recoup whatever prestige it has lost in the situation.

POSSIBILITY OF OTHER MILITARY JUNTAS

Senator MORSE. What are your views, Governor, as to the probabilities of military junta coups being encouraged in some other Latin American countries as a result of the recognition of the military junta in the Dominican Republic and the record of the United States recognition of military juntas elsewhere in Latin America?

Mr. MUÑOZ. It hasn't been recognized in the diplomatic sense, at least in Santo Domingo.

Senator MORSE. I mean the recognition of December 1963, if recognition by the United States——

Mr. MUÑOZ. Oh yes.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. Of this junta in the first place.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

Senator MORSE. What do you think?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I think it was an adverse thing. On the other hand, how can you help it? Mr. Betancourt——

Senator MORSE. Don't recognize it?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Mr. Betancourt has a proposed solution to that. I don't know that it is his only or whether it has been discussed in other quarters; his feeling is that recognition or not recognition of any government that has overthrown an elected government should be a matter of the OAS and not of any individual American country.

Senator MORSE. That is what I am leading to.

INSURE AMERICAN PRESTIGE

I would like to know your views as to whether or not the policy of the U.S. recognition of military juntas without consultation through the Organization of American States has tended to injure our prestige in those countries where forces, democratic forces, are at work trying to strengthen constitutional government?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes, I think it has had that effect. To what degree, I wouldn't be able to say, but they do have that effect in some degree.

But what can you do? I mean under the Kennedy administration this was done this way, it was done in the case of Peru, it was done in the case of Bosch in Santo Domingo.

Senator MORSE. If you ask me, "What you can do," my answer is, "Just don't recognize them."

Mr. MUÑOZ. And find yourself perhaps at the end of 2 years or 1 year, 1½ or 3 years not recognizing one-third of the governments in Latin America.

Senator MORSE. That is exactly right. I think that is the only way you will get freedom established down there as strong as the most powerful country from—if the hemisphere continues to build up these militarists you never are going to get freedom established.

Mr. MUÑOZ. If nonrecognition meant something, it would be a tough policy, if it meant something in practice, if it meant cutting off airplane landing and cutting off shipping, it could be a very drastic thing. It might be a dangerous and possibly saving surgical operation.

Senator MORSE. The price of freedom comes high.

Senator CASE. But that is intervention; isn't it?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Inaction itself would be intervention.

EFFECTIVE NONRECOGNITION

Senator CASE. I suggest that effective nonrecognition of the kind of the Governor was just spelling out would be intervention.

Senator MORSE. Not at all.

You simply, recognize the fact that you can't encourage freedom by knocking it down by recognizing militarists and that is what we have been doing for too long a time in Latin America. As long as we keep doing it we are going to be the No. 1 cause of lack of stability in Latin America and we are today.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I want to say, Senator, that I wouldn't say this in public, because the word "intervention" like the word "sovereignty"—are two words that are both sacred and obsolescent. [Laughter.] But I do say that.

Senator MORSE. People still die for them, don't forget.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Under some other word, intervention is not always quite as bad as it sounds, if it is carried out by a number of friendly Latin American countries.

Senator MORSE. It is not obsolescent, Governor, so long as people die for it.

Mr. MUÑOZ. By intervening in the name of democracy, if it is sincerely done, you are saving a people from being intervened by their own military forces—intervened in their freedom and in their dignity, in their economic opportunities, in their hope. The people of Santo Domingo were under the intervention of the Trujillo dictatorship for 31 years, enjoying sovereignty and the other kind of nonintervention.

Senator MORSE. Being denied constitutional rights.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Of course, it is a very difficult problem. Somebody has to act in a self-justificatory way and we are always careful of that because the tendency to self-justification in very strong.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

OAS PROCRASTINATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Governor, I think there has always been a great deal of confusion and thinking in definition of terms. I think the idea "sovereignty" means that a people have the right to determine their own form of government, type of government. We say that one way to determine that is by so-called elections—I say "so-called" because in many countries the elections are really not the free expression of the people.

We are also confused, I think, a lot of us in our own minds, about constitutionalism but above all, I think it has been quite a general policy in most countries to recognize a regime that is in control of a country where it establishes itself as able to control the situation and to prevent unrest and disturbance and so on and more or less stabilize the situation, regardless of whether they have a formal concept of the type government that they have. I think usually we have followed that policy. There may have been some exceptions.

But when we get down to the OAS operations, I don't believe our experience with the OAS has been too encouraging, for me anyway, and I have been very interested in Latin America for years. We see procrastination and the refusal of the OAS to come to grips with expedition of these problems involved.

Many times it seems that a problem should be solved rather quickly because its elements are out in the open for everybody to see. Yet we see hesitation, procrastination, delays, and this, that, and the other thing. I am not one who wants to blame the United States for everything. I think at least something on the plus side can be credited to the United States in various fields.

But I think some criticism also has to be directed as the failure of the OAS to vigorously take hold of these problems and stop their interminable oratorical outbursts which go on ad infinitum in so many of these conferences and discussions. Until we can get the OAS, the States of the Americas, to really come to grips with these things and realistically approach them, I am afraid sometimes we are going to have to substitute action for inaction.

MOB WAITING FOR A LEADER

I have become convinced from everything I have read and heard that this so-called revolutionary junta is about to take over down there and that the small hard core of dedicated and disciplined, trained Communists in there were rapidly moving into control of that movement. I don't think there is any question but what if we hadn't taken some action there, that the Communists would have controlled it, not that all those people were Communists at all that were taking part in the thing. But you can drive a bunch of sheep with one dog and do a pretty good job of it, without comparing these people to dogs, I don't mean that. I mean the mob, the mass group. Usually they are leaderless and some strong leader comes in and he can run the whole outfit.

Mr. MUÑOZ. You have some canine experts to be sure that they are dogs or not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

Mr. MUÑOZ. You should have some canine experts, according to your own imagery there.

I mean, Senator, that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a figurative statement.

Mr. MUÑOZ. On the information that the administration had relating to a Communist takeover, I have no doubt that there could be a not unreasonable thought that they would feel that the administration could proceed as they did. I cannot, however, evaluate the accuracy of the information.

Senator CASE. You are not just being a loyal Democrat.

Senator Morse is smiling. You really mean this, you mean the Government would have operated this way whether it was Republican or Democratic?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Oh, surely.

Senator MORSE. Faith is a wonderful thing.

Senator CASE. Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Chairman.

UNDESIRABLE LEADERSHIP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are all trying to find solutions to these matters. It is sort of an idealistic theory to say let people alone and they will establish governments of personal dignity and responsibility and all this, that, and the other thing. But you come up to the realism of the situation quite often, and especially where you get emotional mass uprisings of this kind. Then this undesirable leadership, which is trained in such activities, finds a very, very fertile field to operate in and can get in and take hold of it.

Once they get hold of it, just as they have in many countries, once this little coterie or cadre gets hold of this situation, the publicity media, hold of the arms, then they have it and the poor people who are really struggling for something that is idealistic have nothing to say about it and become enslaved.

Mr. MUÑOZ. That is a situation. On the other hand, if you have a military dictatorship, it will tend to produce a much stronger Communist movement and a much stronger chance of a democratic movement being sympathetic or at least not entirely unsympathetic to the Communist idea when that military dictatorship is finally overthrown—as they always do get finally overthrown.

So, this is your delicate balance. Some people no doubt feel easier seeing there is a world struggle between communism and democracy and that this is the basic thing of importance to the world. They feel easier with a military junta that will restrain all discrepancies, all opposition with a strong hand; and, of course, in restraining Communists they will also restrain liberals. But so far as the world struggle is concerned, some people feel safer with that than with a democracy. I don't believe that in the long run they are right——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know what a liberal is.

Mr. MUÑOZ [continuing]. Because the military strong government will produce, has produced, the other kind of movement.

NEED FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A military takeover almost invariably is a dictatorship. It is a dictatorship. But there are occasions when you have to have strength of central government to hold these things in line. When you get mob action that can very easily get

into a Communist dictatorship, let's say, I think that action is needed on occasions, rather than inaction or ineffectual discussion.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Certainly that is sometimes needed in order to maintain some chance of saving life. But that medicine should always be administered as a last resort. I should say with doubt, but with much doubt, that that last resort should not be needed.

I think sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty, has values but I don't think it has the same value, at this time in the 20th century that it had in the 19th century. I think it has to be limited for the sake of the people being more sovereign as to their own rights, as to their own dignities, as to their own personal feelings. But that should be by the people themselves through their contribution or, as Jefferson said, "through their right of further revolution."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what I meant by sovereignty, the sovereignty of the people.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

I would have an OAS force stay in Santo Domingo without intervening, without intervening with anything, either with constitution-making or with lawmaking, only not allowing a democratic government to be overthrown by force. This would be their only function.

Now, whether it is humanly possible that an armed force will not then become subject to certain influences to go beyond that or not, I don't know. But if you could accomplish this, democracy would be served.

If you could accomplish that, you could really get a country like Santo Domingo going and get real democratic training and gradually eliminate the inter-American force; but it would not be the same as the Marine intervention between 1916 and 1924, which was a bond-rescue operation and where the intervention went quite beyond the mere keeping of order. It went into the making of policy as no doubt people who had made investments felt that they had a right to be somehow guaranteed. That motive is not present today.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Without disagreeing——

Mr. MUÑOZ. I just mention this. I don't know that this would be a totally practical possibility, I am sorry to say.

COMPARISON TO INTERVENTION IN MISSISSIPPI

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just wonder whether that would be intervention itself where you put armed forces in there to control the action of the people. I don't necessarily disagree with your theory——

Mr. MUÑOZ. It would be much lighter——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Than OAS force.

Mr. MUÑOZ. It would be much lighter than intervention in Mississippi, for instance, but it would be intervention.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, intervention——

Mr. MUÑOZ. But it could be helpful intervention if carried on with the help of several OAS countries and it will not be called, according to the present meaning, to be unilateral, or nearly unilateral action by the United States.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. OK, my time is up, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

RECOGNIZING OTHER FORMS OF TYRANNY

Senator CHURCH. Governor, I listened with great interest to your testimony. I understand something that probably this question of recognition first raised by Senator Morse and commented on by Senator Hickenlooper, because we seem to apply such different standards in different places. I agree with Senator Hickenlooper when he says that recognition does not connote approval. There is a practical necessity of dealing with governments that are there, but I see a total failure on our part to abide by these standards when it comes to other very big and important countries whose government are also there, such as the Government of China, so these standards have never been governing standards.

It seems to me when the question has been whether or not we should recognize Communist regimes, we don't seem to have the same difficulty with other forms of tyranny in connection with recognition as we have with that particular form. So, I think we have this inconsistent pattern and no standard that we have applied to the question of recognition.

But I would want to get back to your statement with respect to the political immaturity of the Dominican Republic and the fact that a fewer number of Communists might take over the national revolution there than in a mature country. I think that is not arguable. I believe we have been told that some 54 or 58 participants have been identified to the satisfaction of the Government of the United States as having been Communists.

Now, assuming that is so, or that there even might have been more than that number, several hundred involved, would you think that that number of Communists in a national revolution of this sort would be or might be a sufficient number to take over and control the revolution?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I have no way of passing any confident judgment on that, but in the abstract I would say that 58 Communists could be enough depending on other circumstances.

Senator CHURCH. If they were in the key position?

ARMING CIVILIANS

Mr. MUÑOZ. In this revolution, in the pro-Bosch movement, the army people who were pro-Bosch did a very dangerous thing, but as a revolutionist in their place I would have done exactly the same, which is to arm the civilians. It is the only way that you can hold an army in check in Santo Domingo and in many other Latin American countries. It is dangerous because you are arming besides responsible rebels, a number of kids who are irresponsible. You are arming a bunch of people who may actually be gunning for their personal enemies. You are no doubt arming the 58 Communists who also have the ability of leadership in getting other people to act even though the others are not Communists, I mean in mob situations. That could have added to the danger, beyond any question, of a takeover; but I say if I had been a democratic Santo Domingo revolutionist I would have done the same thing,

otherwise the army would have finished me up in 6 hours, finished my cause and that of my people.

AN OPPORTUNITY TO REESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

Senator CHURCH. Do you think, Governor, in having made the decision to intervene and in having sent 20,000 troops in the Dominican Republic, we now have assumed the responsibility of not only seeing to it that Communists do not seize control but also that people of the Dominican Republic are now afforded an opportunity to develop democratic government and that the rest of Latin America can charge us with that responsibility?

Mr. MUÑOZ. That we had prevented them from establishing a democratic government?

Well, there is that——

Senator CHURCH. No, what I said, Governor, was, having intervened to prevent what we felt was the risk of a Communist takeover, we are now charged with doing more than that because we did stop a revolution that was in process directed against the military junta. What we are now charged with is the responsibility of seeing to it that the people of the Dominican Republic have a fair opportunity to reestablish a democractic government. The opinion in Latin America lies in this direction; is that a fair statement of your view, or is it merely my view?

Mr. MUÑOZ. If I understand you correctly, it is a fair statement of my view. Let's see if I do understand you correctly.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. MUÑOZ. You say the United States is charged, by that you mean that charges are made against the United States?

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. MUÑOZ.Yes, this of course is true in a part of Latin American opinion.

Then you use the word "charge" again, but in the last instance I think you mean "charged with," vested with the responsibility.

Senator CHURCH. Yes

Mr. MUÑOZ. Right. That is where I was confused at first.

I think both things are right. The United States is being charged, right or wrong, with this action, accused of it, and it is charged, it is invested with the responsibility which we all hope can be developed, to encourage and help a real restoration of democracy in Santo Domingo on a long term basis. I do not mean that there should be a prolonged stay by the OAS, but that the conditions should be established as shortly as possible for long-term fundamental democratic development.

NEED FOR AN OAS FORCE

Senator CHURCH. I am told, Governor, by some who have been close to the scene, that agreement can be reached on everything except two essentials: Who will control the army and who will control the police. As to this no progress whatever is made because the various factions are unyielding.

Now, if the people are to have any chance for a democratic regime responsible to the people, it seems to me these are the two questions that must be settled, not only with respect to who will be

in charge with respect to a whittling away on the size and prerogative of the army and building a competent peacekeeping force that will be controlled by the civilian government.

Does this mean that an OAS force must remain in the country to enforce decisions against the army and to see that the army is in fact reduced in size and that such a democratic government, free elections and so on, all that go with it, has some chance to be born and some chance to stabilize?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes. I believe that we will find that is the only way of achieving that.

Senator CHURCH. In other words, there is no immediate prospect, given the present circumstances, that the United States withdraw its military force unless an adequate OAS force were to be substituted. Is that your opinion?

Mr. MUÑOZ. But the OAS element should be considerably larger than a token in regard to the U.S. part of it. In passing, I don't know why the constitutionalists are called rebels; they are rebelling against what? There is no recognized government, they are rebelling in favor of a constitution. In that sense the Supreme Court of the United States could be called rebels in its usual duty of upholding the Constitution of the United States.

Senator CASE. It has been alleged.

Mr. MUÑOZ. It has been alleged. [Laughter.]

MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY

You have to maintain peace and stability, you have to disarm all those thousands of armed civilians. I don't see how the democratic forces—among which there may be Communists, no question about that, but they are democratic forces basically—I don't see how the democratic forces could agree to disarm the civilians which are their only guarantee against military dictatorship unless they have some measure of control over the armed forces. This may be an unsolvable impasse, and it may lead to a more prolonged OAS presence, which I think can be very healthy. It may be costly and disagreeable, but it may be very healthy because the keeping of order would be in the hands of people who have not—I hope they will never have—a political axe to grind, an internal Dominican axe to grind, and the democratic forces could proceed under the peace guaranteed by that unpolitical power. Of course, there is always a danger that it might want to become political in more or less subtle ways that would have to be watched.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

THE BIRD'S NEST

Senator AIKEN. I found the Governor's opinion very helpful, as usual. I have no legitimate questions to ask. I am curious on one score, and that is when you left the Governor's office, what became of the bird's nest?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Oh, the bird had flown the cage.

Senator AIKEN. They had flown before you left there?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes. [Laughter.]

Senator AIKEN. A very interesting and influential bird.

Mr. MUÑOZ. No bird could live as long as four gubernatorial terms in Puerto Rico. [Laughter.]

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

SLOWNESS OF THE OAS

Mr. MUÑOZ. I would like to say in answer to the Senator's question about the slowness of the OAS, the OAS is slow, of course, but it is inevitably slow. This kind of organization is bound to be slow and that places the United States and did place the United States in a very grave emergency as it did in April. However, one of the reasons for the slowness of the OAS, the main reason, is that they are all diplomats. You Senators, in spite of filibusters, don't know what a diplomatic filibuster can be. [Laughter.]

One of the more specific reasons is the existence of dictatorships in Latin America. The dictatorships tend to be in disagreement with policies that would fortify democratic forces in Latin America generally and within their own countries. Of course, the diplomat in the OAS represents the President of his country, who may be there democratically or not. If a policy could be developed in which, perhaps as Senator Morse suggests, there could be a collective inter-American action against dictatorships as Mr. Betancourt has spoken of, if this could be done, and dictatorships could be eliminated in Latin America or reduced to a minimum, I think the OAS would be found to work faster than it does now.

THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Senator AIKEN. Is it your opinion that American forces will have to remain there for a long time, and will the people be generally content?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I hope not. But perhaps if the United States and Latin American forces had to remain a while to really put some roots, put at least some tentacles of roots, into the Dominican democracy, I say, with reluctance, it would be a good thing.

Senator AIKEN. But would the people of the Dominican Republic find that preferable to conflict? They would, wouldn't they?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I would say the rank and file of the people would. Of course, most politicians would not, because sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty, is much more an instrument of the ruling classes than of the ruled classes in the Latin American countries. Sovereignty is what protects a bad politician in using his country badly, his people badly, so it is always a great shield. It is charged with the traditional stirring of emotion. But I should say, if necessary to really do a job and get the job underway, the inter-American forces should remain there as long as necessary to do this, not intervening in anything except in making the conditions for the Dominicans themselves to develop their democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

ADMINISTRATION HAD NO OTHER COURSE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, this has been a big day for me. I have seen in 1 day two of my public servants, Arthur Goldberg this morning and Governor Muñoz this afternoon. I am not sure that I think he is the best man to testify amicus curiae in this

kind of a review because what he has done in Puerto Rico has never been done by anyone else in any other Caribbean country, and the genius of it I know quite well for reasons that are unimportant. But we have been friends for a great many years, mutual friends, and I don't think there is anybody who understands the problem down there like he does.

With that premise, Governor, as I understand it, you feel that the administration had no other course then the course they pursued under these circumstances; is that correct?

Mr. MUÑOZ. On the basis of the danger to American lives. But it would be better if they had enlisted a broader part, a larger part of the Latin American OAS in preventing a Communist takeover. I would say that the administration must have had the information justifying that because I don't see why they would have done that, taken that action without that information.

Senator SYMINGTON. They testified here that the people in high office said the Communists were taking over very fast, they controlled over 75 percent, or 75 percent was the exact figure used, of all the firepower in the hands of the rebels, et cetera.

POLITICAL MATURITY AND IMMATURITY

The one question I would like to ask you, and you developed it in my mind as well as some of the statements that were made which I could not find in the record here—I know it is there, but it is a long record, and I was not here during all of the testimony—you mentioned the relative political immaturity in Santo Domingo, which, of course, is understood. I presume the same relative immaturity is also characteristic of Haiti, is it not?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned, therefore, that it would be very difficult to have them react democratically as would happen if this occurred in a more mature country like in Venezuela or in Mexico, and so forth. It just isn't possible to classify your country, to the best of my knowledge, with any of these countries, but you did mention Mexico and you did mention Venezuela.

Some testimony was given us that because of this problem of what you call lack of education in a democracy, an aspect of political immaturity, you get to a point in these countries that you either have to support a military junta or you have to support a Communist regime. I am trying to find the exact statement made by the government witness.

So many Americans were so badly misled by Castro due to some incredibly phony information that was passed around this country that I think it is fair to say that the American people are much more alerted to the danger of a Communist country in the Caribbean after Cuba than they were before. That was accentuated by the 14 days of missile confrontation when I don't think anybody really knew just what might happen.

DEPENDED UPON THE NATURE OF A PARTICULAR MAN

Is there justification in the thinking that because of political immaturity, the way things are going in Santo Domingo we do not have a chance of developing a democratic regime at this time, that

you must either have a military junta or a rebel, whatever the word would be, development that would automatically be dominated by Communists because of the necessity or the capacity for totalitarian control being the logical development in people of this character?

I expressed myself badly, and I wish I could express myself like you do. You see what I am trying to get at, sir?

Mr. MUÑOZ. But I wouldn't put it as black and white——

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I was asking about.

Mr. MUÑOZ [continuing]. Black and white as that. I think the Dominican people, if they had a chance to develop their democracy—not to perfection, or necessarily on the U.S. model—Mexico is a good Latin American democracy but it doesn't operate like the United States democracy at all—but their own Dominican democracy that their genius and circumstances would tend to develop. I think if my good friend Bosch, whom I greatly respect for his sincerity and other good qualities, had been a man of the shrewdness and statesmanship of Betancourt, I think he had a chance to have dealt with that army-Communist situation in Santo Domingo and advanced, I don't say he would have made the democratic utopia in 4 years but advanced the cause of democracy importantly. At least it would have diminished some of the basic causes of undemocracy. You see, there it depended largely on the nature of a particular man—and I am comparing the two men not a good one and a bad one, I am comparing two good men, one of great competence in governing in the peculiar conditions of a Latin American country and the other one without that great competence or without that experience.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course, Betancourt got a good many years of education with you.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I have got a lot of education from him, but I never had a chance to use it because what we have in Puerto Rico is the U.S. Army, which may be political in Washington but isn't political there. [Laughter.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you have made a very interesting statement.

ANOTHER BETANCOURT

My final question, I would like to ask you two points. First, do you know of anybody, based on your friends around that part of the world and here, whom you think might be another Betancourt in the Dominican Republic, and even if you do or if you don't, what do you think from here out should be our policy with respect to how we operate in the future?

Mr. MUÑOZ. In the Dominican Republic?

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Whatever arrangement is made, as I have suggested, should have a view—I realize we get impatient to get the damned thing over with—to work in an arrangement with would deal with the Trujillista army situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. What?

Mr. MUÑOZ. At least establish a method.

Senator SYMINGTON. With what?

Mr. MUÑOZ. The Trujillo army, Trujillista, the old dictatorship army which is more or less there, as well as with the Communist situation. If we do that, I think a great thing will happen or, rather, will be initiated. If we get impatient and say, "Let's patch this up so that it will be peaceful there until there is some kind of election," we may be facing the same situation 12 or 18 months from now.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know of any individual that you feel has got the capacity, who is not a servant of either of the two groups you have mentioned?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I don't know enough about individuals in Santo Domingo, but no doubt there must be persons much more knowledgeable about individuals—people who have been in Santo Domingo more often than I have had a chance to be. First because of dictatorship and afterward because of the Bosch overthrow, there must be some people who have the prime human material for it, although they cannot have had the experience.

But with the inter-American forces present, a man would not have to have the ability of a Betancourt to deal with Dominican armed forces because the armed forces would be out of the picture to begin with, and he can deal in guaranteed peace and constitutionality with the construction of real democratic forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

Senate CARLSON. Governor, I certainly appreciate your appearance here this afternoon.

I have been unable to attend with the exception of one day's hearing the first day with Secretary Mann, but you are so familiar with the Caribbean area and Latin America that you have made some comments that I fully agree with, and I think we must keep that in mind when we begin to discuss the problem. We made our decision, that is past. Now, the question, of course, is what shall we do for the future, not only in the Dominican Republic but there no doubt will be other places.

I was with a man last evening, a very responsible citizen, who said this situation can develop within Guatemala within a few days.

Do you have any information on that?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Not especially, but evidently that can develop.

Senator CARLSON. And I assume in other areas of the Latin American countries.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Senator Church spoke of consistency, I don't think you can develop a real consistency along the Dominican lines in Latin America generally because, obviously, what you can do in Santo Domingo ycu couldn't do in Brazil without terrific consequences, or in Chile. The United States recently faced another possibility which I think is now safely over which is that Communists might have won a legal election in Chile a few months ago; fortunately that is over, and the Communists have never won a legal democratic election anywhere, so I hope this has been the turning point in Latin America. If they had won that, obviously it would

have presented an entirely different problem, even independently from the different nature of Chile itself. There you would have faced the democratic will of the people.

We don't have to cross that bridge now, and I hope never, but if we ever do have to cross it evidently we have got to cross it in a different way than the Santo Domingo bridge.

HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES GET OUT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CARLSON. We did go into the Dominican Republic and that is going to be a debatable question for months to come in this country. I just came from Detroit, MI, and the Detroit Free Press has a full page as to whether we should or should not be there.

Now the next question is, if we go into these countries we naturally do just what you stated by driving these people—there may have been a few Communists, quite a few to start with, but we actually make more when we get in there immediately. Then, of course, the problem is how to get out. How can we expect to get out of the Dominican Republic when we are paying for all of the costs of the Government of the Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo, and the police and feeding people? How can we get out of it?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Well, the very fact that the United States through some arrangement with the OAS is making these payments is a leverage, is a leverage that is there.

Senator CARLSON. How are we going to get our troops out?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Probably this leverage is being used to get agreement, but if you can't get agreement you can use it to try to get submission—and, of course, as a liberal, Senator, I am not an official member of the Democratic Party. I am a member of the Liberal Fellowship.

Senator CASE. I am not sure whether I am a Republican or not.

Mr. MUÑOZ. As a liberal, I obviously favor a nonmilitary government—if you have to force somebody, force the military to yield by diminishing the payments to them.

Senator CARLSON. I noticed you suggested a reduction in the armed forces of the people of the OAS who were in there, I mean once we get it established, but our first problem will be, as I see it, to get our own troops out and then let the OAS take over. I don't see how we can get them out, our own troops, as long as we put all this money in.

Mr. MUÑOZ. No, when I say the OAS I mean the inter-American force.

Senator CARLSON. You mean the U.S. force about 90 percent.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I have said that the Latin American participation in the whole operation should be much larger.

A DOMINEERING POWER

Senator CARLSON. It was the United Nations—and, of course, my good friend Wayne Morse wants the United Nations to take over Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. It wouldn't be 90 percent American troops, I will tell you, that there are in Santo Domingo.

Senator CARLSON. We have 90 percent American troops.

I would feel much better if we had sent 3,500 troops instead of 20,000, on the theory that I think the President had a little feeling we are just going to send a great army down there and we will show the Latin American countries what we can do. We had a little feeling of domineering power which I don't think we should have had at that time. I don't think it helped us.

My first feeling is we are a powerful nation and they kind of look at us that we try to be domineering. I want to protect our people but we are in that situation. If you have some suggestion as to what we can do in the future, because I think we are going to be involved in other cases where we will be invited to participate——

Mr. MUÑOZ. Let us say in the Caribbean, Senator, one of the big controversial points here, that can do harm to American prestige, is whether there was really a danger of a Communist takeover or not. I assume that when the administration acted as if there were a danger it was because it was convinced there was a danger. I have no reason to impute to the administration desire to act unless moved by a conviction of a danger which it was informed about, rightly or wrongly. But I wonder if we—let us consider this: every time, as I have said, a revolution occurs or a movement of political violence against a dictatorship or even for establishing a dictatorship, some Communists are going to be in there trying to use it for their own purposes. Obviously if we have to get into situations in one country and another and another because of a suspicion that they might take over, this is going to result in a very bad situation for the United States and for the countries concerned in many instances. Therefore, I would give thought to the idea of not having to look for Communists under the bed, but of providing a procedure whereby when they really did get out from under the bed you could knock them out with inter-American approval.

PREVENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH RUSSIA OR CHINA

Now, none of this is easy, but I think we should explore the possibility of effective action before they have a chance of developing an effective relationship with Soviet Russia or with China. Soviet Russia would be the more significant one, as would Cuba. Castro took a long time to become an avowed Communist. Now we have that experience, they won't catch us in that again, so that a method should be established, a series of evaluations, of tests in the Caribbean, on the bans of the President's declaration that we cannot tolerate another Communist government in the Caribbean.

My position is about the Caribbean. There is a difficulty of real consistency in the rest of the hemisphere. When the takeover really becomes evident, take action, be prepared with the policy that is to follow, a policy of fundamental democratic construction. Be sure that the tests that you are really dealing with Communists are fair and demonstrable. I don't suppose a Communist government can exist for very long with a free press. I don't think it can exist very long with closely observed free elections.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUÑOZ. So, then you would be freeing the United States from fighting possible ghosts and effectively fighting actual monsters.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Mr. MUÑOZ. If you do that today this would sound terrible. But the way must be prepared to make this part of the climate of the real fight for liberalism and against communism.

CONVINCING THE OAS

Senator CLARK. Governor, I am so happy to see you again. I remember very well that wonderful evening you gave my wife and me in the palace at San Juan some years ago. I always think of it with great pleasure.

Do you think the suggestion you just made could be sold to the OAS insofar as the OAS is concerned?

Mr. MUÑOZ. The OAS is a difficult body to deal with. However, I would like to say, as I wanted to say to Senator Hickenlooper, that the OAS, even as slow as it is with several dictatorships represented in it, this spring took a step that a month before would have seemed impossible. They authorized an inter-American force.

Senator CLARK. What would you think of having the countries who are above the Caribbean, which would involve Mexico, ourselves, Colombia, Venezuela, and I suppose we would have to take Brazil in—would that be more feasible than trying to get the whole OAS to do it?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I doubt if you would get Mexico. Mexico is the hard core of nonintervention.

Senator CLARK. Hard core of nonintervention?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Matter of principle and public opinion, because of long-ago historical circumstances.

Senator CLARK. To turn your mind to another subject, Governor, it has been reported in the press that you and Mr. Betancourt and Mr. Figueres were approached either by certain individuals in the State Department or possibly in the White House with the thought of being drafted to go to the Dominican Republic in sort of a trusteeship capacity. Is there any truth in this story?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Betancourt and Figueres and I talked about this possibility among ourselves and because someone from the State Department suggested it, but the possibility itself would have been difficult because several dictatorships in Latin America would not authorize it. I personally would have liked to see a man like Betancourt with OAS authority dealing with that military situation in Santo Domingo.

INFORMED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS

Senator CLARK. Were you not approached by American officials in this regard?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Well, as I have said, it was spoken of in an informal way.

Senator CLARK. I don't want you to reveal any confidences. The impression was around that you were asked by certain quarters and then it was killed at a higher level.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I would say we were informed about it in an informal way. Evidently the word got about and some columnist wrote about the possibility, just if this thing should be deemed desirable

whether we would be willing, and we said "Yes, if this thing is deemed desirable we would be willing to do that."

Senator CLARK. That was the last you heard of it?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes, that is right.

Senator CLARK. Governor, let's assume that you had gone down to the Dominican Republic and had to deal with the army—I am not too concerned with dealing with Communists because, as you have indicated, you know how to handle it in Puerto Rico—but you are dealing with the army now. Would it not have been necessary, is it not necessary now, to impose a solution on the army by actualy deporting a number of the Trujillistas?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I should say—now the United States is acting as part of the OAS. It would have been better if the OAS participation had been larger. The OAS would say to Imbert—this would be the whole OAS speaking: "You are out, although you are going to have your guard of honor and you are going to have your salary as a brigadier general and you are going to have everything you need to protect your life against Trujillista people who are mad at you and all that, we are not going to pay for your battalion. We are going to employ the soldiers in civilian work but we are not going to pay for these battalions. And, of course, your officer friends will be protected in their lives and property." And all the old generals, all the real died-in-the wool Trujillista generals would be put out to pasture with full pay.

Senator CLARK. Public works?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No, for doing nothing, which would be much more useful to the Dominican people than all the work they may have done before, maybe send some of them to study industrial development in Germany, that kind of a thing. The OAS would not put them in jail or anything like that. Maybe some of them would be subject to trials or put in jail by the proper courts for common, not political, crimes.

Senator CLARK. Do you know Mr. Imbert?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I met him a number of times.

Senator CLARK. I take it you think it would be the part of wisdom to get him out of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Oh yes, because the Dominican people have a feeling that this is just the beginning of dictatorship all over again.

Senator CLARK. Now——

Mr. MUÑOZ. When he shot—he was one of those who shot Trujillo, and although I don't believe in the death penalty, that turned out to be a patriotic thing.

THE CHURCH IS NOT INFLUENTIAL

Senator CLARK. Would it be possible to bring the influence of the church in? It seems to me the influence of the church might be very helpful if it could be brought to bear.

Mr. MUÑOZ. The church is not influential; it is influential, but not decisively influential. They are good Catholics, like many Latin Americans, but not that good.

Senator CLARK. I know what you did about the church in Puerto Rico.

Do you think the same thing probably would have to be done in the Dominican Republic?

Mr. MUÑOZ. We didn't do anything about the church. The church tried to do something about us, and it was unsuccessful, and then it reformed itself.

Senator CLARK. That is what I mean.

Mr. MUÑOZ. But you have a very good man, a highly intelligent man in the Nuncio in Santo Domingo; he is very good, and I think he could be very cooperative to a democratic solution.

Senator CLARK. How about landowners and the sugar planters, could they, do you think, be brought around in support of a democratic regime or are they pretty fascist at heart?

Mr. MUÑOZ. As a class I don't think so; individual ones, yes, of course.

Senator CLARK. But they are quite powerful, aren't they?

Mr. MUÑOZ. They are powerful because of their counterparts in the armed forces.

BOSCH AS A CANDIDATE

Senator CLARK. Have you read the article that Juan Bosch wrote in last week's New Republic?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I don't believe so, but I have read one, I think he wrote in the New Leader.

Senator CLARK. Well, if you haven't read this other one I won't ask you about it.

What would be your opinion as to whether Bosch would be a candidate and would be a powerful candidate if free elections were held today or do you think we would have to look somewhere else for a solution?

Mr. MUÑOZ. My impression is—you are in executive session?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUÑOZ. He is my very good friend, but my impression is that Bosch, I don't want to get into psychoanalysis too deeply, I am no psychoanalyst, of course—my impression is that he really deep down doesn't want to be President and certainly has outward expression is that he doesn't want to.

Senator CLARK. How about Balaguer—is he a good man?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I don't know him but, of course, I hold him in certain suspicion because of his long association with Trujillo. He gained popularity after Trujillo's death because of the fact that he went along with keeping the Trujillo brothers out of Santo Domingo when they tried to get back, but I think the American warships had more to do with that than Balaguer. But he certainly went along with it, and because when he found himself more or less on his own he had a number of demagogic policies of giving away cows and giving away taxicabs and giving away this or the other, somewhat along the line that Evita Peron followed in Argentina, and he did gain popularity, but I don't know him personally. He is said to be a man of intelligence.

MOLINA AND CAAMANO

Senator CLARK. One more question, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know Molina Urena?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I don't believe so.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I may have met him because when Bosch came to Puerto Rico lots of people came and, of course, contrary to protocol, and the run of my house, but I am not conscious of what kind of a person he is.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are on that, did you know Caamano?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No, I talked to him over the phone once or twice.

The CHAIRMAN. But never met him?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have answered, I think, and anticipated more questions than I possibly can think of. I want to tell you how much I appreciate it.

NOTION OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

I have only one very general question. You wouldn't be here if you felt otherwise, I am sure, but is it—if this is the wrong way to put it, tell me so—we hear so much about the feeling that it is impossible to get across in Latin American any real idea of cooperation as far as that would involve in any sense intervention in the affairs of one country in any political matter. Do you think this notion of a peacekeeping force is possible and worth working for seriously?

Mr. MUÑOZ. The OAS under the influence of the Dominican crisis was induced to produce barely the 14 votes necessary for an inter-American force. Now, the Secretary of State made public the idea that this should be made an arrangement for a permanent inter-American force and he found, as we all know from the papers, very strong opposition to that; that it is possible but difficult.

THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION

Senator CASE. I got your sense that this intervention might be possible, if not across the board, in order to maintain a democratic government in power or to possibly help one come into power if conditions with the latter were ripe, but on the former one you were rather specific.

Mr. MUÑOZ. It would not be called classical intervention with a good part of the Latin American OAS behind it.

Senator CASE. In addition to sovereignty, I suppose the matter of the sacredness of the right of revolution is a matter of some importance, is it not; is this correct?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes, the right of revolution when people are oppressed.

Senator CASE. This doesn't apply to all across the board, and to the extent that it does it perhaps is a matter more of interest to the ruling classes or the generals than it is to the people as a whole.

Mr. MUÑOZ. To maintain this nonintervention, this untouchability, this sovereignty idea. But I would say that the Betancourt idea is a very interesting one and I think it should be explored. It may

have a number of bugs in it but it should be thoroughly explored. I don't know that it hasn't; I haven't looked into it thoroughly.

The matter of recognition and nonrecognition should be a matter for the hemisphere. This would apply not only to a Communist but to undemocratic takeovers until a fair election supervised by the OAS had taken place within a prescribed brief period of time, 3 months, 5 months, something like that. That certainly should be explored with the Latin American governments so that in the next Pan American meeting, the one that is not taking place in Rio—it will take place sometime, someplace—it could have been ripened as much as possible, and if there are important bugs in it, of course, they should have been discovered.

WHO IS TO BLAME

Senator CASE. Governor, just a little bit of another matter, another aspect of this. I think you perhaps sensed and maybe have been told specifically that we are so grateful to you for coming to give us some other side of this whole matter than the Government side alone, pursuant to our feeling we ought not to depend entirely upon official Government sources, that is, the administration sources. You have on the one point on which there has been the most controversy, however, only reasserted your belief because of your faith in the wisdom of the administration's decision to intervention.

Have you any suggestion as to how in the absence of your being willing to act as this arbiter, on the basis of your own knowledge, which I am not charging you with or condemning you for, where we may turn in this bitter babel of conflicting voices as to who is to blame, the Drapers, the Kurzmans, and Szulcs, on the one side, and the other people on the other? What would you do as a Governor in face of a thing like this; how do you do right or do you pay any attention?

Mr. MUÑOZ. You mean find the equivalence of that in Puerto Rico?

Senator CASE. As I understand you didn't have it entirely.

Mr. MUÑOZ. No, in Puerto Rico we don't have that problem. We have many fewer Communists per square mile in Puerto Rico than you have in the States, many fewer. We have a little lunatic fringe but they are independentists, nationalists whom, of course, the Communists go along with, not because they are the same kind of people; they go along with anybody who is trying to make some trouble. But even these forces are fringe. These forces in the whole of Puerto Rico would come to about 1,000 where the electorate of Puerto Rico is 800,000 and the people of Puerto Rico 2½ million. Communists are few.

There are these nationalists and they picket a lot and when they picket the Communists picket with them. These 24 Communists are kind of a trail to the nationalist proindependence movement in Puerto Rico. But the nationalists themselves are not significant; they sometimes shoot, you know. They tried to shoot President Truman, they tried to shoot me, they tried to shoot the other House of Congress. It is a problem because you don't want people to get shot but it is not a political problem.

PRECONCEPTIONS OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES

Senator CASE. I didn't quite mean this. I didn't mean to suggest any of these individuals whose names I mentioned are Communists at all. I just meant how do you know who is right among all these? There seems to be a great deal of this in the news reporting in Latin America, it seems to me more than in most places.

Mr. MUÑOZ. My impression in the Santo Domingo situation, and it is purely an impression, is that in a situation like the one that took place with the civilians indiscriminately armed, I would have bet there would be some Communists there and everywhere where this kind of a thing may happen.

Whether you are going to believe that a really dangerous takeover by Communists is possible or whether you are going to believe it is not possible depends a good deal upon your perceptions as a liberal or conservative. Liberals don't want to be caught in the trap of confusing a social reform movement with communism. Conservatives don't want to be caught in the trap of being careless about a social reform movement that may turn out to be a Communist one.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a difference of emphasis.

Mr. MUÑOZ. The bias is almost, at least a margin of bias is almost inevitable, and many U.S. newspapermen are liberal, so that is where the bias is found.

Now, I try not to have it but I have that bias, too, so discount it.

Senator CASE. Some Senators have it.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Have the bias?

Senator CASE. Have a bias.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Everybody has both biases.

Senator MORSE. Nothing wrong with bias. They simply don't recognize convictions. I have a lot of colleagues who have convictions.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I certainly did not use the word "bias" in a pejorative sense. I am describing an almost inevitable human condition and we all should strive to have as little of it as possible.

BIASES OF CAREER DIPLOMATS

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, isn't it also most likely that a career diplomat is going to have the same bias as a conservative because he is assigned to an established government which is normally his job to be associating with not cultivating the opposition or the reformist groups so that normally a career diplomat of long experience would be biased in the same sense that you have used the word in favor of the established order; isn't that true?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Well, it is true.

But I have known some diplomats with whose bias or convictions as you may wish, Senator, I agree with more than the bias or convictions of others.

JUSTIFICATION OF SENDING TROOPS

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I put just one question on this finally?

I would like to ask the Governor, if I may, whether it is also appropriate for me to quote him on this. Would it be fair to summarize your views on the second point you mention in regard to the decision as to sending of troops, that while you do not have person-

al direct knowledge of the facts on which they were sent, you do believe that the administration must have had facts which justified it, and further, that you think it is not unlikely that this is true?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I would rather not be quoted on that one.

Senator CASE. On any of this?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Yes.

Senator CASE. May I ask you then completely off the record?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I wanted to be as useful to the committee as possible.

Senator CASE. I understand fully, but it is known that you are here and something has to be said. I certainly will respect your view on this.

May I ask you then, leaving out the latter part of the question, do you think both that they must have had and you think it is reasonable that the facts were so?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I believe that if the facts were as the administration must have had them they were justified.

Senator CASE. That is all.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I have no way of judging how good their sources of information were as to those facts.

Senator MORSE. May I take 1 minute for a comment on that?

I would like to have to have the Governor know this before he leaves the room.

The CHAIRMAN. Incidentally, I was going to ask the Governor when we were through on this about another subject, the Panama Canal, in which he is very interested. I was just waiting to finish this, but you may proceed.

ADMINISTRATION PROPAGANDA

Senator MORSE. I will be very short. I want to say, Governor, in my capacity of working in Latin American affairs on this committee, you are one of the four men who over the years undoubtedly influenced my thinking more than any other group in Latin America. That will continue to be true.

But I want to also say, since you have emphasized it so much in your testimony this afternoon, that in my opinion the administration had no facts that justified its propaganda that a Communist group was about to take over in Latin America. I think the administration was unfortunately misinformed by an incompetent Ambassador and by a CIA that is a threat to good relations between the United States and Latin America. I also want to say that a large number of liberals in the United States who are pretty well informed on Latin America, who share that view, will be meeting in New York next week in protest of this administration's policy in the Dominican Republic and I shall join them.

I think our policy in the Dominican Republic over and above seeking to evacuate American nationals is just inexcusable, and I think that we have done ourselves irreparable harm. I think that there were a good many people down there at the time not connected with the Government who are qualified to bear out the observation that I have just made. I do not share the view that the administration had any justification for representing to the people of this country that Communists were about to take over.

THE INFORMATION THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to add to that that I think the information given to the President justified it. I have a similar question—I am not quite as positive as to where the truth lies—but I do have a question in my mind about the accuracy of the judgment of our representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time and particularly on the 26th and 27th.

Senator MORSE. Bill, I don't say I don't believe the President believed what he was told. I want to say the President was grossly misled by misinformation.

The CHAIRMAN. To the Governor I want to say that any President confronted with the kind of wires and telegrams he had been given would have taken the action he did and would be justified if those facts were as represented. There is in our testimony, I think, some question about the wisdom of the judgment, the accuracy and wisdom of the judgment exercised by our representatives immediately after the outbreak on the 25th, for the next 3 days, I will say up to the 28th.

Unfortunately, these judgments have a way of influencing what actually took place, so that there was a very changeable and fluid situation. It could well be that after we had refused to mediate on the 27th, a train of events took place that brought the Communists into much greater power and positions of influence.

This is an area on which I know you are not qualified to testify because you weren't there. It is a very difficult thing for even us, although we have had the people who were there to testify.

INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

There is one thing that was brought to my mind just for the record. You were talking—this intervention I thought was right interesting about Mexico. You said there is a hard core of nonInterventionists in Mexico.

Mr. Holt gave me this article in the present Foreign Affairs relating to Wilson's policy in Mexico when we intervened back in 1913 and up to 1917. His Ambassador was relating to the English Foreign Minister what our policy was. I will read just a paragraph.

He said, that is, he refers to the President:

> He wanted to give the Mexicans a chance to try it. Walter Hines Page, his Ambassador in London, put the policy even more simply when talking to Sir Edward Gray. "Suppose you have to intervene, what then?" Gray asked.
> "Make them vote and live by their decisions."
> "But suppose they will not so live?"
> "We will go in again and make them vote again."
> "And keep this up 200 years?"
> "Yes. The United States will be here 200 years and it can continue to shoot men for that little space until they learn to vote and to rule themselves."

So, I can see where the Mexicans might have some feeling about intervention if that is an actual statement of policy.

Mr. MUÑOZ. I can certainly understand it historically. I do think that the word and concept and semantics of antintervention is a hindrance to arrangements that could work well for democracy in the hemisphere if undertaken in good faith.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MUÑOZ. Of course, the thing is that many people in Latin America are suspicious that it would not be in good faith or it might start in good faith and then get infiltrated by special interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

HOW TO RUN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN THE CARIBBEAN

One other thing. I noticed this morning, in fact, we had the nominee this morning, where the President has drafted a Supreme Court Justice to go to the U.N. You mentioned technical assistance to the Dominican Republic; it seems to me it would be a good suggestion that I might consider having drafted to give technical assistance to the Dominicans as to how to run a democratic system in the Caribbean.

Mr. MUÑOZ. If this three-man team that was talked about had taken place, I think probably—this I am saying more off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is off.

Mr. MUÑOZ [continuing]. Because it is not completely serious, but it has significance, I think. You should have delegated Mr. Betancourt to deal with the army. I think we would have delegated Mr. Figueres to deal with Communists and I would be delegated to deal with the elections and with economic development.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be a very good division.

Senator CASE. It would be a beautiful layout.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

OVERBURDENED THE OAS

Senator CHURCH. I just wanted to ask one further question.

It seems to me that if it is possible to deal with the army and Communist elements and establish the beginnings of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic through external intervention, the best prospect for doing this is under the aegis of the OAS. But it seems to me, on the other hand, that the problem that we have handed the OAS is greatly exacerbated by the fact that the intervention in the first instance was unilateral, American intervention which in effect we have now asked the OAS to ratify and to support for the public opinion of Latin America. Perhaps we have overburdened the OAS in this first venture by asking it to move in and take over in the wake of a purely American intervention.

What would be your view of that?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I think it would have been better if the OAS had been the one that took action in the beginning. However, this seems to have been practically impossible under the emergency situation in which the administration found itself. It is my understanding from reading in the papers that the U.S. Ambassador was asked to mediate the day before this situation, and he said he didn't have any authority to mediate. Then the next day the situation, as reported, got so bad, so far as the danger to lives is concerned, principally because of the indiscriminate arming of thousands of civilians of all kinds, that the emergency as it came up to the knowledge of the administration was such that quick action

had to be taken to avoid these tragedies, even not considering the Communist takeover part of it.

I understand that the President tried to inform, but he didn't have time to consult. This is the way it comes out in the paper. You gentleman can go more into detail as to this because you can get a lot of witnesses here.

WHO IS REALLY IN CHARGE?

Senator CHURCH. The thing that troubles me now is who is really in charge?

The U.S. Government is putting up the money to maintain this Imbert junta. We have a force that is supposedly under the command of the OAS which is almost entirely American in makeup, and you have suggested decisions that seem to me to be eminently reasonable, such as progressively reducing and eliminating the army as the dominant factor in the——

Mr. MUÑOZ. Nonpoliticizing the armed forces.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Who makes these decisions and who implements them? Is it really the OAS which makes these and decides where our money will be spent? Is that the present arrangement or is it just the window dressing?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I should say in this case the almost decisive influence is that of the United States. Your trouble of getting a decision at the OAS comes when the ministers meet up here and speeches take place and the interests of the different countries—the small ones, the big ones, those with dictatorships, those in fear of dictatorships, those with a large legal Communist element in their political makeup—all these things must somehow be put to work together. But I suspect that down in Santo Domingo Mr. Bunker is being pretty influential.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you talked to Mr. Bunker?

Mr. MUÑOZ. I can sense this from the papers in their reports on this three-man commission.

Obviously, when he thinks he can't do something he probably doesn't try, but he is a pretty able man and he is probably basically leading that commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you talked to Mr. Bunker?

Mr. MUÑOZ. Briefly, a long time ago, several months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Not since he has had this mission?

Mr. MUÑOZ. No.

Senator MORSE. Governor, if I may take 30 seconds to say in regard to the comment about the Ambassador and emissaries attempting to mediate, I don't think that was the fact at all. I think at the time he didn't mediate. He thought the military was going to win and he was very desirous to have the military win and that is why he didn't intervene. I think when he failed the use his good offices at that time he failed his President.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee proceeded to discuss the possibility of a new Central American canal. The committee adjourned at 5:05 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

TUESDAY, JULY 27, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Senator Kuchel.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have our old colleague and friend Cabot Lodge, who has been nominated as Ambassador to Vietnam.

Mr. Lodge, would you care for a brief introduction, to say a few things, or shall we start right in with questions?

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

Mr. LODGE. Start right in with questions, so far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I will start out and ask that you be the devil's advocate for the moment.

CHANCES OF VICTORY IN VIETNAM

Do you really think there is any remote possibility of what you call victory for the United States in Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. It depends to some extent on how you define victory.

The CHAIRMAN. What you mean by victory?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

I define victory as a condition in which the young Viet Cong fighter wakes up one morning and says, "I am not going back today." And the reason he doesn't go back is that, first, he is scared, he thinks he will get killed if he goes back, and second, he looks around him and he sees the rice and the fish and the ducks and the coconuts and the American aid coming in and life looks pretty good to him. So, he decides to settle down and be a farmer or he takes off into the hills where they still are in Luzon, and in Malaysia, where they do very little harm.

Now, I do think it is possible to bring about a condition like that, and I think that would be a satisfactory outcome. I think we have to learn how to overcome this subversion and terrorism which is a

greater external threat to us, to the United States, than the nuclear where we have a greater superiority, where we have a procedure for handling it. If we don't learn how to cope with Communist subversion and terrorism we are going to have extremely unfortunate results, not only in Asia but in Africa and Latin America.

So, this is a political technique that we have to learn. I think if we do—and I think we can learn it—that we can get a satisfactory outcome. It won't be a victory in the occidental sense of the word, but it will be a satisfactory outcome.

What the military does is give us the opportunity to teach these people how to stand by themselves, how to carry out the revolution for a new and better life, which is what they all want, which is what they talk about. and which the Communists offer them, but only at the price of brutality and suppression of all human rights.

EISENHOWER'S ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I have been reminded of a passage in General Eisenhower's book, "The Mandate for Change." I would like to read it to you. It is very brief, but he did go through very serious consideration of this situation in Vietnam, as I recall it, at the time of Dien Bien Phu because there was a lot of talk, I think—it was seriously considered at that time whether or not we should intervene directly in favor of the French, is that not correct?

Mr. LODGE. I believe so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is from page 372.

"What lessons or benefits, if any, accrue to the free world as a result?"

This is preliminary talk about the French. This is a quote:

I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among the Vietnamese they had nothing to fight for.

I won't read it all. I don't want to clutter the record, although anyone is welcome to read it.

In the earlier stages of the conflict, the fighting was mostly conducted where rough terrain made it impossible to seek out the enemy and bring him to a pitched battle. Later, even when the battle lines became so located that the groupes mobiles could be effective, there still existed within the Red River Delta a condition in which the French could control even the main roads for only about 2 or 3 hours a day. The rest of the time all lines of communications were in the hands of the Vietminh. This meant that the mass of the population supported the enemy. With such a feeling prevalent, it was inevitable that the French would find it impossible to retain the loyalty of their Vietnamese troops.

The next page, 373:

Willingness to fight for freedom no matter where the battle may be has always been a characteristic of our people, but the conditions then prevailing in Indochina were such as to make unilateral American intervention nothing less than sheer folly.

That is a pretty strong statement on Vietnam.

U.S. SITUATION DIFFERENT FROM THE FRENCH

Is it fair to say this was correct but, having intervened, we are stuck with it and we have to do the best we can?

Mr. LODGE. One comment I would make is that our situation is different from that of the French, and I think most Vietnamese consider that it is different. I believe hardly any of the Vietnamese think of us as colonialists. I don't believe any Vietnamese, or an insignificant number, think of us as wanting to stay. I think they recognize that we would like to get out of there and get home as soon as possible, and so they don't have the same attitude toward us that they had toward the French.

But certainly, I agree with the passage that you quote that the support of the population is indispensable, and the minute you get that, you can say that the war is over, and we haven't—the Government of Vietnam hasn't—got enough support from the population. I think it perhaps has more support than the Vietcong have, but I think there is a great majority that is floating and just trying to keep their heads down and not get hit. One of the things that urgently needs to be done is to create a state of mind in which the people adhere to the Government. When they do that, then you can start apprehending terrorists, then they will start giving information to the Government.

The military equipment that we have and the military organization that we have is fine for large enemy units, but we still haven't got a technique for apprehending the individual terrorist or the terrorists in small groups. That can only be done with the help of the civilian population.

The CHAIRMAN. I had known you were here before, your testimony about putting emphasis upon political activity, combined with aid, I mean combining these with the objective of inspiring some interest in the Vietnamese local people and the villages to fight for themselves and to defend themselves was the most persuasive, most sensible suggestion I have heard. But I don't know whether it is possible or not.

RELIABLE CITIZEN HELP

Let me read one other sentence that I meant to read. This is the next page, I believe, on 358. Still a quote:

> The French still had sufficient forces to win if they could induce the regular Vietnamese soldiers to fight vigorously with them and the populace to support them, but guerrilla warfare cannot work two ways. Normally only one side can enjoy reliable citizen help.

It looks at the moment as if that reliable citizen help, such as it is, has turned against us. But as long as we are there and we have to do anything, I think your idea of trying to work on the political aspects of it rather than the exertion of pure physical military power is more likely to contribute to this modified victory we talk about, the kind of victory we talk about, than anything else.

I must say, I almost don't see where we come out in this show unless you can do what you say you can do, that is, inspire a local viable government that they want to support and that they do support, and we have seen very little evidence of that. I don't see how the bombing of North Vietnam is going to affect that very much.

Mr. LODGE. In Malaya and in the Philippines, this procedure that you have just mentioned is what was done, and is what did bring some results. There were some Americans who showed themselves to be very clever at organizing the people and at getting the Government to behave itself in such a way that the peole wanted to support them.

I intend to give that a tremendous try. I am planning to bring some people out who have had success in that kind of work, and give them an opportunity to see what they can do in the hamlets and in the villages with the grassroots type of political counterterrorist organization. It has got to be basically political, and then the by-product is the apprehension of the terrorists and the giving of information to the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE GRADATION OF THE WAR

Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Senator, I would like to ask some pretty frank questions, if I may, and in no way critical. I would just like to get information.

I was thinking, it was 18 years ago you were asking me questions when I was Assistant Secretary of War, and your questions were always penetrating. I remember especially one case, where we had a little contretemps, but I go along with the chairman here and I think the other members of the committee, I——

[Off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. If we could reach a cease-fire, I can understand that, that is a political development, but when we are killing hundreds of Americans and we are making plans risking killing at least a good many thousands more, it seems to me the gradation of the war——

Mr. LODGE. The what?

Senator SYMINGTON. The gradation of the war, which we did in Korea, which I never was in favor of and always thought was wrong, is going to lose us a great deal of respect and understanding at home. I would ask just what is the military position with respect to the military in South Vietnam. Are we only there as advisers or are we going in there now and sort of take over the military operation?

Mr. LODGE. As I understand it, and I am not an expert on this phase of it, we have gone into a new phase in which we are doing more than advise. We have units there that are actually fighting. For example, last Sunday I was in Camranh Bay and saw a battalion of the First U.S. Infantry Division there, which is protecting the Army Engineers as they make Camranh Bay into the base. So, with my own eyes I have seen American troops in combat. The Navy and the Air Force are in combat, too.

You naturally give a great deal of thought to the importance of this thing. Is it worth what we are putting into it? Is it worth risking the lives of our young men?

I can remember in 1917 when the American people concluded that an imperialistic power structure was being created in Europe which, if successful, would threaten our way of life and we inter-

vened by force in Europe to prevent it. Then in 1941, the same thing happened again and we intervened by force again.

I can't persuade myself that it would be any less dangerous if China were to take over the Far East. It seems to me that would be just exactly as big a threat to our way of life. If we had intervened in Europe at the time that Hitler went into the Rhineland or if we had done something when he had gobbled up Czechoslovakia in 1938, it might have avoided World War II. To my mind this place has that kind of significance.

THE OPINION OF THE MILITARY

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree. You have talked—and I don't want to take too much time—but in your illustrations you talked about wars where the opinion of the military was treated with considerable respect. What has me worried is, well, we put our witnesses under oath in the Preparedness Subcommittee, and we asked a member of the Joint Chiefs, "Do you think there is any chance of success operating the way we are?"

The answer was no. He has got to give his personal opinion. We were all through that in the other days. He just said no, he didn't think so.

I would ask you this question. You have a very extended military background.

What chance of success do you think we have if we continue to operate on this basis? By that now, I would like to just to illustrate, I don't see any sense in bombing Hanoi, especially probably where they have got the important people out of there, but why don't we bomb and obliterate their oil reserves? Why don't we bomb and obliterate their capacity to produce electricity? As I understand it, a decision is made we must maintain North Vietnam as a viable economy. It has nothing to do with bombing civilians. It is just the way—maybe we want to start out a brave new world when this matter is over and we don't want to hurt what they are doing. At the same time, they are murdering men and women and children by terrorist bombing of hotels and so forth on our side. I am beginning to get very apprehensive from the standpoint of the future position of this war before the American people.

DIRECTIONS TO THE MILITARY

One other question I would like to ask is the directions to General Westmoreland and to the Navy and the Air Force. Do they come from the military here in Washington as to what they should do, and are you advised about it? How does that work?

Mr. LODGE. I am familiar with the military aspect of it as I see it in Saigon. Now, I don't pretend to know, to be at all authoritative on the Washington end. I know General Westmoreland very well. I know General Moore, who commands the Air Force. I know Admiral Sharpe in CINCPAC and Honolulu.

I think General Westmoreland realizes as keenly as anybody possibly could that this is a politico-military operation, and I have said to him if we had the political side as well developed as the military, we would be on our way. He knows that and there have been very fine speeches made by our military men on the importance of

the people adhering to the Government, and, of course, that is military policy. So from that level, where I have worked in the past, and where I expect to work in the future, there isn't any trouble.

To answer one of your questions specifically, General Westmoreland gets his orders from CINCPAC in Honolulu. That is where his orders come from.

As far as the bombing of the refineries in the north are concerned, all those calculations on bombing of what the targets should be, as you know better than I, having been Secretary of the Air Force, have tremendously complicated technical calculations. I do know that 80 percent of the gasoline and oil that is used in South Vietnam comes from one place, a place called Nabe. I think one thing that would estrange people from bombing the petroleum in the north is the apprehension about what might happen to the petroleum in the south. That certainly would be one of the things you would have to calculate.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

AN OPAQUE PICTURE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Along the general line of questions that have been asked you, which I think indicate the thinking of all of us, for one, I don't know what to do. I am at a complete loss. In my own thinking process—not that I can do anything about it—but we have for two years now been getting conflicting reports, reports of optimism. We were going to be out of there by this year a time ago and everything was hunky-dory and the goose was going to hang high and all this sort of thing. The situation has deteriorated. We do see the failure to bomb certain very important military centers, and this incident a couple of days ago.

All I know is what I read in the papers, that one of our planes may have been shot down by a ground-to-air missile, indicating that they may be beginning to use those launching pads around Hanoi. That would put a different aspect on this. But so far as the civilian population is concerned and its united support of us, I can't see how it is going to happen at the moment.

My unschooled guess at the moment is we have got to have a military victory of some kind there before we can hope to be in a position to give any kind of guarantees to these villages and people that if they do turn to us, they will be protected. It seems as we move in, as long as our troops are there they feel protected. But when our troops move out, the Vietcong move in and they draw back into their shells again.

To me it is a very opaque picture. I don't know enough about it to ask questions. It is back to the old story about Buddy Baer, who got slapped around the ring the first round, and his manager patted him on the shoulder at the end of the round, and he was woozy and groggy, and his manager said, "Stay in there, kid, he ain't laid a glove on you." Buddy looked out of one eye, the only eye that was open, and he said, "Watch the referee, because somebody is beating hell out of me." [Laughter.]

WE ARE NOT WINNING

In the first place, we are not winning. Maybe we are killing more Vietcong than they are killing us—I don't know that we know—but they seem to do like the phoenix from the ashes, they are jumping up again as soon as they get killed.

The question in my mind is, are we determined to win that thing over there or are we marking time? Do we have some kind of a strange plan or philosophy that most of us don't understand?

I think most of us have gone along, surprisingly, at least to me. Three years ago, if somebody had said we would have had the unanimity of support for a program, not approval—and I differentiate between approval of a program and support for it, but I think the President has had remarkable support in this program. But a lot of us wonder what we are supporting, and I just swear, I don't know.

A lot of things I don't approve of, but I still feel that we are in this thing and I have not much choice except to support it as long as we are in it. I expect to support our actions as a country as long as we are in trouble overseas. And I don't think this is time to, because of undue confusion at home. We have enough of it that is bothering us in the various political areas here in the United States. But I simply don't know what we are up against. We intend to win this thing and do a lot of things we ought to be doing, really if it is our purpose to win it as quickly and as vigorously as possible, even to courting the strong possibility or the possibility that the Chinese might get into it, that probably could be handled, and we do have a question about what the Russians will do.

I know those things are of concern, but you, as Ambassador over there, I will just ask you this blunt question. Are you going to direct that show over there, or who is going to direct it? What is the area of responsibility and authority on the ground in Vietnam?

THE AMBASSADOR'S AUTHORITY

Mr. LODGE. The Ambassador is the Chairman of the U.S. Mission, which embraces all U.S. activities. Combat operations are conducted by the military, but on anything which involves more than one American agency, why, the Ambassador gets into it to coordinate and to harmonize.

For example, the military is building a base at Camranh Bay, which I think is a very wise thing to do. You have the question of the people who live there and the question of what is going to happen to them if the fishing gets ruined. Are we going to help to set up a model village and provide some other form of livelihood for them? That is an economic thing and a social thing. The Ambassador would try to work something out to harmonize it with the military. When we have meetings of the U.S. Mission Council, which we have once a week, the Ambassador presides. But, of course, he doesn't conduct combat operations. Those are conducted by the military under the command of General Westmoreland.

BOMBING AS A MILITARY OR POLITICAL PROBLEM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it considered that, for instance, the bombing of Hanoi is a military problem or a political problem?

Mr. LODGE. The bombing of Hanoi is not under the U.S. Mission in Saigon at all. That is directed from outside of South Vietnam. Of course, it is like most military actions, it is hoped to get a political result with it, and it is——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not necessarily advocating it, that isn't the point.

Mr. LODGE. I support the policy of bombing North Vietnam. It is so far the best inducement we have to end this aggression. We are doing better with that than we are on the ground. But I hope that we are going to do better on the ground.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are we going to have to take over the direction of that ground fighting there?

Mr. LODGE. Now, this should never get out because it involves question of vanity and pride. We won't have any trouble getting the command and the control that we want. The Vietnamese are not going to be difficult about it. Of course, we ought to do it in a way that saves their pride and saves their face and doesn't make them look as though they were puppets of the United States. But I don't think there will be any problem about our getting the authority which we want.

REVOLVING TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are rumors going about, I think I have seen a newspaper story or two, that this present Prime Minister, Premier, or whatever he is called, of Vietnam, is a military man who is in there now, that he is going to be out in a couple of weeks or three or in a very short time. They are going to throw him out and we will have another revolving type of government there.

Mr. LODGE. You have a very unstable situation, and that may very well happen. If what we have here in Washington is a central government, you have got to get another name for what they have in Saigon, because the two aren't at all comparable. This government is like a leaf floating on the surface. It hasn't got the roots out in the countryside that our Government has. It doesn't consist of people who have been chosen locally and then come to the national capital the way ours does. The national capital is isolated from the countryside and sometimes it sends somebody out to it. But they have never had enough law and order, they have never had enough peace, and they haven't got enough people trained in civil government to elect local officials and from them eventually elect and choose people to come to the capital.

When you form a government in Vietnam, you have not got politicians from which to form it. You either get them from the Army or you get a few technicians out of the bureaucracy or you get some of the old conspirators against the French, and there are some very fine men among those, but they are not political leaders.

AGITATION BY BUDDHIST LEADERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The thing about this Buddhist leader who has been an irritant over there, depending, I suppose, on the way you look at it—isn't there a mechanism or force or determination or authority, or whatever you want to call it, in the Govern-

ment of South Vietnam in order to remove fellows like that from their agitating position? It seems that he is not satisfied with anything over there unless it would be greatly expanded personal power.

Mr. LODGE. This gentleman—I know whom you are talking about—he wouldn't take office. He refuses to take office. He is developing. His thought isn't the same this year as it was last. Nationalism, patriotism, community spirit, which are all things we take for granted in the West, are not traditional out there. They have ideas that they live by all right, but they are not the same ideas that we live by, and a man who is the head of a religious sect like that, his interests and his loyalty for generations is to the religious sect. The country is all split up into groups, and the loyalty of the citizen is to the group. The Confucianist religion tends to make people worship family, and among the less educated people, to worship their ancestors. So the soldier, who has uniformly been described to me by our advisers as a very brave long-suffering man, his devotion is not so much to the Republic of Vietnam, which has only existed since 1954, as it is to Cao Dai religion or the Hoa Hao sect or something of that kind.

WHAT STIMULATES THE VIETCONG

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What stimulates the Vietcong?

Mr. LODGE. The Vietcong are indoctrinated and trained in the north. They are Communist trained, Communist indoctrinated, and one of the issues we face out there is can a tropical oriental Confucianist country become strong enough and self-governing enough to stand by itself without going Communist or are the Communists the only ones who can organize them.

When I went to China in 1919 it was just as decentralized, just as disorganized as South Vietnam is now. Yet, by golly, some Russian came long and instructed Mao Tse-tung, and Mao Tse-tung took 22 years and organized China, while Ho Chi Minh has organized North Vietnam. It is an absolute police state, totally brutal, and trains hardcore people.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, I wonder what the stimulus is. Why can they do it and why can't the South Vietnamese do it for their own section or their own area?

Mr. LODGE. That is what we have got to try to teach them how to do. We have got to learn how to do it ourselves first and then try to teach them.

The Vietcong have got, in the first place, believable promises that they make. They say they are going to give land to every farmer. When you are out of power and you are coming in, you can do quite a lot by making promises. When you are in power, you can't make promises out there. You have got to do it. There is no use in writing fancy speeches for the government, the government has to give the land to the farmer.

Then——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did they do that in North Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. No, they don't do it in North Vietnam, but they promise it in South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. Bourke, will you yield for a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I am about through.

VIETCONG TERRORISM

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the Vietcong psychologically, through their promises, taking control or are they doing it as a combination of two influences, that is, promises of an improved economic life and terrorism?

Mr. LODGE. I believe if you eliminated terrorism, you would be well on your way. In a Vietcong company, let's say, I suppose there are ten percent who are really convinced Communists and who believe first it was the French and then it was the Japanese and now it is the Americans.

But I would think that 80 to 85 percent of people have joined up because they are afraid not to, because of the way the terrorist operates. He will come into a village, and on a Monday morning he will put a dozen bodies in the street, old men, women, children—nobody has done anything, just indiscriminate terror. He will capture the mayor, cut off his head, and put it on a pole and march around the town, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon it is not too hard to get young fellows to join up. If you could take care of that, you would have solved the most difficult part of the problem.

But there is an ideological side to it, too.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all I will ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will pass for the time being, Mr. Chairman. I would rather give some of the others who have been here a chance.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

DANGER OF A CHINESE TAKEOVER

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Ambassador, you referred to the dangers of the Western world should China take over Southeast Asia. It is hard to disagree with your conclusions there, but the question it raises is if we pulverize North Vietnam, is China more or less likely to come in for a takeover? Have you got that figured out?

Mr. LODGE. If we pulverize what?

Senator AIKEN. North Vietnam, even including Hanoi, is China more or less likely to come into the picture in a military way and with the eventual intention of taking over that area, controlling it?

Mr. LODGE. I have two things to say in response to that, Senator. I believe that if we are successful in South Vietnam and get a result comparable to what the British achieved in Malaya and Magsaysay achieved in the Philippines, that kind of a result, I think that will be a powerful barrier against Chinese expansion. While we are in this struggle I don't expect—this is just my guess—but I don't expect to see a big Chinese army coming in. I don't think the North Vietnamese want it, and I think the Chinese realize that our power of retaliation is perfectly tremendous and that in a contest with us at the present time, we could have the last word and it would be a very potent last word.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is that last word?

Senator AIKEN. Nuclear power.

Mr. LODGE. Bombing power.

Senator LAUSCHE. What type of bombing?

Mr. LODGE. We have the capability of bombing China. There is no doubt about that, and they know we have the capability. If they have the capability, they would use it, and they would assume that since we have the capability, we might use it. That is the deterrent, I think that is a very powerful deterrent on Communist China.

AUTONOMY OF NORTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Then you don't think it is possible for us to punish North Vietnam to such an extent that they would cause China to come in?

Mr. LODGE. I wouldn't expect to see that happen, frankly.

Senator AIKEN. But you think North Vietnam would surrender before they would invite China to come in and take over? Is that what you call a calculated risk?

Mr. LODGE. It is a hard question. That is a very hard question. I don't expect to see a big Chinese army coming in like the volunteers in Korea, because I don't think the North Vietnamese want it.

The question of how much autonomy North Vietnam has, how much North Vietnam is a stooge of Peking, is one of the key questions. I have asked everybody in the U.S. Government and on this trip that I took in April and May, I asked all the government officials of all these little countries right around the edge of China who make a career out of studying China, and all but one said they believed that the North Vietnamese did have automony. Our consul general in Hong Kong, where we have some very well informed people, I think—we have some Americans there who have lived in China there for a long time—that is what they think.

The one exception was——

[Off the record.]

He thought North Vietnam was a total complete stooge of Peking, but nobody else thought so. The Koreans didn't think so. The Japanese didn't think so, and so on.

Senator AIKEN. That situation would emphasize the value of political warfare.

Mr. LODGE. That is correct.

They won't really take us seriously until we have proven to them that we can deal with the individual Communist terrorist and the terrorist working in small groups on the ground in South Vietnam. We haven't yet showed them how to do that.

BOMBING HANOI

Senator AIKEN. Now, the question is frequently raised why do we not bomb Hanoi, destroy their oil supplies and electrical plants. Isn't it true that if we took that action against Hanoi that the Vietcong would promptly take similar action against Saigon and in addition shut off the food supply?

Mr. LODGE. I believe that if we bombed Hanoi, Saigon would be under mortar fire, and mortar fire is just as destructive as bombing.

Senator AIKEN. And particularly the electrical supplies.

Mr. LODGE. As far as gas and oil are concerned, I think before you came in, I pointed out that within, I think, 20 miles of Saigon, I have seen it, is the big gasoline depository of Esso, of gasoline and petroleum products. Now, there is where 80 percent of the petroleum is, so those are all things that have to enter into the calculation as far as Hanoi goes.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

FIGHTING A GUERRILLA WAR

Now, they used to tell us in fighting guerrilla war it took 15 regulars to cope with one guerrilla, to really round him up and put him where he belongs, and then we began to reduce that percentage.

General Taylor was in here, and he said the percentage in South Vietnam is three and one-half to one. This morning I heard on the radio a statement that it was now proposed to increase our forces to an eight to one ratio, 145,000 Vietcong available, that would mean almost a million and a quarter or the addition of 700,000 or 800,000 men to that which is now available in Vietnam.

I don't know where they come from. We have what, 400,000 South Vietnamese, roughly, in the army?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. And 100,000, 75,000 Americans, and then the Vietcong, the last figures I saw estimated were 145,000, which have come up considerably from the few thousand they started with.

I heard it on the radio this morning, and if I heard it once I heard it twice, so it is all over to everybody. But if that is true it would mean an increase of several hundred thousand men from somewhere. I didn't say they would all be U.S., but they might be from Australia or Korea or most anywhere.

Mr. LODGE. That is news to me, Senator. I have never heard that. Moreover, I doubt whether that is the way to go at it.

Senator AIKEN. I am telling you what came over the radio this morning.

COASTAL BASES

The last time you were here, Hanson Baldwin had just published his column in the press, and he was advocating or he was hinting that the inkspot type of campaign with certain very strong bases on the coast from which you could work inland as you would be, it seems to me that events since then have indicated we might come to that, two or three Guantanamos on the coast, and conduct a holding operation and then go ahead with your political operations or military operations or whatever you have to do. We are building some very strong bases.

Mr. LODGE. We are getting very well established at Da Nang, at Chu Lai, at Nha Trang, at Cam Ranh, and, of course, the Saigon-Bien Hoa grouping, while it is not actually on the coast.

Saigon is the biggest port in the country. It is 60 miles up the river, and that gives us a north and south line of communication that the Vietcong can't possibly touch, and it gives us east and west lines that are quite short because Vietnam is shaped like a banana, it is very long and thin.

I was reading the other day when Marshal Lyautey was out there in the 1880's—and he later became a great French Governor General of Morocco—there were no roads in Vietnam at all. These people did their work entirely by boat. The wind is very predictable, it blows one way for 6 months of the year and another way for the other 6 months, and this coastline is punctuated with harbors. I believe for us it is very advantageous because you have deep water ports and you can use your fleet.

I think when you can find the Vietcong in large units, then, of course, you want to attack them. But in my view, that is a very difficult thing to do. When it comes to the Vietcong as individuals or in very small groups, those are the ones who are the real problem; they are the ones who will provide the recruiting and manpower of the Vietcong through their activities through all the villages.

The only way you can get at them is by organizing the totality of the population in the hamlet or in the villlage, and when you do that, then you can go through the hamlet with a fine-tooth comb and get the terrorists out. We have made a very small start of that in the so-called Hop Tac area around Saigon, and I hope when I am there to give that whole way of doing things a big push.

INTERTWINING OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

Senator AIKEN. Baldwin referred at that time, when you were here before, to the requirement for 500,000 Americans to be based there. Of course, that would give a greater feeling of security to Australia, the Philippines, and other places over there. It would seem to me to make considerable sense.

Now, as I understand it, our danger spot is in Pleiku, which is well inland.,

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. From the coast and really could become a Dien Bien Phu.

Mr. LODGE. It could become a Dien Bien Phu if we concentrated there, but we are not concentrating there so far as I know. There is no doubt—Senator Hickenlooper put his finger on a very important point—you can't get a good civilian program going without having some kind of military victory, because the first thing the civilian wants is to get a good night's sleep. He wants that before he wants land reform or economic aid or anything else, and this is an intertwining of the military and civilian all the way down the line.

Senator AIKEN. And that necessitates a continued search for a substantial, reasonably honest government, doesn't it?

Mr. LODGE. The kind of government that can run that country must eventually emerge from the countryside. In most of these tropical underdeveloped countries, the capital is an exotic thing. It has very little relationship with the countryside. It is not at all the way we have it nationally and in our States, and you have got to get enough tranquility so they can start choosing village chiefs, and from them will come people you can send to the capital. At present the capital means little out in the countryside. I think of a Vietnamese proverb that there are five evils that afflict mankind: fire, flood, storm, robbery, and central government. Throughout

history the central government has been a king or a fellow who came out and demanded that they fork up money and that is all.

Senator AIKEN. That is just what I have been saying about the United States. Good government must come from the community, but I am having an awful time selling that idea these days.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

ORGANIZING THE HAMLETS

Senator CASE. Is it the fault of the villages.

Senator AIKEN. That is right. The megalopolis is like Saigon.

Mr. LODGE. All of us in this room came from that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman wishes to take his turn.

Senator SPARKMAN. Your recommendation regarding the organizing, as I understand it, the villages—do you call them villages?

Mr. LODGE. Hamlets are the smallest. This corresponds roughly to the precincts.

Senator SPARKMAN. Wasn't that the plan early in this thing?

I thought when we started this thing, we started out on the idea of organizing the hamlets and it didn't work out too well.

Mr. LODGE. To the best of my knowledge, the first agreement that was reached between the different U.S. agencies on this organization of the hamlets, which involves all agencies, was in June of 1964. Then came all these upheavals in the summer, and they didn't get around to doing anything around it until October. Then they set up the Hop Tac area, which is roughly three concentric circles around Saigon, and by the present time I think they have carried out this kind of program in about 400 of those hamlets, and it has been quite successful, but the trouble with it is it hasn't got enough momentum and it isn't growing. That is my understanding of the history of this.

Senator SPARKMAN. I guess that is right. I was thinking further back than that.

Mr. LODGE. I don't want to exaggerate the importance of it. It is very small, Senator, because 400 hamlets are very small.

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't that somewhat the pattern the British used in Malaya?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. They just pushed out the Communists or denied them access to the villages.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

They had a village, they had a hamlet chief, and he had a committee, and they had a census. They issued identification cards and then had a curfew and they required permits for the movement of goods and people. Anybody who was out after a certain time or somewhere without a permit, they would give them the business and went through the whole thing with a fine-tooth comb. Of course, you had to have the support of the police, and where you didn't have the police you had to have the support of the army.

That is how they apprehended the terrorists. Everybody in these villages know who the terrorists are, but they are too scared to tell you. You have to get their confidence. If you get that, then you have turned the corner.

MISTAKEN HOPE FOR AN EARLY VICTORY

Senator SPARKMAN. Dr. Marcy, my wife, and I drove a good long way through Malaya. In fact, we drove from Kuala Lampur through Penang, right through this country, and we saw these stockaded villages. As a matter of fact, we stopped, as I recall, and had little refreshments in one of the villages. We saw the stockades, the checkpoints and so forth. I was greatly impressed with the way they carried it on, and I think one of our problems had been our unwillingness to take the time and the patience to work it out the way the British worked it out.

Frankly, I felt very good when some of the statements came out early in the campaign, we were going to win by the end of the year, we would take them all out by Christmas 1965, or whenever it was. I wonder if we didn't damage the situation in the minds of the people, particularly back home, when we were expecting an early victory when an early victory is not attainable.

Mr. LODGE. I don't think an early victory is attainable and I think it is a mistake to make the people think it is. I studied the British performance in Malaya a lot. We have a British Advisory Mission in Saigon. Mr. Thomson, who has been very helpful to me, and they had an executive—not only at the top level at the capital but right on down through—they had a council on which the military, the police, the agricultural, the economic information were all represented, and they were all tied together into a political movement.

We haven't done that, but we are going to, I think.

BRITISH IN MALAYA

Senator SPARKMAN. How many men did Britain use in Malaya?

Mr. LODGE. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. A newspaperman told me recently—I have no way of checking it, I haven't checked this, and in fact I was surprised by the number—but he told me they used 300,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield for one observation in this context?

John Chancellor had a broadcast the other day in which he said if the British were correct in saying that the minimum needed to defeat the guerrillas which they found to be in their campaign in Malaysia was ten to one, that would involve a maximum of a 1½ million American troops in South Vietnam, now a minimum of 800,000 troops in South Vietnam. This broadcast was made in the last 48 hours, I think.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I referred to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will you yield for an observation?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me the situation in Malaysia is not comparable to South Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not entirely, but it is the nearest.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You had the British in there for years organizing that situation, and the British were great organizers in their colonies and they had a basic nucleus to start with.

Mr. LODGE. And they also had trained a lot of young men in civil government, which the French didn't do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They had civil servants and this, that, and the other thing. They had a platform from which to operate.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I realize that it true. Even with all of that it took them 12 years.

Mr. LODGE. Twelve years.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because that, they had oceans on both sides and the guerrillas couldn't fade into the jungle.

Senator SPARKMAN. And here we were looking for victory by Christmas.

Mr. LODGE. That is not in the cards.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know it is not now, but I can recall some of the earlier statements that were made to that effect.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VIETCONG

Now, another thing that I think the American people have difficulty with is that we hear talk from time to time about the possibility of negotiations, but if we could negotiate with the Vietcong, let's say, or with anybody who had control over it, what would be our propositions? In other words, have we a definite ultimate goal that we adhere to steadfastly?

Mr. LODGE. I can give you my personal view.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. It is that the armed forces of the Government of South Vietnam should be able to use all the roads. That is a rough off-the-cuff answer. That is just my personal view. I don't know that the U.S. Government has formulated a policy.

To my mind, all talk of negotiations now is very premature. I don't think we are in a strong enough position. I don't think they think we are. We have yet to demonstrate the effectiveness on the ground with regard to the individual terrorist and the terrorists in small groups, which is needed. We know how to cope with large units, but the large units have a way of disappearing into the woodwork when they feel themselves outnumbered.

So, I don't think we are as yet—we are not in a negotiating position.

Senator SPARKMAN. I did not intend to suggest we were, but it seems to me we must always have a goal and that the people must understand what that goal is.

Mr. LODGE. That would be my answer, quick off-the-cuff answer.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to say this: You have got a very hard job coming up.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't know anyone I would rather——

Mr. LODGE. No doubt about that.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. I would risk it with than with you, and I certainly wish you well.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your good wishes. You and I have been together——

Senator SPARKMAN. We were almost tentmates. We had adjoining tents in Plattsburg during 1939.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?

PURPOSE OF BOMBING PATTERNS

Senator MUNDT. As our Ambassador to Saigon, Cabot, what is your recommendation to us or to the Government as to what you believe should be the purpose of the pattern of our bombing program?

Mr. LODGE. The bombing is justifiable on several grounds. First of all, they have this expertness in terrorism and subversion in South Vietnam which is an expertness that we haven't got, and we have an expertness in the use of planes and boats which they haven't got. Certainly it is unfair, if it is all right for them to use the fighting at which they excel and to deny us the right——

Senator MUNDT. I am trying to find out what the purpose and the pattern of it is.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, I am trying to get around to that.

So, when an American is killed by the terrorists, this is one consideration, like the young lady, Miss Barbara Robbins of Colorado, who was in the consul's office in Saigon and she was killed by Vietcong terrorism; or young Americans watching the night baseball when I was there; or women and children in the movie theater, they have a right to be there, and they are killed by this terrorism. They have a right to expect some kind of retaliation, some kind of protection for it. That is one thing.

Another justification for the bombing is to try to convince these people who, after all, are aggressors that this aggression is unprofitable and they ought to call it off. I don't think the bombing by itself is ever going to do it, but I think in conjunction with other things it is effective and it is justifiable.

Now, on the matter of targets, you get into some very expert complex calculations which I am not enough of an expert to make. I certainly think if you have an ammunition factory and the ammunition is going to be used to kill Americans with—to kill the ARVN, the Army of Vietnam—if you make explosives to bomb the American consulate with, I think you have a right to bomb the factory or the ammunition company that makes the explosives.

Senator MUNDT. How about the power plants and oil supplies?

Mr. LODGE. The oil supplies, as I stated before, raises the question about the South Vietnam supplies out of town in which 80 percent of all the oil and gasoline is in this place.

VIETCONG RETALIATION

Senator MUNDT. You don't really believe the Vietcong are governed by ethics, they are not going to bomb ours until we bomb theirs? They are not in position to do so.

Mr. LODGE. They are in position to do so.

Senator, they can take out that oil refinery at Nha Be anytime with a couple of mortar shells.

Senator MUNDT. You think they are just not doing it because they are good fellows?

Mr. LODGE. No, they are not doing it because they don't want us to blow up theirs.

Senator AIKEN. It is a source of income.

Mr. LODGE. Yes, like two boys on bicycles to see who is chicken first. There is no Emily Post about it. They know we can destroy

their petroleum and they know they can destroy ours, and that is one of those things. We can bomb Hanoi. They can cover Saigon with mortar shells.

Senator MUNDT. If they destroy our petroleum, are we dead? Suppose they do it tomorrow morning. At least we see things in the papers after you and McNamara hear about it, at least in this room. Suppose we go out of here and find out they had blown up our oil supplies.

Mr. LODGE. It would be an incredible nuisance. It would be an awful amount of trouble.

Senator MUNDT. Does it mean we are in Vietnam just waiting, at the time they are bombing us all over? Is that it?

Mr. LODGE. This is a very important question, but it is a military question which I am not an expert on. The Pentagon really could give you all the ins and outs of it. Whether it would be a bigger nuisance to us to have this base in South Vietnam destroyed than it would be a nuisance to them to have their base destroyed is a calculation that I don't know enough to make. But it is the calculation you have to make. Maybe it is easier for us to put in a crash refinery than it is for them.

In that case we ought to do it. I don't know enough about it. These are very expert questions.

BUDDHIST PRIEST AS LEADER

Senator MUNDT. I have been reading, you have been reading, too, American papers—you Harvard boys read more than I do——

Mr. LODGE. I wouldn't take that for granted.

Senator MUNDT. Anyhow, there is a lot of scuttlebutt, mostly from left wing, I don't know, columnists—take off the words "left wing"—about the fact that behind your appointment as Ambassador is the feeling that you are going to recommend some Buddhist priest to replace this fellow who is there now.

This Buddhist priest, whose name I don't recall, is somebody that you gave protective custody to at the time of Diem. You are familiar with what has been written, I suppose. I wish you would either confirm it or emphatically contradict it.

Mr. LODGE. It is absolutely untrue. There is not a word of truth in it. There is not a word of truth in it.

Senator MUNDT. Who is this fellow, will you give me his name? You know who it is?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, I know who it is. It is a Buddhist—I would like this off the record if I could.

[Off the record.]

Senator MUNDT. In your opinion, does he have potential leadership qualities to run the shop from the civilian standpoint in Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. I don't think he wants to hold office. He has had many opportunities to. He wants to be influential. I don't think he wants to run for office. His great concern is the Buddhist religion. He thinks about the Buddhist religion in Ceylon, India, Thailand, Cambodia, and that is the great reality to him. [Deleted.] I can only tell you what he talks. I can't tell you what he really thinks. [Deleted.] Like most Vietnamese, his sense of patriotism, nationalism,

loyalty, to the flag and to the Republic isn't at all the way ours is toward our flag and toward our Republic.

Senator MUNDT. You have no contemplation of his assuming the civilian leadership?

Mr. LODGE. Absolutely not. Nothing could be——

Senator MUNDT. Do you believe the other part of it is correct, if he were to get the job, you don't select him, that could happen without your approval?

Mr. LODGE. It could but I don't think it will.

Senator MUNDT. No, no, assuming it does, do you think the rest of the article is correct that he would then be in favor of a negotiated peace.

Mr. LODGE. All I can tell you is that the last time—he called on me in April when I was out there, [deleted]. That is what he was saying.

Senator MUNDT. The third question.

Mr. LODGE. But I hope his name will be left out of the record because this——

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

Senator MUNDT. You have just come back now from your longest and most recent quick tour?

Mr. LODGE. It wasn't very long.

Senator MUNDT. Quick tour of Saigon, not that you lived there. But you went over with all the high brass we have got. You really made a quick analysis, and they have been talking in the temple down here for a week about some new proposals, new plans, new approach to the Vietnamese situation, and I don't expect to be privy to what they were talking about down there.

Mr. LODGE. I have only been present at one meeting.

Senator MUNDT. OK. It makes it easier for you.

Will you tell us now on the basis of your recent trip what new steps or procedures you recommend to us as a Congress? I don't care what you said to the President or what you said to anyone else, what do you recommend to us as national policy on the basis of your recent experiences over there?

Mr. LODGE. I think Congress has a very fine record with regard to this whole situation. There has been discussion here on the merits. There has been an absence of partisanship. There has been a willingness to vote the necessary funds and the necessary authority. I wouldn't, from my vantage point, in Saigon, which I admit is only one part of the whole problem—there is nothing that I think Congress needs to do beyond what it has done.

Senator MUNDT. All right.

COPING WITH COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

Here is the second question: What new procedure should the Government undertake? We obviously are getting no place the way we are doing it now. We have to have something new. I am not asking you what you told the President but what would you tell us. We are all part of the same government.

Mr. LODGE. That is correct. I believe we are not going to get a satisfactory outcome until we learn how to deal with and overcome

this Communist subversion, terrorism on the ground in South Vietnam, and in learning how to do that we will learn how to cope with it in other tropical underdeveloped countries. This Communist subversion terrorism is, I think, the greatest single external threat to the United States. I think it is greater than the nuclear, because we have a superiority of the nuclear and we have an understanding of its deployment, but this is still a problem we haven't got the key to. One of the things I hope to do is to make some headway on that.

Now, I also approve of the program that is now underway to establish these strong points in Da Nang and Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh and of course, the big Saigon-Bien Hoa complex. That is very advantageous, I think, for us. It means we have these deep water ports in which our 7th Fleet can support our forces.

It gives us a north and south line of communication which is in the South China Sea, which the Vietcong can't touch. It gives short east and west lines because Vietnam is shaped like a banana, long and thin. From these I think we can attack targets when it appears propitious to do so when the Vietcong appears in large units, and I think from here we can carry out a basically civilian counter-terrorist, counter-subversion campaign.

MORE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL WARFARE

Senator MUNDT. Question No. 4, and you correct me if I am wrong, but I take it the new element that you are talking about, you are thinking of doing when you get over there, is to step up our political warfare, make it more effective. You made a few statements, you said not enough people have been trained in civil government. We have got over ten years, that is our function, we should have done it. You said the British set up within their Government a whole little operation which reached out and set up this village thing, and you said we are going to do it but we haven't started it.

Mr. LODGE. For years the British have been taking young men to England.

Senator MUNDT. This makes you in your second appearance one of our most distinguished witnesses for the Freedom Academy which the State Department has consistently opposed. Despite its opposition, last Friday the House committee in charge of that bill unanimously reported it. You have four members of this committee, co-authors of it, Case, Dodd, Lausche, Hickenlooper, and Mundt; that is five. Smathers, who has recently retired from the committee is six; Stu Symington, who is a kind of a reluctant lover of this particular bill, has a concept of his own along the same line, so that makes seven. It seems to me that it is just absolutely incomprehensible that the State Department should continue to resist the thing which you indirectly continue to recommend as essential and said it, one way or another, every time you have been here.

I have asked you, Cabot. You said, "I can give you a thousand things." Admiral Raborn was here, and he said we are not even trying in the area where we are weakest. He said we are doing

things in the area we are weakest. I said, "Name them." He couldn't name them. He said it was an executive secret. We couldn't get one on the line.

I wish you, as our Ambassador, before you go back to Saigon would use your considerable influence with the State Department. You ought to have influence because you are going back there for a second time to do your job for your country. I wish you would tell them what you have told us.

AT THE END OF THE ROPE

For me it is idiotic for the State Department to continue to resist and offer their resistance. In the hearings which our House committee have had, even our good friend Douglas wrote a weak letter. It wasn't a good letter, it wasn't very strong, but we are going to have to have some action on it. Here is a copy of the bill, and I wish you would say something to the powers that be.

I have supported this Vietnam policy without a single speech in the Congress, or against it, but I am about at the end of the rope. If we are going to try to win this war with dollars and blood and guts and ignore the brainpower, of which we have a lot, I am about done supporting that kind of expensive program.

You are our key in this. You can tell them, "I am going back down there now, but you have got to train these people." To do that, as you said yourself today first, you have to train the people, like the teachers college.

We have got to have over here some kind of instrumentality, I don't care whether they call it Freedom Academy or something else, but it has to be something different from the Foreign Service Institute. The House believes that, and we passed it one time in the U.S. Senate. The country is beginning to believe this, and this thing is going to explode all over this country one of these days. Lausche or Mundt or somebody is going to give a speech sometime calling attention to the utter idiocy of listening to a distinguished man like you who comes here and says after 10 years we have done nothing in the area in which we should have been working the hardest. If you have these inkspots to make it ultimately effective should we stand in this, you have to somehow penetrate the countryside with some political concepts so they can build up a central government, the grassroots.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Case was here first.

The CHAIRMAN. We are alternating.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead.

Senator CASE. The Senator qualifies as a Democrat. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case then.

Senator CASE. You mean me, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

THE UGLY AMERICAN

Senator CASE. I do want to support what Senator Mundt has said. We don't have any pride of authorship about the form of this thing, but it does seem to us that since last June we were talking

about moving around these villages. I have had the impression we have been talking about this for a decade almost.

Senator MUNDT. Every time Cabot has been here.

Mr. LODGE. Have you read "The Ugly American?" Remember Colonel Hillandale in "The Ugly American?" Well, that type of thing.

Senator CASE. It may not be compatible with democratic processes for training people for subversion but we do it, we talk about it. It seems to me the only thing wrong is we are not doing it very well, and when I say subversion, I mean moving into an area and taking over.

You covered most everything very well, it seems to me, as well as anyone, except the President of the United States, could. There are a couple of things I would just like to have your judgment on. You are pretty familiar with the operation of the councils of our Government in foreign policy matters.

ARGUMENTS FOR DISENGAGEMENT

Is there anybody down there who has constantly and forcefully presented the arguments for disengagement to be sure we have had all points of view considered? Do people talk up at this?

Mr. LODGE. I was very much impressed in the meeting by the procedure which the President used of getting different points of view presented.

Senator LAUSCHE. When was that meeting?

Mr. LODGE. I went to one meeting, the only one I have been to, on the day I got back, which was Wednesday, a week ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Last week.

Mr. LODGE. Last Wednesday when I got back. I got in here 5 o'clock in the morning, and we had the meeting that day.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, go ahead.

Mr. LODGE. Then I was in a meeting yesterday, but it wasn't quite the same. But the different points of view were, I thought, very well presented and very thoroughly presented, and some points of view that I thought were thoroughly fallacious were well presented. I thought it was a good procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why they haven't had you at all the meetings. Why have they only had you at one meeting? Did they only invite you to one meeting?

Mr. LODGE. I went to one meeting and then I went back to Massachusetts.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean you are just going out. I would have thought you would be present at all meetings.

Mr. LODGE. I was present on Wednesday, and then I was present yesterday, and, well, there are various specialized phases that were taken up other days.

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield for one question?

Mr. LODGE. I think it is quite natural.

CONSULTING CONGRESS

Senator MUNDT. Cabot, can you tell us what Republican members from the Hill were at this meeting you attended?

Mr. LODGE. The meeting that I attended, there were no Congressmen or Senators present.

Senator MUNDT. Why isn't Congress consulted on both sides of it?

Mr. LODGE. Maybe they were the other day. I was there last Wednesday, and I was at the White House yesterday.

Senator MUNDT. I read about people like Arthur Dean being brought down.

Mr. LODGE. He wasn't there.

Senator MUNDT. I know, but he has been there to consult on this. If he is an expert on Saigon and how to defend the American system, then there are a lot of super-experts on the Hill in both parties who ought to be consulted, if we are getting down to that level.

To me this is getting a little absurd, to tailor up a program and pass it down to Congress and say, "This is it." I think now is the time—I am all for these long discussions, but I can't see why the Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle have been blackballed. It is not your responsibility, but I wanted that in the record.

Go ahead.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

OVERTURES FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Earlier you said you felt that the talk of negotiation was premature. But haven't we seen in the press some articles or what-not that 8 or 10 months ago there were feelers put out by Hanoi which we rebuffed and ignored?

Mr. LODGE. No, sir. I think not.

Senator CASE. I had seen this statement within the week.

Mr. LODGE. I don't believe it is true. Eight or ten months ago?

Senator CASE. Yes.

I was not aware of this at the time. I might say this, too: There isn't any time I have been active on this that I have seen any evidence of that. But this statement was made.

Mr. LODGE. I think the evidence is to the contrary. They consistently have rebuffed any overtures, and I think representations have been made to Hanoi to cease what they are doing and they refused. I am quite sure that is true.

Senator CASE. Everyone has told us this. The President has told little groups of this personally, and I have no reason to doubt it, but I saw this statement.

Mr. LODGE. I think this is erroneous.

FACED WITH INCREASED AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

Senator CASE. We are faced, I take it, with very much increased American participation in order to strengthen these points along the coast which we can hold against any eventuality. This is your judgment, is it not, or your observation of what the plan is?

Mr. LODGE. I don't know what they are planning, but we are certainly developing some strong points along the coast, which I think is an excellent thing to do.

Senator CASE. I take it we can hold these against any eventuality no matter if the situation disintegrates as it seems to be disintegrating?

Mr. LODGE. I think they can be made strong enough so this—they can be held against any eventuality, and I hope they will be.

Senator CASE. You don't have any judgment as to the number of men?

Mr. LODGE. No, I would rather leave that to the military. The day I flew into Cam Ranh Bay, which was last Sunday—here is Da Nang and there is—these are the big ones. There are some smaller ones that I would rather have you get from the Pentagon.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

Senator CASE. This will take, just in your broad judgment, a number of tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of troops, will it not? Let's assume that it will, several hundred thousand, not putting you to the question there. What in your judgment will be the effect on Hanoi, China, Russia increasing our commitment to this extent, say, several hundred thousand men?

Mr. LODGE. That involves making a psychological judgment.

Senator CASE. This is your area and that is why I ask you.

Mr. LODGE. What the result is in Hanoi and Peking thinking, what their minds are, I don't think they are impressed with a show of strength. I think they look for the will and the capacity to use it. I don't believe they are going to think that they have a chance of losing until we show that we know how to overcome Communist subversion terrorism in South Vietnam. I think you could see it at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba, that it was when President Kennedy gave them the feeling that, by golly, you had better look out, this is getting serious, and that we were prepared to use our strength, then they modified their conduct. I don't think the show of force impresses them.

PROVOCATIONS THAT MIGHT CAUSE HANOI TO RETALIATE

Senator CASE. That was not quite the thrust of the question. I was more concerned as to whether this would create the kind of provocation that would make it necessary for them, in their judgment, to escalate the situation.

Mr. LODGE. I will make a guess on that. You have a right to know my guesses. If I am wrong, why, then I am wrong.

Senator CASE. We are all grown men here.

Mr. LODGE. I don't look to see a large Communist army come in.

Senator LAUSCHE. Chinese?

Mr. LODGE. No, I don't.

Senator LAUSCHE. But he is talking about Hanoi.

Senator CASE. I am talking about all three of these.

Mr. LODGE. In Hanoi, the North Vietnamese are in now and they have the capacity to come much harder. If they thought they could take these strong points, of course, they would do it. The day that I flew into Cam Ranh Bay, which is a harbor comparable in size almost to San Francisco or New York Harbor; it is an extraordinary place. There was some rifle firing going on and the Army Engineers were bulldozing and making storage areas and landing fields and everything else, and across the water you were getting rifle shots and so on. The First Infantry was there protecting the Engineers, and you have to get out far enough so that they can't

start pouring in mortar fire on you, you see what I mean? It isn't just enough to have people on the base, you have to have an area far enough out and a perimeter far enough out for protection, so it takes troops.

CAM RANH BAY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where is Cam Ranh Bay?

Mr. LODGE. It is right there. It is where Marco Polo stopped on his way from Europe to Canton, and it is where the whole Russian fleet went in 1904 on their way to being defeated by the Japanese.

Senator MUNDT. Is it the best harbor in Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. It is enormous. I say it is comparable to New York or San Francisco in size. Because the land isn't fertile, you don't grow rice; it is very sparsely settled. Saigon is a big port, but Saigon is at the head of the delta, you see. But Cam Ranh is a magnificent large, deep water, thoroughly protected anchorage.

Senator MUNDT. Can big battleships go in there?

Mr. LODGE. Anything. It is a superb location.

Senator MUNDT. Is that true of Saigon?

Mr. LODGE. It is the driest part of Southeast Asia, which is a notoriously damp part of the world. It is dry. There are sand dunes and, in fact, the Japanese take it to Japan to make glassware. It is a remarkable sand chemically and it is a tremendously interesting undeveloped area which we are developing.

Senator CASE. Just two more questions, if I may, Mr. Ambassador.

BOMBING RAIL LINES TO CHINA

I think that Carl Marcy, who gave me this, may be right; I was referring to it without remembering. It was a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson Univeristy, named Robert Brown, who came back from 2 or 3 year service, 1961, and has been back and forth some time since. He made a trip as a member of the three-man commission sent to Saigon by the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy, which was one of these teach-ins. The burden of this statement, according to the Times report here, July 22, was that Hanoi's position was not that American withdrawal was a condition to discussion, but that it had to be agreed on in principle. That may have been what I had in mind, although I don't remember that particular one.

These two questions:

Do you have any comment on a piece that was reported in the Washington Post, from the Chicago Daily News Service, datelined Saigon, July 22? The headline says, "China Rallying Attack Unanswered." Apparently we have bombed the railroad from China into Hanoi, which is a very important shipping point for the Chinese, using the Port of Haiphong—is it further down? The report makes the point that we did that and there was no retaliation. Is this the type of thing that you are talking about?

Mr. LODGE. I think the rail lines into China are eminently proper targets.

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Senator CASE. I don't question that. I was just wondering if the failure to respond to anything of this sort suggests that China is not anxious to respond?

Mr. LODGE. I think Peking believes that at this time in history, we are capable of devastating China. They are well aware of it.

EMPLOYING GUERRILLA TACTICS

Senator CASE. The last question, raised by somebody else, is not my own thinking, as much of this is not. The suggestion was, suppose we let the Vietcong take over and put ourselves in the role of guerrillas attacking them, where we would have all the advantages of 1 to 10 or 1 to 15 on our side. Could we then start coming back as fast as we are losing?

Mr. LODGE. I wouldn't think that would be the profitable thing to do. There is no way of avoiding the necessity of learning how to organize the civilian population, and it has been done in other countries. It has been done in Malaya, been done in Luzon, the French learned how to do it in the City of Algiers. When the French left Algeria it wasn't because the terrorists forced them out, but the decision was made in France to leave. Terrorism is a dreadful, tough, difficult, prickly thing and people have learned how to cope with it. But this is something we have yet to learn.

Senator CASE. This means building an esprit and also an ability on the part of Vietnamese?

Mr. LODGE. I don't think I ducked Senator Mundt's question the last time I was here, I think I told him that I could write the names of people who knew something about this on the back of an envelope. I can think of about eight of them, and I am going to try to get some of them to come out.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

SOUTH VIETNAMESE CANNOT COPE BY THEMSELVES

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it fair to assume that since we are increasing the number of troops that we have in South Vietnam that there is an admission that the South Vietnamese are incapable themselves of handling the problem that now confronts them?

Mr. LODGE. We have been proceeding on the theory, since 1961, of the South Vietnamese making the main effort. That, I think, was a good policy. It was always recognized that they couldn't cope with this aggression by themselves; that if it were mere local banditry they could cope with it, but when it had this powerful addition from outside it became an international aggression and required our help.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Mr. LODGE. And so the ARVN, the Army of South Vietnam, still has great value. It would be a very bad thing for us if it didn't exist. But it certainly cannot carry the whole load by itself.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it still a guerrilla warfare as far as the Vietcong are concerned, or are there evidences of one army facing another army and fighting it out?

Mr. LODGE. I don't see an evidence of one army facing another and fighting it out.

A MUCH BIGGER TARGET

Senator LAUSCHE. If they come in in numbers from the north as an army and meet face to face, will our problem be worsened or bettered?

Mr. LODGE. I think it will be advantageous to us, because they will present a much bigger target and they will also tend to turn the population against them. I don't expect to see that happen. This is a thing that is often argued about.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you don't expect to see it happen, there would have to be a reason for it not happening. Would that be that the North Vietnamese realize that they have a better chance in the guerrilla warfare than they would have body to body?

Mr. LODGE. Yes. They would see that—if they see that the U.S. Army is about to destroy them, they naturally will tend to fade away into the foliage and become individual guerrillas and terrorists. That is what they can do that Western armies in Europe and so on can't do. That is what I am afraid that they will do.

This I want to be perfectly clear. There are people, very good people, who don't agree with me about this.

CHANGES IN ATMOSPHERE

Senator LAUSCHE. General Taylor told us that this might become our war when we take command. He also said to this committee, "The last thing we want to do is to suggest we are taking over the war."

Is there a change in that concept or a change in that policy?

Mr. LODGE. Inevitably, Senator, as we increase our effort, that inevitably changes the atmosphere. You just can't help it.

We do want to—I think we should do it in such a way as to maintain the maximum morale on the part of the Vietnamese and so that they make their maximum effort and they just don't slump and take the attitude of, "Let George do it."

But as the number of Americans increases, why, the whole psychological atmosphere changes. That is true. You are right.

Senator LAUSCHE. You made some mention about the will of the military and the will of the people. Is there existent now a will of the people to resist and to save South Vietnam free from Vietcong domination and Communist control?

Mr. LODGE. I think there is. These people have——

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, you have answered that.

A WILL TO RESIST

Has there been discussed in any of the meetings which you attended in the higher circles the question of whether there exists a will to resist on the part of the people?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes; that is very often discussed.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the conclusion is that there is still that will present?

Mr. LODGE. My conclusion is—I will speak for myself. I think that they have the will and desire to resist. They have taken casualties which I am told by the statisticians are greater than any country has ever taken, and they are a remarkably tough people and stoic people. They are not organized the way we are. They are

somewhat medieval in their organization. It resembles more Germany and Italy in the 19th century before Bismarck and Cavour unified them than it does a modern nation state. But without having a sense of Vietnamese nationality, they have a sense of Vietnamese culture and Vietnamese race and language and literature and do not want to be dominated by China. That is a strong belief in all of them, but they don't see that in order to do that they shouldn't have a terrible fight to the death with a neighbor 3 miles away.

Senator LAUSCHE. You mentioned that there were some views expressed vigorously and efficiently at the meetings that you attended but that you thought were fallacious. Would you tell us what views they were that were urged in the meeting that you attended?

Mr. LODGE. I don't think I ought to reveal what was said in those meetings, Senator. I don't think it is my right to do it. But what I was trying to convey was——

EXPLORING DISENGAGEMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you in your own mind explored the idea of disengaging ourselves?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes, I have thought about it. Yes, of course I have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are there any others that you know of in the inner circle who have expressed a view of disengagement?

Mr. LODGE. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't know whether you want to answer that or not.

Mr. LODGE. Not that I know of. I am not really an authority on the inner circles in Washington, you know. I have thought, or I have had these suggestions made, about disengaging. The minute you think about them and analyze them, I reject them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any military man in the top circles who has suggested this disengagement?

Mr. LODGE. No, not that I know of and not to me. But as I say, I am not an authority on this, and I am not really familiar with all of what goes on.

Sentor LAUSCHE. All right.

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

Now then, as far as North Vietnam is concerned, to what extent is it receiving aid from Russia and China?

Mr. LODGE. We know that these SAM sites, these missile installations, come from the Soviet Union. We know that, and there are some expert personnel to instruct in the operation of them. That is one thing we know.

As far as China is concerned, much of the ammunition, weapons, and so on that the Vietcong use come from China.

Senator LAUSCHE. They are both supplying help by way of equipment?

Mr. LODGE. That is what I understand, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you are of the opinion that there will not be a direct participation by either of these nations even though we increase our military representation there?

Mr. LODGE. I think direct participation—I think installing the SAM site is direct participation, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. I said increased participation.

Mr. LODGE. Increased participation?

Senator LAUSCHE. By sending in troops.

Mr. LODGE. I don't expect to see them sending in troops, masses of combat troops. They may send in technicians to give advice on training, that kind of thing, but I wouldn't expect to see infantry divisions, armored divisions, that kind of thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can you tell us what the consensus is of those in the higher echelon, especially the military, about our ability to cope with the forces of, let's say, China and North Vietnam on land with our troops?

Mr. LODGE. No, I would rather have the military testify on how they would meet that. All I can say is that I believe the Chinese know that we are much stronger than they are militarily. I think they know that.

ATTITUDES OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know whether there were any substantial segments of the Vietnam armed forces that favored dealing directly with the Vietcong in order to reach a political settlement?

Mr. LODGE. I do not, no.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you feel that the armed forces are unified in their view of preserving South Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. All——

Senator LAUSCHE. Substantially unified?

Mr. LODGE. Substantially, the generals I know, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. There have been recent reports that a North Vietnam division was in South Vietnam. Is there any evidence supporting those reports as far as you know?

Mr. LODGE. I think there is, yes. I think there is evidence of troop units from the Army of North Vietnam. Whether it is as much as a division, I don't know. But I believe there is evidence that troops from the Army of North Vietnam are in South Vietnam.

U.S. CANNOT AFFORD TO PULL OUT OF VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, this final question: Heretofore in the 6 years that I have been in this committee, every person in high position, the Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of Defense, the Secretaries of State, and the President, have taken the position that we cannot afford to pull out of South Vietnam for if we do, we will create a vacuum and that whole Southeast Asia will be taken over by the Communists. Do you know of any change of views on that view?

Mr. LODGE. No, sir, I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can you tell us why there have been about a week of consultations as to what we should do? Why has it been so protracted?

Mr. LODGE. These are very important matters, and they deserve——

Senator LAUSCHE. Has there been a doubt as to what we should do?

Because the answer to that either confirms what has been said to us heretofore or indicates a change in view, that it is not essential to our national defense that we keep that area in the hands of friendly countries.

Mr. LODGE. I don't think there is any change in the view that this is a vital area, so far as I know.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we pull out of Vietnam, will that be the end of our trouble?

Mr. LODGE. If we pulled out of Vietnam, that will be the beginning of our trouble and what we have been going through the last 3 years will appear very, very mild compared to what we will have to do after that.

THE NEXT CENTER OF TROUBLE

Senator LAUSCHE. In your opinion, if we pull out where will be the next center in which we would be faced with aggravated trouble?

Mr. LODGE. We would have—of course, Cambodia would go, Laos would go. We would have a terrible time protecting Thailand.

Malaysia would be in a very critical position, squeezed between a Communist Southeast Asian Peninsula on the north and Indonesia on the south. I think Australia would be in grave peril and so, with a brief delay, would be New Zealand. I think it would have very grave consequences for Japan.

I think this is a key place. I think this is on a par with Berlin in importance. I think this goes and a whole lot of other things go.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were you Governor in 1952?

Mr. LODGE. I never have been Governor, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Your brother was?

Mr. LODGE. I was elected to this body three times, but my brother was Governor of Connecticut.

Senator LAUSCHE. The reason I ask—in 1953 Indochina was fragmentized and it was then argued that if that area is taken over by the Communists, the whole southeast was in danger. That argument was again repeated with Laos in 1952, and it is now still held that the area is vital to our national defense. Is that correct?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, I think it is.

A VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST

Senator LAUSCHE. This final question: Are we in there to preserve South Vietnam or are we in there because the security of our own country is dependent upon keeping that area free from Communists?

Mr. LODGE. I think it is both.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I thought it was only the former, I would say we just can't afford to stay there.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator CASE. I just want to agree with you on this point. I do think it is unfortunate to have great conceptions of preserving the world for democracy or self-determination. I don't think this is good. When General Taylor came and said this some little time ago

that we were there, it is just not good. We are there, I assume, to prevent specifically——

Mr. LODGE. Of course, there is a vital American interest. We wouldn't be justified in making the effort we are making if there wasn't.

Senator CASE. And we are not the policemen of the world. We are not God.

Mr. LODGE. Not at all.

Senator CASE. And we can't do this in any event all over the world.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Mr. Chairman, that is my last question, but I do think as far as I am concerned, I believe that area is necessary for our security and defense, and I believe we ought to stay in there, providing we can win. I think we ought to have the military men of the highest level come before this committee to discuss this subject with us.

If we can't win, we should get out. The ones who can give us the best advice on that are not Ambassador Lodge. It would have to be the military men.

That is all I have.

INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER KY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, there are just one or two odds and ends here, relative to some of your recent questions. In a television interview on July 18, the Premier—do you call him Ky?

Mr. LODGE. Ky.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Responded to a question along this line. I just wondered if you would comment on it.

There was an interview with [Walter] Cronkite. It says,

> What about manpower? How short are you in manpower? You must—you have been fighting this war so long. The number of young men available must be getting very short.

Ky answered:

> Well, we are not short of manpower, but the problem for the government to solve is how to get the participation of the population in the war effort; in other words, how to bring back their confidence in the people. That is the problem of my government today.

Then a little later on he had this reply.

> Cronkite: Should the American people be concerned about the frequent change of government in Vietnam?
>
> Premier Ky: Not only the American but even the Vietnamese people. We are worried, and I can say we are tired of so often changes. This fact explains also why at the present time most or many Vietnamese people are so indifferent.

I would say he is very worried about whether or not the Vietnamese people in South Vietnam are really concerned about it, with his government, and whether or not they are really supporting it, isn't he, from those answers?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, he is worried.

The CHAIRMAN. And he is dubious about it, I take it?

Mr. LODGE. I think the best thing that any American has ever said was said by Bedell Smith in 1954 when Bidault removed Navarre. Bedell Smith said that any second rate general can win in Indochina if there were a proper political atmosphere. It doesn't

mean they lack courage and are not willing to die, but that isn't the same thing as supporting the government.

EISENHOWER OPPOSED A UNILATERAL APPROACH

The CHAIRMAN. I want to refer to General Eisenhower's statements in South Vietnam because he went through this agonizing appraisal at the time, in 1953 or 1954, I guess it was, when the French were there. This is from his same book, "The Mandate for Change," page 362:

> I was convinced that it was in our interest to commit United States armed forces in the event of overt Chinese aggression, but I was determined that Southeast Asian nations could not disclaim responsibility for their own safety, expecting the United States alone to carry all the burdens of free world security. If I should find it necessary to go to the Congress for authority to intervene in Indochina, I wanted to say that we had allies such as Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and above all, the bulk of the Vietnamese people, ready to join with us in resisting such aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. Next page, 363, in a letter which he wrote to General Gruenther with regard to the matter they were discussing with the French Government. This is a quote from his letter:

> Pleven knows as well as you and I do that, beginning in early 1951, every kind of presentation has been made to the French Government to induce that Government to put the Indochina war on an international footing. . . . We urged further that France not only declare her intention of making Indochina independent and that she was fighting for the right of Indochina to be independent, but that she should take steps to place the issue before the U.N. At the very least, this latter action would have had the effect of legitimizing any kind of coalition that might then have been formed to fight the war.

I would take that to mean that President Eisenhower was not in favor of unilateral American intervention in Indochina. Would you say that is correct?

Mr. LODGE. I certainly think he wanted the Vietnamese to make a major contribution, and he wanted it to be a choice between communism and freedom instead of communism and colonialism. That is what he was trying to get across.

TAKING THE ISSUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. And he was recommending to France that she should take steps to place the issue before the United Nations. Why, in your opinion, has this Government refused to request that?

Mr. LODGE. For one thing, the United Nations today is not the United Nations of 1954. What we are doing in Vietnam, for example, is to my mind completely consistent with the charter of the United Nations. Yet I doubt, I think it is very doubtful whether we could get an endorsement of it in the United Nations as it is presently constituted.

The United Nations today——

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean we only use it when they will do as we say? I was inspired in this by Senator Case's statement a moment ago. I mean, is it a good reason to say we won't go to the U.N. because we don't think they will do what we want?

Mr. LODGE. I don't think we ought to go if we don't think we will get a fair deal on the merits.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether we will or not.

Why do you think we wouldn't?

Mr. LODGE. I just observe the way in which the United Nations has been conducting itself. I think it is going through a very bad patch at the present time. I think it is going to work out of it. I think it is an indispensable, utterly indispensable, organization but I think the General Assembly is obviously in drydock at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. At the moment over an irrelevant issue, irrelevant to this matter; they are in financial difficulties.

Mr. LODGE. I will say this, Mr. Chairman: I don't think the United Nations has the tools or the will or the muscle to undertake the Vietnam operation. That is the first thing.

Second, as far as establishing a channel of communication is concerned, I don't think that what is lacking today are channels of communication. We have many, many channels of communication. We have the channel of the ICC which visits Hanoi every month. We have the channel in Warsaw. We have countless channels between different embassies.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER ASIAN NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. But I was thinking of Senator Case's question that he raised about our being there, and the question Senator Lausche raised that we assume this obligation we have to unilaterally keep the peace in the world. In this case, none of the great Asian powers apparently are willing to lend us a hand at all. That is, Japan, India, and Pakistan are the principal powers in the general area, and not one of them is willing to become a member of this coalition, are they, and to help in the objective which we claim to be our national obligation; isn't that true?

Mr. LODGE. I don't think that is quite the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Are any of those major countries making any contribution?

Mr. LODGE. The Japanese are making an economic contribution.

The CHAIRMAN. It is of a very minor nature.

Mr. LODGE. I recently visited Tokyo and New Delhi, and they told me in private how gratified they were that we were carrying this burden, how much they hoped we would stay, and that we would be successful, and what a disaster it would be for them if we were not there. That is not what they say in public, but that is what the governments tell me in private.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. It is a curious thing to me. This is exactly what we were told about the Dominican Republic, that all the Latin American countries privately say do it, and publicly they don't. Why is this?

Mr. LODGE. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly the same thing was said to us within the week.

Mr. LODGE. I suppose it is the estimate that the heads of those governments have of what the traffic will bear as far as public opinion in those countries is concerned. You have in Japan a press campaign going on, you have student demonstrations in the streets.

In New Zealand, I was demonstrated at by a lot of so-called students who didn't look a day under 40 to me. Some governments are intimidated by that kind of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say, I am very confused about it.

EISENHOWER'S RELUCTANCE

Eisenhower, as I read it there, was most reluctant. It was said a moment ago that everybody since this arose is thoroughly committed to the idea that this is in our vital national interests. I don't read that in Eisenhower's book at all.

He discussed it there. I think he qualified it always that he was willing to enter into a coalition if he had backing, as he stated there, of other people interested in it. But I would judge it is fair to say he had no interest in unilaterally undertaking the defense of this area because——

Mr. LODGE. I don't think he refused.

The CHAIRMAN. He refused to enter into it at that time, didn't he? We were told, although as you say, you were not in the inner circle. I wasn't then or now. I haven't been to one of those meetings.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why aren't you invited?

The CHAIRMAN. I can't answer that question.

But Eisenhower, as I was told, personally vetoed the proposal that we enter into Dien Bien Phu not unilaterally, but to help the French, who were there in a death struggle; is that not correct? Is that not your understanding?

Mr. LODGE. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that the general understanding?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did enter into that situation to the tune of about $2 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. We are like these other people. We gave them money but we didn't commit our forces to it, and I am told—not by him, it was common gossip—that Eisenhower vetoed a proposal that it was said Radford and others proposed. That was said. It was common gossip around here. I can't prove it, but I never heard anybody deny it either.

Mr. LODGE. I have heard it, too, but I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard it. If it hadn't been true, somebody probably would have said so.

Senator SYMINGTON. In a book on Dien Bien Phu which was written by a Frenchman, he states that Admiral Radford persuaded this Government to go into Dien Bien Phu with B–29 bombers. That was overruled by President Eisenhower at the behest of the State Department.

Senator CASE. That was before Diem proved there was some possibility of local resistance, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. This was before Dien Bien Phu. This was the common gossip.

Senator SYMINGTON. April 1954.

QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTION ABOUT SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. This assumption that everybody has agreed this is of vital national importance, vital to our security, I think is ques-

tionable. There are some people who have thought that, and there are some who haven't.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was an element in that thing in the Dien Bien Phu period—had we gone in there, we would have been very properly accused of supporting colonialism, because that was pacification by the French for the French.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, I think, just as we are now being accused of taking the place of the French by some people. That is, we are taking their place and ourselves asserting the right to unilaterally occupy in-country and stay there as long as, well, I don't know how long.

HISTORICAL RECORD

Senator LAUSCHE. May I volunteer something here for the record to make this historically complete?

Fifty Governors were invited to Washington by Eisenhower in 1953, and he had his whole staff present when he spoke to the group. In that meeting it was stated that we cannot afford to give up Indochina to the Communists. I anticipated on the basis of what all of his men said that we were going to step in, and practically everybody there believed it. Bracken Lee of Utah challenged it, and we didn't step in. We decided to let it go, believing that that would be the end of our problems.

That is all I want to say.

The CHAIRMAN. What I was citing here in his authority. Of course, anybody who reads a book has to interpret it in light of their own experience.

THE NATURE OF OUR COMMITMENT

One other thing I would like to ask you in view of this question: What do you consider to be the nature of our commitment to South Vietnam? Will you be more specific about it?

This is repeated continually as committed, and repeated by the President and others. What is your view of our commitment and when was it made?

Mr. LODGE. I think it was made to Mr. Diem in 1954 or thereabouts.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Mr. LODGE. I would like to refresh my memory, but I have always thought it was made by the Eisenhower Administration in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you undertake——

Mr. LODGE [continuing]. But I would have to verify it, Mr. Chairman.

THE ORIGINAL U.S. COMMITMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Since you are part of the State Department—we had the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations a moment ago—I think it would be interesting for this record if you would ask Mr. [Douglas] MacArthur, if you can't do it, to supply for the record exactly what the original commitment was and what instrument it was, when was it made, by whom it was made, and to whom was it made, because this is a matter that is very vague.

These general statements are made. I don't remember any treaty to do this unilaterally.

Mr. LODGE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't consider the SEATO Treaty requires unilaterally our doing this, and I think it would clarify the air and perhaps maybe enable us to understand the nature of the commitment and how vital it is to our interests if you could have Mr. MacArthur——

Mr. LODGE. I will.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Supply for insertion in this record the specific undertaking that was made that could be regarded as a commitment on the part of this country to unilaterally defend to the end the independence of South Vietnam.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very good—instead of putting it in the record, supplying us with a copy of it. It is not secret.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no secret. It will be available to you, and if you want copies the staff will make copies.

Senator MUNDT. Instead of supplying it for the record, supply it to us.

The CHAIRMAN. You give us, as specifically as you can—I understand there was a letter, one thing, a letter by President Eisenhower, and this is being cited as a commitment. I also understand that this letter—and I haven't seen the original or even a verified copy—there were considerable conditions in it. It wasn't just an outright, it was a conditional offer of assistance. But I don't know actually, I have never seen it. I have accepted it in a way, as some of these statements of a general nature that we have a commitment there. I think the record ought to show that.

Senator MUNDT. Wouldn't it be a good idea to have Mr. MacArthur also supply a subsequent commitment, beyond or modified?

The CHAIRMAN. I am drawing no limitation.

Senator MUNDT. You said, "Original."

The CHAIRMAN. I said "original," but anything that is subsequent to that.

Senator CASE. Both.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to limit this. Whatever they can provide.

Senator MUNDT. I thought maybe Mr. Cabot might not have understood.

Senator LAUSCHE. Carl Marcy just supplied me with this background information relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. On page 67 is this statement:

Aid to the State of Vietnam message from the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, October 23, 1954.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that the aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsible to the nationalist aspirations of the people, so enlightened in its purposes and effective in its performance that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your people.

I did not read the first three paragraphs to see just what type of commitments we made. But that must be the item.

Mr. LODGE. That is the one I was thinking of.[1]

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from Missouri.

BOMBING OIL RESERVES

Senator SYMINGTON. Getting back to this bombing of the oil business and very briefly, as I understand it we are relatively strong on the sea and in the air, seapower and airpower are now intertwined, and we are relatively weak on the ground. I can understand why we don't use nuclear weapons. I can understand why we don't bomb Red China. I can understand why we don't bomb Hanoi. But I can't understand why we don't bomb the oil, which would take far less in lives.

We have developed this horror of bombing in this country, in my opinion, to the great detriment of the future security of the United States. If you bomb these forests with B–52's, the chances are that you are going to kill a lot more people than if you bomb oil refineries and thereby, to some extent anyway, impair their capacity to wage war against us. With those premises, as I understand it—however, you tell us, Mr. Ambassador, that the reason we don't bomb those oil refineries is because they might bomb our oil refineries.

Mr. LODGE. I didn't mean to——

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that correct?

Mr. LODGE. I didn't mean to try to give the reason. I don't know what the reason is. I just pointed out that they could retaliate. I don't know why they don't bomb them. I have nothing to do with the selection of targets. That is a military function, and you ought to get military testimony on it. I don't know why they don't do it.

Senator SYMINGTON. My tactical reason for that is, I know we have developed a great appeasement movement in this country and that is all right with me, and I don't argue with it until Americans start being killed and in fairly heavy quantities. If we bombed their oil supplies, and they bombed out our oil supplies, we still have our fleet, we still have our air fleet from overseas, and we are still in good shape from the standpoint of the two strengths of our military arms. I would think we have very seriously impaired their capacity to aggrandizement against us.

Do you see what I am trying to get at?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't see why, if this is the reason, and my impression was—that is why I wanted to ask you this question—you felt that, that we did not bomb their oil reserves. We know where they are, and we would know we would thereby block their movement of trucks and their movement of vehicles and so forth that use oil, but we don't do that because they know where our oil reserves are and we know they have IL–28's and so on and so forth.

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[1] See appendix B.

It seems to me if we do it that way—and I happen to know that military people are very anxious that we should bomb their oil reserves because that has been in the testimony before our committee, in the Armed Services Committee—I don't see why when we still have got our fleet and we still have got our B–52 bombers and so forth. I would think there would be a very good exchange. If we are playing a little chess here now with respect to tactical warfare, why don't we bomb their oil refineries?

Mr. LODGE. Maybe I misspoke and, if so, I would like to correct the record because I don't know why we don't. That is the truth of the matter. I am not privy to any of the decisions that are made about bombing.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Senator MUNDT. I got the same impression as Stu did.

Mr. LODGE. I did want to point out that the fuel supply of gasoline and oil in South Vietnam is very vulnerable and 80 percent of it is all in one place. But I don't know why the decision has been taken on bombing, and I don't want to give you that impression.

AVOID A LAND WAR IN ASIA

Senator SYMINGTON. You see my point, and then I am done. My point is, one thing I was trained for a great many years to avoid at all costs was to avoid a large land war in Asia. Now we are getting into a larger land war in Asia. If we are not willing to exchange maybe a bishop or a knight in this situation, but maybe just a pawn here and still hold a tremendous advantage of our superior seapower and airpower, I just don't see where we are going. I would agree it is important, I would agree with military people who testified before us, in my presence, that we cannot win if we continue this way. This is what has got me very perplexed.

AN INDEPENDENT OR A PUPPET GOVERNMENT

Finally, the staff has handed me—this fellow General Ky has made some statement here, "Communists are the sort of—people who just think about money don't frighten me. It is easy to deal with people who are just fighting for money. But Communists are harder, they are fighting for an idea." Here he says on the Vietnam character, "The thing is you should never believe a Vietnamese. He is not like you. He is an Asiatic." And then on communism he says, "I can tell you that the Minister of Finance doesn't even trust the economic police anymore."

I am just jumping through it here.

On the Vietnamese commanders, "The generals have spent too much time lining the pockets of their own families. How well I know these superior officer types. In the last 20 years not one of them, not one, has died on the battlefield," and so forth.

So, this is the new man in charge over there. I imagine he is going to have his problems, too, isn't he, with his own people?

Mr. LODGE. He is indeed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Giving these kinds of interviews.

Mr. LODGE. He is indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, do you think it is fair to say that there is an independent government of South Vietnam or is it

really a puppet government completely under the domination of American forces?

Mr. LODGE. It is not completely under the domination of the United States, I am sure of that. It is not under their domination at all. It is very difficult to get the things done that you want to get done because there is no followthrough. You can——

The CHAIRMAN. That is, their inefficiency?

Mr. LODGE. Their inefficiency is tremendous. The bureaucratic lassitude is incredible.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the same as not being under our domination?

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, they can—you have these coups. Somebody comes and wakes you at 4 o'clock in the morning and says General So and So has just taken power. Everybody is surprised, including the Americans. It is almost impossible to get intelligence of those things. We are not in the colonial position there. We have not got control, and that is the fact.

IF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ASKED THE U.S. TO LEAVE

The CHAIRMAN. What would happen if this government asked the United States to leave?

Mr. LODGE. I think we ought to consider that in the light of our own interests, and if that were to happen today, I would certainly not want to leave. A government, this government, of course, wouldn't ask you to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? If they are not under our control.

Mr. LODGE. Because they want us to stay. They want to defeat the Vietcong and they know if the Vietcong won, their own throats would be cut. They want us to stay very, very badly, and if there were some kind of neutralist coup and we were asked to leave, I think we probably should take the line, we might very well want to take the line, that this was a spurious government and we wouldn't do what it asked if we didn't think that it was to our interests to get out.

A PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO PEKING

The CHAIRMAN. One last question. I have referred to Eisenhower a lot. It just occurred to me in 1952 he said if he was elected he would go to Korea, didn't he?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And he went.

Mr. LODGE. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with that?

Mr. LODGE. I am; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the situation if President Johnson today said, "I think I will go to Peking."

Senator MUNDT. Go to where, Peking?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. He might never come back.

The CHAIRMAN. I just thought of it. Eisenhower gave much thought to Vietnam.

Mr. LODGE. I think Peking would regard it as a sign of weakness and that they had us on the ropes and that it would be a very injudicious thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it judicious for Eisenhower to go to Korea? He went and the country applauded him, didn't it?

Senator MUNDT. He went to a friendly country. He didn't go to Peking.

The CHAIRMAN. He went to——

Senator CASE. We had reached a stalemate.

Mr. LODGE. We had reached some kind of an equilibrium there, and we were in a much stronger position relatively than we are in Vietnam. We are not strong enough to do it there. We are too weak.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered, just speculating.

Mr. LODGE. They don't think we are ready to sit down at the table with a lot of chips yet.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, can I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. One member just came in. Could I give him an opportunity before——

Senator LAUSCHE. What member?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell just came in. He hasn't had a chance to say anything.

Would you care to before we go on?

Senator PELL. You go ahead. I will defer.

Senator MUNDT. Very simple question——

[Discussion off the record.]

VOTE ON AMBASSADOR LODGE'S CONFIRMATION

The CHAIRMAN. Before we leave, Bourke, I wonder—the Senator is thoroughly familiar with our procedures—can we vote on this today?

Senator MUNDT. Vote on what?

The CHAIRMAN. On his confirmation. He is here for his confirmation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let's confirm him.

The CHAIRMAN. Who makes a motion?

Senator PELL. I would be delighted to make that motion.

The CHAIRMAN. All in favor of the motion to report favorably the nomination, say aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed, no.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The ayes have it.

Senator MUNDT. I assume he is going to carry my message to Garcia: On that basis I will vote for him.

Mr. LODGE. I will do my damndest.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. I have a couple of questions, yes, sir. I apologize for being late, but we were in executive session of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

I am delighted to have already voted on the confirmation of Ambassador Lodge, who is a family friend of 50 years. There are a couple of points I wanted to make on questions that were asked.

U.S. INTEREST TO STAY IN VIETNAM

I am amongst that group who support the President in his efforts in reaching a stalemate in South Vietnam. I don't think we will ever do much more. I personally consider the bombing in the north self-defeating. I am not going to get into the wisdom of where we bomb if we do bomb, because the very fact we are doing it I find myself in virtual opposition to.

I wondered if you had a thought as to this question if the government came in and asked us to get out. I was a little shocked to hear you say we shouldn't get out. I hoped you would rather say we will face up to that problem when it happens, because it cuts all the legal grounds out from under us. If a government asks us out, and we then organize a CIA coup to either replace it or ignore their requests—I was wondering if in reconsideration that is really what you meant.

Mr. LODGE. What I meant was that as of today, I would think it would be very much against our vital interests to get out.

Senator PELL. In other words, our vital interests are to stay there?

Mr. LODGE. Our vital interests as of today would certainly be to stay there.

Senator PELL. But you don't feel if the government did ask us out that we accept that?

Mr. LODGE. Not if it is a spurious government.

Senator PELL. You don't feel the government today is probably just as spurious as the one that it replaced?

Mr. LODGE. A case could be made. There is a lot of spuriousness.

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. And you have got a lot of non-government down there.

Senator PELL. As one Senator, I strongly disagree with you on that point.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Mr. LODGE. When it comes to the legal basis, you have what to me is a very strong legal fact that we are protecting this country from aggression, because this is clearly aggression. North Vietnam and Communist China want to dominate South Vietnam. South Vietnam and the United States do not want to dominate North Vietnam. South Vietnam is the aggrieved party. We are thus acting certainly within the spirit of the United Nations Charter without any question, and that, to my mind, is pretty good law, too, and the question of being asked in, I think, forgive me, Senator, is really a picayune side of the law.

Senator PELL. You don't think there is a law of the jungle which is that great nations have a certain influence and say about what happens in little countries and their immediate periphery as we did in the Dominican Republic and as presumably we do not have in South Vietnam? You would not pay much attention to the sphere of influence there?

Mr. LODGE. It is a question of how far it is going to go.

Now, it goes halfway down to Korea, then it stops in the Straits of Formosa, and then it takes North Vietnam, it stops at South

Vietnam, and then it goes over into that northern part of India. If you are sitting in Peking, there is the Soviet Union over on your right, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and all the way around until you have got the Soviet Union back here. It is a question of where you are going to draw a line.

Are you going to draw it at Waikiki Beach or are you going to draw it—everything to do with China, being as violent and as fanatical as China is at the present time, and we hope the younger men are going to be better. There is evidence that the younger men are more intelligent and more moderate than the old men were.

DEFENSIVE MISSILE SITES AROUND HANOI

Senator PELL. There is another question that bothers me, as I read in the press. We seem to be horrified at the fact they are building defensive missile sites in Hanoi. What is the theory here? To my mind, if a nation builds defensive sites so its capital city does not get bombed out of existence, there is no reason in the world—why are we protesting this?

Mr. LODGE. There are two of them that are 40 miles away from Hanoi that prevent us from bombing an ammunition factory and explosive factory, the products of which have unquestionably been used and will be used again to kill Americans with, and so I believe we have a right to try to destroy the ammunition factory and the explosive factory. If those SAM sites are shooting down our planes as they come in to do that, we have a right to try to take them out.

Senator PELL. I see. In other words, you——

Mr. LODGE. I don't admit of sanctuary. I don't admit that the Soviet Union can set up bases all around the place and still have sanctuary.

Senator PELL. But to your mind it is reprehensible that they would not just leave themselves open, like an opposite eye to be destroyed by us if we get driven to that point?

THE CITY OF HANOI AS A TARGET

Mr. LODGE. I am just talking about the two that are 40 miles away from Hanoi and which are preventing us from bombing the ammunition and explosive factories. On bombing the city of Hanoi, I have consistently been of the opinion that that was not a wise thing to do at the present time.

Senator PELL. I would hope we would always remain that way.

Mr. LODGE. I keep an open mind, but I have not been in favor of bombing the city of Hanoi. I think all the people you would like to get have left town, for one thing, and I think you would just kill a lot of innocent people. I think you would get an immediate reprisal with mortar fire on Saigon and it wouldn't do, but I think ammunition and explosive factories are targets we ought to try to take out in the interests of our own people in South Vietnam.

Senator PELL. But if the North Vietnamese complete the present program of having SAM sites in the periphery of Hanoi, would you take umbrage at that or do you think the United States should take umbrage at that?

Mr. LODGE. I think when there is a target that we think we want to hit and there is a SAM site in the way, then I think we have an

absolute right to try to take the SAM site out. I believe the Soviet Union would expect us to and that the reaction wouldn't be very violent.

Senator PELL. It would be a signal to Hanoi the next step is to bomb Hanoi?

Mr. LODGE. No, I don't think so. I don't see why. If we destroy an ammunition factory or an explosives factory, I don't see why this means hitting Hanoi.

Senator PELL. No, I mean if the defensive sites around Hanoi would be only for defensive purposes to defend their own city if we destroy those sites.

Mr. LODGE. I am not talking about that.

Senator PELL. I am talking about the future ones.

Mr. LODGE. The only ones I know about—there are five or six that are 15 miles out of town.

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. Then there were two that were 40 miles.

Senator PELL. I am talking about the 15 miles.

Mr. LODGE. I have no intentions on that.

DISCOURAGING PHOTOGRAPHERS

Senator PELL. There were some horrifying pictures in the New York Times today about the way information is extracted from our opponents there, reminding me of the Algerian experiences. Is there anything we can do to discourage the people from doing that?

Mr. LODGE. We try to discourage them. We also try to discourage photographers from paying $5 to get people to pose doing these torture pictures, which is quite—there are a lot of these gag pictures out there which are taken by non-American photographers, but are then sold to the American papers holding the knife to the throat and all that. There is a lot of that going on, and we have tried to discourage the brutality which is an oriental tradition on both sides and we tried to discourage the gag pictures, which is not—which is a new wrinkle.

PAUSE IN THE BOMBING

Senator PELL. If there is another pause in the bombing, what would you think would be the most salutary period? I know I am amongst those, and you are probably aware of the incident that——.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator PELL. How long would be a good period?

Mr. LODGE. I think the original escalation in this war was the Vietcong coming in with this technique which we have not learned how to overcome, that is, the first escalation. That was their skill, their technique, that they are very good at, and we don't know how to meet. So we used our technique on them that we are good at, that is, airplanes and boats, and I would be willing to stop the bombing like a shot if they would stop their subversion and terrorism. I think the two have to be linked.

Senator PELL. But if we go in for a pause again, do you agree with the thought of some of us that it should be a week or 2 weeks?.

Mr. LODGE. I wouldn't have a pause unless they had a pause.

Senator PELL. But if we have a pause in trying to get negotiations—I mean the 6-day pause is no good.

Mr. LODGE. I don't think that is the way it is going to work out. In fact, I am one who thinks there is not going to be a peace conference, there is not going to be negotiations. I think one fine day the young Vietcong is going to wake up and say, "I am not going back today," and the reason is that he is going to be killed if he goes back, and he looks around him and he sees the rice and fish and ducks and he sees the Americans coming in there. That is what happened in Malaya. There was no conference and no need for it.

They think they are sure to win and they don't think we are in the game because they don't think the bombing puts us in the game. They think to be in this game you have to overcome subversion, terrorism on the ground, and we haven't yet learned how to do it.

Senator PELL. Thank you. It is really a rough one.

ROGER HILSMAN

Senator MUNDT. Do you know a Roger Hilsman?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. I had lunch with him, it seemed like a long time ago, and he told me that he was the architect of a village by village operation in Laos of which he was very proud. I know he is out of the Government, I don't know why. Is he one of these people who really does understand about this business?

Mr. LODGE. He has had a lot of experience. He was a guerrilla fighter himself in Burma during the war and he was Assistant Secretary of State for Far East. He has had a lot of experience.

Senator MUNDT. He is out of office. Why wouldn't he be a man——

Mr. LODGE. He was one of the men I talked to.

Senator MUNDT. He would——

Mr. LODGE. I saw him in New York the other day.

The CHAIRMAN. What is he doing?

Mr. LODGE. He is at Columbia, I think.

USING CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask you just a couple of questions for the record? First, it has been suggested, and I would like to know what you think about the use of Chiang Kai-Shek's troops. Would it be wise to invite him to send 200,000 or his troops down there, or an number?

Mr. LODGE. Very much off the record——

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LODGE. They are afraid it would bring in Communist Chinese. Most of the people out there are frightened of the Chinese, and they think they are smarter and more energetic and they bustle around more. We have a lot of Chinese military advisers. We have a lot of Chinese Nationalist agricultural experts. A lot of this hit-and-run stuff on the coast, motorboats—the people who run the motorboats are Chinese. There are a lot of them there.

The CHAIRMAN. There are no organized Chinese troops?

Mr. LODGE. When it came to an organized Chinese division, that is a very complex calculation. I would want to really analyze that out. I couldn't give you an offhand answer on that.

I think what we are doing—we are doing a lot with them now and I think it is good. I think we shouldn't advertise it because it is very embarrassing to the Vietnamese. There are only two oriental peoples that the Vietnamese can work with in Vietnam without embarrassment, and that is the Filipinos and the Koreans. The Japanese bother them. They like the Japanese Buddhist religious leadership; and the Vietnamese like Japanese businessmen very much, but the military is a different thing.

The Koreans are very welcome. Among the non-oriental peoples, they don't like any of the European powers to help them militarily because it savors of colonialism, but they do like Australians. They like Australians and Americans among the non-orientals.

NO NEW CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rusk told the committee on April 30 that the administration did not plan to ask for a further congressional resolution "unless the situation takes quite a different turn."

Do you think the situation has taken a different turn since April 30?

Mr. LODGE. I wouldn't think—this, again, you would want to study, but offhand I wouldn't think we needed another resolution, but that is very offhand and I would rather not answer it without much more thought than I have been able to give it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking about his phrase, "unless it takes quite a different turn." I wondered, regardless of whether or not you recommend another resolution, do you think the situation in South Vietnam has taken quite a different turn since April 30 when he was before the committee.

Mr. LODGE. It is evolving, all right. It is not quite the same as it was then. It is in a state of evolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Evolution or devolution?

Mr. LODGE. Change.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any more questions?

Senator PELL. I just——

The CHAIRMAN. We have delayed you very long.

THE END RESULT

Senator PELL. I just want one final query. I was very struck with your thought as to the end result of this exercise. I was wondering if you really believed that the end result—nobody is going to win—but the end result is a sudden decision on the part of the Vietcong just not to fight, lose their will.

Mr. LODGE. Gradually, that is what happened in Malaya. It got too dangerous for them, for one thing. People started informing on them, which is the key to the whole business, and then the civilian life looked good because of a good economic program. Then some of the ones who couldn't settle down went into the hills where they still are.

Senator PELL. Wasn't one of the differences in Malaya the power of the British army who went there, which was maybe 150,000, 200,000, finest troops, for 10, 15 years, and it is a much smaller country? The equivalent thing would be for us to be three-quarters of a million?

Mr. LODGE. They had a wonderful counter-terrorist organization. They did a tremendous job in organizing the civilians. That was really the key to the thing, because it was different and in many ways easier. It is a peninsula and the enemy was of a different race, looked different, whereas in Vietnam everybody looks alike. In Vietnam you have got this long seacoast and this great long frontier, and it is more difficult in Vietnam. But I believe the type of organization that the British perfected in Malaya could do very big things in Vietnam.

Senator PELL. That is all.

A TERRIBLE SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. You have my deep sympathy.

Mr. LODGE. Sympathy—well, somebody has to do it.

Senator PELL. It is very good of you to go out.

Mr. LODGE. You are nice to say that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a terrible situation.

Mr. LODGE. It is a terrible situation, but there are things you can try, and I would like to get a new fresh affirmative political approach.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you can find the people, the personnel and the will to emphasize that development you mentioned before on the political developments.

We will close the record.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Church, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Robert W. Adams, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Mann; Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State; Alexander Schnee, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State; and Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have Mr. Vaughn before us whom we have not had before us before. We have had Secretary Mann.

I wonder if we could start out with asking Mr. Vaughn a few questions just to get started here. We have had some intervening hearings, I may say to both of you, and it may be difficult getting on the track. We had a lot of other things to think about yesterday.

Mr. Vaughn, maybe you have not—could you tell us, what are your views as to our anticipation of the anti-Reid coup of April 24? Did we know about it, and what did you know about it? Could you sort of fill us in on that situation?

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS C. MANN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; AND HON. JACK HOOD VAUGHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. VAUGHN. I would be pleased to, Mr. Chairman.

I assumed my present office in early March, and one of the first tasks that I undertook was to review with the office directors of ARA the various country situations, what the problems were, the political trends, how the Alliance for Progress programs were going. When we reviewed the situation in the Dominican Republic—this was sometime after mid-March—it was very clear to me from what the office director told me, from the reports he had, that we were faced with a very fragile and disintegrating situation economically, politically, and socially.

I gave special attention to the Dominican Republic. I reviewed again with the staff what was going on, and we decided we should call Ambassador Bennett back at the earliest opportunity to see if there was anything we might do to help the government stay in

one piece. We contacted Ambassador Bennett and left it up to him to tell us when the most convenient time would be for him to come back for a week's consultation.

RUMORS OF A COUP

He shared our view that the situation was deteriorating. There were increasing reports and rumors of coup plotting.

The CHAIRMAN. From what source?

Mr. VAUGHN. There were plots within plots—this is, of course, congenital in the Dominican Republic—involving the military and several groups, including the Bosch PRD group. Bosch was reported to be trying to stage a coup, lining up support within and outside the PRD, so you can say, I think with considerable justification, that we knew this was becoming a very shaky situation.

I am not sure that it was within our power to forestall for very long what happened.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE REID GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Were we particularly wedded to the Reid government? Did we think it was the best possible solution as of that time?

Mr. VAUGHN. We felt that Reid had done the best job he could. We recognized he had virtually no political support. We thought he was honest, and we thought he had done a good job in cleaning up some of the military corruption.

The CHAIRMAN. As of that time, who did have political support, if anybody?

Mr. VAUGHN. We had done a report, a poll, some 3 months before the revolt occurred, which demonstrated that the leading man in terms of political backing was Balaguer. Bosch was a poor second, and from there on down there wasn't any strong third candidate. I think Donald Reid came out with something like 5 or 6 percent, but to your question, did we think he was the best answer at the time, my own personal opinion was that we thought he was, and he was performing so much better than some of his predecessors had.

The CHAIRMAN. But had no political support?

Mr. VAUGHN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this just because of having had no participation in the government for 30 years? They just don't have an organized political system there yet; is that correct?

Mr. VAUGHN. This is the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a chaotic situation?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, they have no institutions.

The CHAIRMAN. No institutions and no participation in politics of—and we have to face that.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, this is what concerns me when we look ahead for 2 or 3 or 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

There is hardly anything to work with there.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

SHIFTING OF AMORPHOUS GROUPS

The CHAIRMAN. And these many little factional groups, some called PRD and MPD and PSPD and all this thing, they are just sort of amorphous groups shifting all the time, aren't they, or are they? I am not trying to put words in your mouth but just trying to develop what you think.

Mr. VAUGHN. I think unfortunately those political parties of the left, the three you mentioned have corps, have cadres, have dedicated fellows who know how to organize.

The CHAIRMAN. This PRD?

Mr. VAUGHN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The 14th of June?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

But the PRD I would say is much worse off than they were weeks ago.

The CHAIRMAN. They are relatively small numbers, all of them, there are none of them large coordinated groups even of the left, isn't that it? I am not trying to tell you or lead you but only trying to develop it, because I don't know.

Mr. VAUGHN. I think Balaguer's party and the PRD have been two, what you would call, large parties in the Dominican Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. Balaguer has sort of inherited the old Trujillo influence, such as it was. He was the Premier under Ramfis Trujillo, wasn't he, after the assassination of the old man, didn't he become, while Ramfis was still there?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes. Balaguer was made President while Trujillo was still alive and served for a short time after Trujillo's assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Understand, I am not trying to say what it was but just trying to develop this case.

THE COUP WAS A SURPRISE

That coup was a surprise to everybody, the timing of it was. You knew that things were unsettled but you didn't know it was going to come on that day; is that correct?

Mr. VAUGHN. I would say that by no stretch of the imagination could you say that the coup was a surprise to me, to our people.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not.

Mr. VAUGHN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you have Bennett out of the country when it took place?

Mr. VAUGHN. We knew that the situation was deteriorating to the point where a coup was possible at any moment, and we called Bennett back—I personally called him back—to talk about what steps, if any, we could take to forestall another breakdown of the government there. So that——

The CHAIRMAN. On that day, where were you? Were you in Washington on April 24?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, sir, I was in Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN. We were told that a large number of the other officials were out of town when that happened, out of Santo Domingo or somewhere.

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't think that is the case. I had no report. There were certain members of the military assistance group who were in Panama for a special meeting, but all the service attachés were there, the political staff was there.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ HUNTING WITH IMBERT

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, would you ask him who was out hunting with Imbert that day?

The CHAIRMAN. We had it in the record, military attachés. We had it in the previous questions but I can't remember it.

Do you know?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the military attaché?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, I think it was the naval attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. It was one of the military.

Mr. MANN. One of the three service attachés.

Senator CLARK. I could be wrong. I thought it was the naval captain who subsequently announced—who made the first announcement that was ever made that we had sent our troops into Santo Domingo to put down a Communist movement rather than to protect American lives, or in addition to protecting American lives.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked questions about this before, but I can't keep it all in my mind.

Do you know whether this is true, what Senator Clark just mentioned?

Mr. VAUGHN. My information is that one of the attachés was hunting with Imbert.

The CHAIRMAN. On that day?

Mr. VAUGHN. On that day. And I think it was the naval attaché. He is a marine officer.

ROLE OF THE LEFT IN THE APRIL REVOLT

The CHAIRMAN. This is an article by Paul Kennedy on July 25, which wasn't very long ago. I quote—he is a reporter, special to the New York Times. He says:

> Santo Domingo—A sharp ideological cleavage was forming in revolutionary ranks today as a rebel leader charged that the extreme left had refused to join the April 24 revolt and had even tried to obstruct it.
>
> The charge, broadcast over the rebel radio by José Pena Gomez, a key director of the Juan Bosch Dominican Revolutionary Party, was taken from the outline of a book he is preparing on the first days of the revolt.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't have any comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know anything about it?

Do you have any knowledge as to whether the extreme left did refuse on April 24 to join the revolt?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no information from our Embassy?

I will put the whole article in the record just so it is complete.

[The article referred to follows:]

[The New York Times, July 26, 1965]

DOMINICAN REBEL CHIDES LEFTISTS—"FEAR" AND "MISJUDGMENT" OF REVOLT LAID TO REDS

(By Paul P. Kennedy)

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.—A sharp ideological cleavage was forming in revolutionary ranks today as a rebel leader charged that the extreme left had refused to join the April 24 revolt and had even tried to obstruct it.

The charge, broadcast over the rebel radio by José Pena Gomez, a key director of the Juan Bosch Dominican revolutionary party, was taken from the outline of a book he is preparing on the first days of the revolt.

In his outline, the Liberal party leader says the U.S. Department of State was mistaken in its analysis of the causes of the revolution and he accuses the extreme left, including the Communists, of "fear" of joining the original movement. They, too, were guilty of misjudgment, the book maintains, and could not differentiate between revolutionary and nonrevolutionary elements in the armed forces.

BOSCH FORCES GIVEN CREDIT

Mr. Pena Gomez said the party loyal to former President Bosch was alone responsible for the revolt and had been joined by "honest officials of the armed forces."

"Not one party of the so-called Dominican left," he continued, "participated in the conspiracy in the first days."

The extreme left, he charged, was supicious from the first, attributing the initial action to a combination of "imperialism, militarism, and the Dominican revolutionary party."

"The United States," he said, "showed a lack of intelligence in the early days of the revolt by not taking advantage of the intransigence of the extreme left.

"If the State Department had done the intelligent thing, it would have inflicted a telling blow on the Dominican left, since it had committed a serious error in not joining the movement from its inception," he declared.

SAYS PEOPLE WERE IGNORED

But, he continued, the U.S Embassy and military mission assisted the military group at the San Isidro airbase and a sector of the navy "to disregard popular will and impose by force a miliatry junta."

The Dominican leftists, he said, did not realize that "the objective of the Dominican revolutionary party was to bring about a rapport between the people and those military sectors desiring a revolutionary change."

He went on: "We, on the other hand, maintained that, whatever the original idea of the conspirators, once the people were brought into the streets they would impose their revolutionary ideas over those of the military leaders."

Meanwhile, efforts to form a provisional government were set back when Eduardo Read Barreras declined to accept the Vice Presidency in the proposed Government of Hector Garcia-Godoy. He termed his decision "irrevocable."

Mr. Garcia-Godoy expressed regret but said others were under consideration.

ROLE OF JOSÉ PENA GOMEZ

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who this man, José Pena Gomez, is?

Do you know him, I mean do you know about him?

Mr. VAUGHN. He is——

The CHAIRMAN. It says "a key director of the Juan Bosch Dominican revolutionary party," is the way this describes him, José Pena Gomez. Then later it says:

Mr. Pena Gomez said that party loyalty to former President Bosch was alone responsible for the revolt and had been joined by honest "officials of the armed forces. Not one party of the so-called Dominican left," he continued, "participated in the conspiracy in the first days." The extreme left, he charged was suspicious from the first, attributing initial action to a combination of "imperialism, militarism, and the Dominican revolutionary party."

Had you seen this article?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, I hadn't.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Paul Kennedy?
Mr. VAUGHN. I know him very well.

A RELIABLE REPORTER

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Paul Kennedy wrote it? What about him? Is he a reliable reporter?

Mr. VAUGHN. I have found his reports on areas I have been serving in to be reliable.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that the newspaper with which Matthews was connected and said Castro was a Robin Hood? Is it the same New York Times?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the only New York Times I know, but this was written by Paul P. Kennedy, not by Mr. Matthews.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, but he was also a highly accepted person who spoke the truth and knew all things.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator is quite correct. But I was trying to explore whether or not he knows Kennedy and whether or not he regards him as a reliable reporter. He says he does know him. I don't know him.

Senator CLARK. He also says he is a reliable reporter, too. Herbert Matthews was a reliable reporter.

Mr. MANN. Is he quoting Pena Gomez or is he citing this as a reliable fact?

The CHAIRMAN. He is quoting him.

Mr. MANN. And your question is, Is he a reliable——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Is he a reliable reporter?

Mr. MANN. Pena Gomez was one of the leaders on the rebel side, and the statement that Paul Kennedy reported there is highly inaccurate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to know.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Kennedy is not making the statement. He is stating that Pena Gomez made the statement. I just thought maybe you were aware of this. I don't know Mr. Gomez and have no way of judging him.

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AS POLICY FRAMEWORK

Mr. Vaughn, you recently returned from two regional conferences with U.S. Ambassadors to Latin America; is that right?

Mr. VAUGHN. This is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, conclusions were reached relating to those conferences, relating to our present posture in Latin America and our future policies?

Mr. VAUGHN. The first conclusion that was reached was that centering our policy around the Alliance for Progress was a wise policy, that this is the most helpful, the most constructive step we have taken in a long, long time. It is a very constructive policy step to have the Alliance for Progress and the precepts of the Alliance for the framework for our posture and policy vis-a-vis Latin America.

SUPPORT FOR DOMINICAN INTERVENTION

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything about the Dominican Republic? I don't care to hear anything about the general policies at this time. Is there anything about the Dominican Republic pertinent to it?

Mr. VAUGHN. Their feeling is that most of the Latin countries recognize at this point we made the right move in following the course of action we did in the Dominican Republic. There is widespread support for this action.

The CHAIRMAN. Would any of them publicly support it?

Mr. VAUGHN. I think they would, yes. I think Brazil would, and has, in fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you say, "Will anyone support it," who do you mean, the Ambassadors or countries?

The CHAIRMAN. Countries.

Will any of the countries say anything about it, give us any public support on our position?

Mr. VAUGHN. I think what has transpired in the Organization of American States, the various votes that have been taken there, indicate support. We saw a two-thirds majority supporting what we are trying to do there.

The CHAIRMAN. They supported the OAS force going in there, that was the main vote they made, wasn't it? Did they give any indication whether they were prepared to continue to support an OAS force for peacekeeping purposes?

Mr. VAUGHN. They recognize that there are certain new steps that are going to be needed in the inter-American system, and they are certainly willing to discuss this. I am sure when the Rio conference takes place, perhaps in November, that they will be most prepared to discuss the creation of some sort of peacekeeping force and will have position papers ready for that time.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they are not antagonistic. They are willing to discuss it sympathetically, you think; is that correct?

Mr. VAUGHN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. There are certain countries that have special problems, such as Uruguay and Mexico.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. What arrangements have been made to give political guidance to and exercise civilian control over the armed forces in the Dominican Republic, that is United States and OAS armed forces? Are there any arrangements being made? Do you have any in mind?

Mr. VAUGHN. Arrangements were made early in the game to provide continuing briefings to the inter-American peace force there.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Mr. VAUGHN. By the OAS, and we, of course, participate in this through our information agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that made on April 28, that arrangement?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, it was made subsequently.

The CHAIRMAN. Subsequently. When?

Mr. VAUGHN. It was made when the meeting of Foreign Ministers established the first committee that went there in early May.

PRESIDENT'S CHARGES OF ATROCITIES

The CHAIRMAN. President Johnson said in a news conference on June 17:

> Some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot and their heads cut off.

Was there any evidence subsequent to that to confirm that statement? Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. VAUGHN. I do not know of any subsequent information.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that an accurate statement, in your opinion?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Based on what?

Mr. VAUGHN. Based on the reports that we had the first few days of the atrocities and the shootings and violence.

The CHAIRMAN. Did subsequent investigation confirm that, by OAS or anybody?

Mr. VAUGHN. There haven't been investigations in the downtown area where all this violence took place, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were 1,500 people beheaded?

Mr. VAUGHN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't think the President said there were 1,500 people beheaded.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a quote, according to the staff. It says, "1,500 people were murdered and shot and their heads cut off."

Mr. MANN. Who are they quoting?

The CHAIRMAN. President Johnson, news conference of June 17, according to this.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I wasn't present at the press conference and Mr. Vaughn wasn't present at the press conference. I doubt if we ought to be quoting the President without the questions and answers, and at least having somebody who was there.

Senator CLARK. Why don't we get them? They are right in our files.

STATE DEPARTMENT BULLETIN

The CHAIRMAN. This statement is taken by the staff from a Department of State bulletin and the statement of cease-fire, White House press release dated June 17. This is taken from it, and it purports to be a statement of the President.

It says:

> I think some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot and their heads cut off. Six Latin American Embassies were violated.

I don't know of better origin than the Department of State's bulletin, this is where it comes from.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, the bulletin prints stuff that they pick up out of newspapers. It is not an authentic, official——

The CHAIRMAN. It is not?

Mr. MANN [continuing]. Official spokesman of the White House and the President, no, sir. I really see no purpose in printing newspaper rumors about what the President of the United States said.

The CHAIRMAN. Why does the Department of State do it if it is not verified?

Mr. MANN. I have no knowledge of whether this is an exact quote of what the President of the United States said. I have no knowledge of it and nobody in this room does.

Senator CLARK. You are the Under Secretary of State and that is your bulletin.

Mr. MANN. I am also a lawyer, Senator, and a man ought to testify as to what he knows about personally, of his own knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. This says——

Senator CLARK. This is not a jury trial, Mr. Mann.

Mr. MANN. This is without the——

A PRESUMPTION OF ACCURACY

The CHAIRMAN. The staff says, the official weekly record of the U.S. foreign policy, Department of State Bulletin. The staff thought when they gave me this that this was an official Department of State publication.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is a presumption of its accuracy when it comes out of the bulletin. But don't we have a transcript of that news conference?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't have. This is the only available thing, I guess.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not objecting to bringing it up here.

Senator CLARK. I think we ought to take it subject to later verification so that Carl Marcy can get the transcript.

Mr. MANN. I think that would be much better evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought maybe the Secretary—this is in his special jurisdiction—had some knowledge of this is the reason I thought it was an appropriate question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, we have got a room full of State Department aides down there. They can get on the telephone and ask what that transcript shows.

The CHAIRMAN. Ask them. I don't know that it is terribly important, but these statements can be very inflammatory. I mean the idea of beheading 1,500 people is a highly inflammatory statement; if it is accurate it ought to be said, if it is inaccurate it ought not to be said. It affects the attitude of the public and can influence policy, I think, influence the reaction in Congress and everywhere else. These atrocities have a peculiar impact upon the attitude of people as to whether or not——

NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FACTS

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, aside from what the President may have said or may not have said, I think there is no doubt about what the facts are. The facts are that in those early days there were many, many reports from many sources of widespread atrocities in the rebel-held part of the zone. The probability is that many hundreds of people were killed. The Dominican Red Cross made estimates of the number of people killed at that time. I think myself it was slightly exaggerated. Policemen were being shot by the score. They were seen shedding their uniforms so that they couldn't be identified as policemen after the breakdown of law and order. The anarchy was total.

Since that time, there has not been any authoritative investigation of the number of people killed, simply because we haven't had access to the witnesses. The people who could testify have not been allowed to leave the zone, and it isn't exactly safe for somebody who is known as an antirebel to go inside the rebel zone and conduct the investigation. It hasn't been practicable.

Whatever the President said in those early days--and I don't know of my own knowledge what the exact quote is—he was reflecting, with considerable basis, the reports that he had heard at that time about atrocities and murders——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, this was June 17. This wasn't the early days. The coup was April 24, and this is June 17, 1½, nearly 2 months later.

Mr. MANN. Nevertheless, the facts that I just stated are still the relevant facts, that neither by June 17 nor now have we been able to conduct an investigation to find out exactly what happened in those early days when most of the atrocities did take place.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator allow me to put a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

COMMUNISTS IN THE SECURITY POLICE

Senator LAUSCHE. At the time all of these things were happening, is it a fact or not that in the new government that was to be set up there was chosen as the investigator one of the arch-Communists of the group, the Minister of Investigation?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember his name?

Senator LAUSCHE. It is in the record.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think I remember but my memory fails me on what his title was. But there were people put in charge of the security police who were on the Communist side of the fence.

Senator LAUSCHE. One of the reports which you prepared identifies the man, the name and the title given to him.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, it is in the record.

Senator LAUSCHE. His function was to be the person who would run down and find out who was faithful or not, and the man assigned to that position was an arch-Communist. So, I anticipate you would have had a repetition of Cuba in the Dominican Republic.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON BEHEADINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mann, if you have no firm knowledge to substantiate the evidence of the 1,500 people having their heads cut off, why do they keep talking about it after the event?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I haven't talked about any numbers. You haven't heard me talk about numbers or the numbers of people beheaded. The question that you are really raising here, if I understand it correctly, is what the President of the United States said on a certain day in June, and all I am saying is I have no personal knowledge of what the President said on that day.

The CHAIRMAN. But we know the President doesn't speak of his personal knowledge. He is given this information. Somebody in the Department is supposed to know about these things furnished the President with these statements. He doesn't draw these out of the air. I would assume Mr. Vaughn had given him this information

because you were particularly in charge of this area, that is the reason I thought it was an appropriate question. The President doesn't make these things up himself. He doesn't suddenly think about 1,500. He is reflecting only what somebody told him. I mean that is the normal way it develops, isn't it? He could only know what you or the Ambassador told him, he doesn't make a personal investigation on the spot.

Senator CLARK. If the Senator would yield briefly, all Mr. Vaughn knows is what the Ambassador tells him and what he gets out of the CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Ambassador or CIA tell you this?

Mr. VAUGHN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know the origin of that statement, assuming it was made?

Mr. VAUGHN. Nor do I know if the President actually made it.

The CHAIRMAN. Or if he made it. But if he made it, you did not give him the information. You don't know where he got it?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, I don't.

PROMOTING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

The CHAIRMAN. In this recent meeting of the American Ambassadors, did the meeting on balance arrive at these conclusions that our actions were necessary? Would it be fair to say they did?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they agree that the actions advanced our interests in Latin America?

Mr. VAUGHN. They agreed that the actions taken were in the best interests of——

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait until he answers this question, and then I will yield.

Mr. VAUGHN [continuing]. Of our national policy.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. VAUGHN [continuing]. Were in keeping with our national policy interests.

The CHAIRMAN. In Latin America?

Mr. VAUGHN. Our national, our own, interests.

The CHAIRMAN. In Latin America?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, surely, anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in our interests. It promoted our interests in Latin America, did they agree to that?

Mr. VAUGHN. It promoted our own national policies.

The CHAIRMAN. In Latin America.

Mr. VAUGHN. I am talking about our own national policy, not Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. But we have national policy interests all over Latin America. Did this action promote and improve our position in Latin America?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the conclusion of this meeting?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, sir.

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A PROPER PATTERN FOR THE FUTURE

The CHAIRMAN. Last, did they agree that this action established a pattern acceptable and proper for the future?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, nor was any attempt ever made to establish a pattern. You have to look at the Dominican Republic as the Dominican Republic and not as just another Latin country. There is very little similarity. In fact, sir, I think that the Dominican Republic is really a caricature of what is wrong with Latin America. Everything is extreme. The point you made yourself about the fact that it is a nonsociety—there is no——

The CHAIRMAN. I don't make these points. I was asking a question and I wanted you to make them. I don't have any personal knowledge of this. I was only putting a question and I understood you to say you agreed with it. You make the point, not me.

Mr. VAUGHN. I would like to make them very strongly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Mr. VAUGHN. I feel this in no way can be considered a pattern, the first of a series, a new doctrine, the Johnson doctrine, or anything of the kind.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted you to say. That is just what I am trying to get you to say. And these people down there don't agree it is a pattern and it would be in our interests and you don't agree; is that right?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

ALEJANDRO LAJARA GONZALEZ

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't think I will interrupt at this time. I spoke about the man being appointed to a certain post. Admiral Raborn testified that he was a member of the June 14——

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. This was Alejandro Lajara Gonzalez who had supplied arms to Communists during the revolt and had a record of arson. He was placed in this particular post as deputy director of investigation.

Senator CLARK. By whom, Frank?

Senator LAUSCHE. By this new government that was wanting to take over.

Senator CLARK. You mean the Imbert junta?

Senator LAUSCHE. By the leftists or whatever it was.

But now here is what I am interrupting and I know I am departing——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There were so-called revolutionaries still holed up.

Senator CLARK. Maybe he means Caamano, I don't know who he means.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator LAUSCHE. Here is a memorandum to Pat Holt from Norvill Jones.

A review of Raborn's testimony. Page 380, Raborn testified that a member of the APCJ, Alejandro Lajara Gonzalez, was appointed deputy director of investigation in the constitutional government as a means of showing that the Communists were

taking over the rebel movement. But Raborn does not say that he was a Communist, and even Mann admits that the APCJ has many non-Communists in it.

Here you have a paragraph trying to show that there was no communism in it when Raborn positively said that the man belonged to the June 14 party. I don't like it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very evident. You don't like it. It is perfectly proper for you——

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't like it because it doesn't reflect the actual facts, and these were the interoffice memorandums that I just get to see when accidentally I pick them up. When these memorandums are given, I think each member of the committee ought to be given a copy of it.

The CHAIRMAN. They are available for you. They were available the first day we opened these hearings.

Senator LAUSCHE. Last week I found a memorandum on the table containing a lot of information that I accidentally picked up and looked at. That is all.

DOMINICANS WANT CHANGE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vaughn, do you think a substantial number of Dominicans want a social change?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. If so, what course of action is open to them to get it?

Mr. VAUGHN. The best thing that could happen would be to have a competent man elected through open, free elections.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is feasible that this might be brought about?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, I do. I think it is more feasible to think that they would have elections than they would get top men elected. That is the problem, the paucity of good leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. There are not many people competent, you think, with experience that could run it, is that the trouble?

Mr. VAUGHN. That is the trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. But they want a change, they want a social change?

Mr. VAUGHN. Indeed they do. They need it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we ought to encourage them?

Mr. VAUGHN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. How?

Mr. VAUGHN. I think by giving them all the help we can, technical, economic, and other. But I am not sanguine about their ability to get a popularly elected government that is going to carry them forward. There aren't the elements there. I am rather pessimistic about that.

ONE ELECTION IN 30 YEARS

The CHAIRMAN. Take one election, the only election they have had in more than 30 years.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They elected Juan Bosch. We all agree, I think, or most of us do, that he personally, while a good man individually, was not competent to run a government; he wasn't, temperamen-

tally or otherwise. I believe that is a fair statement of what the testimony has been.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But the election, I am told, was a fair election. It wasn't rigged. It was in the open and so on. So, the unfortunate part was simply this man happened to be the candidate. If you could have another election and possibly find one, this would be the only way you can do anything.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, can I talk about the need for reforms, because we have been talking about this subject. We think reforms are long overdue.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. MANN. One of the first reforms, I think—and several studies have been made, serious studies—is on the distribution of the government-owned land, really the old Trujillo estates, which is needed for two reasons: One is to give the little fellow, the little farmer, his own plot of land and a stake in this society; almost equally as important as that is to get the government out of business, since this has been the principal source of corruption. The principal source of corruption in the government has been in the management of government-owned businesses.

Our plan is to bring about, just as soon as we can, a widespread distribution of public-owned lands and get the government out of business as fast and as far as we can.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is too bad we don't apply that policy within our own Government.

Senator LAUSCHE. Joe Clark was afraid somebody was going to mention that. [Laughter.]

PROFESSIONALIZE THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. MANN. Another reform that is desperately needed, and I am just talking about some of the many that strike me as being the most important, is to professionalize the armed forces. The armed forces are really not a professional group in the sense that other armies are. They were the personal army of Trujillo. Trujillo has only been away from the scene for about 3 years, and he was there for some 32 years, so that everybody there is an old Trujillo employee, if you want to call it that. He ran the country as if it were his personal estate, the whole country, the whole economy.

This is a very difficult thing to bring about at this moment. Reid himself, while he was in, got rid of some of the most corrupt of the generals.

We ourselves, during the time we were exercising some influence on the antirebel forces—we have very little now—actually helped to deport eight generals and attempted to bring about changes in the command positions, opening up top command positions for the younger officers who are still there. The dilemma we face in this is that if you destroy the armed forces at this time, at this particular moment in history, before there is anything to replace them, there is absolutely nothing then to prevent the very strong paramilitary forces under the direct control of Communists from taking over the whole country by force. This is not a tidy situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. As of what time are you talking now?

Senator CLARK. Right now.

Mr. MANN. Right now.

Our plan is to bring about a reform in the armed forces just as soon as this can safely be done without turning the country over to the Communists.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTER-AMERICAN FORCE

The CHAIRMAN. Why shouldn't that be done while we are there with our own Army and the OAS? In other words, why shouldn't this be a thing that should be done right now while we can keep the peace?

Mr. MANN. That is a good question, Mr. Chairman.

The authority that the inter-American force—and before they were there, of the American force—to actually impose a government is very much in question. I would say the majority of the states in the Organization of American States think that we ought to limit our activities to one of good offices, to bring Dominicans together so that the solution will be a Dominican solution to a Dominican problem rather than one imposed by bayonets from the outside.

There is a very strong feeling in this direction. I am not sure that this is practicable because of the lack of capability there. This is one of our great dilemmas.

We hope, and Ambassador Bunker is optimistic, perhaps more so than Mr. Vaughn and I are, that he will be able to accomplish this without imposition, without the use of force. The use of force means that the inter-American force would be used both against the army and against the rebels. We would have to fight both sides to bring about the kind of ideal solution that some of the members on this committee would like to see come about, and which I suppose all of us would, but our legal authority to do this under the OAS resolution simply doesn't exist. We would have to go back to the OAS, and we doubt very much that we could get the authority.

REFORM OF THE MILITARY IS ESSENTIAL

The CHAIRMAN. We have the force in there. It seems to me we have the responsibility, whether it is strictly legal or not, and if the reform of the military and the riddance of the officers is an essential to the establishment of a government, it seems to me we ought to do it. That is up to you—you are a lawyer—to find a way to do it, whether it is legal or not.

Senator CLARK. Despite Mr. Meeker, there is nothing legal about our going in there in the first place.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see why we are hesitant. Having taken the onus of intervention, why don't we go ahead as a first step and do something about the military?

We had Mr. Muñoz here the other day. I don't particularly like to advertise it. It was an executive session, but in this instance he is on all fours, I think, with you as to the importance of this very point. It would be impossible, almost impossible to have a reform government with this Trujillo army still there, and he said this has to be done and I agree. I don't see how you can do it unless we do it

while we are still there, while we still have the OAS and our Armed Forces there. It has to be done as a preliminary.

ESTABLISHING A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. MANN. Our opinion is that the first thing we have to do is to get a provisional government which would be accepted by both sides. That provisional government must be backed up by the armed forces as they now exist, and the provisional government must, as soon as it has the power to do so, begin the problem of reconstituting, finding the good young professional officers and putting them in command positions, and beginning to get rid of a lot of the corrupt wood.

The CHAIRMAN. His thought was that the ordinary soldier, you know, the privates and so on, they are all right. But it is the officers; they have to have new officers, and he is on all fours with that.

Which reminds me, the staff just gave me a quote from the Vision, which is the magazine, this is quoting a diplomat:

"I have stopped trying to understand what happens," said a discontented diplomat. "The most powerful nation decides to intervene in this small republic, does it with a military force which at one time reached 35,000 men, gives us a demonstration of its impressive war equipment, and cannot impose its will in the political arena."

It is a question of having done all this. It seems to me we might as well go on and rid them of this officer corps as a preliminary to the establishing of a provisional government, otherwise they will determine what the provisional government is.

A BIG FORCE FOR A LITTLE COUNTRY

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, some of these figures that are thrown around in the press are wrong. A statement that we had 35,000 troops in there is simply not true.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is 25,000 or 30,000.

Mr. MANN. No, the highwater mark was 21,000 which is quite a difference from 35,000.

The CHAIRMAN. It is still a big force for a little country.

Mr. MANN. There are a lot of people, on the other hand, who thought we should have gone in and cleaned out the rebels in those first days. I am frank to say that once I became convinced that the rebels were in charge, I was tempted to vote that way. What caused us all to——

Senator CASE. The Communists were in charge.

Mr. MANN. I am sorry, sir, my mistake.

Senator CASE. You said rebels, I wanted to understand you.

Mr. MANN. What caused us all to hesitate was the factor I mentioned earlier, that the rebels, and I think we are going to see this in the future many times, surrounded themselves with a lot of civilians, with women and children. To go in and clean out the rebel section with a minimum loss of American lives would have meant a very high casualty rate on the part of innocent women and children and civilians who were not allowed by the rebels to leave the zone.

The alternative would have been to have taken very high casualties in the American zone by being more selective, and having our boys go in and clean out these nests with pistols and rifles. The casualties we would have taken in that situation would have been very heavy.

Now, the same thing is true in answer to those who say we should have turned north and fought the antirebel forces. The casualties there would certainly have been very considerable—they have several thousand men, they have tanks, they have airplanes, they have other things. Our hope has been from the beginning that we could bring about a cease-fire.

UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVES

The CHAIRMAN. You brought that about, didn't you?

Mr. MANN. We can set up a provisional government, and a provisional government will do these jobs.

If we fail in this, and Ambassador Bunker thinks that we won't, then we are going to have to face some of the unpleasant alternatives that you are suggesting here today. But we don't think at this time that we ought to decide to go either north or south.

Mr. VAUGHN. Mr. Chairman, could I say——

The CHAIRMAN. I wasn't proposing war down there with them. But I thought with our paying the bill—as I understand it, we are furnishing Imbert with all the money to pay his troops and so on—it looks to me as if we could influence the officer corps.

RETIRING TRUJILLO'S GENERALS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I have not been able to attend these hearings but I did hear Governor Muñoz. I thought he came up with—as to this professional army, he said we are paying for the costs of the functioning of this professional army, are we not?

Mr. MANN. We were. I believe we have stopped paying salaries of all kinds.

Senator CARLSON. The point he made was this. He said, "Why don't we," and this is his thought, "go in there and select a few of these professional Trujillo generals and put them out on a pension, retire them," and second, why don't we say, "Next week you are going to get less money, we are going to have to cut this down one battalion," not do it by force but try to work it out. Can't it be done?

Mr. MANN. Senator, the answer, I think, is that it cannot be done.

Senator CARLSON. Cannot.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Vance, Mr. Vaughn, and I at one meeting spent many hours talking with the four principal officers, the head of the air force, the head of the navy, the head of the army, and the Minister of Finance, and we made various propositions for modernizing and reorganizing the army. Each time we had a meeting—I withdrew from this and Mr. Vance carried on for about 10 days—each time there was a proposal by us for some specific reform, the four officers would go out and consult with the officer corps. The officer corps would take a vote and they would then come back and report

to us that this was unacceptable and that they would rather fight than yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Fight us?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

They are perfectly willing to fight us, because, while some members of this committee are suggesting that we are seeing Communists under every bed, the antirebel forces are saying that we are soft on communism. They say we are going down a middle road and that what we ought to do is use force to clean out the rebels. The rebels are saying we ought to——

WHO ARE THE REBELS?

Senator LAUSCHE. When you say "rebels" who do you mean again?

Mr. MANN. I mean Caamano, the whole group. The rebel force is composed of 300 to 400 dissident military people who are not Communists, at least 1,500 paramilitary people who are in uniform and commanded by the Communists—the principal military force is under Communist command inside the rebel camp—plus a group of hoodlums who are in it just for the fun and looting and have no discipline. So far as we can tell, nobody is in charge of them. There is also a bunch of civilians who are mainly politicians rather than soldiers.

It is a conglomeration of large numbers of people. What we are trying to do is to carry out the mandate of the OAS to bring about an agreement on a provisional government. Some progress has been made in that direction. To have that provisional government take over control of the country, to collect the arms, to eliminate the Communist danger, to lead the country to elections—this is the policy that we set out on in the early days. It has been our consistent aim since that time.

AN OAS TRUSTEESHIP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, Secretary Mann, I think I understand, at least from my viewpoint, I hope I understand, the difficulties confronting us there. In effect we have done what we have done so often in the past, we have gained a temporary initiative but have failed to go through with it, and now we are stalemated. Instead of cleaning a dirty situation up when we get on top of it, we haven't gone through with it. There may be good and valid reasons, and I think I appreciate some of those reasons. I consider some of them valid, why it is difficult to do certain things we would like to do.

I understand or accept the validity of the facts as I see them, that the military situation there is one that is a hangover from the Trujillo group, that there is a lot of self-seeking there, a lot of self-serving in the military. There isn't any military organization in the Dominican Republic today that can be relied upon to carry out in good faith the purposes which all of us would have in mind, and that is genuine national interest operations leading toward elections there. There is no power force to enforce that.

The people have been under 30-some years of dictatorship there. They have had no opportunity to exercise their own responsibility

as individuals. They don't know what self-government is. They don't know what Communist responsibility is. I think I understand those difficulties, a lot of them.

I wonder if the ideal solution, which I don't think we can attain, might not be trusteeship under the Organization of American States. I also realize the practical impossibility of getting that. Revolution has been a way of life in Latin America as long as they have had Latin America down there, and I think a lot of Latin Americans are a little bit hesitant about doing some of these things because they might want to revolt in their own country one of these days and they don't want to be criticized for it. But some power, hopefully internal power that is on their own steam, has to get in there and control that thing. It has got to be military at the moment, in my judgment.

HARD FACTS VERSUS IDEALISTIC THEORIES

We don't like military governments, we don't like enforced military control, that is true, but we are facing hard facts of the immediate moment rather than idealistic theories. There has got to be some power oriented for the public good down there and determined to advance the public good in a responsible political system, but I don't know where you are going to get it.

There are several ways we could go; yes, sir. We had force enough in there. We could have probably swept the island at a considerable sacrifice and cost. Maybe we should have done it. I don't think we should have if we had imposed a forceful solution at that particular time. But I think the only solution that I can see in this stalemate without creating a temporary situation which will boil over again in a few years or maybe less than a few years, the only hopeful thing I can see would be for the Organization of American States to sometime come to a vigorous unity, if possible, and say:

> Well, we will move in there with a trusteeship. Our trusteeship will be oriented completely to the well-being of the Dominican Republic. We will have no favoritism. We will have nothing. We will set up an organization where people can express themselves in free elections, and we will get the job done.

Now, that is easier said than done, I realize that, because the OAS drags its feet and drags and drags and orates and yells, "Viva Bolivar," and then goes off to a siesta and so on. And we get restless about this inaction.

I don't see any solution to this Dominican Republic affair of any hopeful permanence, unless there is some force developed there directed to the national interest that can control this situation. I don't know where you are going to get it internally. You have got internal jealousies of these groups who want to lead; they are rivals and apparently they don't have any spirit or tradition of public good there. They have the tradition of private benefit, but not public benefit, not public good. I don't know how we can see that the OAS really gets in there vigorously and says: "We will supervise this thing, we will establish law and order, and we will set up a fair proposal which the world and everybody in the world can look at and say is fair and reasonable and gives opportunity."

NEED FOR A VICE PRESIDENT

But then you have got to get people to head it. This so-called provisional president that was suggested, apparently, according to newspaper reports, was willing to take it temporarily. They can't get a vice president; is that correct?

Mr. MANN. The vice president has backed out. Nobody wants to assume the responsibility and the onus for doing anything.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This one fellow said he would do it, didn't he?

Mr. MANN. Barreras said first he would do it. Then he declined. Mr. Bunker told me they had at one time a full cabinet of decent people. One of them said his health was bad and he had to back out; another one said his wife was too nervous and wouldn't permit him to do this; they came up with a series of excuses.

I wonder if I might——

AFRAID OF THE CONSEQUENCES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think underlying it they are afraid they will be lined up against the wall and shot themselves at a later date if they go into this thing? As I understand it, under the proposal they would have to disqualify themselves as candidates for president in the general elections or the proposed elections.

Mr. MANN. Yes. Some of them have political ambitions and don't want to come in for that reason. They don't want to disqualify themselves as candidates for election. But the great problem in Latin America is to find somebody of the kind we have in abundance here, that is, people whose primary concern is not accumlating wealth for themselves and their family, but people who are willing to go into public life, to be criticized, to take it, and sacrifice what you might call one's personal comfort and wealth for public service.

Now, we have that in great abundance in an Anglo-Saxon culture. You simply don't find it so much in a Latin culture.

Senator CLARK. Would you yield for a minute?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

DIVISIONS IN THE OAS

Senator CLARK. I wonder if Mr. Vaughn and also Mr. Mann would comment on the impression I have which is that with the trouble of getting anything out of the Organization of American States, it is really not a unity at all. It consists, on the one hand, of people like Robles and Leoni and Frei and Belaunde, the people of Uruguay, although it is a mess it is still sort of a democracy, Mexico is a quasidemocracy, and then, on the other hand, the states that are run by military dictatorships, starting with Brazil, Paraguay, and the like, so it is almost impossible to get any unanimity of policy because they just don't agree with each other. Isn't there a lot of truth in that, Mr. Mann?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir; that is true, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield further?

WORKING COLLECTIVELY WITHOUT SACRIFICING NATIONAL INTERESTS

May I put this question: How important is it in formulating your plan to be able to tell the people of the Western Hemisphere and the world that this is a plan upon which agreement has been reached by the Organization of American States?

I ask that question because one of the severe criticisms against the State Department and the President was that we did not take into our confidence the Organization of American States adequately before we went in last April.

Mr. MANN. I would answer that by saying it is very important that we, to the extent that we can, without sacrificing vital U.S. national interests, work within a rule of law and within collective machinery set up in the regional and world organizations.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I summarize that?

Except where our national security is involved, we ought to work cooperatively with the Organization of American States.

Mr. MANN. I wouldn't limit it to security, Senator; I would say vital U.S. national interests. For example, the Latins are thinking now in terms of institutionalizing their economic relations with us. This can be defined as meaning that U.S. trade policies and U.S. aid policies would be determined by a majority vote of the OAS. This, I think, while not directly involving our security, is clearly unacceptable to this country. I would say it is broader than just security, but certainly it includes security.

HOW DO WE DEAL WITH SUBVERSION

I wonder if I might say something because I think Senator Hickenlooper touched on something very important, and maybe our greatest dilemma.

If we brush aside Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, we are still faced with a question of how we contain a determined Communist drive to bring about, in country after country, what they refer to as wars of national liberation. How do we deal with subversion?

Now, let me identify in this field of collective action two things that have happened since the 1940's that tend to tie our hands, and for which we really don't have a clear solution. One of them is a series of doctrines growing out of the last century and the early part of this century which are essentially Latin American in character and which say, (*a*), that no state shall for any reason whatever intervene in the international affairs of another state, and (*b*) that each state should be free to determine its own political, social, and economic system—which is essentially the same thing.

Now, these doctrines, if strictly applied, limit our ability to go in and do some of the things, either against the extreme right or against the extreme left, that some people in this country think we should do. More than that, it isn't just a doctrine. You will find that whenever foreign troops go into a Latin American country there is great resentment on the part of the people. It isn't just a doctrine.

I talked with Miguel Alemán, ex-President of Mexico, yesterday and said:

> We really don't disagree with the Mexican concept of nonintervention and self-determination if this is defined in its historical context as meaning the United

States should not intervene in your internal affairs as long as you are a free, sovereign, independent state, and that Mexico has the right to select its own government. We will agree with that.

But the mistake that Mexico is making is that you are applying it to the 20th century doctrines which were really conceived of in the last century to check U.S. power, and you don't have a doctrine, you don't have a plan, to deal with Communist subversion.

And I said to Mr. Alemán—since this is off the record—

Your problem today is not to check the power of the United States in Mexico. Your problem is what are you going to do if the Communists take over Guatemala which is on your south—a weak southern neighbor—or if they take over in Salvador or in Honduras and spread to Guatemala, because you and I would both agree that a well organized, highly disciplined, dedicated cadre would march across the Cuchumatanes Mountains and the PRI Party would be thrown out of power if you tolerated this thing.

And he said,

You are right.

And I said,

Why don't we bring up into the 20th century your doctrines of nonintervention and self-determination so that you and we will have a legal basis on which we could work together in maintaining our own sovereignty and our own freedom and independence?

This is going to take a great deal of thinking. The Latins themselves are going to have to come up with some kind of a doctrine. I hope they will do it within the next 3 or 4 months before we meet in Rio.

COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, Tom, at that point, I am not disagreeing with what you say at all—I agree with it—but on this invervention business, the more or less widespread antagonism toward invervention in Latin America seems to me to be directed against U.S. intervention or participation.

Mr. MANN. Precisely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They fall fail to realize that international communism is intervening in their states every day and that it is an intervention which is more insidious.

Mr. MANN. Precisely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And perhaps more powerful.

Mr. MANN. Precisely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. Than any intervention the United States had done at any time past. Even though we landed Marines at various places, it was a temporary landing, so known and so eventually exercised as a temporary thing.

International communism intervention is a permanent intervention or it is directed toward permanent intervention, and they fail to recognize or acknowledge that there are two kinds of intervention. There is only one kind of intervention apparently in their arguments and in their speeches and that is the colossus of the north.

The CHAIRMAN. That is historical and that is why it is difficult for them to change their mind.

Mr. MANN. Precisely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But they don't differentiate. There are two kinds of intervention, one of which alone they seem to empha-

size and exercise and they brush off the other kind of intervention which is more permanent in its direction and which is directed toward tyranny rather than self-determination.

Senator CLARK. Will you yield?

COMMUNISTS UTILIZE NATIVES

The trouble is that in that second Communist intervention they are smart enough to utilize natives. And the difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the native Dominican Communists——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking in a broader perspective than that in saying that the whole ball of wax is intervention. They are very clever and successful in every case using cadres composed of their own nationals who go to Cuba or China or Russia and are trained, but it is nevertheless intervention in its broad aspects.

Senator CLARK. They are still nationals.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They don't consider that with the seriousness of intervention as they do if the United States says, "We won't try to tell you how to run your government," oriented toward freedom of self-determination. They say that is intervention.

Senator CASE. Bourke, may I put in one more point on intervention?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I talked too loud and too long.

Senator CASE. I never heard you talk too long.

BENEFICENT INTERVENTION

The other day we had that fellow from Puerto Rico, Muñoz Marin. I think he is a great man and certainly a most attractive man. He made this point on intervention, as I understood it, that he doesn't think it was necessarily massive, complete opposition in Latin America to intervention of all kinds; that the intervention that we had come to represent in their mind was almost always intervention on the side either of our own personal money interests or on the side of the military dictatorships. If this could be somehow or other changed so that intervention could be beneficent, this would be recognized and accepted by the Latin Americans.

This is a broad summary, I think, of his point. Isn't it possible, and this I would like just to throw out for your comment, why don't we get somebody like him and Betancourt and Figueres or something to deal with this thing for the Latin American countries? He said—you know him better than we do—he would like to handle the economic side, Betancourt handle the military side, and Figueres handle the philosophical side. This is a Latin American operation, why can't we give him a chance to handle that?

I am sorry, Bourke.

As such, I question, myself, whether, you know, the doctrine is completely bad.

Mr. MANN. This is the direction we hope to head in. I would like to go one step beyond what Senator Hickenlooper said and say we have now reached the point where the doctrines of nonintervention and self-determination are used to protect Communist intervention in the hemisphere. Now, this is very clear.

U.N. CHARTER ON ARMED ATTACK

May I mention a second series of problems which are also, I think, very important in this whole context?

The U.N. Charter expressly recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense against "armed attack."

Senator CLARK. External armed attack.

Mr. MANN. This relates to the 19th century concept of armies marching across frontiers.

What we have now is a new type of indirect aggression, called subversion or wars of liberation or whatever you want to call them, which is quite different from the type of attack which the drafters of the United Nations Charter had in mind. In my opinion, there is a very important need of bringing these provisions up to date into the 20th century so that we can reach broad agreement with our Latin American friends that subversion is a type of aggression which must be resisted just as the 19th century types of aggression must be resisted.

This gets us into a whole new area of juridical problems, but we are trying to move in the direction which you referred to, Senator. I really think we overestimate Muñoz Marin and Figueres. They have a great deal of prestige in the Caribbean area, but they have more enemies in Latin America than they have friends. The only one who can lead the OAS in the direction we are all talking about—and I truly believe that among Americans there is no difference in our objectives—is the United States.

Muñoz Marin can't do it. Figueres can't do it. They can help, but we ourselves must take the lead.

FEAR OF ECONOMIC TAKEOVER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Down under the surface, it is my impression that there is no valid or sincere belief on the part of any Latin American countries that we have territorial ambitions or that we have ambitions to take over their countries. That is a broad brush.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is a fear on the part of many people that dollar investments and economic takeover in one way or another is always in the back of our mind because we are a commercial nation and the history in our past is that we have made substantial effort along that line. I think it is a commercial situation that exists here rather than a political takeover, and yet we have become the whipping boy in a lot of situations there and are called aggressors from a military or a political standpoint.

I don't know how we can do this. At least in my experience, you can talk to Latin American leaders—and I have talked to a few here and elsewhere—I couldn't ask for more agreement with those things than you can get in your own office or when you talk with them privately. They talk the best game you ever heard. At least to me, we are a great people, and they know we have no ulterior purposes. A lot of them go even farther on their part and say, "We need American capital and know-how, and the next day they go to the stump and make some extravagant statements. That is something, I suppose, that goes on in many countries.

But I am not trying to minimize the problem. I think it is a colossal problem.

USE OF DOMINICAN EXILES

But the only key that I can see to it at the moment that would be the most helpful would be some kind of a united, fairly united, determination, substantial majority determination of the OAS to really say, all right, the chips are down here, and we will establish a trusteeship and we will lay it out so plain that the rest of the world on a sensible basis couldn't really say we had any ulterior motives except to see over a period of time that these people set up their own government and there is power enough to give them a fair shake at self-determination, and so on. These people don't have the tradition of private responsibility to their government, to their community, to their nation, and their loyalties or their adherence, whatever it is, have been to various warlords or military leaders of one kind or another, and they are all fragmented all over the place. A lot of the leaders have been killed, exiled in the last 30 years.

Do we have any exiles in this country or other places that could go back to the Dominican Republic, of ability, if they thought there would be some reasonable opportunity to do something? It seems to me there are a lot of them left.

Mr. MANN. Not that I know of, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A lot of them left the Dominican Republic at one time or another.

Mr. MANN. What we may end up with in all of this in terms of inter-American force, in this whole problem of subversion, is not an OAS-type resolution but a protocol or agreement, or treaty, between a majority of the Latin American states, which is left open to adherence by those who are not prepared to join us at this time. Brazil has suggested this. For example, Brazil, Argentina, the United States, all of Central America, and four or five other states who believe pretty much as we do, have to move ahead right now because we are going to be faced with another overthrow of a free government if we don't.

SUPPORT FROM FREELY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Senator CLARK. Could you get such a thing with more or less freely elected governments, such as Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, guerrilla states, who would join us in such an effort?

Mr. MANN. No, I think you are going to find the duke's mixture. For example, Costa Rica, which is probably the most democratic, would certainly go along.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. MANN. El Salvador, which is a democratically elected government, is strongly in favor of this kind of action. The Panamanian Government, a freely elected one, will also go along with something of this kind.

Senator CLARK. Could you do anything geographically in terms of a Caribbean compact in which you would perhaps, with some logic, exclude a number of states with whom we are having difficulty on the ground they were not geographically close?

Mr. MANN. We have thought a great deal about that. As a matter of fact, I think it would be much less dangerous for the United States if, let's say, missiles were placed in the southern part of Chile than if they were placed in the Dominican Republic. Some kind of a northern pact which would be based on Brazil and hopefully all of the states bordering on the Caribbean would make a great deal of sense from the standpoint of our own national security, and this may well emerge out of all this.

You may find people like Frei for doctrinal reasons just opposed to any kind of collective actions against the Communists. Frei's belief—his honest belief—is that a solution to the Dominican problem is to take Communists into the cabinet. Our equally honest belief is that, given the weakness of the non-Communists and the divisions among them, if you did that the Communists would have effective political control and power within 6 months.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They always have.

Mr. MANN. This is really what divides us. It isn't a doctrinal thing. I suspect that we are not going to be able to get unanimity because of differences of view of this kind.

Senator CLARK. Let's leave Frei out of it. Why can't we get Leoni on our side?

Mr. MANN. I think I tried to explain earlier that Leoni and Betancourt both welcomed this intervention in the early days, and what caused them to shift was the attitude of the left wing of the A.D. Party plus Rafael Caldera's Christian Democrats following the Frei lead. The balance of power in Venezuela shifted, and the politicians shifted.

Mr. VAUGHN. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

OAS WAS NOT READY TO RESPOND

Mr. VAUGHN. You asked about the Dominican situation on the military side and why we didn't go in and reduce the size of the Dominican armed forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly the officers.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, sir.

I think the fact is clear that right from the start, from the Organization of American States to the Peace Committee, it was clear that, psychologically and organizationally, they were not ready to respond, not able to respond, to meet this threat in the Dominican Republic. But after we made the move to bring some order, to stop the killing, to evacuate our friends and our citizens, we continued our efforts to get the OAS involved. The fact is also that the OAS is involved, that there is a Latin American general directing the armed forces, and there is an OAS committee seeking to mediate and bring about a provisional government, and the OAS is providing help and assistance across the board. We think that this is in our interest.

We don't think that a unilateral move, unless all else fails, can be justified vis-a-vis the military or any other organization. As you know, the Latin tendency is to sit back and take a legalistic or romantic point of view, and armchair all the way through. We want to get the OAS involved, and we want them to recognize that there

are certain parts of that organization that are outmoded. This is a different age, and there are different threats and different needs. To the extent that we can help them realize what we, the Americas, are up against, and how deficient the OAS is and what the possibilities for action are, I don't think we will ever have an effective OAS.

So, I feel it would be a mistake for us to move alone in trying to cope with the Dominican armed forces problem.

CORRUPTION IN THE OFFICER CORPS

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly everything I have heard would indicate that the officer corps of the old Trujillo army is probably the most corrupt element down there. We had testimony about their importation of goods to avoid tariffs and reselling, black market operations. It is primarily the officer corps, and the effect of that also—he didn't talk about that particular aspect, but Muñoz said this is the thing that has to be cured or there is just hardly any hope for a democratic system there.

While the OAS is in there, this general from Brazil surely is interested in improving the situation. Can't that officer corps be cleaned out little by little, retired? He didn't mean to shoot them. He said give them a pension, send them off as Ambassadors, get them out of the country but don't kill them or anything violent. Take them a little at a time and decimate the old Trujillo officer corps and then use the regular men and put them to work on civilian works, roads, irrigation, or anything else.

That is the point, to neutralize their influence so there will be an opportunity for whatever the Dominicans can do. It makes sense to me. I don't know when with our present control—if we are ever going to do it, we have to do it while we are there.

As he pointed out, if you are going to have elections you will get another election like you did in Bosch and maybe you will get a good man. If the army is still there, a good man will try to reform them after we are gone and he is a sitting duck. It has to be done before you have that election and I thought it made a lot of sense purely as a practical way to do it.

REFORM OF THE ARMY

The reform of the army has to come before you get a good man in. A good man will be like Reid Cabral. The reason that triggered this was an effort to get rid of just a few officers, as I understand it. He sent out word certain officers were to be retired and that triggered this revolution.

I thought it made a lot of sense. We go to an awful lot of trouble to go to have an election and all that and if these people are still there, they won't like the reforms, they won't like the deprivation of their privileges, and they will throw them out. You will be right back to where you were. It made a lot of sense to me, his suggestion you have to get rid of the officer corps as the seat of the trouble, and maybe it has to be arbitrary. As long as we have already committed ourselves, now is the time to be arbitrary.

Mr. MANN. You understand, Mr. Chairman, that our plan is that, as soon as we get a provisional government and before elections, Garcia Godoy began to clean up the military.

The CHAIRMAN. While we are there.

Mr. VAUGHN. He would do it while the inter-American force is there. Just how far we can go without—I repeat again—fighting, without shooting, I don't know, and I don't think anybody knows.

The CHAIRMAN. This takes ingenuity.

STOP PAYING OFFICERS' SALARIES

One thing I like about Muñoz, I think he is very resourceful. He said, "I wouldn't try to shoot one if you do, but make him Ambassador to Paris." That is where they used to send Rubirosa, "Give him a pension but get him clear out of the country and keep him out. Don't kill him."

Mr. VAUGHN. All of these suggestions have been made to both sides months ago, in the early days of this thing, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. But when you are in control you ought to be able to make them do it, if you take them one by one or a few at a time, it seems to me. I don't know. It sounded like a practical approach to liquidate the old officer corps. He says don't just disband the army. There is unemployment anyway, you want to use them, that is the privates, who are not politically motivated. They are not corrupt. They haven't had an opportunity to be. It is the officers who are corrupt.

Senator CARLSON. The point I thought he made was we were paying the costs of the army. Maybe we were not, but then it gets to another situation. But we were paying.

The CHAIRMAN. We were paying $15 million a month, I think that is it.

Mr. VAUGHN. Since the Senator educated me on this point, I talked to Ambassador Bunker. We both agreed we would stop paying salaries in order to build up the pressure.

Senator CHURCH. Tom, how close do you think we may be to a provisional government?

Mr. MANN. I would hope, myself, within 2 or 3 weeks. I think if we don't make it within the next 2 or 3 weeks we are going to have to face up, as I said earlier, to some alternate way of solving the problem.

Senator CHURCH. If this provisional government can be created, would it rest upon the consent, participation of both factions or on one?

Mr. MANN. It would rest certainly on the agreement of the civilian Bosch part of the rebel side and on at least the tacit acquiescence of the dissident military on the rebel side. It must have the tacit acquiescence of the regular officer corps and the support, I would say, of Balaguer.

Now, that ought to be enough to get it going. This leaves unanswered the question of what you do with the Communist-led elements inside the rebel-held zone who are not responsive to Caamano or to anyone else, and on this we don't have a clear answer. We don't know whether they would go underground and plan on

guerrilla activities in the mountains, or whether they would choose to make a last ditch stand inside the rebel zone.

NEED TO COME OUT RIGHT

Senator CHURCH. I want to say, make just one point that I think is implicit in your answer.

I have never criticized the decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic. I think that given our experience in Cuba and the close obvious importance of the Caribbean to the United States that if there were grounds, as I have always assumed there must have been, it was to conclude that a very substantial Communist takeover was there, I think we had to move. But having moved, I think we now assume a very special responsibility to ourselves and also in connection with attitudes toward us elsewhere in Latin America. In other words, we have got to come out with this thing right.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. If we can't accomplish it through the OAS, I hope we can, but if we can't, then I think we must see to it ourselves that we come out right, because afterward I think we will be judged by the eventual opportunity of the people to assert self-determination and by the kind of government that emerges from this occupation.

Therefore, my own feeling is let us try to do it through the OAS. If this fails, let us do it anyway.

Mr. MANN. My personal opinion is the same as yours, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

KEEP COMMUNISTS OUT OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you presently firm in the conviction that it would be a mistake to take into the provisional government any of the June 14 movement who are Communists or the Peking-oriented and Moscow-oriented Communists?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there a pretty firm judgment on that?

Mr. MANN. That is what all the people in the State Department and Ambassador Bunker are agreed upon. This would be a great mistake.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, the belief as if you did take them in, they would begin boring from within and would finally take over?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is supported by the experience that has been had throughout the world where these coalition governments have been formed?

Mr. MANN. It is supported by a great many experiences in the past.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to jump the gun. I had some questions at some point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead. I was starting. I hoped you would interrupt. Go ahead and take your turn.

UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CLARK. Mr. Mann, you outlined a little while ago the need for reforms in the Dominican Republic. I wonder if you would include, as a pretty important measure if we are going to maintain some kind of peace down there, a rather massive program of public works to deal with the unemployment situation?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like you just to listen to this for a minute. It has been my view we are going to do a complete job of investigation, nonetheless we are of the view we don't want to call anybody except people who are identified with the administration. I yield to you in that regard. Unless there is some reason why Mr. Mann and Mr. Vaughn could give us as to why we shouldn't, it seems to me we ought to get Mr. John Martin and Mr. McGeorge Bundy down here. They have played a very active part in this. Both have been down here at the request of the President. It may be that Mr. Mann and Mr. Vaughn can give good reasons as to why they don't think they would contribute much to the committee's consideration of this. I would like to have their views on it.

Mr. MANN. I think Mr. Martin is very knowledgeable. He might well make a very good and valuable witness before this committee.

ROLE OF JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN

Senator CLARK. Is it true, as I have seen alleged, that he is primarily responsible for bringing Tony Imbert into power? If not, who was?

Mr. MANN. May I testify from memory, which may be betraying me right now?

Senator CLARK. Sure.

Mr. MANN. My understanding was that Martin was told to set up——

Senator CLARK. Who sent him down there, did you?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I did not.

Senator CLARK. Do you know who did? It was the President; wasn't it?

Mr. MANN. I don't know of my own knowledge.

Senator CLARK. Do you, Mr. Vaughn?

Mr. VAUGHN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, what was your question?

Senator CLARK. Who sent Martin down to the Dominican Republic? I will make the statement; they don't want to. It was the President.

Mr. MANN. I work for the President of the United States. I am loyal to the President. I never quote the President, especially if I was not present at the time something was said.

The CHAIRMAN. For whatever it is worth, Mr. Martin told Mr. Holt that he sent him.

Senator CLARK. Has Mr. Holt interviewed Mr. Martin?

Mr. HOLT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Senator CLARK. Have we got a transcript of that interview?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir.

Senator CLARK. Go ahead, Mr. Mann.

Mr. MANN. My understanding is Mr. Martin talked with hundreds of people. He went over and had a conversation with Mr. Bosch. He tried for many days to find a middle-of-the-road progressive group around which people might rally on both sides—the moderate, anti-Communist elements on both sides. He found that no one was willing to assume the responsibility except a Mr. Imbert, and he did encourage Mr. Imbert under those circumstances to do this job.

Senator CLARK. Is this in accord with your recollection, Mr. Vaughn?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, sir.

MISSION TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CLARK. You went down there yourself, didn't you, Mr. Vaughn, at one point?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Who was the party who went down with you? Mr. Bundy was one of them wasn't he?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Who else?

Mr. VAUGHN. Mr. Vance and Secretary Mann.

Senator CLARK. You were along, too?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Was that expedition on your initiative or were you sent down there by the President?

Mr. MANN. I was asked to go down by the Secretary of State. I was not present at the meeting where the decision was taken to send the mission down.

Senator CLARK. Can you give us in general terms, and I don't mean a long detailed statement, just what your instructions were, what you were able to accomplish, what didn't work, and what part Mr. Bundy played in all of these deliberations, largely from my point of view of finding out whether it would be useful to call Mr. Bundy before this committee.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Vance were instructed to get in touch with Mr. Bosch and the people who were sympathetic with the rebel side and to enlist their cooperation in setting up a provisional government which would have safeguarded against a Communist takeover. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Vance stopped off on the way to Santo Domingo and talked with Mr. Bosch, and, I believe, with Mr. Guzman who was there at that time.

Senator CLARK. Who was then being seriously considered as the chief of the provisional government; is that right?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. Who vetoed him, Imbert?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I will come to that. No one in particular vetoed him.

OAS FIVE-MAN COMMITTEE

Mr. Vaughn and I were instructed to go straight to the Dominican Republic to confer with the five-man OAS committee there, to explain to them what we were doing, and to talk with the military

and endeavor to get the regular military to adopt a flexible attitude.

Senator CLARK. Was that the OAS committee which subsequently resigned and came home?

Mr. MANN. That is correct, sir. That is the five-man committee under the chairmanship, I believe, of an Argentinian.

Senator CLARK. Your view of them is a little dim, as I recall your previous testimony.

Mr. MANN. Some members of that committee, yes, sir.

MEETING WITH THE DOMINICAN MILITARY

Mr. Vaughn and I had a long meeting, I think, about 3 hours, with the military.

The CHAIRMAN. The Dominican military?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that, Imbert?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator CLARK. Wessin.

Mr. MANN. The military. Mr. Imbert is not a regular military. He is an honorary general. I also talked——

The CHAIRMAN. He is an honorary general?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. He was made an honorary general because he shot Trujillo. We talked with the chiefs of the armed forces—the chief of the army, the chief of the air force, and the chief of the navy.

Senator CLARK. Did that include Wessin?

Mr. MANN. We tried to talk with Wessin, who refused to see us.

Senator CLARK. He wouldn't talk.

Mr. MANN. We also talked several times with Mr. Imbert and we tried to explain to him, in general, that he had rendered a service to his country in terms of having stabilized the countryside, helping to maintain order, and assisting in the distribution of food and other emergency supplies to the people, but that he was not the man to head up a provisional government, not the man around whom anyone would rally, and that his patriotic duty was to step aside as soon as a provisional government could be set up. That was essentially our mission.

VISIT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TEAM

Senator CLARK. Could you state the dates during which you were in the Dominican Republic? If not, would you supply them for the record?

Mr. MANN. I would like to correct the record, if I am wrong. I think that all four of us left on May 15. Is that the correct date, Pat?

Mr. HOLT. This chronology says the White House team arrived May 17, and May 18. Mann and Martin returned to Washington. Bundy and Vance remained in Santo Domingo.

Mr. MANN. I think my recollection is we left here on May 15; we went straight to the Dominican Republic. Mr. Vaughn returned on May 17 and I think I returned on May 18.

Senator CLARK. Leaving Bundy behind?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Vance stayed behind for approximately the 10 days.

Senator CLARK. Have you told us in general what you did during the 2 days you were there?

Mr. MANN. Two or 3 days. I think Vaughn was there 2 and I think I was there 3.

I did not have any conversations with Mr. Guzman. Mr. Bundy carried on those conversations alone with Guzman, assisted by junior Embassy officers who kept notes.

Mr. Vance, after he arrived, which was a day or two after our arrival, took over the job of talking with the regular military. I continued, as long as I was there, talking with Imbert and the OAS.

ATTEMPT TO BUILD A GOVERNMENT

Essentially, Mr. Bundy tried to build a government around a man named Guzman, who is a farmer, a member of the PRD, and who was Bosch's nominee.

Senator CLARK. Who had been Minister of Agriculture in the Bosch government?

Mr. MANN. Who had been Minister of Agriculture; yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Why did that break down?

Mr. MANN. It broke down because of the disagreement between rebels and the antirebel forces on, essentially, three issues: Who was going to control the military? The rebels insisted that all of the senior officers in the regular military establishment be exiled from the country and that their people be put in charge of the regular military establishment. There was no flexibility at all on this and no hope of getting agreement, not only from the officers directly concerned, but from the officer corps. They vote; they meet and vote, including the second lieutenants, and this was not acceptable to the officer corps.

The second main issue was who was going to control the provisional government in the preelectoral period and through elections. Who was going to have political power? Both sides, in effect, insisted on having their people in charge, and it was impossible to get agreement on middle-of-the-roaders who would assure a fair deal for both sides.

Another main issue was the reluctance of the rebel side to make any undertakings about what they would do with the Communists. We were insisting that the identifiable Communists—who would not have been all the Communists, but at least the Communist leaders—be exiled or in some other way controlled so that they could not participate in political activities in the preelectoral period.

REINSTATING THE 1963 CONSTITUTION

Senator CLARK. Of course, was there not also a question of whether the constitution of 1963 should be reinstated?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I hate to give you my own opinion on this because it is an opinion. I think the main reason they insisted on the constitution of 1963 instead of the constitution of 1962 was precisely because the constitution of 1963 made it impossible to exile

or otherwise control Communist elements inside the rebel area. During these negotiations, even the PRD elements at that time—this is not their current position—took the position that there were no Communists, that everybody inside the rebel zone was a "hero of the revolution," and that they must be taken care of. They have changed that position now and openly admit that a good part of the military strength is under Communist control. But as of the time Bundy was there they would not admit this.

Senator CLARK. Two more questions, Mr. Chairman, and I will be through.

CHARGES BY JUAN BOSCH

Have you read the article on Santo Domingo by Juan Bosch in the July 24 issue of the New Republic?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I don't read all of that. I don't have time. I would like to very much.

Senator CLARK. I don't imagine you read the New Republic regularly.

Mr. MANN. I read it occasionally, Senator. I have no prejudice against it. I read it sometimes. I don't read very much simply because I don't have time.

Senator CLARK. The reason I ask you is I share the chairman's view about Bosch, but there are a number of charges in this article which were of considerable interest to me. Instead of taking the time to ask you to agree with them or to rebut them now, if it is agreeable with the chairman, I would like to ask you to have somebody in your establishment furnish a comment on this Bosch article, and particularly this part of it which reads:

> The military junta headed by Antonio Imbert was the brainchild of Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, of the United States, in other words. Rarely in modern history has so costly an error been committed in terms of U.S. prestige as placing in the hands of Imbert the power of armed Dominican troops, then advancing as an excuse for his crimes the argument of fighting communism in Santo Domingo. The brutal killings of Dominicans and foreigners, including a Cuban priest and a Canadian priest, which were committed by Imbert's troops on the pretext of wiping out communism will, in Dominican history, be forever laid to the account of the United States, and particularly to Ambassador Martin.

REPORT TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

I have also a report here made to José Mora, Secretary General of the United Nations Security Council through the Organization of American States which was made by three individuals, Jorge Avendano, Daniel Schweitzer, and Alfonso Quiroz Cuaron.

Are you familar with those?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator CLARK. That document, at least in part, the charges made in Mr. Bosch's article, led me to the tentative conclusion, subject to any rebuttal which you and Mr. Vaughn would like to give, that the only documentation of atrocities that could stand the light of day was the documentation of atrocities committed by the Imbert government.

Mr. MANN. Senator, first on the atrocity part of the question. I have no personal knowledge—I was not there——

Senator CLARK. Of course not, and neither was Mr. Vaughn.

Mr. MANN [continuing]. But I personally have no doubt from all the intelligence I have seen that there were hundreds of atrocities committed by the rebels inside the rebel zone in those early days. They actually hunted down known anti-Communist newspaper people and others and shot them.

Senator CLARK. I don't want to interrupt you, Mr. Mann.

You said that before and I will take your word for it.

ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY IMBERT PEOPLE

What I am interested in are the atrocities committed by the Imbert people.

Mr. MANN. I am coming to that. I equally have no doubt at all that the Imbert side committed atrocities which are indefensible. There are hatreds on both sides of this thing—this isn't a black-and-white thing, so far as the atrocities are concerned. Both sides, in my opinion, took advantage of the anarchy and tried to eliminate as many of their political enemies as they could find.

Now, the atrocities on the GNR side, the Imbert side, have been documented simply because the Human Rights Committee of the OAS was there on the ground at the time and was able to go out and disinter people, identify them, and so forth. The atrocities committed inside the rebel zone have never really been subjected to the proper kind of investigation and may never be, because too much time elapsed before the Human Rights Committee arrived on the ground to be able to do that.

Senator CLARK. Of course, Mr. Bosch wasn't there, either, and, therefore, perhaps this statement of his is suspect; I guess it is. I quote:

> Under the revolution no one was shot or decapitated, but Imbert forces shot and decapitated hundreds of persons.

Would you disagree with that?

Mr. MANN. I have seen many rumors of headless bodies but I haven't seen any verification about any headless bodies from either side of the line of communications.

TROOPS FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS

Senator CLARK. Mr. Vaughn, was there or is there now in the OAS force a Nicaraguan battalion named for Anastasio Somoza?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, there is no Nicaraguan battalion there. There is a smaller unit than that.

Senator CLARK. Is it known as the Somoza battalion?

Mr. VAUGHN. Not to my knowledge.

Senator CLARK. Are there any Paraguayan soldiers there?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. How many?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't recall the number but I think it is a company.

Senator CLARK. Are there Honduran soldiers there under the command of one Lopez Arellano?

Mr. VAUGHN. There are Honduran soldiers there.

Senator CLARK. And is Arellano a Honduran general?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't know.

Senator CLARK. His name doesn't mean anything?

Mr. VAUGHN. The only Latin American general there, to my knowledge, is General Alvim who is the commander of the inter-American force.

Senator CLARK. Bosch says Lopez Arellano is a sort of Honduran Wessin y Wessin, does that ring any bell with you?

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

WARNINGS TO BOSCH ABOUT COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's take a look at Bosch for a moment.

Isn't it a fact while he was in power, the State Department was in touch with him cautioning him of the Communist power that was being exercised while Bosch was in control?

Mr. MANN. It is my understanding, Senator, that the Embassy on various occasions stressed to the Bosch government the danger of Communist infiltration.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it a fact that in spite of the importuning of the dangers of the Communist taking over, Bosch was indifferent to what our State Department was saying?

Mr. MANN. I would say that Bosch never evidenced that he fully understood the danger of the Communist movement in the Dominican Republic.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it a fact while Bosch was in power he allowed the Communists to use the governmentally owned radio station for propaganda and indoctrination purposes?

Mr. MANN. Senator, that may well be correct. Would you permit me to look it up? I don't know it of my own knowledge.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think I am quoting Martin now. And second that he allowed a school building to be used by Communist teachers teaching the Communist technique and philosophy. You probably don't know that.

Mr. MANN. Of my own knowledge; no, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And third that he allowed the exiled Communists to come back into the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And fourth that he allowed the youth of the Dominican Republic to be sent to Cuba to be indoctrinated in communism?

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am quite certain that I am quoting directly the testimony given here in this room when Bosch was overthrown.

SELECTING AND ABANDONING GUZMAN

Now then, you state that one of the reasons why the thought of selecting Guzman was abandoned was that you could not get an agreement that the Communists would be exiled?

Mr. MANN. Or otherwise dealt with effectively.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Which was the primary reason in abandoning Guzman? Was it on the basis of who was to control the military, who was to control the provisional government, or what was to be done with the Communists?

Mr. MANN. As a practical matter they were all important, but the one predominant in our minds here in Washington was their equivocal attitude toward the Communists.

Senator LAUSCHE. I did not know of this but on the floor of the Senate where Guzman was being considered I pointed out his close relationship to Bosch and the danger of putting Guzman in there, and the fact that they were not willing to yield on the matter of disposing of the Communists is pretty strong proof that my position then was right. I just want to conclude by stating that I subscribe fully to what is being done, and I think to have done otherwise would have placed on our shores another Cuba. We would have become victims of the same fallacious persuasion that you have in control a Lincoln, as they called Castro, a Robin Hood, as they called him. I merely wanted to repeat that I subscribed to the course that has been followed.

Mr. MANN. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

MOVING BACKWARD

Senator MUNDT. As I recall, Tom, when you were here last, you said that, talking about this rebel center being retained in the central part of Santo Domingo, failure to iron out the military contest there, you said, "Well, unless something happens in a few days we are going to have to take another look at it."

Now you tell us it is 2 or 3 weeks, we are going to continue as we are. So, we are moving backward. We lost ground here in the last few days and that is kind of discouraging to me and kind of disillusioning. A few days buoys up your hopes but a few weeks it looks to me like the situation tends to deteriorate.

What is this costing the United States per day over there? You are the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. You ought to have those figures at the tip of your tongue?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I don't have the costs. The answer to the first part of your question is that within 2 or 3 days I did have a talk with Ambassador Bunker. He came back over the weekend to consult. He also consulted with other senior officials in Washington.

Ambassador Bunker's opinion was that it would be possible, without the use of military force to set up a provisional government if we were willing to use economic pressures. We told him that we——

PRESSURE ON THE REBEL ENCLAVE

Senator MUNDT. Do you mean a boycott of the rebel enclave there?

Mr. MANN. We told him that we were perfectly prepared to use all economic pressures as soon as he would recommend them. He recommended that we authorize him to inform Imbert that we would no longer pay the salaries of the military on the Imbert side. He received that authorization; he did so inform Imbert.

Senator MUNDT. It would look like we are pressuring the people on our side instead of the people who are doing the shooting on the rebel side, not the kind of pressure I was hoping for.

Mr. MANN. We do have a problem with Imbert in that he insists that he should head up the provisional government. This is not the recommendation of the OAS committee, and it is our judgment that you cannot have either peace or tranquility unless we can get somebody in the middle of the road the head up this government.

It is hard for me to estimate when we will have a provisional government. I would hope that we would have one within 1 week. I said I thought that within 2 or 3 weeks we would have to have a solution or that we would have to look for alternative means.

ESTIMATED COSTS

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Vaughn, do you know what it costs, in answer to his question? Do you know what it costs?

Senator MUNDT. Are you able to tell us what it costs?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't think we can put it on a per-day basis.

The CHAIRMAN. About how much?

Mr. VAUGHN. The pattern of aid has varied and changed as we have committed our forces and made different arrangements and brought the OAS in more, but we had obligated $42 million from the beginning, of which some $37 million had been disbursed as of last week.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't it about $600,000 a day? I thought we had testimony about it. Wasn't that about what it was?

Mr. VAUGHN. In the early days.

The CHAIRMAN. We had some testimony on that, Karl.

Senator MUNDT. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we ask these gentlemen to go back to their books, we must have records someplace, and prepare a table to put in the record. As I say, you don't have it on the tip of your tongue but what this is costing per day or per week, first, from the standpoint of supporting our own military people over there, and second, from the standpoint of the AID programs we are having, and third, maybe you can answer this, are we underwriting any costs of the OAS troops or are they paying their own?

Mr. MANN. I think we are giving them logistical support. We are not paying their salaries or anything of that kind.

Senator MUNDT. How about sustenance?

Mr. MANN. That is what I mean by logistical support. We are feeding them and perhaps supplying them with ammunition. We can put in a statement about that.

Senator MUNDT. I had heard reports they were paid higher serving there then they would at home and it was being supplemented by American money.

Mr. VAUGHN. That is not the case. The Brazilians pay their own troops.

WHO HAS THE VETO POWER

Senator MUNDT. Who is really making the decisions there now? Are we making them unilaterally, is the OAS making them, or how are they being made?

Who has the veto power? Suppose a suggestion comes up, do we veto it or does the OAS vote it? In the final analysis somebody has to be boss. The OAS is there and everything is done under the

American imprimatur. Does it mean we are running the show, or who is running the show?

Mr. MANN. As of the last 2 or 3 weeks, since the arrival of Ambassador Bunker, the three-man OAS committee has been making the principal decisions, both in terms of giving political guidance to the inter-American force, and in terms of conducting the negotiations for the setting up of a provisional government. We are in touch, of course, with Ambassador Bunker, and he knows what our feeling is about communism and he is aware of our worries about expenditure of U.S. funds.

Senator MUNDT. Is he a member of that three-man committee?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. The chairman.

The committee is making these decisions?

Mr. MANN. As of this moment.

Senator MUNDT. If two of the three members of the committee make a bad decision, this is what we buy.

Mr. MANN. The mandate of the OAS is to the committee, and they are making the decisions.

As I say, Ambassador Bunker, who is an American citizen and an American official, is aware of U.S. policy objectives.

U.S. ABILITY TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS

Senator MUNDT. That doesn't quite respond to my question. Assuming, which I hope is not the case, but certainly it is within the realm of possibility, that the OAS comes up with a decision which we know to be bad, which we feel to be bad, which would be detrimental to our interests, advantageous to the Communist point of view, and he is outvoted 2 to 1; is this what we are committed to buy?

Mr. MANN. No, sir, I wouldn't say that, sir. I wouldn't say we would buy it if we thought it was contrary to our interests.

Senator MUNDT. Then I misunderstood your earlier answer. You told me that they were making the decisions.

Mr. MANN. That is right, sir.

Senator MUNDT. So, they made a decision, and we don't like it; what happens?

Mr. MANN. Senator, up to this time, we have been able to influence the decisions made to a very considerable extent, and we are confident that no decision would be made by the three-man committee which is contrary to what either we or Brazil consider to be vital.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO CARRY OUT OAS DECISIONS

Senator MUNDT. But there are facts, are there not, not to get into any diplomatic quibble, but realistically, if a bad decision is made, we are stuck with it because we have got one vote out of three and we either are or are not committed to carry out whatever the OAS decides. I think we are entitled to know just what that commitment is.

Mr. MANN. As a practical matter—as a realistic matter, as you would say—the Brazilian Government and the United States Government see eye to eye on this problem. The second member of the

committee is a Brazilian Ambassador. I think for all effective practical purposes the United States and Brazil have a majority. I believe that the third member of the commission, the Ambassador from El Salvador, also agrees with the other two, so that, as a practical matter, I think there is no problem in terms of divergence of their recommendations, in basic points from U.S. policy.

Senator MUNDT. Have you ever given any consideration, has our Government ever given any consideration, to the possibility that the Dominicans just are not quite ready to operate a stable self-government by themselves and we are working at an impossible solution in that area, or do you deny that as a possibility?

Mr. MANN. No, sir; we have given a great deal of thought to that possibility.

POWER, AUTHORITY, LOCATION, AND PRECEDENT

Senator MUNDT. If that is a possibility, it seems to me we have four possible alternatives, one less than the President told us about yesterday morning when he said we had five.

We have the OAS to establish some kind of protectorate, which apparently they will not do because they are fearful that a precedent will be established which might come home to plague them. I think they would do it otherwise, but I think they think it means this might be one of their own countries, which is understandable.

We get the U.N. to establish some kind of an instrumentality to guide these fellows for a few years to learn how, but from our point of view I don't think anybody is sanguine about the U.N. because the Russians wish to have the world in turmoil. Why in the world should they correct it?

We have the power and the authority and we have the location and we have ample precedent for doing it ourselves. But since we have demonstrated before the world how well we can do that with the Philippines, we have become very sensitive to world opinion, so we don't do anything which is good for the world unless the world recognizes it in advance. Apparently we are not going to do that because somebody might criticize.

It seems to me there is one other alternative, one other option, and that is for our Government to exercise some leadership and to say to the members of the Organization of American States, "We recognize your organization doesn't want to get involved in this. We think it is absolutely essential there be some kind of protectorate, some kind of benevolent umbrella under which this thing is going to operate for a while and share the costs and responsibilities. We don't want to go it alone. We don't want you to criticize us for thinking we want to do it alone; we need your help. How many of you will form with us a select committee to operate a protectorate?"

Could we get four or five or six, or do they have the guts for them to say, "All right, we don't need the whole OAS. The five or six inter-American select committee will establish this protectorate and share the responsibilities for doing this thing."

In other words, a sort of OAS committee of our own without the OAS assuming any responsibility for it because it doesn't involve

anybody. But do you have anybody down there who would join that kind of business? Does it make any sense?

PERSUASION AND AGREEMENT

Mr. MANN. I think there is a fifth alternative which—hopefully by persuasion and agreement, but if necessary simply by decision of the OAS three-man group—would be to recommend to the governments of the hemisphere that we recognize a provisional government, followed by our and other American republics recognizing it and supporting it.

The difference between what I am suggesting and what you are suggesting, Senator, is this: The exercise of a trusteeship by force would probably require military occupation of the entire country. Certainly we couldn't do it with the troops we have there at the present time. I would personally hope that out of all this will come a provisional government—I hope a good one, but at least the best that we can get set up—supported by the military, and which can begin to restore law and order in the country at early date.

Senator MUNDT. Their military?

Mr. MANN. It has to be supported by their military.

Senator MUNDT. Wouldn't their military be in the same posture whether it is under the select committee of the OAS or whether it is under a provisional government of their own? What difference does it make?

Mr. MANN. It's a matter of pride with the Dominican military. I think both sides would like to see the foreign troops out within a reasonably short period of time.

NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD INSIST ON SOVEREIGNTY

Senator MUNDT. I can't quite distinguish in my own mind, Tom, the difference between four and five, if you want to call my suggestion four. It was my suggestion of doing this under a trusteeship or a protectorate, or whatever you want to call it, of a select committee of inter-American states. Of course, it envisions the establishment of a provisional government but it also assumes a committee of Latin Americans to work with them to guide them and to help them, with a continuing interest in this thing, a continuing realization that any provisional government now established left to itself probably will not long endure.

Mr. MANN. Senator Mundt, I really don't believe that any provisional government we could get would tolerate a Latin American, or a U.S., or an OAS trusteeship in that sense. I think they would insist on being sovereign. They would listen to advice but they would not subordinate their authority to any group of foreigners as a practical matter.

So, what we are trying to do is to get a provisional government that can maintain law and order and control the situation; then, give them the support and keep the inter-American force there for a certain period of time to make sure that they get a good head start toward elections. Perhaps even through the election period we might have to keep the force there.

ELECTIONS AS A CURE-ALL

Senator MUNDT. Are you quite convinced in your own mind, Tom, that this happy phrase "elections" is a cure-all for everything? It seems to me when we talk about elections we have to think about the electorate. They can't have an election someplace in Africa as we do it in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. You admit our election last year was awfully good.

Senator MUNDT. When you talk about elections you have to think about the election procedure. I am not convinced in my own mind that you can wave the happy wand of elections around and solve everything. Who is going to vote and under what terms? I want to know that.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think elections in the Dominican Republic within the next 12 months are a rather risky thing from the standpoint of the possible emergence of a Communist force, but I don't think we really have much choice except to use the influence we have, as best we can, to make it work.

It is true, Senator, that some of the countries in the world today are not really prepared for a New England townhall-type of democracy. What we are trying to do is go down this road step by step in the hope that eventually we can establish democratic traditions and that they would grow and flourish.

I am not prepared to tell you that they are going to succeed in every case. I believe it is going to be two steps forward and one step back. That is the history of it.

Senator MUNDT. One final question: At what stage——

Mr. MANN. I wouldn't want to leave the impression with you that I think everthing is going to be settled when we get a provisional government set up. I don't think that is the case. But we are hopeful that it will be one step forward; it will be progress.

BEYOND THE REALM OF REALISM

Senator MUNDT. Is it beyond the realm of realism that you could find a provisional government which, instead of resisting the assistance of the select committee of Latin American states, would invite them in and say, "Look, we need your help and your counsel and your support; what you can do to help us develop this?"

Mr. MANN. Actually we do have plans to send down under OAS auspices Rodrigo Gomez, who is the best central banking expert in Mexico, to help them get their financial and fiscal policies in order. We have talked to him about this. We have in mind enlisting the cooperation of CIAP under Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria to go down and help them on their development program. We have in mind consulting with the provisional government—in fact, arrangements are already made if the present candidate does emerge—on identification of dangerous Communists and on the question of how to deal with them.

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you one final question.

You either have or a representative of part of the government has completed adulation of the capacity of elections to cover everything at every place at every time.

THE PHILIPPINE FORMULA

At what stage in American history did we abandon the Philippine formula which we used so successfully to develop a showcase of an independent democracy in the Philippines? We did it, not by holding elections prematurely, but denying them autonomy and election and knocking down Aguinaldo and all their rebels until they were ready to do it. This worked like a charm. The best illustration of decolonization made in the U.S.A., we conducted it. I don't know whether Republicans, Democrats, or both; I suspect it was both. It took a long time, but it worked. We have discarded it.

Can you tell me from your rich background of American State Department policy when we abandoned it and why?

Mr. MANN. I would say that the first step toward abandonment took place in 1932, I believe it was, at the Montevideo conference, where the United States accepted for the first time the abandonment of unilateral intervention by the United States in Latin American internal affairs.

I think that it was since 1932—it could have been 1932-34, somewhere in there—and then progressively under Latin American insistence, that this concept has been strengthened in treaty obligations built around the doctrines of nonintervention and self-determination, whereby we immediately and totally abandoned the practice of intervention of the unilateral type.

Senator MUNDT. Around the world, including Latin America.

Mr. MANN. No, sir; this is basically a hemisphere doctrine. We don't have the same treaty obligations regarding nonintervention in other parts of the world that we have in this hemisphere.

Senator MUNDT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one point I wanted to refer to, particularly since we have Mr. Vaughn here.

CABLES TO THE AMBASSADOR

Mr. Vaughn, when this broke out were you in charge of the cables, instructions that were going to and from, communications with the Ambassador in the Dominican Republic in April?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, this responsibility is always shared, depending on the nature of the message, whether the office director is the one who approves the transmission or takes action on his own, using his own judgment, or whether I do or it goes on up to Mr. Mann or to the Secretary or to the White House. So, it is——

The CHAIRMAN. But you were aware of everything that went back and forth, whether or not you made the final decision; is that right?

Mr. VAUGHN. With the exception of the period 2 days before that Saturday, when I was not in town.

The CHAIRMAN. On April 27 were you in town? April 27, that was 3 days after. It started on April 24.

Mr. VAUGHN. April 27? I got back on Sunday, April 25.

The CHAIRMAN. That is April 25.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

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AMBASSADOR'S AUTHORITY TO MEDIATE

The CHAIRMAN. The previous testimony indicated Mr. Bennett said on April 27 when he was requested to mediate that he had no authority to mediate. Do you know about that?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your opinion he did not have authority to mediate?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, and our basic job was not one of mediation. We were certainly prepared to extend, and did repeatedly use, our good offices.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference? What in your mind is the difference between using your good offices and mediation?

Mr. VAUGHN. Mediation, in my opinion, is one step further than good offices, because it is more formal, and there is a consensus or an agreement on the part of the opposing factions that there will be a mediator who can try to resolve the differences.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have authority to use his good offices?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, indeed he did.

APPROACH BY MOLINA

The CHAIRMAN. Why didn't he use his good offices when Molina Urena approached him on April 27 to try to bring about a truce and negotiation?

Mr. VAUGHN. He did. To the best of my knowledge, he did use his good offices all the way through, but Molina was not interested. Molina considered himself the boss, and he wanted Wessin to come to him since he was in control as the provisional head of the government, so it was rather difficult to deal with Molina.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. VAUGHN. For that reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Molina approached him. He didn't approach Molina. I thought Molina, from the testimony, was in the position of requesting assistance from Ambassador Bennett. I don't know other than what we have had, it wouldn't—normally a man who is out requesting assistance isn't difficult to deal with. So, he thought the thing was in bad shape.

Mr. VAUGHN. Was this after——

The CHAIRMAN. When Molina came to the Embassy on April 27. That was a Tuesday.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Wessin's tanks had not yet, I think, taken themselves out, and he indicated he thought that the situation was very bad for his side. He was asking for, I thought, using his good offices to try to save the situation.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

AMBASSADOR TRIED REPEATEDLY TO MAKE PEACE

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I ask you particularly about this is that the testimony from others has indicated that there possibly was a good opportunity here to use the good offices to settle this matter, at least not settle it permanently, but to bring about a cease-fire and negotiation.

Do you have any comment to make on it?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes, I do.

I think Ambassador Bennett told you that he did use his good offices repeatedly to try to get the two opposing factions together and to stop the bloodshed and to make peace in the form of a truce. Attempts were frustrated on several occasions by rebel activities when he succeeded in getting the air force to stop strafing. It was not just one particular incident. It was on repeated occasions that both Ambassador Bennett and other officers of the Embassy sought a truce.

The CHAIRMAN. On this particular day, you feel that he did not wish to use his good offices becasue he did not think that Molina Urena was the proper person; is that a fair statement?

Mr. VAUGHN. My interpretation of what happened that day and preceding days was that Ambassador Bennett, and the attachés and the Embassy staff, tried to get the opposing factions to stop shooting and to come together and talk. We have seen no indication anywhere that this wasn't the case, that this wasn't the Ambassador's intention.

SENTIMENT AGAINST PERSECUTION OF COMMUNISTS

The CHAIRMAN. A while ago, someone, I believe it was Senator Clark, referred to Juan Bosch's article here. I have another article of July from a magazine called War and Peace Report.

I would just like your comment on this statement. This is Bosch writing:

> If there weren't enough Communists to take power there was, on the other hand, a strong sentiment against persecution of the Communists. This feeling developed because during this long tyranny Trujillo always accused his adversaries of being Communists. Because of that anticommunism and Trujilloism ended up being equivalent terms in the Dominican political vocabulary.

Do you think that is an accurate, reasonable statement?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, I don't, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not.

Mr. VAUGHN. It is not, in my opinion.

OPPRESSION BY THE POLICE AND ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN [reading].

> Moreover the instruments of oppression by the police and the armed forces remained the same in 1963 with the same men who had served under Trujillo.

Is that accurate?

Mr. VAUGHN. I don't think it is. The steps taken by Reid Cabral to curb the power, influence, and corruption of the armed forces, I think, were effective, although not completely. He had a great deal more to do. But I don't think that the repression and the arbitrary measures taken by the armed forces during the Trujillo days were continued anywhere near the same level during later regimes.

The CHAIRMAN. He says here:

> During the months of May and June of 1964 more than 1,000 members of the PRD * * *

Which as I understand it is his party——

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing to read].

Who had been accused of being Communists were in jail at one time.

Do you know whether that is accurate?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. On the whole you would say this article is not accurate, judging from what I have read to you.

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't Senator Clark ask you to comment on that other article?

Mr. VAUGHN. No, he asked Secretary Mann.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you take this one along and see what you think of it?

Mr. VAUGHN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. What magazine is that?

The CHAIRMAN. War and Peace Report.

QUESTION OF WHO IS A COMMUNIST

I don't know of anything further. The questions of judgment as to who is a Communist and who is not a Communist is a pretty difficult thing. It is anywhere, isn't it, particularly in a chaotic situation like that?

Mr. VAUGHN. Unless, sir, your man has a record——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. VAUGHN [continuing]. Of having been trained in Cuba, having visited China. These are the people we are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are fairly clear.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I would like to say that, for me, the definition of a Communist is not difficult at all. A Communist is a member of an organization which is under the discipline and control of the Communist apparatus.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't say definition. What I had in mind was identification of people who could tell whether or not they are difficult, people that you don't know thoroughly is all I am talking about.

Mr. MANN. I think there are a great many people who, let's say, are liberal or leftist, and are not members of an apparatus, and who are incorrectly called Communists by rightist extremists. But I don't think this should confuse any of us.

Senator MUNDT. Actually, if a man is under control or the influence or the domination of the Communists, does it make any difference whether he belongs to the party or not if he is carrying out their modus operandi?

Mr. MANN. We use the words "fellow traveler" to mean somebody who goes along and supports. But the word "Communist," at least in the sense that the State Department uses it and I use it, certainly is a member of the apparatus just as you would say a Republican is a member of the organization called the Republican Party and a Democrat is a member of a party called the Democratic Party.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, I wonder if I might put in the record a copy of a statement which I handed to you the other day,

and which I think clarifies a lot of the questions that took place earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. And then we were asked to put in comments on an article by Theodore Draper called "The Roots of the Dominican Crisis." This has been prepared by staff members, and with your permission, I will put this in the record to comply with that request.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; we would like to have that.

Mr. MANN. Then we have some more brief comments on Mr. Marder's article in the Washington Post of June 27, 1965, which I would like to put in the record.

Then we have some information here about U.S. imports of Dominican sugar which we were also asked to supply for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MANN. It is just one page; I will put that in also.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much.

The committee is adjourned.

Mr. MANN. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

FURTHER HEARINGS ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Long, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.

[William S. Gaud reviewed the problems involved in investment guaranties to United States copper interests in Chile.

On motion by Senator Clark, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nomination of Tom Killefer to be executive director of the Inter-American Development Bank, a reappointment.

The committee next considered the proposed consular convention with the Soviet Union (Ex. D, 88–2). After discussion, Senator Symington moved a vote on the question of reporting the convention to the Senate. The motion carried on a voice vote.

The committee discussed, without action, the resolution (S. Con. Res. 17), to express the sense of Congress against the persecution of persons by Soviet Russia because of their religion.

The committee next considered the resolutions (S. Con. Res. 22; S. Con. Res. 23; and H. Con. Res. 416), all relating to expressions on the peoples of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The resolutions were put over.

The committee considered proposals relating to its current conference with conferees from the House of Representatives on the bill (H.R. 7750), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.]

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CLARK. Can we spend a minute or two on the Dominican Republic inquiry?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. I would like to urge you—particularly since Wayne is here, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin America—I want to urge you not to shut that hearing off until we have made an effort to get [McGeorge] Bundy down and also John Bartlow Martin, and in due course when he comes back, Ellsworth Bunker. It seems to me we have embarked on an investigation here, which is one way of running a railroad and it is your railroad as chairman so I don't have any strong dissent with what you have done.

We have heard nothing except administration witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Except Muñoz.

Senator CLARK. Except Muñoz, who is really very favorably disposed.

Senator CASE. Muñoz Marin?

The CHAIRMAN. I wouldn't say it was that way. Assumptions, assuming he was right.

Senator CLARK. He was very careful. I thought he gave us very useful testimony.

But here we have a situation where I think such cross-examination as some of us have been able to do pretty clearly established that the administration was not completely in accord on its position there, and one of the key fellows was Bundy. I don't think he agreed with Mann. I don't think Mann knew when Bundy was going down there. When he got down there, I think Bundy wanted to do things that Mann didn't want to do. Bundy, to be sure, failed but to me the thing is just full of obscurities and inconsistencies between the testimony of Mann and Vance and Vaughn and Muñoz Marin and Rusk. It seems to me we ought to try to get some of those things cleaned up a little bit before we make a decision as to whether we want to make a report, or if you don't want to see a report made, unquestionably a minority or majority report, if you want to handle it by saying you are going to make a major speech on the subject and letting us who wish to do so.

My own view is you haven't got the whole story out of the administration witnesses. Frank Church suggested we call some of these reporters who were active, and Hick didn't want to do that and you didn't want to do that. I supported Church.

PRESENT A BALANCED PICTURE

But if we get the testimony of Bunker, Martin, and Bundy, then it seems to me those of us who want to try to present a balanced picture can take the published works. I just spent last night reading the article which Tad Szulc wrote in the Saturday Evening Post. I don't necessarily say he is the end-all and be-all, which he is not, but he makes so many points which are factually opposed to what the administration says. We all put a pretty big investment in this thing and time and effort, and I would like to see it—you can't keep it going forever, but it seems to me unless we get Bundy and Martin and eventually Bunker, we haven't any very good justification for saying we made a careful inquiry into this whole thing and now we are going to make our report and go on to something else.

Senator MORSE. I would like to supplement by saying I do think some of these correspondents ought to be brought in, including the Chicago Tribune correspondent who has been down there many years, who is on the other side, but who nevertheless has a point of view that you ought to listen to and find out—I quite agree they cannot dismiss these correspondents the way they are trying to dismiss them.

Senator CLARK. You have a problem as to how much time you are going to give to it in committee. I understand your point of view.

I think you ought to call some correspondents. I realize it is controversial. If you are not going to do that I will go along with you,

but I don't think you ought to shut it off when these names keep coming into the testimony all the time. I don't think Bundy has any right to claim executive privilege.

A CONFIDENTIAL SERVANT OF THE PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. But he does have a right to do it. At the very beginning, we wanted to hear Bundy and we have all run into this situation before. He is considered a confidential executive servant of the President. I don't think you could in court force him to come. We could ask him to come.

Senator MORSE. You can't force him.

Senator CLARK. I don't think so either.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to requesting him to come again if you want.

Senator CLARK. I think we ought to request in writing and have him claim executive privilege and drop it.

Senator MORSE. I think Rusk should be called.

Senator CLARK. Why should the Under Secretary of State come down here voluntarily all the time, the Deputy Secretary of Defense comes down here, and little old Bundy says, "Nuts to you, I am not going to come." If Johnson wants to tell him not to come, let's have Johnson tell him him not to come. I don't want Bundy making up his mind as to whether he wants to come or not.

[Off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I never want to stand in the way of a committee's desire.

Senator CLARK. I want to persuade you, one guy, two guys.

THEY HAVE THEIR STORY WELL IN HAND

The CHAIRMAN. I am perfectly willing to have them. I think they have their story pretty well in hand. They will all say the same thing, but if you can get anything out of them——

Senator CLARK. I would like to try.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see.

Senator MORSE. It is important to us to get their story. I don't care how much in collusion they are, because we have evidence from other sources and we are going to publicly discuss it.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say I don't mind having correspondents, but picking and choosing——

Senator CLARK. Why not start with Bunker and Martin?

The CHAIRMAN. I have not read that article. You have used that as a basis of questioning. You have got practically everything he is willing to say on the record, so you can use that as a basis for questioning.

Senator MORSE. That is a good way to start.

The CHAIRMAN. Who do you want to start with?

Senator CLARK. Martin and Bundy, chronologically.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BUNDY AND RUSK

The CHAIRMAN. Ask Martin; request Bundy and, as you say, make him plead executive privilege. Rusk can't do that, but there has always been recognized a difference between a confidential secretary and an official like Rusk.

Senator CLARK. I should think the President would want Bundy to come down.

The CHAIRMAN. Who do you want to start with?

Senator CLARK. Martin.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he here?

Mr. MARCY. I don't know where he is.

The CHAIRMAN. Find out where he is and see if they are available.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is busy writing an article.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, start with Martin and tentatively Bundy. If he can come, do you want Rusk along with Martin?

Senator CLARK. No, I would rather have them separate.

The CHAIRMAN. Have Rusk separate.

Senator CLARK. Martin will be back in 10 days. Presumably he said Bunker's mission is a failure.

The CHAIRMAN. Because of the time element, let's give the staff flexibility to have some of these meetings in the afternoon or morning or whenever we can get a meeting—a meeting along about the 12th.

Senator CLARK. Couldn't you do it a little before the 12th on one or two of these people?

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to be away until next Wednesday——

[Off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will try to get Martin, Rusk, and Bundy.

Senator CLARK. And eventually Bunker.

The CHAIRMAN. If he is still down there.

CALLING NEWSPAPER REPORTERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't have objection to calling newspaper people in here, providing if we are going to do it let's have all of them.

Senator MORSE. That is my point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let's have Tad Szulc, who is a special pleader and has a special ax to grind, and I think the same thing applies to Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune; they are both able writers. They both have spent a lot of time down there, but they both have different viewpoints. To get a newspaperman here unless we can get some kind of an idea about the source of material—I still think a lot of them will talk to one or two disgruntled people around and they will write a big story around it.

Senator MORSE. That is what we ought to ask. The difficulty, Bourke, of not having them is they influence public opinion. We ought to try to make some record that we can use with the public as to who did they talk to and what were their techniques.

The CHAIRMAN. When we really want it they will say, "We can't give our source."

Senator MORSE. All right, let them say it. Make the record on it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is one of the most specious alleged rights I know of.

Senator CLARK. Szulc, in this Saturday Evening Post article which Senator Gruening put in the record of few days ago, pretty nearly put in his sources. He talks about this, that, or the other guy and some of it is significant.

The CHAIRMAN. Use that as the basis of your questions. Presumably this is what he will testify about.

Senator CLARK. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. They have all written their statements.

All right, the staff will try to work that out as soon as we can.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee recessed to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Morse, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Aiken, and Case.

The committee considered S.J. Res. 32, to authorize a contribution to certain inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands for death and injury of persons, and for use of and damage to private property, arising from acts of the United States Armed Forces after August 15, 1945, and before April 28, 1952, and S.J. Res. 13, of identical title. The resolution, S.J. Res. 32, was ordered reported without objection.

The committee next considered the Gut Dam Claims Agreement with Canada (Ex. C, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.). The agreement was ordered reported without objection.

The committee next considered the bill (S. 1826), to amend Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 relating to certain claims against the Government of Cuba. The bill also was ordered reported without objection.

The committee next considered the bill (S. 1935), to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 relating to claims of American nationals settled by the United States-Polish Claims Agreement of July 16, 1960. After discussion, the bill was ordered reported without objection.

The committee then considered the bill (S. 2064), to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, relative to the return of certain alien property. The bill was also ordered reported without objection.

Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg discussed with the committee financing problems at the United Nations.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 1965

THURSDAY, AUGUST 12, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Case.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Kuhl of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have the Secretary and Mr. Bell here this morning to discuss the aid program and the difficulty we have encountered with the House.

Mr. Secretary, you have a statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID E. BELL, AID ADMINISTRATOR

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I have some very brief comments indeed on three of the issues which apparently are involved in the present situation. I welcome the opportunity to discuss with this committee matters relating to the conference on the foreign aid authorization bill. I would hope that today's discussion may be of assistance in resolving the matters at issue between the Senate and the House.

First, let me express the appreciation of the administration for the hard work that both Houses of the Congress have devoted to the passage of the foreign aid bill. We very much appreciate the burden which the Congress—and particularly the committees directly involved—must bear each year in order to carry forward this vital program. This is reflected in the hearings, the debate on the floor, and in the conference committee. We share the desire that ways may be found to lighten this burden on all of us in the future.

It is our understanding that agreement has been reached on nearly all issues in the conference committee. We are pleased that the conferees have approved most recommendations of the administration.

The final sum authorized—$3.36 billion—is nearly $100 million less than requested. In view of possible emergency needs in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, it may be necessary to request supplemental sums later on.

THREE AREAS OF CONCERN

As to the issues remaining to be resolved, it is clear that these involve foreign aid in future years, not in fiscal year 1966. Therefore, it may be useful if I comment briefly on the thinking of the administration and proposals which it intends to make in three areas at issue in conference and of concern to your committee. They are: multi-year authorization, a study of the present program, and use of multilateral channels.

As you know, the current multi-year authorization for development loans and Alliance for Progress loans and grants will expire at the end of fiscal year 1966. The administration expects to request that the multi-year principle adopted by the Congress in 1961 and 1962 for development lending be extended to include all other authorizations contained in the foreign aid bill to be proposed early in the next session of the Congress.

A multi-year authorization would serve to reemphasize the continuing U.S. commitment to assist sound development efforts in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It would reduce the waste of manpower, inefficiency, and interruptions inherent in a program which is authorized from year to year, and it would relieve both the Congress and the executive branch of the burden of yearly consideration of an authorization bill.

The administration is prepared to make a full presentation to the authorizing committees each year, as they may request. We shall, of course, make a full presentation to the Congress of the proposed program in conjunction with the annual appropriations bill.

OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN AID PLANNING COMMITTEE

The executive branch has already expressed its position on the Foreign Aid Planning Committee. The reasons for our opposition are contained in the position paper transmitted to the conferees: a break in the continuity of the program; uncertainty about U.S. purposes and goals; ambiguity as to the roles of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, as well as ambiguity regarding the responsibility of the executive and legislative branches.

However, we recognize the concern of this committee and the Senate about the future content and direction of the foreign aid program. We would be very pleased to assist, in any way we could, any studies undertaken by the two legislative committees. In addition, the executive branch, prompted by these congressional concerns, will conduct a special study of the program, giving particular attention to the issues raised by this committee: the number of countries receiving assistance, the requirements for assistance and the prospects for achieving our objectives and terminating assistance, the contribution of other developed countries, and the appropriate relationships between bilateral and multilateral assistance.

ENLARGING AID RESOURCES

On March 9, I appeared before this committee in support of the foreign aid bill. At that time, I restated the position of the administration, as expressed in the President's foreign aid message, on the subject of multilateral aid. I said:

The executive branch and the Congress are in agreement on the desirability of enlarging the resources available to international aid-giving agencies on the basis of cost-sharing among the advanced countries.

This is still our policy. Since March, we have expressed our support for, and actively participated in, the formation of the Asian Development Bank. We have continued to support increased use of World Bank consultative groups and the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, CIAP. We understand that the World Bank has in mind an effort to enlarge the resources of the International Development Association, and we expect to work with the Bank to that end. We support an expansion of the World Food Program and an increased annual target for the U.N. Development Program.

We have again asked that the Appropriations Committees remove the prohibition in the appropriations act on the use of the authority of Section 205 of the Foreign Assistance Act. If that ban is removed, we would propose to use the authority to seek to induce additional contributions to the IDA over and above regular contributions agreed to in the course of the IDA pledging process.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this brief statement has been helpful to the committee and that my statement and the answers which Mr. Bell and I may give to your questions will assist in a successful resolution of the remaining matters at issue in the Senate-House conference committee.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Bell, do you want to add anything to that at this time?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

MULTI-YEAR AUTHORIZATION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I guess you know what the problem is. We have had a number of meetings, I think 12, with the House. The point of disagreement is this multi-year authorization. The conferees, four of whom are here this morning, have stood fast on that.

I would like to hear from some of the others, particularly the Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. I would like to make a brief statement to the Secretary and Mr. Bell.

I don't think this is the appropriate time this morning to debate with these gentlemen substantive differences over foreign aid. You know very well what my differences are.

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

So, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to confine myself to a statement in regard to procedural problems I want to raise with the Secretary and with the Director.

To you, sir, I want to say, as I mentioned before I came in here, I am presenting at the Labor Committee this morning an administration amendment to a very difficult matter we have in connection with 14(b).[1] I called before I came in here and begged them to

[1] The "right to work" provisions of the Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Relations Act.

postpone it to the last possible minute so I can stay here just as long as I can, but if they call, I have to go over to present the amendment and try to get the bill out at the session this morning.

But to the Secretary and Mr. Bell, I want to say that in the last 2 years I have filed minority views in connection with the foreign aid bill. Others will have to speak for themselves, but my interpretations and my minority views of the last 2 years have had a sufficient impact on the Senate of the United States—so that it greatly influenced the adoption of the Morse amendment this year, both by this committee and by a substantial vote in the Senate of the United States.

I don't know how one can run up a warning flag more noticeably than that. This administration, I think, must face the fact that the adoption of the Morse amendment this year, both by this committee and by the Senate, is a very serious warning that foreign aid, on the basis of its present status, is losing ground in the Congress. Each one can make his own interpretation, but I am satisfied it is losing ground in the country.

I don't like it, because in spite of what you read to the contrary, the senior Senator from Oregon is not against foreign aid. I would like to have a foreign aid program, but I am not going to support a continuation of the present program for the reasons that I have set out in this minority report and in my many speeches in the Senate.

I am not engaging in any quarrel over the content of those speeches this morning. But it was following my minority report two years ago that Mr. Tom Mann and an associate—I wish my memory was better—I wish you would find out who it was he brought up—one of the associates, I think, Mr. Bell, from your organization. I may be wrong. It is your organization or State. He said—and I paraphrase him, but accurately—paraphrase both of them. They said:

> We are disturbed by your minority report. We would be less than honest if we didn't tell you it gives us great trouble, because there is a lot of merit in a lot of it. And we would like to have a series of conferences with you this fall, before another foreign aid bill is sent up here, to see it we cannot iron out some differences and reach some understandings as to how these matters can be corrected in the next foreign aid bill.

I said, "That is fine, except for one thing. You cannot meet with me alone. Not that I would not be happy to meet with you alone, but I think is a committee problem. And I think this is fine. I think we ought to have a series of informal conferences before you come up formally, and I think all members of the Foreign Relations Committee should be invited to participate in those conferences."

They completely agreed.

Now, I am not blaming anyone, but the fact is that that program has not been worked out. And I think that is part of our mistake.

A MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY

I know how busy you people are. But so are we. We have a mutal responsibility. We ought to try to keep as closely together as we can and not let these broad differences develop between us—and they exist at the present time.

As the chairman knows, I have been critical of the commitee as a committee, too, because I have felt, as you will find in my minority

reports, that the committee has been willing to leave it up to you people in the State Department and the AID organization to correct some of the misgivings and fears of the committee rather than have the committee take its own corrective action. I have urged that the Foreign Relations Committee ought to adopt the necessary amendments if they believe that there are shortcomings in the AID program.

This year I filed my second minority report. As far as I am concerned, there has been only token consideration of the criticisms that these reports have represented on the part of the State Department or the AID people, but that is your privilege. You have that perfect right under our system of separation of powers.

Now we are headed for another year. Anyone around this table that thinks there is any chance of our getting a foreign aid bill out of the House conferees with the Morse amendment in it or with the two year authorization—I fully expect capitulation on the part of the Senate conferees. I will be critical of them when they do it. I shall not join them. I shall not sign that conference report. I shall oppose it on the floor of the Senate and continue to oppose it in other forums in this country.

But that is not the way in my judgment, may I say as an old mediator, to try to get together. If we have a common objective, then we ought to try to work out some procedural understandings that will make it possible for us to reach that goal. And what do I suggest by way of those procedures?

If it is true that Tom Mann represented the point of view—that is, the point of view downtown—I think, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Director, between now and next January we ought to try on an informal basis to work out some resolutions of our differences.

INFORMAL CONFERENCES

Where I am wrong, those informal conferences ought to be able to point it out, and I undoubtedly am wrong on some points—not to my present knowledge, but I undoubtedly am. Where you are wrong—and I think those conferences would persuade you that you are wrong, because this committee is of one mind in regard to some of these matters—I think it would be helpful before you send up the next bill.

You say, Mr. Secretary, in your statement this morning, if I interpret it correctly, that we can, as we know we can, count on you and the Director for cooperation in connection with any study that may be undertaken by the committees. I don't think the House committee is particularly interested in the type of study that the Senate committee has been talking about. At those informal conferences we might reach an understanding for a thorough study—and I use the word "study" and not "investigation"—of the foreign aid program in respect to the particular points on which there is disagreement with you people, at least on the part of some of us here in the committee.

FIRING OF AID STAFF

Let me mention, not substantively but because it relates to the procedural point I want to mention, or it has some substantive factors in it—one of the arguments that was constantly being made in our conferences by the House people was my proposal would mean a wholesale firing of AID people and that it would create such a blow to the morale down there, they would have no idea whether or not they are going to have a job after 1967, which would make it difficult for you to get competent people. I think there is something to that argument, but I think we ought to be able to work out an understanding to remove that fear by making it perfectly clear that we are not going to do away with foreign aid beginning with fiscal 1967—we are going to have a reformed program beginning in 1967.

I do think, as the chairman has as the last point in the memorandum that the staff has handed members of the committee here this morning, there is a great concern of the overstaffing of AID missions. I hear it wherever I go. I do think we have got to come to grips with the overstaffing in AID.

If we can enter into an understanding that the investigating committee, if you have one, is stopped from making any recommendations for reducing the number of people working for AID because of the morale effect it might have on AID—I think there is a need for a great cut in the staff. But be that as it may, this is the kind of problem that we ought to be able to work out in informal conferences.

One other point, and then I will be through.

MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA

I don't see how you expect that you can maintain public support for AID if we yield to Pakistan and India, for example, in connection with the military aid they are asking for.

A report in the paper this morning said Pakistan is going to go to Russia and ask for MIG's if they cannot get our fighters. My answer is, "Go to Moscow, get your MIG's."

I happen to believe that one of our serious problems in foreign aid is all the good we do under our economic aid program is destroyed by the bad we do under our military aid program. And I don't think you are going to be able to sell military aid at the level you are now selling it very much longer, because I don't think the public is going to buy it. I don't think the public is going to buy building up India and Pakistan for war or building up Greece and Turkey for war—and we have discussed it around this table at great length. I think we have got to come to grips with the military aid program.

WHAT TO DO WITH MILITARY AID

But that raises, gentlemen, a great controversy within this split, where we are a split committee over what to do with military aid. Some of us are very much of the opinion that you just cannot separate military aid from foreign policy. In some parts of the world, I happen to think that military aid determines what our foreign policy is, and I don't propose to let the Pentagon building deter-

mine our foreign policy. No one has said more frequently and been more ardent about it than I have, that I want my Secretary of State to be the Secretary of State, and I don't want military aid to be wagging American foreign policy. I think it is in India and Pakistan and Greece and Turkey and some other parts of the world, too.

These are some of the substantive differences that exist. I don't propose to more than mention them here.

I incorporate, Mr. Chairman, by reference, every criticism of foreign aid I have made in my two minority reports and criticism I have added to them in my speeches. I am pleading that we some way, somehow, work out a procedure with Secretary Rusk and Mr. Bell, that we try to resolve these differences to the extent we can, prior to next January 1. Maybe we can agree among us on the kind of group that can be selected to conduct a survey of foreign aid.

The alternative, of course, and you have a perfect right to do it within the committee and the Department—"all right, Morse is entitled to his views, let him go ahead and express them, and we are going to follow the course of action we want to follow without any further consideration to the procedures he has mentioned." As a lawyer, I would respect your right to do that and would proceed to meet it in opposition.

All I want—and I was the one, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Bell, as the Chairman will tell you, that suggested we ought to get together with you before our next meeting with the House to see if there is any indication on the part of you two gentlemen that you are willing to try to work out between now and January 1 any agreement that we can reach as to how we can reduce at least the impact of the criticisms that those of us who have been criticizing foreign aid will be making again next year if the basis for the criticism is not removed.

That is all I am going to say, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you wish to say anything at this time?

MULTI-YEAR AUTHORIZATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like a little clarification on page 2 of the Secretary's statement. The three areas—multi-year authorization, a study of the present program, the use of multi-channels—do I understand that it is your position, or the administration position, that you affirmatively support multi-year authorization, support a study of the present program in principle, and support the use of multilateral channels?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, the big controversy here that has been going on is a multi-year authorization controversy, and this may be the wrong place to talk about that.

I am not enthusiastic about the multi-year authorization, but I have gone along with it. I will support the Chairman on it, but I am not enthusiastic.

In the committee, I tend to believe we ought to look at it every year from an authorization standpoint, so if we want a change in the authorization bill, we could do that. But be that as it may, I am

supporting the multi-year authorization—at least up to this point. I don't see any particular change in the immediate offing.

I personally think that we have almost got to have a study of this program. I am not wedded to the idea of a big combination administration and congressional committee on this thing. In the first place, I think it will bog down with other things other people have to do.

I go back to what we did, which was started by Senator Fulbright at one time. We had this worldwide study. I think there is something to that approach if we can get somebody to do it.

A CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM

I think it is a congressional problem to study this. The administration studies it all the time. I think if we are going to be able to make up our minds independently—that is not that we are in conflict or in harmony, but we have an independent responsibility here. If we are going to make up our own minds, I think we have got to do it. I don't particularly like this idea of mixing up Presidential appointments with part of the committee and the House and the Senate. We will never get anyplace on that kind of a committee, in my judgment, that is satisfactory.

But I don't think our committee is yet ready to undertake the responsibility of a worldwide survey on this as a committee. In the first place, you cannot get the people to do it. They have other things to do.

I would hope that we could pattern a study on the responsibility of this committee because of the manifest difficulties of getting a joint committee between the House and the Senate of the two committees. I would hope this committee would assume the responsibility, and the Chairman can't do it, the committee can't do it, unless the committee members are willing to do it themselves.

I think there ought to be a study program, and it ought to be intensive, and it ought to be started at once; that is, just as soon as we can get out of the woods here in the legislative business. But I can also see the practical impossibilities of that.

Now, the use of multilateral channels, to a limited extent I agree with that, but I can only go about so far on that. I think we have certain responsibilities that have to be bilateral.

We could settle a lot of these things in conference within 10 minutes if we could settle the question of multi-year or single year authorization. I don't know how we are going to solve that. Something has to give someplace.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I make a very brief remark?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

AN AGREED FRAMING OF THE ISSUES

Secretary RUSK. I would like to take into account what both Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Morse have said. I would hope I can have the privilege, if any of this is to be included in a report, of perhaps deleting certain portions of my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. That record is not going to be published.

Secretary RUSK. All right.

I did not suggest with precision what might be the next step in terms of multi-year authorization. It might be after studying it that the different parts of the program might have different periods of time. And second, I need not say to those sitting at this table that we do need to be in very close touch with the other body of the Congress on this matter, to take that into account, in terms of what proposals are made.

Quite frankly, I am myself very much interested in the discussion of a study and Senator Morse's remarks on that subject. It seems to me one of the first steps—we perhaps ought to try to do this before the Congress adjourns in this session—is to try to get in effect an agreed framing of the issues that need study, take up some of the key points which have been brought up in minority reports and expressed by Senators on the floor and in this committee.

If we had with more precision the central points which need examination, then this committee and the House committee and the executive branch could proceed as best they themselves decide as how they would want to look at it from their point of view. But I would also hope that at least at a staff level, if not beyond that, there could be a continual give and take and exchange of ideas in connection with those studies.

A COMBINED LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE STUDY

Quite frankly, one of the problems that I have—and I don't want to put words in the President's mouth—about the combined legislative-executive study is that I know that President Johnson, perhaps to a rather unusual degree, considers that the Government of the United States includes both the executive and legislative branch. I have known a number of occasions where he does not wish to make his own judgment as President until he has a full understanding of what the judgment is at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Therefore, I don't think the President's appointees ought to be an integral part of the legislative appointees in a way that would somehow commit the President before he knows what the legislative view is.

Now, therefore, in connection with Senator Hickenlooper's remarks about the merger of these groups, I can see considerable advantage in the legislature studying this in any way that you gentlemen would wish, the executive studying, and then the President's proposals can take into account both these studies with the fullest cooperation in terms of staff, for example, so that we can try to resolve some of these very far reaching issues which Senator Morse and others have raised, and which the committee has discussed at great length. So, I would hope that we could get on with this study, because we agree that it is needed.

ELICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS

On the multi-year authorization, we would like to be in a better position than we are now to elicit contributions from others. Gene Black, in connection with the billion dollar Asian Development Bank, has indicated that we might be ready to put in $200 million. And the Asian countries themselves have come up with another

$200 million. And we are hoping that European countries would come in with a substantial part of the remainder.

Now, this is multiplying the American dollar many-fold. It may be that we might want on other occasions to make some funds available to one of these international agencies without that kind of matching, but to use this to entice other resources forward is a very, very stimulating and powerful weapon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE COMMITTEE IS SPLIT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it is all very well to talk about the study and so on, but in your own experience you have seen that this committee is split, first, on what should be done, and it is almost impossible to get them to give time to this program. I do not know, as a practical matter, what to do with this. In my own views about it—I am unable to convince the committee that my views are correct—many of my own views, and I have no success with the House.

I have the feeling that the House will not agree with us, partly for an irony; that is, they have nothing else to do but foreign aid, and they want to make a life's work of it, every year. It is not because of the merits of our arguments. They simply do not wish to give up an annual review of this, because they have nothing else to do. And so you cannot argue about this. It has nothing to do with the merits of any proposal.

I am completely frustrated about this bill. I do not feel that I want to make a life's work of foreign aid which does not result in anything very constructive. Today the way they approach it, as we see in Brazil, is not a way I particularly approve of. But I do not know what to do about it.

And our members, seven of our members are on this Finance Committee, and only when Finance is not meeting will they come to this committee. Then if they are called upon to vote, the time comes for voting.

I see no improvement in the substantive way the program is carried out. I do not know what to do about it. It is the most frustrating legislation I have had anything to do with.

THE MILITARY HAS MORE VOTES

This committee does not agree with me—the Senator from Oregon does not—about the military. I do not think he has any real control over it. We tried to cut it this year, and when it came to a showdown, the military had more votes than we did, and had their way. I voted to cut it back to this year's same amount, but when it came to a showdown, they had more votes than we did, even as to the amounts. We certainly do not have much influence on the way they use it, even though we have it here.

Whenever they want additional money, they go get it. They got $700 million through another committee. They can get any amount they want.

This is just a gesture, what is in here, about the military part of it. If they needed $2 billion, $5 billion, $10 billion, they would go

through the other committee, and they use it in the foreign field. The Senator from Oregon knows that.

Senator MORSE. They would go much further if you didn't have what check you do have. You have more check than you think you have. If you give it up entirely, they will run away with the ball; there would not be a team against them.

The CHAIRMAN. They do exactly as they please now. Not only as to how they use it, but as to the amount. We had a good illustration of that earlier this year when the committee voted to keep it at this year's level, and they got busy—the Secretary of Defense got busy, and they introduced a motion to reconsider, and the Senator knows what happened.

Senator MORSE. If they had had to come to us in the first place, they would have asked for more in the first place.

The CHAIRMAN. They subsequently got $700 million in addition to that. So it was an idle gesture. The whole thing was running in circles.

WHO WILL VOLUNTEER TO STUDY THE ISSUE?

But fundamentally, this committee, the major number are not interested in its examining or trying to study foreign aid. We have a maximum here this morning. We have seven members. That is almost the maximum. We rarely have over five when we have the consideration of this bill.

Now, who here would volunteer to serve on a committee to give this a real study? Well, there is one. Anybody else? Two. Put that down. Note that—three.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am willing to give time to it, but I want the terms of reference laid out a little bit more.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe a subcommittee of this committee—or we have these who volunteered.

Senator GORE. I was volunteering to serve with you.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not volunteer. I am getting too old to spend the rest of my life on foreign aid when I cannot influence it at all.

Senator MORSE. You do influence it.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not influenced it an iota.

TOO MANY COUNTRIES SPREAD TOO THIN

There are two or three things I mentioned on this key country—I agree with the Senator from Oregon, too many countries spread too thin. I have not noticed at all the slightest inclination to influence it in the administration. I think they are in 82. In South America, I would like to see them give much more relatively to Brazil—if necessary, take it away from others. I do not know whether that is necessary, that is a matter of judgment, how much money they have involved.

But even in Brazil, I would much rather see more given to technical assistance and the infrastructure, housing, water, sewer, and transportation, which would give the basis for private enterprise to operate. Instead of that, a very large part of it goes to projects that have nothing to do with the infrastructure—its specific industrialization, which ought to be done by private enterprise, which will not build water, sewer, and roads.

We have talked about this for ages, emphasis on technical assistance. This is not the way the emphasis is being given now. And we have talked about it after year. This program is so big, and they have their own views, and they go on and do as they please. They have for years.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

NEGLECTED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not think that should be limited to Latin America or Brazil. Many times we have neglected the real down-to-earth part of the aid program, and that is the technical assistance, or the old Point Four Program.

The CHAIRMAN. We have said this year after year. Have you noticed any results?

Senator SPARKMAN. No. In fact, it seems to me we have been getting away from it. I remember back a few years ago, a great deal used to be said about these impact programs. I think we have given entirely too much attention to impact programs, rather than getting it to the root, to develop ideas and surveys of resources so that private industry would have an incentive to move in and do the impact program work.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know how to influence them. It has been year after year after year. Because of the time this takes, those who give time to this at least have no time to do anything else, some of which are much more interesting and maybe more fruitful than this is. This is an interesting program, an important program, but it is not the only program.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that next year is going to be a very interesting year for me. I would gladly volunteer for the service, except that I do not expect to spend much time here.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS

Senator SYMINGTON. I would be glad to get into a study of this. I would like to say this, Mr. Chairman, and then I have to go to another meeting that I promised sometime back to be at— a couple of bills on the Armed Services Committee. I always go over there a little chastened, to the Armed Services Committee, after hearing some of the comments around here.

But the one thing that worries me in this program, Mr. Secretary, if I may just say a word and then I will go, is this heavy expansion in the multilateral field, as against the balance of payments problems, and whether or not you—I do not know, maybe gold does not mean anything, maybe it is good for us to get rid of our gold; maybe if we continue to incur these contingent liabilities against gold—but it seems to me this is a very optimistic and broad program, if at the same time we are correctly informed by the Secretary of Defense and the President that there are going to be heavy additional military expenditures. One reason that I would be so anxious to see a 2-year program is to perhaps get better correlation on the whole question of fiscal policy and fiscal responsibility.

Has there been any study made of how the widening of these soft windows, for example, et cetera, how that is going to affect the balance of payments position?

Secretary RUSK. We have studied that regularly, Senator Symington. I do think, however, that one of the points which could well be looked at in much greater depth is just this point, because this is not just a question of aid and whether 85 percent of aid is in the form of goods and services and that kind of thing. These intermesh also with trade relationships, and it goes far beyond just the narrow aid relationship. I should think this is a point that needs considerable clarification in connection with the study that we have in mind.

I would hope that we could identify—not necessarily agree on the answers—but we could identify quite early, this month, the key points that need thorough examination about the aid program, in effect the sort of terms of reference that Senator Hickenlooper mentioned, so that we could concentrate the time of busy people on those things which go to the heart of the matter. I should think the gold problem is one of those.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not think there is a better illustration anywhere in the world of the importance of technical assistance as against sewers and buildings and roads than this Brazil picture. I was more impressed with that than anything on the trip in this field. That part, I think, is very important.

DEEP FISCAL TROUBLE

My final thought is I think we are in very deep trouble for the fiscal and monetary position. I think we are in deeper trouble than most people are willing to say publicly, including people like Bill Martin and Al Hays. One speech cost a great many people a good many billions of dollars, because he pointed out we might get ourselves in trouble if we continue to operate on this basis.

I do not think you can win a war as we did in the past, but I do think we will have complete destruction of our way of life if our situation blows up. I do not think our production capacity and GNP have anything to do with it at all, relatively speaking, as against this problem of obligations in gold.

If this program goes through, you are going—in addition to tremendous problems that are incident to balance of payments, it will be automatic, regardless of all the empirical projections about it, as a result of your heavy additional military action abroad. In addition to that, you are opening up an obvious heavy additional contingent liability problem directly pertinent to the balance of payments in your aid program. I do not know whether this economy can stand it, no matter how big it is and how much better it is than any previous history of the world.

That is the kind of thing I would hope we would get into. It bears to a considerable extent on some thoughts of the Senator from Oregon. We have spent a lot of time on this. We do not agree on everything, but we certainly agree on the dangers incident to this aspect of it.

You are starting up a great new World Bank, you might say, in this Asian bank. I heard Mr. Black develop it. It is going to be fine,

but is the compromise in Korea—well, it is a good Freudian slip—is the compromise in South Vietnam going to be a half a billion dollar aid program and a lot of new buildings, or the Mekong Valley. And the next time it comes up again, we go through the same thing. We end up in the same position in a new country. How long can this go on before this economy cannot stand it?

CUTS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, in this very private and frank discussion, let me make a comment about technical assistance, which I think helps to illustrate the problem about consensus and the kind of osmosis that we have in the give and take—the influence that you exercise in this committee by that osmotic process.

I personally am very strongly in favor of technical assistance, partly because we have a great deal that is unique to offer in this field. I also have seen in 10 years in a private organization that spent 50 years in technical assistance in Latin America, results that can be accomplished with little investment.

But this committee took $15 million off the technical assistance budget for Latin America. So if we talk this out, and we get an understanding of where we go on this, I think we could get a clearer view of a joint executive-legislative understanding.

Senator MORSE. That is true, Mr. Secretary, but you have to also look at the parliamentary strategic position we find ourselves in here on the committee. I would say for myself—I would have voted for more if we could have gotten some substantial cuts elsewhere. But we had to take a look, finally, at where we could cut it down. And the desirability of cutting it down, in my judgment, was greater than the desirability of leaving your techical assistance at the level it was. We had a chance to do some cutting there, and so we cut.

I would have preferred to have increased it, but you have got a responsibility here—at least I have a responsibility, as I see it, of deciding how can I cut the total bill. If I cannot get the help that I need to cut it where I think the greater cuts ought to be made, such as in military aid and some of the countries that I thought ought to have been drastically cut, such as Pakistan, India, Greece, and Turkey—if I am going to accomplish anything at all, I have to support a cut here.

I only want to take a minute more, Mr. Chairman.

I have talked to Dr. Marcy, and unless the Chair or members of the committee object—I asked Dr. Marcy if he knows of any reason why the State Department and Mr. Bell should not have access to the staff memorandum. I would like to make the staff memorandum a part of the record, because I think it would be very helpful to Secretary Rusk.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is all right.

[The document referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
August 12, 1965.

STAFF MEMORANDUM

The committee decided to meet with Secretary Rusk and AID Director Bell when, after twelve sessions, the Senate-House conferees on aid had been unable to reach agreement on two issues—a 2-year authorization and the creation of a planning committee to conduct a thorough review of the program. It was thought by some Members that a discussion of basic aid issues with administration officials might induce them to make certain reforms without legislation, and perhaps lay the groundwork for an agreement among the Senate and House conferees. Thus, if the administration would undertake next year to propose and fight for a 2-year authorization and to accept the guidelines of the Morse amendment for a thorough review with deep congressional participation, the need for some of the aid bill provisions now in disagreement would be mitigated.

In this context, the main issues for discussion with Secretary Rusk and Administrator Bell are as follows:

Aid issues:

I. There is a strong impression that the administration believes that aid as an instrument of foreign policy means that:

a. The United States should have aid programs in as many countries as possible, and;

b. The United States should push to get aid programs started and not wait to be asked.

Comment: The Morse amendment expressed policy disagreement with both points by seeking in the future (a) to limit the number of recipient countries, and (b) termination of the program in 1967 "as presently constituted." Basically, the committee wants more concentration and less diffusion of aid effort.

II. There seem to be increasing examples of bilateral United States aid becoming counterproductive; e.g., the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, and Pakistan. These countries either turn against the United States or blackmail the United States for aid. Aid programs become targets for nationalist, anti-U.S. demonstrations.

Comment: Is it possible for the United States to give substantial help to a nation without inciting nationalist demonstrations with anti-American overtones? Two possible solutions have been proposed by Members:

1. More aid through multilateral free world institutions.

2. Emphasis on project aid, thus avoiding a United States commitment to a particular government which may lose its mandate by being accused of being pro-United States.

III. Some Members have expressed the view that the administration believes in development for development's sake. Query whether development as such serves U.S. interests unless it is somewhat in the pattern that the West has found efficient and liberal.

Comment: One reason the Morse amendment spells out "principles" to guide the planning committee is to emphasize that aid does not serve United States interests unless it promotes the rule of law, free enterprise, free speech and press, etc.

Somehow the U.S. aid program seems to lack a rationale—is it to promote development regardless of the political complexion of recipients? Is it to promote U.S. political purposes regardless of economic results? A well understood rationale might help secure wider public acceptance of aid.

IV. Members are constantly concerned at reports and evidence of overstaffing of AID missions. How can they get at this problem without resorting only to cuts in aid?

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
August 3, 1965.

STAFF COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE COMPROMISES ON AID CONFERENCE

Two issues now separate the conferees. First is the insistence of the Senate conferees that the aid program be authorized for 2 years. The administration would be pleased if the Senate were to prevail. The House conferees, however, insist that the House itself would not accept a 2-year authorization.

The second point at issue is the insistence of the Senate conferees on the appointment of a planning committee with its related provisions requiring that the aid pro-

gram "as presently constituted" be terminated in July 1967 and setting forth principles to guide the planning committee in its efforts to devise a more acceptable aid program. The administration would be pleased if the House conferees were to prevail. Administration opposition would be mitigated if the provision regarding termination were dropped and the committee recomposed to give greater representation to the executive. The administration also objects to the limitation on aid recipients to 50 countries.

The conferees have met 12 times.

Compromises that have been suggested:

I. The Senate would recede from the 2-year authorization and the planning committee proposal, the 2-year authorization and the planning committee proposal, but in doing so the chairman of the Senate committee would state that next year he would urge the Senate simply to re-pass this year's bill inasmuch as the Senate and the committee has this year authorized a 2-year program. If the House wants to go through the exercise every year, that is up to them. What would be in conference next year, then, would be this year's Senate bill and a new House bill. The chairman would also announce that he was appointing a special subcommittee on aid to work next session on a Senate bill to be submitted in 1967. Additional funds might be required for this purpose.

II. The second compromise proposal would also involve the Senate receding from the 2-year authorization and the proposed planning committee provisions, in exchange for the following:

a. The House conferees to agree individually and collectively to work hard next year for a 2- or more-year authorization and to state in the conference report that there were many arguments for longer authorization. This could be only a moral commitment.

b. The conferees jointly to urge that the President create a planning committee with suitable congressional representation and that such committee be urged to take a fundamental look at the aid program bearing in mind the principles set forth in the Senate bill. The two congressional committees would appoint subcommittees to work with the president's committee. Draft language of this proposal is available.

III. Senate conferees might continue to hold the line. Aid is continuing to operate under the terms of a "continuing resolution" which is effective until August 30, at which time it will need to be renewed, or lapse. *Quid pro quos* for ultimate agreement would range from House acceptance of Senate terms to insistence on the administration taking a more affirmative action on, for example, use of 15 percent of DLF funds for expenditure through multilateral organizations.

Senator MORSE. One more point.

IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMITTEE AND STATE DEPARTMENT

You know what my view would be for whatever it is worth, if I were you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Bell. You know the thing that disturbed me more about foreign aid than anything else is what you have heard here this morning. The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate—as badly split as the chairman of this committee has pointed out, the frustrations the chairman of this committee has told you about, the fact that he thinks that he cannot get the cooperation and the interest from his members—I think that is the most serious thing in the picture. I think something has got to be done to improve the relationships between this committee and you gentlemen so that this committee will realize it has a grave responsibility in this.

I do not know of any committee that has a more grave responsibility concerning the future of foreign policy of this country, and the future economy of this country, as referred to by the Senator from Missouri, than this committee. If what he says is true—and it is true—this committee, in my judgment, is in a state of complete frustration and disunity in regard to what ought to be done by the committee in foreign aid.

I think that has got to be erased; we have to get that behind us, and quickly. That is what I would be concerned about more than anything else in the foreign aid picture if I were you two gentlemen.

I do not think my point could have been made more eloquently clear than the chairman himself unwittingly has made it this morning when he has bared his breast to you as to what the situation is within this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We have 19 members. I dare say we rarely, if ever, have had a quorum present in the taking of testimony or the markup of the bill. It is only on one or two very critical things, when we had to do it, when we asked the Finance Committee to come over here on two or three votes. But they are not here and not interested in being here in the discussion of the bill. We go through the bill every year, but you have three, four, or five people at most out of 19.

Now, I want to ask this.

RECOMMENDATION ON STALEMATE

Before these members leave, and we can continue, what is the recommendation of the Secretary of State about this conference? We have had 12 meetings. What do you recommend we do, specifically?

Secretary RUSK. What do I recommend?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, what does the administration want us to do on this conference. We are sitting here. We are stalemated for 2 months or longer. What do you want us to do on it? What is your recommendation? We have a continuing resolution—it will go on, I presume, all year. Last year it went on until the first of the year. Do you recommend that, or what do you recommend?

I am going to ask the committee what they recommend, if they will give voice to it, after this is over. The conference is deadlocked.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you stay at deadlock long enough, you run into the Cooper amendment, which is a moratorium for 12 months, and you will not have any legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. What does the Secretary recommend? That is why we asked you here, to confer with you about this conference.

Secretary RUSK. I would hope that the conferees would be able to agree on a bill in anticipation that the administration would propose a multi-year authorization next year; second, that we work out informally ahead of time a means by which we study this present program; and, third, that we maintain the multilateral authorization and that we do our best to get the appropriations procedure to leave that multilateral authorization there rather than repeal it in the appropriation stage. Now, those are the three central things.

The CHAIRMAN. In effect, you would like to see us recede with those, I assume, state that in the report.

Secretary RUSK. I think that the recession on the multi-year authorizations on a 1-year basis, in effect, is a 1-year recession. It does continue, however, the question of the study. And I think everyone understands, in view of what has been said in the committees, that that study is a far-reaching examination of the program as a

whole, and it sustains the view of the committee on the use of multilateral channels.

A HODGE-PODGE OF PATCHWORK

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me, getting back into the guts of this thing, the committees of the House and the Senate have been willing to devote a substantial amount of time to dollars in this thing, and policy and program has been a sort of a hodge-podge of patchwork, patch to patch and so on.

That is why I am very strong for the idea of a well-defined examination of this program so that we can get some kind of an updated policy as to foreign aid itself and not limit our activities and most of our rumpuses to dollar amounts. You look at this bill, as it has grown from year to year, and it is like Topsy—it has just growed.

A reexamination of this thing, if we could get it, if the members, as the chairman pointed out a while ago—if we could get the members to do it, which is very doubtful, it would be very helpful in giving us some kind of a policy pattern as to activities.

Senator MORSE. May I ask a question of the Secretary and Mr. Bell?

I do not ask you to approve of the idea, but to tell me what you think the result of it would be. How certainly would the foreign aid program be hurt, if any, if we continued foreign aid as it is now for the time being, with the continuing resolution, with the understanding it be made clear at the time it would not apply to emergency needs, such as Vietnam? In fact, I think Vietnam ought to be considered outside of the foreign aid program anyway. It is a war issue now. Let this cook at that stage until we come back in January, if we adjourn, and be in a position in January to consider whether or not you want to go beyond a continuing resolution program.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think on that I would need to have a chance to discuss that point with the President.

Senator MORSE. I know.

Secretary RUSK. There is the problem about the continuing resolution of less than a year. That is that the appropriation is the thing that is very important to us in determining how we deal with other governments.

Now, this is very much in the picture, for example, in regard to India and Pakistan at the present time, you see. A third of the money in the foreign aid bill is for the subcontinent.

Senator MORSE. I would like to see us continue with the continuing resolution for a year, with the understanding we take up separate issues as they arise on an emergency basis.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that I am in a position to speak for the administration on that point this morning. I would have to consult on that.

Senator MORSE. I understand that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would resist in my own mind the continuing resolution philosophy. I think we ought to fish or cut bait on this thing, on establishing the law, the authorization. But I think we ought to make every effort to find out where we are going

and what we are doing. A lot of things, I think, are wrong in this bill.

Senator MORSE. I want you gentlemen to accept my apologies, but I have to go and offer this conscientious objector's, religious amendment, which I disapprove of, but will offer.

PROPER RATIO WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is something for the conferees, I guess, to consider. But it seems to me the staff memorandum contains some very good suggestions. It seems to me that it fits in quite well with what the Secretary has presented here, the three-point program he proposes for next year. Perhaps we could work out something on the basis of that memorandum.

By the way, while I have the floor I want to say this. There was reference to the $15 million cut in technical assistance. I can assure you that I did not vote for any such cut as that. Now, during a good part of the consideration of this bill, I was not here, and it may very well be that that came up at the time. But I do believe that we have not maintained the proper ratio as between technical assistance and some of the other programs that are, I believe, not basic to the same extent as programs carried on by the technical assistance office. But I think that they have given us a very good proposal here with reference to next year.

SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH A CONTINUING RESOLUTION

By the way, it seems to me that it is a shoddy way to do business to carry on under a continuing resolution, and certainly we ought to have some kind of definite settlement of this thing. But it would seem to me that under a continuing resolution, since, as I understand, that simply continues as it is now, as it has been going during the last fiscal year, that the program would not be particularly crippled. And so far as appropriations are concerned, does the continuing resolution not permit the use of funds—does it not make an appropriation, a continuing appropriation?

Secretary RUSK. I would ask Mr. Bell to speak to that. There are some serious problems about proceeding just on the basis of a continuing resolution.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not advocate it, but it seems to me it is something we could live with.

Mr. BELL. It would be very difficult for the following reasons: first of all, it is enacted by the Appropriations Committee. They report out the continuing resolution. And they have consistently been unwilling to report those continuing resolutions for more than a month or at the most two at a time, which would mean that we would have to operate throughout the entire year on a sort of one 1-year-30-day lifespan, which we would hope would be extended and presumably which would be extended, but which would be a very inadequate basis for planning and executing a sensible program.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, the Sword of Damocles is over your neck.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else? Senator Aiken.

GET OFF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

Senator AIKEN. I would like to get off this conference committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, everybody does.

Senator AIKEN. It is not amounting to a damn.

I am especially enamored with the expressions of appreciation and pleasure which is found on the first page of the Secretary's statement today. In my opinion that represents the acme of diplomacy or something.

If I can take one minute, I will tell you why I want to get off this mess.

First, the multi-year authorization. We cannot expect anyone to conduct an aid program on a 1-year authorization. The 1-year appropriation should be control enough to keep them going reasonably straight.

As far as the study goes, I am dead against any hybrid study commission. I have been on too many of them. They do not amount to anything at all. The outsiders who do not have much to do make the decisions, and we folks who are pretty busy do not have much to do with it.

I am in favor of continuing the study by this committee. That is our business. That is what we are here for. If we do not do it, then we better abdicate. I certainly do not favor making a study in conjunction with the House, because they have already told us they want two members to every one we have, because they are twice as big a committee. That does not amount to anything.

These special studies that we have had in the past—we have got very, very low returns on them. We hire somebody to make a study of this part of it. They come into this office, to this committee room, and get the material and the information, and then write it up, and we give them $20,000 for it. It makes them very happy, but it does not contribute much to our general knowledge. I think this committee can make—what we are here for is to make a continuing study of this situation, not just 2 weeks a year or anything like that.

And then when it comes to multilateral channels, I say we have to consider each one of those by itself. You cannot make a blanket rule that we are going to do so much multilaterally and so much bilaterally. I hope that the Appropriations Committee does remove that prohibition, because it is unduly restrictive.

COMMITTEE HAS GROWN TOO LARGE

If we cannot agree on what to do—we have 19 members on this committee—every time they add two members to this committee, it takes twice as long to do the work. When we had 15 members, we got along very well and got work done. With apologies to you, Cliff.

But that is a reason that we get bogged down—19 members. It is so difficult to get 10 of them at a time. I do not know how many were here when this bill was reported out of this committee. I know it was reported on a Friday, and I was spending most of that day with the Prime Minister of Canada. I was practicing practical international relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I think when we reported it out——

Senator AIKEN. We just cannot go on like this. We are becoming—well, I will not say what we are becoming. But we are becoming that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are, too. I think we are worse than that.

Senator AIKEN. I do not blame this committee. The House is just as bad, and probably worse. I am pretty sure it is worse.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether it would help at all, but I know you know that as far as I am concerned, my time is entirely available. The problem, I think, has been that distinguished Senators have so many committees, and their time is so crowded, it is a little hard to get into a thoughtful, longer range discussion of the concepts of the aid program. I mean, as far as I am concerned, if we could get 19 members of this committee to spend a week at Camp David and really talk about these things, fine. But how to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we have had 19 together at a time. We appealed to Senator Long; he brought some over from Finance, and we got 10.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did not even have 19 when they took the picture.

Senator AIKEN. That shows how bad off we really are.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what to do.

The Secretary has another appointment—unless somebody has a question.

DESTROYING COMMITTEE MOMENTUM

Senator SPARKMAN. I was just going to say—I agree with the implication in the statement by the chairman that this wrangling every year and the great amount of time that we spend on foreign aid is having an adverse effect on the committee, I think. That within itself helps to beat down the attendance.

The CHAIRMAN. It does. It destroys any momentum in the committee, even on other matters, because they get in the habit of not coming to this committee. When they come in here, they always have something else more important. There is always something else to do, and whatever it is, it is more important than this committee. We had a few here, but you see, two or three of them are gone. They always do.

Anything else? Do you want to add anything, Mr. Bell?

Do you have anything to say?

Senator CASE. With all deference—just one thing.

Senator AIKEN. Just think it, do not say it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to discuss this after the Secretary leaves.

LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE

Senator CASE. I am interested in this proposal of the National Academy of Sciences in regard to a Latin American institute for advanced study in agriculture. I understand there is deep opposition to it in your agency, and sometime—this is not the appropriate time—I would like to have this thrashed out. It seems to me this should be encouraged.

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Mr. BELL. In the light of the discussion—there is strong positive favorable reaction to the idea of strengthening research institutions in Latin America. We have some skepticism about the particular instrument, and we would be delighted to discuss that. It is a question of means, not of effectiveness.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else for the Secretary?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

WITHDRAW DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES FROM BRAZZAVILLE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.

By the way, Mr. Chairman, I think you may be interested to know that we have concluded that we should withdraw our remaining diplomatic and consular personnel from Brazzaville. Three times in the last nine months they have arrested officers of our embassy there, put them in jail, incommunicado, forcibly deported them. This is a a small country of 800,000 with a pretty mean, nasty approach to its neighbors and to us. We thought we would just rather quietly insist upon the rights of the legation and just take the four or five we have left there out of the country for a while and see what happens.

Mr. BELL. The AID program was suspended about six or eight months ago.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you. You anticipated my question.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Bell was very helpful on that, because they arrested the head of the agency.

The CHAIRMAN. How about Indonesia? Are you withdrawing from there?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. As the committee knows, we have made no commitments for new AID programs.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean all consular people. They have been attacking them.

Secretary RUSK. Not quite yet. We are waiting to see what happens on the 17th of August, which is the independence day speech that he usually makes.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

FURTHER HEARINGS ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 11:45 a.m. in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, and Mr. Kuhl of the Committee staff.

[Consideration of the bill (S. 2167), providing for the participation of the United States in the Hemis-Fair 1968 Exposition in San Antonio, TX, was put over.

[On motion by Senator Hickenlooper, and by unanimous voice vote, the nomination of Robert W. Akers to be Deputy Director of the USIA, was ordered reported favorably.

[Consideration of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Ex. H., 88th Cong., 1st Sess.) was put over to a later meeting.

[By unanimous voice vote, the committee ordered reported favorably the bill (H.R. 10132), to authorize the Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, to accept the award of the Military Order of Christ with rank of grand officer.

[By unanimous voice vote, the committee also ordered reported favorably the bill (H.R. 4170), to provide for adjustments in annuities under the Foreign Service retirement and disability system.]

TERMINATE THE HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Dominican Republic hearings? I asked Bundy—you know, Clark raised hell here. He wanted Bundy, and now Clark has left town.

Bundy told me first he would be willing to come up informally and have tea, and then later we got word that he said the offer had been countermanded and he would be glad to talk with us, but he could not come up here because the President did not like the precedent of confidential agents and servants being brought up to the Hill and, of course, he has the privilege or right to avoid it. He says he does offer it if the committee cares to come down to his house or down there and have a cup of coffee with him. He will talk with us all we want. I do not know whether the committee wants do that, do you?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I do not. I think this thing—I do not know what is going on down there. I thought it was settled, but apparently they have not settled it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to have any more hearings?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we just close the hearings? Do you think there is anything the committee can get together on with respect to a report or shall we just state our own views about it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think I would make a report of the committee. I do not think we could get a committee together on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think so, either. So, we won't have any more hearings, and we won't try to make a committee report; is that all right?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It will suit me fine.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we can get together. We can wrangle about it. Everybody has a different view on it. I will probably say what I think about it in a speech.

Mr. MARCY. Just for the record, do you want to make a motion that hearings be closed? The reason I mention this is because you will remember the last case was that Senator Clark indicated he wanted to have four more people called, and maybe some press people called. He is out of town now and will be out of town for 10 days.

The CHAIRMAN. He will raise hell if we try to do it. Why don't we wait until he comes back, and then we will make a motion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Case.

The committee was briefed on a proposed new Asian Development Bank by Eugene R. Black, Presidential Adviser on Southeast Asia Economic and Social Development. He was accompanied by Joseph Barr, Under Secretary, Treasury Department.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, AUGUST 20, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

The committee brought under consideration the protocol, dated at The Hague, Sept. 28, 1955, to amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929. Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, appeared and testified on certain aspects of the protocol.

The committee also discussed a press story concerning the proposed purchase of chairs for the South Vietnamese Government.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 11:30 a.m. in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

Without objection, and on voice vote, the committee ordered favorably reported the nominations of Harlan Cleveland, to be U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the NATO; Phillips Talbot, to be Ambassador to Greece; Wilson T.M. Beale, Jr., to be Ambassador to Jamaica; Joseph J. Sisco, to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; and Raymond L. Thurston, to be Ambassador to the Somali Republic.

The resolution (H. Con. Res. 285), to allow the showing in the United States of the USIA film "John F. Kennedy—Years of Lightning, Day of Drums" was made the next order of business. Upon voice vote, the committee decided to report the resolution adversely, and to substitute therefor an original joint resolution (S.J. Res. 106), of identical title and of new text.

The committee next considered the bill (S. 2072), to authorize a contribution by the United States to the International Committee of the Red Cross. On motion by Senator Church, and by an unanimous voice vote, the committee ordered the bill favorably reported to the Senate.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:35 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Pell, Case, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

The committee heard a briefing on the conditions in Greece from Ambassador-designate Phillips Talbot.

Action on the nomination of Charles Frankel to be Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs was put over temporarily.

On voice vote, and without objection, the committee approved for report the bill (H.R. 10342), to authorize the Hon. Frances P. Bolton, a Member of the House of Representatives, to accept the award of Officer in the French National Order of the Legion of Honor.

The committee put over the bill (S. 2167), to provide for participation of the United States in the Hemis–Fair 1968 exposition to be held at San Antonio, TX, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Ex. H, 88–1), to another time.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 10:36 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Symington, Pell, Clark, and Hickenlooper.

On motion, and by voice vote, the committee approved for report the nominations of Mrs. Eugenie Anderson to the U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council of the U.N.; James Roosevelt to be U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council of the U.N.; and Raymond Hare, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Senator Sparkman then moved the report of the nomination of Charles Frankel to be Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. After discussion, Senator Symington, seconded by Senator Clark, also moved the report, which carried on a voice vote. Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Lausche reserved their position on the nomination.

The committee approved, without objection, the nominations of Charles W. Yost to be Deputy Representative of the U.S. to the U.N., with rank of Ambassador, and as Deputy Representative of the U.S. in the Security Council of the U.N.; Dr. Gustave Ranis, to be Assistant Administrator for Program Coordination, AID; Bernard Zagorin, to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and James Watt, to be U.S. Representative on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization.

On voice vote, the committee approved for favorable report the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Ex. H, 88–1).

By voice vote, and without objection, the committee approved for report the bill (S. 2167), to provide for participation of the United States in the HemisFair 1968 Exposition to be held in San Antonio, TX, in 1968.

The committee next discussed invitations received from the Indian and Japanese Governments to send parliamentary delegations there in the fall. On motion by Senator Sparkman, the staff was directed to prepare an original resolution which would authorize the purposes of such trips and pay expenses and report same if agreeable to the chairman and ranking minority member.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:10 a.m.]

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MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 10:45 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (acting chairman) and Senators Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Lausche, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of John A. Gronouski, to be Ambassador to Poland, and James M. Nabrit, Jr., to be Deputy Representative of the United States in the Security Council of the U.N.

The committee passed over consideration of the two joint resolutions (S.J. Res. 80 and H.J. Res. 403), for the holding of the World Health Assembly in the United States.

On motion of Senator Hickenlooper and without objection, the committee ordered reported an original resolution authorizing $25,000 to meet the expenses of Senate delegations responding to official invitations abroad.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI WAR

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In August 1965, large-scale clashes took place between Indians and Pakistanis in the disputed territory of Kashmir. India claimed that as many as 3,000 Pakistanis had infiltrated into Kashmir, while an underground radio station proclaimed the infiltrators as "freedom fighters." On September 6, Indian forces invaded Pakistan and launched a major drive toward the city of Lahore, to relieve Pakistani pressure on Kashmir. The United States suspended military aid to the two countries and called for a cease-fire, and the Soviet Union called on both sides to "display reason." The People's Republic of China declared its support for Pakistan against "India's aggression" and demanded that India stop all intrusions along the Sino-Indian border.

On September 23, India and Pakistan accepted a U.N. cease-fire resolution and halted their fighting. The resolution called on both sides to withdraw their forces to the positions they held prior to the August fighting. Pakistan continued its calls for a plebiscite in Kashmir, while India refused to allow U.N. peacekeeping troops to be stationed in its territory, but the fragile truce held.]

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room S–116, Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Ambassador H. G. Torbert, Jr., Department of State; Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, Department of State; and Commander C. S. Hattaway, USN.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The first order of business this morning, we have with us the Secretary of State for discussion of the Indian-Pakistani conflict and its implications for United States foreign policy. The Secretary has a cabinet meeting and will have to leave at, what, 11:30, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Not later than 11:30, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you suggest we proceed as quickly as we can and ask the first round of questions. Just so everyone may have an opportunity, we ought to have the 5-minute rule, and if there is any time left over, we can go on to anyone who has any special interest in it.

Mr. Secretary, will you proceed please.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I might start with a brief recapitulation of the military events since the first week in August before discussing some of the policy and other questions that arise in connection with the fighting here between India and Pakistan.

In early August, several thousand trained and armed infiltrators came across from Pakistan-held Kashmir into Indian-held Kashmir. We confirmed this from intelligence sources as well as from the events on the ground and what the captured prisoners apparently told the Indians. I should say that those infiltrators were sent across without the slightest consultation between Pakistan and ourselves. Their purpose was to stimulate a Kashmir revolt in Indian-held Kashmir. That revolt did not occur.

The Indian armed forces moved in on the infiltrators and succeeded in blunting their first efforts. But India became concerned about the substantial numbers of further infiltrators that appeared to be prepared to move in behind them, and so India, after about a week's effort against the infiltrators, decided to put their own armed forces across the cease-fire line in two key places, one in the Kargil area—Kargil is over to the east, where a key Indian road runs very close to the cease-fire line—where the Paks in effect commanded the heights and could interfere with India road traffic and, second, the Yuri salient to the west which had been used apparently by Pakistan for the massing of potential infiltrators.

PAKISTAN DENIED RESPONSIBILITY

Now, that move was significant in this respect, that Pakistan officially was denying responsibility for the infiltrators. Although that lacked candor, it did in effect put some political ceiling on the character of the fighting or the nature of the escalation.

When India put its own armed forces across the cease-fire line to try to interrupt this infiltration, this in turn challenged the Pakistan regular armed forces and brought the matter up into a much more public confrontation between India and Pakistan. In an effort to meet the Indian move, Pakistan then in turn moved a strong force in the direction of Jammu, in the general area of Jammu, led, we believe, by an armored brigade of the 1st Pakistan Armored Division. That, in turn, threatened to cut the principal highway into all of Kashmir from northwest India and threatened to isolate up to 100,000 Indian troops in the Kashmir area by blocking their lines of communications. This also was a principal line of supply that goes up into the Ladakh area further into the northeast. In other words, it is a major route of contact for the Indians.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if we might have him indicate the general outline of Kashmir.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does it go all the way up——

Commander HATTAWAY. This area to the south and east, and Pakistan in this area.

Secretary RUSK. And a considerable area to the northwest not on the map.

GENERAL STALEMATE DEVELOPING

Faced with that threat to Jammu, which militarily was pretty important to the Indians, the Indians escalated further all of these moves on both sides, again without consultation with us, by launching an attack in the general direction of Lahore, Lahore being one of the key cities of Pakistan, over 1 million people living there, and very near the Indian border. That fighting in that area apparently has succeeded in causing Pakistan to pull its major thrust back from the Jammu area, and it is in that general Lahore-Sialkot area along that frontier where most of the fighting is now occurring.

We do not get detailed information from either side about what is actually happening in the fighting, but our general impression is that neither side has made any significant impact upon the other in terms of occupying territory. We think there have been several thousand lost on both sides. It looks at the present time as though some general stalemate is developing there in that particular area.

Now, insofar as East Pakistan is concerned, thus far there has not been heavy engagement over there. There have been a few air raids back and forth, but ground forces have not, so far as we know, been engaged in any major way there. I will come back to that in just a moment.

The red arrow to the southwest shows an Indian push in the general direction of Hyderabad, and of course Hyderabad is just right in there, and Karachi is just to the southwest of that. We doubt that that is going to do very much or get very far. That is across a desert and the forces involved there are not large. The Pakistanis have announced that they have been pushed back. That does not look like a major effort.

SETTLEMENT OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE AS A WAR AIM

In terms of the war aims of the two sides, analyzing what has been said, both privately and publicly, in one sense it appears that both sides have settlement of the Kashmir issue as a war aim. The Pakistanis are saying in effect that there cannot be a cease-fire without a settlement of the Kashmir question, and the Indians are saying there cannot be a cease-fire unless there are guarantees that this kind of thing will not be resumed, and they continue to insist that Jammu and Kashmir states are a part of the Indian union and that they must have guarantees that there will not be further military pressures on that situation. So that although the Pakistani point of view appears to be more specifically on the point that the Kashmir question must be settled, the Indian view is the other side of the same coin.

Now, with this fighting in mind, let me remind you that the Kashmir question has been unsolved for the last 18 years, that many, many efforts have been made along the way to get some resolution of it. The Indians have been in effect sitting tight and refusing to discuss any settlement that would be at all acceptable to Pakistan. So there has been steadily built up over the years a Pakistan, frustration with their failure to get a political settlement of the Kashmir question.

It has loomed much larger in the Pakistan mind than the Indian mind, partly because India is sitting on the status quo and it is

Pakistan who has been wanting to change the status quo. But the decision to try to settle the matter by force was itself a very grave decision taken by Pakistan in July or early August, and that is directly the starting point, the button that was pushed that started this present phase of military action.

CHINA'S ATTITUDE

Secretary RUSK. There are several large questions involved here. One is China's attitude. As you know, there have been contacts between Pakistan and China for the past year or so, with increasing frequency. Chenyi, the Foreign Minister, was in Karachi, where he had a talk with Bhutto after this fighting started, and the public statements made by Peking clearly show that they are siding with Pakistan and clearly show a desire to put pressure on India in this situation. The question is whether they are coming in from the military point of view. We do not yet have any significant evidence of substantial Chinese military movements toward that area.

I just point out in passing that in comparing this situation today with the situation back in 1962, there are a good many indicators that we had in 1962 that are still missing here in 1965. Now, that does not prove too much, because those indicators can change, and it is entirely possible that we will be seeing patrol contacts and other signs of Chinese attempts to put pressure on India in the days and weeks ahead, unless this matter is brought to a quick conclusion.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the Kashmir area on the border of China?

Secretary RUSK. The Ladakh area up to the northeast borders China. Both India-held Kashmir and Pakistan-held Kashmir have common borders with China. Pakistan itself worked out a border deal with the Chinese on their part. The Indians and the Chinese still have some unresolved problems between them in that far distant Ladakh area up in the very top of the Himalayas. The disputed area is 14,000 feet and above in altitude and very difficult to get to from either side. The most important difficulties India has with China is over in the northeast, the so-called MacMahon Line.

Since 1962, I should point out, the Indians have had fairly sizable forces in the northeast, at least six divisions, some of which we have helped to equip as mountain divisions. We would, of course, hope that those divisions could stay there watching that frontier rather than to become drawn into fighting in East Pakistan. So the first big question is China.

Second——

DISPUTED LADAKH TERRITORY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Perhaps we could get the perspective if we could see the whole map for just a minute.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Point out Ladakh.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Outline the areas.

Commander HATTAWAY. This is the Kashmir border right here.

Secretary RUSK. Just let your pointer move and go northwest now, right in there, a little bit further to the west; the disputed

Ladakh territory is through the top of the mountains there, west of where the Colonel is now pointing, right up there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does that adjoin both India and Pakistan?

Secretary RUSK. That is where the Chinese built a road through part of Ladakh that India claimed, which connected two parts of China as a convenient road through there. Nehru allowed them to build that road for a period of 3 or 4 years without raising any particular objection to it, and then this was part of the issue that was raised in 1962 when the fighting occurred.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does Ladakh join both Pakistan and India?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Ladakh is a part of the general Kashmir state, and in effect it adjoins both Pakistan and India-held Kashmir, that is correct, although the principal responsibility is in India-held Kashmir, and the Indians have basic security responsibility for it. It is their forces up in the high passes and so forth.

PROSPECT OF MUSLIM-HINDU RIOTING

A second major problem here is the ever-present prospect of communal rioting between Muslims and Hindus throughout the subcontinent. This is especially important in light of the 40 to 50 million plus Muslims that live in India and some 10 million Hindus that live in Pakistan, many of them over in East Pakistan. We are very concerned about the possibility that as a result of this fighting, communal rioting between the communities will start, and in that case the military casualties will be a fraction of the casualties that could be inflicted by the civilians among themselves if this should occur. There is some possibility that that can be limited if neither side makes deep incursions on the other side, but if either side does make a deep incursion, then it is going to be very difficult to keep that communal rioting from flaring up. There have been just a few reports thus far, maybe three or four incidents which indicate that some communal rioting has begun, but thus far it has not been sweeping like an epidemic over the subcontinent.

As far as we are concerned——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It has happened before.

Secretary RUSK. It happened at the time of the partition, and up to a million people lost their lives from the civilian rioting, quite apart from any military police action that was taken at that time.

SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

We have ourselves tried to concentrate on getting a successful action by the Security Council and the Secretary General to get both parties back up the cease-fire line. The prospect today is not high. U Thant is now in Delhi. He may go from Delhi back to Rawalpindi, although I noticed in the morning news reports he was coming back to New York by way of Moscow. We have other information indicating he may well go from Delhi back to Rawalpindi to see if he can work further on the problem on the ground.

We have felt that if we put all of our effort into the Security Council, that that might be the best chance to get these people to pull back. I can say that we have been in touch with both governments from the time that the infiltrators first came in, urging in the strongest terms that they show restraint and moderation and

try to reduce this and not let this kind of a situation build up. But I think we have to say against the background of 17 or 18 years involvement with this issue that the issue of Kashmir and the Muslim-Hindu relationship and the Indian-Pakistan relationship is such an all-consuming problem for both of these countries that the outsider's view or judgment in the matter turns out to have only a marginal influence on the parties directly concerned.

KEEP EAST PAKISTAN QUIET

We have in recent days—and I would hope that this could be kept among ourselves—been making a strong effort with both capitals to get them in effect to declare that the East Pakistan and Bengal area would remain quiet. From the Indian point of view, it would seem to us to be important for them to use their forces to watch the Chinese border and not run the risk of major communal disturbances which would surely occur if the Indians moved in on East Pakistan.

From the Pakistan point of view, East Pakistan is thoroughly exposed to India from a military point of view; that is, it is largely undefended in any serious way. They may have a division or so of troops there. They may have some air. But from a military point of view, East Pakistan is not really defensible if India should make a serious push against it.

Clearly it seemed to us that the possibility of a Chinese involvement would be much greater if the fighting moved over to the east than it might be if the fighting were limited to the northwest frontier, so we are making a major effort to do that. There is some possibility it might be possible, because there is some advantage to both sides we think, and they seem to think, in handling it. But we still have not quite buttoned that down.

We have had good responses from India. We have not yet had a real response from Pakistan, but from a military point of view, we think that Pakistan would be even more interested in that than India.

NO CLEAR FINDING OF AGGRESSION

From our own point of view, we have not felt it possible to make a clear finding of aggression against one of the parties. Each side has taken steps without consultation with us, which has escalated this problem. We have pointed out to both governments that we have had crises before in the post-war period, that if we and others handled those crises as they seem to be handling this one, that we could easily have had a world war out of almost any one of them if each side just automatically takes the most immediate and tempting military action to build up the fighting, that that is the easiest thing to do, and the easiest way to get into a major conflict.

We have been urging restraint on both of them. We have not felt it possible to make a clear finding of aggression.

The Security Council has felt that it was not possible to do so on the basis of the reporting of the U.N. people in the field, although the Secretary General's report made it clear that Pakistan was responsible for infiltration and that India was responsible for moving into the phase of organized military action across the cease-fire

line and across the international boundary. We therefore do not believe that our relationships of our bilateral assurances to the two countries with respect to aggression are operative in this situation. Our treaty arrangements are limited to Communist aggression. We have made it clear to Pakistan from the time those agreements were first signed in the middle 1950's that that was the case. Our informal association with CENTO, close as it is, is clearly for the purpose of dealing with Communist aggression and does not envisage our relation with CENTO becoming involved in hostilities between India and Pakistan.

MISUSE OF AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT

We are concerned about the misuse of American military equipment. At the present time, the Pakistanis are using it heavily. It is about all that they have in terms of tanks and aircraft. The Indians, however, are using forces in the area not yet, so far as we know, committed to combat, which have been equipped by us as mountain divisions for the purpose of meeting the Chinese. I think we will have to assume that unless we can get a cease-fire very quickly that both sides are going to use whatever weapons they can have at hand, whatever their origins, as a part of this fighting. And so we quite frankly do not anticipate that it will be possible for us to stop that use of U.S. arms if the fighting continues—another reason, however, for us to put maximum pressure behind the Security Council to try to get a cease-fire and get these people behind their borders.

We have indicated that, as far as our own military assistance to the two parties is concerned, that has been suspended, and we would not renew that without consultation here with Members of the Congress. We have also indicated that we have not been making new loans and grants to either side pending the disposition by the Congress of the aid bill. That has been generally true with most countries, with one or two exceptions, such as the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, for some months now, and we have also stated publicly that we would not undertake new commitments of loans and grants to either party without further consultation here with the Members of the Congress.

DIFFICULT QUESTION OF FOOD

Now, there is a very difficult question before us, and that is what we do about food. We have a P.L. 480 agreement with Pakistan which runs for the rest of this calendar year. Those shipments have been continuing. We had an agreement with India which expired on June 30. We renewed that for 2 months in order to keep the pipelines full, pending a full examination of the whole aid field and the national interests of both countries with respect to it, but now in the next 10 days or so it is going to be necessary to decide what we do about that. To me this is one of the most complex of the issues involved. It is possible to say that armies fight on their stomachs, but I think we can be quite clear that it is not going to be the armies who will be the first to suffer if there is a serious food shortage in this situation, that this will come out of the civil-

ian population and those elements in the population least able to take care of themselves.

The possibilities of widespread hunger, famine, or epidemic or disease on a subcontinent of 550 million people is not a very promising prospect and one that we have to think very hard about. Our aid in food there has been small compared to their total production, but it has been that margin which has been required to prevent hoarding and provide the marginal increment that makes a difference between reasonable sufficiency and serious shortages in certain areas of the country.

I am not proposing an answer to you gentlemen. I think it is something that you ought to help us think about and brood about here in the days immediately ahead as to how we handle that particular problem.

Mr. Chairman, I think that perhaps that is enough of a background to start the discussion and to take up questions that might be on your minds at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

U.N. PLEBISCITE PROPOSAL

Can you say what the status of the plebiscite proposal which the U.N. approved is? Has that been finally buried by a flat rejection by the Indians?

Secretary RUSK. The Indians have rejected this idea of a plebiscite for the past decade or more now. You will recall that Mr. Nehru did make a commitment back in 1947 or 1948—1947, I believe—that there would be a plebiscite. The Indians now claim that such a plebiscite, in the first place, could never have happened without the Pakistanis withdrawing their troops from the area. Otherwise there could not be a free election. Since that time they have said a plebiscite is not required because it is not necessary, that they have had elections up there, that there are people who speak for the people of Kashmir. At the present time, they point to the fact that the Kashmiris did not revolt to support these infiltrators who came along and that that itself was an indication of where they stood on it.

Quite frankly, our own view over the period has been that the people of Kashmir ought to be consulted about their future, that they might wish to choose between the two countries or might wish to choose independence as an independent state of Kashmir. And we had hoped that when the Sheik Abdullah was released from prison that he, by his own negotiations with the two governments, would be able to find some solution here with which both India an Pakistan could live. He is now, in effect, in house arrest by the Indians, and so it has put that question off still further.

One of the things that has increased Pakistan's frustration in this situation is that India, contrary to the advice of all or most of her friends, has been taking certain steps, constitutional steps that looked as though it was incorporating Jammu in Kashmir even more further into India. That has stimulated a very sharp reaction in Pakistan and has increased the Pakistani sense of frustration.

On the whole I would say, Mr. Chairman, that looking back over the 18 years, one can understand Pakistan's sense of frustration

about the absence of any serious attempt to get a settlement on the part of the Indians without necessarily endorsing their decision to try to settle the matter by force. We have had problems of that sort ourselves—reunification of Korea, the division of Germany, and questions of that sort—but we have not ourselves elected to try to resolve those by force with all the consequences that go into that.

LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH U.S.

The CHAIRMAN. You said these actions are taken without consultation with us. Is either country under any obligation to consult us about these matters?

Secretary RUSK. One would suppose that if they expected to call upon us with respect to alliance relationships or bilateral assurances, the necessity for consultation is inherent. I suppose that they have no technical obligation to consult, although I am not sure that that is true so far as Pakistan is concerned under SEATO. But it would be the most elementary point that if they expect us to support them, the necessity for advance consultation is apparent, and that did not occur. So, this is broadly a political issue rather than a technical contract with respect to consultation, and surely they have an obligation to consult with us if they are going to violate our bilateral understandings and use American military supplied equipment for purposes for which that equipment was not supplied.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you now speaking of Pakistan or India?

Secretary RUSK. I think both of them have been deficient in consulting with us about these various moves, and therefore we are inclined to take the view that not having brought us in on the takeoff, they are not entitled to get our help in the crash landing.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION

The CHAIRMAN. The Pakistanis have consulted with the Chinese, and one of the pieces in the paper indicated the Indians have approached the Russians; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. The Indians have approached everybody in this situation. Both sides have approached everybody. The Russian position thus far has been that although they recognize Jammu in Kashmir as a part of the Indian union, they have been pressing both sides very hard both bilaterally, as have we, and in the Security Council, to pull back behind the cease-fire line and restore peace in the area.

The Russian view is, "We are glad to see it." We will not try to assess all the motives that might be in it, but we think that that is perhaps a stabilizing element here in this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is a complex problem, is it not, any way you look at it?

Secretary RUSK. It is indeed.

PAKISTANI USE OF AMERICAN WEAPONS

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me one of the bad parts about this is the use by the Pakistanis of American weapons. Is there any

way that can be corrected? I assume that weapons cannot be reclaimed, can they?

Secretary RUSK. They might be subject to being reclaimed on paper, but that does not get you very far in fact. They are not going to turn them back. You can be sure they are not going to turn them back to us. We could assert a claim that they be returned, but that would not help settle this problem.

Actually the military assistance matter is not going to have an immediate effect on this military situation. They are going to be fighting with what they have in hand. What comes in from the outside is not going to have a substantial effect on what happens here in the next several weeks, and one of the encouraging things in one sense, Senator, is that each side must see the most formidable problems as they look down the longer range road here in terms of sheer military supply, ammunition, spare parts, oil, and gasoline. Neither side has a formidable backup of the sort that is required to maintain operations of this sort indefinitely into the future. They are already hurting in some respects for spare parts on both sides, both in air and so far as tanks are concerned.

So, there is some limitation here, if they look down the road at all rationally. There are some inhibiting effects here in terms of the scale and the account of the operation.

PROBLEMS NEED SERIOUS DISCUSSION

Senator SPARKMAN. Suppose a cease-fire is obtained. It is not worth much unless it can go on and solve the bigger problem, is it?

Secretary RUSK. I think that the Indians are going to have to accept the fact that a cease-fire is a first step and that, beyond that, their problems with Pakistan have got to be discussed in a serious way at the conference table somehow. At the present time the Indian mood is not to do that, and that is one of the things that U Thant is working on now.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you by any chance see Amjad Ali on Face the Nation yesterday?

Secretary RUSK. I saw a portion of it. I did not see the full program.

Senator SPARKMAN. He was pretty persuasive, I thought.

Secretary RUSK. The Pakistanis can make a pretty persuasive case short of the decision to try to settle this question by force.

Senator SPARKMAN. Have you by any chance read the memorandum that the staff has prepared for us?

Secretary RUSK. No, I am afraid I have not.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me to be very fine, but it does not solve any of the problems for us. It just points them up more sharply.

Secretary RUSK. If they would add that final paragraph on how to solve it, I would like very much to get hold of it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I can only say that this is a terribly perplexing problem and it has been with us for a long time.

SEATO AIMED AT COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

I remember in 1957 Dr. Marcy and I were over there, and when we came back we put out a report calling attention to the fact that the United States was really financing the fight between the two countries by underpinning their respective economies, and that we ought to do everything we could toward obtaining a solution to the Kashmir question. I still think that we ought to. As to details of what it would be, I do not know.

Secretary RUSK. There is one point of issue on which the Pakistanis are not entitled to any feeling of misunderstanding whatever. At the time of the signing of the SEATO Treaty, the United States made it very clear that we consider the SEATO Treaty aimed at Communist aggression. That was expressed almost in the nature of a formal reservation. It was not quite a reservation in the usual sense in which the Senate puts it on in terms of its approval for ratification. This was done so forcefully at that time the Pakistan representative at Manila at first refused to sign SEATO, and then it was worked out that he later did.

But every year this question has come up at SEATO, from 1954–55 onward, and the United States has made it very clear every year that as far as we are concerned SEATO and CENTO have to do with Communist aggression and are not involved in other disputes, regional disputes that members of the alliance might have with each other. So that in a sense there has been a failure of the meeting of minds from the very beginning of both SEATO and CENTO in that the Pakistanis have never really accepted this point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

SEATO–CENTO COMMITMENTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, if either should have been declared an aggressor—that is hypothetical so far—would it call up our commitments under SEATO or CENTO so far as Pakistan is concerned?

Secretary RUSK. I think not under SEATO–CENTO, [deleted].

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what I was wondering about. I know it is a hypothetical question at the moment, but if India, which is not a party to either treaty, should be declared an aggressor, then India would be committing an aggression against one of our associates in these treaties. I was just wondering whether they could call upon us for assistance to suppress the aggression.

Secretary RUSK. We have not felt that that commitment is activated in a situation that was in effect launched by sending thousands of infiltrators from Pakistan-Kashmir into India-Kashmir without consultation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that. I understand the ball of wax that exists here.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just posing a hypothetical question.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That there was a clear-cut declaration that India was or is an aggressor. I was just wondering what position that might put us in if Pakistan should say, "Aggression has

been committed against us. Now we call upon you to fulfill your commitments to help us suppress aggression," because this is an aggression from another nation which is not a party to this.

Secretary RUSK. Each side has in its public statements as well as its bilateral talks with us and statements in the Security Council—each side has charged the other with aggression here. The Security Council decided that it could not get anywhere by trying to make a determination on that point.

PAKISTAN'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You get into a lot of involved questions here. If each side is an aggressor, do we get in on each side and suppress the other one? Has either side requested aid of us in this struggle—I mean the immediate struggle—in the last few weeks?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Pakistan has asked the CENTO countries and the United States for assistance here in this situation. We have told them that we do not consider that the CENTO commitments are involved here. We have put all of our eggs in the Security Council basket at the present time, saying that to comply with the Security Council resolutions is the first necessity. We have indicated that our attitude toward the situation will be affected by their response to the Security Council.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, leaving aside the necessity for India to guard its borders against China, either in the northwest or the northeast, could you give us any rough estimate of the size of the respective forces that could be engaged here, that is, what could Pakistan throw into this by way of forces, and what can India throw into it, and about how many tanks and armor and motorized equipment and so on is available to each side on this particular border operation?

Secretary RUSK. In general the broad ratio of forces is on the scale of 900,000 Indians, 200,000 Pakistanis, in terms of the overall scale of forces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does that include a corresponding amount of armor and tanks?

Secretary RUSK. The Indian forces are less well equipped with modern equipment. The Pakistani forces have more modern tanks, a few more modern aircraft. But even the aircraft side, the ratio between India and Pakistan is about 3 to 1.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In favor of India.

Secretary RUSK. In favor of India. India's aircraft are made up of a miscellaneous bag of 35 to 40 different kinds of aircraft they picked up here and all over the place. Pakistan has basically about 10 or a dozen 104's from us. They have something less than 100 of 86's from us. Then they begin to pull back into older model planes. India has roughly a dozen Migs and then they break into all sorts of miscellaneous.

THE SPARE PARTS PROBLEM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That raises the spare parts problem, does it not?

Secretary RUSK. Yes it does.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean it increases the problem of spare parts on the part of India.

Secretary RUSK. In the longer run India has a much greater capability of supplying its own forces with locally-produced material. They have a much stronger industrial capacity and they have arms factories, so that over a period of, say, 6 months—even after 30 days I think the advantage in that score would begin to shift to India because of their capacity to do something for themselves, whereas Pakistan is almost wholly dependent upon outside sources.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Can they keep this going more than about 3 months or will they not run out of supplies by that time, both sides?

Secretary RUSK. We have asked——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Unless they get massive assistance from outside.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, we have asked for further details on this. In general our people in both countries think that if this present scale of operations continues, very large problems would begin to grab hold within 30 to 60 days on both sides—of supply, ammunition, things of that sort—and the significance of that, Senator, I think, is that that being true—and if you assume that these generals on both sides are as aware of that as presumably we are—then the tendency would be for them to start now to conserve their resources for the longer run. In other words, that that has some immediate impact upon the scale of operations and the scale of forces committed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am jumping quickly here. There are a lot of questions involved in each of these that I would like to ask.

PAKISTAN'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AMERICAN PLANES TO LAND

How about the refusal of Pakistan or its failure to permit our landing of planes to evacuate Americans in there? What is the situation?

Secretary RUSK. We have gone back at them very hard on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did they give an excuse?

Secretary RUSK. During last night.

In the first instance, I should point out that our own people out there felt that, for example, in the Lahore area, our people are safer in the city of a million people than they would be on the road, because if they are up there in an area which is filled with military operations——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I am talking about air evacuation.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Yes, the air evacuation at the beginning was postponed because of the air activity in that area. We now have—this should be held very closely—we have assurances from India that if we let them know when air evacuation occurs, they will assure that there will be no Indian interference, but we have not yet been able to get Pakistan's permission to bring in our planes that are standing nearby to come in for evacuation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have evacuation problems in western India?

Secretary RUSK. In the northwest we can do pretty well by taking them out over the road to Kabul in Afghanistan where ar-

rangements can be made to receive them, and some of our people have been moving from northwest India over that road.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have we put airplanes in there to take them out?

Secretary RUSK. We have not put them into Pakistan yet.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean in India.

Secretary RUSK. We could get our planes into India for purposes of evacuation. We have already drawn our people from Indian Punjab down to Delhi, so that they are out of the combat area on the Indian side, but we still have a large number of people in the Lahore area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I apologize for being late, Mr. Secretary.

Senator RUSK. That is all right.

MEDIATION REPORT ON INDIAN-PAKISTANI DISPUTE

Senator MORSE. Could you advise us about the availability, if it is available, of a report that Frank Graham is supposed to have made for the United Nations on that assignment that he worked on 3 or 4 years on the Kashmir issue? He was assigned as the United Nations representative to try to mediate in this dispute between Pakistan and India.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. And I had never seen—I suppose it has just been kept locked up—I have never seen that report. Are you aware of what is in that report?

Secretary RUSK. The last report that I am aware of was made before I came to my present office, but I will be glad to get that out and send it down to the committee.

Senator MORSE. I would just like to have your value judgment. I do not know, No. 1, what it contains, and, No. 2, my understanding is that neither Nehru nor the Pakistanis were interested in agreeing to the procedure that I have been told he outlined, but frankly I do not know what it is. I am talking from the historic standpoint, it might be interesting to know what happened to that United Nations——

EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, it might be of interest to the committee if we could give you—because it is a very extensive record— a chronological account of all of the efforts that have been made to find a peaceful settlement here. For example, I myself was in the subcontinent 2 years ago working in both capitals, trying to get them to the table to settle this matter. Duncan Sandys, the British Minister, was out there at the same time. I think that a chronological account of this 18 years in this field would be of interest to the committee, and if there are reports that indicate the outcome of particular phases, we will be glad to append those to such a chronology.

Senator MORSE. If you could, give us a synopsis of the efforts made by the Graham Commission. I think they are pretty extensive, and I think he had several long conferences with Nehru and

also the Pakistani leaders. The last time I talked to him about it, he left me with the impression that if the United Nations would just take hold of it on the basis of what this commission found, there was some hope that they might mediate a settlement. But I just do not know what the facts are.

Secretary RUSK. There was some feeling just before Nehru's death that maybe he might be willing now to get this thing settled before he left office, but he unfortunately died before anything could move on that. Of course, some of us felt back in 1962 that Pakistan lost a tremendous opportunity at the time of the Chinese attack on India, that if they had elected at that time to express solidarity with India with respect to China, they would have created a political situation which could have made it possible to settle the Kashmir thing in terms favorable to Pakistan, that the reaction of India would have been such as to open up that possibility.

Senator MORSE. It may be a blind alley, because I do not know what the facts are, but I wish you would have someone in the Department look into it from the standpoint of the Department and Ambassador Goldberg, because Graham is a very modest man, and he is not one that would put his feet forward to make proposals.

Secretary RUSK. As you know, he still is the mediator for Kashmir on the Security Council.

Senator MORSE. He is still the mediator? I think he has got a wealth of information——

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. That you ought to milk out of him. I would suggest that either you call him down or that Ambassador Goldberg call him in and see what he thinks. I would like to know what he thinks.

The only other question, Mr. Secretary—and if you have covered it before I came in, please do not take the time to repeat it.

Secretary RUSK. That is all right, sir.

THREAT FROM CHINA

Senator MORSE. I am very much concerned about what the Chinese and the Pakistanis may be up to. Maybe you have already covered it. Are you concerned about any real danger that the Red Chinese may try to embarrass us by pouring forces in there, or letting them take some of their planes?

Secretary RUSK. That is a real possibility that we are concerned about. I have told the committee before you came in that we do not see significant evidence of Chinese troop movements into the area there. Some of the indicators that we had in advance in 1962 are still missing from the present situation, but nevertheless the possibility of some Chinese pressure on the ground cannot be dismissed.

They are already engaged, as you know, in maximum diplomatic pressure by their statements and everything that they are saying. So, this is one of the major elements and is an element that we think ought to call for a certain caution on the part of India.

IF FANATICISM BREAKS OUT

Senator MORSE. I will talk to you or whoever you assign to me later about it, because I do not want to in any way refer to the in-

dividual concerned, although I do not think I would, because he is no longer connected apparently with any of your missions—he has gone back to academic life—but I spent two hours Friday at a briefing that I got from this person who just returned from Pakistan. He said—and I had not seen your memorandum, Carl—he stressed what is brought out in this memorandum of the staff, that he thinks that probably one of the two major problems that confront us is the revival of what he called the communal riots. Between Pakistan and India, that is bad enough, but more basic than government conflict is the communal conflict, and if that fanatacism breaks out—and I quote him exactly—he said, "Senator, they will die by the tens of thousands. Nothing can control that if that gets started."

He is afraid that is going to break out in this area. Could you brief us on what you people know about that?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I had commented briefly on it. This is a major threat. There is no question about it. You remember that almost a million people lost their lives at the time of partition——

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. In 1947, over just this. The loss of life at civilian hands could be many times the loss of life at military hands. We have pointed out to both governments that if they take action of this sort that could stimulate that kind of outburst, that is roughly equivalent to having a nuclear exchange with each other. Your friend apparently said tens of thousands. This could run into the millions in a very short period of time. There are 40 million Muslims in India, 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan, in Pakistan, and if they turn against each other, then the slaughter could be fantastic.

I reported earlier that some three incidents thus far have been reported of communal rioting. If either side makes a deep penetration of the other, we feel that this would give a great spur to that kind of communal rioting.

DANGER TO FOREIGNERS

Senator MORSE. Then I asked him about the foreigners there, and he said that the real danger, if that gets out of control, is that they will take the foreigners with them and mow them down as well as their own people.

Secretary RUSK. There is, I think, somewhat greater danger of that today because of the heat and the feelings of both sides about various countries abroad than there was in 1947. In 1947 a white face was practically a passport to safety, but that is not necessarily true today.

REDUCE THE IMPACT OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT

Senator MORSE. Now, if China does move and comes to the assistance of Pakistan, have you reached any tentative conclusions as to what our policy should be vis-a-vis Red China?

Secretary RUSK. We have not come to a conclusion on that. This is an enormous question, one of the greatest importance, and we certainly will be in consultation with you gentleman again before

any conclusion is reached on that, if it should occur. Much will depend upon where and in what way and what else is happening.

I am not sure you were here when I reported that we are trying to get both governments to agree that East Pakistan and the Bengal area will remain at peace. We feel that if that can be accomplished—and there seems to be some interest in this on the part of both governments—we think that it would reduce somewhat the impact of a Chinese involvement.

RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO ENFORCE PEACE

Senator MORSE. Has Ambassador Goldberg obtained any indication yet from any conversations with the Russian delegation as to any willingness on their part to join us in enforcing peace over there if it becomes necessary to do it?

Secretary RUSK. Nothing beyond full unanimity and apparently in good spirit in the Security Council. I have heard a report that Ambassador Dobrynin is coming back this week to Washington, and we will be exploring that. The Russian representative at the United Nations is their No. 2 man there at the present time, and he is not very communicative about the larger aspects of policy.

We have picked up from a number of capitals the feeling that the Soviets are very indignant about the Chinese role in this situation. The Soviets apparently hold China responsible for this thing having flared up as it did by encouraging the Pakistanis to feel that they would have support if they moved.

Senator MORSE. This public criticism of Ambassador Goldberg by the head of the Russian delegation is no indication, is it, that basically they do not want to work with us, but that was pretty much for window dressing?

Secretary RUSK. And also there was a procedural point that came up that the Russians felt they had to make a point of.

Senator MORSE. That is what I mean.

Secretary RUSK. No single member officially asked for a meeting of the Security Council, but about eight or ten of them—eight of them told the President of the Council, "We ought to have a meeting," so he called one. The Russians wanted to reserve on that point of technicality.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I am not very inquisitive this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Not very what?

Senator AIKEN. Inquisitive. I know it is a long word, but it looks good.

RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

What are the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan? Is it calm now?

Secretary RUSK. It has been rather interesting there that Afghanistan, despite the fact that it has the Pushtunistan issue with Pakistan, has elected to give its political support to Pakistan in this situation. In other words, Afghanistan is apparently not trying to fish in troubled waters here for its own advantage. I think the

Muslim areas are playing an important role here. This is reflected in Iran, it is reflected in Turkey, and some of the Arab states.

Senator AIKEN. Senator Morse spoke of Frank Graham's report. India has just flatly rejected that, have they not?

Secretary RUSK. For all practical purposes since 1949 India has refused to talk seriously about settling the Kashmir question.

INDIAN REQUEST FOR AID AGAINST CHINA

Senator AIKEN. The Indians came in 2 or 3 years ago and said if we gave them some money, they would teach the Chinese a lesson; did they not?

Secretary RUSK. They certainly asked for help and got it.

Senator AIKEN. And they lasted about 2 weeks.

Secretary RUSK. At the time that they were under attack.

Senator AIKEN. From my brief experience at the United Nations, I found that Pakistan always stood by the United States. India never missed an opportunity to embarrass us. I suppose we can blame Krishna Menon for that, but I cannot quite forget it.

Secretary RUSK. That has changed somewhat in the last two years as far as Pakistan is concerned.

EFFECT OF WAR ON INDUS VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

Senator AIKEN. When we got him out, it changed some anyway.

What effect will this war have on the Indus Valley development, where we have already invested a half billion dollars, I think?

Secretary RUSK. Of course if it continues, the effect on all economic and social development programs in both countries will be very large. This is the great tragedy, one of the great tragedies of the situation. I think undoubtedly that many of these things will just come to a dead halt as resources are diverted into these war efforts.

PAKISTAN VIEWS EVERYTHING IN TERMS OF KASHMIR

Senator AIKEN. I do not think I have anything more. I might ask whether you feel that Pakistan's misgivings over SEATO is due to lack of sympathy for the West or just plain foresight. You do not need to answer it.

Secretary RUSK. No, I will be glad to comment on that, Senator. I think that basically the Kashmir problem has come to be 95 percent of Pakistan's foreign policy and that you look at everything else in terms of that issue. This is why they did not put any troops in Korea in 1950. This is why they have not been of any assistance in South Vietnam. They have just concentrated on this particular issue and have measured everything by that.

Senator AIKEN. And about two-thirds or 70 percent, perhaps, of Kashmir is Muslim.

Secretary RUSK. The population is roughly that.

Senator AIKEN. With sympathies toward Pakistan.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. I guess that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

ALLEGED CIA PLOT

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I take just a moment before the Senators have to leave?

There was a story in the Daily Telegraph this morning in London that will probably be hitting our press, written by a man named Anant from Delhi, a man who used to work for one of our own publications and was fired because they had trouble about his associations and his objectivity many years ago, that alleges——

Senator SYMINGTON. I did not hear that.

Secretary RUSK. Anant.

Senator SYMINGTON. His association with what?

Secretary RUSK. Because of his associations and his lack of objectivity. This story alleges that CIA was involved in an attempt to unhorse Ayub. There is just not a shred of truth to this. It looks to us as though the Daily Telegraph had been victimized by what those in the under the rug trade call a black operation of some sort, stimulated possibly by India, possibly by China, possibly by Pakistan.

We have not been able to dope out what is behind it, but if you can see those reports, I assure you there is absolutely nothing in that whatever, that we have not been engaged in any such activity. As a matter of fact, there were some in Pakistan who accused some of our people of trying to be involved in the recent elections in Pakistan, and that was just utterly not true at all. I mean this is something in which it is easy to make the allegation, but at least you Senators should know that there is just nothing in it.

Senator SPARKMAN. How do you spell his name?

Secretary RUSK. A-n-a-n-t, Anant.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Senator LAUSCHE. From the standpoint of the principle of self-determination, it would appear that with 70 percent of the population in Pakistan being Moslems and the other Hindus and probably other religious faiths, that Pakistan is in the right in its demand for a plebiscite or its petition for a plebiscite.

Secretary RUSK. Not all the way, Senator, because Pakistan is not interested in an independent Kashmir. People like Sheikh Abdullah, who have strong followers among the Kashmiris, got nowhere in talking to the Pakistanis about a plebiscite on which independence would be one of the alternatives. So, I am not sure that their commitment is to self-determination so strongly as it is toward a Pakistani Kashmir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why does India feel that Kashmir ought to belong to it in face of this diversity of population?

Secretary RUSK. Just shortly after the partition, the leadership of Kashmir, which then was Hindu, made a formal accession to India, without consulting with the Kashmiri people in any sort of plebiscite, so that on that, if you took this into court on a purely legal ground, the Indians would probably win the legal case. But on the broad political base, when a territory is under dispute and the general view ought to be that the attitudes of the people themselves

ought to make some difference, I think then it shifts over to the Pakistan——

Senator LAUSCHE. There was one Hindu leader at the time of the partition——

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. Who decided to go with India.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it was he alone that led the movement that caused Kashmir to become a part of India. What happened to that man that led that movement? I do not recall whether he was extinguished by Hindus or not.

Secretary RUSK. I would have to go back and check to see what happened to him, Senator.

U.N. RESOLUTION FOR A PLEBISCITE

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, did the United Nations formally adopt a resolution calling for a plebiscite?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was that done in the Assembly or in the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. In the Security Council, but there have also been resolutions in the Assembly since then, in the same direction.

CHINESE-INDIAN TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, is there a Chinese-Indian territorial dispute of any consequence under which India claims that China has land that belongs to it or China claims that India has land that belongs to China?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, there are two areas that are under dispute between India and China. One is the Ladakh area up in the high mountains of the northwest and the other is the MacMahon Line along the Northeast Frontier Agency territory in the hills north of Assam.

Senator LAUSCHE. So that China would have some cause to go in under the claim that it was a territorial question with it, as distinguished from going in for the purpose of helping Pakistan.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Quite apart from the possibility of specific collusion between Pakistan and Peiping, both Pakistan and Peiping have in effect territorial claims against India, so that there is something there that they might feel is the basis for simultaneous action even though it is not organically connected by any binding agreements.

Senator LAUSCHE. If these two contesting parties wear themselves out, what is your opinion as to what China will do as that goes on?

Secretary RUSK. I think that in the longer run China would gain if the subcontinent were to exhaust itself in fighting within the subcontinent, but we still do not know whether China is in fact contemplating a military intervention.

I think we have to assume that they are certainly thinking very hard about it. But this is not a simple thing for them. They did not pull back from the Assam area in 1962 for military reasons, that is, because of what the Indians had done to them militarily; they

pulled back apparently because of basic logistic and other problems of maintaining forces in that area.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all, except you mentioned that there are 230,000 Pakistanis and 900,000 Indians.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

SHAH OF IRAN'S CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I certainly have not too many questions, but I was present when the President of Pakistan, Mr. Ayub, was here before this committee. Somehow I might have gotten the wrong impression, first, that he would be cooperative, to say the least; second, I had great doubts as to his trust worthiness. That is just the impression from having met the man once. But evidently the State Department, based on the contributions we have made in the way of defense material, had other thoughts.

Does the State Department feel perfectly sound and safe in granting any of these commitments?

Secretary RUSK. I will not go back to the mid-1950's when these arrangements were first concluded, but primarily our interest in reasonable strength in Pakistan is related to the Middle East rather than to Southeast Asia or the subcontinent.

Now, at the present time, the Shah is very much worried about his own attitude toward Pakistan in this situation, because he is concerned about Pakistan's attitude if Iran ever needs Pakistan. We had hoped that the combination of the three regional members of CENTO—Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—would be able to establish a solidarity in that area that would tend to protect that area from temptations to the north, and I think that that has been the more important aspect of our thinking in what we have done about Pakistan.

INSTALLATIONS IN PAKISTAN

Senator CARLSON. Then just going a little bit further, we have, have we not, placed some very important installations [deleted] in northern Pakistan, and I assume, based on that, it would indicate that we had no question about their being with us.

Secretary RUSK. We have found in general that on those issues, that is, on issues not related to India, that Pakistan has over the years been really very helpful, very helpful, and if that should all come to nothing now in the heat of this India-Pakistan problem, looking back on it, I think however expensive it may have appeared, that we have got some very important returns. [Deleted.]

FUEL SUPPLIES

Senator CARLSON. Where are these people that are fighting this war getting their oil, both countries?

Secretary RUSK. There is a small amount of production in Pakistan, a more substantial part in India, but Pakistan imports about four-fifths of its oil requirements. They seem to have pretty good reserves on hand. They are in good shape for several months to come, we understand, from the military point of view.

Senator CARLSON. What would be the situation if there was a fuel shortage? You mentioned the cutting off of P.L. 480 to India soon unless some provisions were made with Pakistan. What effect would that tend to have on religious riots and slaughter as a result of lack of food, if any?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that if there were an indication that food was going to be short, in terms of stopping the external supply lines, the first thing that would happen would be hoarding. That would multiply the shortages in the subcontinent, both in Pakistan and in India. If hoarding occurs in addition to the stoppage of external supplies, then there would be very serious hunger and famine problems in large areas of the country, which in turn could lead to the possibilities of epidemic.

In other words, the impact upon 550 million people could be very, very important if the minimum food requirements somehow were not sustained, despite the fighting. That is one side of it.

The other side is whether in fact it is practical to get food to people, given a certain military situation, whether it can in fact physically be done, with the transportation dislocated, the rolling stock used for military purposes, and things of that sort. But I can see down the road here some very, very large and catastrophic results if these 550 million people cannot get a minimum amount of food.

Senator CARLSON. That is a decision I can see we are going to have to make soon.

Secretary RUSK. It is going to have to be made within the next 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARLSON. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

The Secretary has to leave. He has a Cabinet meeting this morning. That is why I was trying to rush it along.

SUSPENSION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES

Senator WILLIAMS. To what extent are we still supplying India and Pakistan?

Secretary RUSK. There are no military shipments going. We have said publicly that we have suspended those. We are not making new loan or grant commitments to either party—we had told them that some time ago—until after you gentlemen had finished the aid bill. P.L. 480 shipments are continuing. In the case of Pakistan, those agreements last around this calendar year. In the case of India, the agreements expire June 30, and we have a 2-month extension pending a full negotiation, full discussion, so that the food shipments are continuing. I think under existing aid commitments, there are some additional shipments being made to both countries under existing arrangements.

Senator WILLIAMS. Are they being made to both in the same manner in which they were made prior to this?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir. We are trying to pursue an evenhandedness here on such questions at the present stage.

PRESSURING INDIA TO COMPLY

Senator WILLIAMS. A hypothetical question w raised just assuming that the United Nations declared India to be the aggressor. That would put us in the position more or less of having to support Pakistan.

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that if one party—and this looks ahead here; I am a little fearful about anticipating too much—if one party comes forward completely and wholeheartedly and says to the United Nations, "We are ready to do what you ask us to do," and the other party says, "No, we are not going to do this," that this would shift a good deal of support toward the country that is prepared to comply and bring pressure against the country that is unwilling to comply.

Senator WILLIAMS. My question is, if that develops and it was Pakistan that came, more or less, in the clear and India was the aggressor, how would that put us in relations with China if we and China were both taking a position against India at the same time?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that talking about mobilization of pressures, my guess is that in that circumstance, India's position would be such that she could be brought around to complying with the Security Council's resolution.

President Radhakrishnan, by the way, has been exerting a moderate influence in New Delhi on these matters. Some of the members of the cabinet are much more inflamed than he is. If I were to predict today though, Senator, I would suspect that India will be able to be more forthcoming today with the Security Council than Pakistan, partly because India is sitting on the status quo and Pakistan is the one that is trying to get a change in the status quo, so it is somewhat easier for India to say to the Security Council, "All right, fine, we will do exactly what you say."

Senator WILLIAMS. If the Security Council came back and ultimately said to go ahead and have this referendum, I was wondering whether India could reject that or not, and if they did reject it, just what position we would be in.

Secretary RUSK. We are going to try to the maximum extent possible to deal with this question in the Security Council rather than bilaterally so that there will be hopefully 11 nations speaking for all of the U.S. membership. Now, obviously we can be caught in between as we have been in many other disputes over the post-war period, and there will be considerable resentments and animosities built up in one country or another or even in both. But I would think that we would support, with what pressures are available to us, the actions taken by the Security Council.

Senator WILLIAMS. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF KASHMIR

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, one point that has not come up in the press or in your discussion today that I had understood was the reason for the Indian intensity in wanting to hang on to Kashmir is not so much geography or economics, that it has a religious or a mystical relationship to the Hindus very much like Jerusalem had

for the Christians, which promoted the crusades and Mecca. Is this not the reason why the Indians have been hanging onto it?

Secretary RUSK. There have been two very strong psychological elements working on the Indian side here, apart from the usual desire of any country to have whatever territory is nearby that it wants. One is that Mr. Nehru's own family is a Kashmiri family, and this was something that made it very difficult for him to even think about any other solution to Kashmir.

Second, the Indians say that religion cannot possibly be accepted as the basis for a political state without a serious breaking up of the Indian union itself. They have 40 million Muslims in India. They refuse to accept religion as a proper basis for political organization. This, in turn, sounds over on the Pakistan side of the border as though it means that the partition of the subcontinent was wrong and that India in the long run has the idea of reunifying the subcontinent and going back on the agreements of 1946 and 1947.

These factors are used by the Indians as very strong reasons for rejecting the notion that a Muslim Kashmir has a right to go to Pakistan because of religion. They say this means the disintegration of India. I personally feel that this has been exaggerated by them in terms of its effect on the rest of India.

Senator PELL. I have noticed that many of the high caste Indians, particularly in a conversation with Nehru, that he has this sentimental respect for the land of the forbears.

PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN-MADE WEAPONS

Another thing which I do not think you have had an opportunity to cover and I wondered if you would [illegible] what would be the percentage of the heavy weapons—I am not talking about small arms, but the tanks and planes—what would be the percentage of those that are American made that the Pakistanis and Indians are using?

Secretary RUSK. Colonel, is it not fair to say all of the tanks?

Commander HATTAWAY. All Pakistani tanks are U.S./India, I am not sure. India is building some of her own.

Secretary RUSK. But actually many of the Indian tanks were left over from World War II and are the World War II vintage, and this means that both of them have problems of spare parts and maintaining an armored division in the field.

I personally, as a former soldier in that theater during the war, do not look toward either side making a major penetration of the other country. As you know, an armored division requires a gusher of oil and gas behind it, and they have major logistic problems in supporting large forces any distance from their home bases.

Senator PELL. On the planes, what percentage of those would be——

Commander HATTAWAY. Pakistan is all U.S./India has U.S. some Migs from Russia, some of them English airplanes. It is quite a scattering in there.

Secretary RUSK. And they are making some planes of their own. Are the Gnats not Indian planes?

Commander HATTAWAY. The Gnat is a British design. Some are obtained from Britain and some they are making themselves.

Secretary RUSK. I see.

Senator PELL. This would probably confirm the wisdom of Senator Morse, and I know I regret I have not had the courage of my convictions at times in supporting this restriction.

WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

The final query I have is in connection with the strife there. Is it our firm policy to work through the U.N., or will we engage in bilateral pressures if we find that the U.N. policy goes against our interests?

Secretary RUSK. I think the major effort, the consuming effort now is to give maximum support to the Security Council effort. We, Britain, and the Soviet Union are reinforcing what has been said in the Security Council in bilateral discussions in the two capitals, but the whole effort there is to support the Security Council action.

Senator PELL. The main focus of our efforts is through the Security Council.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

TURKISH AND IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN

Senator MUNDT. I read in the paper that Turkey is supplying arms to Pakistan, that she is tied up with Pakistan through CENTO. To what extent is she supplying arms?

Secretary RUSK. We have discussed with Iran and Turkey the point that equipment that we have sent to Turkey and Iran for other purposes is not available to them for transshipment to Pakistan. Turkey and Iran may send to Pakistan some miscellaneous supplies and materials that come from other sources. For example, Iran might make some POL available. Turkey might make some kinds of ammunition available that they make themselves.

Senator MUNDT. But we could not effectively object to that, could we, because they are treaty powers?

Secretary RUSK. We are not in a very strong position to object to it, and over the long run, depending on how the Security Council effort comes about, it is not necessarily contrary to our interests to have Iran and Turkey show some sympathy to Pakistan in this situation, to be available to help pick up the pieces when this is over. Now, if that is more psychological and political and physical than military intervention, I think this is manageable.

MARGINAL CHINESE ASSISTANCE

Senator MUNDT. Unless the Security Council takes a strong stand through something more than words to stop this conflict, then you are a lot more optimistic than I am that the Pakistanis are going to run out of supplies, because it seems obvious to me that Red China has a vested interest in keeping these things boiling. I think she will supply any deficiencies that develop in Pakistan. Why are you so optimistic?

Secretary RUSK. I would think I had not intended to sound a note of optimism here.

Senator MUNDT. Optimistic that they might both run out of supplies.

Secretary RUSK. Oh, on that. I think probably the Chinese assistance would be relatively marginal and indecisive unless they came in with their own troops. What they could move or what they would be willing to move by way of military equipment and supplies into either East or West Pakistan would have relatively little influence on the actual fighting. These are many divisions engaged here, and it would take an awful lot of supply, and China does not have any spare parts capability or anything of that sort.

Moving tanks or modern aircraft would be quite another problem. So, I think the chief threat of China is not so much supply but intervention.

Senator MUNDT. I do not suppose a good diplomat ever admits he makes a mistake, but do you not really think you owe this committee a debt of gratitude, especially Frank Lausche, for denying the big loan for the steel plant in India? Otherwise we would be up to our neck in that situation right now.

Secretary RUSK. Diplomats are committed to look to the future, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. You do not have to admit that.

PAKISTAN'S FRUSTRATION

Tell us as quickly as you can what happened to Pakistan? I remember sitting up here in the Senate, and they had a rather attractive fellow give a speech. Everybody applauded him. This sounded like an American speech, talking about democracy. What was his name, Ali something? But you remember, he was quite a fellow.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, President Ayub Khan came in 1961 and made a speech to the joint session.

Senator MUNDT. What happened that caused things to deteriorate?

Secretary RUSK. Basically it is a growing frustration over 17 and 18 years of effort to get a Kashmir settlement, which has not come about. This is the consuming interest of Pakistan's foreign policy, and the more they try to get a settlement, the more it looks as though the Indians dig in and refuse a settlement.

Senator MUNDT. Do all the merits not seem to be with Pakistan in this situation? The U.N. has said Pakistan should have Kashmir, a plebiscite would indicate that Kashmir would be to——

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, on the political issues, Pakistan is supported by a large part of world opinion. The United States, for example, has voted for those resolutions in the United Nations that say that the attitude of the Kashmiri people ought to be fully taken into account through a plebiscite. That has been the direction of our discussions in Delhi for 17 years. I do not think that Pakistan has that kind of support for a decision to try to settle it by force, and that is the thing that has greatly balanced off the scales here in this situation.

Senator MUNDT. We are not sure that Pakistan has started this fighting. The Security Council cannot decide.

Secretary RUSK. If you go back to August 1, the events that have occurred since the Ran of Kutch settlement seem to us to have been stimulated by the sending of these thousands of infiltrators

from the Pakistan side across the cease-fire line into Indian-held Kashmir.

A PRINCELY STATE

Senator MUNDT. How did this Hindu ever happen to be elected or selected?

Secretary RUSK. He is a king. I would have to check back to run that down, but there was a princely state up there, and he was a Hindu.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A hereditary thing.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. Just as in Hyderabad there was a Muslim head of a population that was basically Hindu.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, I am told he is still living.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I believe he is.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary has to go unless there is some very important last question.

Senator MORSE. One, and he can answer it on his way out.

RELATION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM

What is going to be the effect of our position in the United Nations vis-a-vis the war between Pakistan and India and the war in South Vietnam? Is it going to strengthen or weaken our position in regard to South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think that it will divert a good deal of attention away from South Vietnam in the U.N. if the Kashmir thing is still going on. But I think on the whole that we will be in a pretty strong position in the General Assembly on Vietnam because of the very strong record of an effort to bring this to the conference table and a complete rejection of that by Hanoi and Peiping. I think this is the thing that has made a big difference in the U.N.

Senator MORSE. Will we be asked to call upon the Security Council to take the same jurisdiction over it that we are asked to take over in the war between Pakistan and India?

Secretary RUSK. We are prepared for that and ready at any time. Hanoi and Peiping do not accept that jurisdiction, and the Secretary General and the Russians say, "For heaven's sake, do not have a divisive debate on this if you cannot settle it."

Senator MORSE. If Peiping will never accept it, why do we not just file the resolution and see what they do?

Secretary RUSK. The key problem there is how to handle the Russian attitude on this, you see. At the present time the Russians on the Communist side—the Russians are most amenable to a settlement of the matter. If by pressing them they get dug in more harshly, that is another problem.

Senator MORSE. There is a possibility here because they certainly want this Indian-Pakistan thing settled. They are more worried about that than they are Vietnam. The Russians might be willing to go with us on a resolution in the Security Council on Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. We have put that to them and they have turned that down in very harsh terms. They said do not put them on that spot.

Senator MORSE. You have not filed the resolution. That is the test of that pudding.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper had one question.

RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just wanted to ask what is the religion of the Sikhs, the Gurkhas, and the Sepois? Are they Moslems?

Secretary RUSK. The Sikhs have their own religion as an offshoot, I believe. It is sort of a combination of Muslim and Hindu. I am not an expert on that. The Gurkhas by and large have a Hindu tradition.

I noticed in the newspapers this morning Nepal asked the Indians not to use the Gurkhas in this war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How about the Sepois?

Secretary RUSK. They are Hindus basically.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they going to fight their brothers, I mean these various groups?

Secretary RUSK. Brothers are fighting brothers in this situation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean their religious brothers.

Secretary RUSK. It is possible. There are Muslims in the Indian armed forces today.

The CHAIRMAN. We have got to let the Secretary go. One last one. Senator Mundt?

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SITUATION

Senator MUNDT. This is not on Pakistan, but I have two letters this morning wanting to know to what extent Wessin is an American kidnapee and whether we are involved in what happened to him.

Secretary RUSK. The president down there, Garcia Godoy, and the OAS Committee decided a long time ago in consulting with many Dominican leaders that Wessin had to leave the country if the Dominican armed forces are to remain together and be under presidential control, so that although he left voluntarily, I would put "voluntarily" in quotation marks.

Senator MUNDT. I know he did not leave voluntarily, but I would like to know can I tell them honestly that the United States had nothing to do with it.

Secretary RUSK. We were a member of the OAS committee. We helped persuade him to go. We helped persuade him to go.

Senator MUNDT. Persuade him to go? We kidnaped him?

Secretary RUSK. No, I think that he walked on his own steam to the airplane.

Senator MUNDT. Who was holding what in his back?

Secretary RUSK. Let us not become enamored of this fellow.

[Discussion off the record.]

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee proceeded into executive session. The committee then took up the resolution (S. Res. 144), authorizing the Foreign Relations Committee to investigate the legality of shipping restrictions on wheat. The committee decided to give further consideration to the whole subject.

[The committee adjourned at 11:50 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion of Senator Sparkman, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of Richard H. Davis, to be Ambassador to Rumania, and John H. Burns, to be Ambassador to Tanzania.

The committee also voted to have U. Alexis Johnson to appear before it at a later date.

The committee undertook discussion of two resolutions (S. Con. Res. 59) and (S. Res. 144) having to do with East-West trade and the legality of shipping restrictions on wheat. After debate, the committee concluded to hold a meeting on the whole matter in all its aspects and to leave to the staff the assembly of witnesses.

The committee reviewed the forthcoming visit of Pope Paul VI to the United States.

Senator Lausche raised the question of the resolution (H. Con. Res. 416), requesting the President to urge certain actions on behalf of the Baltic States. The staff was directed to get a new reaction on the resolution from the State Department, and the resolution was passed over.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[After more discussion of the Pope's visit, the committee adjourned at 11:55 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in formal executive session at 4 p.m. in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Church, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, and Case.

Lucius Battle, Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, talked to the committee on Egyptian affairs.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 9 a.m. in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Lausche (subcommittee chairman) and Senators Sparkman, Gore, and Clark.

The subcommittee heard Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William P. Bundy, on Vietcong brutalities.

No transcript was taken of the proceedings.

NOMINATION OF U. ALEXIS JOHNSON TO BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Church, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Jones and Mr. St. Clair of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are here to hear from Ambassador Alexis Johnson, according to my slip, from California. Maybe the first question we want to understand is why you moved from Kansas to California.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, before you even get that far, I want the record to show he is a Kansan, born in Falun, KS, still has relatives there, that that is really where he belongs.

The CHAIRMAN. This is one of the principal reasons we did not act on you the other day. We wanted an explanation of this contradiction that appears in your biographical sketch.

[Mr. Johnson's biographical sketch follows.]

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Present position: Deputy Ambassador, Saigon.

Considered for: Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Born: Falun, KS—October 17, 1908.

Education: A.B., 1931, LL.D., 1957, Occidental College; 1931-32, Georgetown U. School of Foreign Service.

Marital status: Married.

Experience: Nongovernment: 1932-35—Office manager; Government: 1935-37—FSO, unclassified, vice consul of Career, Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, Language Officer, Tokyo; vice consul, Keijo; 1939—Vice consul, Tientsin, China; 1940-42—Vice consul, Mukden, Manchuria; 1940—FSO-8; 1942-44—Vice consul and 2d Secretary, Rio de Janeiro; appointed Consul; 1945-46—Consul, Manila; Detailed to General Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Powers, Yokohama; 1947-49—FSO-3, Consul General; Assigned as Consul General to Yokohama; 1949-51—Department, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs; FSO-2; 1951-53—FSO-1, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; 1953—Counselor of Embassy (Political Affairs), Prague; 1953-58—A.E.&P. to Czechoslovakia; 1954—Detailed to U.S. Delegation Geneva Conference as Coordinator; 1955—U.S. Representative, Geneva ambassadorial negotiations with Communist China for release of U.S. and Chinese citizens; 1958-61—A.E.&P. to Thailand; SEATO Council; FSO-Career Minister; 1961—Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; 1963—Personal Representative of the President, with the rank of Special Ambassador, to attend

the ceremonies incident to the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia; 1964—FSO–Career Ambassador; 1964—Deputy Ambassador, Saigon.
Military: 1944—U.S. Army Civil Affairs Training School, University of Chicago.
Office: American Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam.
Home: Care of American Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam.
Legal residence: California.

STATEMENT OF U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, OF CALIFORNIA, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

Mr. JOHNSON. I cannot appeal to the fifth.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you cannot appeal to the fifth. You have got to answer. You are under oath.

Mr. JOHNSON. I moved there because my parents moved there.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you could not help it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I could not help it.

The CHAIRMAN. You still prefer to be in Kansas. There are no members from California on this committee, so it is much better.

Mr. JOHNSON. I see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think there is any definite age as a national standard about when a person is sui juris, but I think on the question of the Department of State, he ought to be able—on the question of his State, he should determine that when he is born.

Mr. JOHNSON. I went through the first year of high school in Kansas, and my parents moved to California in 1921.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you live in California?

Mr. JOHNSON. Glendale is where I was brought up. I went to Glendale High School and then to Occidental College and came back here in 1931.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in Foreign Service?

Mr. JOHNSON. 1935. Next month it will be 30 years. I took the examination in 1932 and I finished them. Those were the depression years, if you will recall. I lived here in Washington, worked all over town here, finally ended up at Call Carl's as office manager for a few years.

The CHAIRMAN. A very efficient operation. Why did you not call them over to Vietnam?

Mr. JOHNSON. I should have.

STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM WILL FADE AWAY

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me, how do you see the outcome of the present struggle in Vietnam? What do you think could be the ultimate ending? Is this going to end up as a similar situation to Korea, or just how do you visualize it?

This is executive session, and we are just talking it over here to start the conversation. I would like to know how you foresee from your long experience in this area how this struggle can ever be resolved in any way.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that most likely it is going to be resolved, and from our own standpoint—my own personal view is that it can best be resolved by what I might call a tacit understanding or simply fading away.

My feeling is that if the north decides that, at least for the time being, it is not a winning road that they are on, they can pull back

on this and may well pull back. I would never say they will pull back permanently any more than they do anyplace, but they might well decide to withdraw the forces that they have there and at least stop the military phase of this.

I think this is going to take some time. I do not think they have come to the conclusion yet that they are required to take this course of action. But the actions that we are now taking—I think that in a foreseeable period of time, I would say within the next year, it is entirely possible that they will do this.

The CHAIRMAN. Just fade away rather than have a treaty.

Mr. JOHNSON. Fade away rather than have a treaty or a conference. In some ways this makes it easier for them, and from our standpoint I think would be a relatively satisfactory outcome.

I myself cannot see the possibility of a new international regime for Southeast Asia and South Vietnam that would be any more satisfactory than the 1954 settlement. I feel that the return to the principles, if you will, of the 1954 settlement is the best possible outcome. This does not require a new international conference. It does not require any formal agreement. It would permit both sides to go back to the 1954 agreement.

A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. This regime in South Vietnam, do you think this tactic, sort of taking the heat out and calming down the situation, that these people can create a functioning government that will govern that country in a reasonably satisfactory way?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, over a period of time. The problems they face are, apart from the Vietcong, similar to the problems of any of these new countries, particularly those that had no preparation for independence, and the development of political institutions there is going to take a considerable period of time. In fact, their political history or political experience is really less than 2 years. During the French period they were permitted no political activity of any kind. It was only conspiratorial activity.

This was much the same under Diem, and only since the fall of Diem has there been what you might call the beginnings of some political life, political activity in the country. They are still in their very, very early stages. They simply lack the experience.

I myself, thinking of the problems of Government, always think of what I call the three C's: that is, consultation, the ability of people to communicate with each other, dialog with each other; conciliation to accommodate their points of view; and consensus, arriving at some common basis upon which to take action. They are still in the early stages of the first. They have difficulty in meaningful dialog with each other, meaningful communication with each other.

One thing I can say is that they are more and more conscious of this problem. They are talking about it more. They are conscious of doing something about it and are beginning to try to do something about it.

PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS

One of the encouraging things—it was not a big event—one of the encouraging things, I felt, was the way that the provincial council elections went off last May. In spite of the efforts of the VC to prevent their taking place, they had over 50 percent of the voters, eligible voters that registered. This is the total country, including VC controlled areas, 40 percent of the total population registered. About 70 percent of them voted. They took quite an active interest in it. It was carried out in a very orderly way, and in a much better way than we frankly expected.

They are now planning to call a national advisory council made up of members selected from these provincial councils, as well as representatives from the professions like the doctors, lawyers, labor, and other elements of the population to form this into a national advisory council to the Government, and then if this goes well, to turn it into a constituent assembly. I think this is a very useful development. I think it is an element in developing some experience in political life and the art of politics within the country, which they need so much.

COMPARISON TO AMERICAN TROOPS IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. Do you foresee that we will have to stay there as advisers, financial supporters, for a number of years?

Mr. JOHNSON. I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. About like Korea.

Mr. JOHNSON. In some ways like Korea, yes. Whether we will have to keep troops there or not, I just would not speculate at the moment. Hopefully we would not. Hopefully, if the war is satisfactorily resolved by whatever means, it would be possible for us to withdraw entirely as far as our combat forces are concerned. This is what I hope will be able to happen.

The CHAIRMAN. We still have two divisions, do we not, in South Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, we do. The situation is some ways bears similarities to Korea. You know political developments there bear a lot of similarities to Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. In both cases you had strong men who really were the saviors of their country. Diem held the country together in 1955 as Rhee held Korea together. Then you had the military coup against them. Then you had the efforts of the military to form a government. There are many parallels between the two situations.

NO OTHER CHOICE

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think we should contemplate an investment of some $5 or $10 billion in the country in the next 10 or 15 years.?

Mr. JOHNSON. Let us see, we are running a $1 billion economy. Yes, something in those orders of magnitude.

The CHAIRMAN. You think this is a good bargain for us?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not think we have any other choice. We obviously have a choice of not doing this.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it is to our interests to invest that much.

Mr. JOHNSON. I very, very strongly feel this.

My own feeling is, Senator, that if this struggle is to result in a victory, without defining victory at the moment, for the Chinese theory of violent revolution, that it is going to result in an enormous increase in prestige in the Chinese Communists' winning, every Communist party around the world, and we will be finding a reflection of this in Africa and Latin America. We will be paying a much heavier price over the next generation than we would for the cost of making the stand here at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, you are interested in this matter.

Senator CLARK. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman, but I think I should yield to the more senior members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have any questions?

RISING LIKE A PHOENIX

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are all concerned about the settlement of this dispute. I am a little confused about your outline of what kind of an end will come to this thing. In the past, do you consider that we have ended anything on a satisfactory basis?

We put the Russians in a position of control in the Baltic, in the Balkans. We did not end the Korean situation with anything except a stalemate. It has caused us continuous trouble.

Do you think we have any thought of really cleaning that thing out there or beating the thing to the ground so that it cannot rise like the Phoenix again from the ashes in 2, 3, 4, or 5 years?

It seems to me that it is a futile thing and a disaster if we just pull out of there and say, "Oh well, they have kind of gone back across the border now and are licking their wounds, and maybe they will be good boys." I think we will be right back at it again in a very few years. We did not do it in Cuba. We did not clean that situation out.

Do we have to look forward, do you think, for the next generation or two of just continually half settling these things and have them pop up here, there, and other places again because they only take a respite from their Communist activities and tactics of that kind?

I do not know what the answer is. I hope the answer is one of finality, but I am not sure it is going to be.

Mr. JOHNSON. This goes into the whole question of the Communist bloc.

NO FINAL ANSWERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are not settling anything in the Indian-Kashmir dispute. That is going to fester there. My own personal view is both sides got short of ammunition and were happy to have a respite, but it is going to pop up again. It is bound to. We did not have direct charge of that. All we did was furnish the things for them to shoot with on both sides. I would like to see things brought to a termination if possible, especially where we have undertaken the active, violent participation in these things.

We certainly have taken it on in Southeast Asia. I am supporting what we are doing down there at this point, but I do not know if I will support what we end up doing. It has got its problems. I do not suppose you or anybody else have the full answer to it.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, we certainly do not. I do not know, if you want to be philosophical about it, I just do not feel there are any "final" answers to the problems of the world. Its human relations are a matter of continuing struggle, as long as you have an aggressive China and an aggressive doctrine in China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It appears to me if we just get sort of a standoff in South Vietnam or Vietnam, it will be a complete victory for the Communist world. Maybe not as complete as if they drove us out at the point of a bayonet, but from the propaganda value they can point out that the great United States is not so great after all. They could not even lick them in South Vietnam. They had to finally just call a stalemate and pull out.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not thinking in terms of any stalemate myself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not necessarily think you are.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just wondering here in my speculation on this thing.

Mr. JOHNSON. Until the VC pull back, cease their military terroristic activities, there is no answer to this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot envision, from a practical standpoint, pulling back until they have had the hell licked out of them.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is what we are seeking to do now, that is what we are seeking to do.

ENCOURAGE OTHER SIDE BY OFFERS TO NEGOTIATE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you something else that concerns me very greatly. I want to make it clear that I think we should maintain our position of earnestly seeking a fair, equitable, and reasonable settlement of this thing——

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. On the basis of self-determination. I do not disagree with that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I applaud it but, personally and frankly, I have the feeling that every time the President speaks up or the Secretary of State speaks up about every week or so and says, "Oh, we want to come to the conference table," that all we do is to encourage the other side by repetition. They get the idea that we are rather desperate. I think from the psychological standpoint it probably has an adverse effect rather than an affirmative effect.

I think, having made our position clear and having contacted all these other countries that are trying to help here, that constant repetition of our desire for a conference table on let us say a "no precondition basis" is bound to have an adverse effect. I think it has been a policy of military action for many generations, I do not know how long, the basic theory that when it looks like the enemy would kind of like to surrender, you attack him, if you are dealing from strength; that is, you step up your force, which has the tend-

ency to break his will to fight more, if he is beginning to weaken. That has been done in many wars when feelers have been put out that the enemy would like to talk, you step up your pressure on him. That seems as near assuring the fact that he then will capitulate.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are.

Mr. JOHNSON. We are?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are stepping up the pressure.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

THE DIE IS CAST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am in agreement with what is going on there, and I am in agreement with the necessity of more vigorous action. I think the die is cast. I think we are in it, and I think that is the thing we have to do.

But along with that, I wonder if we are not in some ways—not intentionally—but in some ways encouraging the enemy to think we are getting so damn sick of it that we are going to shoot a few times more and then we will be ready to talk somewhat on their terms. That is not the kind of business we are in now. We are in a business where people are getting killed, and we are in a business where the free world and the Communist world are coming to grips over there, and what effect it will have on Africa and all Southeast Asia, Latin America, and other places is very ominous indeed.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In speculation, anyway.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not expect you to have all the answers here this morning.

Mr. JOHNSON. I might say a couple of words.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just trying to tell you my rather confused thinking and attitude on this thing.

Mr. JOHNSON. One of the fundamental questions always being raised is, what is the attitude of the Vietnamese people with regard to this? Are we engaged in trying to put down a popular rebellion against an unpopular government?

This question is always arising, and it is one upon which we have tried our best to get as objective answers as are possible. It is not easy to get answers. One of our means, in addition to the people that we normally have stationed in the provinces, we have some eight political officers in the Embassy, all who speak Vietnamese and whose sole job is to roam the countryside, talk to the villagers, talk to the officials, talk to our own people to get some judgment on this.

One thing I am convinced, that this is not any——

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, may I ask at this point, these people who go out to inquire, are they white Americans who speak Vietnamese?

Mr. JOHNSON. Oh yes, these are Foreign Service officers.

Senator CHURCH. They are not Vietnamese people themselves.

Mr. JOHNSON. These are Foreign Service people who speak Vietnamese, yes. We use them heavily to try to get as objective a view as we can.

THE REALITIES OF VIETCONG RULE

I am convinced that whatever ideological appeal, the Vietcong may at one time have had, this has long since disappeared under the realities of Vietcong rule. To a degree the Vietcong are victims of their own success. They have been administering considerable areas of the country now for a considerable period of time. This has not brought heaven on earth. Their promises of pie in the sky no longer really exist. Their taxes are higher than the government taxes. They draft boys at a younger age than the government drafts them. They cut off the communications. In flying over the country you can almost outline Vietcong held areas by seeing where the roads and bridges have been cut, and people are not attracted to the Vietcong any longer, if they once were.

Now, this does not mean that they give enthusiastic support to the government, but other things being equal in general, they would prefer to be under the government. I think this is now fairly well established.

BASIC PROBLEM IS SECURITY

I am more and more impressed with the fact, the longer I was out there, that the basic problem is one of security. When you can give security to the people, they rally relatively well to the government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, basically they like to live in their villages and grow their rice and have fun on Saturday night and be let alone.

Mr. JOHNSON. And be let alone.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, their civic or governmental consciousness is not, insofar as loyalty to the central government or area responsibility to the body politic, is not very great; is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not very great.

One of the problems, one of the political problems is the regionalism. You first have regionalism between the north and the south. I really did not fully appreciate this until I went there. The Nordais, that is the people from the north and the Soudais, the people from the south, are a very important political fact. The first question that always comes up with regard to any political appointment is, Is he a northerner or is he a southerner?

Apart from the ideological situation, also the southerners do not want to be run by the northerners. This works in our favor as far as our struggle is concerned against the north. It works against us when it comes to political life in the south. The difficulty that the northern refugees have of getting together in a political way with the southerners, this is what brought Quat down.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean the people in the Middle West do not like to be run by Harvard.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator CLARK. Or vice versa.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or vice versa.

SITUATION IN GO CONG PROVINCE

Mr. JOHNSON. Just a couple weeks before I left, I was down in Go Cong Province, southeast of Saigon. This is an area that has been liberated in the last year from the VC. They had it for about 3 years. I was very impressed with the job the government was doing down there.

Senator CLARK. Where is this, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. Go Cong, G-o C-o-n-g.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Southeast?

Senator CHURCH. South of Saigon, right on the water.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is right straight south according to this map.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I guess it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. G-o C-o-n-g? It is right on the delta there of the Saigon River.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The south mouth.

Mr. JOHNSON. That area was under VC control for about 3 years. During the last year it has been freed, and insofar as the casual observer can determine, the people welcome this and the government is doing a pretty good job.

The VC had closed the schools. The schools are now open and new schools have been built, and if the number of children in the schools is any indication, this certainly was very welcomed. On this I have a feeling that schools are one of the things that the people most desire.

They put an electric light plant in the little district town there. This was obviously welcomed. They have rebuilt the bridges. In general the population is cooperating well with the government and the government seems to be doing a fairly good job.

People think in provincial terms rather than national terms still. In a sense this is 44 or 45 different wars, a different war in each province, and any generalization you make you can prove or disprove by the province that you pick. It is very, very hard to make broad generalizations on it.

GET DOWN TO A ROCKBOTTOM APPROACH

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this as a matter of general observation. You do not need to answer this if you do not want to. I do not want you getting into other fields than your own.

As far as South Vietnam is concerned—I have never been to North Vietnam, but I have been to South Vietnam quite a few times—I have the impression that basically they are pretty vigorous and alert people; that is, so far as their personal vigor is concerned.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are different from the Cambodians, and in many ways they are different from the Thais and certainly the Laotians.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I have the feeling that too many of our programs in so many of these places in the world, in what we call the underprivileged or the underdeveloped countries, we have consistently sent hordes of people into these countries who apparently start with the premise that when you expose aborigines or people who have never had an association, or much, with Western-type civilization, they will be so happy to see Western types of civilization come in that they will embrace them and enthusiastically take the job over and get the job done yesterday.

Mr. JOHNSON. I know what you mean.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are starting in at such a high level that we waste a great deal of our effort, because we just do not get down to the rockbottom, almost infantile approach we have to—I do not mean that these people are not in control in their own way, but so far as modern systems, modern things are concerned, they are in many ways basically infantile. That is especially true in what we consider to be modern political responsibility of the individual to his community. It has been family operation for generations. We just start in at too high a level on these things.

I am not against doing what we can for these countries, but I just think we have not been able to really get our programs right down in the dirt and bring them up step by step. We start at too high a level. We give them machinery and they do not know what to do with it.

I wondered if we have not done that in many places, which frustrates results which we might otherwise see if taken slowly step by step. What are we doing in Vietnam? Are we approaching it at that level?

DEALING WITH PIGS AND CORN

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we are doing it quite well on that now. I will not gainsay the points made except to say that all of us are working in Vietnam, over on the USOM side as well, are very conscious of this problem, and we have consciously been trying to direct our programs down at the grassroots if you will.

We are dealing with pigs, with corn. We are dealing with schools. We are dealing with roofing, concrete, and we are dealing with dispensaries.

I feel on the whole, from my own observation of it, that our programs are pretty realistic and pretty well received. I will not say that there are not exceptions, but in general I feel that we are doing fairly well at it. I am quite impressed with the caliber of the people that USOM has now got there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am glad to hear that.

Mr. JOHNSON. They are quite well organized, and we are organized in quite a different way out there than anyplace else. The USOM has its field operations staff that coordinates all the various other technical bureaus; that is, public health and public administration and these things. They do not operate independently.

A MONEY CROP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is that fiber they raise up north, canaf?

Mr. JOHNSON. Canaf, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that still quite a program up there; do you know?

Mr. JOHNSON. Oh no, that was in the agricultural resettlement area in the highlands.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. The security is very, very bad in those areas.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was up there. It seemed to have a considerable prospect for a money crop for these people up there.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To encourage them to settle down and stop burning off the mountainsides and migrating and so on.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Once when I was there, they had developed a very cheap, simple machine to strip these fibers and get them down to the point where they could separate them and use them. I was just wondering whether the natives—I saw a lot of places where they were working at it, lots of them——

Mr. JOHNSON. I did not observe that myself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. I did not know—it has been several years ago and the country was fairly peaceable then.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. In general, the security situation in those areas has been quite unsatisfactory.

MALARIA PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How about the malaria program around in those areas?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is a malaria program still going on.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they pretty well eradicating malaria?

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they cutting down?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is still a great deal of malaria, and the program has been heavily set back by the security situation, the inability to get into villages.

PIG-CORN PROGRAM

One of the most successful programs has been the pig-corn program. When a hamlet is secured, there is an arrangement under which they can get a well-bred boar and sows. They are given some concrete to make a simple pen. This is very popular.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we can get them to keep the blood in stock for breeding purposes and not eat them on feast day.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, they value the pigs. They value the pigs very much, and this has been very successful.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean until they get them to a——

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I agree with you, Senator, that the Vietnamese people as individuals are very, very capable. In drawing comparisons, I think——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have only an impression.

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. As individuals they are the most capable and vigorous people in Southeast Asia. Their difficulty is that they are individualists and still a very, very high degree of individ-

ualism, and they have difficulty in working together. This is the problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is part of the offshoot of the old family system; is it not?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I think that is in part it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is, man just looks after his own family and his cousins.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They do not care much about who lives over in the next paddy.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have taken too much time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

ROLE OF UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Senator CLARK. Mr. Johnson, I would like to turn your mind temporarily away from Vietnam, if I may, to some other aspects of the job you have before you that you are about to take over. Am I correct that, as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, you will be the principal assistant to Mr. Mann?

Mr. JOHNSON. The terms of reference are not in those terms. I act on behalf, primarily, of the Secretary and the Under Secretary. This, of course, will be worked out between us, but to a degree Mr. Mann concentrates on economic affairs. I concentrate on everything else, primarily relations with the Pentagon, relations with CIA, relations with other Government Departments, and also assisting the Secretary in supervising the Bureaus, the geographic Bureaus, particularly in matters that involve more than one Bureau, being the court of first instance, if you will, in making recommendations to the Secretary in cases of differences of view.

Senator CLARK. Will you have any responsibility over the conduct of our foreign policy in Latin America?

Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly, yes.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC POLICY

Senator CLARK. As you know, this committee is not exactly monolithic, and there are several schools of thought about our Latin American policy. But I wanted to ask you a couple of questions and suggest one point of view, which I realize is not necessarily that of all my colleagues, although I think it is shared by the chairman, and that is the feeling of grave concern about the implications of our Dominican Republic policy, not to get into the question as to whether we did right or whether we did wrong, whether we overreacted or whether we did not, and where to go from here. I would like to make an observation and ask you to comment on it.

It has seemed to me that the inevitable result of what we did in the Dominican Republic has been to alienate those countries in Latin America which should be really our best friends, because they are the countries which are concerned with making the Alliance for Progress work in terms of land reform, education, public health, the breakup of oligarchical and military control, and surge toward a higher standard of living for all the people under a demo-

cratically elected government. I have particular reference to Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, to some extent the Argentine.

Now, in September the House passed a resolution after a relatively short debate which had been favorably reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I would read the resolving part of it: "It is the sense of the House of Representatives that, one, any such subversion or threat"—referring to Communist subversion—"violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American republics and, two, in any such situation"—I interpolate such situation refers to a potential Communist subversive movement—"any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as to resort to armed force in accordance with the declarations of principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, colonization in whatever form by the subversive forces known as international communism, its agencies in the Western Hemisphere."

A HOLY WAR AGAINST COMMUNISM

Now, there are one or two of us in the committee who have been accused of being soft on communism. I do not think we need to defend ourselves from that charge. But I, for one, am very, very gravely concerned that the State Department made no objection to the passage of that resolution by the House.

A number of my colleagues in this body think that we are engaged in a holy war against Godless communism all over Latin America, and I read to you from this morning's Washington Post a dispatch from Bogota, Colombia, which reads:

> Crying "manifestly aggressive," the Colombian Senate called for Parliament to meet urgently to discuss a U.S. House of Representatives resolution approving unilateral military intervention to block communism in the Western Hemisphere. The resolution, which has no legal force, was passed recently by a 312 to 52 vote.
>
> The Colombian Senate said the resolution "represents a return to the unpleasant era of Yankee imperialism." In Mexico City, an echo sounded. The left-leaning Revolutionary Workers' Federation called it "a resurrection of the Monroe Doctrine, the worst threat the people of Latin America have ever faced."

Now, to be sure, Monday morning quarterbacking is easy, and those of us who attacked the action of the administration in the Dominican Republic are all Monday morning quarterbacks. I admit that. Nevertheless, I am gravely concerned as to the posture of our Latin American policy for the reasons I have just outlined, and which the chairman, in my opinion, so brilliantly stated in a speech he made on the floor about a week or 10 days ago.

I wonder if you would comment on that point of view.

Mr. JOHNSON. Really, not avoiding you question, Senator Clark, the last 15 months I have had no contact, of course, directly at all—I have had no firsthand information. I was in Saigon throughout the period of the Dominican developments, so I just do not feel competent to comment on the events surrounding that or the reactions in Latin America.

Certainly, as far as the necessity of the United States adopting a posture and attitude that favors forward movement and reform in Latin America, I think it is very important that we do so. One of the concepts, as I understood it, of the Alliance for Progress, was to associate ourselves with that.

A HARD LOOK AT UNILATERAL INTERVENTION

Senator CLARK. Of course, this is an executive session, and I do not blame you for the answer you have just given. I wish if I had been in your shoes I would be wise enough to make the same reply. But I wish you would take back to our friend, Mr. Mann, that there are some members of this committee who hope he will take another good, hard look as to whether unilateral intervention to overcome by armed force an alleged Communist revolution had better not be done again unless they are very sure indeed that what they are really doing is not going in to support oligarchical and military forces to the detriment of those very elements in the country which ought to be our best friends.

You understand, in making this comment I am not being in any way critical of you.

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Senator CLARK. But I would just like to get that on the record.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator CLARK. I would like to ask a couple of questions about Vietnam if I may, Mr. Chairman, unless somebody else wants to pick up that point.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. Joe, may I just say in that connection that I think that the general proposition that the chairman laid down in his very remarkable and candid appraisal of the Dominican Republic has applicability outside of Latin America. I think it has great applicability in the whole of the underdeveloped world in Asia and Africa, where we will experience many kinds of uprisings in the course of the next generation. It seems to me quite inevitable.

I am not one who believes that the outcome in Vietnam will have a significant effect upon uprisings elsewhere. I think the history of these uprisings demonstrates that they occur wherever internal conditions are such as to invite them and that they break out in scattered, farflung places about the world, and will in the future.

I think that the guidelines indicated in the chairman's address with reference to Latin America are equally applicable in Asia and in Africa. I hope that we will begin to exercise prudent restraint when it comes to unilateral American involvement in these matters.

I think, Mr. Johnson, I agree with a statement you made earlier when you said that many of these situations are not susceptible to a solution. I would say particularly they are not susceptible to an American solution.

I believe ultimately that self-determination is the proper recourse in South Vietnam. I think self-determination is the proper course in Kashmir. I believe it is in East Germany. But for a long,

long time we seem to have been saying that we believed in it in East Germany, and the Communists were saying that they believed in it in South Vietnam.

My only point is that I think the temptation to intervene on a unilateral basis oftentimes proves counterproductive. I think the lessons that we should draw from both the Dominican Republic and Vietnam are very real, and they should be looked at and analyzed very carefully before we plunk into another situation of this kind elsewhere.

PRECONCEIVED VIEWS ON COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS

Senator CLARK. I agree with that, and I would like to make just this additional comment. I happen to have a very high regard for Jack Vaughn, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. I first came in contact with him down in Panama, where I thought, on the basis of a very superficial observation, that he had a very fine understanding of the very complicated political problems in that rather weird little country. His position regarding President Robles I thought made awfully good sense, but when he got into the Dominican Republic business, I thought the panic button was pushed, and much too soon. Mr. Mann came down here and told us there were grave threats to four or five other countries of the same thing happening. He knows the facts far better than any of us could.

But I hope on the basis of preconceived views about a Communist takeover and possibly preconceived views about the vital importance of supporting oligarchical business interests, that we will not jump in again in a situation where it would be wise to take another good, hard look to be sure we were right.

PACIFICATION OF VIETNAMESE COUNTRYSIDE

I would like to ask you a couple of questions of a factual nature. How are we getting along with respect to the pacification of the countryside in South Vietnam?

Ambassador Taylor was down here not too long ago. He showed us a map which indicated that the Vietcong over the last couple of years had succeeded in overrunning most of the real estate in South Vietnam, and we were pretty well holed up in a number of major cities, although it was an ebb and flow back and forth.

Do you think that with this recent increase in military strength, and, as I understand it, the improvement in the military situation, that we are now making more progress in pacifying the countryside? Can this be done without massive American casualties?

Mr. JOHNSON. We are not yet making significantly increased progress. The problem of pacification has been that we have been approaching it, the Vietnamese and ourselves have been approaching it from the standpoint of standard guerrilla, antiguerrilla doctrine of moving out from an oil spot and gradually wringing the guerrillas out of an area and pacifying an area. This the Vietnamese do a fairly good job at. It depends on commanders, local officials, and so on.

The reason it has not worked better than it has is because of the presence of these main force regular VC units, that is, the battal-

ions and the regiments which are not formed as guerrillas but are formed as regular units and have been able to hole up in these base areas, refit, resupply, and plan their next operation and then sally out from there against a pacified area and in a 1- or 2-day operation end a psychological shock through the area that upsets the work that the government has been doing over a long period. This has been the basic problem.

Now, as I conceive it, the main job of the American forces, the reason we are bringing them in, is to deal with these main force units. This is the job that American forces can, I am convinced, and should be able to do, either destroying or neutralizing. I use the term "neutralizing" in the sense of driving them back to areas where they can no longer threaten the pacified areas.

VIETCONG STRATEGY OF AVOIDING BATTLE

This is going to take some time. The strategy that the VC are now adopting is one that we thought they might well adopt, and that is avoiding battle. Given their avoidance of battle, it means that it is going to take our forces a considerable amount of time first to identify and locate these units. You know that, say, in an area of 20 square miles, you have four or five battalions in there but you do not know precisely where they are, and you can do this in two ways. You can get at this problem in two ways, which are complementary, of course. One is doing better on the intelligence side. This is partially a matter of information from the local population and partially a matter of technical intelligence, aerial observation.

Senator CLARK. That is terribly tough; is it not?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is very, very tough indeed.

Senator CLARK. It is a bad country to get good intelligence from.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is very, very tough indeed. Those of you who have flown over the country know you have miles and miles of just these treetops. You know there is a VC unit down there someplace but exactly where it is, you do not know.

Senator CLARK. They also melt into the populace very quickly.

Mr. JOHNSON. These main force units, the term we use, do not operate that way. They do not melt into the population.

You have three levels of VC forces. You have got the main force units, which are your battalions and your regiments armed with Communist bloc arms and what we call regular army. Then you have your regional guerrilla forces, which come from the area and more or less melt into the population. Then you have your village guerrilla forces, which do melt into the population. This is your part-time soldier.

Now, the problem in dealing with the main force units is not so much their melting into the local population as finding them. We are going at this from the standpoint of trying to improve intelligence and also the difficult problem of coordinating and making use of the intelligence you get. That is always a problem, of course, in a situation of this kind, getting it on a timely basis. It is no good to know that this unit was there last week. You need to know where it is today.

PENETRATING VIETCONG BASE AREAS

The other way of going at this is what Generals Westmoreland and McVey are now doing, is these aggressive actions into their base areas. For the first time these base areas are really being penetrated.

Senator CLARK. This is going to run into battle and substantial casualties; is it not?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, well, we have it. We have just had this operation, we are still in the process of this operation north of Ben Cat, north of Saigon. There were probably about 10,000 VC main force units in the area. We have made no real contact thus far. I do not expect that we will.

What they have done is retire, and, as you see, we have run into caches of arms and food and we ran into a hospital area. They can continue to retire and avoid giving battle in these areas up to a certain point in my view. At some point they are going to have to make a stand if we keep at this, or they are going to have to retire from the field. They can sacrifice so much in the way of bases and supplies, but there comes a point where they cannot afford to sacrifice any further if they are going to remain in the field as regular units.

VIETCONG CONTROL OF TERRITORY

Senator CLARK. That map I showed you, which is in front of you now, from this week's issue of Newsweek, is that about accurate in terms of the real estate which the Vietcong control and the real estate which we and our allies control?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have a hard time giving a categorical answer. I am not avoiding it. I never in my own mind out there have been satisfied with this question of the use of control. The problem is that the government controls large areas during the daytime, and the VC control other areas at night. Who controls it?

Senator CLARK. Let me try to define the question, admitting that that is the case and that map is not very different from the one that——

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. From the one that General Taylor showed us the last time he was here.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Is it possible to bring any effective economic aid to people living in areas where the Vietcong control at night and the Vietnamese control in the daytime, or does this not pretty well stymie our economic aid program?

Mr. JOHNSON. It does stymie your economic aid programs. Your economic aid programs can only be really effective in the areas that are under control. So, this gets back to the question again of security.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM

Senator CLARK. And that leads to a further question. Is our economic aid program under present circumstances able to be effective to that extent?

Mr. JOHNSON. There are two aspects to it, the economic. The first is the import program.

Senator CLARK. I can understand that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Supporting the general economy.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is one aspect of it. The other aspect of it is what you are doing out in the countryside.

Senator CLARK. You spoke a minute ago of a situation there where they brought in an electric plant and several other amenities. This could not very well be done in that pink area on that map.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, you are entirely right. No, it cannot. And it is not desirable.

We have had considerable discussion of this. Should you try to do anything in an area that is a disputed area. It is not one that you can give an easy or a quick answer to. Obviously you might try to build a school and you may get some mileage out of this, even though you do not fully control the area. On the other hand, you do not bring in rice or concrete or cement, things that could be of use to the Vietcong. You have got to do it on a selected basis. The effectiveness of it, though, is limited unless and until you can give security.

STABILITY OF THE KY GOVERNMENT

Senator CLARK. What is your impression as to the stability of the Ky government?

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me first say this is not a Ky government in the sense that you had a Khanh government or a Diem government. This is a collegium of the generals.

Senator CLARK. He is not really a dictator.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, no, by no means. All the important decisions are taken by the generals, and he is acting on their behalf. You could well have shifts within the collegium, and I would anticipate there will be some but this would not be an overthrow of the government.

Senator CLARK. This is what we would call in Latin America a junta.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I suppose you could call it a junta. It does bear similarities to that.

Senator CLARK. But in terms of the stability of the collegium government then; what is your opinion?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that it is probably the most stable situation we have had since Diem. In some ways I think it is healthy. Its military forces are the only organized, disciplined forces within the country. For better or worse, they hold political power, and it is better in my view to have them take responsibility for it than it is for them to be acting in the background.

Senator CLARK. Is governmental corruption a serious problem?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I would say it is, but not a disastrous problem.

Senator CLARK. Did you see that article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs, which went into the history and background——

Mr. JOHNSON. George Carver's?

Senator CLARK. Yes.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.
Senator CLARK. Is that substantially accurate?
Mr. JOHNSON. Substantially accurate, a very first-class article.

TELEVISION CREW'S EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Finally, one little vignette which I would like your observation on, which I have been told by a very capable radio and television commentator who went over there and was asked by the USIA to go out with a camera crew and take some television tape in connection with the dedication of a school in a little community not too far from Saigon, which he agreed to do. They went on out there I think in jeeps, fairly rough equipment, and there had not been too much coordination with the Vietnamese army. When they got there, they found that that particular community was about to come under attack by a massive group of Vietnamese airplanes, artillery, armored equipment, and the like. So, they pulled their crew over to the side of the road and stood by pretty well out of shell fire while this massive attack went on for about 45 minutes, after which the armed forces dispersed and returned to their base, and they went out to take their television tape of a little red schoolhouse and the dedication of it and immediately came under rifle fire from the schoolhouse directed at the camera crew by the Vietcong.

Mr. JOHNSON. By the Vietcong?

Senator CLARK. This fellow swore that was true, and he is a fellow I have some confidence in. Does that make any sense to you at all?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, it is entirely possible, entirely possible.

Senator CLARK. It is kind of frustrating.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is kind of frustrating, but it is entirely possible as to the type of thing that can happen.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

PHILOSOPHY NOT UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just make one statement?

I want to assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that the philosophy expressed by Senator Clark and Senator Church in which they asked you to take messages to Tom Mann is not universally shared in this committee.

Mr. JOHNSON. I understood that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will not go into any further detail on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. No questions.

INVESTMENT OF AMERICAN AID

The CHAIRMAN. I want to return, just for my own clarification, to your answer a moment ago about our investment. I recall having a hearing on foreign aid. We had, as I recall it, some of the military representatives here. This was some years ago. At that time our economic investment, not counting the cost of our troops and direct military investment, in economic aid was about $5 billion. It is

probably much more now. I asked the military man—I do not know which general it was; the record will show—what importance to the national security is it to the United States, the continuation of this particular situation in South Korea, and he said, as well as I recall it, that it was very important to our security, that it was like a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, and he strongly supported the continuation of that program indefinitely as I understood him.

Is that your position in South Vietnam? If I understood you correctly, you thought it would take $5 to $10 billion in the next 10 years to maintain a presence there and some degree of stability of the program. This is assuming that this fight as such, I mean violent warfare—do you think it would be a good investment?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sorry, assuming that the warfare ends?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Ten years, $500 million a year? If I could reconsider my answer on that, I do not think we would be in those orders of magnitude if you did not have military action.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you to be a prophet and say what we will spend. This is hypothetical.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is about what we have spent, as I recall it, in South Korea. It is hard to say what we have spent, because if you add the cost of the support of the two divisions of military people there, it is vastly more than that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

INDEFINITE OBLIGATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. We were reviewing foreign aid at the time, and the question that I raised was whether or not it is in our interests to take on these obligations and continue them indefinitely, really supporting the economy of a country there of 20 million people, or is it 14 million people?

Mr. JOHNSON. 14 million people.

The CHAIRMAN. 20 million in Korea and 14 million in South Vietnam?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am still very puzzled about how we can just indefinitely accumulate these satellites, if you like, around the world whenever problems arise. Goodness knows what we are going to be asked to put into India and Pakistan even if they should have a cease-fire. You know there are going to be applications for enormous amounts. Do you not anticipate there will be?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would not think any increased amounts.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would not think so. I do not know. That is my off-the-cuff opinion. I do not see on what basis.

The CHAIRMAN. They clearly diverted a lot of their funds to these military things.

Senator CHURCH. They will have to have their armed forces restored.

Senator CLARK. They have got to get some more ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. And I do not know why they will not ask for it. That has been history in the past.

All I raise, purely as a matter of national interest, is how we ever disengage in these areas. It is a puzzle to me. We are going to be saddled in the Dominican Republic. Once you intervene, you then assume a responsibility, and then you get into a pattern of support which is very difficult to disengage from. As long as you are there and supporting it, I think it interferes with their own efforts to become viable on their own.

Well, why not? This is an easier way for them to just continue to accept our support.

THE DOMINO THEORY

I do not know. Really I am very puzzled about what the ultimate outcome of this is. This recent thing—we have often had the domino theory expounded that we are holding the fort in South Vietnam, but the domino theory now begins to look a little odd in reverse. Here is Sukarno in behind this fort we are holding, evidently growing in his direction, and if the Chinese wish to do it—I do not think they are going to do it, as a matter of fact—but if they wish to, they outflank us. They can go in through India through Assam. They go into Burma, and here we stand maybe as an isolated island in Vietnam holding the fort, and all around you you have this. This confuses a layman such as myself about these theories, about their holding the fort.

And the investment in material, time, and effort and everything else in a place like this seems out of proportion to its importance to our security in contrast, for example, to the interest we have in maintaining the independence of Western Europe, where there is real power, I mean power that could be very effective in case of an emergency. I cannot imagine that there is any power in South Vietnam that would help us in any emergency, because they cannot even defend themselves. They cannot even maintain themselves.

Just leaving out all kinds of possible prejudices and ideological conflicts and so on, which I know you cannot do as a practical matter, but if it is possible to analyze it from this point of view, it does not look like a good investment to me to put that kind of money and effort and time and personnel, people, into a godforsaken little piece of real estate where the people, as Senator Hickenlooper said, all in the world they want to do is grow a little rice and be let alone. And neither we are letting them alone nor are the others letting them alone. This bothers me. I do not know what the policy ought to be.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with the chairman. I have to leave. I want to wish you well.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. It is very, very good to see you.

TO DENY THE TERRITORY TO THE ENEMY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not follow that idea. I mean I am not in accord with it. I do not think fundamentally and basically we are in there to save one country or one piece of real estate. We are in there to deny possession of that great territory and the resulting influence which the possession of international communism

would have. We are in there to deny that very important strategic area to the enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. But then it becomes a question of judgment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just like taking hill 14 in a battle. Hill 14 probably had been broken to pieces and would not grow anything and is not worth anything, except you deny that to the enemy where he can have a great advantage over you if he gets it. I think that is probably the justification of this thing in my mind. It is not a question of saving this country or that country, as an individual country.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not that simple though. You can make this argument on a lot of other places. We can say Yugoslavia is a very unique and a very strategic area down there in the center of the Balkans and so on. How can we tolerate it being under a Communist regime? We do tolerate it. In fact, I do not think it is any threat at all to us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not international communism that controls Yugoslavia.

Senator MUNDT. Yugoslavia was led into the regime by an indigenous Yugoslav Communist by the name of Tito.

OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What I want the Ambassador to explain to me—and I am very ignorant about these matters—is how in the world it is worthwhile to the taxpayers of Arkansas and of Iowa and of Pennsylvania to invest anything between $5 and $10 billion in South Vietnam in the next 5 or 10 years. These are just rough estimates.

Our prestige has become involved, because we got in there with an aid program and so on. Now, I understand as of the moment—and I am not advocating that we just give up, because of prestige. That is another matter. We cannot turn tail, and as you say, I think, properly, because we have been challenged in this area; we think we have, we have stated we have, and this has grown up in 10 years, that as of the moment we have got to do the best we can. I am not saying let us just turn tail.

But if this settles down—you said probably it would within a year, you hoped it would within a year.

Mr. JOHNSON. I hope, optimistically.

The CHAIRMAN. Optimistically.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And your people, Mr. McNamara, have been overly optimistic for a number of years. You will admit that. The judgment as to the progress of that struggle——

Mr. JOHNSON. I want the record to show I said not less than a year.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. I do not want to tie you down to that. I do not care if it is a year or 6 months or 2 years. But when that happy day comes, if it does, I do not quite see how we are justified to take this on as a client and just support them indefinitely at this time. I think we should foresee the time and say, "Boys, you are on your own. Now you do the best you can. If you can maintain yourself, all right. If not, why, you ally yourself with Burma or

with Cambodia or with North Vietnam or anybody else." I do not care who, once we get our prestige disentangled and we are not being run out, driven out, and embarrassed in that fashion, that kind of an element which I think is wholly irrational but a fact of life, and I do not ignore it. We have always been subject to that.

Senator CLARK. It seems to me it is a big question of judgment as to whether we are better off if they hold hill 108 or whether we hold hill 108, because the obligations in holding on to hill 108, which nobody wants, may not be worth it.

STUCK WITH A LAND WAR IN ASIA

It has always seemed to me we made an awful mistake when we got into there in the first place. We should be exercising whatever sea and air power we have from the islands of Japan coming on down through Formosa and the Philippines. Now we are stuck with a land war in a land base in Asia, and, as the chairman says, we cannot get out because of prestige and status.

The CHAIRMAN. At one time it was said by no less authority, I think, than General MacArthur that we should not become engaged in a land war on the Continent of Asia, and I think other eminent leaders, military as well as political, have said that. I think they had the idea that Senator Clark has, that if we are going to hold the line, it would be a series of island bases where naval and air power is really effective and can be brought to bear upon the situation. But now we have gone into the very place where it is extremely difficult, and I think we all agree this is a difficult terrain for our kind of military power.

Senator CLARK. We might think what happened to Athens when they went on that Sicilian expedition and fouled everything up. If they had stayed home, they would have been a lot better off.

STEPPING INTO THE FRENCH SHOES

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know where we go from here. I am not in a position to challenge what you are doing now. In fact, I have said that the President has no alternative but to pursue this particular controversy, this war that you are having, to some kind of a conclusion if possible. But over the longer term, I do not know where this country goes.

I would imagine the Vietnamese themselves have already got the impression that we stepped into the French shoes, and they suspect that we are not there just purely as an altruistic thing, that we are a pawn in a much larger game, and I suspect, not knowing anything about it, that we are not going to be a bit more popular than the French were. Even now we are not. We are white and we have many of these customs. We live better than they do and we have most of the same characteristics that the French have. We are running the government for them. We are telling them what to do, are we not? We have to.

Mr. JOHNSON. If I may comment on that, Senator, I know this is a part of the problem of which we have been very, very conscious, and all I can say very, very honestly is that I do not think that at this stage the Vietnamese feel that we are in the French shoes or that we are acting like the French.

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This has been an enormous contrast. Westmoreland and others there have been very, very conscious of this problem and have done a perfectly splendid job in indoctrinating officers and indoctrinating the men.

I talk about our provincial reporters, our people who try to keep their ears to the ground and all this. There has not yet arisen any hostility or any resentment toward Americans or any tendency to compare them with the French. Quite the opposite, the spontaneous statement you get is, "You are so different from the French."

WHO IS RUNNING THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

As far as running the government, no, we are not running the government.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not? Is Mr. Ky running the government? Do you really mean that?

Mr. JOHNSON. I really mean that, I really mean that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do? Well, frankly I do not believe you, in spite of your——

Mr. JOHNSON. In some ways it would simplify things maybe if we were running the government. Our complications arise from the fact that we are not running the government. We did not choose Prime Minister Ky.

Senator CLARK. That is true, I guess.

Mr. JOHNSON. We can influence him on what he does, and we try to influence him.

The CHAIRMAN. Could he last a week if you did not support him in every way possible? Does he have any resources of his own that he could maintain himself?

Mr. JOHNSON. In the broad sense, the country, of course, is dependent on us.

The CHAIRMAN. Completely?

Mr. JOHNSON. The country is dependent on our support.

The CHAIRMAN. And the government?

Mr. JOHNSON. This is different from saying that we dictate what the government does.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see how it is, Mr. Ky could not last a week if you were not right in there paying all the bills and doing everything that has to be done to keep the society running.

Senator CLARK. He has got a few cards in his hands, too, I would think.

LIMITS ON INFLUENCING INTERNAL POLITICS

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. We can only influence the internal political situation within limits. I think past experience has shown this. My own theory on it is that insofar as we do intervene directly and patently in the internal political situation, we only bring about an artificial situation which cannot last. We intervened. September 13 Westmoreland and I worked all day and all night saving Khanh from the coup d'etat. Looking back on it, all we did is prolong his life a little bit and perhaps it would have been better to let things go as they were.

This question is always being raised with me out there: Why do you not get more directly into their affairs?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said saving Khanh's life?

Senator CLARK. His political life.

Mr. JOHNSON. His political life. People are always saying to me, "Why do you not get more directly into affairs? Why do you not run affairs more directly?"

My answer always has been that the longer I was there, the less competent I felt really to do so. We just do not know enough ourselves about the forces at work within this to ourselves be able to make the decisions on these things.

Let me, if I can, go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, foreign aid is on the floor. Are there any other questions?

[No response.]

APPROVAL OF THE NOMINATION

The CHAIRMAN. Could we vote? The motion has been made to confirm Mr. Johnson. You are in favor of this?

Senator CLARK. Yes, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion has been made to report his nomination favorably. All in favor say "aye."

[Chorus of "aye's."]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed "no."

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd wants to be recorded as favoring the nomination of Mr. Johnson. The "aye's" have it, and the motion is carried.

NOMINEE'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, I am not trying to peddle the speech. But I gave a talk in Japan on my way through at which the Prime Minister, the cabinet, and others were present which sets forth my own—this is tailored to Japan, but sets forth my own views very much. I wrote this entirely myself on Vietnam. I would be glad to make the text available to you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to see a copy of it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I included some factual information in here which we compiled out in Saigon that has not previously been used.

The CHAIRMAN. We can have some copies made of it. Do you have other copies?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not have another copy with me.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have some copies made.

I have got to say something about this foreign aid bill. I was asked to come to the floor, and if you will excuse me——

Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly.

ISSUES LEFT UNFINISHED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to try to make it clear here—I said a while ago I endorse what is happening in South Vietnam. I draw a sharp distinction, and always have, between approval of steps that have gone on in the past, some of which I disagree with, but I approve the conduct of the situation inasmuch as we are in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Under present conditions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I mean we have assumed something there. Whether I approve of all the things that led up to the assumption of this responsibility or not, I do not know, but I still think, who was it, Nathan Hale said, "My country is right," but right or wrong we are in this situation, and I hate to see us not finish it.

We have so many things we have not finished, that we have got dangling in the air over various places of the world, and I think the chips are down pretty much here. This has got to be brought to a conclusion. I do not necessarily mean we have to overrun North Vietnam. I do not necessarily mean that. I can certainly conceive that the time might come under certain circumstances that we will have to try to take care of the whole situation from a military standpoint, I mean in connection with the actions we are taking now, in order to settle it and bring it to the point where in all reasonable possibilities the adventures of international communism would at least be brought to a halt in that particular area for a very substantial period of time. I do not know what will happen 25 years from now.

TERMS FOR LEAVING VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. That leads to my question which you may have answered while I was out of the room. Have you decided in your own mind and would you be willing to place here in the record your very knowledgeable suggestions as to what you consider the acceptable accomplishments which we should attain in Vietnam before getting out?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He did cover that earlier.

Mr. JOHNSON. I said a withdrawal of all the cadres, the personnel, and the people that are working for the north in the south, and a substantial end to the insurgency. There is always going to be some disorder in the country, as there will be in any country, but I would say an end to the present insurgency, a dissolution of the National Liberation Front being a part of this.

CAPACITY OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Senator MUNDT. Do you feel that the present government, the people over there, have the capacity to make a go of it on their own without further guidance and direction from us or somebody else, if we produce this absence of bloodshed and conflict?

Mr. JOHNSON. As much capacity and in some ways a little bit more than many similar situations. I would not say they have any absolute capacity. I was talking about the problem previously, about the problem of political development, political maturity there.

Senator MUNDT. Do you think they can make a success of their government in Saigon if we use the formula that they adopted in Laos?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think this would be fatal. I think this means the loss of the country. In fact, this is the Liberation Front strategy, and they have been very frank about it. The first step is a coalition government; the next step, Liberation Front takes over the govern-

ment; the next next step, amalgamation with the north. They have been very frank about that.

A PYRRHIC VICTORY

Senator MUNDT. I am glad to hear you say that forthrightly, confidently, and emphatically as you have, because it completely reflects my own point of view and my greatest concern about the great trouble and travail and bloodshed which we are involved with in Vietnam, that we wind up with a Pyrrhic victory as we have so many other places in the world.

I have no confidence at all that a government so young and inexperienced running Saigon can win out if they have such a Communist cell within their own government, a coalition arrangement. It did not work in Laos. I do not know any place it has worked throughout history, and my concern about the situation in Vietnam I also have to a much lesser degree in connection with the situation in the Dominican Republic.

Every step we have made up to the point where we start driving out of the country the people who are fighting against the Communists—and I am concerned about that primarily because of the psychological impact it has got to have upon the Communist leadership in that area. When they see us helping the symbol of resistance to be kidnaped, regardless of all the other things, it is certainly going to be an encouraging indication to the Communists in the area. We stay stubborn, act mean, refuse to cooperate until Joe Doe and Sarah Doe and somebody else gets taken out, we begin to muscle into places where we should not be.

A COALITION WOULD BE FATAL

I have seen no indication that this is going to happen in South Vietnam, except I get a little bit squeamish when we talk about negotiations at a time when we are not operating from strength. If we negotiate as equals or from a position of weakness, I think we are going to wind up with some aspects of coalition and I think that that would be fatal.

Mr. JOHNSON. The word "neutralism" in South Vietnam is a euphemism for a coalition government. This is well understood throughout the country, and this is really what the war is about. The efforts of the Liberation Front are to establish a coalition government, as I pointed out, the first steps toward consolidation with them.

Senator MUNDT. I presume that is right because they have got an unbroken record of successes. Bourke and I heard Madam Chang in a very interesting little sentimental and inspiring oration upstairs here. She did not deal with any of the specifics of world affairs, but she made a happy phrase about how the wheels in her mind began revolving to find out, after she had looked at the legend on the tombstone someplace which said, "Nowhere does freedom come cheaply," she began to get those wheels revolving, "If I can find a single exception as I know history." She said she could not.

From what I know of history, I can find no single exception to the fact that when the Communists can penetrate a government in a comparatively underdeveloped area of the world with a coalition

arrangement, I do not know of any but that they have taken over. Maybe there are some, but I do not know about them.

The tragedy, it seems to me, would be written in letters as tall as an elevator on a Kansas prairie in Kansas City, KS, if, after doing all of this difficulty—and I agree with the policy that we are caught in a trap and we have got to resist—but if it is settled on that kind of basis, that would be tragic.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Carl and I sat in a meeting with some non-Communist ministers in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1947, and we heard this fellow almost break down and say, "If we do not get some firm help of some kind here, in 6 months the Communists will take us over because they have put Communists in this government. We have got them in the ministry." It was almost 6 months to the day when the Communists moved in. They took over. They got themselves in these positions and moved in, a coalition setup.

Senator MUNDT. Like the cat that swallows the canary, she is just waiting for this thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We do not seem to learn.

A SETTLEMENT WORTH THE PRICE

Senator MUNDT. I think that we are moving along toward success in Vietnam, and as we move along toward success, I think we should step up our firmness to be sure that the settlement is worth what we have been compelled to pay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With respect to dealing from weakness or strength which you brought up a moment ago, I think we are in a position of strength today. Whether we deal from a position of strength or not is another thing.

Senator MUNDT. This is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or whether we, having a position of strength, then begin to deal on the basis——

Senator MUNDT. I am not sure we have gotten quite strong enough to deal on that basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. I am saying we are in a position of strength and hopefully we will get stronger in that position. Then if we abandon that and begin to compromise, we will be abandoning a position of strength.

Senator MUNDT. How long were you in Saigon?

THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADMINISTRATION

Mr. JOHNSON. About 15 months. I went there a year ago last June.

Senator MUNDT. What procedures or processes would you employ to train the South Vietnamese in the techniques and the disciplines of self-governent?

Mr. JOHNSON. This cuts across the board of a lot of what we are doing. At the technical, administrative level we have advisers out in the provinces, civilian advisers. Our subsector advisers, McVey, sector advisers at district level also try to help the local district chief with his administration. At the national level we have the National Institute of Administration.

Senator MUNDT. National what?

Mr. JOHNSON. Institute of Administration, which is turning out administrators to become assistant province chiefs and things of that kind.

Senator MUNDT. Do you have this in one place or are there several of those?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is one National Institute.

Senator MUNDT. Can you give me a picture of it, how it operates, so I can close my eyes and see a five-story building off somewhere, who the faculty is, where they came from? Can you give us a word picture?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is a modern building of about five stories. It has some 400 to 500 students, as I recall it, with a 3-year course. This was founded some years ago, and the faculty is now entirely Vietnamese who were brought here to the United States for training. Many of them had their Ph.D.'s.

Senator MUNDT. Their technical training someplace, I presume, in the academic environment of America.

Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, yes, and have gone back and are now running the Institute.

At the level of political life a great deal of our activity is what I would call informal activity. I talked earlier about the difficulty these people had in carrying on a dialog. We do a great deal at all levels of bringing them to our homes, bringing them in together and just sitting down and talking with them and getting them to talk with us. We talk with each other. We do this—Ambassador Taylor and I used to do it, Ambassador Lodge is now doing it—and we do it at lower levels with our political officers. This is a continuous process.

Senator MUNDT. The faculty in the institute, as I understand it, is comprised of Vietnamese who have learned about government by spending some time in college environment, campuses and classrooms of American universities.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. As a matter of fact, all of them were trained before I arrived there, and they are now in place. Exactly what their training consisted of, I am not personally and directly familiar with, except that they did have their training in the States. They had some exposure in Washington here also. Now this is at the administrative level, not at the political level.

SETTING UP VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

Senator MUNDT. When you capture a village and out go the Vietcong and in come the loyal Vietnamese, how do you set up the village government?

Mr. JOHNSON. The first process is bringing in the police. We are laying heavy emphasis upon training, increasing the strength and increasing the training of police, with the objective of identifying and getting out of the village what we call the infrastructure, that is, the leftists——

Senator MUNDT. At this moment of history you bring in the police, who is it that is in charge of the village, the United States, Vietnamese officers?

Mr. JOHNSON. Always Vietnamese officers. In no case is it Americans.

Senator MUNDT. They move in the day after the Vietcong move out—he is a military man; you bring in the police?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, may I say that the military officers, the Vietnamese battalion commander, moves on out with his battalion, and the symbol of government that comes in is the district officer, the district chief.

Senator MUNDT. The district military officer?

Mr. JOHNSON. District chief who is usually a military man, but has a civilian function. He exercises both a civilian and a military function. He is essentially a civilian official.

Senator MUNDT. Does a civilian command or the military? He has to have some boss. Who is he?

Mr. JOHNSON. His boss is the province chief.

Senator MUNDT. He selects him?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is a process. Yes, he and the central government appoint the district chiefs. He also wears two hats, the province chief——

Senator MUNDT. He is the province chief?

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. He is the province chief. The province chief is usually a military officer now, but in some cases he is also a civilian. He has two functions. He has a military function, which is command of the regional forces. That is sort of a national guard, in our terms, of the province. Those are the forces that remain in the province, and they are normally under his command.

VILLAGE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Then in each village—let me clarify this. As we used the term in South Vietnam, a village is closer to what we could call a hamlet, and what we call a village is a hamlet; a collection of 1,000 or 1,500 people living in one place is a hamlet. The village is subdivided into hamlets. So, we usually talk about hamlets and what happens in a hamlet.

Your chain of civilian command is from the province chief to the district chief to the village chief. The village chief may be appointed or he may be the traditional village chief that has been selected by their own. Then from the village chief to the hamlet chief.

Now, the process is when the Vietnamese forces move in, they move out the VC, the first thing that happens is that the village chief and the district chief go into the village and start organizing and recruiting what are known as popular forces. This is sort of a village militia that serves full-time in the village, and their sole job is to defend the village or the hamlet.

At the same time, under the authority of the district chief and the village chief, the police are moved in to give identification cards to the inhabitants, try to identify members of the VC infrastructure and get them out of the village. Then they send in what they call political action cadres. These are people who are trained in helping the village or the hamlet organize the government. What they do is propaganda, and assistance in organizing the government, and at some point when they think it is ready, they have an election in the hamlet for selecting the hamlet chief.

Senator MUNDT. How well trained and by whom is the village chief? He is kind of an important cog.

Mr. JOHNSON. He is an important cog and is not too well trained. Usually he is the traditional head of the village. He is somebody who over the years by common consent, in some cases by formal election, in some cases appointment—it is not uniform—is recognized as the head.

Senator MUNDT. But in terms of training in governmental administration as a chief, is he pretty much of a novitiate?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, he is as far as the modern system is concerned, but he knows his people, and he knows the traditional setup in the village, and is looked upon by common consent in the village as being their head and as a representative and spokesman. He is not a national government administrator. He is the local man.

Senator MUNDT. How well trained and by whom and in what district is the fellow who has several hamlets?

Mr. JOHNSON. This varies a great deal. In some cases he may be an army officer with little training in the arts of civil government; but he may have an assistant district chief who has come out of this National Institute of Administration. You just cannot generalize on it.

DEVELOPING POLITICAL CAPACITY

Senator MUNDT. I do not want to prolong this, but I would like to visit with you personally about it some time, because I have a sneaking feeling in the seat of my pants that where we are losing the war in Vietnam to the extent that we are and where we are weak and in no position to lead from strength is that we are not doing nearly the job from the standpoint of developing the political capacity for those who are going to have to run the country after we are gone, as we have done in developing the military capacity of the Vietnamese, who, as I understand the picture, do a fine and creditable job of fighting when given the opportunity.

Would you say that there is some reason that I might have for having that suspicion, or would you say it is completely unjustified?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, I would say it is justified, and I would say it is something that is much more difficult to come to grips with than the military. It is something that we are very conscious of and are trying to work at.

Senator MUNDT. I think one reason, Mr. Ambassador, that we are not able to come to grips with it, in addition to the fact that it presents in many ways a more difficult problem, is the fact that we do not have the American machinery to do that which is comparable to the excellent military machinery that we have with the military job. We are equipped in that. We have got a whole great big Pentagon full of people who know how to train somebody to fly a plane, to navigate a plane, and manipulate a gun. But I think you have got to admit we do not have anything comparable in the political field to train our warriors there and elsewhere to do the job which I think equally needs to be done.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM

Mr. JOHNSON. May I comment? One of the problems, of course, is that in the military field there is a right way of doing things, a right way and a wrong way. We usually know the right way, and if it is right in the United States, it is right in Vietnam.

Senator MUNDT. No, no, we have not learned. The guerrilla kind of war in Vietnam is completely different.

Mr. JOHNSON. I left myself open on that.

Senator MUNDT. There is a Vietnamese aspect to what we do militarily.

Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, yes.

Senator MUNDT. There is a Vietnamese aspect as to what we do politically.

Mr. JOHNSON. The point I was making, more so politically.

Senator MUNDT. Probably so.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the point I was making or trying to make, that the way of running a township official in the United States, planted in a Vietnamese village, his experience has little applicability except doing it in a Vietnamese way and adapting it to a Vietnamese way much more so than with the military.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I completely agree, just as the same is true when you are doing the kind of fighting that you have to do in swamps and valleys, which is considerably different from the kind of situation that is taught at West Point.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

ACADEMIC THEORIES ABOUT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Senator MUNDT. What I am getting at is that, as I see the political cadres that we try to send into various parts of the world—and I will give you an illustration. Santo Domingo, which is coming up pretty fast, is another one. I think we are kind of subject to the criticism that George Bernard Shaw made of people like me who used to teach in a teachers' college. You may recall his phrase when he said, "Those who can, do. Those who cannot do, teach. Those who cannot teach, teach others to teach."

I think that is what is happening to the Vietnamese. They go to Harvard, Yale, and Princeton and get a very fine course in academic theories about public administration. Unless we start giving them something more practical when they come there and something which is compatible with what we do for the young military people who come here from Vietnam and elsewhere, the Lord is certainly going to have to be riding high on our side if we win any victories. I think we are completely and almost totally unprepared to do the job we have got to do in terms of political leadership around the world with people who are able to handle the kind of administration required in the various underdeveloped countries where they have to do things substantially different from what is written about in textbooks here, which are designed to train people to be good government people and servants in a developed society. It is an altogether different problem.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. I guarantee you cannot find a textbook in the libraries of any of those colleges to which these fellows come when

they have gone from Vietnam that have got the kind of things adapted to the village arrangement that you mentioned as to the line of command and so forth which is traditional. What we have got to teach them to do is to do better the things that they are going to do anyhow.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. In terms of government.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

Senator MUNDT. I am delighted that a man of your experience and background, who has lived in the lap of futility in that area for so long, is now the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am? I did not know that.

Senator MUNDT. I do not know what that means.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A little item of appointment that comes along.

Senator MUNDT. You are kind of in charge of the political war in the State Department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is not yet. The President can still change his mind.

Senator MUNDT. We have confirmed him.

So, I have great confidence in you. You have got a very fine record, and I am just trying to shake you up a little bit to make your realize that at least 12 Members of the Senate think we are doing so little that we have got to introduce a bill to try to get started doing something and the House committee has unanimously reported it.

If we cannot get any cooperation and leadership at your end of the avenue, we are going to do if from the legislative end, because I do not think we can afford to eat up American boys and American capital in military efforts unless we are prepared to move in with this kind of competent guidance and training required to make these victories meaningful and enduring. I will talk to you about this some time privately.

You look to me like a new white hope. We have had nothing but the great Russian chorus of nyet, nyet from your end of the avenue for 6 years, in spite of the fact that the Senate one time passed this. They martialed their troops, defeated it in the House, set up the Perkins committee to prove that we were wrong, and the Perkins committee said we were right, that the vacuum existed. They brought up a sorry substitute as an offset.

In your part of the world and mine, we had little backfires against prairie fires in the early days. But this is a job that needs to be done. So, I salute you as a new white hope and trust that we can get something done,

That is all, Mr. Acting Chairman.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thank you for the title. I guess there is nothing else.

Mr. JOHNSON. Very good to see you again.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING LATIN AMERICA

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On September 15, 1965, Chairman Fulbright delivered a speech in the Senate blaming the Johnson administration's decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic on poor advice that the President received from representatives in Santo Domingo. Fulbright charged that the United States intervened not to save American lives but out of fear of a Communist victory; that this fear was based on inadequate evidence; that the United States missed opportunities to mediate among Dominican factions; and that U.S. policy was "marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation." Fulbright questioned the legality of American intervention, and urged the administration to pursue a policy of greater reliance on the Organization of American States.

In the Senate, several Senators took strong objection to Fulbright's conclusions, and in the House, Representative Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (D-Alabama), chairman of the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced H. Res. 560 which endorsed unilateral use of force by any Western Hemisphere country to prevent a Communist takeover anywhere in the hemisphere. On September 20, under a suspension of the rules, the House voted 312 to 52 in favor of the Selden resolution.]

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:55 p.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Morse, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Senator Javits; Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, if it meets with your permission, we will start the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It is actually a meeting of the subcommittee but if you insist, I recognize the Senator from Oregon to proceed.

Senator MORSE. I insist.

I would like to say to the committee that Senator Symington, Senator Aiken, and Senator Javits indicated they will be right down, but I don't think we should wait any longer as a matter of courtesy to Secretary Mann.

Mr. Chairman, I called this meeting of the American Republics Subcommittee to consider mushrooming reports of adverse Latin American reactions to the so-called Selden resolution, H. Res. 560, which was adopted by the House of Representatives last week by a vote of 312 to 52. I believe that at least three parliamentary bodies in Latin America have protested that action. The Department of

State has been criticized for failing to publicly oppose House action on the resolution.

It seemed to me that the Department of State should have an opportunity to meet with us—and I have invited the full committee to attend today—to express its views on the Selden resolution, the Javits-Carlson resolution, S. Con. Res. 56, and my resolution, cosponsored by Senator Clark and Senator Young of Ohio, S. Res. 150, which I introduced yesterday.

I invite Secretary Mann to comment on these resolutions, and I am sure that the Senators will have questions later. But I think that we need, Secretary Mann, in addition to whatever else you wish to say, for you to give us an account as to whether or not it would have been wise or unwise in the opinion of the Department for it to make a statement for public consumption both here and abroad as to the State Department's and administration's reaction to the Selden resolution as passed in its final form.

I have read all the testimony that is released in connection with the hearings, including Mr. Sayre's testimony, and we can discuss our views on that later in the hearing. But as my two speeches in the Senate show, I am very much concerned about the representations that have been made to us from Latin America. When a president of Latin America sends an emissary to see me directly, I felt, as you know I always feel, that under those circumstances they should be talking to the State Department, not to me, but it was some indication, at least to me, of the concern that exists in Latin America.

OPPOSITION TO THE SELDEN RESOLUTION

My own views in opposition to the Selden resolution and my feeling of the lack of wisdom, as expressed in my two speeches in the Senate—but I thought it was only fair and right that before criticism continues to grow, and possibly like a prairie fire, that this hearing might be salutary and you might be able to use this hearing as a basis for making any statement that you might want to make that later could be made public.

But, as of now, Mr. Chairman, I want the Secretary to know this is an executive session. Nothing will go out of this session unless the State Department authorizes, as they did in the House, I understand, a version of the hearings from which they eliminated any security matter that they think needs to be eliminated.

Senator CLARK. Will the Senator yield before the Secretary replies?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. I understood these consultative committees have no legislative authority, but I wonder if we might include in the statement of the views we would like to get from the Secretary his opinion as to whether the recommendation in due course by this committee of either the Morse or Javits-Carlson resolutions, or a combination of the two, might not go a long way to offset what appear to me to be very unfortunate results all over Latin America because of the passage of the Selden resolution.

Senator MORSE. I take for granted the Secretary would discuss that. I have questions that I am going to ask him later, depending

upon his opening statement. I intend to press my resolution before the committee, both my subcommittee and the full committee, to seek to get it to the floor of the Senate for Senate action. I think it is very important that the Senate, under the Constitution, which has the advise and consent power, and not the House of Representatives, should be advising the administration officially as to what we think ought to be foreign policy in a field such as this.

THREE RESOLUTIONS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, before Secretary Mann proceeds, I would just like to state that even before the Selden resolution was offered or considered in the House, Senator Javits and I thought about the resolution, we visited about it. We thought it might be of some help in the situation in Latin America and that is why we threw it in. We have written a letter to our distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which he has not received, asking that we get the views of the State Department on it. That is as far as we have gone in this resolution.

Senator MORSE. I will ask to have the Selden resolution, Javits resolution, and the Morse-Clark-Young resolution printed in the record.[1]

JURISDICTION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I object to the subcommittee assuming any powers in excess of those that are granted and existent under the presently established rules. Whatever shall be done must be done under the aegis and authority of the whole committee, and I assume that we are now meeting as a subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is correct, but it is very proper for the subcommittee, as I understand it, with the permission of the chairman, to have a reporter here, to take testimony, and to make a recommendation to the full committee. The action, if any, will be taken, I presume tomorrow morning when the full committee meets; if there is any agreement on the subcommittee as to what action they recommend to the full committee, the full committee will act on it tomorrow morning if they wish to.

Senator MORSE. May I say, Mr. Chairman, for the record, there is no question about the jurisdiction of my subcommittee to be printed to conduct such a meeting as I am conducting.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. Out of this subcommittee will go forth, as many times in the past, whatever recommendations to the full committee it wishes to make, and I expect to be making recommendations to the full committee tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a meeting scheduled for tomorrow morning, as everyone knows. This, among other things, could be considered.

Mr. Secretary, you might proceed.

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[1] See appendix C.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS C. MANN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, it might be helpful if I describe what really happened in connection with the Selden resolution in a chronological way so we get this clearly in our minds.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you first describe the essence of the Selden resolution?

The CHAIRMAN. You have it before you.

Mr. MANN. There were a number of resolutions introduced, I believe, again last year in the House and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. We were not particularly anxious, for reasons which I can explain later, to push consideration of these resolutions, but hearings were called and Mr. Sayre, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, testified.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask—was the Selden one introduced last year?

Mr. MANN. I am not clear. I heard of one introduced by Congressman Flood. I believe maybe Mr. Selden had one of his own. I think there were several pending before the committee, if my information is correct.

Senator CLARK. There were several.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MANN. In his testimony in executive session before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Sayre made these points. First, he said that the Department of State is generally in accord with the objective of the proposed resolutions, that is plural, which recognize that the American States consider international communism a danger to their national sovereignty and are determined to exercise, when appropriate, their rights of individual and collective self-defense to combat Communist aggression and intervention in the hemisphere. That was the first point.

The second point he made was that one of the cardinal principles of the inter-American system is that of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. He made very clear that the United States subscribed to the policy of nonintervention.

Then the third point that he made was that any official public statement made by the U.S. Government should clearly recognize the important role of the OAS and the entire inter-American system to assure that effective collective action is taken to safeguard the peace and security of the hemisphere.

Then the fourth, main point that he made was that the final whereas clause in the amendment which the committee was considering should be amended in a certain way.

The fifth point he made was that the second operative paragraph should be modified to read in a way in which he suggested.

MISTAKE IN PROCEDURES

Now following—I hurriedly read the record, and my own conclusion or opinion is that a mistake was made in trying to draft a highly technical, very difficult resolution by exchanging comments across the table in a hearing such as the one we are having today. I

think the mistake was in not getting a piece of paper, not getting the State Department lawyers to sit down with the committee staff and whatever members the committee wanted to draft on it and come up with something which was consistent with, precisely consistent with, the rules laid out in the inter-American system.

Mr. Sayre thought that his points had been clear——

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Who?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Sayre, who represented the State Department in testifying before the committee.

The committee staff, according to my information, which I get from Mr. Selden, then proceeded to draft a resolution which the Department of State did not see. They made certain changes. As near as I can tell, the typist even left out the main line in one of the clauses, just, I presume, a typographical error; I couldn't explain it any other way.

Senator AIKEN. I could.

Mr. MANN. It was the resolution that was passed by the committee, I am told by Mr. Selden, unanimously. It was sent to the floor under a rule which permitted no amendments.

This came to my attention late Friday afternoon, and I believe about the same time to the attention of Mr. Sayre, who brought it, the problem, to me.

SELDEN RESOLUTION WAS DEFECTIVE

Preceding the Monday on which the House would take action on both resolutions, I immediately called Mr. Selden by telephone and said that I thought the resolution was very defective and suggested that we sit down with the committee and the State Department people, and specifically Mr. Meeker, our legal adviser, and agree on what changes ought to be made. Mr. Selden said that the rule did not permit this.

I suggested that the resolution might well be withdrawn and rewritten and reconsidered by the committee and sent to the floor. Mr. Selden said he didn't think that would be acceptable.

We agreed at that point to meet Saturday morning, the next morning, and consider the matter further. We met in my office, I suppose, for 2 or 3 hours.

In the meantime, late Friday evening and night, we identified the principal errors in the draft that I considered to be errors, that is a conclusion, and Friday morning I described to——

The CHAIRMAN. Saturday morning.

Mr. MANN. Saturday morning I described to Mr. Selden what the error was. The principal one was the introduction of a phrase about a threat of aggression and a possible interpretation that this would justify the unilateral use of armed forces.

There were other less important problems we had with it. They mixed up resolutions with the Rio Treaty. It wasn't clear to me about whether we were talking, some of the words were referring to, collective action or to the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. It was an apples and oranges sort of thing.

We considered all alternatives, and I drafted some paragraphs.

[Brief recess.]

Senator MORSE. Now, if it meets with your pleasure, we will go back on the record and we will pick up where you left off, Mr. Secretary.

A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION

Mr. MANN. If one assumes, as I did assume, that the majority of the House would support the resolution and that it would be very difficult to get it withdrawn, then there were two alternatives. One was to have a clear statement of the Department's position read by some member of it, opposed to the resolution. The other alternative was to agree with Selden that in presenting it, he himself would make clear two basic points. One was that the resolution, to use the language which I drafted and which Mr. Selden read on the floor:

> To make clear that the House does not intend to say that a mere threat of subversion, standing alone, justifies the unilateral use of armed force, to make clear that the House does not intend to depart from existing inter-American treaties and resolutions on the subject.

Now, I think that is as clear a statement as could have been made.

The difficulty was that in picking up the story, this part of the intent of the resolution was totally omitted by the press in the stories. They carried the story in a rather sensational way, and Latin Americans are accustomed to reading only the newspapers, never the Congressional Record in that situation, never even consulting before they act. The result is that a very erroneous impression has gotten around the hemisphere that the State Department had no views on the subject or was too timid to express them or something of that kind.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was it inserted into the whereas clauses of the resolutions, the suggestion which you made that it is the purpose to make clear that——

Mr. MANN. The mere threat of subversion standing alone?

Senator LAUSCHE. And the second——

Mr. MANN. No, sir——

Senator LAUSCHE. Any actions taken in compliance with treaties would not warrant the statement?

Mr. MANN. This was not——

Senator LAUSCHE. It was not put in the resolution?

Mr. MANN [continuing]. It was not put in the resolution for the reason that the resolution had been sent to the floor under a rule which permitted no amendments.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you repeat what you suggested go into the resolution?

Mr. MANN. I said——

Senator LAUSCHE. That no acts, simple acts of subversion, and so forth——

Mr. MANN [continuing]. The first suggestion I made was that the resolution be withdrawn, rewritten, reconsidered by the committee, and sent to the floor again. This was not acceptable.

MERE THREAT OF SUBVERSION DOES NOT JUSTIFY INTERVENTION

The second suggestion I made was that if the resolution would be voted on the following Monday, and if it were not possible to amend it, that Mr. Selden himself should make clear that his proposed resolution does not intend to say that a mere threat of subversion standing alone justifies the unilateral use of armed force—to make clear that the House does not intend to depart from existing inter-American treaties and resolution on the subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did he make that statement on the floor?

Mr. MANN. He did make that statement, and it hasn't been noticed or referred to since, unfortunately. This is the cause of all the trouble down south.

Senator MORSE. You find that statement on page 23459, and I am going to insert the statement in the record.

Senator CLARK. Which column?

Senator MORSE. Of the Congressional Record for September 20, 1965. We will have it inserted in the record at this point. Of course, the difficulty with the statement is that it was like a pin in a haystack. It was lost in all the chaff that had gone into the discussion of this resolution preceding, and the views of the House had become set by the previous discussion.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the date of that Congressional Record?

Senator MORSE. I think this statement of Secretary Mann is very, very helpful.

Senator CLARK. I have page 23459—what column?

Senator MORSE. Page 23459. Starting at the bottom of the middle column, or the end. I will read it.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is the date?

Senator MORSE. I will read it.

Mr. Speaker: House Resolution 560 builds upon the concept of the inter-American collective security system, as expressed in this final act of the ninth meeting of consultation.

In this regard, I want to point out that the Department of State generally agrees with the objectives of the proposed resolution and so stated in its testimony before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. In reviewing the resolution passed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the committee report, the Department of State has informed me that it would have preferred that the last whereas paragraph and the second operative paragraph follow more precisely the language of Paragraph V of Resolution I of the 9th Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which I have just quoted, so as to make clear that the House does not intend to say that a mere threat of subversion, standing alone, justifies the unilateral use of armed force—to make clear that the House does not intend to depart from existing inter-American treaties and resolutions on the subject.

The Department of State has said that the legislative history should, in any case, clearly show that it is not the intention of House Resolution 560 to depart from the policy laid out in the Paragraph V of Resolution I quoted above.

While this particular paragraph refers specifically to Cuba, the principle of self-defense has general application.

I assured the Department of State that the legislative intent would be made clear in this respect, and, on this basis, the Department withdrew whatever objections it might have had.

THE SKIDS HAD BEEN GREASED

I want to say at this point so that the Secretary can make a further comment, two Members of the House came over to see me,

who were vigorously opposed to this resolution. They made these comments, in effect: Of course, the statement of Selden's at this time in the debate probably hadn't been heard by a half dozen people in the House, if that many, but they said, second, they wished I would ask this afternoon whether or not, after the Foreign Affairs Committee reported the Selden resolution, the Department of State or any officials in the executive branch of the Government or anyone acting in their behalf expressed the administration's opposition to the House majority leader or the Speaker. They said the Speaker, when you had the resolution brought up under suspension of the rules, didn't need to recognize Selden, and if he hadn't recognized Selden it would have simply failed, and the feeling was that the skids had been greased for the passage of this matter and the implication was that the administration was for it. They pointed out to me also that the resolution was brought up under a suspension of the rules which requires a two-thirds vote, and if the Speaker or any spokesman for the administration in a body had indicated they didn't want the rules suspended, they wouldn't have a chance of getting the two-thirds vote.

So, my question to Secretary Mann is, to your knowledge was there any attempt on anyone's part in the administration to apprise the Speaker that it was not in favor of the resolution as written?

Mr. MANN. The answer to that is, "No." I would like to explain why.

But, first of all, I want to say, since you have read the entire statement, that there was one change in the statement that we had, I thought we had, agreed upon. It is in the last line, "the Department withdrew its objections," is the way the statement that I had drafted read. This was changed at the last minute on the floor, I suppose, to "whatever objections it might have had,"which makes it sound very equivocal. That is not my language. I want the record to show that.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I never have any trouble making up my mind, Senator. Like a Texas judge, often in error but seldom in doubt.

Senator MORSE. You and I have the same failing. [Laughter.]

A VERY DELICATE QUESTION

Mr. MANN. Senator Morse, I think this is a very delicate question that you are asking. Let us assume that you had proposed, you occupying the same position that Mr. Selden does in the House, chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee, and let us suppose that there had been a hearing, that you had introduced a resolution, that I had testified, I think, clearly as to what the resolution should do and should not do; that the entire committee had heard this, the entire committee then passed unanimously, approved a certain resolution which did not conform to my recommendations, and sent it to the floor of the Senate for a vote.

Now, if I were to maneuver to get the Speaker or the Vice President, whoever was presiding over the Senate at the time, to enter into a conspiracy with him not to recognize you so that there could be no vote on the resolution which this committee had unanimous-

ly approved, I would think this would be a lack of good manners. I did in this case precisely——

Senator LAUSCHE. You would be placing yourself in a most dangerous position of vigorous reprobation and condemnation, if you went to the chairman or the presiding officer of the Senate and asked him to rule either well or rule badly on the issue.

Mr. MANN. I think this would be an unwarranted intervention by the Department of State into the internal affairs of the House or Senate.

I did precisely the same thing I would have done with you, Senator Morse. I went straight to Mr. Selden, and I told him very clearly what our problems were and why I thought that would be a mistake. I asked him to consider withdrawing it and changing it, but he said that it was not feasible. Then I did the best thing that I could.

Now, the error was made, I want to say again, in my opinion the error was made, in lack of communication at the drafting stage between the lawyers in the State Department, because this is a very technical subject, and the staff of the committee which did the drafting. What came out of there was not a State Department document. It was a House document.

"CONSPIRACY AND COLLUSION"

Senator MORSE. Let me say, in commenting upon your description of what you think the situation would have been if the administration had urged the leadership of the House to fight the suspension of rules, you used the words "conspiracy and collusion." Well, of course, you are not engaged in conspiracy and collusion. I want you to be aboveboard on it.

Let me say that the administration, in its legislative representations in the Senate, constantly seeks to defeat the passage of legislation that it thinks is unwise, but does it aboveboard. We all know what they are doing. They go to the majority leader and urge him to follow a certain parliamentary course. He advises us that that is the course he is following and that is what the administration wants.

We just got through a pretty bitter debate here in the Senate on the highway bill when, one afternoon, three amendments out of the blue were sent up by the President, by the White House itself. Possibly there was a controversy on the floor of the Senate, but they were aimed at defeating the bill in the form it was then in.

My question goes to this: Is there any evidence that the administration made clear to either the majority leader or to the Speaker that it thought it would be better if they did not have a suspension of the rules, and the leadership turned them down. If it did, that is one thing. But if the leadership did not even know that the administration did not prefer to have it come to a vote in that form, they might very well have put forth the necessary support, as these two Congressmen told me today, to prevent a suspension of the rules.

Senator CARLSON. Will you yield?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. The Senator from Alabama and I served in the House, and I think we are the only ones around the table who did.

I know on some occasions I had sought recognition over there, and I would say, "Mr. Chairman," the Speaker, and the first thing he said was, "For what purpose does the gentleman rise?" You had to tell him, and if he did not agree with you, he sat you down. I am not critical about what you did over there, but that is how much power the Speaker has over there.

Senator MORSE. All I want to find out, Secretary Mann—and you are not subject to criticism if you did not, but I want to know the facts—did the administration try to appraise Albert and McCormack that it thought the resolution in that form should be considered?

SAYRE'S TESTIMONY

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question before we go up to vote: Had the State Department made a report on this resolution to the committee before the committee acted on it?

Mr. MANN. We testified through Mr. Sayre at the time when the subject of these resolutions was under consideration. We did not see the draft that was sent to the floor until after it had passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and sent to the floor under a rule which permitted no amendments.

Senator CLARK. Did you put anything in writing, Tom, or was it verbal testimony?

Mr. MANN. The testimony of Mr. Sayre was in writing. It was taken down and published.

[Short recess.]

Senator MORSE. Let us go back on the record so we won't keep the Secretary for an unreasonable period of time.

HOUSE SPEAKER WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED

So that when we come to read this transcript you and I are not left hanging in the air with incomplete statements on our respective points of view, before the last intervention, I pointed out that the question about the fact of legislative policies and the administration constantly making representations in the handling of legislation in the Senate that seek to prevent favorable action on it, no one knows better than I do, in handling educational legislation, as the Senator from New York and the Senator from Pennsylvania know, that we confer with the administration frequently on parliamentary strategy, including sometimes seeking to get additional members added to a conference so that we can have the votes that we need in conference. There is no conspiracy about that so long as it is known to the parties in interest.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator, there is a bit of disagreement around here as to your views.

Senator MORSE. I expect you to disagree, may I say good-naturedly.

But, may I say, these two Congressmen who talked to me today said that they were concerned because they do not think that there was any information given to the Speaker or to the majority leader that the administration had any doubt as to the wisdom of passing this resolution. They said they were not speaking for the Speaker or for the majority leader, but it is their opinion that had the

Speaker or the majority leader been aware of any such attitude on the part of the administration, Selden either would not have been recognized, as Senator Carlson says is not uncommon in the House, or the votes would not have been there to suspend the rules.

Am I correct in my understanding? I want to be sure that we do not have something hanging in the air, that the administration did not notify either the Speaker or the majority leader that they would prefer not to have the resolution passed in that form under a suspension of the rules.

Mr. MANN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MORSE. I interrupted you in your questioning.

THE UPROAR IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator LAUSCHE. What did you do to indicate that you did not approve of the measure as it was finally passed?

Mr. MANN. What we did——

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you do what you indicated previously, showing that unless it was clearly established that those two points which you identified earlier were complied with——

Mr. MANN [continuing]. Senator, the resolution which was passed by the committee and voted on by the House is not very precisely drafted. It is subject to a number of constructions.

What we decided to do in the absence of being able to get it amended was to make it clear that this should be construed in such a way as to be consistent with inter-American law. Now, that was one way to handle it.

In my judgment, the uproar in Latin America—and there has been some uproar in Latin America, I do not want to overemphasize the importance of it, I do not think it is as important, for example, as the possibility of putting a recapture fee on sugar—but nevertheless, in terms of our public relations with Latin America, this misunderstanding was caused by a failure to understand exactly what the House did by reading sensationalist news reports. This was added to by rather sensational statements made on the floor by opponents of the resolution.

The debate confused the issue even further, and I would think that the first thing we ought to do is to make clear that the House does not favor the unilateral use of force, armed force, when there is a near threat of subversion because, obviously, there is a threat of subversion in many states of the world, and we should not go charging around invading every time there is a threat.

Now, I think from the national interest standpoint, what would help us the most is to get the facts clear, that Selden did say this, he was the proponent of the resolution, that the intention of the House was not to announce some doctrine which is absurd, but that it was a problem of imprecise drafting, and that the House and the Senate and the Executive are agreed that we are going to abide by our treaties. I think this is the dignified way to present this to the world, instead of presenting ourselves as divided over an issue where I think there is really no disagreement.

CORRECTING THE ERROR

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may say, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to say that it was my personal impression that it is too late. Maybe I am wrong. I think that time has passed. It could have happened earlier, but I think it is too late to try to get that across. I may be wrong.

Mr. MANN. All right. Then I would say this: I am still trying to think of the country and not of personalities or parties.

Senator MORSE. That is the only thing that counts.

Mr. MANN. I would say if we could, the House and the Senate and the Executive could, get together and draft a proper resolution, and if we could get this passed unanimously—I cannot speak for the administration in that—in a calm way, and we could weave into this in some way the correction of this other error—I do not think we should admit the House intended to do something that it did not intend to do. It is a very complex subject. Then we would present to the world a united front.

Senator MORSE. I do not think, Mr. Secretary, you could ever get anything through the House unanimously or get it through the House without a bitter debate. It might be best to have the administration make a statement.

REPLEDGED SUPPORT OF EARLIER AGREEMENTS

The only objective I had in mind, and I think the only objective that Senator Javits and Senator Carlson had in mind—but they can speak for themselves—was simply for the Senate to go on record repledging its support of agreements we have already ratified; namely Rio, Punta del Este, and the Washington agreement. Now, that is the objective of the Morse resolution. I think it is the objective of the Javits resolution. He, Javits, and Carlson also include the United Nations Charter, but I did not because I thought we ought to limit it to the action we have taken in regard to treaty agreements with Latin America, because I do not think there is anything that we can do that is going to clear up the confusion that is caused, for example, by the language at the bottom of page 13 of the House hearings:

> Mr. SELDEN. Thank you, Mr. Sayre. As I understand your statement, you made only two suggestions. One is that the final whereas clause be amended to include the words "until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere."
>
> Mr. SAYRE. In substance that is correct.
>
> Mr. SELDEN. Your second suggestion is that the second resolve clause be amended accordingly; is that correct?
>
> Mr. SAYRE. That is right.
>
> Mr. SELDEN. Otherwise the State Department has no objection to this resolution in its present form?
>
> Mr. SAYRE. That is right, sir.

That has caused a lot of confusion because we do not know what he was even implying.

Mr. MANN. That is what I had reference to when I said earlier in my statement that it is a great mistake to try to draft a very complex legal document by generalized questions and answers across the table where you are not looking at a piece of paper that has words on it.

WHAT RESOLUTION WOULD ACCOMPLISH

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask what good purpose you think the State Department thought this resolution would serve? What did they have in mind by this resolution?

Mr. MANN. It was not our resolution, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. But the spokesman says he has no objection to it even with the changes.

Senator MORSE. He never advised against it in his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. If the change had been adopted, what good purpose do you think this would have accomplished coming from the House?

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, if you are asking a generic question, I would say that I doubt myself, except in very exceptional circumstances, that resolution passed by the House and Senate contribute any useful purpose in the conduct of foreign affairs. If I had been asked myself whether this resolution should have come off the floor, I would have said I would have preferred no resolution on the subject of any kind.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that would have been the simple thing for Sayre to say, "Well, we don't think a resolution will serve any good purpose."

Senator MORSE. That is the question I wanted to put, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see what purpose it could have served even if it had been corrected in accordance with Sayre's suggestions.

Senator MORSE. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that Sayre got drawn into a discussion here about a subject matter that called for but one, I think, one position of the State Department, and that is the State Department does not advise that any resolution be passed. We have these three agreements. The State Department stands on these three agreements. That is our already expressed policy.

All I am seeking to do in my resolution—maybe we should not offer it—is to get a recommitment to the treaties we have signed. That ought to be our answer.

EVALUATION OF THE MORSE AMENDMENT

The CHAIRMAN. In view of that, does this last statement of yours mean that you do not think the Morse resolution would serve any good purpose?

Mr. MANN. I think we have a problem here. I myself do not have a clear opinion at this time. I would like to give you a tentative opinion, that, perhaps, if out of this hearing could come not a resolution which would appear or be construed as putting the Senate in opposition to the House, but a statement which emphasizes the positive and reaffirms the agreement between the Senate and the House and executive branch that we are going to live up to our treaty obligations or whatever other appropriate points ought to be made, it seems to me this might be constructive, more constructive, than a resolution.

Senator MORSE. Let me make clear for this record so that the House Members can read it and understand it, as well as the State

Department, the White House, and everything else, that the senior Senator from Oregon has no desire to draw an issue with the House. I have expressed my disapproval of this resolution; on that I acted in my senatorial capacity, and I stand by every word I said.

If, out of this meeting, as you suggest, some statement could be drawn, whether it is done by the members of this committee and issued to the public or released to the State Department or to the White House, to the effect that as a result of this hearing this committee is satisfied that American foreign policy in Latin America in respect to this subject matter is clearly set forth in Rio, OAS, Punta del Este, and the Washington agreement, I think we would have accomplished a constructive purpose, and I should think that it could be so done.

I am not married to a resolution. I happen to think that the Senate, with its power under the advise and consent clause, has a great duty to pass resolutions from time to time advising the President of the United States on foreign policy.

CHECKING THE EXECUTIVE

The chairman of this committee was in a very interesting debate this afternoon on the floor of the Senate. My interpretation of the debate, Mr. Chairman, is that, in essence, that is the thesis you defended, the advise and consent clause means that we not only have the prerogative, but we have the duty on occasions, to advise the Chief Executive in regard to foreign policy. I think you are just unanswerably right, and therefore I would not want this record to indicate that I agree with Secretary Mann to any degree whatsoever that resolutions passed by the Senate of the United States are not wise. I think sometimes it is our duty to pass them in checking the Executive.

The CHAIRMAN. The Executive does not hesitate to ask us to pass resolutions which they propose.

Senator MORSE. I think we should volunteer them without his asking.

The CHAIRMAN. They do not hesitate to ask us to pass resolutions as to anything they want to do under any circumstances.

NO RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR STATE DEPARTMENT VIEWS

Senator CARLSON. Only for this reason, the Secretary, I rather gathered he expressed himself that a resolution might not be of any benefit or of any advantage.

Now, we introduced our resolution on September 2, and on September 9 the committee requested the views of the Department. As a matter of fact, I am advised that they asked on several occasions later for views, but we never did get them.

I would have been pleased personally if the Secretary sent word up, "We would rather not have the resolution." But, as I gather, we have not been able to get a report.

Senator MORSE. For some reasons.

Senator CARLSON. We asked for views and we did not get any response.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I wonder if I can say three things?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Mr. MANN. One, I did not say that resolutions by the Senate and the House were never useful. I said there were circumstances where they were most useful.

I think we have a problem in this case of presenting an image to the world of a Senate divided from the House, and I could not say, as a Foreign Service officer, that I think this would be the best way to do it. I would rather see some procedure worked out where we can stand together before the world.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think I can stand together with the House.

INCLUSION OF CANADA

I wanted to ask you about another part of their report which you have not commented on. It says:

What the resolution does

This is the report of the House committee—

In essence, House Resolution 560 does two things: Recognizes that the subversive force of international communism threatens the sovereignty and political independence of all nations in the Western Hemisphere.

That would include Canada and the United States and Mexico, and I do not recognize at all that our political independence and sovereignty is presently threatened in any serious way whatever, or Canada's.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I do not disagree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. These are extreme statements that I do not like to say I agree with.

Mr. MANN. What I am exploring with the committee here is not a rubberstamp approval of that House report or the resolution. I think I have already stated that I think both of them contained inaccuracies.

What I am looking for is some way in which these errors can be corrected, misinterpretations can be corrected, and by building on certain paragraphs that are accurate, we can present the House in a favorable light rather than unfavorable light, and we can give the appearance of a united Executive and Congress to the world. This does not mean that we have to approve the errors. Far from it. We could word this in such a way as to be perfectly consistent with what you just said. I happen to agree with it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Morse resolution is simple. It is very short. I do not know whether it would do any good or not. This is to be determined.

TWO ROADS TO FOLLOW

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask a question on the Morse resolution?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you construe the charter of the Organization of American States, approved by the Senate in 1950, to hold that when our country witnesses the seizure of one of the nations of the Western Hemisphere by Communists that we must stand idly by and abide by the alleged principle that each state in the Western Hemisphere has the right to determine for itself what it shall do?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think that, as we said earlier, there are two roads we can follow when we are faced with this kind of a situation. The preferable road, of course, is collective action under the Rio Treaty or under the Charter of the OAS. This we would always prefer and try to get.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, at this point——

Mr. MANN. I am coming to——

Senator LAUSCHE. He says, "Whereas the Senate in 1947 gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which provides for consultation and collective action, in accordance with the constitutional processes"—is that what you are talking about?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you feel that is the preferable course to follow?

Mr. MANN. That is the preferable course, but it is not the only course.

I was about to say, Senator, that the second road that one can follow is not the road of collective action under the Rio Treaty or the charter, but the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. President Kennedy, and indeed other Presidents, have emphasized from time to time that this is a right which we will not abandon.

The CHAIRMAN. But didn't President Kennedy make such a statement when the facts were—he interpreted the Russian placing of missiles as being a threat to this country?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And isn't the original purpose of most of these commitments by the United States not to intervene, as directed against United States intervention, not Russia? I mean, what the Latin Americans originally were concerned about, because of numerous interventions by us in the ways of dollar diplomacy, was some assurance by us that we would not do this. Isn't that the original purpose?

Mr. MANN. That is the original purpose, and I think that is compatible with what I just said.

The CHAIRMAN. I just give the background.

RIGHT OF INTERVENTION

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask Senator Morse and Senator Fulbright, are you advocating if it is thoroughly apparent that in the Dominican Republic the Communists are to take over that we have no right under the present international agreements to intervene?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that it is strictly legally—and these are always subject to certain extreme contingencies, you are giving a hypothetical case—strictly legally, what we should do is ask for consultation with the OAS.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not what the Morse resolution says.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it does.

Senator MORSE. It certainly does.

The CHAIRMAN. It is reaffirming what the OAS Charter states, that there are these flat statements in three different places that you do not intervene under any circumstances. Then, with the exception under article 6, I believe it is, that in case of these unusual

circumstances you referred to, then we consult with the OAS on means to combat them, and that is what strictly legally the treaty means; is it not?

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask my question?

Mr. MANN. There is another article, Senator, and I think this goes to what you are talking about. Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States reads as follows:

> Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17.

Which are the nonintervention articles.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Mr. MANN. That is in the charter. It was always been in the charter.

CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL COMMUNIST TAKEOVER

Senator LAUSCHE. What would that mean in the instance where you have an obvious, clear, unequivocal takeover by the Communists of one of, let us say, the Caribbean nations, and we determined that it was inimical to our security?

Mr. MANN. I would quote, I would add here to what President Kennedy said, that we would hope that the American states under the charter and under the Rio Treaty would act in a collective fashion to deal with it, and he added to that, "Let word go forth that if for any reason they refuse or fail or cannot act, that the United States will exercise its inherent right of self-defense."

Senator LAUSCHE. What if the situation was of a nature where delay imperiled the achievement of our objective for national security? That is what happened in the Dominican Republic, according to the proof. You could not wait.

INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator MORSE. If you give me 2 minutes, let me tell you what my amendment proposes to do. The concern I have with the House amendment is that it is being interpreted as extending the agreement that was reached vis-a-vis Cuba——

Mr. MANN [continuing]. In the Punta del Este and the Washington agreement into a general authority on the part of any country in the Western Hemisphere to proceed unilaterally upon its value judgment as to what it thinks a situation is in some other Latin American country. That is what the Latin American countries are bombarding us with when they say the United States has gone back—I have one quotation here, I won't bother you with it, has gone back—some decades into the so-called intervention policy.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say, it is not limited to countries in Latin America. It is all countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Senator MORSE. Yes, that is true.

Senator SPARKMAN. They could act against the United States or Canada, technically.

Senator MORSE. But the interpretation which has been made in Latin America, as I understand the objection made to me, we have taken the Cuban situation out of the Punta del Este and the Wash-

ington agreement, and we are now going to apply it on a unilateral intervention basis in any case where in our judgment we think it ought to be applied.

I would like to get it corrected if I can. All my resolution seeks to do, and I told you yesterday when I introduced it, you can change its wording if you can better carry out the objectives of it. I am not wedded to the wording. But the objective is clear that we now restate that we stand behind the Punta del Este, we stand behind OAS, and we stand behind the Washington agreement. That is our policy, and I do not know what in the world is wrong with it.

Senator CLARK. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

GRAVE DAMAGE TO STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator CLARK. I would like to make an observation, which I will make briefly. I want to make it in Mr. Mann's presence and then get his reaction to it.

It seems to me that the House has done grave damage to the status of the United States of America in those Latin American countries which are our friends and which are the legal source of hope and help for the Alliance for Progress. The Secretary knows of my profound disagreement with what was done in the Dominican Republic, and I believe the House has really rubbed salt in open wounds in this regard.

I am not interested in placing blame or credit.

Senator MORSE. I am not either.

Senator CLARK. I am not interested in doing that for what has been done, but I do want to see what we can do to ameliorate or perhaps patch up the situation and resume a position which was clearly laid out in all of these treaties before we marched into the Dominican Republic. Therefore, I would feel quite strongly that we ought to pass something like the Morse resolution or the Javits-Carlson resolution—and I am not wedded to semantics—in order to show the people of Latin America and of the world that we are not going to continue on this policy which I think has done so much damage to the United States of America. Therefore, I would like to suggest to the Secretary that while I am very much interested in hearing his views as to why it is unfortunate to have a Senate differ with the House, I would like him to make the basic assumption that there is a real chance that the Senate will want to do something to differ very strongly with the House. Then I would like to ask him to direct his attention to the wording of these resolutions and to see to what extent he would like to have them changed in order to bring them into accord with the State Department policy.

NEED FOR TEAMWORK WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator MORSE. I would like to go even further than that, although I agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania. I would prefer the resolution, but we keep talking about we want, the State Department and the Foreign Relations Committee want teamwork. I want teamwork. If they have got some suggestions as to a statement that could be issued that they could enforce from the Foreign

Relations Committee of the Senate, that is, acting under the advise and consent clause of the Constitution, and the House does not act under that clause, that would be helpful to the country. Substitute that for a resolution. I am not committed to it, but it is partly implied in an earlier statement that Secretary Mann made. But we certainly ought to do something, it seems to me, rather than just let this pot boil over, and I think it is going to boil over.

The Secretary does not think it is very important in Latin America. I do not agree with him. I think it is the kind of bitterness that is going to grow. I think we will hear a lot about it at Rio, and we could get this item on their agenda removed, in my judgment, if we act before we ever go near Rio.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been trying to get in a remark, too, for some time.

Senator MORSE. I beg your pardon.

Senator SPARKMAN. You did not take it away from me. I just have not pushed myself hard enough.

In order that you may have it all before you when you start talking, first of all, let me say I cannot help but feel a degree of disappointment in the apparent lack of action of the State Department in connection with this House resolution. By the way, this is not the first time we have been coping with one of these things and been given a job of trying to rescue the situation. You may remember the Panama situation, the Panama flag resolution, you may remember that, when there was great demand over here when that was passed for us to take some action.

It seems to me that it would have taken very little—I do not want to seem too critical but I think it is better for us to understand ourselves—it seems to me it would have taken very little action on the part of the State Department to stop it. I know it would have taken very little here before this committee, and I am rather of the opinion it would have taken very little before the committee over there or before the leadership of the House. However, that is done.

WHAT ACTION THE SENATE SHOULD TAKE

Now, the question is what action shall we take on this side. I, first of all, would agree strongly with your suggestion that if we could write carefully a new resolution and pass it unanimously through the two Houses, it would be fine. But I think that is out of the question.

I rather hate to see us bring up any resolution in the Senate for two reasons. First of all, it does put us in a position of being opposed to the House and fighting the position that they take. The second is always the danger that a fight might develop on the floor of the Senate with reference to a resolution. Somebody might want to change it, write in stronger language, and we might find ourselves in an embarrassing position when we are handling it on the Senate floor.

I am rather intrigued by the suggestion that Senator Morse has just made that perhaps this committee could draw its own resolution. I do not mean one to be put on the calendar of the Senate, as I understand that is what Senator Morse meant, but a statement to

be issued by this committee, and then let the State Department speak out on that. It seems to me that, perhaps, would be the best and safest way at this stage of the game. That is all I care to say.

TAKEOVER SITUATIONS ARE ALREADY COVERED

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Sparkman, how would you feel in a statement issued by the committee with situations which clearly indicated a Communist takeover at the shores of the United States, and it was urged that under the various bilateral and multilateral agreements which we have, we had no right to interfere. I would like to ask that of you and then of Mr. Mann.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would simply answer it this way. It seems to me that those situations are already covered in the various agreements, treaties that we have.

Secretary LAUSCHE. Mr. Mann, will you now tell how they are covered? Answer, first, specifically my fear that there might be established a clear Communist regime, I am putting it in the worst form, under the dictatorship of China, and that we know it to be the fact. Are we precluded under the existing multilateral agreements from asserting ourselves directly within those nations?

Mr. MANN. We are not, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does Senator Morse agree with that?

Senator MORSE. As Secretary Mann will tell you, I played a very minor, insignificant, wee part in negotiating that understanding.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude, I just want to make a short statement along the lines Senator Sparkman made.

SUPPORT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

I appreciate the difficulty confronting this committee and, I think, the entire country in view of what has happened. This resolution of Senator Javits—and I am not speaking with pride of authorship or anything—but we did introduce it on September 2, and we discussed it, we visited about it, we kept reading press stories, and we thought, "Let's throw in a resolution along this line which, at least, expresses our concern about the Organization of American States and our support of it."

On September 13, Mr. Selden introduces his resolution, and it looked to some of us on our side over here, at least to Mr. Javits and myself, "Well, the administration did not look at ours, they just took the House resolution." They did; I mean that is the way it appeared.

We discussed it. We asked for reports on September 9. We never heard of anything. I do not have any pride of authorship in this language, but had they taken this resolution or some similar resolution, we would not be in that situation. That is my point.

We did have a feeling that they just said, "Well, let's go to the House and pass a resolution." I am sure the Secretary is correct when he says they did not have that in mind, but that is what it looked like, and that is what happened.

We had no pride of authorship. All I want to do is let the Organization of American States know that we are going to work with

them, that we still preserve our rights to go down there and protect ourselves when necessary.

THE HOUSE DID NOT FOLLOW AN ORDERLY PROCEDURE

Mr. MANN. I wonder if I might say—so many statements have been made that I really have not had a chance to reply to them—I wonder if I might say that the State Department is used to being criticized for overreacting or underreacting. We are either all Communists or we are all trigger-happy hawks, depending on which decade you are talking about. We are all the same people.

The problem here, as is evident from the facts, is that the reason we got into this trouble is that the House did not follow an orderly procedure of presenting the bill, the proposed resolution, to the State Department for its comments. We had never had an opportunity to see it in the form in which it went to the floor and to suggest changes and amendments.

I just do not see how any reasonable man could say that we are responsible for a bill which we never saw and that we should have intervened in the legislative processes of the House under the circumstances to prevent this from coming to a vote, when it was clear that the majority of the House wanted it to come to a vote and that they were going to vote for it. That is my opinion, and I simply wanted to register this.

Senator MORSE. Do you mind if I interrupt at this point before you go to the next point or do you want to finish?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

STATE DEPARTMENT CANNOT JUST STAND BY

Senator MORSE. I want to say that I do agree except as to the last point. I do not think the State Department can ever justify standing by if either House of the Congress is following a course of action which, in its opinion, is going to jeopardize the best foreign policy interests of our country, without using every legitimate means at your disposal to try to prevent that injury from taking place. That is not a criticism of the State Department, but I think you have a duty. If we have a resolution up here that is going to do great damage to the foreign policy of the United States, I think we should be apprised of it by the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I would agree with that. It seems to me the established procedure is through the leadership; that is why you have breakfasts with the leadership every Tuesday morning. I thought it was not out of order or at all bad manners to express to them either on Tuesday morning or any other time that you do not think it was wise.

But I was hoping you would give an answer to Senator Sparkman's suggestion that perhaps you could feel that some statement, whether exactly like this or something like it, would be useful. If you think it won't be useful, why, I would like for you to say so, and you think we had better not do anything or would you think a resolution or a statement, as has been suggested, would be appropriate. I am just seeking your advice on it.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I suggest that——

The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer it.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I suggest if you go to the floor of the Senate, I think a vigorous argument giving support to the Selden resolution might, as Senator Sparkman said, result.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. That is why I am asking does he think this alternative suggestion of a statement by the committee, which I think is more likely—I am not sure at all you could get a unanimous one out of the committee, and certainly not out of the Senate—but a statement, even a clear majority of the committee, would be useful, before we begin worrying about the precise kind. I think if you look with disfavor on any kind of a statement which you think of at this time, I think we ought to know that.

Senator MORSE. May I suggest procedurally, I think Secretary Mann should be allowed to comment on that, but then I think Secretary Mann—I am as guilty as anyone around this table—should be allowed to make a complete statement without interruption as to anything more he wishes to say with regard to the subject matter. I do not think we are being fair with him procedurally. If you will proceed, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree.

OUTCRY OVER GOING SOFT ON COMMUNISM

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I want to cooperate with this committee. I have not had an opportunity to test out on my principals this precise recommendation, but I will recommend a statement by this committee or a joint resolution, provided we are assured of a broad spectrum of support. I see no reason why we could not sit down together and draft a statement to which every man around this table could agree, and I would personally recommend to my principals that I be given the job of clearing this with Morgan and the House leadership over there so that we could come out with a statement which would not be attacked on the floor of the House, and which everybody could agree to. I think really that this ought to be a very easy thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not agree with that at all. I think if it appears to change substantially the Selden one there will be a great outcry that you are going soft on communism. I cannot imagine your getting one that would approach unanimity in the House.

Mr. MANN. At least I would like to be given the opportunity to try. If we can get the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee, and others to agree, and after 3 or 4 hours with Mr. Selden I think that the area of agreement is very large, we could emphasize the positive. We can accomplish the objective that this committee wants to accomplish, and we could present a united front which, in terms of national interest, is obviously what we ought to be doing.

The CHAIRMAN. As a practical matter, you know we are not likely to be here too long, and to work out that you would be a genius. I do not like to say you could not do it, but I do not believe you could.

Senator MORSE. You are a born optimist, Mr. Chairman, if you do not think we are going to be here very long.

[Discussion off the record.]

GET THE MESSAGE TO LATIN AMERICA

Senator MORSE. May I say this, Mr. Secretary, certainly I have no objection to your trying it, but let us assume that you run into a stone wall over there, and they feel that even that is going to be sort of a slap in their face, which I want to avoid. It seems to me you ought to keep in mind two other alternatives: No. 1, a statement simply to be put out by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on which the Department can comment, and that statement should be worked out with you. I think we can work that statement out together.

Mr. MANN. I think it ought to say that the administration and the State Department agree with it affirmatively.

Senator MORSE. Or the third possibility is for the Foreign Relations Committee to simply pass a Foreign Relations Committee Resolution, a statement by the Foreign Relations Committee by way of a resolution, not for the floor of the Senate, but what I want to do is to get the message down to Latin America that we are not modifying or we do not intend to modify by unilateral action on the part of the United States the three treaties that we are relying on.

They think they got us to agree with them on a non-intervention policy, and they think Rio and OAS and the Washington agreement are that commitment. It has all the safeguards in there, as you have just testified a few moments ago. It has all the safeguards there to protect our own right of self-defense. We saw to that at Punta del Este, and we saw to it down here at the Pan American Building, and I just want some message to go down to Latin America from the Senate committee, from the State Department that will dispel these criticisms. That is my objective.

CLEARING RESPONSE WITH THE BUREAUCRACY

Mr. MANN. Senator, I share that objective. I have no difficulty at all with that statement. May I say one thing in answer to Senator Carlson? He has asked several times why he has not heard from the State Department on the proposed resolution.

Let me say this, Senator, that we do have a draft letter here which I would like to go over with you. It has not been cleared yet throughout the entire bureaucracy, but I have cleared it and the legal division has cleared it and the Latin American Bureau has cleared it, and I think you will have it very soon. It raises one question we have not touched.

Senator CARLSON. I just want to say this: If you came up here with a statement, and if you do it now, "We would rather not have a resolution," we would have felt all right about it. We had no feeling about it, but we did think—I have been around here for a long time—may I go off the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. Back on the record.

AN ATMOSPHERE OF MISUNDERSTANDING

Mr. Secretary, what is the reservation which you said you had?

Mr. MANN. Yes. This is a question, not a reservation. We are going down in November. Again, there are some very important

and delicate negotiations with the ministers in an atmosphere of great misunderstanding, largely promoted, I think, not by what we have done but by sensational stories about what we might do, which are not correct. That is what these fears have fed on.

Now, the question we raise in this letter is whether specific concrete proposals such as an inter-American force, let us take that for example, ought to be proposed in a Senate resolution before we have discussed what this is with our colleagues, which is obviously going to be a very controversial subject.

There is nothing—there is only one thing in the resolution that bothers me a little bit, which I will be glad to identify for you, but more important than that, and that is a detail that could easily be corrected, but more important than that is a tactical question of whether it is better for the Senate and the House to go down as advisers and participate in those negotiations or, in effect, put ourselves in concrete before we even begin to talk.

Senator CARLSON. We are not pressing it, I assure you.

Mr. MANN. That is the major problem that on the eve of negotiations any detailed statement poses. I do not feel strongly about it. I do not think the Republic will fall if this committee wants to go ahead with it. I would not oppose it because every legislative body has a right to express itself anytime it wants to.

Senator MORSE. I think that is the point we needed, Mr. Secretary, because we already have with us this hemispheric force covered in the foreign aid bill. I mean we have already got it.

THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

The CHAIRMAN. Does what you say also apply to the Morse resolution?

Mr. MANN. The Morse resolution bothers us in two details which could easily be corrected. No. 1, it omits any reference to the inherent right of self-defense which, I think, the Senate would not want to do, individual self-defense.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me ask a question on that point.

Senator MORSE. Spell it out.

Mr. MANN. That is easy to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who determines whether the circumstances are of a nature where the right of self-defense may be interposed? Is it the multilateral countries of the Western Hemishpere or is it the United States itself?

Mr. MANN. In the last analysis if we cannot agree, it is the United States itself which must decide whether its own security is at stake.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, if that is true, I think we ought not to have any trouble with the House through a conference in which you are the intermediary, to come up with an agreement.

Senator CLARK. Let him finish. You were only half through, Tom.

INDIVIDUAL AS WELL AS COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Mr. MANN. The other question—we have no difficulty at all with your two objectives, Senator Morse, with the modifications to include the individual as well as the collective self-defense right.

I have a little trouble with the resolution advising the President to comply with his treaty obligations. This is not——

Senator MORSE. Take it out.

Mr. MANN. This is not a matter of law. It is simply a matter of, if I may say so, of manners.

Senator MORSE. Take it out.

Mr. MANN. Because I have no doubt that the President fully intends to comply with his obligations, and the implication here is that maybe he does not. I would not think the Senate would want to say that.

Senator MORSE. It is not intended.

Senator CLARK. Can I ask a question?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

DEFINITION OF SELF-DEFENSE

Senator CLARK. I am bothered by this phrase "the inherent right of self-defense." I wondered, Mr. Secretary, whether there is any body of precedent or inter-American law which defines it.

What bothers me is the word "self-defense" is an awfully big word. Is that intended to mean that if there is a threat of a Communist takeover in Cienaga the United States could take the position that this is a matter involving our self-defense and move in unilaterally with force to adjust the situation?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think the answer to that in the hypothetical case you are talking about, unless there are special circumstances which convinced Americans that it was necessary, that the answer to that would be a categorical "No."

Senator CLARK. Now, you move up to Haiti and it could be very different. But what I am concerned about is that word "self-defense." I reiterate the question: What does it mean in this connection?

Mr. MANN. Let me say that I think this is another very delicate question that the Inter-American Peace Force raises, because you cannot only—if we go the route, and I hope we do, of the creation of an Inter-American Peace Force, we would have to at the same time set up a political mechanism which would make the kind of political decision that you are talking about, and we are going to encounter great differences of opinion, not caused by any particular thing that we have done, but much more basic than that. This is going to take some very careful, deliberate negotiations. This is one of the reasons we plan at the present time to meet for 3 weeks in Rio de Janeiro on November 17, I think it is, and to have 2 weeks of discussion of this and other questions related to it, and then to postpone until March of the following year what you might call the second half of the meeting, which would be to bring about charter amendments.

COMMUNIST STATES BECOME MILITARY BASES

Senator CLARK. They will buckle at self-defense, won't they, if it is given the broad meaning that some of the members of this committee want to give it?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I think that is true. Senator, there are some people who believe in the hemisphere that a Communist state is

not a threat to anybody, because Latin Americans tend to look on communism as a kind of philosophic thing that professors talk about in ivory towers and universities.

Our experience is, and certainly this is proved by the Cuban missile crisis—I do not want to open the other question at this time—that the difficulty with a Communist state in this hemisphere is that it automatically becomes a military base and a military arm of the Sino-Soviet bloc or a part of the bloc, depending on what the conditions are in the bloc.

Senator CLARK. I do not have any difficulty or disagreement with that at all. I think the question is largely one of procedure, and again I say this phrase, "the inherent right of self-defense," can get so it looks pretty ridiculous.

Mr. MANN. Senator, I do not disagree with that. It is a very difficult subject. It has never been defined any more than "aggression" has been precisely defined. The Rio Treaty speaks about an aggression, for example, which is an armed attack.

Senator CLARK. Which is obsolete.

Mr. MANN. [illegible] is clear. That is the 19th century concept of aggression, armies marching across frontiers.

A NEW TECHNIQUE OF INVASION

We now have in the 20th century a new type of problem, a new technique of invasion, not just limited to the Communist states.

Pakistan, for example, infiltrated several thousand men into the Kashmir. It armed them, it trained them, and they started shooting.

Senator CLARK. It is Communist technique.

Mr. MANN. They were paid, they were trained, they were organized in Rawalpindi.

Now, the question that this hemisphere has got to face—and this is why we are divided and confused, because we really have not defined our terms yet—is how we deal with this type of aggression. This, of course, creates fears.

This is something new. This is something that there is no law on. We have to think it through. We have to try to agree on some words and some definitions. We have not done this yet, and we are talking actually about a vague fear that this country is going to act in a very irresponsible way, just as you think we did in the Dominican Republic, and I disagree. But here again, this hinges on what the facts were. Our disagreement is not on philosophy, it is on the conclusion that one draws from the facts.

Senator CLARK. Also to some extent it is semantics.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. I think that is true, Senator.

A MILD HYPOCRISY IN APPLYING SELF-DEFENSE

Senator CLARK. I like to see phrases used which have some precise meaning as opposed to throwing, in effect, in my judgment, a bucket of paint on the issue by using this word "self-defense."

Mr. MANN. I do not think anybody—at least I hope you are not saying, Senator, that you wish we would abandon this right because then we would be at the mercy of a majority vote in the U.N. and the OAS, and this would be dangerous.

Senator CLARK. I do not want to abandon it, but it seems to me a mild hypocrisy involved in most instances in saying "self-defense." It is the instrument of U.S. policy to prevent the taking over of a Latin American state by Communist subversion. But I think we thump our chests quite a little bit when we say this is self-defense.

The CHAIRMAN. You are arguing with the application of the principle, you see, it seems to me. In a specific set of circumstances the question is, is it or is it not.

Senator CLARK. I do not like to see the principal statement, in terms of semantics, self-defense.

Mr. MANN. I am going to, if I can get cleared again, if I may have as much trouble in getting our answer to Senator Carlson cleared, I intend in about 2 weeks to go to California and make a speech to the inter-American editors, the Inter-American Press Association, in which I will set out with, I hope, some precision and objectivity and without reference to any personalities, our views at the present time on the issues that we are talking about precisely right now.

Senator MORSE. Good.

Mr. MANN. Including the resolution.

PRESENT A UNITED FRONT

Senator MORSE. I do not like to impose on your time, but very quickly, take the point you made about your reference to my resolution that the President should have no trouble in carrying it out either by way of a resolution or a statement, and saying that it is the sense of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the foreign policy of the United States should be and will be conducted in consonance with these and other treaty obligations which were freely entered into. Should be and will be, and eliminate the reference to the President whatsoever.

Mr. MANN. I think we could agree with that, and I would hope that we could present a united front on that.

Senator MORSE. What I would like to try, Mr. Chairman, not by way of formal action—I wish the attention of all my colleagues for a moment—the Secretary has been very generous with his time in staying this long—I would just like to have an informal understanding among us, the Secretary and his staff, Carl Marcy and Pat Holt, in consultation with any of us they want to consult with, to kick this around for this weekend and see if by Monday we can come up with a statement in the alternative, one by way of a resolution just for the Foreign Relations Committee, to see if it wants to announce our preference, in view of what the Secretary has said, a statement that could be put out by the chairman of the committee, endorsed by those of us who endorse it, and have the State Department make whatever statement it wants to make on that statement, plus the attempt on the part of the chairman, if he thinks he can work out something with Morgan and Selden, to try to get a joint statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Secretary. You said "chairman," you meant Secretary.

Mr. MANN. I will try it.

Senator MORSE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MANN. I will try it if that is what the committee wants.

Senator LAUSCHE. One question for information.

Senator MORSE. I said the chairman of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Later you said that the chairman would work this out with Morgan.

Senator MORSE. I meant the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. I know. You said chairman when you meant Secretary.

Senator MCCARTHY. You do not have any confidence in being able to negotiate with these two fellows right now; do you?

RIGHTS UNDER INTER-AMERICAN LAW

Senator LAUSCHE. Do the signatories to the three agreements mentioned by Senator Morse agree with our interpretation, that is yours and Senator Morse's, about the right of the United States to act unilaterally in matters which directly threaten its security?

Mr. MANN. Senator, I will give you as clear an answer to that as I am capable of giving you. Inter-American law talks in general about collective action. The only place that I know of, and you correct me, Mr. Lowenfeld, where a reference was made to the, I think they called it the, essential right of self-defense, was in paragraph 5 of resolution I of the 1964 meeting of consultation here in Washington. Senator Morse was present at that.

This paragraph was not a U.S. paragraph. It was drafted, I think myself, with some imprecision, by the Argentine delegation, presented by the delegation, and supported by the majority. This was a meeting in which we were considering Cuban aggression against Venezuela, and that was a situation where the facts were much clearer than they appear to be to some of us in the Dominican crisis, and we had nevertheless a close split vote on that. We had, if I remember correctly, Senator, a bare two-thirds majority after a very hard negotiation.

Senator MORSE. But, Mr. Secretary, there is one other place in which I rest my case, and that is in the Rio Treaty itself, and I read it, article 3:

> The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. MANN. That is a reference to it, yes. I stand corrected.

Senator MORSE. I think it is a clear statement of our right of self-defense.

RIO TREATY AND AGGRESSION

Mr. MANN. Then there is another article in article 6 of the Rio Treaty, and I understand Mr. Arthur Vandenberg was the author of this one. If so, I salute him, because it refers to aggression which is not an armed attack.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Mr. MANN. By an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict or by any fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America.

Senator MORSE. That is right. That is very important.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is more pertinent to the issue than your quotation, Senator Morse, because yours is based upon an armed attack, and this is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but that same section is the one that goes on and says, "or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree." That is the same section 6, that attempt to deal with it.

Mr. MANN. That is the collective action paragraph.

Senator MORSE. No question about it. The principle is there.

And we have the informal understanding that I have made? It has got to be informal. Is there any objection?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

TAKING THE RESOLUTION TO THE SENATE FLOOR

Senator LAUSCHE. Wayne, where do you land if you go to the floor of the Senate with the resolution?

Senator MORSE. I never worry about where I land when I go to the floor of the Senate.

Mr. MANN. I wonder if I could talk about something else, something about the Sugar Act?

Senator MORSE. We are agreed on this informal understanding. Dr. Marcy and Pat Holt, do you know your assignment?

Senator LAUSCHE. I still abide by what I said earlier, that I object to this group taking any action; that it can recommend to the whole committee that we will take action.

Senator MORSE. We are not taking official action. We are having informal meeting. We are trying to get ready for the full committee. Is that agreeable with you, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. We will hear you on sugar.

Mr. MANN. Off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Close the meeting on this subject.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. I would say in bidding you good night, Mr. Secretary, that my own evaluation of this meeting is that it has been a very constructive one, and you, in no small way, are responsible for that. This is the way to stop prairie fires. You have been very helpful.

Mr. MANN. Thank you, sir.

Senator MORSE. I hope we can get something worked out.

Mr. MANN. We will start in the morning with staff, Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt.

[Whereupon, at 6:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, Clark, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

The committee approved and authorized the release of a letter addressed to the President calling for certain decisions regarding the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.

The committee then considered the bill (H.R. 30), to provide for participation of the United States in the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Dade County, FL. A motion by Senator Symington to report the bill favorably failed on a point of no quorum.

The committee briefly discussed organization and procedures of the committee.

The committee reported without objection certain nominations and promotions in the Foreign Service.

The committee heard Joseph Palmer, II, Director General of the Foreign Service, on nominations of the President to promote certain Foreign Service Officers to the class of Career Ambassador and Career Minister.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:50 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in informal executive session at 10 a.m., in room S-116, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (Acting Chairman) and Senators Lausche, Clark, Hickenlooper, and Williams.

Lt. Col. George Benson, USA; Jonathan Moore, Special Assistant, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Francis Underhill, Deputy Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Department of State, briefed the committee on the situation in Indonesia.

No transcript was kept of the meeting's proceedings.

MINUTES

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

The Chairman announced the meeting had been called primarily for consideration of the bills (H.R. 30 and S. 216), respecting the authorization of INTERAMA in Dade County, FL. The measures were put over for other consideration.

The committee next considered the bills (H.R. 10779 and S. 666), to construct an international toll bridge at Pharr, TX, and to give the consent of Congress to certain international bridges. The bills were put over after discussion.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

THE WORLD SITUATION

OCTOBER 13, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Dodd, Long, Lausche, Symington, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Senator Kuchel; Mr. Marcy and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we might as well start.

The committee will come to order. Unfortunately, there are other committee meetings going on, these conferences. We only expect to get two more who said they would come and they are not here.

The Secretary, as we all know, has been in New York having a round of talks with a variety of Foreign Ministers and others at the U.N., so we gather this morning to hear his report of what is going on.

Will you proceed, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sure that the committee hopes that this will be my last appearance before the committee before adjournment. In the happy event that that is so, please let me express to the committee my great appreciation for the time and the interest and concern and advice and legislation which this committee has invested in our foreign relations.

I thought perhaps today I might spin the globe quickly, commenting very briefly on some key matters here and there, and then taking many of them in more detail as the committee might wish.

TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

I did spend 2 weeks in New York talking to a very large number of Ministers. There are about 90 Prime Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers, and Foreign Ministers at the Assembly during these first 2 or 3 weeks. I had bilateral talks with more than 60 of them and got some very definite impressions about the general flavor of the situation.

First, I think they were very gratified that the Assembly is back in business, and they recognize that the United States made that

possible. Second, I think there is a mood of moderation, not only in the Assembly but in the countries represented there. I will come back to that in key points as I make this review.

I think it is also correct to say that the point has now been made beyond any serious doubt, this obstacle to peace in Southeast Asia is not the United States. The point is quite clear now that it is Hanoi and Peking who refuse to come to a conference table or refuse to engage in any serious discussions of peace. I was not heckled on that subject by any of these Ministers, and I think that point is very well established.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

Turning for a moment to Vietnam, the military operations there have not developed in the direction of General Giap's Phase 3, that is, conventional warfare. The Vietcong are delivering very few battalions or regimental attacks but they do maintain a high level of sabotage and terror incidents.

The Vietnamese are taking the main responsibility for winkling the smaller Vietcong groups out of the villages and the countryside. The U.S. forces are in the nature of a general reserve and are employed against located battalions and regiments where the massed firepower and the special capabilities of the U.S. forces can be brought to bear.

The monsoon season in the highlands is coming to an end, but the monsoon will shift over to the coast, particularly the northern part of the coastal area, so that we may have some difficulty in air operations out of the airstrips in the northern part of South Vietnam. Most of the rest of the country will be clearing up as far as major cloud cover is concerned.

The monsoon reduced air activity by not more than about 10 percent. It may be that the Vietcong overestimated the effect of the monsoon on air operations.

A BREAKTHROUGH IN MORALE

The second comment that I would make is that we are getting reports from the provinces through a regular monthly report from the Americans who are out at the grassroots. We pull together their firsthand observations in the villages and in the countryside to test certain key points with respect to morale, with respect to effectiveness of operations.

This month—and I report this with some care because I have been over this terrain before—but this month, they have reported what seems to be a breakthrough on two important morale points: one is an upsurge of confidence on the part of the South Vietnamese and a determination to see this thing through, and second, a very important upsurge in the readiness of the local people in the countryside and villagers to give information about the Vietcong. Both of those are very good indicators of the general feeling of how the war might be going.

The third comment is that we have maintained contacts with the other side. We do not yet see the critical indication from the north that they are prepared to stop this operation in the south. I talked to Mr. Gromyko at some length about this in New York. Their po-

sition seems to me to be that they would be prepared to come to a conference or to see this matter settled, but they are unwilling themselves to make any move unless Hanoi agrees. We have been in touch with Peking, and Peking continues to be adamant, very hostile toward any idea of discussion on negotiation.

HANOI UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE

In our contacts with Hanoi, we find Hanoi is somewhere in between, but at present still closer to Peking and still unwilling to engage in serious discussion. Peking has, however, withdrawn the removal of American forces as a pre-condition for discussion. Did I say Peking?—Hanoi has withdrawn that element as a pre-condition for discussion.

Hanoi has also stopped denying that they have infiltrated the south. In our private contacts they do not pretend now that they are not doing anything, and that is, I think, something of a step forward because they have acknowledged that something is happening which has got to stop if there is going to be any peace there, something to bargain with, something to discuss.

STOPPING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

I did have an interesting talk with Mr. Peter, the Foreign Minister of Hungary, who just talked with Hanoi. Hungary is now establishing a mission in Hanoi. He tried to leave with me the impression that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam something good would happen, but as has been the case with these other Communist capitals, particularly Moscow, we have not been able to get any indication at all as to what would happen if we stopped the bombing. They are now saying that now talks can occur, nothing can happen while the bombing continues. We know as late as yesterday they announced they are organizing additional groups to send to the south. We know that they are continuing their bombing operations in the south, although the bombs are carried by men on foot.

USE OF PRIVATE CONTACTS

We have also made it clear that there are private ways by which indications could be given as to what the results would be if bombing were stopped. Nothing whatever has come in those channels.

We reminded them when the Berlin blockade was settled, such private contacts indicated the basis on which it could be settled, and when the Korean war was settled that was started by such contacts, and that is is within the resources of diplomacy to talk about a reciprocal cessation of action, pulling back on both sides. There has been no indication whatever that they are prepared to talk in those terms.

I say that because this question of how to begin to bring this to an end is something that we give a lot of thought to. If there were something reciprocal that could pull North Vietnam and South Vietnam apart militarily we would, of course, be interested.

We will continue to pursue these contacts, but thus far, as I say, the critical signals have not been received.

MOSCOW NOT LOOKING FOR IMPROVEMENT

I did not get the impression from Mr. Gromyko that he had brought any new crises or new solutions with him. We had two long discussions. We boxed the compass, remaining on each point just long enough to find out whether there was any movement, whether there was anything further to discuss. We talked about Germany, Berlin, disarmament, trade, Southeast Asia, questions of that sort, and it is my impression that the situation as far as discussion between Washington and Moscow is concerned is somewhat immobile.

Part of that is that Moscow does not wish to see much forward movement here in the face of the difficulties they are having inside the Communist world because of Southeast Asia. I do not get the impression that Moscow is going to move in any dramatic way about Southeast Asia, nor do I get the impression that Red China is girding up its loins for a major move into Southeast Asia. So, I think we are in here for another two weeks and months to find out where, when, and how the break is coming that will move this matter toward peace.

We may get indications in exactly the opposite direction if the other side makes major decisions about moving it toward a larger scale operation, but at the present time, it is not developing toward a great land war in Asia, nor do we see preparations on the other side indicating that they are planning to make it a great land war there.

[Deleted.]

UNSETTLED SITUATION IN INDONESIA

In Indonesia, the situation there is still very unsettled. The effort by a battalion of the palace guard to bring off a coup on the 30th of September appears to have been tied in with at least some Communist elements, and apparently had had a strong orientation toward Peking. There was a story in this morning's Washington Post that we had proof that Sukarno was implicated. We don't have such proof, and I think it is very unfortunate that such a story should have appeared.

What we have had is a third-hand report that one of the prisoners picked up by the army had stated his view that Sukarno knew about the 30th of September so-called coup.[1] But these people did succeed in killing six key generals. This quite naturally infuriated the army, and the army has been moving quite vigorously thus far to strike at the PKI, not only directly—they apparently arrested more than a thousand leaders—but indirectly by supporting Muslim and other groups who are demonstrating and burning PKI offices and things of that sort.

Sukarno's position on all this is still, I think, up for grabs. He has not made a flat commitment as to what his own position would be. My own impression would be that it would be very difficult for

[1] On September 30, 1965, rebel army troops led an unsuccessful *coup d'etat* against the government of President Sukarno. Regular army units crushed the rebellion and charged the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with complicity. Sukarno initially opposed the army's campaign against the Communists, but soon reversed his position.

him to oppose the army in this matter. There has been some discussion of the organization of a new Communist Party to permit the liquidation of the PKI and its now bad and tarnished reputation. But there are signs that the army is determined and that there will be considerable disorders over the next few weeks while the struggle between the army and some of these Communist elements goes on.

The army apparently has picked up a considerable number of arms made in China. Since they know that they do not have arms agreements with China and had not received those arms officially, it is their view that these arms were smuggled in by the Chinese to the PKI for the purpose of preparing the way for just such a coup as was attempted.

One other factor that has added considerable fury to the situation was the killing of General Nasution's daughter.

The CHAIRMAN. They tried to kill him.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. He was wounded.

Senator SPARKMAN. Killed one of his aides?

Secretary RUSK. Killed his young daughter. We tried, by the way, to get her and bring her out for medical treatment but were unable to do so before her death. That has added to the flames.

SEPARATIST FEELING IN SUMATRA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What about the situation in Sumatra? Here about a week ago I asked this question of some people who came over from the State Department. They said it was quiet in Sumatra. Then the news reports come out a couple of days later that the people are restless there.

Secretary RUSK. Disorder has picked up in the last week as the army has moved in on the Communist elements in Sumatra. My own impression is that the army is in a very strong position in Sumatra. The principal problem that the army has is in central Java where the Communists are fairly strong and where they seem to be, some of them, fairly well-armed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a little more than that in my question and my wonder about it. It seems to me Sumatra has been historically restless with furnishing a great deal of the revenue for Indonesia and being under the heel of Djakarta. They had those uprisings there a few years ago, and I just wondered whether there wasn't a latent revolt instinct possibly among the productive elements in Sumatra, the plantations and the oil and such.

Secretary RUSK. It is quite true there has been a strong separatist feeling under the surface in Sumatra. My own hunch is—and one can't know these things very well in advance—but my own hunch is if the army succeeds in Java in maintaining its position, that the army would probably hold together what is now Indonesia, but that if the army should lose in Java, army elements in some of the other islands might very well lead to a separatist operation in the Celebes, in Sumatra, and perhaps in some of the other islands. I suspect it is the army which is now providing the unifying forces among the islands, but a separatist Sumatra is a possibility if the army is discredited or defeated in Java.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

RAPPORT WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, for the past 3 years or more, you and other spokesmen of the Department have supported some continued military or economic aid to Indonesia on the rationalization that should a conflict occur, the United States would have a rapport and by continuing aid would continue a rapport with the military. To what extent has that existed and to what extent does it promise to be beneficial to us?

Secretary RUSK. We have tried to maintain a thread of assistance to the army there despite the fact they have had massive arms help from the Soviet Union. At the present time we are in touch with the key army leaders. The present commanding General, Suharto, is a man who was trained at Benning. Most of the leaders have been trained in this country at one time or another.

[Deleted.]

THE SITUATION PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 30

Secretary RUSK. On the whole, to try to sum up there, I would think at worst the situation is likely to revert back to what it was before the 30th of September, but in the other direction there is a real possibility that the situation could come out much more favorably from our point of view and from the point of view of Western interests.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you say "revert back to what it was before September 30" or a period of time before that, let us say, do you mean to say that there is a possibility that Sukarno will get back into a position of supreme leadership or does it appear that his almost absolute control from the political standpoint has been shaken somewhat and eroded?

Secretary RUSK. When I say at worst, I think the high probabilities are that it will stop short of that. I think his position has been tarnished. I think his position with the Communists on the island has been seriously damaged and the non-Communists or anti-Communists have been materially strengthened and are willing to assert themselves publicly. So, I think the probabilities are that the situation will be improved over what it was, say, on the 1st of August when the PKI was running pretty strongly and had a dominant influence on Sukarno.

SUBANDRIO LEAVING THE CABINET

We understand, for example, that Subandrio will soon be leaving the cabinet. That will be a definite plus from our point of view. We understand that the chief of the air force will soon be sent outside the country, and that would be a plus because he was working very closely with the PKI.

So, the chances are there will be an improvement. I think at worst it isn't likely to go much beyond what it was on the 1st of August, which was very definitely unfavorable from our point of view.

Senator GORE. Why is Subandrio leaving the cabinet?

Secretary RUSK. He has been pretty well discredited in this recent episode. He has been leading the PKI groupment of political influences there. The army considers him a leader of their opposition, and he was—it has been reported that he was—somehow implicated in the 30th of September coup. He was on the list that the 30th of September coup leaders put out as those being responsible for the revolutionary council that they announced on the 30th of September.

Some of those men who were named on that list had not been consulted and had not consented to their names being on it. Whether this was true of Subandrio, we just don't know. But, you see, Subandrio has been trying to work toward an axis with Peking, and his influence inside the Indonesian Government has been very bad from the point of view of the United States or Western interests there.

Senator GORE. He was the Foreign Minister when Sukarno was visiting here.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator GORE. He is a bad egg.

Secretary RUSK. In my book, yes, sir.

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PROPAGANDA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, do we have—it is hard to assess, I suppose—but do we have the capability of a massive propaganda assault under this situation right now? I get back to Lumumba in the Congo. Lumumba got killed. They never have proved who killed him, but he did get killed down there, and the propaganda mills of the world ground out and their sirens screamed to high heaven, and an assault on the Western World was made when one fellow was killed.

Now here, in this quite evident, I think, Communist-oriented plot in Indonesia, they go in and mutilate and shoot deliberately in cold blood, what was it—six generals?

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dump them in a common grave, wound the seventh one, and kill his daughter. Of course, you don't run the newspapers, I understand that, but we don't seem to get the propaganda impact out of that, that came out of the Congo when one fellow got killed. I don't justify the killing of anybody as a matter of coldblooded operation, that isn't the point. But it would seem to me that there ought to be some way that the so-called free world and the Western oriented world or the anti-Communist oriented world, whatever you want to call them, could take advantage of this and possibly make some impact, especially on these wavering nations, about what the Communists do when they get in.

Secretary RUSK. We are trying to coordinate our own propaganda with the line the army is taking on these matters, and the VOA has been emphasizing very strongly the murder of these generals and the involvement of the Communist Party in that. One doesn't hear much about that here, but the VOA's treatment of this has been heavily aimed in that direction. What is most important is what the Indonesians are getting these days, and this is being worked very heavily, this latter thing.

POOR REPORTING OF COMMUNIST ATROCITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not only what the Indonesians are getting, in my view, but it is the impact on the undetermined world, that is the world that is wavering here one way or another. All I read in the American papers—I can't read these foreign papers, but it seems that everytime something happens and a Commie leader gets put in jail or something, the papers scream to high heaven about the injustice. I haven't seen much comment about the fact of these terribly brutal murders. In fact, I didn't see much comment about the atrocities committed in the Northeastern Congo. You cull through the news and you find it someplace or another.

Secretary RUSK. And, indeed, you don't get much about the atrocities committed by the Vietcong.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, you don't. That is the unfortunate thing. I don't know what the answer is. I know what the answer ought to be in my own mind. I think we ought to be able to lay it out a little bit more.

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad to review that.

We have a policy directive to the VOA to emphasize this aspect of it in their foreign broadcasts, but we don't get much rebound to that here. In general, the press treatment of this situation around the world has been sympathetic to the army and the non-Communist elements down there.

Moscow is playing this very cautiously at the present time. Moscow has not been bitterly critical of the army. They have warned the army not to move into the arms of the imperialists, but they themselves have been puzzled about just how to play this situation.

Peking is trying to put a bland face on it and send Sukarno messages of good will and trying to disengage themselves from the 30th of September, but the army is not letting them get away with that in Indonesia. I will give further thought to that.

SOUTHERN RHODESIAN PROBLEM

Moving to another area, I might make a few comments on certain key matters in Africa. The Southern Rhodesian problem is a highly inflammatory issue at the present time, the basic issue there being whether Southern Rhodesia should move to independence under constitutional arrangements which keep all of the control in the hands of a group of about 250,000 whites without making much room for some 4 million blacks in the country. This is a matter which has greatly agitated the continent and on which the British Government, with the support of both the Labor and Conservative Parties, has taken a very strong line.

We today cannot be certain as to what the Rhodesian Government will do in the next 24 to 48 hours. There have been some indications in the last 24 hours that the matter of declaring unilateral independence will be put off for a time. There is some effort being made to organize a commonwealth committee to try to work something out with the Rhodesian Government, but it could become a highly dangerous situation if they move ahead in the next 24 or 48 hours to declare their independence and open the

way for a good deal of disorder in Southern Rhodesia with perhaps assistance and stimulation from the outside added to it.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson [2] were not able to reach any common ground in recent talks. That does not mean, however, that it is inevitable that Southern Rhodesia will move immediately. Their cabinet is meeting today and I just can't predict at the moment just where they will come out.

We have, in general, said that we support the British attitude on this, that we do think there ought to be further constitutional discussions making some adjustments, although we are not ourselves pressing for a one-man, one-vote situation there under present circumstances and as a matter of an immediate arrangements, but some indication that the blacks would be permitted to have some share in the government under a new constitution.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

TAKING THE MATTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. For my own information—I have some other notes, but just to be sure I cover this—why do we have to take a position prior to this time? Does this matter go to the U.N.?

Secretary RUSK. It is in the U.N., and I think the problem here, Senator, is that the General Assembly, with a large two-thirds in the Afro-Asian bloc, could do something quite drastic and rash here in this situation. One can imagine, for example, at the worst that the General Assembly would come up with a two-thirds vote to impose U.N. peacekeeping on Southern Rhodesia and although we and the British would not want to have any part of that, there are others, including the Soviet Union, who might want to take some part.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would this go directly to the General Assembly and not to the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. It would undoubtedly be in both places. The General Assembly had this in front of its Fourth Committee, and they just voted 107 to 2 urging the British to do whatever they could to prevent the unilateral declaration of Indonesia.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't want to belabor it and I am sure it is because of my ignorance, but doesn't a matter like this go to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly for the purpose of debating——

Secretary RUSK. If they were fighting across frontiers, the Security Council would be the logical place for it to go. It came up in the General Assembly Fourth Committee because it is a problem arising with a non-self governing territory.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the General Assembly have a right to express themselves and vote on it without it going to the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, on that issue.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then inasmuch as we pretty well know what would happen if this does occur—the U.N. would certainly support the British position against the unilateral position of Rho-

[2] Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

desia—why do we have to get into it in this country? Why can't we wait until the U.N. acts?

Secretary RUSK. That is what happened. Yesterday there was a vote in the U.N., 107 to 2.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

So, when the radio referred this morning to the fact that it was the first time we have supported Britain in a colonial position since 1776, they were referring to the United Nations action and nothing which had been done by the State Department.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am clear.

Secretary RUSK. We are responsible for the position we took in the U.N.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

PERSUADE SMITH NOT TO TAKE DRASTIC ACTION

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, the play here at the moment, Senator, is try to persuade Smith not to take drastic action here. Actually, now that he has made his point in London and has not given away what he might call his principles on this situation, if he now simply keeps things in the status quo for a period, there would be a certain relief and a certain reduction of tension on the matter for quite some time, and he would be able to pursue the status quo in about the way they have done in the last 2 or 3 years. If he moves under the pressure of his own immediate following to a declaration of independence, then this raises issues of sanctions, raises issues of disorder inside Southern Rhodesia; neighboring African states will be wanting to send in various groups of one sort or another to help out the blacks there, and it could get to be a real mess there in central Africa.

So, we are hoping that the advance buildup of opinion, including our own, would inject some caution into the Southern Rhodesian cabinet and keep them from moving too fast into a situation that could be so damaging for everybody.

AMERICAN INCONSISTENCY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I suppose we have to look at the practicalities of the situation, but it seems to me we are a little inconsistent. On the one hand we are, by our action, supporting colonials; that is, we are saying the British have control here. They are the controlling power. The British are trying to dictate, as opposed to the established government in Southern Rhodesia—I am not defending some of their practices, that is not the point—but we are supporting British sovereignty over this thing, and we are opposing the official governmental position of Rhodesia of independence.

Of course, there is nothing very consistent about governmental action or attitudes, or we would be raising the devil about Latvia and Estonia and so on that the Russians have taken over. We would be raising hell about Goa and a few other things, but I don't know; it is a highly complicated situation.

Really, I don't know what business we have in there at the moment, rather than sit back and let nature take its course somewhat and maybe give your good offices to get a settlement.

STOCKPILES OF COPPER

Secretary RUSK. The chain of events we would hope that would be avoided would be violence in Southern Rhodesia, which could lead to Southern Rhodesian action against Zambia, which in turn would cut off Britain's principal copper supply, which could lead to a severe shock to the British balance of payments, which could lead to our involvement in the support of the pound. You just get—looking down the road, you see some fairly difficult steps ahead.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said there are practicalities to be considered. I am not discounting the fact that there are a lot of practical things involved.

Secretary RUSK. Unfortunately, in terms of our own stockpile, copper is one of the few things we don't have much of in our stockpile, so we can't help the British if they are cut off from copper in Zambia.

Senator SPARKMAN. We had some testimony before the Joint Committee on Defense Production, and I particularly examined them on copper. They said they had copper that was available for disposal. I questioned them on that, because it seemed strange to me that—wait a minute, I guess I am wrong on that. Copper was in shortage. Manganese was not.

Secretary RUSK. My information is that copper is just about the level that we decided we would have it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I will go back on that.

Manganese is one thing they were talking about disposing of. I was wondering why since we were wholly deficient in manganese. There were some others, but I will take it all back.

SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Secretary RUSK. I might drop the word in passing that you will notice in this morning's paper that [President Joseph] Kasavubu has asked for [Moise] Tshombe's resignation as Prime Minister.

This is on the occasion of a move into a new parliamentary period. The play behind the scenes—and we can't guarantee that any of these plays work out as we were promised ahead of time—is that Kasavubu would appoint a formateur; that is, to exploit the possibility of a new government. He has done that in the form of a man named [Evariste] Kimba, but it is anticipated he will appoint Tshombe as Prime Minister after a few days. This was laid out in advance. Whether it will in fact work out this way, we can't be sure.

We have done everything we can think of to keep Kasavubu and Tshombe working together, working in tandem there. One is President and the other is Prime Minister. Mr. Tshombe apparently has some ambition to be President, and this has caused, as you can imagine, a certain estrangement between himself and Kasavubu. But the combination of the two, it seems to us, seems to be the best arrangement in the Congo, and we would hope that the scenario that we thought was agreed to 2 days ago would now work its way in that Kasavubu and Tshombe would find themselves working together again. As I say, we can't guarantee that at the moment, but it does seem to be on the track thus far.

I can also report that arms to the Congo rebels seem to be in the process of being stopped all around. I reported to the committee earlier that both Egypt and Algeria have stopped some months ago. Sudan has now joined and is blocking arms to the Congo rebels, partly because these arms are getting into the hands of their own rebels in southern Sudan.

[Discussion off the record.]

MODERATION OF NASSER

Secretary RUSK. I would like to mention the situation of Mr. Nasser. He has just appointed a new Prime Minister, [Zakara] Moheiddin, who has the reputation of being much more friendly to the West than his predecessor. We believe that his settlement of the Yemen with King Faisal is very probably going to be carried out.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. We know that Nasser has at the summit meetings caused moderation on such questions as the diversion of Jordan waters, of the use of arms against Israel. We have had some help from him on such matters as the boycott of American firms doing business with Israel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Help from whom?

Secretary RUSK. Help from Nasser on the boycott of American firms doing business with Israel. Egypt is perhaps the most forward Arab state in giving passports to American citizens of the Jewish faith.

We have the impression that Nasser is facing a period of moderation compelled by his economic situation.

Now, there is a problem coming up for him when and if these 50,000 troops from the Yemen come home. They have suffered substantial casualties. Our own man there thinks they have taken at least 15,000 casualties, far larger than have ever been announced. There seems to be a good deal of disaffection in these troops in the Yemen, so many Arabs are now speculating about what will happen when these troops come home. If they appear to be in any sense a threat to Nasser, and we know that he is nervous about his own personal situation, it is possible that he might want to employ them in some other adventure, for example, against Libya, something of that sort, or against the Sudan. We think that that is rather unlikely, but on the other hand, it would be of some importance for us to have some leverage on Nasser in that situation.

FOOD AID EXTENSION

We are giving, therefore, some thought to another P.L. 480 arrangement, moving from title I as much as possible into title IV, which is a dollar repayable arrangement, short-term rather than a long-term arrangement with him because we don't want to lose leverage by too long-term an arrangement and, at the same time, relating to such aid, economic factors such as his own sale of rice abroad or his own use of his own foreign exchange for markets in others than our own.

But we do believe that there has been substantial improvement in Nasser's attitude toward our own interests in that area. The question is whether we do not need or should not have some sort of

presence or leverage there in the next 6 months or so as some of these decisions are faced by him when his troops come back from Yemen.

I just want to let the committee know about that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aren't there discussions going on looking to a year's extension of this at a present time?

Secretary RUSK. Well, not longer than a year. As you know, our agreement expires on June 30. We have not given them an answer on that at the present time. The President wants to review this in greater detail, and——

Senator SYMINGTON. An answer to what?

Secretary RUSK. We are not giving the Egyptians an answer on a new P.L. 480 arrangement. This is still under consideration in the executive branch.

AN ACE IN THE HOLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just generally speaking, it seems to me that we have got a complete ace in the hole on this thing. Nasser would have great difficulty if he couldn't get American food. I don't know where he could get it from anyplace else. I don't know of any other country that can furnish it to him on the basis that he could pay for, and while I can see certain benefits under certain conditions of continuing or renewing some help of this kind to him, I certainly would hope that it was almost on a day-to-day basis, that is comparatively speaking.

Secretary RUSK. I agree that this is an important ace in the hole.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is the only control we have over it, and it is a pretty heavy control.

Secretary RUSK. But if a care is not played, then it is no longer an ace in the hole. It has to be played in some fashion.

Now, the week-by-week or month-by-month control comes over the issuance of purchase authorizations. As you know, Senator, we last spring stopped the purchasing authorizations even though the agreement still had $37 million to run. We stopped that in direct connection with the arms to the Congo rebels, so we do believe that this is a——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We apparently had quite an impact.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it did indeed.

But unless the arrangement had been there, it would not have been used as a leverage, you see. This is the point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand. But I start from the premise, which is probably an extravagant statement, that they can get along somehow, perhaps, but they can't hope to live and progress without the backlog of American food at the present time. I don't know where they would get it from in quantities, and it seems to me it is a very great leverage which we have. With Nasser—getting back to the old statement that when the devil is sick the devil a saint would be, and when the devil is well, the devil a saint is he—when he has foodstuffs protecting him for a period of time, then he begins cussing the United States again; when he needs it, he becomes a more mollified fellow.

Secretary RUSK. I think if we were to make a list of the principal items in which we feel our interests are engaged and a list of the

things we would want to Nasser to do, that on the whole over the last 6 months he has moved very well from the point of view of American interest. One can't guarantee that there won't be another Suez speech or something of that sort, in which case these things would be opened up again; but in terms of using the leverage, I think we have used it in a pretty powerful way here over the last 6 months.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think so, too.

Secretary RUSK. So unless we hold open the possibility, then the lever is gone. He would try to make whatever arrangements he could with others. I think he would undoubtedly get some foodstuffs from the Soviet Union despite their shortages. He probably would work it out with them on a barter arrangement. In the meantime he would become, I think, extremely vicious toward us and toward our interests in that area, and he still is in a position to do us considerable damage if this effort at moderation among his advisors does not succeed in paying off.

But, as I say, we are studying this, Senator, and we will be in touch with you before a final decision is made.

CHALMERS ROBERTS ARTICLE ON INDONESIA

Senator KUCHEL. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question about that?

The CHAIRMAN. He went over Indonesia once.

Senator SYMINGTON. I didn't know how you were going to do it. I have a note here——

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have him cover other things.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just one question in context.

You did say that you were sorry that the Chalmers Roberts article was published. Even if it was wrong, why were you sorry it was published? I just want to be sure I understand it.

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, it is factually wrong and we will be charged with having turned up a factual inaccuracy because we don't have the proof that Sukarno was implicated. We have a third-hand report that one prisoner said X and Y.

But also it is possible that Sukarno will be faced with a situation in which to survive he must join the army, and we may have to live with Sukarno. It is possible that the army may decide they have got to unseat him. We just don't know how that is going to come out, but we don't see it is in our interests at the present time to engage the United States specifically against Sukarno as the individual through such a device as the Chalmers Roberts article. You see, he has moved in many directions over the years, and he may conclude that he must throw in his lot with the generals or there is no—he may conclude he has no other choice. They may give him no other choice.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, will you move on to some of these others? Our time is limited.

INDIAN-PAKISTANI SITUATION

Do you have anything to say about Pakistan-India which was so recently in the news?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. We were very disturbed about the fact that both sides took up arms here in this situation without any consultation with us or with others, so far as we are aware. The Pakistanis sent 4,000 to 5,000 infiltrators into India-held Kasmir in the first week in August without consultation, expecting apparently a revolt of the Kashmiris in support of them. That revolt did not occur.

The Indians then, immediately, without consultation, moved their own armed forces across the cease-fire line and publicly challenged the armed forces of Pakistan, doing so, without bringing it to the Security Council or without showing the restraint they have asked us to use in places like Indochina.

Pakistan then moved a large force, including an armored brigade, to cut off India's communications with Kashmir, and then India moved corresponding from the Punjab into Pakistan. The rate of escalation there was such that we were able to remind both countries if we and the Soviet Union had escalated our crisis in the post-war period at such a rate, we could easily have had more than one world war.

One can understand the frustration of Pakistan in not getting any movement out of India to settle the Kashmir question over the past 17 years. The Indian position has been stubborn, has been unyielding, has been sanctimonious. It has ignored the general attitude of the United Nations on repeated occasions, so one can understand that frustration and still not support the attempt to settle the matter by force.

One encouraging sign in the situation was that from a military point of view, neither side seemed to be fully committed to engaging the other side in terms of hitting at decisive objectives; that is, neither side concentrated its forces to go for the jugular of the other side in any important way. From a strictly military point of view, the two sides seemed to be horsing around each other along a 1,500 mile front.

But the prospect down the road for both sides was catastrophe for different reasons on both sides. If you war-gamed it from the point of view of CINC Pakistan or CINC India, you could only see disaster down the road, so I think that helped the two sides to come to a cease-fire when the Security Council turned out to be unanimous on this, and the Soviet Union and the other big powers demanded a cease-fire.

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CHINA

The Chinese matter is an interesting part of this. We do not know all that we would like to know about what conversations took place between Pakistan and Peking. We think that, we know that, this subject was discussed between them. I suspect that if Pakistan had gotten itself in a position of a serious defeat or an important victory that China would have pressed on into the sub-continent or at least to pick up the territories they were claiming against India.

I can tell the committee that although we did not consult with the Soviet Union on this except in the Security Council about specific resolutions, it just happened that both we and the Soviet Union warned China privately at about the same time to stay out of this affair. My guess is that this had a wholesome influence on Peking's judgment, and when they saw the prospect of a cease-fire between India and Pakistan they apparently elected not to push their own threats.

STABILIZE THE CEASE-FIRE

The present problem is to stabilize the cease-fire. I think it is moving steadily toward an actual stopping of the shooting, although there continue to be some incidents on both sides, and then a withdrawal of forces followed by a strong Security Council effort to bring about a peaceful agreement, a settlement of the issues between the two countries.

Of course, the third point is going to be the most difficult of all. There is some possibility that if it is impossible to find a settlement which both can agree to, it is possible that it can be brought to accept a settlement to which both object. There have been some hints of that from both sides, and I wouldn't want to be optimistic at all after 17 years of a failure to find a solution for this problem.

But that has to be the effort. We, the United States, have enormous interests in trying to get some peace between these two countries, but thus far it has eluded us.

The Soviet Union has pressed its offer to invite Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub to meet together in Tashkent to see if they can settle the matter. The Indians have accepted the offer; the Pakistanis have, in effect, turned it down.

I find it a little difficult to assess what such a meeting could produce or what it would mean. Having reflected upon our own 17 years of effort, where we spent most of the time with one dog chewing on one leg and another dog chewing on the other leg, I am not particularly opposed to the Soviet Union having a fling at trying to bring these two countries together. I doubt that they would succeed in doing it but if they did, then, although it would be a substantial diplomatic feather in the Soviet's cap, it might also lead the way to an arrangement in the subcontinent that we ourselves could live with.

SHIPMENT OF U.S. ARMS

The CHAIRMAN. What is our position on arms to either one or both?

Secretary RUSK. We stopped our shipment of arms to both sides during the fighting. We have not resumed them, and we have also suspended new aid commitments to both sides. As I indicated in the statement that was read to the House of Representatives, we do not anticipate resuming those commitments without consultation with leaders here in the Congress.

We feel that there are major issues of common interest here that have to be discussed and resolved between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. There are just too many important issues that need clarification for us to be indifferent to and

to let them feel that they can take American aid for granted here regardless of how they themselves not only handle their own affairs but handle their relations with each other. So, I would anticipate that until that discussion can occur we would be very slow in the aid field.

KEEPING THE FOOD PIPELINE OPEN

Now, we have tried to keep the pipeline of food open because that has very strong humanitarian overtones and is an extremely sensitive matter in the political field. Our P.L. 480 arrangement with Pakistan runs through the end of this calendar year. Our arrangement with India terminated on June 30 but we have extended it on a month-by-month basis thus far. In order to try to avoid food crises in both countries, we have let the purchase authorizations go forward.

But, again, that ought to be——

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, I thought you said you suspended all aid.

Secretary RUSK. New commitments under the aid program. We have kept the food pipelines filled under the P.L. 480 program.

Senator SYMINGTON. To India?

Secretary RUSK. To India, well, we were already—our pipelines to Pakistan were moving ahead. We thought we ought to keep the two of them on the same footing as far as the pipelines are concerned.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long will the commitments go?

Secretary RUSK. I think that the latest one was a 30-day extension of the commitments. It runs through the end of this month at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you are really doing, then, is giving them food. You haven't stopped your economic aid, you have extended it.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry, I perhaps ought to be more specific. We have not made any new economic aid commitments under the aid bill. The P.L. 480 food shipments are in a different category, and what we have done there is simply keep the pipelines filled.

On NATO questions, we anticipate——

USE OF AMERICAN WEAPONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Before you get away from this aid program, I am just looking at a provision of the act which says:

> Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished to such country under this act, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor Foreign Assistance Act, in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter or any agreements entered into pursuant to any of such acts, shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

I am just wondering what action, if any, has been taken in connection with this or in connection with the charges that have been made—I don't know whether they have been substantiated or not—that either Pakistan or India has used military equipment that we furnished in fighting each other.

Secretary RUSK. Both of them have used American equipment and have used it contrary to their commitments to us in this fight-

ing with each other. We have tried to solve that problem by getting them to pull away from each other and stop the fighting. That seemed to be the most immediate way to resolve it.

We didn't want to get into the question of trying to charge one or both with aggression, because that carried with it a number of other consequences. We have commitments, for example, to each one with respect to what happens if they are subject to aggression from the other with the use of American equipment. We did not want to stir up that issue but rather try to solve it by getting the fighting stopped and, in effect, making the problem not from that point of view.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with what you say, your reasoning, but it seems to me this language is pretty clear, and mandatory.

Secretary RUSK. We have tried to get both parties back into compliance, you see, that has been the effort. I would have to consult the lawyers on this.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not advocating.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I understand.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am inquiring.

Secretary RUSK. We are using this legislation very severely with both governments during the fighting as a part of the argumentation that they must stop straightaway or the consequences will be very large.

PAKISTAN'S REQUEST FOR NEW JETS

The CHAIRMAN. What are you going to do about this Pakistani request for new jets to replace the jets which they have lost; are you going to replace them?

Secretary RUSK. We have not moved on that at all. We are not going to send military assistance to them for some time to come.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you, under that provision, can you legally?

Secretary RUSK. I would need legal advice before I would comment on the legal part of it, but as a policy matter a lot of things have got to happen before we would consider any resumption of that kind of aid.

The CHAIRMAN. I wouldn't think you would need a lawyer to interpret what that provision says. It says specifically you can't do it legally. I didn't say illegally. You can't do it legally, I wouldn't think.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

What about our relations with the U.S.S.R.? I understand you had a long talk with Gromyko. You touched on it very briefly. Did Gromyko say anything to you about the consular convention?

Secretary RUSK. No, that did not come up in our talks there.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder why not? You didn't bring it up or he didn't? You didn't want to bring it up?

Secretary RUSK. We talked about the negotiation of a new exchange agreement, and it was agreed that we would proceed with that negotiation.

THE CONSULAR CONVENTION

The CHAIRMAN. Is the consular convention dead as far as the administration is concerned?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; no, sir. We would like to see it. I think the——

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The consular convention with Russia.

Are you going to press for its approval in the next session? Is that your present intention?

Secretary RUSK. That is our present plan. I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, that if it comes up we want to be sure it passes, because if it comes up and it fails to pass then we have exaggerated our difficulties.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not it passes depends a lot on your attitude. I mean if the administration doesn't take a strong position on it, it won't, I guess. You know the problem as well as I do, about Mr. [J. Edgar] Hoover's statement and so on. I just wonder what to look forward to. I will be asked about it, and I don't know what to say really about what your attitude is.

I want to congratulate you; I have already written you a letter about your attitude on the tobacco with Yugoslavia. I thought it was an excellent position you took. I agree thoroughly with the way you handled it.

Couldn't you get together with the administration? I know there are other branches besides State, and particularly CIA believes strongly this ought to be done. I wondered whether you couldn't get kind of a general attitude involving the other parts of the government than State with regard to the consular convention if you really want it approved.

Secretary RUSK. There are two, it seems to me, two quite separate issues here.

PROTECT U.S. CITIZENS

The first issue is the consular agreement as it stands without the question of opening new consulates, either there or in our own country. From that point of view, there is every advantage in the agreement as it stands, because it gives us a chance to protect our citizens who are going into the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers against the usual practices of a police state.

Now, the question of opening up a consulate is a separate question on which I also have views, but it is not the immediate question before the Senate. I have told the committee that we would consult with the committee before we went into the question of opening consulates.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. Indeed, one consulate would add perhaps 12 or 15 people to some 9,000 people who already have diplomatic privileges in this country. So this is not itself a major problem, but I would hope that we could get this consular convention as it stands because of the great benefits that obtain within the four corners of the paper whether or not there are to be any consulates in each country opened up.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate the administration will take a strong stand for it next year?

Secretary RUSK. That is my present understanding of the matter. I certainly will do my best in that direction as Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely want to canvass one statement that you made, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said we will only add 12, 15 people to the immunities situation. Under the most favored nations in these other consular treaties, it will add more than a thousand.

Secretary RUSK. Potentially it could add some 400 if those who have the most favored nation clause would call for similar treatment on a reciprocal basis. But our understanding is those nations have very little interest in it because they, for other reasons, do not want to add to diplomatic immunities in their country if it is not necessary. So, the way you have free systems and free governments and a general acceptable rule of law, we don't expect they will pick up this privilege under the most favored nations.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't add 400 people; it merely changes their privileges, those already here.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It gives immunity to those already here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But it gives 400 new immunities.

The CHAIRMAN. Next year isn't an election year, and I wondered what the administration's position is going to be if I am asked, which I am very often, what is the administration's position. If you took as firm a stand particularly involving the major divisions of government so explicitly as you did in the tobacco case, I think you might make a good impression on the Congress.

Secretary RUSK. We will have to take this up in terms of a count.

TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC

The CHAIRMAN. What about trade relations? Are you doing anything about that, with Eastern Europe and Russia? Are you going to do anything about the 50–50 clause, for example?

We sent you a letter. Did you see it?

Secretary RUSK. I did see it, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve of it?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that this is a matter that the administration is studying. We have not yet had any serious indication from the Soviet Union they want to buy. I could only express a personal view that I don't believe that this is the right way to go about strengthening our own merchant marine because it doesn't add anything to guarantee them 50 percent of nothing in a situation where such transactions do not occur so long as that provision is there. But I think it needs a good deal of sorting out, and I would hope we could find an answer to it.

Senator LONG. Might I make a suggestion along that line, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

MAKE THE COMMITMENT WITH YOUR EYES OPEN

Senator LONG. I didn't sign that letter and I wasn't here except about one day of the hearings and not a full day on that subject but, as I understand it, when John Kennedy was President he wanted authority to sell this wheat to these Eastern bloc countries. To gain the support that he thought he would need to get that authority, he said that he would carry 50 percent of that in American bottoms. That is how I understand that this whole thing got started, and that was administrative rather than an act of Congress as I understand it.

Now, as a politician, I don't think you ought to go abroad promising people something unless you expect to do it. I give John Kennedy credit of being a sincere man that way, and I have never known him in my experience to break his word.

It seems to me if you are going to make that commitment, you should have made it with your eyes wide open, knowing you have to do one of two things: knowing you have to reduce the cost of that wheat in the Commodity Credit Corporation and sell it at a lower cost to offset that higher cost of American merchant transportation, or else you are going to have to go over here in the merchant marine and put more subsidy for American shipping, one way or the other, because the Communist country is not going to pay the United States more money for wheat than they can buy it somewhere else from other countries for.

So logically, to me, one of two things, is to be done. Now, the merchant marine doesn't want it put on their budget apparently, and Agriculture doesn't want it put on theirs, but one of the two of them ought to be made to stand the burden of the higher cost of the American merchant marine of fulfilling that commitment. If all you are planning to do would be to make an entry commitment and then say, "The wheat won't move that way" and then say, "That being the case, we will have to break our word with you," it seems to me the man who made the commitment should have thought about it to begin with.

Secretary RUSK. There is a third alternative, Senator. I don't have, quite frankly, the latest information since I have been at the U.N. for the last 2 weeks, but the third alternative would be for labor itself to take a second look at this situation and decide whether, in fact, it is in its interest to press this matter.

CHANGING THE POLICY

Senator SYMINGTON. Why should the Johnson administration be held to everything that the Kennedy administration did, if it is not right? There are foreign policy changes, and problems change, following the trend on that. Why can't you change it in this administration as against what the past administration did?

Secretary RUSK. In our complicated society, one of the problems is that if we simply changed a policy, who would load the ships? I mean that is the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The representative of the unions said they would prefer really an increase in what he called a fair subsidy, direct subsidy, rather than a 50–50 clause. Haddock said that, I think that is correct. But the Congress, the administration had never car-

ried out what he believed was their commitment as to subsidies, treatment of the merchant marine directly, and he said he would prefer an adequate or satisfactory subsidy arrangement directly, and then you could do away with the 50-percent clause.

Later on Gleason,[3] when asked would they load it if it was taken off, said no, of course, they wouldn't do it. But I am not sure—he was asked, "Would you do it in case a larger subsidy for operation of the ship was given?" This was just a newspaper reporter asking him the question. He may well have meant that under present conditions he is not going to load this. I don't know this.

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS WHEAT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't sign the letter, although I agreed with the spirit of it. The reason I didn't sign it was I didn't want to cause recirculation of a roundrobin letter. I didn't sign it because I didn't think it emphasized what I think is the most important thing there, and that is the disposal of surplus wheat to relieve our agricultural situation. I didn't think it emphasized it sufficiently and I procrastinated on it a little bit. I have no objection to it; in general, I approved the letter. If I had been in on its preparation, I would have suggested more forceful language on the reduction of our wheat surpluses and so on if we can sell it for this amount of money.

The CHAIRMAN. It was taken up in the committee and any suggestions were welcome. You weren't here that day.

Senator HICKENLOOPER.That is what I said, if I was here in its inception. I don't disagree with the principles in the letter. In general, I agree with the letter; I make that clear.

The CHAIRMAN. You say they haven't shown any indication that they would buy it. Of course, they wouldn't if this is in existence. Have you asked them if they would buy it, if this was asked?

Secretary RUSK. This was asked.

The CHAIRMAN. From Gromyko?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. In a very private way, not to get prestige committed or not to get a promise made on our side without knowing whether we could for sure deliver. We haven't any indication back from them.

The CHAIRMAN. It is obvious they are not going to indicate they would buy at a higher price. They made that very clear, and I think they have already made the commitments of $680 million for this year. I don't know whether they need any more or not. If they do, they would still look to other places unless this is corrected.

Secretary RUSK. The prospect is they are going to be in the world market for some time to come.

The CHAIRMAN. For a number of years.

POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SELLING THE WHEAT

Senator LONG. Just one point I want to explore a little bit. I don't like to differ with my friend from Missouri, but it seems to me as though when the President wanted to sell this wheat, he wouldn't have had the political support he needed for his act if he

[3] Thomas Gleason, president of AFL–CIO International Longshoremen's Association.

didn't have two things. One, he picked up the farmers because they wanted to dispose of the wheat. That picked up political support but he needed more, so, he made this commitment to the merchant marine interests, the labor people, and also, I assume, to shippers who were interested in this, to the shippers who were going to share the benefit of it along with the farmers.

Now, I have seen a lot of things that Presidents have done where they made commitments, said, "This is what the policy is going to be if we have this authority, and we are going to handle it this way." It may be that you could say, "Well, after all, that commitment was just made by the President and was not written in the law."

But I believe the facts are—and it is on the record—everybody knew the commitment was made on the Hill as well as down at the White House. I think you will find that President Johnson knew all about that commitment. He understood that. That was a commitment that was made, that is how it came about, and it seems to me as though it is just as simple as saying here we are going to do something that is going to help the farmers and we are going to handle it in such a way that it is going to help the merchant marine.

I am perfectly content to do anything to help the wheat farmers. I want them to be in business and make a nice profit. I hope my good friend from Missouri will help my sugar farmers, and I think perhaps you will. But I think also, as far as the merchant marine fellows are concerned, they also contribute to our national security, and they are an important segment of our economy.

If you made a commitment to them, I think you ought to keep it unless the price goes too high, and I see no reason to think that the price of keeping that commitment is out of bounds. It is just a question of who is going to pay for that cost of it, us or the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union didn't make any commitment to our merchant marine, so if anybody is to pay we have to pay for that commitment.

Secretary RUSK. There is a cabinet committee that is working with the trade and with the unions on this matter. I can't give you an indication of an answer today because I frankly don't know that there is an answer.

MERCHANT SEAMEN VERSUS FARMERS

Senator LONG. I don't want to be put in a position that I have got to vote against my merchant seamen in order to vote for the farmers or that I have got to vote against—the other way around. I want to be able to vote for something where neither one of them get hurt, they both benefit. It seems to me it is just a matter of us paying a little more money as Federal expense for us to do this thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Russell, it seems to me that we are treading water on this thing. If it is American policy to support the merchant marine, and I think it probably is—of course, I don't like to be blackmailed by the unions and, of course, that is being done here, I think, and we are putting up with it—but if we are going to support the merchant marine, we are accomplishing nothing.

As I said in my letter, we are not shipping the wheat. The merchant marine is getting no business. The wheat is sitting in storage here and we are paying storage on it and we are subsidizing it every year. If we lifted this 50 percent, we not only would be disposing of the wheat but we could find some other method if Congress deemed it desirable to aid the merchant marine further. We are aiding them now, we are contributing to them now, we are subsidizing them all down the line now, keeping them afloat.

Senator LONG. I have no interest in these fellows, in the longshoremen's part of the deal.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a very definite interest. I am getting tired of being blackmailed by labor leaders.

The CHAIRMAN. I am, too. I don't think it is a proper way to conduct foreign policy to have their interests engendered in this way.

Senator LONG. I don't agree with that part of it, but I think they ought to load the ships, too. I don't believe in calling a strike off because they feel as though they are being done in. But, on the other hand, they have made a commitment and if the commitment is not kept, it seems to me as though they are justified to some extent in showing their displeasure about it.

COMMITMENT IS NOT INFINITE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Russell, that commitment is not infinite. No commitment of that kind is infinite. Somebody said a minute ago—maybe you acknowledged it—that conditions do change. The fact that President Kennedy made that commitment one time under a certain set of circumstances doesn't mean that circumstances, when they change—either he, if he were still President, or a succeeding President, can't change an executive order to meet the exigencies of the occasion. I don't see there is anything absolutely sacred about a commitment once made, otherwise commitments made by executive order 20 years ago should still be in effect.

Senator LONG. But it was obvious on the face of it that if you weren't going to do something to offset the higher cost of American merchant shipping, that you hadn't promised them anything at all when you made the commitment. Something had to be offset, and nothing was done to offset the higher cost of American shipping. In that case the commitment made to them was, on the face of it, a completely fraudulent commitment unless there was intent that something be done to implement it. We have discussed what the possibilities are to implement it, and one of those steps ought to be taken to implement that commitment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I certainly don't agree with that. While I don't necessarily agree with the commitment that was made at that time, I can see that perhaps in the mind of the President, President Kennedy, when he made it, he might have considered that the circumstances of the moment made that the most desirable situation to create.

Now, I think circumstances——

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't think the President could have foreseen that it was going to have that adverse impact.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are just losing out of both ends of the horn.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. What I urge the Secretary to do, I think as far as the majority—Senator Hickenlooper already stated he has no objection to that letter, and I think there were some others. Senator Aiken told me he didn't disagree with the letter, but he objects on principle to roundrobins. He is for the letter. There are more who would sign it, who are in agreement with the sentiments of it.

But I would like to urge the Secretary to take a firm stand on this and propose in connection with it, if you think necessary, some other way to satisfy the unions, whatever that is. There ought to be some better way than this, because this is a self-defeating one and is not accomplishing any purpose for anybody. It is interfering with what is the declared policy of the government. So, whatever it is worth, we hope you can move on this thing and get this thing off center.

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Next, can you come to the Dominican Republic, give us a report on what the situation there is?

Secretary RUSK. The principal effort in the last several days has been to bring about an assertion of the control of President [Hector Garcia] Godoy over the downtown area. The first important step on that was taken yesterday when the government's police forces were merged with the police forces in the downtown area, and President Godoy now has a police position in the downtown area. The second step, which is just on the point of being taken, is a removal of the armed forces elements from the downtown area to a location outside the city where they would be integrated into the regular armed forces. These two steps would, we believe, serve to put the government in charge of the downtown area and make it possible for them to take some steps which they thus far have not been able to take without some serious fighting.

It appears that at least some substantial elements of the inter-American force will be asked to stay there until the election. That is some 7 months off.

We have been concerned, quite frankly, about some of the individuals who are still active in the island. But, on the whole, we think that this matter is going to work out with a moderate, center of the road kind of government there, although it is going to take a lot of attention, a lot of work between now and the election.

But in terms of the first important step, that is, the assertion of government control over the downtown area, apparently there is moving, and moving in the last day or two.

RUMORS ABOUT CHE GUEVARA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there anything in the rumor that Che Guevara has shaved his beard off and is in the Dominican Republic?

Secretary RUSK. We haven't had any evidence of that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say a rumor.

Secretary RUSK. There was a report he had been killed in the Dominican Republic. We can't confirm that. We just don't know where he is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

GODOY WILL NOT BE A CANDIDATE

Senator LAUSCHE. Is Godoy the interim government, or is he going to run?

Secretary RUSK. He is the interim government pending elections which are going to come 7 months from now. He himself has said he will not be a candidate.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will Bosch be?

Secretary RUSK. It is still very uncertain. If I had to guess, I would be inclined to guess today he would not be a candidate. Balaguer is the principal known candidate and he has pretty substantial support around the island, as I think I have told the committee before. In some polls that were taken before the revolt, Balaguer had a substantial lead over Bosch in the poll that was taken as a sampling around the countryside.

BOSCH'S PLANS AND PUBLICITY

But we just don't know what Bosch's own plans are. Bosch does have an extraordinary press. He has, apparently, a very effective press agent.

For example, when he returned, it was reported all over our press that there was a crowd of 60,000 people to welcome him. We had a helicopter flying over the crowd and did some counting. We couldn't count more than 6,000, but by the time the press reported it, it had been multiplied by 10 times.

We do not have the impression that his return stimulated a great and overwhelming popular reaction in support of Bosch. He has been somewhat discredited by his tour as President before he was overthrown. I think there are a good many who felt that he did not conduct himself with great distinction at the beginning of this affair and, had he come to the Dominican Republic early, he might well have been the President of the Dominican Republic today.

Senator LAUSCHE. How has his demand that we pay him $1 billion been received? Has that taken hold?

Secretary RUSK. This hasn't taken hold anywhere where there is any responsibility. It has been treated as a ridiculous matter by the inter-American Foreign Ministers. This is purely a propaganda statement. There is just no substance in it.

AID TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. Are we giving them aid now?

Secretary RUSK. We are on a short-term basis, on almost a week-by-week basis, but we have not laid on large, long-term commitments because there are a good many things they have got to do before we feel that is justified.

ADMITTING CHINA TO THE U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant to ask you when you were talking about the U.N., what is the prospect on admission of China; that is, a vote on admission of China? Will there be one?

Secretary RUSK. There will be one, because this item has been filed for discussion on the agenda. It will come up, one, on that item and, second, in the report of the Credentials Committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it an important item?

Secretary RUSK. We feel there is a majority of at least 20 to support the idea this—it is an important item. We think on a straight vote on the merits of the case, on a resolution that would throw out Formosa and seat Peking that there would be a majority of perhaps seven, with a number of abstentions. But, in any event, since we think there is no question that it will be decided that it is an important question, we don't see much prospect that there will be an effective resolution seating Peking at this session.

Senator GORE. You didn't make clear how the majority of seven would be.

Secretary RUSK. Seven for seating them. Even India, who has enormous problems with Peking, still wants to vote to seat them in the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean they want to unseat Taiwan or seat them both?

Secretary RUSK. The Albanian resolution, Albanian type resolution, as it has come to be known, would expel Formosa and seat Peking. There will be a little—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would that be in the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. No, just in the Assembly. The Assembly cannot seat anybody in the Security Council. A more difficult resolution would be one that was equivocal on that point because some would claim that they believe in a two-Chinas policy, and they would be voting to seat Peking without voting to expel Formosa.

But the two are exactly identical in terms of their effect because it is very clear that Peking would not come near the United Nations if Formosa continued to have a seat. So, the effect of the two types resolution would be the same.

We are having, I think, good support from a good number of the smaller African countries. France's attitude on this has not overwhelmed in French-speaking African countries, and we think there is still a majority of seven opposed to seating of Peking.

TALKS WITH CHINA IN WARSAW

I might report to the committee that we had our 127th talk with Peking in Warsaw since I met with the committee, and for the 127th time Peking started off the discussion saying, "There is nothing to discuss until you are prepare to surrender Formosa." When our man stated we are not going to surrender 11 million people without their consent, then the conversation went off in the same stilted well-known positions that have characterized these talks for the last 10 years.

So, it continues to be true that surrender of Formosa is the sine qua non in Peking of any sort of business with us at all. They won't talk about the exchange of some newspapermen. They won't

even talk about the exchange of a few doctors. They won't even talk about Southeast Asia. Everything turns on this question of Formosa, so we are——

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, if that is true, and you are sure that they wouldn't come in unless we got rid of Formosa, wouldn't it be to our advantage worldwide to change our position on having them in?

Secretary RUSK. It isn't easy, Senator, to take a position publicly that you are prepared to live with; in other words, relying upon Peking saying no. In the first place they may fool you; they may present themselves and want to come in.

PROBLEMS CHINA POSES FOR THE U.N.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would that create insuperable problems in the world, in the U.N.?

Secretary RUSK. To me the key problem at the present time is what Peking would think of an invitation to come and sit in the General Assembly in relation to their own judgment as to whether or not their policy of militancy is a success or whether they are going to have to work out some changes in it.

Now, we have got an enormous stake in Peking's judgment as to whether they feel they are on the right track, because if they are encouraged to stay on this policy of militancy, then I think we are headed for major trouble in the Pacific and in Asia. Whereas if they can be brought to feel they are not getting ahead, I mean they are being rejected by country after country—for example, in Africa. The events in Indonesia can't be pleasing. They walked uphill and downhill in the India-Pakistan affair in the face of warnings from both Moscow and the United States. They are showing an extraordinary amount of caution in the Southeast Asia problem.

I mean if anyone had asked me a year ago can the United States put 140,000 troops in South Vietnam and bomb four-fifths on North Vietnam without a major Chinese reaction, I would have said no. It is hard to conceive that they would not react in a major way, but it is happening.

Now, they could react tomorrow morning. But here we have in this bombing of the north——

A VERY DANGEROUS STEP

Senator SYMINGTON. If they don't come in the U.N. and if a test-ban treaty is negotiated and if they get the nuclear weapon, what will any test ban treaty mean unless they have got some kind of relationship with it?

Secretary RUSK. But the problem is not one of contact or relationship. We have discussed more important matters with Peking over the last 10 years than any government that has diplomatic relations with them, with the possible exception of Moscow. We talk with them much more than the British and the French and these other countries do. The problem is not contact, the problem is with contact where you can't live with what you find out, and I am quite sure that the General Assembly is not going to serve as a reform school for Peking. They have got to come to their conclu-

sions based upon a very hard and harsh assessment of their interests and this policy and whether or not they are going to be successful. I am concerned that an invitation to them by the General Assembly would be looked upon by Peking as a ratification of their policy, and at the present moment it seems to me that would be a very dangerous step, a very dangerous step.

I would have to say to the committee that if there is peace in Southeast Asia, that is, if we can succeed in fending off and turning back this aggression from the north, then I think the possibilities of fending off a majority vote in the General Assembly to seat Peking would be very slim. I think that peace in Southeast Asia would open the way to a majority in the Assembly to seat Peking.

NOT RATIFYING CHINESE MILITANCE

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see how an invitation would be a ratification of their militant policy, especially in view of what you said about their lack of success in recent months.

Senator SYMINGTON. Neither do I.

The CHAIRMAN. If we change our policy, we certainly are not ratifying it. We have given every evidence we are against it to the tune of 140,000 people over there. I don't know why they would follow it. They must be very irrational to term it that way.

Secretary RUSK. There are other factors, too—the effect on many of the smaller countries in the immediate neighborhood of mainland China. You would get this in Korea, Japan, Formosa, Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam.

INDIA AND CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said India wants them in, although clearly India is not ratifying it. She has been the victim of the militant policy. She thinks if they were in, the full force of the U.N. might be brought to bear to control them. It seems to me that is a more reasonable interpretation of it, of an invitation, than the other.

Secretary RUSK. That sounds a little hollow in the Indian mouth, though, because the full force of the U.N. hasn't had the slightest impression on India over the last 17 years on Kashmir.

The CHAIRMAN. It hasn't in other cases, too, but I don't see how it could be interpreted as an approval of their militant policy. It would be an experiment, of course. It may not have any effect upon them, but I don't know how it would be interpreted as ratification.

Secretary RUSK. There are other developments here. Peking, itself, through Chen Yi's press conference, has said they would not come into the U.N. unless the U.N. apologized for calling China an aggressor in 1950 over Korea. They would not come in unless there were a reorganization of the U.N. under which the imperialist puppets would be expelled from membership.

The CHAIRMAN. None of those would be acceptable. I mean we are not considering, I wouldn't consider, any of those things as taking place. But just a straight-out invitation without any of these conditions could not be interpreted that way. Goodness knows, nobody is saying we are going to apologize or any of those things. I wouldn't consider that for the moment.

MORALE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator LAUSCHE. Has our position become stronger in that Southeast area since we have had some successes in South Vietnam, that is, with Thailand and the whole area?

Secretary RUSK. I think that there is no question that the morale of Southeast Asia has gone up.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. If we vote for the admission of Red China, you said it would have an adverse impact upon the psychology of these countries.

Secretary RUSK. I was thinking of Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Formosa, South Korea, and I think a very strong impetus to the neutralism in Japan. We don't object to neutralism as such, if there is no great struggle going on, but there is a great struggle going on and we need some determined attitudes on this among the countries surrounding China.

SOVIET VETOES IN THE U.N.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask you how many Soviet vetoes have they had in the United Nations now?

Secretary RUSK. There have been about 103 or 104, I think, at this point.

Senator LONG. About 104. As a practical matter, haven't we gotten now so that we don't even ask for a lot of things we would have asked for if it hadn't been for the 104 votes, a number of times we haven't had it vetoed because we knew they would have vetoed what we came up with as a solution anyway?

Secretary RUSK. There have been times we have not put matters before the Security Council because of the certainty of a veto.

Senator LONG. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And this Soviet veto is one of the principal reasons why over the last, well, since 1950, we have turned to the General Assembly on a good many matters.

Senator LONG. Here is the point I had in mind.

It seems to me that you started out organizing the United Nations—I was in the service back at that time and didn't pay any attention to these, but everybody said that was the $64 question, suppose these great powers can't work together under these provisions of the U.N. Charter?

The answer was if the great powers can't work together, nothing would be achieved anyway. That was the answer.

All right. Then we found out Russia would not work with us, so based on the philosophy we had when we started this, the whole thing was condemned to failure from that point forward.

Now, 104 times we have accomplished some kind of an answer, and Russia has vetoed it. The United Nations as a device to settle disputes among nations is a very, very disappointing proposition just because somebody who oftentimes was not even a party to the dispute was vetoing the proposed settlement; in the matter of mutual aid, a complete failure; in economic aid, you can't trust it. For political settlements, every time you get one, veto. It can't work out. It cannot be used for free elections because you have got

a party vetoing anything that would try to guarantee free elections.

It just seems to me that the minuses of this outfit greatly exceed the pluses. If we hadn't had it, if we at any time had organized ours as a debate society and invited everybody to come around and cuss everybody out—that is what they are doing. If you listen about a week and you listen to all these African and Asian countries cuss us out and low-rate us, and many of these with speeches by Peking and Moscow political sections, and then sit around and watch nothing happen, the whole thing is a frustration.

A TWO-NATION VETO

If you didn't have it, we could have proceeded to organize about two-thirds of the world—I think we could have—and we still could organize most of the world into some group that would be willing to settle disputes among themselves, to have some sort of judicial machinery such as the World Court, perhaps improve upon it to where you could effectively settle international disputes, where you could have effective mutual military aid. You could have effective economic aid and self-help and we could work out political decisions and perhaps even get it agreed that where you had come danger of a Communist takeover we could have some device to guarantee free elections. Personally, it leaves me thinking if we just had this thing as a pure debate society, recognize that is all it is, and international debating society with everybody welcome to come and cuss the other fellow out and then, having done that, we would prepare speeches to cuss out every Communist country, and they and their satellites in their speeches cuss us out, and then get a three-quarters vote of one fellow to condone the other fellow and then go home, and then have those willing to work together as a club and say we are willing to stand together and arrive at a decision and make commitments and meet them instead of having a one-nation veto, have a two-nation veto—one fellow could not continuously be himself arbitrarily veto, but get somebody to go along with him—maybe we could have an international organization.

But it looks to me as if the U.N., with the problems we face, is sort of like having designed yourself a monkey wrench to do a job when a screwdriver is what you really need. Having been up there and taken a look at this last frustrating session where we accomplished exactly zero, I will say at that last session I served, that was the epitome, exactly zero, and we had to work hard to achieve that.

LAST BEST HOPE OF THE WORLD

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to once again disagree with my colleague from Louisiana, my good friend. I think that the hydrogen bomb makes the United Nations the last best hope of the world, and I think it very deeply—I think Elihu Root was right when he said the world rule of law was inevitable, and he did it half a century ago so I can't share that view.

But I will say this, you put us who are on the Armed Services Committee and the Disarmament Committee in a Disneyland, because what difference does it make what we agree on with the Rus-

sian people as regards the bomb, or anybody else who has the bomb, if one quarter of all the people in the world are in a country that has now had its explsion and is rapidly approaching the point to where the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee in a few months thinks they not only can hit Europe but thinks they can hit the United States? We are just in an Alice in Wonderland thinking because of the dichotomy of thinking when Bill Foster and Butch Fisher come in and talk about a dream world that makes no practical sense at all unless we can establish some form of relationship either with the Red Chinese in conjunction with the Soviets, or forget the whole thing and keep on arming, which is bound to bring catastrophe to my kids in the not-too-distant future.

TRADING FOR THE UNKNOWN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The only disagreement I would have with that argument—I agree with the first part of your argument; in the second part we would be taking, to me, an inexcusable chance. We would be trading what we have for something completely unknown. Suppose they were admitted to the United Nations, there is no assurance whatsoever that they would join in this bomb control, atomic control business. They would be their own free agents. Just as we had firm commitments on a lot of things, we would have firm commitments on non-aggression.

Secretary RUSK. We would not oppose Peking's coming and taking part in a serious disarmament effort. We have talked to them about this privately some time ago, and they showed not the slightest interest. We have always recognized if we began to make any headway on disarmament at Geneva and with the Soviets, that you couldn't get very far without Peking's coming into it, because they are an important military power and you can't disarm in complete disregard of what is happening on mainland China.

I think Senator Long saw the United Nations in its worst hour. I do believe, sir, that your views are perhaps are a little too gloomy about it. It has been important that the United Nations provided a framework through which the great powers could bring about a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. It has played a useful role in Cyprus in trying to keep things quiet on that island, and it has helped to keep the Jews and Arabs from each other's throats out in the Near East.

There have been a number of other things—by the way, Mr. Chairman, I did raise with Mr. Gromyko——

THE CHINESE SEAT IS AN EXCEPTION

Senator LONG. The point I make, Mr. Secretary, if you didn't have it, if you hadn't had it at all, you would organize something to take its place. What you would organize would be something much more effective.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think for the first seven or eight years of the U.N. we had, in effect, the kind of organization you are talking about, because there was a very substantial majority that was regularly voting 47 to 7 or 52 to 8 or 9, that sort of thing, on issues of interest to the free world. It has become somewhat more complicated with the large number of Afro-Asian members added since then.

But even there, in general, we find that we and the great majority are looking in the same direction and voting the same way on most of the important issues. The Chinese seat is a very specific exception. Then there is the great bulk of the day-by-day work, the unseen work, the kind of work that the press never notices, which has to be organized on a pretty general international basis if it is to succeed, such things as epidemic control, safety of life at sea, and other things. It is extraordinary to see how many things that affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens require some sort of understanding or arrangements internationally.

On any given day we are sitting in on 15 or 20 meetings, and it might be dealing with hog cholera here and it might be dealing with radio frequencies there, and all these other things. We would have some tough questions if we didn't have that kind of organization available.

But, I did ask Mr. Gromyko whether they had reached a point where they could consider the elimination of the veto under chapter 6 of the charter, that is in the field of peaceful settlement.

As you know this committee for 15 years has urged the removal of the veto under chapter 6 of the charter. We ourselves want the veto under chapter 7 of the charter, which is the military section of the charter. He said no, this was not a discussable matter, and they would not under any circumstances consider change of the veto.

CHINA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator LAUSCHE. Is China a permanent member of the security Council?

Secretary RUSK. They are.

Senator LAUSCHE. If Red China were admitted, which of the two Chinese would be the permanent member?

Secretary RUSK. If Peking were admitted to the General Assembly and took its seat there, which it is unlikely that they would without the expulsion of Formosa, then there would be a real Donnybrook in the Security Council about the Chinese seat there.

For example, you would get into the questions of whether seating them would be vetoable. That is a question on which the lawyers could argue until the cows come home, and undoubtedly that question would at least go to the World Court.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

CHINESE ADVOCATED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator LAUSCHE. One further question, in the last half decade when this breach has occurred between Peking and Russia, has Red China been urging the use of the atomic bomb and all-out means upon Russia to achieve its objective of communication?

Secretary RUSK. There have been times when they have spoken like that; other times, somewhat more cautiously. But very recently Marshal Lin Piao put out a major declaration of policy in which he criticized Moscow for taking too gloomy a view of war. They hope to persuade Moscow as fellow socialists to revise their view in this direction.

We have the impression that Moscow and we together take a very gloomy view of war. The doctrine in Peking is not very acceptable to the Western part of the Communist world.

Senator LAUSCHE. I point that out merely because it shows the utter disqualification of Red China to conform with any of the basic principles underlying the creation of the United Nations. They do not believe in peaceful coexistence. They are urging every means conceivable to communize the world. They have been urging Russia to use every means. I can't believe that if you once admit them they will abandon that attitude.

Thanks very much.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just had one question I wanted to ask before we leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Secretary Rusk, I would like to ask a question.

OVERTHROWING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Barron's carried a paragraph that either the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency is promoting a program to overthrow the present government in South Vietnam. Did you see that?

Secretary RUSK. I haven't seen it, but there is not an iota of truth in it, just not an iota of truth in it.

Senator LAUSCHE. It would be frightening to everybody if that was happening.

Secretary RUSK. Just nothing to it at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't it a fact that we are approaching a stability of government in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. The present government, in effect, is a council of generals. Ky is the executive agent or the spokesman for a council of generals. He is not in any sense a dictator in his own right because the power is distributed there and is shared by the council.

But quite frankly, what we have talked to Ky about—and this is nothing covert or under the rug or anything like that—is the importance of organizing a much stronger political movement of national union, looking to the time when this matter may move from the battlefield to the ballot box in the villages. If the Vietcong prove to have the only efficient political organization in the villages, in the countryside, without anything that can meet them on the political hustings, then this would be serious. So, we would hope that these generals would try to find some way to drawing together the Buddhists, the Catholic leaders, and the secular leaders and the Montagnards and try to build a political movement of national union that could win the political battle that presumably is going to come if we get peace.

Whether anything of that sort stimulated that story, I don't know. But I can assure you there is no undercover operation to undermine the present government. We have been concerned, as you know, about the succession of governments there, and we would like to keep this momentum going.

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. IN SPACE

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to ask you, in the morning paper there was one article about cooperation between the United States and Russia in space. Then there was another interesting little item, it says, this is a quote, datelined St. Louis:

> America must seize control of space militarily before the Soviet Union does. According to Air Force General Bernard A. Schriever, Director of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Project, our military responsibility in space is to respond to the threat—both stated and implied—which is posed by Soviet space technology and Soviet political ambition.

This leaves me confused as to what is our Government policy in space.

First, may I ask was that speech cleared by the Department?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to check to find out whether I saw it beforehand. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it normal, is it routine that they usually are?

Secretary RUSK. There are procedures for doing it. Whether this particular speech was handled in that procedure or not, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that express the policy of the administration?

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet space program combines both civilian and military aspects, and they never have been willing to get into any discussion about which is which. We know they are planning to put a large military laboratory into space. They make no bones about it. We know they are doing things in space that have a direct military impact. In our program we separate the NASA activity, which is non-military, from the military aspect.

We and the Soviets both have to be aware of the military implications of space. It is our policy not to leave the Soviet Union in a monopoly position in this field.

Now, we have tried on many occasions to elicit as much cooperation from the Soviets in space as they are prepared to extend. Mr. Khrushchev's response at one point was, "Sure, we will cooperate with you; we will send a man to the moon and you bring him back."

MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL COOPERATION

We have in the last few days worked out with them a certain expansion of cooperation on the medical and biological aspects of space. Now that they are getting weather satellites into operation, we hope there will be a more effective two-way exchange of data derived from weather satellites than our previous cooperation.

They and we are working together, I should say pretty effectively, in developing some rudiments of law applicable to outer space. We may well have to decide that there should be something like an Antarctica regime for the moon within the foreseeable future, and the Soviets are interested in that.

SECURITY AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SPACE

But there still remain security and military aspects of space which limit their willingness to cooperate. We know perfectly well they are going ahead with an important space program with mili-

tary aspects, and so we feel that it is important that we ourselves not get caught short in that field.

The CHAIRMAN. What puzzled me is how does one seize control of space militarily? Do you get a deed to it, or do you stake out a claim to it? How does one do that?

Secretary RUSK. No, I think that refers to developing a capability in space so that you can deal with whatever the other side tries to do to you from space. I think that is more a metaphor than exact statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me your first statement about proceeding to cooperate if you can make any progress—and apparently you are making some progress—is the only way you could neutralize it as a threat to anybody. I mean if each tries to seize it, it is bound to have to come into conflict.

Secretary RUSK. As I say, we have what is practically an open ended offer to the Soviet Union for cooperation in space.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do and if you mean it, I wouldn't think this kind of statement of the general would promote your ends at all. It seems to me it would be—to a layman it sounds directly contrary to what the other story about cooperation in space means.

Wouldn't that occur to you as being a little conflicting?

Secretary RUSK. It may sound conflicting, but I think as a realistic matter both we and they are engaged in space activities and space research and space development that has a military impact.

COMPARISON TO ATOMIC ENERGY

The CHAIRMAN. It is like atomic energy. Dr. Seaborg, some of his people have told me—Bourke knows more about this than I do—that in the development of atomic energy and things of that kind you are getting considerable exchange. He told about a visit of some of our leading people to their latest and newest development somewhere down in the desert near the Caspian Sea. In the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and desalinization and that sort of thing, he says they cooperate very well. Is that your information?

Secretary RUSK. They are inching along. We have invited them to see some of our launchings. They have turned that down, perhaps because they are not prepared to extend reciprocity. We have invited them to a shot to develop capability of detecting underground shots. We have no indication they are prepared to visit that. I think that they still look upon secrecy as a major strategic weapon. It has been very hard to break through that preoccupation of theirs with secrecy to develop far-reaching cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether Schriever's statement was cleared by the State Department or not?

Secretary RUSK. I personally don't know this morning. I would have to look to find out.

The CHAIRMAN. But normally there are procedures for that and normally there are; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. We have this arrangement with the Pentagon, and for senior officers I just would have to find out, Mr. Chairman, as to what happened in this particular case.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I meant not with this case.

Secretary RUSK. There are normal procedures for clearances.

The CHAIRMAN. And normally speeches in this area would be cleared, whether or not this one was?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. So you know about this?

SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR DOMINANCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any satisfactory evidence that the Soviet Union has abandoned in any material degree its determination to be militarily dominant in the world, that is, as an ultimate goal at the present time?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, Senator, that their objective to become politically dominant through the world revolution is unchanged. I think their sense of tactics has changed somewhat from the earlier Stalin period.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not talking about tactics but I am talking about the goal of dominion.

Secretary RUSK. On the military side, it is my impression that in the nuclear field they are trying to maintain a second strike capability that would be totally destructive for the rest of us or as destructive as possible. I do not have the impression they are building in a fashion that would give them any hope of being able to overwhelm us without devastation of their own country. In other words, I think there are some limits of the magnitude of their effort. Exactly where those limits are in theory for them, I personally don't know. I would have to get some help from the analysts who follow this very closely.

A FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE CAPACITY

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference in that and deterrence? You say a second strike capability. Do they look upon this in terms of our attack?

Secretary RUSK. In terms of a nuclear exchange, if they are rational, I think they have given up the idea that a first strike by them can overwhelm us and leave them secure. But, on the other hand, there is a problem of what they might attempt to do by conventional means under a nuclear umbrella that would presumably deter our using one. I think still there is a major military problem over against the Soviet Union.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that what you mean by second strike?

Secretary RUSK. Second strike.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think second strike is a fiction. I always have had that idea.

Senator SPARKMAN. You think it is effective?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A fiction.

Secretary RUSK. Fiction.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you don't have the capability of a first strike, you don't have the capability of a second strike in my guess. There are those who disagree with that.

As I understand it, the theory of first strike and second strike is this: in the first strike theory you are poised for what you would believe to be a devastating attack on the other follow, to destroy his capability of retaliating, if possible. We have gone on the theory

that—we have talked about second strike; that is, that we could absorb a devil of a shock in this country and then have the power to go back and destroy them. I don't follow that theory particularly. I think if you don't have a first strike capability, then you don't have the second strike capability, because if you cut one leg off a man he can't run as fast as if he had two legs.

Secretary RUSK. There is another combination, Senator, if I may so so. It is conceivable you can have a first strike capability without a second strike capability.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Oh, indeed.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, so the problem is to be sure you maintain the second strike.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have three cartridges for your gun, and if it takes the three for the first shot——

[Discussion off the record.]

ARMS IN OUTER SPACE

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you this question: the U.N. resolution relating to arms in outer space, would that apply only to nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. That applies only to nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Senator SPARKMAN. Oh, yes.

Now, it would be perfectly feasible to put a military laboratory and space station up there, military station, without violating it?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I haven't read this speech as reported in the morning paper by Under Secretary Mann, but is that approved by the Department? Does that express the government's policy?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice the Secretary looking at the clock. He has an engagement.

Secretary RUSK. I am sure the Senators have other things to ask me.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, we will then excuse you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very interesting.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2 p.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senator Mansfield (subcommittee chairman).

Howard E. Sollenberger, acting director of the Foreign Service Institute, reviewed the operations of the FSI.

A stenographic brief of the testimony was taken by two secretaries of the committee.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee entered an executive session at 11:50 a.m., in room S–116, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Case.

On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee approved for report the nominations of Franklin H. Williams, to be Ambassador to Ghana; William H. Weathersby, to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Sudan; William M. Rountree, to be Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa; Hermann F. Eilts, to be Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, to be Member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; and the nominations of Dr. Luther H. Foster, Dr. Rufus C. Harris, and Arnold M. Picker to be members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International, Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and Laurence N. Woodworth, of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, presented testimony on the Supplementary Tax Protocol with Belgium and the Tax Protocol with the Federal Republic of Germany. After their appearance, the committee, on motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, approved the Protocols for favorable report.

The committee passed over the resolution (H.J. Res. 403), extending an invitation for the WHO to hold the 22nd World Health Assembly in Boston, MA, in 1969, and the bill (H.R. 30), to provide for participation by the United States in INTERAMA in Dade County, FL.

The committee postponed action on nominations of the President to the class of Career Ambassador and the class of Career Minister.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

The committee took up the consideration of the bill (H.R. 30), to provide to the participation of the United States in INTERAMA in Dade County, FL. Senator Lausche moved that consideration of the measure be postponed until January. Senator Hickenlooper offered a substitute motion that it be reported without recommendation, as amended. On the call of the roll, the members responded to their names, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Mansfield	Senator Lausche
Senator Symington (proxy)	Senator Clark
Senator Dodd (proxy)	Senator Williams
Senator Pell	The Chairman
Senator Hickenlooper	
Senator Aiken	
Senator Carlson (proxy)	
Senator Mundt (proxy)	
Senator Case (proxy)	
Senator Long (proxy)	

So Senator Hickenlooper's motion was agreed to, 10 to 4.

The committee next considered the resolution (H.J. Res. 403) extending an invitation to the WHO to hold the 22nd World Health Assembly in Boston, MA, in 1969. The measure was put over when Senator Aiken objected on the grounds a quorum was not present.

The committee reported the nomination of Philip H. Trezise to be Representative of the United States to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 10:50 a.m.]

APPENDIX A

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1965.

Hon. J.W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the course of Ambassador Lodge's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee July 27 you asked if the Department could supply a statement for the record on our commitment to assist South Vietnam.

Since this commitment was developed, restated, and redefined on several occasions during the last fifteen years, I am enclosing a listing of the various agreements, public statements, commmuniques, and letters that together constitute the United States commitment to help South Vietnam defend itself against Communist aggression.

If I can be of any further assistance to you or the Committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure.

THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

1. December 23, 1950: Realizing that the Communist-led Viet Minh drive against the French in Indochina was part of the general Communist offensive in the Far East whose northern front was in Korea, the United States under the Truman administration signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement ("Pentalateral Agreement") with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This agreement, authorized by P.L. 329, 81st Congress, provided for indirect United States military aid through France to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

2. September 7, 1951: The United States signed an agreement authorized by P.L. 535, 81st Congress, with Premier Tran Van Huu's Government providing for direct United States economic aid to Vietnam.

3. July 21, 1954: During the concluding plenary session of the Geneva conference, the head of the United States delegation, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, made a unilateral United States declaration. The main points of this declaration were as follows:

   a. The United States "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva Agreements.

   b. The United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

   c. The United States "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly." (p. 61)[1]

4. October 23, 1954: President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem pledging United States aid and support to South Vietnam. (p. 67)

[1] Page references are to the Committee Print, dated June 16, 1965, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, entitled "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam."

5. January 1, 1955: On the basis of the existing Pentalateral Agreement, the United States began sending direct supporting assistance to the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

6. February 19, 1955: The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO Treaty) came into force. In a protocol to the treaty, the "SEATO umbrella" was extended to cover Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos should these countries request SEATO assistance in resisting Communist aggression. The United States Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1. (p. 62)

7. March 7, 1955: The United States under the Eisenhower administration and the Government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem signed an agreement which supplemented the agreement mentioned in (2) above.

8. July 6, 1956: Vice President Richard Nixon visited Vietnam and delivered a letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem stating that President Eisenhower looked forward to many years of cooperation between the two countries.

9. May 11, 1957: A Joint Communique of President Eisenhower and President Diem was issued in Washington. President Eisenhower assured President Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam. (p. 73)

10. October 26, 1960: In a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, President Eisenhower assured President Diem that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

11. May 13, 1961: At the close of Vice-President Johnson's visit to Vietnam, a joint Vietnamese-United States communique was issued stating that:

a. Both governments will extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid.

b. Vietnam's regular armed forces will be increased with United States assistance.

c. The United States will provide assistance for the entire Vietnamese Civil Guard.

d. United States military experts will be used to assist Vietnam's armed forces in health, welfare, and public works activities at the village level.

e. A special group of United States economic and fiscal experts will be sent to Vietnam to work out a financial plan as the basis for joint efforts. (p. 77)

12. August 2, 1961: President Kennedy declared that the United States would do all it could to save South Vietnam from communism.

13. October 26, 1961: In a letter to President Diem, President Kennedy reaffirmed United States determination "to help Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth."

14. December 7 and 14, 1961: An exchange of messages between President Diem and President Kennedy resulted in President Kennedy's stating that the United States, in response to the Vietnamese Government's request, was prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and preserve its independence. President Kennedy went on to promise that the United States would promptly increase its assistance to Vietnam's defense efforts against Communist aggression. (p. 84)

15. January 4, 1962: The United States and Vietnamese Governments issued a joint communique on the expansion of economic development programs which called for both Governments to do "their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi." (p. 86)

16. November 24, 1963: President Johnson affirmed the United States intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Vietcong.

17. December 31, 1963: In a New Year's message to General Duong Van Minh, President Johnson pledged that the "United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Vietnam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory." (p. 106)

18. April 20, 1964: President Johnson stated that no one should "doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Vietnam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom."

19. August 7, 1964: The Congress approved the Southeast Asia Resolution by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House of Representatives. The Resolution stated that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any

armed attack against "the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It also declared that the United States was prepared "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." (p. 128)

20. April 7, 1965: In his speech at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson stated that he intended to keep the promise repeated since 1954 to help South Vietnam. "To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong. (p. 197)

21. May 4, 1965: In his message to the Congress accompanying a request for an additional $700,000,000 to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam, President Johnson stated, "This is not a routine appropriation. For each member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our efforts to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed." The House approved the appropriation by a vote of 408 to 7 and the Senate by a vote of 88 to 3. (p. 219)

22. July 28, 1965: President Johnson told his press conference that "We are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation."

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APPENDIX B

LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS

[From the Congressional Record, Senate, Sept. 15, 1965]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the formation of a provisional government in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy is good news. It provides reason for cautious optimism as to the future and testifies as well to the arduous and patient efforts of the OAS mediating team. I wish to pay tribute especially to Ambassador Bunker for his wisdom and patience in handling this difficult affair. The formation of a provisional government is not the end of the Dominican crisis, but it does bring to an end a tragic and dangerous phase of the crisis. Many problems remain, particularly the problem of establishing the authority of a democratic government over the Dominican military. Nonetheless, the situation now seems to be moving into a less dangerous and more hopeful phase. At this time of relative calm it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic, and the U.S. role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future.

I was in doubt about the advisability of making a statement on the Dominican affair until some of my colleagues made public statements on the floor. Their views on the way in which the committee proceedings were conducted and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as a whole, are so diametrically opposed to my own that I now consider it my duty to express my personal conclusions drawn from the hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The suggestions that have been made that the committee was prejudiced in its approach against the administration's policies are, in my opinion, without merit. The committee was impartial and fair in giving a full and detailed hearing to the administration's point of view, so much so, in fact, that it heard only one witness from outside the Government.

U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor.

These are general conclusions I have reached from a painstaking review of the salient features of the extremely complex situation. These judgments are made, of course, with the benefit of hindsight and, in fairness, it must be conceded there were no easy choices available to the United States in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task of diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis.

It cannot be said with assurance that the United States could have changed the course of events by acting differently. What can be said with assurance is that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events. The reason appears to be that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed. This decision seems to me to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement, in the initial stages and on distaste for the return to power or Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD—Dominican Revolution Party.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is of critical importance and I shall comment on it later. The essential point, however, is that the United States, on the basis of ambiguous evidence, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so. It apparently never occurred to anyone that the United States could also attempt to influence the course which the revolution took. We misread prevailing tendencies in Latin Amer-

ica by overlooking or ignoring the fact that any reform movement, is likely to attract Communist support. We thus failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo—and the status quo in many countries is not good enough.

The principal reason for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo was faulty advice given to the President by his representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time of acute crisis. Much of this advice was based on misjudgment of the facts of the situation; some of it appears to have been based on inadequate evidence or, in some cases, simply inaccurate information. On the basis of the information and counsel he received, the President could hardly have acted other than he did.

I am hopeful, and reasonably confident, that the mistakes made by the United States in the Dominican Republic can be retrieved and that it will be possible to avoid repeating them in the future. These purposes can be served, however, only if the shortcomings of U.S. policy are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. I make my remarks today in the hope of contributing to that process.

The development of the Dominican crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, provides a classic study of policymaking in a fast-changing situation in which each decision reduces the range of options available for future decisions so that errors are compounded and finally, indeed, there are few if any options except to follow through on an ill-conceived course of action. Beyond a certain point the Dominican story acquired some of the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.

Another theme that emerges from the Dominican crisis is the occurrence of a striking change in U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic and the possibility—not a certainty, because the signs are ambiguous, but only the possibility—of a major change as well in the general Latin American policies of the United States. Obviously, an important change in the official outlook on Dominican affairs occurred between September 1963, when the United States was vigorously opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch, and April 1965, when the United States was either unenthusiastic or actually opposed to his return.

What happened in that period to change the assessment of Bosch from favorable to unfavorable? It is quite true that Bosch as President did not distinguish himself as an administrator, but that was well known in 1963. It is also true, however, and much more to the point as far as the legitimate interests of the United States are concerned, that Bosch had received 58 percent of the votes in a free and honest election and that he was presiding over a reform-minded government in tune with the Alliance for Progress. This is a great deal more than can be said for any other President of the Dominican Republic.

The question therefore remains as to how and why the attitude of the U.S. Government changed so strikingly between September 1963 and April 1965. And the question inevitably arises whether this shift in the administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries, whether, to be specific, the U.S. Government now views the vigorous reform movements of Latin America—such as Christian Democracy in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in Peru and Accion Democratica in Venezuela—as threatening to the interests of the United States. And if this is the case, what kind of Latin American political movements would now be regarded as friendly to the United States and beneficial to its interests?

I should like to make it very clear that I am raising a question not offering an answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the current attitude of the U.S. Government toward reformist movements in Latin America. On the one hand, President Johnson's deep personal commitment to the philosophy and aims of the Alliance for Progress is clear; it was convincingly expressed, for example, in his speech to the Latin American Ambassadors on the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress—a statement in which the President compared the Alliance for Progress with his own enlightened program for a Great Society at home. On the other hand, one notes a general tendency on the part of our policymakers not to look beyond a Latin American politician's anticommunism. One also notes in certain Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, a preoccupation with counterinsurgency, which is to say, with the prospect of revolutions and means of suppressing them. This preoccupation is manifested in dubious and costly research projects, such as the recently discredited Camelot; these studies claim to be scientific but beneath their almost unbelievably opaque language lies an unmistakable military and reactionary bias.

It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to U.S. aims in Latin America be resolved. We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the

same time aline ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do. The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists. The prospect of an election in 9 months which may conceivably produce a strong democratic government is certainly reassuring on this score, but the fact remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against a revolution which, had we sought to influence it instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign military intervention. Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.

We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America. The choice which we are to make is the principal unanswered question arising out of the unhappy events to the Dominican Republic and, indeed, the principal unanswered question for the future of our relations with Latin America.

It is not surprising that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable, and our Revolution of 1776, for that matter, was not much of an upheaval compared to the French and Russian revolutions and to current and impending revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Our heritage of stability and conservatism is a great blessing, but it also has the effect of limiting our understanding of the character of social revolution and sometimes as well of the injustices which spawn them. Our understanding of revolutions and their causes is imperfect not because of any failures of mind or character but because of our good fortune since the Civil War in never having experienced sustained social injustice without hope of legal or more or less peaceful remedy. We are called upon, therefore, to give our understanding and our sympathy and support to movements which are alien to our experience and jarring to our preferences and prejudices.

We must try to understand social revolution and the injustices that give it rise because they are the heart and core of the experience of the great majority of people now living in the world. In Latin America we may prefer to associate with the well-bred, well-dressed businessmen who often hold positions of power, but Latin American reformers regard such men as aliens in their own countries who neither identify with their own people nor even sympathize with their aspirations. Such leaders are regarded by educated young Latin Americans as a "consular bourgeoisie," by which they mean business-oriented conservatives who more nearly represent the interests of foreign businessmen than the interests of their own people. Men like Donald Reid—who is one of the better of this category of leaders—may have their merits, but they are not the force of the future in Latin America.

It is the revolutionaries of the non-Communist left who have most of the popular support in Latin America. The Radical Party in Chile, for example, is full of 19th century libertarians whom many North Americans would find highly congenial, but it was recently crushed in national elections by a group of rambunctious, leftist Christian Democrats. It may be argued that the Christian Democrats are anti-United States, and to a considerable extent some of them are—more so now, it may be noted, than prior to the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic—but they are not Communists and they have popular support. They have also come to terms with the American copper companies in Chile; that is something which the predecessor conservative government was unable to do and something which a Communist government would have been unwilling to do.

The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. The question is whether it is to be Communist or democratic revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence. It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Chile.

In my Senate speech of March 25, 1964, I commented as follows on the prospect of revolution:

"I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur."

I think that in the case of the Dominican Republic we did close our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. That, I think, is the central fact concerning the participation of the United States in the Dominican revolution and, possibly as well, its major lesson for the future. I turn now to comment on some of the events which began last April 24 in Santo Domingo.

When the Dominican revolution began on Saturday, April 24, the United States had three options available. First, it could have supported the Reid Cabral government; second, it could have supported the revolutionary forces; and third, it could do nothing.

The administration chose the last course. When Donald Reid Cabral asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday morning, April 25, he was given no encouragement. He then resigned, and considerable disagreement ensued over the nature of the government to succeed him. The party of Juan Bosch, the PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, asked for a "U.S. presence" at the transfer of government power but was given no encouragement. Thus, there began at that time a chaotic situation which amounted to civil war in a country without an effective government.

What happened in essence was that the Dominican military refused to support Reid and were equally opposed to Bosch or other PRD leaders as his successor. The PRD, which had the support of some military officers, announced that Rafael Molina Urena, who had been president of the senate during the Bosch regime, would govern as provisional president pending Bosch's return. At this point, the military leaders delivered an ultimatum, which the rebels ignored, and at about 4:30 on the afternoon of April 25 the air force and navy began firing at the National Palace. Later in the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. Embassy to use its influence to persuade the air force to stop the attacks. The Embassy made it clear it would not intervene on behalf of the rebels, although on the following day, Monday, April 26, the Embassy did persuade the military to stop air attacks for a limited time.

This was the first crucial point in the crisis. If the United States thought that Reid was giving the Dominican Republic the best government it had had or was likely to get, why did the United States not react more vigorously to support him? On the other hand, if the Reid government was thought to be beyond salvation, why did not the United States offer positive encouragement to the moderate forces involved in the coup, if not by providing the "U.S. presence" requested by the PRD, then at least by letting it be known that the United States was not opposed to the prospective change of regimes or by encouraging the return of Juan Bosch to the Dominican Republic? In fact, according to available evidence, the U.S. Government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis.

The United States was thus at the outset unwilling to support Reid and unwilling to support if not positively opposed to Bosch.

Events of the days following April 24 demonstrated that Reid had so little popular support that it can reasonably be argued that there was nothing the United States could have done, short of armed intervention, to save his regime. The more interesting question is why the United States was so reluctant to see Bosch returned to power. This is part of the larger question of why U.S. attitudes had changed so much since 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was warmly and repeatedly embraced and supported as few if any Latin American presidents have ever been supported by the United States.

The next crucial point in the Dominican story came on Tuesday, April 27, when rebel leaders, including Molina Urena and Caamano Deno, called at the U.S. Embassy seeking mediation and negotiations. At that time the military situation looked very bad for the rebel, or constitutionalist forces. Ambassador Bennett, who had been instructed four times to work for a cease-fire and for the formation of a military junta, felt he did not have authority to mediate; mediation, in his view, would have been "intervention." Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and without massive military intervention. Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the Marines, and as we know some 20,000 soldiers were landed—American soldiers.

On the afternoon of April 27 Gen. Wessin y Wessin's tanks seemed about to cross the Duarte bridge into the city of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt themselves rebuffed at the American Embassy, some of their leaders, including Molina Urena, sought asylum in Latin American embassies in Santo Domingo. The administration has interpreted this as evidence that the non-Communist rebels recognized growing Communist influence in their movement and were consequently abandoning the revolution. Molina Urena has said simply that he sought asylum because he thought the revolutionary cause hopeless.

An opportunity was lost on April 27. Ambassador Bennett was in a position to bring possibly decisive mediating power to bear for a democratic solution, but he chose not to do so on the ground that the exercise of his good offices at that point would have constituted intervention. In the words of Washington Post writer Murray Marder—one of the press people who, to the best of my knowledge, has not been assailed as prejudiced:

"It can be argued with considerable weight that late Tuesday, April 27, the United States threw away a fateful opportunity to try to prevent the sequence that produced the American intervention. It allowed the relatively leaderless revolt to pass into hands which it was to allege were Communist."[1]

The overriding reason for this mistake was the conviction of U.S. officials, on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best, that the rebels were dominated by Communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, expectation of an antirebel victory. They therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate Communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution.

Owing to a degree of disorganization and timidity on the part of the antirebel forces which no one, including the U.S. Embassy and the rebels themselves, anticipated, the rebels were still fighting on the morning of Wednesday, April 28. Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently recommended that the antirebels under Air Force General de los Santos be furnished 50 walkie-talkies from U.S. Defense Department stocks in Puerto Rico. Repeating this recommendation later in the day, Bennett said that the issue was one between Castroism and its opponents. The antirebels themselves asked for armed U.S. intervention on their side; this request was refused at that time.

During the day, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, from the point of view of public order in general and of the antirebels in particular. In midafternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.

It was at this point, on April 28, that events acquired something of the predestiny of a Greek tragedy. Subsequent events—the failure of the missions of John Bartlow Martin and McGeorge Bundy, the conversion of the U.S. force into an inter-American force, the enforced stalemate between the rebels under Caamano Deno and the Imbert junta, the OAS mediation and the tortuous negotiations for a provisional government—have all been widely reported and were not fully explored in the committee hearings. In any case, the general direction of events was largely determined by the fateful decision of April 28. Once the marines landed on that day, and especially after they were heavily reinforced in the days immediately following, the die was cast and the United States found itself deeply involved in the Dominican civil conflict, with no visible way to extricate itself, and with its hemisphere relations complicated in a way that few could have foreseen and no one could have desired.

The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention that began on the evening of April 28. In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Domingo until the marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April 28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be exaggerated.

Nevertheless, there can be no question that Santo Domingo was not a particularly safe place to be in the last days of April 1965. There was fighting in the streets, aircraft were strafing parts of the city, and there was indiscriminate shooting. I

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[1] Washington Post, June 27, 1965, p. E3.

think that the United States would have been justified in landing a small force for the express purpose of removing U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island. Had such a force been landed and then promptly withdrawn when it it had completed its mission, I do not think that any fairminded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities.

The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated. On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger to American lives was his primary reason for recommending military intervention.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is therefore crucial, but it cannot be answered with certainty. The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate in planning the revolution—indeed, there is some indication that it took them by surprise—but that they very rapidly began to try to take advantage of it and to seize control of it. The evidence does not establish that the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution. There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation.

The administration, however, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a Communist takeover. In their apprehension lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion.

It is, perhaps, understandable that administration officials should have felt some sense of panic; after all, the Foreign Service officer who had the misfortune to be assigned to the Cuban desk at the time of Castro's rise to power has had his career ruined by congressional committees. Furthermore, even without this consideration, the decisions regarding the Dominican Republic had to be made under great pressure and on the basis of inconclusive information. In charity, this can be accepted as a reason why the decisions were mistaken; but it does not change the conclusion that they were mistaken.

The point I am making is not—emphatically not—that there was no Communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since. The issue is not whether there was Communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something on which reasonable men can differ. The burden of proof, however, is on those who take action, and the administration has not proven its assertion of Communist control.

Intervention on the base of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake in my opinion which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics. Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it. If any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America. Worse, if that is our view, then we have made ourselves the prisoners of the Latin American oligarchs who are engaged in a vain attempt to preserve the status quo—reactionaries who habitually use the term "Communist" very loosely, in part out of emotional predilection and in part in a calculated effort to scare the United States into support their selfish and discredited aims.

If the United States had really been intervening to save American lives, as it had a moral if not a strictly legal right to do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have been forgotten. But the United States did not intervene primarily to save American lives; it intervened to prevent what it conceived to be a Communist takeover. That meant, in the terms in which the United States defined the situation, that it was intervening against the rebels, who however heavily they might or might not have been infiltrated by Communists, were also the advocates of the restoration of a freely elected constitutional government which had been forcibly overthrown. It also meant that the United States was

intervening for the military and the oligarchy—to the detriment of the Dominican people and to the bitter disappointment of those throughout Latin America who had placed their hopes in the United States and the Alliance for Progress.

On the basis of the record, there is ample justification for concluding that, at least from the time Reid resigned, U.S. policy was directed toward construction of a military junta which hopefully would restore peace and conduct free elections. That is to say that U.S. policy was directed against the return of Bosch and against the success of the rebel movement.

In this connection it is interesting to recall U.S. policy toward Bosch when he was in power in the Dominican Republic between February and September of 1963. He had been elected, as I have already mentioned, in the only free and honest election ever held in the Dominican Republic, in December 1962, with 58 percent of the votes cast.

The United States placed such importance of his success that President Kennedy sent the then Vice President Johnson and Senator Humphrey, among others, to attend his inauguration in February 1963. In September 1963, when he was overthrown in a military coup, the United States made strenuous efforts—which stopped just short of sending the marines—to keep him in power, and thereafter the United States waited almost 3 months before recognizing the successor government. Recognition came, by the way, only after the successor government had conducted military operations against a band of alleged Communist guerrillas in the mountains, and there is a suspicion that the extent of the guerrilla activities was exaggerated by the successor government in order to secure U.S. recognition.

It may be granted that Bosch was no great success as President of the Dominican Republic but, when all his faults have been listed, the fact remains that Bosch was the only freely elected President in Dominican history, the only President who had ever tried, however, ineptly, to give the country a decent government, and the only President who was unquestionably in tune with the Alliance for Progress.

Despite these considerations, the United States was at the least unethusiastic or, more probably opposed to Bosch's return to power in April 1965. Bosch himself was apparently not eager to return—he vacillated in the very early stages and some well-informed persons contend that he positively refused to return to the Dominican Republic. In any case, he missed a critical opportunity. But the United States was equally adamant against a return to power of Bosch's party, the PRD, which is the nearest thing to a mass-based, well-organized party that has ever existed in the Dominican Republic. The stated reason was that a PRD government would be Communist dominated.

This might conceivably have happened, but the evidence by no means supports the conclusion that it would have happened. We based our policy on a possibility rather than on anything approaching a likelihood. Obviously, if we based all our policies on the mere possibility of communism, then we would have to set ourselves against just about every progressive political movement in the world, because almost all such movements are subject to at least the theoretical danger of Communist takeover. This approach is not in the national interest; foreign policy must be based on prospects that seem probable, hopeful and susceptible to constructive influence rather than on merely possible dangers.

One is led, therefore, to the conclusion that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change. The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of the status quo, in the probably vain hope that these forces could be induced to permit at least some reform and social change, the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won.

How vain the hopes of U.S. policymakers were is amply demonstrated by events since April 28. The junta led by Gen. Antonio Imbert, which succeeded the junta led by Colonel Benoit, proved quite intractable and indeed filled the airwaves daily with denunciations of the United States and the Organization of American States for preventing it from wiping out the Communist rebels. These are the same military forces which on April 28 were refusing to fight the rebels and begging for U.S. intervention. Our aim apparently was to use Imbert as a counterpoise to Caamaño Deno in the ill-founded hope that non-Communist liberals would be drawn away from the rebel side.

In practice, instead of Imbert becoming our tractable instrument, we, to a certain extent, became his: he clung tenaciously to the power we gave him and was at least as intransigent as the rebels in the protracted negotiations for a provisional government.

The resignation of Imbert and his junta provides grounds for hope that a strong popular government may come to power in the Dominican Republic, but that hope

must be tempered by the fact that the military continues to wield great power in Dominican politics—power which it probably would not now have if the United States had not intervened to save it from defeat last April 28. Even with a provisional government installed in Santo Domingo, and with the prospect of an election in 9 months, there remains the basic problem of a deep and widespread demand for social change. The prospect for such social change is circumscribed by the fact that the military has not surrendered and cannot be expected voluntarily to surrender its entrenched position of privilege and outrageous corruption.

The United States has grossly underestimated the symbolism of the Bosch constitution of 1963. It can be argued that this contains unrealistic promises, but it has stirred the hopes and idealism of the Dominican people. The real objections to it, the part of conservative Dominicans, seem to be that it provides for separation of church and state and that it provides that Dominican citizens have the right to live in the Dominican Republic if they so desire—that is, that Dominican citizens who happen also to be Communists cannot be deported. In passing, one may note a similarity to the U.S. Constitution on both of these points.

The United States has also misread the dedication of the Dominican military to the status quo and to its own powers and privileges. It may be said that the United States has overestimated its ability to influence the military while failing to use to the fullest the influence it does have.

The act of United States massive military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a grievous mistake, but if one is going to cross the bridge of intervention, with all of the historical ghosts which it calls forth throughout Latin America, then one might as well cross all the way and not stop in the middle. It is too late for the United States to refrain from intervention; it is not too late to try to redeem some permanent benefit from that intervention. Specifically, I think that the influence of the United States and the Organization of American States should be used to help the Dominican people free themselves from the oppressive weight of a corrupt and privileged military establishment. It is entirely possible, if not likely, that if the military is allowed to retain its power it will overthrow any future government that displeases it just as it has done in the past. The OAS mediating team made a contribution by bringing about the installation of a provisional government; the OAS can still make a solid contribution to Dominican democracy by urging or insisting that as part of a permanent solution the Dominican military establishment be substantially reduced in size and some of the more irresponsible generals be pensioned off or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad. If the United States and the OAS are going to impose a solution in the Dominican Republic, they might as well impose a good solution as a bad one.

Since preparing these remarks, I note in this morning's press that General Wessin has been induced to leave the Dominican Republic. This, I believe, is a step in the right direction.

The Foreign Relations Committee's study of the Dominican crisis leads me to draw certain specific conclusions regarding American policy in the Dominican Republic and also suggests some broader considerations regarding relations between the United States and Latin America. My specific conclusions regarding the crisis in Santo Domingo are as follows:

First. The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated. The decision to land thousands of marines on April 28 was based primarily on the fear of "another Cuba" in Santo Domingo.

Second. This fear was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. There is no doubt that Communists participated in the Dominican revolution on the rebel side, probably to a greater extent after than before the landing of U.S. marines on April 28, but just as it cannot be proved that the Communists would not have taken over the revolution neither can it be proved that they would have. There is little basis in the evidence offered the committee for the assertion that the rebels were Communist-dominated or certain to become so; on the contrary, the evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single faction was dominant at the outset and in which everybody, including the United States, had opportunities to influence the shape and course of the rebellion.

Third. The United States let pass its best opportunities to influence the course of events. The best opportunities were on April 25, when Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, requested a "United States presence," and on April 27, when the rebels, believing themselves defeated, requested United States mediation for a negotiated settlement. Both requests were rejected, in the first instance for reasons that are not entirely clear but probably because of United States hostility to the PRD, in the second in-

stance because the U.S. Government anticipated and desired a victory of the antirebel forces.

Fourth. U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic shifted markedly to the right between September 1963 and April 1965. In 1963, the United States strongly supported Bosch and the PRD as enlightened reformers; in 1965 the United States opposed their return to power on the unsubstantiated ground that a Bosch or PRD government would certainly, or almost certainly, become Communist dominated. Thus the United States turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy.

Fifth. U.S. policy was marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation. The former is illustrated by official assertions that U.S. military intervention was primarily for the purpose of saving American lives; the latter is illustrated by exaggerated reports of massacres and atrocities by the rebels—reports which no one has been able to verify. It was officially asserted, for example—by the President in a press conference on June 17 according to an official State Department bulletin—that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off." There is no evidence to support this statement. A sober examination of such evidence as is available indicates that the Imbert junta was guilty of at least as many atrocities as the rebels.

Sixth. Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President. In the critical days between April 25 and April 28, these officials sent the President exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of these, recommended U.S. massive military intervention. It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such advice, the President made the decisions that he made.

Seventh. Underlying the bad advice and unwise actions of the United States was the fear of another Cuba. The specter of a second Communist state in the Western Hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men.

I turn now to some broader and long-term implications of the Dominican tragedy, first to some considerations relating to the Organization of American States and its charter, then to the problem of reaction and revolution in Latin America, finally to a suggestion for a freer and, I believe, healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America.

Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States says that:

"No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state."

Article 17 states that:

"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."

These clauses are not ambiguous. They mean that, with one exception to be noted, all forms of forcible intervention are absolutely prohibited among the American States. It may be that we should never have accepted this commitment at Bogota in 1948; it is obvious from all the talk one hears these days about the obsoleteness of the principle of nonintervention that some U.S. officials regret our commitment to it. The fact remains that we are committed to it, not partially or temporarily or insofar as we find it compatible with our vital interests but almost absolutely. It represents our word and our bond and our willingness to honor the solemn commitments enbodied in a treaty which was ratified by the Senate on August 28, 1950.

There are those who might concede the point of law who would also argue that such considerations have to do with our ideals rather than our interests and are therefore of secondary importance. I do not believe that is true. We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment; the matter, we are told, is one of vital national interests. I do not see why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in the Americas than it is to honor the much more ambiguous and less formal promises we have made to the South Vietnamese.

The sole exception to the prohibitions of articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in article 19 of the OAS Charter, which states that "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17." Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is

not an armed attack or by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent."

The United States thus had legal recourse when the Dominican crisis broke on April 24, 1965. We could have called an urgent session of the Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking article 6 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do so. The administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to consult—or inform—the congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally.

Advising the Latin American countries of our action after the fact did not constitute compliance with the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would advising them before the fact have constituted compliance. One does not comply with the law by notifying interested parties in advance of one's intent to violate it. Inter-American law requires consultation for the purpose of shaping a collective decision. Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement could we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican Republic.

It is possible, had we undertaken such consultations, that our Latin American partners would have delayed a decision; it is possible that they would have refused to authorize collective intervention. My own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and other foreigners, but even if it seemed to us that it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies. We should not have done so because the word and the honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend.

There is another important reason for compliance with the law. The United States is a conservative power in the world in the sense that most of its vital interests are served by stability and order. Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. A great conference is taking place here in Washington this week on the subject, World Peace Through Law. As a conservative power the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behavior of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we violate the law ourselves, whatever short-term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long-term interests.

There are those who defend U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that the principle of nonintervention as spelled out in the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argument is unfortunate on two grounds. First, the contention of obsoleteness justifies an effort to bring about changes in the OAS Charter by due process of law, but it does not justify violation of the charter. Second, the view that the principle of nonintervention is obsolete is one held by certain U.S. officials; most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete, the principle of nonintervention was and remains the heart and core of the inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provided them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need: protection from the United States.

Many North Americans seem to believe that, while the United States does indeed participate in Latin American affairs from time to time, sometimes by force, it is done, with the best of intentions, usually indeed to protect the Latin Americans from intervention by somebody else, and therefore cannot really be considered intervention. The trouble with this point of view is that it is not shared by our neighbors to the south. Most of them do think they need protection from the United States and the history of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt corollary" suggest that their fears are not entirely without foundation. "Good intentions" are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Just about anybody, including the Communists, believes in his own "good intentions." It is a highly subjective criterion of national behavior and has no more than a chance relationship of good results. With whatever justice or lack of it, many Latin Americans are afraid of the United States; however much it may hurt our feelings, they prefer to have their security based on some more objective standard than the good intentions of the United States.

The standard on which they rely most heavily is the principle of nonintervention; however obsolete it may seem to certain U.S. officials, it remains vital and pertinent in Latin America. When we violate it, we are not overriding the mere letter of the law; we are violating what to Latin Americans is its vital heart and core.

The inter-American system is rooted in an implicit contract between the Latin American countries and the United States. In return for our promise not to interfere in their internal affairs they have accepted a role as members of our "sphere" and to support, or at least not to obstruct, our global policies. In the Dominican Republic we violated our part of the bargain; it remains to be seen whether Latin Americans will now feel free to violate theirs.

In the eyes of educated, energetic, and patriotic young Latin Americans—which is to say, the generation that will make or break the Alliance for Progress—the United States committed a worse offense in the Dominican Republic than just intervention; it intervened against social revolution and in support, at least temporarily, of a corrupt, reactionary military oligarchy.

It is not possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the United States on the part of democrats and reformers in Latin America. I myself think that it is deep and widespread. Nor am I reassured by assertions on the part of administration officials that a number of Latin American governments have secretly expressed sympathy for our actions in the Dominican Republic while explaining that of course they could not be expected to support us openly. Why cannot they support us openly, unless it is because their sympathy does not represent the views of their own people and they do not dare to express it openly? In fact, real enthusiasm for our Dominican venture has been confined largely to military dictators and ruling oligarchies.

The tragedy of Santo Domingo is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the shortrun is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the longrun. Intervention in the Dominican Republic has alienated—temporarily or permanently, depending on our future policies—our real friends in Latin America. These, broadly, are the people of the democratic left—the Christian and social democrats in a number of countries, the APRA Party in Peru, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela, and their kindred spirits throughout the hemisphere. By our intervention on the side of a corrupt military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic, we have embarrassed before their own people the democratic reformers who have counseled trust and partnership with the United States. We have lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution in Latin America and that the only choice Latin Americans have is between communism and reaction.

If those are the available alternatives, if there is no democratic left as a third option, then there is no doubt of the choice that honest and patriotic Latin Americans will make: they will choose communism, not because they want it but because U.S. policy will have foreclosed all other avenues of social revolution and, indeed, all other possibilities except the perpetuation of rule by military juntas and economic oligarchies.

The dominant force in Latin America is the aspiration of increasing numbers of people to personal and national dignity. In the minds of the rising generation there are two principal threats to that aspiration—reaction at home and domination from abroad. As a result of its Dominican actions the United States has allowed itself to become associated with both. We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young and idealistic Latin Americans who must now wonder whether the United States will one day intervene against social revolutions in their own countries, whether one day they will find themselves facing U.S. Marines across barricades in their own home towns.

I, myself, am sure, as I know President Johnson and indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become the enemy of social revolution in Latin America. We have made a mistake in the Dominican Republic, as we did at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but a single misjudgment does not constitute a doctrine for the conduct of future policy and we remain dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

We know this ourselves but it remains to convince our true friends in Latin America that their social revolutions will have our sympathy and support. It will not be easy to do so, because our intervention in Santo Domingo shook if it did not shatter a confidence in the United States that had been built up over 30 years since the liquidation of the Caribbean protectorates and the initiation of the "good neighbor policy."

It will be difficult but it can be done. President Johnson took a positive step on the long road back in his statement of rededication to the Alliance for Progress to the Latin American Ambassadors on August 17. It remains for us to eliminate the

ambiguity between the antirevolutionay approach symbolized by Project Camelot and the preoccupation with problems of counterinsurgency on the one hand and the creative approach of the Alliance for Progress on the other. If we do this—and I am both sure that we can and reasonably hopeful that we will—then I think that the Dominican affair will be relegated in history to the status of a single unhappy episode on the long road toward the forging of a new and creative and dignified relationship between the United States and Latin America.

In conclusion, I suggest that a new and healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America must be a freer relationship than that of the past.

The United States is a world power with world responsibilities and to it the inter-American system represents a sensible way of maintaining law and order in the region closest to the United States. To the extent that it functions as we want it to function, one of the inter-American system's important advantages is that it stabilizes relations within the Western Hemisphere and thus frees the United States to act on its worldwide responsibilities.

To Latin Americans, on the other hand, the inter-American system is politically and psychologically confining. It has the effect, so to speak, of cooping them up in the Western Hemisphere, giving them the feeling that there is no way to break out of the usually well intentioned but often stifling embrace of the United States. In their hearts, I have no doubt, most Latin Americans would like to be free of us, just as a son or daughter coming of age wishes to be free of an overprotective parent. A great many of those Latin Americans for whom Castro still has some appeal—and there are now more, I would guess, than before last April 28—are attracted not, I feel, because they are infatuated with communism, but because Cuba, albeit at the price of almost complete dependency on the Soviet Union, has broken out of the orbit of the United States.

It is the nature of things that small nations do not live comfortably in the shadow of large and powerful nations, regardless of whether the latter are benevolent or overbearing. Belgium has always been uncomfortable about Germany and France; Ireland has never been able to work up much affection for Great Britain. And in recent years some of the Eastern European governments have demonstrated that, despite the Communist ideology which they share with the Soviet Union, they still wish to free themselves as much as they can and as much as they dare from the overbearing power of Russia. It is natural and inevitable that Latin American countries should have some of the same feelings toward the United States.

Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate requirement for a new and more friendly relationship between Latin America and the United States in the long run is not closer ties and new institutional bonds but a loosening of existing ties and institutional bonds. It is an established psychological principle—or, for that matter, just commonsense—that the strongest and most viable personal bonds are those which are voluntary, a voluntary bond being, by definition, an arrangement which one is free to enter or not to enter. I do not see why the same principle should not operate in relations between nations. If it does, it would follow that the first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements, both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate.

President Frei of Chile has taken an initiative to this end. He has visited European leaders and apparently indicated that his Christian Democratic government is interested in establishing new political, economic, and cultural links with European countries. For the reasons suggested, I think this is an intelligent and constructive step.

I think further that it would be a fine thing if Latin American countries were to undertake a program of their own for "building bridges" to the world beyond the Western Hemisphere—to Europe and Asia and Africa, and to the Communist countries if they wish. Such relationships, to be sure, would involve a loosening of ties to the United States in the immediate future, but in the long run, I feel sure, they would make for both happier and stronger bonds with the United States—happier because they would be free, stronger because they would be dignified and self-respecting as they never had been before.

89TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 150

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 29, 1965

Mr. MORSE (for himself, Mr. CLARK, and Mr. YOUNG of Ohio) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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RESOLUTION

Whereas the Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 2, provides for the Senate to give its advice and consent to the President with respect to treaties; and

Whereas the Senate in 1947 gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which provides for consultation and collective action, in accordance with the constitutional processes of each of the parties, to meet threats to peace and security of the Hemisphere; and

Whereas the Senate in 1950 gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Charter of the Organization of American States which prohibits intervention by one State in the affairs of another: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate further advise the President that the foreign policy of the United States should be con-

ducted in consonance with these and other treaty obligations which were freely entered into.

SEC. 2. It is the further sense of the Senate that the foreign policy of the United States, with respect to the Western Hemisphere, should be directed toward achievement of the following major objectives:

(a) The economic growth rates and social reforms set forth in the Alliance for Progress, as embodied in the Charter of Punta del Este, including the encouragement of the development of regional markets; and

(b) Collective defense of the hemisphere against aggression or subversion as provided in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and more specifically in the resolutions of the Eighth and Ninth Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, dated respectively in Punta del Este, January 31, 1962, and Washington, June 26, 1964.

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89TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. CON. RES. 56

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 2 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 1), 1965

Mr. JAVITS (for himself and Mr. CARLSON) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

0075734145

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas recent events in the Dominican Republic have suggested the desirability of strengthening the inter-American system to facilitate the taking of prompt and effective multilateral action when required to maintain the peace, security, and freedom of the Americas; and

Whereas a prime objective of the Organization of American States and of the United States is to strengthen freedom in the Americas by upholding the right of the people to self-determination and by encouraging confidence in and respect for constitutional and democratic governments, and to foster conditions to insure against subversion and infiltration by the forces of international communism or ultra-rightest forces which pose a constant danger to the freedom of the people of the Americas; and

Whereas the Organization of American States and the United States are committed to accelerated economic development and social progress in the Americas, as the right road toward freedom, dignity, security, and peace for all the people of the Americas, and to prevent infiltration or subversion by Communist or ultra-rightist forces: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

1. The United States again pledges its faith in the oldest of the regional security systems established in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the collective security system of the Americas under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Charter of the Organization of American States, and again pledges its efforts to preserve and strengthen free democratic institutions and to encourage and contribute to accelerated economic development and social progress in the Americas, as set forth in the Act of Bogotá of 1960 and the Charter of Punta del Este of 1961.

2. The United States, while continuing to reserve the inherent right of self-defense, consonant with its treaty obligations under the inter-American system and the United Nations Charter, joins in the determination of the member states of the Organization of American States to maintain a common defense against aggression and subversion within the Americas, including efforts

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to subvert free institutions by infiltration and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of any nation in the Americas.

3. The United States should seek to improve the authority and capability of the Organization of American States to take timely action in emergencies affecting the peace and security of any nation in the Americas in accordance with the requirements of a common defense set forth in the preceding paragraph of this resolution, by standing ready to support and assist in the establishment of means to undertake peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the Organization of American States, and by such other procedures as the President may deem appropriate, consonant with the Constitution, the inter-American system, and the United Nations Charter.

4. The United States should encourage and support collective consultation among the members of the inter-American system and with Canada with a view to refraining from the establishment of diplomatic relations with, and denying military and economic aid to, any regime brought into power in a member state by the unconstitutional overthrow of a freely elected, constitutional, democratic government ruling in accordance with its constitutional mandate, and to requiring, as a precondition to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the extension of military and economic aid,

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prior commitments for the restoration of constitutional government, for the holding of free elections, and for the application of human and civil rights and liberties, within a reasonable time, and a sincere dedication to accelerated economic development and social progress within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty; and should encourage and support other common efforts to strengthen constitutional, democratic, and progressive government in the Americas.

5. The United States should continue its active support of the Alliance for Progress with emphasis on self-help and mutual cooperation; economic integration of the Americas through common markets, free trade areas, or other appropriate means; the encouragement of other developed nations to maintain an appropriate level of development aid in the Americas; and the encouragement of the growth of the private enterprise system and of conditions to enhance its capability for accelerating economic development and social progress in the Americas.

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89TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 542

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 23, 1965

Mr. SELDEN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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RESOLUTION

Whereas the subversive forces known as international communism, operating secretly and openly, directly and indirectly, threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all the Western Hemisphere nations; and

Whereas the American Continents, by the free and independent positions which they have assumed and maintained, are not subject to colonization or domination by any power; and

Whereas the intervention of international communism, directly or indirectly, however disguised, in any American state, conflicts with the established policy of the American Republics for the protection of the sovereignty of the peoples of such states and the political independence of their governments; and

Whereas such a situation extended to any portions of the West-

ern Hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the whole of it, including the United States; and

Whereas the ninth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance recognized that acts possessing characteristics of aggression and intervention carried out against one or more of the member states of the Organization of American States may be responded to in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) In any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.

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House Calendar No. 160

89TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 560

[Report No. 983]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 1, 1965

Mr. SELDEN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

SEPTEMBER 13, 1965

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

Whereas the subversive forces known as international communism, operating secretly and openly, directly and indirectly, threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all the Western Hemisphere nations; and

Whereas the American Continents, by the free and independent positions which they have assumed and maintained, are not subject to colonization or domination by any power; and

Whereas the intervention of international communism, directly or indirectly, however disguised, in any American state, conflicts with the established policy of the American Republics for the protection of the sovereignty of the peoples of such states and the political independence of their governments; and

Whereas such a situation extended to any portions of the West-

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ern Hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the whole of it, including the United States; and

Whereas the ninth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance recognized that acts possessing characteristics of aggression and intervention carried out against one or more of the member states of the Organization of American States may be responded to in either individual or collective form, which could go as far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) In any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.

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89TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
1st Session } { No. 983

SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RELATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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SEPTEMBER 13, 1965.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. SELDEN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. Res. 560]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 560) to express the sense of the House of Representatives declaring the policy of the United States relative to the intervention of the international communistic movement in the Western Hemisphere, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the resolution do pass.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee on Foreign Affairs considered House Resolution 560 and other similar resolutions dealing with the menace of the international Communist movement in the Western Hemisphere. On August 31 and September 1, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs heard testimony from the Honorable Charles E. Bennett, of Florida; the Honorable Daniel J. Flood, of Pennsylvania; and the Honorable Richard Ichord, of Missouri, in support of their respective resolutions on this matter. Officials of the Department of State testified in executive session and have no objection to the resolution in its present form. The subcommittee considered all pending resolutions in executive session on September 1 and reported House Resolution 560 to the full committee without dissenting vote. The Committee on Foreign Affairs considered the resolution on September 9 and ordered it reported favorably without amendment.

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2 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

BACKGROUND SITUATION

The inter-American system of collective security was designed essentially to confront traditional forms of direct aggression.

In the two decades since the end of World War II, it has become increasingly clear that the threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere lies in Communist subversion rather than in armed invasions across frontiers. The Guatemalan situation in 1954, the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba closely tied to Soviet bloc policy, Communist infiltration in key posts in Brazil prior to the 1964 revolution, and continuing Communist-instigated urban terrorism and guerrilla activities in various countries in Central and South America, all attest to the relentless efforts to subvert governments in Latin America. The attempt by Communist agents to seize power in the recent chaotic situation in the Dominican Republic provides yet another vivid illustration of modern Communist aggressive tactics.

Subversion, unlike direct aggression, for the most part takes place within national boundaries using human and material sources within the country. Although training, supplies, and directives originate abroad, the action itself assumes characteristics of something indigenous and is frequently further disguised by prevailing political, economic, and social unrest. In short, the subversive activities are carefully cloaked with the appearance of being a domestic problem. As a result, a number of American governments have been reluctant to regard subversion as susceptible of international action, holding that such action would collide with the inter-American principle of nonintervention.

The Communists have recognized this unresolved dilemma within the inter-American collective security system and have tailored their aggressions accordingly.

The Alliance for Progress is designed to remove the underlying causes of social discontent in Latin America, which provide fertile ground for Communist machinations. However, success of the long-range objectives of the Alliance is endangered by continuing Communist efforts to increase the political tensions of the region.

As awareness of Communist intent mounted, the American Republics have taken some steps to adapt the basic procedures of the inter-American security system to meet the new challenges. Perhaps the measure most relevant to coping with Communist aggression by subversion was a resolution adopted by the foreign ministers of the American Republics at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation in July 1964. That meeting of consultation was called to consider Venezuela's charges that Cuba had mastermined and supplied a plot to overthrow Venezuela's democratic institutions. Although the final resolution was aimed specifically at the Government of Cuba, the fifth proviso relates acts of subversion to the kind of aggression for which the Rio treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) provides collective action. The resolution provides:

> To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of *the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to*

armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere. [Italic added.]

WHAT THE RESOLUTION DOES

In essence, House Resolution 560 does two things. Recognizing that the subversive forces of international communism threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all nations in the Western Hemisphere, it supports (1) the President of the United States in any action he deems necessary to prevent in a timely manner Communist subversion in the hemisphere; and (2) action by any one or more of the members of the Organization of American States in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense to forestall or combat Communist subversive aggression in the Western Hemisphere.

As can be noted, the fifth whereas clause clause of House Resolution 560 is fully consonant with the resolution of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of the American Foreign Ministers quoted above.

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APPENDIX C

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLICATIONS FOR 1965: HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1965

Feb. 5 and 8, 1965	Inter-American Development Act Amendment.
Feb. 10, 1965	Automotive Products Agreement Between the United States and Canada.
Feb. 16, 1965	Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments.
Feb. 22 and 23, 1965	To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Feb. 24, 25 and 26, 1965	East-West Trade. Part II.
Mar. 2, 1965	State Department and Diplomatic Nominations.
Mar. 9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29 and Apr. 7, 1965.	Foreign Assistance, 1965.
Apr. 26, 1965	To Amend the Peace Corps Act.
Apr. 27 and May 18, 1965	United States Information Agency Nominations.
Apr. 28 and 29, 1965	United Nations Charter Amendments.
May 6, 1965	Increased Quota in International Monetary Fund.
May 26 and 27, 1965	Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention.
May 11 and 12, 1965	Planning for Peace.
June 29, 1965	World Population and Food Crisis.
July 6, 1965	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
July 30, 1965	Consular Convention with the Soviet Union.
Aug. 4 and 5, 1965	International Claims.
Aug. 11, 12, 16, 18 and 25, 1965.	Tax Convention with the Soviet Union.
Sept. 17 and 27, 1965	Shipping Restrictions on Grain Sales to Eastern Europe.
Oct. 13, 1965	Tax Protocols with Belgium and Germany.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

Jan. 14, 1965	Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam.
February 1965	Background Documents on East-West Trade.
February 1965	Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes.
Feb. 24, 1965	Consultative Subcommittees.
Apr. 5, 1965	10th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.
April 1965	A Background Study on East-West Trade (Legislative Reference Service).
May 4, 1965	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, 1964.
May 10, 1965	Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group: 5th Meeting.
June 16, 1965	Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. (Revised Edition).
June 30, 1965	Interparliamentary Union: Dublin Conference, Apr. 19–25, 1965.
July 1965	Yugoslavia 1964: Report by Senator Fulbright.
July 1965	Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic.
September 1965	Consultative Subcommittees.

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1965—Continued

October 1965	Background Memorandum: Review of Certain Fundamental Policies Underlying U.S. Foreign Aid Program.
Dec. 15, 1965	11th NATO Parliamentarian's Conference.

SENATE DOCUMENTS

S. Doc. 59, Sept. 25, 1965	Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group: Report on the 8th Meeting.

SENATE REPORTS

S. Rept. 4 (S. Res. 28), Jan. 15, 1965.	Study of Foreign Policy.
S. Rept. 67 (S. 805), Feb. 11, 1965.	Increased U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank.
S. Rept. 73 (H.R. 2998), Mar. 5, 1965.	To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
S. Rept. 125 (S. Res. 89), Mar. 18, 1965.	Attendance at meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
S. Rept. 143 (S. 693), Apr. 1, 1965.	Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments.
S. Rept. 170 (S. 1837), Apr. 28, 1965.	Foreign Assistance Act of 1965.
S. Rept. 175 (H.R. 7064), May 5, 1965.	Saigon Chancery.
S. Rept. 190 (S. Con. Res. 17), May 14, 1965.	Persecution of Persons by Soviet Russia.
S. Rept. 196 (H.R. 6497) May 19, 1965.	Increasing the U.S. Quota in the International Monetary Fund.
S. Rept. 267 (S. 2054), May 27, 1965.	Amend Further the Peace Corps Act.
S. Rept. 328 (S. Con. Res. 36), June 14, 1965.	International Cooperation Year.
S. Rept. 360 (S. 1903), June 23, 1965.	United National Participation Act Amendments.
S. Rept. 361 (S.J. Res. 71), June 23, 1965.	U.S. Contribution to the South Pacific Commission.
S. Rept. 362 (S. 1760), June 23, 1965.	Greek Loan of 1929 Settlement Act.
S. Rept. 372 (S. 1742), June 28, 1965.	IBRD and IFC Articles of Agreement.
S. Rept. 469 (H.R. 8862), July 20, 1965.	Contributions to the International Council of Scientific Unions and Associated Unions.
S. Rept. 564 (S.J. Res. 32), Aug. 10, 1965.	Authorizing a Contribution to Certain Inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands.
S. Rept. 622 (H.R. 10132), Aug. 17, 1965.	Authorizing the Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, to Accept Foreign Decoration.
S. Rept. 631 (H.R. 4170), Aug. 19, 1965.	Adjustments in Foreign Service Annuities.
S. Rept. 643 (H.R. 8715), Aug. 24, 1965.	Contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
S. Rept. 646 (H. Con. Res. 285), Aug. 25, 1965.	USIA Film—"John F. Kennedy—Years of Lightening, Days of Drums."
S. Rept. 647 (S.J. Res. 106), Aug. 25, 1965.	Do.
S. Rept. 654 (H.R. 10342), Aug. 30, 1965.	Authorizing Hon. Frances P. Bolton, of Ohio, to Accept a Foreign Decoration.
S. Rept. 682 (S. 1935), Sept. 2, 1965.	Amendments to International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.
S. Rept. 684 (S. 2064). Sept. 2, 1965.	Amending the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.
S. Rept. 700 (S. Res. 145), Sept. 9, 1965.	Invitations from Foreign Parliamentary Bodies.
S. Rept. 701 (S. 1826), Sept. 9, 1965.	Cuban Claims.

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1965—Continued

S. Rept. 767 (S. 2167), Sept. 22, 1965.	U.S. Participation in the HemisFair 1968 Exposition.
S. Rept. 859 (H.R. 10779), Oct. 11, 1965.	International Bridge Act of 1965.
S. Rept. 937 (H.R. 30), Oct. 22, 1965.	Interama.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS

Ex. Rept. 1 (Ex. A, 89–1), May 5, 1965.	United Nations Charter Amendments.
Ex. Rept. 2 (Ex. B, 89–1), June 7, 1965.	Extensions of International Wheat Agreement, 1962.
Ex. Rept. 3 (Ex. H, 86–1), June 29, 1965.	Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention.
Ex. Rept. 4 (Ex. D, 88–2), Aug. 3, 1965.	Consular Convention with the Soviet Union.
Part 2, Aug. 10, 1965	Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. Minority Views.
Ex. Rept. 5 (Ex. C, 89–1), Aug. 16, 1965.	Gut Dam Claims Agreement.
Ex. Rept. 6 (Ex. H, 88–1), Sept. 8, 1965.	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol.
Ex. Rept. 7 (Ex. G and I 89–1), Sept. 8, 1965.	Tax Protocols with Belgium and Germany.

APPENDIX D

VOLUMES PUBLISHED TO DATE IN THE HISTORICAL SERIES

Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Assistance Program: 1949.
Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50.
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–50.

Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
- Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1947–48.
- Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1949–50.
- Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951.
- Volume IV, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, 1952.
- Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1953.
- Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 1954.
- Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1955.
- Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956.
- Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session, 1957.
- Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 1958.
- Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 1959.
- Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960.
- Volume XIII, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session, 1961.
- Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 1962.
- Volume XV, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, 1963.
- Volume XVI, Eighty-eighth Congress, Second Session, 1964.
- Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965.